Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government

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Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government Leadership Challenges for the Autonomous Bougainville Government PATRICK NISIRA SSGM DISCUSSION PAPER 2017/3 This discussion paper is based on a public speech 1990s become increasingly conscious of the long- delivered by the Hon. Patrick Nisira MHR, the Vice- term dangers for Bougainville if violent conflict President of the Autonomous Region of Bougainville, between Bougainvilleans continued. Any dreams of which was organised by the State, Society & Govern- self-determination for Bougainville would be under ance in Melanesia Program of the Coral Bell School grave threat. of Asia Pacific Affairs, ANU College of Asia and the Against that background, it should be no Pacific on 28 April 2016. surprise that from the very beginning of the peace The subject of the leadership challenges facing process, the focus amongst the Bougainville leaders the Autonomous Bougainville Government (ABG) committed to the process was on unification is an important one, especially with the referendum of Bougainville. It was for that reason that the on the possible independence of Bougainville fast first step was the extended meeting of opposing approaching (it must be held no later than mid- Bougainvillean leaders in the Burnham One talks 2020). Leadership challenge is a subject that raises in New Zealand in mid-1997. And of course, those key issues about the central roles for the Autono- talks were in fact a resumption of the previous talks mous Bougainville Government (ABG) envisaged between the divided Bougainville leadership held by the Bougainville Peace Agreement (BPA). Many in Cairns, Australia, in September and December of the ABG’s leadership challenges are inherent in 1995, initiated largely by Theodore Miriung, the general situation of Bougainville in 2016. In a then premier of the Bougainville Transitional real sense it is a ‘post-conflict’ situation — in that Government (BTG). Bougainville’s violent, destructive and deeply divi- The deep drive for unification was always in sive nine-year civil war (1988–97) ended almost large part directed to replacing the parallel and 19 years ago now, in mid-1997. But of course, divi- opposing Bougainville government structures gen- sions, tensions and various forms of conflict (some- erated by the conflict. The Bougainville Revolution- times localised violence) continue. This complex ary Army had its associated ‘civilian’ government, ongoing and endlessly changing situation presents the Bougainville Interim Government (or BIG), constant challenges for leadership at all levels, including for the ABG. headed by Francis Ona. The BIG had its own sys- There are, however, some critically important tem of local-level government — a three-tier sys- ABG leadership roles intended by the BPA. The tem of Councils of Chiefs. Opposing them were reasons for, and the nature and significance of, the Bougainville Resistance Forces (or BRF) and, these roles are best understood by reference to the from 1995, the Bougainville Transitional Govern- deeply divided conflict situation in Bougainville in ment. The BTG began establishing its own system the mid-1990s, in the several years before the peace of local-level government in 1996, the Councils of process began. Elders. There were even separate women’s organisa- tions associated with the BIG/BRA, Context — the ABG, Reconciliation and and the BTG/BRF, respectively. Unification So it is not surprising, perhaps, The ‘moderate’ leadership on both sides of the once the Burnham One talks saw main divide within Bougainville had by the mid- the opposing leadership agree to State, Society & Governance in Melanesia ssgm.bellschool.anu.edu.au Patrick Nisira work together for peace, that in the January 1998 for the reconciliation government. When those Lincoln Agreement they agreed with the Papua efforts unexpectedly failed, the 1995 Organic New Guinea government on the need for ‘free and Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level democratic elections on Bougainville to elect a Governments began operating in Bougainville Bougainville Reconciliation Government before the from 1 January 1999. That should have resulted in end of 1998’. the replacement of the BTG by a newly established Through 1998 and 1999 a great deal of effort and constituted Bougainville Interim Provincial went into achieving the much sought after Bou- Government (BIPG) headed by then Bougainville gainville Reconciliation Government. Indeed, regional MP, John Momis, as governor. BIG/BRA the pursuit of that goal itself became divisive. In leaders, and others, saw this as contrary to the 1995, the Organic Law on Provincial Government, Lincoln Agreement commitment to establishing which came into effect in April 1977 and under a Bougainville Reconciliation