Challenges of autonomy in 's Autonomous RegioQ of Bougainville

Edward P Wo!fers

WITH THE ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT AND LEGISLATURE and the swearing-in of the Ministers of the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) in June 2005, peace-building in Bougainville entered a new phase. Bougainville has been officially renamed the 'Autonomous Region of Bougainville'. The ABG has replaced the ad hoc arrangements through which Bougainville factions whose leaders had signed the Bougainville Peace Agreement in 2001 had previously consulted and cooperated with each other and with the National Government of Papua New Guinea in making and building peace. Together, the ABG and the National Government now face the multiple challenges involved in establishing, operating and developing the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy, and in making a difference to the lives of people in Bougainville through practical peace-building on the ground. However, even now (more than five years after the Bougainville Peace Agreement was signed, and over two years since the ABG took office), the Bougainville peace process is still incomplete. It does not include all of the people and area of Bougainville: the hard-core of the late 's closest supporters around Panguna remains outside (with travel and communications made difficult by the road-block at Morgan Junction, outside Arawa); and

The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volume 30, 2007, 1- 22 © 2007 by JPacS Editorial board (USP) 2 The Journal ofPadftc Studies, Volume 302007 communities around Tonu in Siwai, South Bougainville, have been cut off since late 2005 as a result of the presence and activities of and others, including armed men, associated with the illegal U-Vistract pyramid 'fast-money' scheme. While the ABG has been set up with formal responsibility for substantial functions, powers and control over resources and government services, Bougainville autonomy remains a work-in-progress. Other important functions, powers, sources of income and government services are listed in the national Constitutional Laws giving legal effect to the Bougainville Peace Agreement as available for transfer at the ABG's initiative, subject to the availability or, at least, the development, of the capacity and resources required for the ABG to assume responsibility. A number of institutions for which the Bougainville Constitution provides are still to be set up. Meanwhile, the reality on the ground is that despite progress made since open armed conflict ended with the signing of the Burnham Truce in November 1997, roads, bridges, wharves, airfields, government offices and other infrastructure around Bougainville are in need of repair, reconstruction or replacement as a result of destruction, damage or neglect during the (1989-1997). Services have to be restored or provided for related reasons, including the provision of educational, training or other opportunities for the 'lost generation' of young people who missed out on schooling during the conflict, as well as the growing demand of an increasing population. Pressure is growing for the provision of opportunities, through investment and other means, for Bougainvilleans to engage in productive employment that will enable them to improve their lives. There can be no certainty that the agr~ed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy will meet all of the needs or aspirations of all Bougainvilleans, either politically or in other ways. But the ABG is now the democratically elected instrument through which Bougainvilleans can express their demands, and hope to see their priorities result in practical action in areas of activity for which the ABG is responsible. Meanwhile, the Members for the Provincial and three Open electorates in Bougainville continue to sit as full Members of the 109- member National Parliament (MPs) and, depending on the political alignments there, participate in the Government-of the-day.! However, unlike other Provincial Members, the Member for Bougainville is not a Governor; nor, as Bougainville is now outside the Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local- Challenges of autonomy in PNG's Auntonomotls Region ofBotl gainville 3

Level Governments, do the Bougainville MPs participate in the consultative and planning mechanisms or have access to the same government funds as MPs in other parts of the country. (fhe arrangement that Bougainville continues to be represented in the National Parliament on the same basis as the rest of Papua New Guinea-with a Provincial Member, and Open Electorates distributed according to population-was agreed during the negotiations leading up to the Bougainville Peace Agreement, the agreement was reached despite the view held by many Bougainville leaders, including some of the MPs themselves, that implementation of autonomy should be accompanied by a reduction in Bougainville's representation in the National Parliament.) Under the Bougainville Constitution s. 55(3), the four Bougainville MPs are entided to sit, vote and speak in the Bougainville legislature, but they cannot move motions, vote or be counted towards quorums. The arrangements for autonomy contained in-the Bougainville Peace Agreement are the product of negotiation-part of a multi-dimensional and multi-layered set of compromises between Bougainvillean leaders and factions, among politicians and officials involved in formulating the National Government's positions, and 'across the table', so to say, between the Bougainville and National Government delegations (Regan 2002; Wolfers 2006a: 4)-for the agreed purpose defined in the Lincoln Agreement on Peace, Security and Development on Bougainville, Paragraph 1 of securing 'lasting peace by peaceful means'. They form part of a package contained in the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which also includes a guaranteed referendum among Bougainvilleans on Bougainville's political future, an agreed weapons disposal plan, amnesty and pardon for crisis­ related activities, and a commitment by former combatant groups to disband and work through lawful, democratic and unified political and administrative structures established in accordance with the Agreement. In economic circumstances such as those that continue to prevail in Bougainville as a result of the previous conflict, the autonomy arrangements can, obviously, not generate the capacity or resources required for restoration or development on their own (the potential tax-base, apart from persons in public employment, remains very small, while people around Bougainvillc will find it even more difficult to take advantage of economic opportuni[i ·s as they arise if prices increase as a result of any decision by the AB I to liN!' its powers to impose further indirect taxes). The extent to whi h :l lItllllllllll' will, in practice, make a real difference to BougainviUeans' li vl's will Ii, 1" 1111 II I ' 4 The Journal ofPaafic Studies, Volume 30 2007

