Statehood, Religion and Strategic Europeanization in the Southern Caucasus

9 / 2013

Guest Editors: Michael Dobbins and Mariam Parsadanishvili (Konstanz)

Signpost near the Gremi Church outside Telavi, Georgia. In a figurative sense, the signpost depicts the new and diverse menu of strategic cultural, political and economic orientations of the southern Caucasian countries (photograph by Mariam Parsadanishvili)

Online Journal of the Center for Governance and Culture in Europe University of St. Gallen www.gce.unisg.ch, www.euxeinos.ch Managing Editor Maria Tagangaeva

Center for Governance and Last Update March 13, 2013 Landis & Gyr Culture in Europe stiftung University of St.Gallen Contents

Editorial 3

Islamists in Azerbaijan: How Dangerous are they? by Rasim Mirzayev, EuroKaukAsia, Bonn-Berlin 6

Post-Rose Revolution Georgia: How Democratization Went Wrong - and Why Authoritarianism also May have Backfired by Michael Dobbins, University of Konstanz 15

“The Armenians were the first to Adopt Christianity as the State Religion” The Understanding of Statehood and Collective Symbolism in Armenia by Anush Yeghiazaryan, University of Konstanz 22

The Development and Establishment of Political Identity in the Republic of Azerbaijan by Yusuf Özcelik, EuroKaukAsia, Bonn-Berlin 27

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 2 Statehood, Religion and Strategic Europeanization in the Southern Caucasus

he Southern Caucasus is a region replete more recent processes of Europeanization and Twith seemingly insurmountable chal- “westernization”. Despite their highly fragile lenges. The three small nations that form this traditions of statehood, these three countries mountainous region are not only confronted are characterized by a very strong sense of with the enormous burdens which other for- collective identity, bolstered by century-old mer communist countries face such as eco- religious and cultural traditions. In the past nomic stabilization, democratization, and the two decades, Armenia, Georgia, and Azer-

Editorial (re-)establishment of civil society, to name just baijan have also taken far-reaching efforts to a few. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are stress their sense of belonging with the West also plagued by additional daunting obstacles in political, religious and cultural terms. Thus, specific to their geographical position. These the Caucasus is torn between continuity and include, most prominently, the multiple un- change in nearly every conceivable aspect of solved armed conflicts within their borders, life and therefore stands out as a particularly the often unwarranted Russian and Iranian fascinating, yet still poorly understood region. influence, and their immediate proximity to With this in mind, the authors seek to con- northern Caucasian separatist conflicts. Both vey a greater understanding of the histories in the present and past, the region has been a and contemporary domestic developments of political football of the grand powers seeking the three Caucasian countries. The essays by to strengthen their foothold over the geopoliti- Rasim Mirzayev and Michael Dobbins focus cally as a bridge between Europe, Asia and the on recent events in Azerbaijan and Georgia Muslim world. In view of the lacking immedi- and in particular external influences on the ate prospect of EU membership as a stabilizing development of statehood. In his article, Ra- reform catalyst, the Southern Caucasian coun- sim Mirzayev explores the complex interplay tries are – to a large extent – forced to cope between Islamization and Europeanization in with the manifold ethnic, religious, linguistic Azerbaijan. He observes a growing potential tensions on their own. The future of the region for the radical Islamization of the country – thus remains highly uncertain and domestic despite the generally highly secular attitude stability is further endangered by the dire eco- of the overwhelming majority of Azerbaijanis. nomic situation and widespread poverty. The author explains this paradox on the ba- Contrary to many previous western anal- sis of both historical developments as well as yses, which have focused primarily on major more recent developments after the collapse international events affecting the Caucasus – of the Soviet Union. He argues that the lack the Russo-Georgian War of 2008, the conflict in of political leeway for democratic and pro- Nagorny-Karabach, the Abkhaz conflict – this western parties and the simultaneous western issue of Euxeinos aims to delve deeper into the support to the ambitions of the Aliyev govern- fabric of the Armenian, Georgian and Azer- ment have resulted in widespread social dis- baijani societies. Specifically, the authors and content and thus provided a “window of op- editors aim to convey a deeper appreciation of portunity” for Islamic extremism. Thus, closer the ongoing and by no means complete pro- ties with the West due to energy resources cesses of state-building and identity construc- may have actually increased the potential of tion against the background of their diverse Islamic radicalism in Azerbaijan. ethnic and religious heritage, but also the

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 3 Michael Dobbins also looks at very re- en the readers’ depth of understanding of this cent political events in Georgia. In his essay he uniquely complex region. outlines how the redesign of Georgian political institutions after the Rose Revolution was Mariam Parsadanishvili (Konstanz) largely driven by the power-seeking strategies Michael Dobbins (Konstanz) of the new elite, who transferred “pseudo-Eu- ropean” political institutions to the country. About the editors: This ultimately strengthened authoritarianism behind a democratic façade. However, he ar- Mariam Parsadanishvili, born in Telavi, gues that this strategy has recently backfired Georgia, studied Slavic and Germanic lit- and – in view of the new power-sharing ar- erature and History in Telavi, Konstanz and rangement between Mikheil Saakashvili and Warsaw. She is currently completing her doc- Bidzina Ivanishvili – may have “accidentally” toral thesis on the topic “Georgia and Russia: contributed to the democratization of Georgia Processes of disintegration since 1970”. The if both men and their political allies prove ca- thesis is part of her research project funded pable of working together. by the Cluster of Excellence “Cultural Foun- In her essay, Anush Yeghiazaryan explores dations of Integration” at the University the meaning of statehood for Armenia and of Konstanz. She also works as a freelance sheds light on the cultural foundations, which translator and trainer for intercultural com- shape the collective symbolism of the Arme- munication. She is the author of the book nians. She stresses, in particular, the adoption “Pasternak und die georgische Dichtung: ro- of Christianity as the state religion in the 4th mantische Tradition und die Dekolonisierung century as well as the development of the Ar- der Poesie im 20. Jahrhundert” (Pasternak menian alphabet and the Armenian territory and Georgian Poetry: The Romantic Tradition itself as the central cornerstones of Armenian and the Decolonization of Poetry in the 20th identity. In this regard, Armenia is very much century), Saarbrücken: VDM Verlag, 2008. like Georgia, in which the troika – fatherland, Additional publications: 2010. Georgiens kon- language, faith – is crucial for identity forma- fliktreiche Abkopplung von Russland: Hege- tion. Along similar lines, Yusuf Özcelik also moniale Ansprüche Moskaus und Verirrun- delves deep into the past to outline the devel- gen des georgischen Nationalismus. In: Vogt opment of the political identity of the Republic M. T. et al. ed., 2010. Der Fremde als Bereicher- of Azerbaijan, by examining the evolution of ung. Schriften des Collegium PONTES. Band the written language, the varying names of the V. Bern, Berlin etc.: Peter Lang, pp. 323-332. country as well as the country’s flag. Against e-mail: mariam.parsadanishvili@googlemail. this background, he provides critical insights com into the unsteady history of the Azerbaijanis within and outside the spheres of influence of Michael Dobbins is a graduate of political various external powers. Both authors show science and Slavic studies at the University of that Azerbaijan and Armenia have undergone Konstanz and also studied at the Universities long-winding and difficult processes of nation of Warsaw and Rutgers. He completed his doc- and identity building, which are still ongoing. toral degree with a thesis entitled “Comparing We hope very much that the essays broad- Higher Education Policies in Central and East-

