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Home , Anne Warfield Rawls, Social constructionism

Warren Schmaus. Rethinking Durkheim and His . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. xii + 195 pp. $70.00, cloth, ISBN 978-0-521-83816-0.

Reviewed by Michael C. Behrent

Published on H-Ideas (November, 2006)

Few social theorists have been scrutinized as terpretative argument about Durkheim's theory of closely as Emile Durkheim. Yet while hundreds of the categories and a normative argument con‐ commentators have vetted his ideas over the past cerning the tenability of social constructionism, century, only in recent decades have the episte‐ Schmaus also makes an intriguing historical argu‐ mological dimensions of Durkheim's thought been ment concerning the origins of Durkheim's views extensively explored. As a number of new studies on the categories--or, to be precise, concerning the attest, this interest springs at least in part from error that he perceives lying at the origin of these the desire to assess an epistemological thesis so views. Schmaus's book is, in this sense, the fasci‐ infuential that few working in the social sciences nating history of a misreading. As readers of The have not grappled with it at some level: namely, Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) know, the claim that is "socially constructed." Be‐ Durkheim, in his last major work, not only argued cause Durkheim argued that the most basic con‐ that is essentially a social phenomenon, cepts of thought can best be explained so‐ but also that religion--and thus ?"are re‐ ciologically, he has often been considered as the sponsible for the very building blocks out of godfather of social constructionism. In Rethinking which human thought is formed. These blocks in‐ Durkheim and His Tradition, Warren Schmaus at‐ clude such notions as time, space, number, causal‐ tempts to weed out all that is untenable in social ity, and substance, which philosophers have tradi‐ constructionism through an examination of tionally labeled "the categories of the understand‐ Durkheim's thought. Contrary to what the title in‐ ing." (Unlike , Durkheim consid‐ dicates, Schmaus's book does not cover ered time and space to be categories, rather than Durkheim's oeuvre as a whole, but specifcally what the German philosopher called "forms of in‐ considers his argument that the categories of hu‐ tuition."[1]) Schmaus's frst concern is purely his‐ man understanding are primarily social in char‐ torical: how did Durkheim come to think that the acter. What makes this book of interest to histori‐ categories of the understanding were social in ans of ideas is the that, while proposing an in‐ character? Schmaus addresses this question in H-Net Reviews two steps. In the frst place, he argues, we must through nineteenth-century French thought--ter‐ see Durkheim, who was trained as a philosopher ritory that, while increasingly familiar to intellec‐ before founding as an autonomous dis‐ tual historians, remains largely uncharted in phi‐ cipline, as responding to a longer philosophical losophy departments. According to Schmaus, most tradition, which Schmaus considers in chapter 2. nineteenth-century French philosophers simply The frst philosopher to theorize categories was did not understand Kant: "many of Kant's subtle . His categories referred to the highest distinctions were lost upon his earliest French in‐ genera, that is, the most general attributes that terpreters" (p. 52) who were "mystifed by his no‐ could be predicated of an entity. Yet it was with tion of a transcendental " (p. 50). The source Immanuel Kant that modern thinking about the of this confusion lay in the exact meaning of categories truly began. For Kant, the categories re‐ Kant's : for many of his early ferred to the preconditions that logically had to readers, the contention that depends obtain for experience to be possible in the frst on necessary preconditions seemed to be an argu‐ place. However, as Schmaus explains in lucid and ment about the in which those precondi‐ economical prose, Kant's theory is a response to tions were presumably located, making it a psy‐ the problem presented by 's views on chological claim. Moreover, Kant's linking, in the the of . According to Hume, we transcendental deduction, of the categories to the never actually experience one thing causing an‐ essential unity of human consciousness, which he : when we observe, for instance, two events called the "transcendental unity of apperception," occurring in rapid and regular succession, we in‐ appeared to justify this conclusion. Yet this read‐ fer a causal relationship that our senses have in ing of Kant, as Schmaus makes clear, is demon‐ fact never perceived. Kant responded to the chal‐ strably wrong. In the Prolegomena to Any Future lenge of Hume's skepticism by arguing, in a sec‐ (1783) and the second edition of the tion of his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) known First Critique (1787), Kant left no doubt that his as the transcendental deduction, that for an expe‐ was a purely logical argument concerning how rience even to occur, a number of concepts must universally valid judgments about experience are be presupposed. He dubbed these concepts "cate‐ possible. However, as Schmaus explains, the accu‐ gories of the understanding," and claimed there rate interpretation of Kant's transcendentalism as were twelve of them, among which was causality. a logical claim lagged behind the inaccurate un‐ While Hume had been right, Kant suggested, to derstanding of it as a psychological theory. Only say that we never perceive causes, he failed to re‐ with the German philosopher Hermann Cohen alize that they are logical prerequisites of experi‐ (1842-1918), in the latter part of the nineteenth ence. In this way, Kant's categories were critical to century, did a better reading begin to prevail. the Copernican that he efectuated in This particular misreading of Kant, Schmaus philosophy: henceforth, the main epistemological claims, had a decisive impact on Durkheim's problem would no longer be that of how the mind thought, via the infuence of two prominent gains access to the external world, but that of how French thinkers examined in chapter 3--Victor the knowing mind shapes the external world. Cousin (1792-1867), the founder of a spiritualist Schmaus readily acknowledges that Kant's doctrine known as Eclecticism, and Pierre Maine thought harbored a number of ambiguities that de Biran (1766-1824), who was retroactively asso‐ would befuddle his readers. In chapter 3, ciated with Cousin's school. That Schmaus takes Schmaus begins to examine the history of the con‐ Cousin seriously at all, rather than confning him fusion that Kant's arguments engendered. To con‐ to his role as an intellectual power-broker (as his‐ nect Kant to Durkheim, Schmaus takes a detour torians, until recently, have done), is in itself re‐