continuing cooperation, including the mobilisation and sharing of flnancial and other resources, by the National Government and the ABG. The understanding and support of foreign aid donors will also be needed. So will participation by foreign investors. The manner in which and the degree to which the ABG and the National Government continue to meet the commitments they have made to consult and cooperate, and to honour agreed arrangements to prevent and resolve disputes, will, no doubt, influence the willingness and ability with which foreign aid donors and investors alike will participate in restoration and development in Bougainville. For many participants in the negotiation, implementation, operation and development of Bougainville autonomy, the real tests of success will involve meeting the challenges involved in establishing the agreed conditions for holding the referendum on Bougainville's political future guaranteed in the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing national Constitutional Laws within the agreed time-frame of 10-15 years after the establishment of the ABG (that is, between 2015 and 2020)-with a separate independence for Bougainville an available option-and then in achieving their preferred result. The conditions to be achieved before the referendum is held include weapons disposal and good governance, which is deflned by reference to 'internationally accepted standards ... as they are applicable and implemented in . .. Bougainville and the rest of Papua New Guinea' (Bougainville Peace Agreement, Paragraph 313(a)). Relevant benchmarks include 'democracy and opportunities for participation by Bougainvilleans, transparency, and accountability, as well as respect for human rights and the rule of law, including the Constitution rifPapua New Guinea'. For the National Government and Bougainvilleans who favour Bougainville remaining part of Papua New Guinea, the lvad-up to the referendum provides an opportunity for demonstrating the effectiveness and long-term acceptability of the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy. For advocates and supporters of an independent Bougainville, autonomy might be regarded as preparation for, and, perhaps, as evidence of capacity for and of the advantages of Bougainville independence (with both the ABG's achievements, as well as problems and frustrations that can be sheeted home to the National Government, possibly cited in support). However, the real test for the National Government, the ABG, and leaders and people on all sides will be not the referendum itself, but the maintenance Challenges ofatltonomy in PN G's A tlntonomotls Region ofBotigainville 5 of public order and peace when the result of the referendum is announced (whatever it may be), and the National Parliament deliberates and then decides on the outcome (again, whatever the final decision)-and the commitment and ability on all sides to keep and keep building peace.

Origins and character of Bougainville autonomy The conflict that affected communities around Bougainville between 1989 and 1997 is best understood as a civil war, in which the withdrawal of state services in early 1990 and the subsequent blockading of Bougainville gave rise to a situation in which neighbouring communities, even villages, clans and families, were divided. The primary division was between those who allied themselves with the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA-which was formed in 1989, with the declared purpose of fighting for a separate independence for Bougainville) and the National Government (which was represented and acted through the security forces-the Papua New Guinea D efence Force, Police, and Correctional Institutional Services). The security forces fought with the support of the Bougainville Resistance Forces (BRF), which emerged out of groups opposed to the BRA and supportive of the National Government and the security forces in 1990. However, the decisions made by Bougainvillean individuals, groups and communities whether to join, oppose, or be neutral between the two sides-or to switch from one to the other-were often influenced by local considerations, such as the alignment, perceived threat or fear of a longstanding enemy, rival or ally. Despite the military connotations of their names-and the titles borne by their 'commanders' (respectively, from 'General' and 'Chairman' on down)­ both the BRA and the BRF were, essentially, loose alliances of leaders and groups with local support. This meant that the agreements that paved the way for the establishment of the ABG were products of multi-layered compromises between leaders and groups on what might be loosely described as 'the Bougainville side' of the negotiating table between them and the National Government in 1997-2001; and then between the Combined Bougainville Delegation and the National Government (on whose side a similar process of coalition-building and compromise occurred as a result of successive National Governments' commitment to a bipartisan-in a multi-party Parliament and Government, really a nonpartisan, 'national'-approach to making and building peace). 6 The Journal ofPacijic Studies, Volume 30 2007

