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Tunis Suicide Attack Resurrects Terrorism Shadow, Memory of Ben

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UK £2 Issue 247, Year 5 March 8, 2020 EU €2.50 www.thearabweekly.com Iraq’s political Post-election Coronavirus uncertainties deadlock fears in the persist amid unrest in Israel Middle East Pages 3, 7, 9 Pages 2, 6, 14 Pages 4, 16, 17 Tunis suicide attack resurrects terrorism shadow, memory of Ben Guerdane’s battle Attack shows that jihadists are still irked by the memory of security forces winning the battle of Ben Guerdane, four years ago. Stephen Quillen in the Tunis suburb but disrupted and Lamine Ghanmi activity there only briefly. Soon af- terwards, the high-end restaurants and coffee shops in the area were Tunis back to usual business. “I heard a huge thud that I first n the anniversary of a wa- thought was a tremor,” a private tershed battle in the south security guard, posted across the of the country, suicide street from the embassy, said. O bombers struck a police Sofiene Sliti, the spokesman for checkpoint near the US Embassy in Tunisia’s counterterrorism crimes Tunis, jolting the country into real- court, said the two attackers were ising that the fight against terrorism carrying a large amount of explo- is far from over. sives and that their motorbike was The March 6 bombing killed a po- booby-trapped. liceman and injured five other peo- Local media said the attackers ple. The two attackers also died. were Tunisian nationals who had The terrorist incident occurred recently been released from prison. on the eve of Tunisia marking the Their identities were not released fourth anniversary of the battle of but media reports said they were Ben Guerdane in southern Tunisia, from a working-class neighbour- where security forces with the help hood north of Tunis and that one of the local population repelled an of them had been imprisoned over Ben Guerdane’s anniversary. Police secure the scene of bomb attack near the US Embassy in Tunis, attempt by Islamic State-affiliated charges of “glorifying terrorism” on March 6. (AFP) extremists to establish a foothold social media. on the border between Tunisia and The bombing was among a string against terrorists; that’s why they Tunisian citizens who fought with Fakhfakh released a statement call- Libya. of lone-wolf attacks in recent years are opting for such desperate acts extremist groups in Iraq and Syria, ing on the country to “close ranks A total of 55 extremists were but the trend is a far cry from jihad- reflecting their confusion,” Mechi- many of whom are under surveil- and reject any form of violence that killed in Ben Guerdane and 42 ar- ist activities in 2015, when Islamic chi said. lance, house arrest or in prison. could threaten Tunisia’s security rested, while 13 security troops and State-claimed assaults on the Bardo Others saw additional lessons Instability in next-door Libya, and democracy.” seven civilians died. The battle is National Museum and the Sousse from the suicide attack. Amel where heavily armed militias and He praised security units that commemorated each year by Tu- beach resort caused scores of fatali- Grami, an expert on extremism, jihadist formations, including Tuni- “have shown great courage and nisians as a triumph against terror- ties. said the attacks could be a form of sian militants, roam the landscape promptness in the fight against ter- ism. Terror-related concerns in Tunis “retaliation” for the killing of Abu amid continued civil strife, is an- rorism.” “We will be celebrating the anni- in recent years have been limited to Iyadh, the head of Ansar al-Sharia other source of concern for Tuni- As it battles a lingering terror- versary of the Ben Guerdane battle relatively small-scale attacks with of Tunisia, which has claimed alle- sian authorities. ist threat, Tunisia remains under a as a victory against terrorism,” min- limited casualties and clashes in giance to the Islamic State, as well “The attack indicates that the state of emergency. ister of the interior Hichem Mechi- the mountainous regions near Al- as a “message to the West and US security challenge remains a major chi told Tunisian television. geria between security troops and telling us they are still alive.” challenge in Tunisia,” security ana- Stephen Quillen and The March 6 blast shocked the jihadist fighters. Adding to Tunisia’s terror con- lyst Ali Zeramdini told Reuters. Lamine Ghanmi are Arab Weekly diplomatic and business enclave “We have retaken the initiative cerns is the return of hundreds of Incoming Prime Minister Elyes correspondents in Tunis. Idlib agreement draws battle lines for next Turkish-Russian escalation Thomas Seibert soldiers into Idlib since early Febru- The day after the Moscow agree- quoted Russian Foreign Ministry The clash between Moscow’s pri- ary. ment, the