2 H-Net Reviews markable. More importantly, Schmaus demon‐ that would occupy a place of honor in his ‐ strates with considerable skill why we should see sophical lexicon: that of representation. Cousin Cousin's psychological interpretation of Kant as had subscribed to Scottish "" phi‐ something other than a "willful misreading" of losophy, which maintained that we perceive ex‐ him (p. 63). Like some of Kant's early German crit‐ ternal objects directly, rather than through the ics, Cousin believed that, rather than placing phi‐ mediations of a mental picture. Janet, an infuen‐ losophy on a more secure basis, Kant had tial thinker who also wrote a philosophy textbook strengthened skepticism's hand. In Cousin's eyes, assigned by Durkheim, rehabilitated the older the apparent victory that the German thinker had view that, in addition to directly perceived ob‐ secured in claiming that the preconditions of ex‐ jects, the mind is also inhabited by representa‐ perience were not located in experience itself was tions, which make general ideas possible. Reject‐ won at the cost of declaring philosophy impotent ing realism (the that general ideas exist as to speak about what lay beyond the realm of ex‐ in their own right) as well as perience--the hazy world of what Kant called the (the claim that general ideas have no other con‐ noumena, or the "thing-in-itself." In particular, creteness than the particular objects to which Cousin feared the skeptical implications of Kant's they refer), Janet endorsed a form of conceptual‐ claim that we even experience our own selves as ism, the doctrine proposed by the twelfth-century mere appearances, rather than as things-in-them‐ philosopher Pierre Abelard, which holds that gen‐ selves. "I am conscious of the power to resist to a eral ideas exist, but only as representations ap‐ certain extent the forces external to mine," Cousin pearing in the minds of . Janet's under‐ insisted. "What are all the arguments in the world standing of how general ideas work, according to in opposition to a fact like this?" (quoted, p. 67). Schmaus, inspired Durkheim to appeal to the idea Thus Cousin, Schmaus argues, ignored Kant's of representation to explain the function of collec‐ transcendentalism, ofering in its place an "apper‐ tive beliefs. ception of willed efort" (p. 67), which maintains The central contention of Schmaus's historical that the self, through efortful activity and a ca‐ argument is that Durkheim appropriated the pacity to resist its surroundings, has immediate Eclectics' psychological framework for himself, of itself. Another exponent of the self yet transposed it onto the study of as willed efort was Maine de Biran, who invoked rather than phenomena. Schmaus it to explain how the mind frst comes to under‐ identifes two moments in this process, each cor‐ stand causality. For Maine de Biran, the sponta‐ responding to one end of Durkheim's career. In neous experience of the 's activity is what frst chapter 5, Schmaus examines a lecture series that teaches us to look for causes, in our minds as well Durkheim delivered at the Lycee in Sens, where as in the natural world. Thus in diferent ways, he taught philosophy in the early 1880s.[2] In both Cousin and Maine de Biran mistook Kant's these lectures, Durkheim simultaneously perpetu‐ transcendentalism for a philosophical psychology ated the Eclectic tradition and outlined a program and sought in the idea of "willed efort" a superior for a new philosophy founded on scientifc princi‐ description of how the mind prefgures experi‐ ples. Schmaus places particular emphasis, howev‐ ence. er, on Durkheim's use of the concepts that he be‐ While Durkheim inherited the explanation of lieves would nearly scupper Durkheim's intellec‐ causality in terms of willed efort from Cousin tual project. In the Sens lectures, we fnd and Maine de Biran, he turned, as Schmaus Durkheim endorsing Janet's conceptualist views demonstrates in chapter 4, to Paul Janet (1823-99), on representations, which to Schmaus suggests Cousin's spiritual heir, to borrow another concept "the shared concepts or mental entities to which