The founding and guiding principles of Bougainville autonomy were negotiated over a period of almost four years (1997-2001). They were further refmed when the Constitutional Laws giving legal effect to the Bougainvilfe Peace Agreement, Constitutional Amendment No. 14 and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville . . . were being drafted, and then debated before being passed by the National Parliament (with a single amendment, which ensures that firearms control remains a National Government function and power). While many features of Bougainville autonomy have been influenced, both positively and negatively, by prior experience in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea and other countries, they do not follow any particular modeF Although they have given fresh life to demands for autonomy in other parts of Papua New Guinea, notably the East New Britain and Morobe Provinces (Wolfers 2006b: 12-13), they are also not intended to provide a model for anyone or anywhere else. Bougainville leaders were adamant that they were negotiating for Bougainville, and no one else. The National Government was loath to set precedents for other parts of the country in the context of the Bougainville negotiations. The specific focus of the agreed arrangements for Bougainville autonomy is made clear in the emphasis on peace and peace-building, not constitutional issues, in the names and stated purposes of the agreements and laws that give them legal effect. Thus, the Papua New Guinea Constitution, Part XIV, and the Organic Law made under that Part, which together give legal effect to the Bougainvilfe Peace Agreement, both carry the title: 'Peace-Building in Bougainville - Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum'. While the title does not specifically mention all of the main elements of the Agreement to which the laws give effect, it highlights the degree to which compromise and agreement were possible only because autonomy w~ s part of the package of mutual commitments to making and building peace outlined above, in which it was closely linked to the guarantee of a referendum on Bougainville's political future. The links between the various elements comprising the package were evident during negotiations- when former combatants made clear that amnesty was critical to making and building peace, including weapons disposal; progress on autonomy depended on prior agreement to a guaranteed referendum, with a separate independence for Bougainville as an available option, as a means of resolving differences over the 'political issue' among the Bougainville parties; Challenges oj autonomy in PNG's Auntonomous Region oJBougainviffe 7 and agreement on weapons disposal provided the assurance of security that was basic to implementation of autonomy, holding the referendum, and finalising the Bougainville Peace Agreement as a whole. The links between different elements of the Agreement also carried through into the laws giving it legal effect-with the date on which the laws came into force and the holding of elections for the ABG dependent on progress with practical weapons disposal (certified by the United Nations Observer Mission in Bougainville [UNOMB] at stages designated in Papua New Guinea law [Constitutional Amendment No. 14, s. 2 and Papua New Guinea Constitution s. 279(2)]). The institutions through which the ABG operates, including the rules for the election or appointment of persons to these institutions, together with those that may be added as the ABG decides and resources allow, are established by the Constitution of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville (known for short as the 'Bougainville Constitution,), which derives its formal, legal authority from the Papua New Guinea Constitution, Part XIV and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville ... made under that Part. The Bougainville Constitution was itself made-and is required to operate-within the framework of relevant provisions of the Papua New Guinea Constitution (as amended to give legal effect to the Bougainville Peace Agreement) and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville ... Made and adopted following widespread and repeated consultations with communities around Bougainville, the Bougainville Constitution also contains a list of 27 objectives and principles specifying in considerable detail the purposes for which Bougainvilleans want the powers of government to be used (they include a provision [s o34] that must surely be unique among government constitutions anywhere in the world, that the ABG 'shall make the fight against HIV / AIDS and its threat to the clans and to the future of Bougainville a major priority'). In addition to consultations with Bougainvillean communities, the makingof the Bougainville Constitution also included ongoing consultations with the National Government. Where the latter's concerns-and the agreed legal requirement­ for consistency with the Papua New Guinea Constitution, in particular, were not fully met and uncertainty remains, a compromise was reached whereby papers prepared and submitted by the National Government conveying its concerns regarding certain provisions in the Bougainville Constitution were presented to the Bougainville Constituent Assembly when the Bougainville Constitution was formally adopted, and formally accepted as 'aids to interpretation'. This means 8 The Journal ofPacijic Studies, Volume 30 2007

that they might well be cited in future in the event they are relevant to court cases concerning the legality of the provisions to which they refer. The process by which the Bougainville Constitution was made, outlined in figure 1, included three separate sets of consultations by members of the Bougainville Constitutional Commission with people in towns and villages around Bougainville.

Figure 1 How the arrangements for the Autonomous Bougainville Government were made

I National I Bougainville I Government factions

~~'d"B ougainville Interim Provincial agreed Government ill ~ consulation with Bougainville Peace Agreement I I Bouganville given forcetof law People's Congress

Papua New Guinea ~ appointed Constitution Part XlV Bougainville Constitutional I Comminssion* ~v 0J},r. ~

Structure of government under the Bougainville Constitution As previously mentioned, the powers and functions, sources of revenue and government services available to the ABG are specified in the Papua New Guinea Constitution, and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville .. . Many will not be transferred until the ABG requests them (the ABG began with much the same functions and powers as a provincial government; other functions and Challenges of autonomy in PN G 's Auntonomolls Region of BOtlgainville 9 powers will be transferred in response to requests initiated by the ABG as the National Government and the ABG agree that resources and capacity allow). The powers and functions that will remain with the National Government and are not available for transfer to the ABG are specified too. These include some that guarantee the ABG access to certain resources, and both opportunities and rights to be consulted or participate in various ways in areas that continue to be National Government responsibilities. Examples include provisions guaranteeing certain financial grants annually to the ABG (an unconditional grant to meet the recurrent costs of government, a Police grant, and a restoration and development grant, which is made according to an agreed formula); and the right to be consulted over international agreements that are 'likely to affect' the ABG's functions and powers (Papua New Guinea Constitution s. 293(3) (a) (i», and to prevent implementation of certain border agreements that affect the ABG's jurisdiction. Other provisions in the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing national Constitutional Laws that also allow the ABG to playa limited role in areas where the National Government retains overriding responsibility include closely defined rights for the ABG to legislate in relation to human rights and crirninallaw. They also include the rights to obtain foreign aid that does not adversely affect Papua New Guinea's existing foreign aid arrangements or foreign relations, and to raise loans following consultation with the National Government, and subject to central bank regulations and approval; the ability to nominate a representative on National Government delegations to regional meetings and organisations 'of clear special interest to Bougainville' (Bougainville Peace Agreement, Paragraph 71); the right to participate in National Government delegations engaged in negotiating new border agreements with Solomon Islands; and the power to take part in the making and operation of Bougainville-related arrangements that will allow ABG officials to participate actively in defence-related activities, such as maritime and border surveillance, search and rescue, the provision of assistance in natural disasters; and still other opportunities and rights in other areas of continuing N ational Government responsibility and control, including foreign investment, the issuing of work permits to foreigners seeking employment in Bougainville, and specified aspects of fisheries management in parts of Papua New Guinea's continental shelf and 200-nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone associated with Bougainville. 10 The Journal ofPaciftc Studies, Volume 302007