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 4 ern Europe” in Konstanz. During his doctoral eastern Europe, as well as the domestic and studies and afterwards he worked as a research foreign policies of Caucasian region countries. fellow at the Chair for Comparative Public Pol- Recent publications: Dobbins, M., Tosun, J. icy and Administration (Prof. C. Knill) at the 2012. A differential approach to energy policy? University of Konstanz and at the Collabora- Explaining the prevalence of market-based en- tive Research Center “Transformations of the ergy policy instruments in Central and Eastern State 597” within the project “Internationaliza- Europe. In: Morata, F., Solorio I. eds., 2012. tion of Education Policy” at the University of European energy policy: an environmental ap- Bremen. In January 2012 he joined the Chair of proach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishers; Political Science, Policy Analysis and Political Dobbins, M., 2011. Higher Education Policies in Theory (Prof. M. Busemeyer) at the Univer- Central and Eastern Europe: Convergence towards sity of Konstanz. His main areas of research a common model? Basingstoke: Palgrave. are education and higher education policy, e-mail: [email protected] policy-making in the EU, policy-making in the USA, transformation processes in central and

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 5 Islamists in Azerbaijan: How Dangerous are they?

by Rasim Mirzayev, EuroKaukAsia, Bonn-Berlin

Abstract Although Azerbaijan is one of the most secular and strictly western oriented countries in the entire Islamic world, a tendency towards the formation of radical, Islamic groups can be observed here in the past ten years. This tendency may take on dangerous dimensions because: 1) The ruling authoritarian and immensely corrupt regime does not allow the traditionally democratic and pro-western parties any leeway for political activities, and 2) western governments support the ambitions of the Aliyev clan to maintain power due to their own interests in the country’s energy resources. Therefore, the author expects similar political developments in Azerbaijan as in Arab dictatorships.

A brief look at the relationship between The second factor is the unambiguous Euro- Islamization and Europeanization in pean and western orientation of the society. Azerbaijan Both the overwhelming majority of the common citizens as well as the entire national elite, hat may seem to have been incredible in particular the intellectuals, hold “western- Wfor many observers is increasingly be- ized” or “Europeanized” attitudes. Along with coming a reality: during the past ten or fifteen that, the majority of and most important po- years there has been a tendency towards radi- litical forces and actors in the country can be cal Islamization among various parts of the characterized by a traditionally strict western population of Azerbaijan, in particular within orientation. Thus, the European-western mod- the younger generation. This is the case de- el of society is regarded as a desirable objec- spite the fact that the country has traditionally tive in the entire country, spanning from the and fundamentally differed from other Mus- capital to the provincial villages. This is also lim countries precisely in this regard. This is confirmed again and again by diverse surveys. evidently a contradiction, which can be quite Accordingly, nearly 90 percent of the respon- plausibly explained by looking at the current dents would prefer to integrate their country developments in the country. into European structures than into the Islamic The claim that Azerbaijan is not a typical region.2 Islamic state is based on at least three very im- The third factor is the religious indif- portant factors. The first factor is secularism or ference of most citizens, or in other words a a very secular attitude1 throughout all strata certain degree of frivolity in dealing with reli- of society. Since the foundation of the Demo- gious issues and thus an only loose association cratic Republic of Azerbaijan in 1918, the Azer- with Islam. Against this background, the ma- baijanis have maintained a tradition of a laical jority of the population of Azerbaijan cannot state. While during the Second Republic, i.e. 2 According to the research the Azerbaijani Soviet Republic (1920-1991), results, only approximately 10 percent of those atheism was officially propagated, secular tra- surveyed believed that the country’s constitution ditions were also apparent during this period. should correspond with the norms of the Sharia. The extent to which this applies to the Azerbaijani 1 However, this attitude is the society is reflected in data from surveys according result of a coercive secularization process during to which Iran is only mentioned by four percent of the Soviet era. Originally however, Azerbaijan was the respondents as a role model for Azerbaijan. – also Islamicized by force. see e.g. Mammedli (2011).

