Challenges of Autonomy in Papua New Guinea's Autonomous Regioq of Bougainville
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Challenges of autonomy in Papua New Guinea's Autonomous RegioQ of Bougainville Edward P Wo!fers WITH THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND LEGISLATURE and the swearing-in of the Ministers of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) in June 2005, peace-building in Bougainville entered a new phase. Bougainville has been officially renamed the 'Autonomous Region of Bougainville'. The ABG has replaced the ad hoc arrangements through which Bougainville factions whose leaders had signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001 had previously consulted and cooperated with each other and with the National Government of Papua New Guinea in making and building peace. Together, the ABG and the National Government now face the multiple challenges involved in establishing, operating and developing the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy, and in making a difference to the lives of people in Bougainville through practical peace-building on the ground. However, even now (more than five years after the Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed, and over two years since the ABG took office), the Bougainville peace process is still incomplete. It does not include all of the people and area of Bougainville: the hard-core of the late Francis Ona's closest supporters around Panguna remains outside (with travel and communications made difficult by the road-block at Morgan Junction, outside Arawa); and The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volume 30, 2007, 1- 22 © 2007 by JPacS Editorial board (USP) 2 The Journal ofPadftc Studies, Volume 302007 communities around Tonu in Siwai, South Bougainville, have been cut off since late 2005 as a result of the presence and activities of Noah Musingku and others, including armed men, associated with the illegal U-Vistract pyramid 'fast-money' scheme. While the ABG has been set up with formal responsibility for substantial functions, powers and control over resources and government services, Bougainville autonomy remains a work-in-progress. Other important functions, powers, sources of income and government services are listed in the national Constitutional Laws giving legal effect to the Bougainville Peace Agreement as available for transfer at the ABG's initiative, subject to the availability or, at least, the development, of the capacity and resources required for the ABG to assume responsibility. A number of institutions for which the Bougainville Constitution provides are still to be set up. Meanwhile, the reality on the ground is that despite progress made since open armed conflict ended with the signing of the Burnham Truce in November 1997, roads, bridges, wharves, airfields, government offices and other infrastructure around Bougainville are in need of repair, reconstruction or replacement as a result of destruction, damage or neglect during the Bougainville conflict (1989-1997). Services have to be restored or provided for related reasons, including the provision of educational, training or other opportunities for the 'lost generation' of young people who missed out on schooling during the conflict, as well as the growing demand of an increasing population. Pressure is growing for the provision of opportunities, through investment and other means, for Bougainvilleans to engage in productive employment that will enable them to improve their lives. There can be no certainty that the agr~ed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy will meet all of the needs or aspirations of all Bougainvilleans, either politically or in other ways. But the ABG is now the democratically elected instrument through which Bougainvilleans can express their demands, and hope to see their priorities result in practical action in areas of activity for which the ABG is responsible. Meanwhile, the Members for the Provincial and three Open electorates in Bougainville continue to sit as full Members of the 109- member National Parliament (MPs) and, depending on the political alignments there, participate in the Government-of the-day.! However, unlike other Provincial Members, the Member for Bougainville is not a Governor; nor, as Bougainville is now outside the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local- Challenges of autonomy in PNG's Auntonomotls Region ofBotl gainville 3 Level Governments, do the Bougainville MPs participate in the consultative and planning mechanisms or have access to the same government funds as MPs in other parts of the country. (fhe arrangement that Bougainville continues to be represented in the National Parliament on the same basis as the rest of Papua New Guinea-with a Provincial Member, and Open Electorates distributed according to population-was agreed during the negotiations leading up to the Bougainville Peace Agreement, the agreement was reached despite the view held by many Bougainville leaders, including some of the MPs themselves, that implementation of autonomy should be accompanied by a reduction in Bougainville's representation in the National Parliament.) Under the Bougainville Constitution s. 55(3), the four Bougainville MPs are entided to sit, vote and speak in the Bougainville legislature, but they cannot move motions, vote or be counted towards quorums. The arrangements for autonomy contained in-the Bougainville Peace Agreement are the product of negotiation-part of a multi-dimensional and multi-layered set of compromises between Bougainvillean leaders and factions, among politicians and officials involved in formulating the National Government's positions, and 'across the table', so to say, between the Bougainville and National Government delegations (Regan 2002; Wolfers 2006a: 4)-for the agreed purpose defined in the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville, Paragraph 1 of securing 'lasting peace by peaceful means'. They form part of a package contained in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which also includes a guaranteed referendum among Bougainvilleans on Bougainville's political future, an agreed weapons disposal plan, amnesty and pardon for crisis related activities, and a commitment by former combatant groups to disband and work through lawful, democratic and unified political and administrative structures established in accordance with the Agreement. In economic circumstances such as those that continue to prevail in Bougainville as a result of the previous conflict, the autonomy arrangements can, obviously, not generate the capacity or resources required for restoration or development on their own (the potential tax-base, apart from persons in public employment, remains very small, while people around Bougainvillc will find it even more difficult to take advantage of economic opportuni[i ·s as they arise if prices increase as a result of any decision by the AB I to liN!' its powers to impose further indirect taxes). The extent to whi h :l lItllllllllll' will, in practice, make a real difference to BougainviUeans' li vl's will Ii, 1" 1111 II I ' 4 The Journal ofPaafic Studies, Volume 30 2007 continuing cooperation, including the mobilisation and sharing of flnancial and other resources, by the National Government and the ABG. The understanding and support of foreign aid donors will also be needed. So will participation by foreign investors. The manner in which and the degree to which the ABG and the National Government continue to meet the commitments they have made to consult and cooperate, and to honour agreed arrangements to prevent and resolve disputes, will, no doubt, influence the willingness and ability with which foreign aid donors and investors alike will participate in restoration and development in Bougainville. For many participants in the negotiation, implementation, operation and development of Bougainville autonomy, the real tests of success will involve meeting the challenges involved in establishing the agreed conditions for holding the referendum on Bougainville's political future guaranteed in the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing national Constitutional Laws within the agreed time-frame of 10-15 years after the establishment of the ABG (that is, between 2015 and 2020)-with a separate independence for Bougainville an available option-and then in achieving their preferred result. The conditions to be achieved before the referendum is held include weapons disposal and good governance, which is deflned by reference to 'internationally accepted standards ... as they are applicable and implemented in . .. Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea' (Bougainville Peace Agreement, Paragraph 313(a)). Relevant benchmarks include 'democracy and opportunities for participation by Bougainvilleans, transparency, and accountability, as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law, including the Constitution rifPapua New Guinea'. For the National Government and Bougainvilleans who favour Bougainville remaining part of Papua New Guinea, the lvad-up to the referendum provides an opportunity for demonstrating the effectiveness and long-term acceptability of the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy. For advocates and supporters of an independent Bougainville, autonomy might be regarded as preparation for, and, perhaps, as evidence of capacity for and of the advantages of Bougainville independence (with both the ABG's achievements, as well as problems and frustrations that can be sheeted home to the National Government, possibly cited in support). However, the real test for the National Government, the ABG, and leaders and people on all sides will be not the referendum itself, but the maintenance Challenges ofatltonomy