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Durkheim and Janet appealed in their accounts of the will's internal experience of its own eforts. At the meaning of general terms could have served the same time, to strengthen this theory's prob‐ as the inspiration or model for Durkheim's later lematic validity claims, he reconfgured it in soci‐ notion of collective representations or states of ological terms, claiming that the idea of causality the " (p. 104). Moreover, originates with the experience of the collective Durkheim also lectured at Sens on the categories rather than the individual will. The two demands themselves. Following the Eclectics in misreading that Durkheim imposed on the categories in the Kant, he derived the categories from a psychologi‐ Sens lectures--to explain the universality as well cal rather than a transcendental deduction. Yet at as the variability of human reason--resurface, the same time, he rejected, for complex reasons Schmaus argues, in The Elementary Forms. At that Schmaus discusses, key components of the times Durkheim suggests that social forces invari‐ Eclectic account. According to the young ably generate the same of categories in all soci‐ Durkheim, the categories have necessary and con‐ eties, while at others he implies that particular tingent, as well as rational and empirical, dimen‐ categories are unique to specifc . At this sions; though the mind may be a blank slate prior point, Schmaus's historical argument becomes an to experience, once experience actually begins, exegetical one. How, Schmaus asks, can Durkheim reason kicks in, as it were, in a way that requires simultaneously claim that the categories are uni‐ to conform to its logical strictures. versal, and assert that diferent cultures Rather than searching for traces of Durkheim's so‐ reality diferently? Durkheim appears to want it ciological concerns in his early philosophical both ways, though by the time of his lectures on teachings, Schmaus asserts that the real continu‐ (1913-14), he seems to have favored ity between the Sens lectures and Durkheim's ma‐ the relativistic argument. The more Durkheim ture thought lies in the twin demands that he sides with the latter, the more he endorsed the placed on his theory of the categories, which must tenet of social constructionism that Schmaus fnds contain both "universal and necessary principles most objectionable, namely the claim that difer‐ of reason" and "concrete representations, drawn ent cultures are incommensurable from one an‐ from experience, that fall under these principles" other. (p. 117). In Schmaus's reading, Durkheim conclud‐ To resolve these problems, Schmaus distin‐ ed that "the principle that every phenomenon has guishes--as he Durkheim himself did in a cause may be universal, while the concrete rep‐ the Sens lectures--between the categories proper resentations of causality may nevertheless be cul‐ and the ways in which they are collectively repre‐ turally variable" (p. 117). By distinguishing the sented. According to this reading, the categories principles of reason from the ways in which they are universal, yet diferent societies represent are represented, Durkheim partially freed himself them in diferent ways. All , for instance, from Eclecticism's hold, taking one step towards impose causal relations on their perceptions; yet the true path of Kantian transcendentalism, and what to some might appear as the result of divine one step away from the incipient of his action will be seen by others as the interplay of psychologizing mentors. purely mechanical forces. Moreover, Schmaus be‐ The Elementary Forms of Religious Life, the lieves that this distinction clarifes what magnum opus of Durkheim's late career, marks Durkheim meant when he says that the categories the second moment in Durkheim's partial appro‐ are social in character. This claim can be inter‐ priation of Eclecticism. In this work, Schmaus preted as meaning either that they have a social contends, Durkheim borrowed the Eclectic argu‐ origin or that they have social function. For ment that the category of causality originates with Schmaus, only the latter is coherent, a point the