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 6 Rasim Mirzayev

be regarded as religious in a strict sense. Even tural orientation of the Azerbaijanis – from if most adult citizens are defined as “Mus- the Islamic-oriental traditions to western val- lims”, a very large share of them has little to ues and ideals – above all through the secu- do with the religion and hardly practice it in larization of public life in its entirety. He saw their everyday lives. That means that the reli- the main reason for the Europeans having gious affiliation of most Azerbaijanis tends to achieved freedom of thought in the liberation be merely a formal issue. It is simply accepted of Christianity from the rule of the church and as a legacy of the older generations and/or fur- in the reformation. In his view, Islam, by con- ther cultivated in a purely formalistic manner trast, had not changed for centuries and not as a tradition.3 adapted at all to the new challenges of life. Furthermore, for centuries there has been Thus, he believed that Islam stood in the way a strong tradition of efforts to reform Islam in of a progressive development of the Muslim Azerbaijan as well as a tradition of Islam cri- peoples. For him, modernization signified, on tique. Even in the 7th century under the lead- the one hand, liberation from Islamic dogmas ership of Babek Khurremi there was heavy re- and, on the other hand, Europeanization. sistance against the Arab conquerors and the Several of Akhundov’s successors indeed coercively imposed Islamization. This battle did enthusiastically adopt his idea of Europe- lasted more than 20 years. Furthermore, the anization and his Islam critique, but accentu- reform efforts were reflected in philosophical ated other aspects. For example, the founder movements such as Hurufizm (F. Naimi, I. Na- of Pan-Turkism and the main ideologue of the simi, 14th century) and Sufism (M. Fizuli 16th First Azerbaijani Republic (1918-1920), Äli bäy century and afterwards). Starting in the mid- Hüsseinsadä was an admirer of Martin Lu- 19th century a large enlightenment movement ther and advocated a reformed Islam, but still was initiated in Azerbaijan, many advocates of also regarded it has an important component which pressed for the modernization and Eu- of the national identity. The latter presented ropeanization of the region and saw religious a tripartite concept for the national develop- fanaticism as the main reason for the back- ment of the Azerbaijanis - Turkization, Islamiza- wardness of the society. This Europeanization tion and Europeanization - which later became and enlightenment movement was founded by the state ideology of the First Azerbaijani Re- Mirza Fatali Akhundov (1812-1878), the great public – the first in the entire Muslim world! Azerbaijani thinker, author and Islam critic, (Mirza 2000) The values of western civiliza- who has been frequently called the “Oriental tion (secularization, freedom, democratiza- Voltaire” or “Caucasian Molière”. (See Brans- tion, etc.) were spread among the population tädter, Mirzayev 2012) by his successors with great enthusiasm and Akhundov completely changed the cul- determination, and in part also implemented and further developed. 3 The most recent research on During the Second Republic, i.e. in Soviet this area also confirms that the number of religious Azerbaijan, these ideas were for a large part believers in Azerbaijan, who more or less comply also further spread among the masses of the with the norms of Islam in their everyday lives, do not account for more than 5-7 percent of the entire population through the education system as population. See e.g. Yunusov, Arif (2007, 2010, part of cultural revolution. The result of this 2012). process was a consequently European, west-

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 7 Rasim Mirzayev

ern oriented, secular society, which in the Based on realistic estimations, the situa- majority was only formally linked with its tion looks much different: in the early years quasi-Muslim traditions. The contemporary after the collapse of the USSR, only two to Azerbaijani elite, the so-called intelligenzija, three percent of Azerbaijanis were so called sees itself in the spiritual tradition of Akhun- practicing believers. But just 20 years later, dov and his secular successors. Moreover, this number increased to over 20 per cent ac- since general Soviet education had reached cording to several studies. This is still a com- all segments of society over a course of nearly paratively low number of devote believers, 70 years, Azerbaijan achieved a much higher but the figure indeed has increased tenfold. level of educational performance than most (Yunusov 2012) other Muslim countries (including Turkey). As As in other “Muslim Republics” a form is well-known the Russian or Soviet education of “Re-Islamization” also has become appar- system was originally based on the western ent in Azerbaijan, which initially – despite the secular education system. Shiite heritage – did not draw on particularly Considering the above mentioned factors radical Islamist historical traditions or take on and conditions, the fears with regard to radical any radical political forms. Even though the Islam in Azerbaijan are only more astonishing. extent of the so-called Re-Islamization process However, this danger cannot be ruled out, as in Azerbaijan is small compared to other So- there are solid reasons for it at the moment. viet Republics (Northern Caucasus, Central Asia), one must bear in mind that the number 2. Re-Islamization tendencies after the of adherents of the Wahhabites and other rad- Soviet era and the potential consequenc- ical-Islamic movements (an estimated 20,000) es has continuously increased in the previous years. In Azerbaijan as well as all other post-So- There are several reasons why more and viet republics a return to religion as an integral more people – in particular young people – part of the national identity can be observed have joined fundamentalist and radical-Islam- since the early 1990s. According to sociologi- ic movements. Among the four most impor- cal surveys at the end of the 1980s, only ap- tant causes are: proximately 50% of Azerbaijanis described The enormous level of social inequality in themselves as religious believers, while in society and the growing dissatisfaction among 2006 this figure had already increased to 72 % the population with the authoritarian and ex- of respondents. (See e.g.: Mamedli 2011) How- tremely corrupt Aliyev regime; ever, one should not regard this trend as a true The abolishment of political freedom in Re-Islamization, rather more as a transitional the country and the marginalization of the phenomenon among people between coercive traditional, democratic and western oriented Soviet atheism and the traditional religious opposition parties in the past 15 years, due to and moral ethos. In other words, people are extensive repression by the government; reluctant to reveal that they are not true believ- A deep disappointment over the betrayal ers or not real Muslims – just as in Soviet times of democratic values by the western govern- many people did not dare to openly state that ments, which openly support the authoritar- they do not believe in communist ideals.

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 8 Rasim Mirzayev

ian regime of the Aliyev clan in Azerbaijan also issues involving economics and world due to their own personal interests in energy politics. They often live out attractive ideals resources.4 from the Koran in a modern way. Through Discrediting of the official, Islamic institu- notions of “brotherhood” or “sisterhood” so- tions and their functionaries in the eyes of the cial networks are created which are aimed to believers. facilitate a new solidarity based on the ideal Regarding the final point, it must be of equality. This ideal is seen as a complete stated that the officially registered and state contrast to the moral decay of society, the im- controlled “spirituality” evidently serves the morality of the ruling class, and the “prostitu- regime and its own material interests. The tion” of power. The moral atmosphere of the machinations of the highly corrupt and usu- Wahhabite communities thereby has become a ally untrained Mullahs are generally well kind of “oasis” with increasing attractiveness. known and disdained. Even the Head of the In addition, many of the new mosques quick- Muslim Administration of the Caucasus, Haji ly came under the influence of various radi- Allahshukur Pashazade, who has held this of- cal, Islamist movements and therefore were fice since the Soviet era, is not a well-respected closed by the government one by one (approx. man. Most Azerbaijanis believe that he and 14 mosques in total). his colleagues conduct dirty business under Nevertheless, the politicization of Islam the disguise of religion. These official spiritual in Azerbaijan still cannot yet be regarded as leaders thus are unable to serve the youth as a a widespread trend. The Islamic Party, which modern moral authority or role model. was founded in the 1990s, is still a marginal By contrast, the new religious leaders of phenomenon in the political landscape, whose the Salafist/Wahhabite movement (e.g. Imam leaders have been convicted and imprisoned Qamet Suleymanov), who were well educat- time and time again on the same and largely ed at foreign Islamic universities, approach implausible pretences (drug consumption, people directly, discuss in an open and skilful possession of illegal firearms etc.).5 manner not only their everyday matters, but