Mutual assurance that the National Government and the ABG will respect the arrangements contained in the Bougainville Peace Agreement is reinforced by 'double entrenchment'. This means that the national Constitution, Part XIV and the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville . .. can be amended only if standard procedures for amending Papua New Guinea's Constitutional Laws are followed (one month's notice, two separate votes at least two months apart, and passage by specified absolute majorities, generally two-thirds of the total membership of the National Parliament)-plus the passage of the same amendment by the Bougainville legislature (generally by simple majority, but subject to two-thirds majority support in the case of the referendum provisions). The ABG is also required to respect Papua New Guinea's international obligations. The primacy of the Bougainville Peace Agreement, which was negotiated in the presence and with the active participation of leaders and former combatants from the main Bougainville factions, is underlined by a Constitutional provision stating that the Agreement 'may be used, so far as it is relevant, as an aid' to interpreting the national Constitutional Laws that give legal effect to the Agreement (Papua New Guinea Constitution s 278(3)).3 The structure of the ABG is outlined in figure 2. As the diagram shows, the system of government includes a directly elected President and legislature, operating under what might be regarded as a modified Westminster system of responsible government in which the ABG's Cabinet, the Bougainville Executive Council, is chosen from among the members of-and is subject to removal by-the Bougainville legislature, the Bougainville House of Representatives. According to the Bougainville Constitutional Commission's final Report, the recommendation-which was subsequently made law-that the President should be directly elected was determined by a number of different considerations, including perceived similarities with traditional systems of government or kastom, experience with the North Solomons Provincial Government between 1976 and 1990 (when the Premier was directly elected), and observation of what was described as the 'inherently unstable' situation at the national level where 'ever-changing alliances of convenience' were said to determine who would form Government and 'the system seemed to collapse whenever a no confidence vote was near' (Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004:175). Figure 2 How the Autonomous Bougainville Government is organised and operates a Notes a The strucrure outlined is that of the Autonomous Bougainville Government at its establishment: pending any redistribution of electorates nationally, Constitution ofthe Independent Bougainville continues to have 4 Members of the National State ofPapua New Guinea Parliament (a Provincial Member and 3 Open Electorate Members - for North, Central and South) (as amended by Part XIV, giving legal effect to the Q Bougainville Peace Agreement the National court system, constitutional offices established ., under the Papua New Guinea Constitution (the Public ;::: Prosecutor and Public Solicitor, Ombudsman Commission, ~ etc.) and Government services (the Papua New Guinea ~ Organic Law 011 Peace-building Public Service, Police, Correctional Services, etc.) continue to ~ in Bougainville~Autonomous operate in Bougainville, at least until the Autonomous ~ Bougainville Government and Bougainville Government establishes the courts, ~ ~ Bougainvil/e Referendum constitutional offices, Government services, etc. for which the Bougainvi/le Peace Agreeme1/t and the Papua New Guinea ~,., (made under the Papua New Guinea ConstiJUhon) Par! XIV - Peace-Building in Bougoinville - AJlJonomous Constitution, Part XIV) BOJigainville GovernmmJ and BOlfgainvil1e Referendum provide ~ the functions and powers of the Autonomous Bougainville Cl Government are much the same as those of provindal ,->' governments, with provision for further functions ~ Constitution ofthe Autonomous Region ofBou ganville and powers on an agreed list to be transferred from ~ the National Government at the initiative of the ~ I (Bougainville Constitution) I Autonomous Bougainville Government Under the agreed arrangements: I '-> b the number of constituencies for the Bougainville Legislature at '" future elections will be between 28 and 38 :$ ~. c National MPs may speak in the Bougainville House of I I I I Representatives, but nOt vote or move motions or count towards ~ 1:0 Legislature Executived Judiciary Constitutional Offices a quorum <> The following provisions may be implemented as the Bougainville ~., House of Representatives BougairUvilIe Provision for Provision for House of Representatives decides, following a procedure requiring ,.. Executive Council Bougainville Chief Bougainville needs and resources to be identified and made public 33 constituency Ombudsman b Justice and High ~ members President (directly Court, Auditor General d establishment of Bougainville Government Services elected) Public Prosecutor e appoinonent of up to 4 more members of the Bougainville 3 women other courtsf Public Solicitor Execu rive Council representatives Vice President Public Services Supreme Court of Commission establishment of Bougainville courtS 3 former combatant 8 other members Papua New Guinea electoral officials, etc.g g establishment of Bougainville Constitutional Offices representatives (including 1 woman) remains highest court from legislaturee of appeal The same procedure applies to the establishment of 4 National MPsc an advisory body of traditional chiefs and other traditional leaders Regional Governments 12 The Journal ofPacijic Studies, Volume 302007