4 H-Net Reviews he illustrates in his analysis of what Durkheim Intellectual historians will appreciate says about causality. The term causality contains Schmaus's conviction that the history of ideas can within it two distinct ideas: that of power and that elucidate philosophical arguments. By using the of a necessary connection. For Durkheim, the idea thought of the French Eclectics (particularly their of power originates in totemism, understood as a positions on Kant and the categories) to throw crystallization of collective moral forces. Yet this Durkheim's into relief, Schmaus ap‐ contention leaves itself fully exposed to the pears to subscribe to Quentin Skinner's vision of Humean charge that "no impression, either of intellectual history as the study of the various sensation or refection, implies any force or efca‐ "moves" that thinkers make within the conven‐ cy" (quoted, pp. 127-128). In other words, if tional that they inhabit. Yet Schmaus causality is born of social causes, then it must be also uses history to show how Durkheim was led either contingent (since those particular social astray. Implicitly, he makes Eclecticism shoulder causes might not have happened) or unjustifed the blame for social constructionism, at least inso‐ (because we never experience causes, only suc‐ far as Durkheim is its most important conduit. cessions of events). The idea of necessary connec‐ Most of the views that Schmaus fnds untenable in tion, however, rests on much sturdier ground, as Durkheim are those that he claims Durkheim bor‐ its validity derives from the social function that it rowed from the Eclectics. In addition to fnding fulflls, rather than from the social conditions Durkheim's derivation of causality (understood as through which it was engendered. Without the power) from the experience of social forces want‐ recognition of "a logical relationship between an ing on Humean grounds, Schmaus also objects to intentional state and an action" (p. 133), Schmaus Durkheim's understanding of collective represen‐ would have Durkheim say, no form of moral obli‐ tations--handed down, he maintains, from Janet. gation would exist; without moral obligation, soci‐ Durkheim's confation of the categories with their ety would not exist. Schmaus writes, "Where Kant collective representations marginalizes psycholo‐ saw the categories as necessary for there to be gy from the (since psy‐ universally valid judgments about the objects of chology is allegedly concerned only with individu‐ our experience, it seems that Durkheim was im‐ al thought processes). Moreover, it underwrites plying that the category of causality and perhaps the view that the categories of the understanding the other categories also, are needed for there to are culturally variable, leading to "an unaccept‐ be universally valid moral judgments as well" (p. able incommensurabilism and cognitive rela‐ 132). Consequently, Durkheim's claim that the cat‐ tivism" (p. 138). Furthermore, Schmaus suspects egories have a social character should not be read that the excessively functionalist tendencies of the as a foundational claim about their origin, but as French sociological tradition might also be la a functional claim about their moral purpose. faute a Cousin. Because the Eclectics saw the con‐ This point clinches Schmaus's argument: if the so‐ nection between the will and human action as a cial character of the categories lies in their func‐ causal relationship in which the will initiates ac‐ tionality, then they are protected from Humean tion, rather than, following Kant, as a justifcatory skepticism concerning arguments from origin, in relationship in which the will provides reasons addition to being safe from the social construc‐ for action, the French sociological tradition fol‐ tionist claim that each society has its own cate‐ lowing in their wake has often remained indifer‐ gories, since identical social functions can be ent to the meaning of social action. Schmaus con‐ found spanning otherwise radically diferent soci‐ cludes that "it is perhaps no accident that inter‐ eties. pretive sociology that focuses on the meaning of actions developed and took hold in Germany

