Political Reviews
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Political Reviews The Region in Review: International Issues and Events, 2017 nic maclellan Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2017 volker boege, mathias chauchat, alumita durutalo, joseph daniel foukona, budi hernawan, michael leach, james stiefvater The Contemporary Pacic, Volume 30, Number 2, 461–547 © 2018 by University of Hawai‘i Press 461 Melanesia in Review: Issues and Events, 2017 Vanuatu is not reviewed in this issue. As a consequence, disgruntled young Bougainvilleans brought the mine to a Bougainville standstill through acts of sabotage in In 2017, the Autonomous Region of late 1988. The GoPNG sent its police Bougainville in Papua New Guinea riot squads and later its military to the (PNG) entered its final and decisive island and declared a state of emer- stage of peacebuilding, with prepara- gency on Bougainville in June 1989. tions for a referendum on the future Opponents of the mine established political status of the region com- the Bougainville Revolutionary Army mencing in earnest. Peacebuilding on (bra), which took up the fight against Bougainville began in the late 1990s the PNG security forces. Fighting that after a decade-long violent conflict. started in central Bougainville soon During the conflict, Bougainvilleans spread across the whole island. The suffered from the collapse of basic bra adopted a secessionist stance and services such as health and education called for political independence for and the breakdown of infrastructure Bougainville. bra fighters managed and public administration. Out of the to overrun and shut down the mine almost 20,000 Bougainvilleans who at an early stage of the war, and it has lost their lives, only a minority were remained closed ever since. combatants killed in action; the vast In its war against the bra, the majority were civilians. Fighting also PNG military was supported by local led to the displacement of more than Bougainvillean auxiliary units, the 40 percent of Bougainville’s popula- so-called Resistance Forces. Over time, tion of approximately 250,000 people. it became the Resistance that bore the The root causes of the war were brunt of the fighting for the govern- the negative social and environmen- ment side. Moreover, long-standing tal effects of a giant mining project, local conflicts were also carried out the Panguna gold and copper mine, violently under the umbrella of the which had been established in Cen- war of secession. Parties entangled in tral Bougainville in 1972. In the late local conflicts either joined the BRA or 1980s, locals in the mine area started the Resistance, the war became more to demand meaningful environmental and more complex, and the frontiers protection measures, compensation for blurred. The time of war was to a environmental damage, and a larger large extent a time of statelessness. share of the revenues generated. The The institutions of the PNG state were multinational mining company that forced to withdraw from Bougainville, operated the mine (known today as and the secessionists were unable to Rio Tinto) and the government of build their own state institutions. This Papua New Guinea (GoPNG), both of opened the space for the resurgence of which profited enormously from Pan- non-state, local customary governance guna, disregarded the locals’ concerns. institutions so that traditional authori- 482 political reviews • melanesia 483 ties, such as elders and chiefs, became Bougainville. It can be argued that responsible for organizing commu- only with the referendum and the nity life. They drew on long-standing peaceful implementation of its provi- customary norms when dealing with sions will peacebuilding have reached conflicts in the local context, often a satisfactory conclusion. (For an over- facilitating reconciliations at the intra- view of the war and of post- conflict and inter-community levels. peacebuilding, see Wallis 2014; Regan Thus, local peacebuilding had 2010; Braithwaite and others, 2010; already generated positive results well Carl and Garasu 2002; for the histori- before a high-level political peace pro- cal, social, and political context, see cess commenced in 1997. A formal, Regan and Griffin 2005.) Bougainville-wide ceasefire came into While Bougainville peace is mainly effect at the end of April 1998, paving homegrown, an international peace- the way for official peace negotia- building intervention—which, com- tions, which finally culminated in the pared to other endeavors, was a “light Bougainville Peace Agreement (bpa) intervention” (Regan 2010)—has on 30 August 2001. The bpa has two also played an important role. New core political provisions: first, the Zealand hosted the initial rounds of establishment of the Autonomous peace talks and negotiations. Neigh- Region of Bougainville (ARoB) as a boring states and the United Nations special political entity within the PNG conducted, with the consent of the state, with far-reaching autonomy; and conflict parties, a peacebuilding second, a referendum on