Electorates are distributed by population per administrative District (which often, but not always, coincides with significant local identities) and, in the case of special seats set aside for women and former combatants, by National Parliament Electorate / Region. A number of the Bougainville Objectives and Directive Principles contained in the Bougainville Constitution deal specifically with aspects of post-conflict peace-building, such as the 'Pursuit of peace, rehabilitation, reconciliation or harmony' (s. 6). Others address challenges that have arisen or increased in importance following the conflict, including those dealing with 'Strengthening of customary authority' (s. 13), 'Unity and stability of Bougainville' (s. 16), 'Welfare of widows, children, orphans, the aged and the disabled' (s. 20), etc. Other provisions also owe quite a deal to the context of post-conflict peace-building in which the Bougainville Constitution was made. They include a provision, clearly intended to promote the re-integration of former combatants into the broader society, by establishing three special seats in the Bougainville legislature for which former combatants, certified as such by other former combatants-not just members of a nominee's particular faction-are alone eligible to stand. Voting in these electorates, one for each Region-North, Central and South Bougainville- is on the basis of universal adult franchise. The controversial character of this provision is underlined by the specific references contained in the Bougainville Constitution to processes by which it can be reviewed, and-subject to consultation with former combatants, and two­ thirds absolute majority support-removed before the referendum is held (the provision will automatically cease to apply if a decision is made not to proceed with the referendum, and, in any event, when the referendum is held). It is also arguably the case that the three special seats for women (who are elected on a universal franchise too) owe something to the important role that women played in pressing for peace and then making and building peace in Bougainville (which also explains why-and may, in turn, owe something to-the inclusion of three women among the Bougainville Constitutional Commission's 24 members). Pre-conflict Bougainville was not only prosperous (at least in macro­ economic terms) and well provided with government services when compared with other parts of Papua New Guinea; the mine at Panguna and associated activities, together with village and plantation-based agricultural production Challenges oja utonomy in PNG's Auntonomous Region ojBougainviffe 13

(mainly cocoa and coconut) meant that Bougainville was a major-in fact, by far the largest-contributor to national income and National Government revenue, and hence to the wellbeing and development of Papua New Guinea as a whole. The effects and continuing legacy of the Bougainville conflict on the Bougainville economy can now be discerned in the provisions contained in the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing laws for restoration and development grants; the transfer of certain revenue-raising powers, and a change in the grants system when Bougainville achieves fiscal self-reliance; the emphasis on capacity and resources in determining the timing of future transfers of responsibility for functions, powers, resources and services, and the establishment of constitutional offices; etc. It can also be seen in the way in which the Bougainville Constitution links implementation of certain provisions, such as the establishment of Regional Governments, a second legislative chamber, constitutional offices, to capacity, resources and sustainability. A certain distrust of power-evident in the way the Bougainville Constitution provides for voters to recall elected members,4 as well as the future introduction of detailed procedures for the conduct of plebiscites, and voter-initiated law­ making-may also owe something to experience before and during the period of armed conflict. However, the most important continuing effect of the conflict- apart from the direct consequences it has had for human and material losses, infrastructure and services-is the emphasis that Bougainvilleans continue to place on the need for reconciliation. This is given expression both in the Bougainville Objectives and Directive Principles contained in the Bougainville Constitution, especially the provision calling for the establishment and encouragement of 'institutions and procedures for the promotion of mediation, reconciliation and harmony .. .', etc. (Bougainville Constitution s. 15(2)) , and in the obligation that the Bougainville Constitution s. 187(1) imposes on the Bougainville Executive Council to 'formulate a policy for . . . dealing with human rights issues and abuses of human rights arising out of' the Bougainville conflict, and for 'effecting reconciliation of the parties involved'. It finds practical expression in ongoing requests for assistance in mobilising the resources required to hold culturally appropriate reconciliation ceremonies (and, a related consideration, in claims for compensation both for services rendered in support of the National Government and losses incurred during the conflict). 14 The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volume 30 2007

Other effects of the conflict can be seen in the provisions in the Bougainville Peace Agreementcover.ing reassurances concerning the withdrawal of the D efence Force from Bougainville and defIning the ABG's role in relation to certain defence-related activities mentioned above. They can also be seen.in the priority given to (re-)establishing other aspects of security, additional to reconciliation, through implementation of provisions in the Agreement and given legal effect through the Organic Law on Peace-Building in Bougainville . .. Ss. 24--29, which give both the ABG (through a Minister) and the Police Commander in Bougainville an enhanced role .in relation to Police .in Bougainville (who still remain part of the Papua New Guinea Police); to strengthening Police numbers on the ground; and to recruitment, training and deployment of Community Auxiliary Police (with support from New Zealand aid).

The first general election for the President and other members of the ABG legislature Follow.ing the National Executive Council's advice to the Governor-General a few days before Christmas 2004 that he endorse the Bougainville Constitution as consistent with the Papua New Guinea Constitution, preparations for holding the fIrst general election for the ABG moved into high gear. The process required revising the Common Roll previously used in national elections to ensure the .inclusion of persons qualifIed to enrol-Papua New Guinea citizens who are 'Bougainvilleans', defIned as persons born, adopted by custom, or married into a 'Bougainvillean clan lineage', or the children of a person who is a lineage clan member (Bougainville Constitution Ss. 7, 110), and aged 18 or over-and removal of the name of anyone who was not. When voting began in late May 2005, a total of 294 candidates stood, including 5 for the Presidency, 25 for the 3 seats specifIcally set aside for women contestants and 28 for the 3 former combatants, and 236 for the 33 constituencies open to all qualifIed voters. Many candidates belonged to or were in some way allied with one of the four political parties that registered for the election. Candidates for the Presidency .included the two Co-Chairmen of the Bougainville Transitional Consultative Council through which the Bougainville Interim Prov.incial Government (BIPG) , formally constituted by law, and other Bougainville leaders consulted and cooperated following the former's establishment after a court case .in 1999. One was the sitting Governor and Challenges of autonomy in PN G's Auntonomous Region ofB ougainvzlle 15