4 In the West, few doubts remain 5 For example, in January 2011 about the corrupt and authoritarian nature of the head of the Islam Party Movsum Samedov and Aliyev’s Regime, in which power was transferred several other activities from the party were arrested in 2003 from the deceased father to son. (See, for and then convicted for up to 12 years, allegedly example, reports on Azerbaijan from international for the possession of weapons and due to their human rights organizations). Nowadays, few purported terror plans. However, nearly no one in Azerbaijanis also doubt that western governments Azerbaijan believes such public accusations, as it primarily support this regime due to their interest is well known that the reason for the arrests was in the energy reserves. The mere fact that all a video of M. Samedov on YouTube, in which he elections in Azerbaijan since 1996 have been broadly expressed critique of President lham Aliyev and described by western governments and institutions appealed to the Azerbaijani people to fight the as “advancements towards the democratization despotic regime. See here: http://www.youtube. of the country” despite the widespread electoral com/watch?v=rXS8mMKhfZw (consulted 11 manipulations is another cause of enormous February 2013) disappointment.

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 9 Rasim Mirzayev

3. Different Islamic pathways in post-So- expanding the transport routes (not only for viet Azerbaijan Azerbaijani oil and gas, but also from Central Asian and potentially Russian sources) to the Since the end of the Soviet era, two differ- Mediterranean Sea and to Western Europe, ent orientations of Islam can be observed in Azerbaijan is becoming an undesired rival, Azerbaijan: which is increasingly proving to be a close ally a) the traditional or official Islam, whose of the Americans and an active member of the institutions are supported by the state; anti-terror coalition. Therefore, the Arab oil b) the radical or missionary Islam, whose magnates could attempt to weaken Azerbaijan members and structures are supported from with the help of radical-Islamic organizations abroad. or to turn the entire region into a crisis zone. Besides the internal Re-Islamization process, a persistent penetration of Islam from 3.1 Foreign groups operating in Azerbai- abroad can be observed in Azerbaijan, as most jan of the radical Islam groups are exported from other Muslim countries. For example, the re- As one of the most significant regional ligious movement “Nurtshuluq” (followers actors, Iran also seems to be very interested of Fattullah Gülen) has entered Azerbaijan in the destabilization of Azerbaijan and most through Turkey. At the same time, Arab coun- of the following religious movements and tries (in particular Saudi Arabia) and Per- groups come from Iran: “Sheychiye”, “Jundul sian Gulf countries have supported religious Mehdi”, “Gum’s Shiites”, “Teheran-Jamaat” movements based on Salafism (Salafiyyun, or among others. It recently repeatedly and un- Wahhabim) and “Al-Dschihade”, among oth- equivocally warned that if Azerbaijan gave ers. It is even assumed that Al-Qaida has set the Israelis and Americans the possibility to up a “nest” for its operations in Azerbaijan. use Azerbaijani territory as a basis for an at- Even beforehand, the country had been tack on Iran, it would immediately fire rockets used by Al-Qaida as a “transit zone” or for at and completely destroy its neighbour. As the coordination of terrorist attacks in other already mentioned above, there were several countries. While using Azerbaijan as a “coor- deployments of Azerbaijani security services a dination point” and “secret haven”, the ter- long time ago during which numerous Islamic rorist network did not wish to undertake any groups were liquidated, which held ties with noticeable activities in the country, rather the the Iranian secret service. contrary by inconspicuously remaining in the The following Islamic Jamaats from the underground and adhering to the state regu- Northern Caucasus have also aimed to spread lations for religious activities. However, there their operations in Azerbaijan: “Sharia-Ja- are indications that the organization is at- maat”, “Gulistan-Jamaat”, “Shamil-Jamaat” tempting to go on the offensive and thus carry among others. Previously such radical under- out terrorist activities in Azerbaijan as well. ground groups were primarily able to estab- Why has such a re-orientation taken place? lish themselves in Baku and its surroundings, There are different answers to this question. but in the past few years they have spread One of the motives could be the issue of oil: by across almost the whole country. However,