the future intervention. The United Nations sent political status of Bougainville—either a small observer mission from August complete independence or remaining 1998 to the end of 2003. Furthermore, with Papua New Guinea. The bpa a regional Truce Monitoring Group, stipulates that the referendum has which later became the Peace Moni- to be held ten to fifteen years after toring Group, was on the island from the establishment of an autonomous late 1997 to June 2003. New Zealand government for Bougainville (which led the Truce Monitoring Group and took place in 2005). The ARoB has Australia led the Peace Monitor- its own constitution, adopted by the ing Group, with Australia providing Bougainville Constituent Assembly on the bulk of personnel and resources 12 November 2004. The first elections (Wehner and Denoon 2001; Adams for a Bougainville House of Repre- 2001; Bowd 2007; Braithwaite and sentatives and a president were held others 2010; Regan 2010; Breen 2016; in June 2005, followed by two more Boege, Debiel, and Rinck 2017). elections in 2010 and 2015. At pres- In general, Bougainville is seen as ent, Bougainvilleans are governed by a peacebuilding success story. This their own Autonomous Bougainville success is built on the constructive Government (abg). interactions between international In May 2016, the abg and the and national state actors and institu- GoPNG agreed on the target date tions on the one hand (in particular of 15 June 2019 for the referen- the GoPNG and the abg) and local dum on the future political status of customary actors and institutions on 484 the contemporary pacific • 30:2 (2018) the other. While the former pursue a between the abg and the mgu yielded Western, liberal agenda of peacebuild- the Panguna Communiqué, which ing and state building, the latter work laid the foundations for an ongoing to introduce their custom-based ways process of rapprochement between of conflict transformation and forming the two entities. Since then the abg political community into the process. and Meekamui have been involved in In the course of this local/custom- various forms of exchange, with both ary–international/liberal interface, sides committed to the “unification” hybrid forms of peace and governance of all Bougainvilleans. are emerging that differ considerably Although the Meekamuis insist that from Western, liberal concepts (Boege in principle Bougainville is already 2010, 2011). independent (the bra proclaimed a Despite the overall success of Unilateral Declaration of Indepen- peacebuilding and state forma- dence in May 1990), the Panguna tion on Bougainville, some areas Meekamuis have joined the process of Bougainville are still controlled toward referendum. This includes by armed groups that have not yet a commitment to disarm before the officially joined the peace process, end of 2018. The Meekamui move- and some sections of the population ment, however, is not a unitary force do not acknowledge the abg as the but consists of several factions. While (only) rightful government. Mention the mgu is willing to come to the has to be made in particular of the table, other factions are more reluc- Meekamui movement (Meekamui tant, namely a group led by Noah means “holy land” in one of the local Musingku, who proclaimed himself Bougainville languages). Meekamui is “king” (King David Peii II) and has the faction that split from the former established a “kingdom” around Tonu bra when the peace process com- in southern Bougainville, and a group menced in the late 1990s. Meekamui led by Damien Koike, a former bra is in control of the area around the commander who controls a no-go Panguna mine in central Bougain- zone in Konnou, also in south Bou- ville as well as pockets in the south gainville, where he operates his own of the island. The Panguna Meeka- gold mine. Bringing these “wild cards” mui have their own government, the into the referendum process will be a Meekamui Government of Unity challenge. (mgu), and their own military, the An important step in this regard Meekamui Defence Force. Although was made in early May 2017 when the Meekamuis have not yet officially leaders and (ex-) commanders of joined the peace process, they have the bra, the Resistance, and various never undermined it either. Meekamui Meekamui factions came together for has declared the territory under its a four-day meeting in Arawa under the control around the Panguna mine a title “Re-Unifying Bougainville for a “no-go zone” for outsiders, although Free and Fair Referendum” (even the the “border” between the no-go zone “king” sent the “general” of his “royal and the rest of Bougainville is rather guard”), followed by a reconciliation porous. In August 2007, meetings ceremony on 17 May. Since the split in political reviews • melanesia 485 1997, these leaders had been divided setting up various committees such between the majority of the bra, as the Joint Bougainville Referendum which joined the peace process, and Committee and the Joint Bougain- the minority faction, which became ville Referendum Communications the Meekamuis.