Member for the Bougainville Provincial Electorate, Hon. , who resigned to contest this election after 33 years of membership in the National Parliament (broken only when he resigned in support of the declaration of Bougainville's secession from Papua New Guinea shortly before national Independence in 1975, and restored when he stood again in the 1977 general election, after the signing of the Bougainville Agreement formally ending the secession and providing for the establishment of the North Solomons Provincial Government under the national Constitution). The other was Joseph Kabui, the last Premier of the North Solomons Provincial Government before the conflict, then the President of the BRA's political arm, the Bougainville Interim Government (BIG) during the conflict, and President of the Bougainville People'S Congress (BPC) formed to bring the Bougainville factions together during the peace process. The candidates for President also included , formerly a close adviser to the late Francis Ona, a firm and active participant in the peace process, a member of the BPC and, subsequently, Minister for Peace and Autonomy in the BIPG; and Joel Banam, President of the Leitana Council of Elders on Buka, a strong supporter of the BIPG, and BIPG Minister for Finance until the election. The outcome was a resounding victory for Joseph Kabui (who gained 55+% of the vote to Momis's almost 35%. In addition to the Presidency, Kabui's Bougainville People's Congress Party won 27 seats in the ABG legislature, while members and allies of Momis's New Bougainville Party gained 11 (the New Labour Party won one). A team of 15 international observers from the Commonwealth Secretariat, the Pacific Islands Forum, Australia, Japan and New Zealand, led by Ratu Epeli Nailatikau of Fiji and supported by the United Nations, observed and reported on the election. Although they acknowledged that the electoral roll had shortcomings and some unfortunate incidents occurred during polling, their over-all verdict was that:

the election was competently and transparently conducted in all key respects. We were immensely impressed with the commitment and patience of the people of Bougainville throughout the entire process. The dedication of the electoral officials and polling and counting staff, and the scrutineers' active engagement, is to be commended. 16 The Journal of Pacific Studies, Volutne 30 2007

... while there are some matters that might be improved for future elections, the results of this first autonomous election credibly reflect the wishes of the people of Bougainville. (Commonwealth Secretariat 2005:22)

The margin, if not always the fact, of Joseph Kabui's victory in the Presidential election surprised many observers. The best explanation for his success can probably be found in the way he had kept building the coalition, which led to the incorporation of the former BIG / BRA into the BPC, together with the members of the former Bougainville Transitional Government (BTG), which had been established under national law in 1995, and the BRF; the formation of the Bougainville Transitional Consultative Council in 1999; and then the establishment of the Bougainville People's Congress Party before campaigning in the ABG election. Other noteworthy features of the election results included the defeat of such leading public figures and participants in the peace process as former BRF Chairman, Hilary Masiria (who stood in his home area, the Peit constituency, Buka), and the former BRA Chief of D efence, (who was candidate for the former combatants' seat in the South); the former BTG Deputy Premier and BPC Vice-President Thomas Anis (candidate for Baku, Buka); James Tanis, a former BRA leader and active participant in the peace process, who had become Minister for Peace and Autonomy in the BIPG before deciding to stand for ABG President (for which he came third, with just under 4% of the votes cast); and one of the leading women's activists in the peace process, Theresa Jaintong, who stood for the women's seat in Central. It would be premature to speculate about the significance of the newcomers to Bougainville-wide office, and any changes that might follow. In a move clearly intended to promote reconciliation, ABG President Joseph Kabui put together a 'Grand Coalition' following the election, appointed former BTG and BPC Member Joseph Watawi as Vice-President, and formed a Government consisting of members across former factional differences and party lines.

Challenges for the ABG and the National Government The challenges facing the National Government and the ABG are, to some degree, defined by the different constituencies to which they are politically accountable, both within their respective legislatures-the National Parliament Challenges of autonomy in PNG's Auntonomous Region ofBou gainville 17 and the Bougainville House of Representatives-and at elections. Their respective capacities to respond owe a great deal to the distribution of responsibilities-functions, powers, resources, and control over service­ between them, and to their willingness and ability to cooperate. The main agreed mechanism for consultation, cooperation, and preventing (and where they arise, resolving) disputes between them is the Joint Supervisory Body OSB) which is set up under the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing laws. The decision to set up the JSB on an interim basis in late 2002-almost three years before it was required by law-together with the roles it has played in facilitating identification and cooperation in dealing with difficulties in implementing the agreed arrangements, demonstrated the positive commitment the ABG and the National Government have displayed in honouring the Bougainville Peace Agreement and the national Constitutional Laws that give it legal effect. The experience, combined with the determination to find a positive way forward (without resort to the courts) in relation to other difficulties that have arisen in relation to implementation of other provisions of the Agreement and other issues, gives additional cause for hope. So does the willingness of Members and parties on all sides of the National Parliament to set aside other differences and deal with Bougainville on a bipartisan, national basis (with National Government officials briefing all of the politicians involved). In Bougainville, the Administration has been restructured and fresh appointments have been made to meet the changed circumstances-and the need for enhanced support of the ABG in policy and management-following Bougainville's transition to autonomy (or, at least, the beginning of the process by which the ABG may assume responsibility for the full range of functions and powers made available under the Bougainville Peace Agreement and implementing laws). The National Government has reconstituted the Bougainville Peace and Restoration Office (BPRO) as the National Co-ordination Office for Bougainville Affairs (NCOBA) to co-ordinate National Government responsibilities in and in relation to Bougainville, and provide support for the ABG at the national centre of government. In early 2006, the ABG produced the flrst 5-yearly instalment of its own rolling plan, the Strategic Action Plan 2006-2010 (SAP). Stressing the importance of inclusiveness and 'bottom-up' planning, the SAP describes its own over-all purpose as being, 'Together [to] help village people improve their well being through a sustainable local level approach (ABG 2006:17). 18 The Journal ofPacijic Studies, Volume 302007