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 10 Rasim Mirzayev

most missionary Islamic groups are based in “Hisbu-tahrir”, “Forest Brothers” among oth- four regions: ers. - Baku and its surroundings For example, in late October 2007 the - The northern regions, in particular Qu- Azerbaijani Ministry for National Security ba-Qusar (North-East) to Zaqatala-Balakan announced that the secret services have suc- (North-West); most Sunni Muslims also live in ceeded in foiling the plans by Wahhabists to these regions. commit acts of terror against the embassies of - Sumgait (previously a Soviet industrial the USA and Great Britain as well as offices of city) BP and Statoil among others. There was talk - South-East, i.e. Talysh region (Lenkoran, of large-scale raids, round-ups of weapons, Masally, Astara, Yardimly etc.) numerous arrests, heavy exchanges of fire and - Ganja (traditionally strictly Shiite) in some cases even the liquidation of armed As a rule, these Islamic movements and terrorists. Such events purportedly took place groups are also financially supported by their in the entire country, but were most prevalent respective countries of origin. The latter are re- in the capital Baku and its surroundings as garded by the government as the most danger- well as the large industrial city Sumgait. The ous risk groups and combatted with all means. arrests of the Wahhibists even affected the army. There were reports on the arrest of 15 4. The fight against terrorism: success or officers from the Ministry of Defence and ten hypocrisy? participants in a course of the Military Acad- emy, who were suspected of being members Azerbaijani governmental representatives of Islamist underground organizations.6 The relevantly frequently report about the strong climax of these operations was allegedly the and successful measures to fight terrorism, arrest of a well-known member of the terrorist which they regularly carry out in the coun- group Al-Qaida, Abu Jafar. He is said to have try. The focus of such reports is usually on come to Azerbaijan from Saudi Arabia several the arrest of members of various Islamist and years ago together with other voluntary Arab terrorist groups. These drastic measures have Jihad warriors, in order to find recruits for Ji- become more systematic and continuous since hadist groups, which were operating in vari- 2006. Several court trials have already taken ous conflict-ridden areas of the Caucasus (in place, in which dozens of such groups have particular Chechnya). been convicted due to their allegedly planned 6 “Jihad is my goal in life!” terrorist activities. proclaimed the supreme lieutenant Kamran Asadov Time and time again, the representatives (born in 1975), an officer in the Azerbaijani army, of the security agencies describe the highly in court. He thus showed no remorse, nor did his dramatic and sensational special operations, 19 collaborators. By contrast, they swore that they would continue their battle against the “Kafirs”, which the special units of the secret service the non-believers, until the “end of their lives”. have carried out against the radical Islamic ter- They also described the Sheikhülislam, the official ror groups. References are frequently made to religious leader of the Caucasus, as a “Kafir”. Such internationally well-known terrorist and radi- open and combative hate rants by the members of cal groups such as “Al-Qaida”, “Al-Jihade”, the above mentioned radical group are a relatively the “Wahhabites”, “Hesbollah”, “Jeishullah”, new phenomenon in Azerbaijani society.

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 11 Rasim Mirzayev

4.1 The “Forest Brothers” and the attack operations. on the Wahhabist mosque “Abu-Bekir” On 7 April during one of these operations in Ganja, the second largest city in Azerbaijan, On 17 August 2008, there was a bomb at- a heavy exchange of fire occurred between tack on the “Abu-Bekir” mosque in Baku. This members of the special unit of the Ministry mosque was built several years before with the of Security and fighters from the so-called financial support of Arab sponsors and served “Forest Brothers”. During the operation, a as a central meeting point of the Salafist (Wah- least two people died, the leader of this un- habbist) community under the leadership of derground organization Vugar Padarov Qamet Suleymanov. He was the imam in the (nickname: “Busra”), and an officer from the mosque and received his religious training in Ministry of Security. It has been reported that Saudi Arabia in the 1990s. Subsequently, the Vugar Padarov, who had become the leader Wahhabists were declared responsible for this of the organization in summer 2011, and sev- attack, during which two people were killed eral of his fellow combatants previously had and 19 injured, and 20 people in total were put participated in the Islamic resistance move- on trial. ment in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There they This group called itself “The Forest purportedly fought against western forces Brothers” and consisted of two sub-groups, and then later against the Russian military to- which called themselves “Sumqait-Jamaaty” gether with rebels in the northern Caucasus. and “Guba-Gusar Jamaaty”. Thirty-one mem- In early 2012 they came to Azerbaijan to orga- bers of a radical-Islamic group were convicted nize “Jihad” in their homeland. It is assumed in court and sentenced to three to fifteen years that they have more recently gained combat in prison in June 2010. The group, which was experience in Dagestan under the leadership supposed to be set up by Azer Misirkhanov of the emirs of the “Caucasus-Emirate“ such (nickname: “Abdulla”), had planned to blow as Israpil Velijanov (nickname “Gassan”) and up the Baku-Novorossiysk oil pipeline. Azer Ibragimkhalil Daudov (nickname: “Salekh”). Missirkhanov was previously killed by the US However, one should point out here that the military in Afghanistan. members of the Forest Brothers organization arrested in Gäncä are not from this city, but 4.2 Massive anti-terror activities in the from other areas such as Zaqatala, Balakan, run-up to the Eurovision Song Contest Qakh, Scheki, Ujar, Qusar, and Sumgait. In spring 2012 numerous raids and arrests were The preventive anti-terror measures, also carried out in the capital Baku. which the Azerbaijani security services had There is almost no doubt that a real dan- already initiated in early 2011 on a large scale, ger of terrorist attacks existed during the ESC: intensified in 2012 in advance of the European according to several sources of information Song Contest (ESC): in the previous year more both northern Caucasian rebels (“Caucasus than 70 Islamists and/or alleged members of Emirate”) as well as Iranian and other Islamic terror organizations were arrested and con- organizations had set plans to carry out ter- victed in various regions of the country, while rorist attacks during the ESC event in Baku. some were even liquidated during the special (Pravda.ru 2012, Rosbalt.ru 2012)

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 12 Rasim Mirzayev

5. How great is the danger of radicaliza- words, the ruling class has nearly effortlessly tion? benefited from the fake economic success of the oil-based “rentier state”. Thus the ruling As mentioned in the beginning, the pros- elite have opted for a new strategy: the overt pects for a fundamentalist Islamist movement transition to an authoritarian regime as exists would appear to be weak in Azerbaijan. Cur- in most other Arab countries. In such coun- rently, there is no basis for radical Islam or Is- tries it is commonplace for the rulers to ma- lam in general to dominate the political iden- nipulate the issue of Islamization and to signal tity of the Azerbaijanis, as Islam as a religious to the western democratic allies (in particular doctrine or fundamental Islamism is very the USA) that if they lose power, radical and weakly rooted in Azerbaijan in comparison fundamentalist Islamists will come to power. to other Muslim countries. Thus the chances Evidently, the Azerbaijani “democracy imita- of an “Islamic state” being established here tion regime” has opted for a model which has are extremely weak. However, several experts been practiced for decades in Arab countries are warning of a rapidly growing number of with authoritarian regimes à la Mubarak, with supporters of radical Islam in Azerbaijan. (Yu- whose family the Aliyev clan previously held nusov 2012) very close ties. Thus as long as the above men- There are still many reasons for optimism. tioned factors persist and as long as the poli- Nevertheless, one cannot entirely rule out the tics of the regime and the western countries possibility of explosive developments that towards the regime do not change, the danger pave the way for fundamentalist tendencies. If of a radical Islamization of Azerbaijan contin- the number of religious groups for whom Is- ues to exist. lam not only constitutes a religion, but also a We are now all witnesses of the events to political alternative for the country continues come … to grow, the emergence of a protest movement under the banner of Islam is only a matter of Translated from the German by Michael Dobbins time. The only alternative against such possi- bilities is doubtlessly a true democratization of References the country and at the same time reform-oriented policies in all areas of society. For many Brandstädter, E.-M., Mirzayev R., 2012. years already, Aliyev’s authoritarian regime Ein kaukasischer Aufklärer [A Caucasian has attempted to imitate democracy in Azer- Enlightener], Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 15 baijan, in order to somehow placate his west- December [online], Available at: http://www. ern allies. However, it has become clear that nzz.ch/aktuell/feuilleton/literatur-und-kunst/ the hopes placed in Aliyev Junior – for exam- ein-kaukasischer-aufklaerer-1.17891137 ple that he keeps his promise and slowly push- (consulted 15 February 2013) es the country towards reform and democratization – have been disappointed. In light of the Mamedli, A., 2011. Politicheskii islam influx of “petro dollars” amid the enormous v Azerbaidzhane ne sposoben na price increases for crude oil, there appears to samostoiatel’nye deistviya, [Political Islam be no necessity to further pursue the previ- in Azerbaijan is not capable of becoming an ous politics of “democracy imitation”. In other independent force] Novosti-Azerbaidzhan, 25