Syrian Observatory for spokeswoman Maria Zakharova as orities and those of Turkey, which Turkey is likely to try to turn the Human Rights, a war monitor, said saying that “as far as efforts to elimi- has supported rebel groups fighting Istanbul northern part of the province into nine rebel fighters and six Syrian nate militants and terrorists go, if Assad, has not gone away with the a “safe zone” for hundreds of thou- government soldiers had been killed they are designated as such, they latest Moscow agreement. As those he ceasefire agreement for sands of refugees who have fled in fresh clashes. must be eradicated, first and fore- differences persist, they could be- Idlib, struck March 5 in Mos- fighting in other parts of Idlib, the Referring to the many jihadist for- most, by the Syrian Armed Forces come the backdrop for the next es- cow, seems to draw the bat- last rebel bastion in Syria after nine mations that make up a major part of and the forces of countries that le- calation in Idlib. T tle lines for the next escala- years of war. the Turkey-backed Syrian armed op- gally cooperate with the Syrian au- tion between Turkey and Russia in Syria has seen many ceasefire position, Russia and Syria say “ter- thorities.” Charles Lister Syria. agreements that broke down shortly rorists” in Idlib must be stopped. Charles Lister, director of the “I think the agreement is not after they were signed, however. The Russian news agency Tass Countering Terrorism and Extrem- strong enough and will not hold for ism Programme at the Middle East a long time,” Mohannad Othman of Institute in Washington, said the “In other words, this [Syria] the Al-Sham Humanitarian Founda- remark by Zakharova indicated that ceasefire is likely to be as tion, an NGO active in Syria, said via the new truce might be short-lived. meaningless as all those that e-mail a day after the Russian-Turk- “In other words, this [Syria] cease- came before it.” ish deal was struck. fire is likely to be as meaningless as “I think what was produced yes- all those that came before it,” Lister Iran, Assad’s second international terday is a status quo, where both wrote on Twitter. partner, is another factor that could sides accept a temporary situation Some refugees in Idlib also said rock the new ceasefire, said Michael as it is, and fighting will resume very they were not very hopeful and ex- Tanchum, a senior fellow at the Aus- soon,” he said. press scepticism about the commit- trian Institute for European and Se- The agreement between Russian ment of Damascus and its Russian curity Policy. President Vladimir Putin and Turk- backers to the ceasefire. “Iran-backed Shia militias and es- ish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan The main goal of Russia, Assad’s pecially Hezbollah fought very hard in effect cuts Idlib in half. The sec- main backer, is to secure a victory against Turkish allied forces in key tor of the embattled Syrian province by the Syrian Army in Idlib, which strategic locations,” Tanchum said south of the M4 highway, which would seal Assad’s triumph over his in a message in response to ques- crosses Idlib from east to west, is adversaries nine years after the Syr- tions. “Iran will need to be brought to be controlled by forces loyal to ian war began. Success in helping into the process or Hezbollah could Syrian President Bashar Assad. The Assad to regain control of the whole reignite tensions with attacks on area north of the M4 will be under country would be a major strate- Turkey-backed forces.” the control of various rebel groups, gic win for Russia, cementing the of which the jihadist Hayat Tahrir Opposite directions. Russian President Vladimir Putin (L) and his country’s new role as a Middle East Thomas Seibert is an Arab Weekly al-Sham is the strongest, and of Tur- Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan after their talks at the power broker as the influence of the correspondent. key, which has sent thousands of Kremlin in Moscow, March 5. (AP) United States in the region wanes. 2, 7-8, 15 2 March 8, 2020 Top news Putin frustrates Turkey’s military plans in Idlib Thomas Seibert Istanbul he new Russian-Turkish agreement for a ceasefire in the embattled Syrian prov- T ince of Idlib demonstrates that Moscow, as the supreme pow- er in Syria, is ready to override An- kara’s interests to reach its aim of ending the war with a victory for its partner, Syrian President Bashar Assad, analysts said. The agreement, announced March 5 after a 6-hour meeting in Moscow between Russian Presi- dent Vladimir Putin and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan essentially froze the conflict lines in Idlib. The deal did not force Assad’s forces to roll back mili- tary gains made in the past three months, which had been a key Turkish demand.
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