With 11 stated goals, which have not been prioritised, the SAP specifies six Strategic Policies:

1. Promote peace and harmony 2. Promote economic growth 3. Improve access to services in the community 4. Sustainably manage all assets 5. Meet international standards of good governance 6. Build capacity and strengthen government institutions (ibid.:20-21)

These are, in turn, applied to specific sectors, and intended for implementation through a number of key impact projects or policies. While the SAP states that it is linked to the plan intended to guide development nationally, the Medium-Term Development Strategy (ibid.:26), the latter does not make specific provision for the particular circumstances and needs associated with post-conflict recovery and reconstruction. The SAP does not specify exactly where the money is coming from (that is, how internally raised revenues, National Government grants that are guaranteed by the national Constitutional Laws implementing the Bougainvzlfe Peace Agreement, other grants, foreign aid and loans will each be raised and contribute to implementation). As the estimated cost of the activities specified in the SAP itself amounts to K189.318 million over the five year period 2006- 2010, securing the funds required for implementation is quite a substantial challenge for the ABG and, potentially, the National Government. For its part, the National Government is considering how specifically national interests and purposes in Bougainville can be, respectively, safeguarded and promoted. The means available include offering the ABG additional conditional grants (which may be for activities that are, in practice, supported by foreign aid), as the Bougainviffe Peace Agreement and national Constitutional Laws provide (such grants cannot be imposed; they must be agreed). They may also include direct expenditures in regard to functions and powers for which the National Government continues to be responsible in Bougainville. The 2007 national Budget provides evidence of the National Government's ongoing practical support for peace-building in the form of a Recurrent Grant to the ABG ofK50,509,500 (up from K40,789, 200 in 2006), which is the third Challenges of alltonomy in PNG 's Allntonomolls Region of BOllgainville 19 largest such gtant in Papua New Guinea (after the province with the largest population, Morobe, and another, more populous, special case, Southern Highlands); and an allocation of K47,479,500 (up from K36,276,300 in 2006) for development funded through the Public Investment Progtamme, which is much larger-by far-than the allocation to any province in Papua New Guinea (cited in Wolfers 2007:105). However, needs and demands for restoration and development in Bougainville continue to outstrip resources. These are additional to the additional costs of government directly attributable to autonomy itself (to the structure, the number of members, the scale and diversity of the responsibilities of the ABG's political executive and legislature, and the time and attention they require of their members; as well as the additional, senior staff required to support the ABG, including personnel qualified to give policy advice). Moreover, the costs of government in Bougainville are, in practice, likely to gtow as functions and powers are transferred; institutions, offices and government services for which the Bougainviffe Constitution provides are set up; and such devices as the procedure by which voters can recall elected members, plebiscites, and voter­ initiated law-making become operational. Conscious of the need to build up a sustainable revenue base in order to address, if not always to meet, public aspirations, the ABG has, therefore, been seeking resources of various kinds, including revenue-generating investments, from abroad. The priority it has given to the early transfer of the functions and powers of government in relation to mining, oil and gas-and the resumption (and possible extension into new areas) of mining in Bougainville-can probably be largely explained in similar terms. However, public reactions to the proposal have, at best, been mixed, especially in communities close to the mine site at Panguna and most seriously affected by mining activity (mining itself, as well as the environmental and social disruption left in its wake), and, more recently, the Bougainville conflict.