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 13 Rasim Mirzayev

November (Interview in Russian) [online] Rosbalt 2012. Islamisty ugrozhaiut uchastnikam Available at: http://www.novosti.az/ “Evrovideniia” v Baku [Islamists threaten expert/20111125/296628521.html (consulted 10 participants of Eurovision in Baku], [online] February 2013) Rosbalt.ru, Available at: http://www.rosbalt. ru/exussr/2012/04/12/968812.html (consulted Mirzayev, Rasim, 2000. Türkçülüyün babasi. Ali 7 February 2013) bey Hüsenyzadenin yaradiciligi [The founder of Turkism. The Works of Ali bey Huseynzade]. About the author: Baku: Elm. Dr. Rasim Mirzayev holds a doctorate in Yunusov, A., 2007. Azerbaidzhan v nachale philology and has worked as a research XXI veka: konflikty i potentsial’nye ugrozy, associate at the Literary Institute of the [Azerbaijan at the beginning of the 21st Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan (Baku). century: the conflicts and potential threats] He was also publisher and editor-in-chief of Baku: Institut mira i demokratii (in Russian); the analytical journal “The Third Era“ (Baku). After settling in Germany he was a lecturer Yunusov, A., 2010. “Ia ne veriu v perspektivu of Azerbaijani studies at the University islamskoi revoliutsii v Azerbaidzhane of Leipzig and a research fellow at the po iranskoi modeli” [“I do not believe in Department of Central Asia at the Humboldt the prospect of an Islamic revolution in University of Berlin. He is a founding member Azerbaijan based on the Iranian model”] and managing director of the Eurokaukasia (Interview in Russian), Regnum, 23 February Cultural and Science Center. In the past five [online] Available at: http://www.regnum.ru/ years he has been affiliated as a research news/1256591.html associate and lecturer with the University of Yunusov, Arif, 2012. V perspektive Bonn and Humboldt University, while also Azerbaidzhanu ne izbezhat’ islamskoi collaborating on a freelance basis with the revolutsii [In this perspective Azerbaijan Analytical Center Fischer & CO (Vienna) and does not seem to able to avoid an Islamic the Academy of International Cooperation revolution], REGNUM , 18 April (Interview in (Bad Honnef). Recent publications: Russian), Available at: http://www.elections- Mirzaev, R., 2008. Wie „Fremde“ unter ices.org/russian/publications/textid:14941/ Eigenen: Zu Identitätsproblemen von süd- (consulted 8 February 2013) aserbaidschanischen (iranischen) politischen Emigranten in Nord-Aserbaidschan. In: Yunusov, A., 2012. Islamskaia palitra Jahrbuch Aserbaidschanforschung, Berlin: Azerbaidzhana [The Islamic spectrum Dr. Köster, pp.175-189; Mirzaev, R., 2010. of Azerbaijan], Baku: Adil’ogly. (in Identitäts- und Integrationsprobleme der Russian). aserbaidschanischen Minderheit in Georgien. Pravda.ru 2012. Islamisty ugrozhaiut vzorvat’ In: Vogt, M.Th. et al., 2010. Der Fremde als ‚Evrovidenie‘ [Islamists threaten to blow up Bereicherung, Frankfurt a. Main et al.: Peter Eurovision], [online] www.pravda.ru, 12 Lang, Band 5, pp.265-28. April, Available at: http://www.youtube. e-mail: [email protected] com/watch?v=7k77WOX1NbI (consulted 7 February 2013)

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 14 Post-Rose Revolution Georgia: How democratization went wrong - and why authoritarianism also may have backfired

by Michael Dobbins, University of Konstanz

Abstract This essay outlines how the redesign of Georgian political institutions after the Rose Revolu- tion was largely driven by the power-seeking strategies of the new elite. Building on previous critical assessments of the post-revolution reforms, the author argues that the new elite engaged in the “strategic institutional transfer”. While publically touting western institutions as a basis for reform, the reformers strategically neglected crucial components of the institutions which they aimed to transfer. This ultimately strengthened authoritarian institutions behind a democratic façade. To conclude, the author discusses discuss how this power-seeking strategy may have recently backfired in the recent parliamentary elections and potentially “accidentally” contributed to the democratization of Georgia.