5 H-Net Reviews rather than in France" (p. 119). So while Schmaus helped Schmaus push some of his own insights demonstrates an appealing interest in the back‐ further. For instance, when discussing the prob‐ ground to Durkheim's thought, the role that histo‐ lem of the universality and validity of the causali‐ ry plays in his argument is mostly negative. He ty, he notes that Cousin "had no better solution to presents history as a nightmare from which this problem than to assert that God is the source philosophers must awake rather than as the tin‐ and foundation of this and other categorical prin‐ der in which philosophical inspiration is sparked. ciples" (p. 74). Yet he fails to notice how much this Durkheim only gets it right, in Schmaus's view, claim resembles Durkheim's contention that the when he unburdens himself of tradition. categories are born in the experience of religious One reason why Schmaus views the relation‐ rituals--with the critical diference that Durkheim ship between history and philosophy in this way roots them not in a personal god but in a sociolog‐ is that he is exclusively focused on the internal ical understanding of religion. A greater aware‐ history of philosophical thought. In his account, ness of how non-philosophical concerns (such as the roar of battle is distant indeed: we hear noth‐ the belief that religion might stabilize a restive so‐ ing of the chronic social and political turmoil that ciety) impinge on philosophical would, rocked France in the century following the 1789 in places, have strengthened Schmaus's historical Revolution, or even of how philosophy became a argument. terrain upon which competing political visions More emphasis on context might also have confronted one another. Though Schmaus de‐ led Schmaus to place greater weight on the most serves credit for taking a serious interest in often important historical problem that the study of neglected thinkers like Cousin and Maine de Bi‐ Durkheim raises: how did he come to think that a ran, it is a shame that he does not engage recent new science of sociology could answer questions scholarship which considers the role played by that philosophy could not? Or, to calibrate the the Eclectics in post-revolutionary France’s quest question to Schmaus's specifc concerns, why did for a stable political order.[3] Granted, intellectual Durkheim think that a of the cate‐ historians have already explored many of the po‐ gories was superior to a psychological one? litical vistas onto which Durkheim's work opens. Schmaus's claim that Durkheim believed that his [4] And it is also true that to ask for more political sociological account had greater universal validi‐ context is to invoke one of the stock grievances of ty than those put forth by his Eclectic predeces‐ intellectual history against philosophy. All the sors seems to be only part of the story. When same, Schmaus's that "Cousin held Schmaus defends a Durkheim purged of the that people have a need for fxed, immutable claims that the categories have a social origin principles" (p. 62), or that Durkheim started "from (rather than just a social function) and that the the premise that the nature of the mind is such categories themselves (and not just their collec‐ that it has a need for unity, order, and simplicity" tive representations) are culturally variable, his (p. 112) seem to cry out for an analysis of the rela‐ triumph over Durkheim's latent social construc‐ tionship between philosophy and the tumultuous tionism has something Pyrrhic about it. The politics of a revolutionary age. Similarly, Schmaus Durkheim Schmaus has gained, whose categories acknowledges the of August Comte in are as strictly universal as Kant's, save for the oc‐ Durkheim's time, without mentioning the ideolog‐ casional dash of local color, seems decidedly less ical reasons for his appeal, such as the role posi‐ original than the one we have lost, who postulat‐ tivism played in legitimating the Third Republic's ed that reason was indelibly marked by its origins struggles with the Catholic Church. In some in‐ in human social practices. stances, greater sensitivity to context might have