Government. As a which provincial governments had operated in all result, the national government was persuaded to provinces, had been repealed and replaced by a suspend the BIPG from the instant that the 1995 new Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Organic Law came into operation in Bougainville Local-level Governments in the rest of PNG, while on 1 January 1999. the 1977 Organic Law on Provincial Government That allowed the establishment in the first half continued to operate in Bougainville under special of 1999 of an elected Bougainville People’s Congress and temporary provisions applicable only to Bou- (or BPC), without a basis in legislation. The inten- gainville. The reason for this special treatment was tion was that the BPC would be the Bougainville that in 1995–96 then PNG Prime Minister Chan Reconciliation Government. But of course, those was exploring with the BTG the possibility of spe- who had hoped Momis would become governor cial autonomy for Bougainville under the 1977 were upset by the suspension action, and the estab- Organic Law as a way of ending the conflict. lishing of the BPC, especially when former senior This temporary provision for Bougainville BIG leader, Joseph Kabui, was elected BPC President. that kept the previous Organic Law in force and These problems in implementing the Lincoln provided for the operation of the BTG was due Agreement provisions for a Bougainville Reconcili- to expire on 31 December 1988. In late 1998, ation Government, meant that far from unifying efforts were being made to not only continue the and reconciling, the process was itself divisive. As a operation of the 1977 Organic Law in Bougainville result, when the negotiations for a ‘comprehensive but also to amend that Law to provide a basis political agreement’ (also required by the Lincoln Abbreviations Agreement) began on 30 June 1999, those sup- porting Momis and the establishment of the BIPG ABG Autonomous Bougainville Government refused to participate. BCL Bougainville Copper Limited It was the combination of a range of efforts BIG Bougainville Interim Government from mid-1999 to achieve a reconciliation amongst BIPG Bougainville Interim Provincial Govern- the divided leadership, and a PNG Supreme ment Court decision late in 1999 that saw a remarkable BPA Bougainville Peace Agreement compromise agreement. The BIPG would operate BPC Bougainville People’s Congress as the legal government for Bougainville, but would BRA Bougainville Revolutionary Army make all decisions in consultation with the ‘extra- BRF Bougainville Resistance Forces legal’ BPC. BTG Bougainville Transitional Government So, from late 1999, leadership was shared, COE Council of Elders between Governor Momis and President Kabui. PIP Public Investment Program Though the term used in the Lincoln Agreement — PNGDF Papua New Guinea Defence Force the Bougainville Reconciliation Government — was RDG Restoration and Development Grant never applied to this unique, ad hoc arrangement, SSGM2 Discussion Paper 2012/1 State, Society http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm & Governance in Melanesia SSGM Discussion Paper 2017/3 it was truly a ‘reconciliation government’. It brought (a) facilitate the expression and development together previously opposing factions and oppos- of Bougainville identity and the relation- ing leaders in creative, flexible and highly inclusive ship between Bougainville and the rest of arrangements that worked. Papua New Guinea; It was this set of arrangements for the ‘recon- (b) empower Bougainvilleans to solve their ciliation government’ that provided leadership and own problems, manage their own affairs government for Bougainville until the ABG was and work to realize their own aspirations elected in June 2005. Reflecting the agreed arrange- …; ments for cooperation of the BPC and the BIPG, (c) promote the unity of Papua New Guinea; Momis and Kabui jointly led the combined Bou- (d) provide for a democratic and accountable gainville negotiating team that from December 1999 system of government for Bougainville negotiated for the BPA, signed on 30 August 2001. that meets internationally accepted stand- The successful operation of these ‘reconciliation ards of good governance, including the government’ arrangements undoubtedly provided protection of human rights. the firm foundations necessary for the ABG to Under the BPA, the ABG has extensive powers and become the true, long-term ‘reconciliation govern- resources made available to it, intended to enable it ment’ for Bougainville. These ad hoc arrangements were actually far to not only develop the policies and laws needed to more inclusive, and reconciliatory, than the single solve the problems and realise the aspirations of all elected Bougainville Reconciliation Government Bougainvilleans, but also implement those policies envisaged
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