1. Introduction science deals with the phenomenon of policy transfer (see Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Stone n this essay, I show how the redesign of 1999; 2004). Such studies focus on how knowl- IGeorgian political institutions in the after- edge about policies, institutions and ideas math of the Rose Revolution was driven to a from one political system are drawn on in the large extent by the power-seeking strategies design of policies and institutions in another of the new elite.1 Initially described by west- system (Holzinger and Knill 2005). Dolowitz ern observers as a democratic breakthrough and Marsh (2000) highlight, however, that (see King 2004; Weir 2005), the Rose Revolu- such transfer processes are prone to numerous tion was as unprecedented opportunity to pitfalls. For example, the transfer may be in- introduce western democratic institutions in complete, uninformed, or inappropriate with Georgia. Building on previous more critical regard to the context. First, policy-makers assessments of the post-revolution reforms may hold misconceptions about or have insuf- (Hale 2005; 2006; Papava 2006), I instead show ficiently understood the foreign models they how the new elite engaged in what I define as wish to copy. Second, policy-makers may ne- “strategic institutional transfer”. While pub- glect important components of a transferred lically touting western institutions as a basis policy, making the transfer process incom- for reform, the “architects” of the revolution plete. Third, inappropriate policies may be strategically neglected crucial components of transferred to inappropriate contexts. the institutions which they aimed to transfer. Since the Rose Revolution, Georgia has en- Thus, the “revolution” ultimately strength- ergetically engaged not only in the transfer of ened authoritarian institutions behind a dem- western policies, but also political institutions. ocratic façade. To conclude, I briefly discuss After the failed democratization attempts how this power-seeking strategy may have under the Gamsakhurdia and Shevardnadze recently backfired and “accidentally” contrib- presidencies, Georgia embarked on a third at- uted to the democratization of Georgia. tempt to recalibrate its political institutions in line with those of western democracies. The 2. Institutional transfer as a reform central claim of this essay, however, is that the strategy process of institutional transfer has been char- A growing body of research in political acterized by precisely the pitfalls outlined by Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) and taken place in 1 For a similar argument and more detailed a strategically dishonest manner. Despite the analysis, see the forthcoming article by the same author in Europe-Asia Studies. burgeoning democratic rhetoric, the political

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 15 Michael Dobbins

institutions established by the new elites in the sequently escorted out of the building by his aftermath of the Rose Revolution were based body guards, before declaring a state of emer- to a large degree on incomplete and/or unin- gency and mobilizing troops and police units. formed transfer, and often carried out in a de- However, the elite troops refused to follow his ceitful manner. By no means should the many command and he resigned the evening of 23 formidable achievements of the Saakashvili November, 2003 (Kandelaki 2006). government be ignored or downplayed (e.g. Following a wave of sympathy from the police reform, education reform, military West, “architects” of the Rose Revolution reform, impressive infrastructural develop- repeatedly stressed to their aim to transfer ments). However, the tangible socio-economic western democratic institutions to Georgia progress came at the expense of an increas- (Zhvania cit. in Scholtbach and Nodia 2006; ingly authoritarian and executive-centered Saakashvili 2004; cit. in Areshidze 2007, 15 et policy-making process. seq.). Saakashvili and his allies proclaimed that the existing “quasi-presidential” system 3. Dishonest democratization and should be replaced with a European-style westernization? “quasi-parliamentarian” system (Saakashvili – Rustavi TV 3 February 2004). To do so, the In the 1990s Georgia was plagued by new elite sought to overhaul the country’s po- widespread corruption, economic stagnation litical-institutional architecture and introduce and post-totalitarian social decay. Neverthe- a new array of “democratic” institutions. Most less, the country did introduce basic demo- notably, a Prime Minister was supposed to cratic rules, largely modelled on the United share governing responsibilities with the Pres- States Constitution, which resulted in a sys- ident and the judicial and legislative branches tem of presidential government (see Areshid- were to be strengthened in line with western ze 2007) with various parliamentary control political systems. mechanisms vis-à-vis the executive. In the Upon closer scrutiny though, the insti- early 2000s, widespread discontent and mis- tutional remodelling was driven by precisely trust in the political system was channelled the pitfalls outlined by Dolowitz and Marsh into a large-scale popular movement to oust (2000) – with a strong power-seeking com- the Shevardnadze government. Led by Minis- ponent. First, with repeated references to the ter of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili, Speaker of French context, the post-revolutionary “insti- the Parliament Nino Burjanadze, and her pre- tutional architects” introduced the position decessor in office Zurab Zhvania, the move- of Prime Minister to purportedly strengthen ment accused Shevardnadze of manipulating the legislative. However, the Georgian Prime the 2003 elections. Saakashvili declared him- Minister starkly differed from western mod- self the winner on the basis of electoral exit els in terms of his/her capacity for action. For polls by independent institutes and called for example, in most semi-presidential systems, civil disobedience against the government. In the Prime Minister must be confirmed by the late November, supporters of the opposition legislative, even when appointed by the presi- headed by Saakashvili stormed the Parliament dent. The situation differed in Georgia howev- building with roses in their hands (hence the er, as the Prime Minister could be designated “Rose Revolution”). Shevardnadze was sub- or dismissed by presidential decree – without

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 16 Michael Dobbins

consent from the legislative. And unlike in (Law on Courts of Justice – Chapter 5, Clause semi-presidentialist France, the Georgian par- 36, Sub-Clause 1). However, in striking con- liament could not force the resignation of the trast to the American model of independent, government after the post-Rose Revolution re- permanently appointed judges, who can dis- forms. Moreover, the redesigned Georgian po- credit executive and legislative actions as un- litical system did not provide for situations in constitutional, the “independent judges” are which the President and Prime Minister come not only appointed by the Georgian President, from different parties (i.e. cohabitation in the but also can be disciplined and dismissed by French context). In fact, the Law on the Struc- him/her. Just like the case of the Prime Minis- ture of the Georgian Government, its Authori- ter, the very elements which secure the inde- ties, and Activities” (Sakartvelos Mtavrobis, pendence and autonomy of the newly trans- Uplebamosilebisa da sakmianobis zesis she- ferred institution were (strategically) omitted. saxeb) explicitly stated that the Prime Minister Third, the new ruling elite introduced is directly subordinate to the President (Chap- a new public prosecutor’s office Sakartvelos ter 3, Clause 7, Sub-Clause 5, Item A). Thus the Prokuratura, which was said to be modelled af- Prime Minister remained a mere extension of ter the French Procureur de la République or the the President without any strong legislative German Staatsanwaltschaft. However, instead role and clearly defined competences. In fact, of ensuring the separation of powers, the in- the Georgian Prime Minister was not even giv- stitution remained under extensive executive en the authority to appoint his/her own cabinet control and presidential influence (Reisner members without presidential approval. Thus, 2005; Papava 2008). The Main Procuror, the the newly created institution of Prime Minis- head of Sakartvelos Prokuratura, is designated ter appears to be a case of strategically incom- by the Prime Minister and in turn approved or plete transfer. In other words, a foreign model dismissed by the President (Law on the Sakart- was drawn on to create a new institution, but velos Prokuratura - Chapter 2, Clause 9, Sub- it lacked important components which would Clause 1). This also has ramifications for the have enabled it to act autonomously and inde- sub-national level, as the Main Procuror has pendently of the president and executive. the authority to designate regional procurors. Second, another important institutional Thus, the post-“Revolution”-reforms led to a development also took place along the same judicial system, which was steered by Main lines regarding the judiciary. The “architects” Procuror, who essentially functioned as an ex- of the regime change alluded directly to the tended arm of the President. American model of separation of powers and Fourth and finally, the overall balance of aimed to create an independent judiciary like power between the parliament and president the American Supreme Court (Saakashvili cit. presents another interesting case in point, in Areshidze 2007, 220 et seq.). Once again which reflects the dishonest nature of the “Eu- though, the process of institutional re-design ropeanization process” after the Rose Revo- proved to be incomplete if we take the Ameri- lution. In traditional parliamentary democra- can system as a benchmark. Like in the United cies, the parliament can force the government States, the so-called “independent judges” are to resign. More recently in Georgia though, selected by the Georgian President and since the very opposite was the case, despite fre- 2009 do indeed require parliamentary consent quent claims that Georgia was converging

