12. Bougainville: Origins of the Conflict, and Debating the Future of Large-Scale Mining ANTHONY J. REGAN Introduction The 50-year relationship between large-scale mining (LSM) and local- level politics in Bougainville has been complex and fraught. Bougainville is the only place in the world where host community violence has resulted in the long-term closure of a large-scale mine. Bougainville Copper Ltd (BCL), a subsidiary of Conzinc RioTinto Australia (CRA), operated the huge Panguna copper and gold mine from 1972 to 1989 under a 1967 agreement with the Australian colonial administration of the then Territory of Papua and New Guinea (TPNG). The first large-scale mine in what is now Papua New Guinea (PNG), it closed in 1989, early in a violent conflict that lasted from 1988 to 1997 (Regan 1998, 2011; Braithwaite et al. 2010), and it was still closed in 2016. Widespread perceptions exist, especially outside Bougainville, that mine closure resulted mainly from generalised Bougainvillean rejection of mining. While several main strands of causal factors have been proposed— including ethnonationalism, culture and class (Regan 1998) and local cosmology (Kenema 2010)—most published accounts see the conflict 353 Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics originating in violent action by young mine-impacted landowners seeking permanent mine closure (e.g. Dorney 1990; Filer 1990; Connell 1991, 1992; Boege 1999; Denoon 2000; Gillespie 2009; Lasslett 2014). Some observers (e.g. Jubilee 2014; Lasslett 2014) assert that the mine lease landowners continue to be generally opposed to any resumption of mining operations at Panguna, or that Bougainvilleans in general are opposed to large-scale mining. However, since being established in 2005 under provisions of the PNG Constitution implementing the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA) of August 2001, the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) has considered reopening the Panguna mine as the most realistic path to achieving the fiscal self-reliance needed for either the autonomy or possible independence contemplated by the BPA, and claims widespread (though not unanimous) community support for this approach. This chapter examines whether the conflict was in fact a consequence of mine-impacted landowner commitment to permanent mine closure, and whether broad-based opposition to mining—by either mine-impacted landowners or Bougainvilleans more generally—was central to local politics in 2016. The chapter is in three main parts. The first outlines aspects of the context in which the conflict originated that are critical to better understanding of both its origins and some new evidence (advanced here) about several distinct Bougainvillean stakeholder groups other than young mine lease landowners, all deeply involved in the conflict origins. They occupy the ‘community corner’ in a rectangular model of relationships involving four main sets (or ‘corners’) of stakeholders, the other three being the state, mining companies, and the ‘fourth estate’ (Ballard and Banks 2003; also Chapter 1, this volume). The second part focuses on this new evidence, outlining the origins, concerns, roles and goals of these other ‘community’ stakeholders, and their relationships to one another, as well as to the state and the company. The third part discusses continuities and changes in these relationships since the conflict began, and the extent to which generalised opposition to LSM now exists. 354 12. Bougainville Context of Conflict Origins Bougainville and PNG Bougainville’s population in 2016 is approximately 300,000 (less than 4 per cent of PNG’s total population). Its 9,438 square kilometres is roughly 2 per cent of PNG’s total land area. Pre-colonial Bougainvilleans were organised mainly around tiny stateless societies involving great diversity in language,1 culture (Ogan 2005), and identities (Regan 2005a). Despite major social and economic changes since colonial ‘rule’ began in the late nineteenth century, the most significant social groups today continue to be nuclear and extended families, the localised clan-based landowning lineages to which those families belong (typically containing 50–150 members), and flexible groupings of such lineages. While under nominal German colonial control from 1884 to 1915, the first administrative centre was only established in 1905, and Australia took control from 1914 to 1975. Under colonialism, interactions with people from elsewhere in PNG contributed to a pan-Bougainvillean identity, with the dark skin colour of most Bougainvilleans as the primary marker (Nash and Ogan 1990). Identity politicisation occurred after World War II, when: because of the natural affluence of their village life and the coverage of the [Bougainville] district by