Conclusion Despite widespread use in discussions of decentralisation and local self­ government, not only in Papua New Guinea but elsewhere, 'autonomy' is not a clearly or precisely defined term (Lapidoth 1997:5). When used to refer to a system of government (not the autonomy of individuals, gtoups, communities 20 The Journal ofPacijic Studies, Volume 30 2007 or states as such), 'political autonomy' has two different kinds of uses: one to refer to the relative authority of the political institutions in different parts of a country as distinct from the centre of government, including states in federations such as Australia, India, Nigeria, the United States of America, etc., cantons in the Swiss federation, provinces in Canada, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands, and local political institutions of various kinds in many different countries; the other to refer to entities that are not fully integrated into a particular national system where government institutions have authority short of full sovereignty. The last include many different one-off arrangements for particular parts or appendages of much larger countries. Examples include Norfolk Island (Australia); the Commonwealths of Puerto Rico and the Northern Mariana Islands (the United States of America); the Aland Islands (Finland); the Faroe Islands and Greenland (Denmark); etc. They now include Bougainville (papua New Guinea). Although influenced in various ways by discussions and precedents in other situations, Bougainville autonomy is also one-off in other ways. Its unusual, even unique, character means that Papua New Guinea has an asymmetrical system of government (in which arrangements are not uniform throughout the country).5 It adds to the rich diversity of constitutional and political forms already found in the South Pacific, and globally. The ABG, the National Government and the diverse people whom both are elected to represent face many different, often daunting challenges in implementing and realising the potential of the agreed arrangements. Bougainville autonomy faces perhaps the toughest test to which systems of governance are ever put: the verdict of the people they are meant to serve expressed through a referendum in which the system's continued existence is put to a vote. However, the referendum will not be self-executing. The result will not be given automatic effect. What follows (if anything) depends on what Papua New Guinea's National Parliament decides. Thus it is that, above and beyond the many challenges involved in implementing, managing and developing the institutional arrangements for Bougainville autonomy- and avoiding, or, when they arise, peacefully resolving any disputes-the ABG and the National Government of Papua New Guinea, together with the people whom they have been elected to represent, face the Challenges of autonomy in PNG's Auntonomous Region of Bougainville 21 most daunting challenge of all: making autonomy work so that it makes a real difference to people's lives; and ensuring that peace is maintained and peace­ building continues during the lead-up to the referendum on Bougainville's political future, when the referendum is held and the result is announced, and when the National Parliament deliberates and decides on the outcome. This is the real challenge of the arrangements for Bougainville autonomy and the other agreements reached in the cause of securing lasting peace by peaceful means in accordance with the Bougainville Peace Agreement, and of achieving the goal for which the national Constitutional Laws implementing the Agreement are named: 'Peace-Building in Bougainville - Autonomous Bougainville Government and Bougainville Referendum'.

Notes

This article is based on a paper that was originally presented to a seminar hosted by the Pacific Institute of Advanced Studies in Development and Governance, University of the South Pacific, on 23 February 2006. The views expressed are personal, and do not necessarily express any official positions. 1 At time of writing, on the eve of the 2007 Papua New Guinea general election, two of the Bougainville MPs are Ministers, Hon. Sam Akoitai (Central, Minister for Mining) and Hon. Michael Laimo (South, Minister for Education), one is a Parliamentary Secretary (Hon. James Togel, MP for North, and Parliamentary Secretary for Internal Security), and the Regional MP, Hon. Leo Hannett, has recendy moved from the position of Parliamentary Secretary assisting the Prime Minister to Chair of the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee. No other group of MPs from another part of the country occupies proportionately as many senior political positions at the national level. Whether and how the Bougainville MPs' executive and parliamentary posts impact on their effectiveness in representing the particular interests of their electorates is an open question. 2 As with the Papua Nell} Guinea Constitution, it was not that precedents were ignored. Rather, as with the Final Report of the pre-Independence Constitutional Planning Committee, examination of what was agreed for Bougainville 'would send a specialist in many directions if he was looking for origins, and in some cases there are no external precedents at all' (papua New Guinea 1974, Part 1: 1 /2). Moreover, different participants might well be conscious of different precedents, and identify different sources for what was proposed and what was subsequendy agreed. 22 The Journal ofPaciftc Studies, Voltlme 30 2007

3 cf. Paptla New Guinea Constitution s. 24, which provides that records of debates and documents used in the making of the Papua New Guinea Constitution 'may be used, so far as they are relevant, as aids to interpretation where any question relating to the interpretation or application of any provision of a Constitutional Law arises.' 4 A petition for recall requires the signatures of at least one-third of the enrolled voters for the member's constituency, stating reasons for the recall (Bougainville Constitution s. 58 (2». 5 Like many other national capitals, Papua New Guinea's National Capital District, which covers the Port·Moresby area, comes under a special arrangement too.

References

Bougainville Constitutional Commission 2004, Report . .. , Arawa and Buka. Commonwealth Secretariat 2005, GeneralElection for the Autonomous Bougainville Government. Report of the Commonwealth-Pacific Islands Foru1l'I Expert Team, online http: //www. the commonwealth.org/ shared_as p_files / iploadedfiles /E26ADF4 5-79D9-4638- 83F6-A687F7FOCB_BougainvilleReportFinal.pdf, 1/6/2007 . Lapidoth, Ruth 1997, Autono11ry: Flexible Solutions to Ethnic Conflicts, Washington, DC. Papua New Guinea, Part 1,1974, Final Report of the Constitutional Planning Committee, Port Moresby. . Regan, Anthony J 2002, 'Resolving two dimensions of conflict', in 'Weaving consensus: The Papua New Guinea - Bougainville peace process', eds Andy Carl & Sr Lorraine Garasu, Accord, 12, 2002:36-42. Wolfers, Edward P 2006a, 'International Peace Missions in Bougainville, Papua New Guinea, 1990-2005 - Host State Perspectives'; online http://unpan1.un.org/ intradoc/ groups/publici documents/ un/ unpan02261.pdf, 1/6/2007. 2006b, 'Bougainville Autonomy: Implications for Governance and Decentralisation', Public Policy in Papua New Guinea - Discussion Paper Series, 20006/5, State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, Australian National University, Canberra. --2007, 'Meeting the challenges of peace-building and autonomy', Papua Nelv Guinea Yearbook 2007, Port Moresby, 98-111.