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Schmaus's desire to correct Durkheim's errors ciety."[8] Rawls's and Nielsen's respective eforts and to inoculate his thought from charges of so‐ to locate Durkheim's categories in a theory of so‐ cial constructionism distinguishes Schmaus's cial practice and a social metaphysics are no work from other recent eforts to grapple with doubt vulnerable to Schmaus's Humean objec‐ Durkheim's theory of knowledge. Anne Warfeld tions. Yet by emphasizing, albeit in diferent ways, Rawls has, in a recent study, argued that the vast claims that Durkheim made for adopting Durkheim's epistemology elaborated in The Ele‐ a sociological perspective on human knowledge, mentary Forms should be read as a theory of how they nonetheless ofer compelling descriptions of mutual intelligibility is achieved through enacted what Durkheim's project actually was--even if social practices.[5] Durkheim, she maintains, did Schmaus, in his well argued study, makes it clear indeed believe that the categories have a social that there are solid philosophical reasons for fnd‐ origin, because only through the intense emotion‐ ing this project deeply problematic. al experience of ritualistic practices can moral These reservations aside, Schmaus has ac‐ forces imprint themselves on individuals, provid‐ complished a considerable feat. He has made an ing them with the practical know-how needed en‐ important contribution to the history of Kantian gage in social interaction. As Rawls explained in thought, demonstrating that the most persuasive an exchange with Schmaus in the American Jour‐ accounts of his thought are out of sync, as it were, nal of Sociology (1998): "As far as Schmaus is con‐ with his historical reception. Through a close cerned, the central argument of Durkheim's mag‐ study of often neglected French philosophers, num opus was never written; Durkheim re‐ Schmaus has explained the centrality of the mained to the end a rationalist in the classical derivation of causality from willed efort to nine‐ sense to the end, who did not criticize the inher‐ teenth-century French thought, and presented ent universal 'givenness' of reason." Yet, Rawls in‐ convincing evidence that this tradition shaped sists, "Durkheim was not talking about social con‐ Durkheim's view of the categories in The Elemen‐ tent flling universal rational containers," rather, tary Forms. He also ofers a thoughtful critique of he argued "that the social created the container, social constructionism. Schmaus's work should re‐ the framework, the category itself, not only the mind intellectual historians of all that they have contents." Durkheim did not argue for reason's so‐ to learn from philosophers--especially those, like cial origin to undermine reason's claims to uni‐ Schmaus, who grapple with history. versality, but because he believed that it was pre‐ Notes cisely its social origin that made it universal.[6] Donald A. Nielsen makes a comparable argument [1]. Emile Durkheim, Les Formes elementaires in another recent book. Whereas Rawls grounds de la vie religieuse (Paris: Presses Universitaires Durkheim's epistemology in a theory of practice, de France, 1960 [1912]), 12-13. Nielsen roots it in his social metaphysics. Inter‐ [2]. Notes taken on these lectures by one of pretations of Durkheim's work along positivist Durkheim's students, Andre Lalande, were discov‐ lines have overlooked "the metaphysical dimen‐ ered in 1995 by Neil Gross. sions of Durkheim's work," namely an obsession [3]. In this vein, see Patrice Vermerern, Victor with totality, philosophical , and religious Cousin: Le Jeu de la philosophie et de l'etat (Paris: that owes as much to Spinoza as it L'Harmattan, 1995); and Agnes Antoine, Maine de does, say, to .[7] Durkheim's theory Biran: Sujet et politique (Paris: Presses Universi‐ of the categories, Nielsen argues, essentially taires de France, 1999). Also relevant, though ap‐ serves this metaphysic, providing "the bridge, so pearing after Schmaus's book was published, is to speak, between totality and actually existing so‐ Jan Goldstein's The Post- Revolutionary Self: Poli‐

7 H-Net Reviews tics and Psyche in France, 1750-1850 (Cambridge, [8]. Ibid., 203. Mass.: Press, 2005). Jerrold Seigel's The Idea of the Self: Thought and Experi‐ ence in Western Europe since the Seventeenth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005) addresses Cousin, Maine de Biran, Janet, and Durkheim in a national but not exclusively political context. [4]. There are two infuential intellectual bi‐ ographies about Durkheim: Dominick LaCapra, Emile Durkheim: Sociologist and Philosopher (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1972); and Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical Study (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). Important mono‐ graphs that place Durkheim's thought in historical context include: Robert Alun Jones, The Develop‐ ment of Durkheim's Social Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Ivan Strenski; Durkheim and the Jews of France (Chicago: Uni‐ versity of Chicago Press, 1997); Ivan Strenski, Con‐ testing Sacrifce: Religion, , and So‐ cial Thought in France (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); and Judith Surkis, Sexing the Citizen: and in France: 1870-1920 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006). [5]. Anne Warfeld Rawls, Epistemology and Practice: Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2004). [6]. Anne Warfeld Rawls, "Durkheim's Chal‐ lenge to Philosophy: Human Reason Explained as a Product of Enacted Social Practices," American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (November 1998): 888. See, too, Schmaus's critique of Rawls's posi‐ tion: "Rawls, Durkheim, and Causality: A Critical Discussion," American Journal of Sociology 104, no. 3 (November 1998): 872-886. [7]. Donald A. Nielsen, Three Faces of God: So‐ ciety, Religion, and the Categories of Totality in the Philosophy of Emile Durkheim (Albany: Sate University of New York Press, 1999), 5.

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Citation: Michael C. Behrent. Review of Schmaus, Warren. Rethinking Durkheim and His Tradition. H- Ideas, H-Net Reviews. November, 2006.

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