Christian missions (mainly Catholic and non-Australian), the administration neglected to play a conspicuous role in development almost until copper was discovered. Bougainville was known as the ‘Cinderella’ district not because it was poor but because it was ostensibly neglected (Griffin et al. 1979: 150). Identity politicisation was intensified by resentment of colonial racism (Ogan 1965, 1971a, 1972) and by development of the mine, which was seen as something imposed to benefit the rest of PNG with little regard to detrimental impacts on Bougainville itself. A major manifestation of change since 1905 has been the expanding range of groups or organisations to which Bougainvilleans belong or relate (churches, women’s groups, local governments, economic enterprises, political parties, etc.). Nevertheless, the autonomy long enjoyed by local 1 There were 25 languages and a comparable number of sub-languages or dialects (Tryon 2005). 355 Large-Scale Mines and Local-Level Politics lineages and other pre-colonial social groupings remains the default position for Bougainvillean understandings of how to relate to these new social phenomena. This expectation of autonomy helps to explain the extent to which the diverse groups involved in the origins of the conflict expected autonomy from one another, as do groups involved in contemporary debates on the future of mining. For most rural Bougainvilleans, PNG remains remote (Tanis 2005: 468). This was even more so in 1963, when PNG-wide politics first developed around the election of TPNG’s first representative legislature, which included just one Bougainvillean representative. Concerns about national representation of Bougainville probably had little effect on voters in the 1963 and 1968 elections (Ogan 1965, 1971a; Anis et al. 1976). However, rapid changes associated with development of the mine led to much wider understanding of such matters in the 1972 elections, contributing to the election of a young Catholic priest from Buin, John Momis, a critic of the mine and the administration, who continues to be a key political figure in Bougainville. Growing agitation for a special political and financial status saw an interim Bougainville Provincial Government established in 1974 (Ghai and Regan 1992: 55–9), and disputes over its mine revenue share precipitated Bougainville’s attempted secession from PNG on 1 September 1975, just before PNG’s Independence Day. The crisis was resolved in mid- 1976, when the PNG Government agreed to constitutional provision for provincial government and guaranteed that the new North Solomons Provincial Government (NSPG)2 would receive all of the royalties from the mine aside from the 5 per cent already payable to some of the Panguna mine lease landowners (Bedford and Mamak 1977). Many Bougainvilleans concluded that only intense confrontation with PNG brought results, and that the little understood process of secession (Ogan 1990: 36) and status of independence would remedy many problems. Following the 1976 agreement to end attempted secession, Bougainvilleans had high expectations of the NSPG. In 1977, John Momis became the PNG minister responsible for the new provincial government system established under the agreement. Strong support for autonomy of the NSPG was now expected from the centre, and these expectations were reinforced by establishment of the Momis-led Melanesian Alliance (MA) 2 See Regan (2005b) on reasons for use of the different names, ‘North Solomons’ and ‘Bougainville’. 356 12. Bougainville party in 1980. The MA soon dominated both NSPG politics (especially from 1984) and Bougainville’s four seats in the PNG Parliament. But neither Momis nor his party had a significant impact on PNG policy towards Bougainville. By the mid-1980s, the NSPG’s lack of expected powers over areas of growing concern, such as mining, land and internal migration, was a source of widespread disappointment (Ghai and Regan 2000, 2006). For many, the failure to pursue secession appeared to have been a mistake. Mine Revenue Distribution and Landowner Compensation The social, economic and environmental impacts of mine exploration and feasibility work (1963–69), construction (1969–72) and operation (1972–89) were especially shocking for mine lease landowners but also shocked most other Bougainvilleans on many levels. The 10,000-strong construction workforce—mostly recruited from elsewhere in PNG— was more than 10 per cent of Bougainville’s total population at the time. From 1972, the permanent workforce was around 3,500, about 80 per cent of them Papua New Guineans, less than a third of whom were Bougainvilleans (Quodling 1991: 37). The limited mine employment opportunities were resented, but the far more limited mine revenue share received, not only by mine lease landowners but also