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 17 Michael Dobbins

on a parliamentary system of government. President and executive surrounded them- After 2004, the President was given the au- selves with a series of “semi-western” institu- thority to dissolve the parliament and trigger tions, which – at least until recently (see be- early elections. At least for western democratic low) – reinforced the pre-existing system of standards, this represents an unprecedented “patronal presidentialism” (Hale 2006, 306). infringement into the sovereignty of the par- Amid the barrage of democratic rhetoric it liament. Effectively, Saakashvili granted his is difficult to speculate from the outside about executive apparatus a power vis-à-vis the the precise motives of the new elite. It is also parliament, which is an inherent and essential an open question whether the architects of the power of the parliament vis-à-vis the execu- Rose Revolution deliberately sought to create tive in parliamentary systems. authoritarian institutions of government or The relationship between the Parliament merely viewed them as a temporary “coping” and Prime Minister over the past decade also strategy to impose benevolent economic and reflects the pattern of executive overreach. societal reforms from above. However, at best, Contrary to the previously existing semi-pres- the preliminary institutional outcome of the idential system, the Prime Minister could not Rose Revolution is the result of faulty assump- necessarily be ousted by parliamentary elections and misconceptions about western insti- tions, as he/she could stay in power by presi- tutional arrangements. At worst, the weaken- dential decree (Lanskoy and Areshidze 2007, ing of parliamentary controls appears to have 169). And along the same lines, he/she could been driven by “strategic dishonesty” to serve also be dismissed by presidential decree, irre- the power-seeking interests of the new elite. spective of parliamentary election outcomes. 5. The October 2012 elections: accidental 4. Pseudo-democratization as a survival democratization? strategy? As described above, the post-Rose Revo- Purportedly inspired by western models, lution “reformers” alluded to western in- the main political actors of the Rose Revolu- stitutions perceived as successful (e.g. par- tion created a narrative that they were im- liamentarism, strong judiciary) to mobilize porting “democratic” political institutions to support for institutional modifications, which Georgia. However, the examples above show ultimately did not result in a western-style that they did so incompletely and haphaz- democracy, rather a form of presidentialism ardly to the extent that the institutions lacked which lacks the necessary institutional checks the institutional stability, independence and and balances inherent in successful presiden- autonomy of the corresponding western insti- tial democracies. Thus, the purported transfer tutions. Altogether, an array of legislative and of western political structures did not help judicial checks and balances to constrain the consolidate the previously existing fledgling president were either removed or integrated semi-democratic structures, rather gave rise into the power sphere of the executive, while to a super-presidential “hyper-executive” and other important parliamentary controls were weakened the institutional capacity of the Par- simply omitted during the process of institu- liament. tional transfer. In other words, the Georgian In view of the previous patterns of action,

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 18 Michael Dobbins

it is surprising that President Saakashvili – af- This electoral upset led to the first peace- ter concentrating nearly all political power in ful leadership transfer in post-Soviet Georgia the executive – has recently acted on his prom- and “accidentally” forced the still reigning ise to strengthen the other governmental insti- President into an unprecedented power-shar- tutions, most notably the Prime Minister. The ing arrangement. Thus, one can tentatively new Georgian Constitution (see Civil Georgia hope that this will translate into a new, more 2010a) significantly curtails the powers of the balanced political culture and institutional President as of 2013. For example, the Presi- equilibrium that ultimately reinforces democ- dent may no longer dismiss the government racy and political cooperation. In fact, the new and, most importantly, the Prime Minister arrangement – the first of its kind in the post- will now act as the head of government and Soviet sphere2 – could actually still constitute set the policy agenda (Shields 2010). More- a win-win situation for Saakashvili. The new over, the Prime Minister acquires the power to parliamentary majority lacks the required determine his/her cabinet. 100 seats for constitutional amendments and Although the modifications were also is therefore unable to further boost the pow- publically legitimized as an approximation ers of the Prime Minister, despite Ivanishvili’s with western standards (Civil Georgia 2010b), stated intention to do so. Therefore the two they were widely perceived as a continua- leaders have been forced to share powers un- tion of the power-seeking patterns described til the presidential elections in late 2013. This above. Initially, Saakashvili was expected to has arguably placed a heavier burden on the follow in Vladimir Putin’s footsteps and as- politically inexperienced new parliamentary sume the now strengthened position of Prime majority and its leadership, who must prove Minister after his second presidential term the honesty of its democratic ambitions. (see Shields 2010; Corso 2010; Marcus 2010). The strong burden on Ivanishvili per- And indeed, it is precisely at this point in time haps explains Saakashvili’s current political (2013) that the new constitution transfers sig- restraint and stated willingness to cooperate nificant powers to the Prime Minister. Thus, with the opposition. On the one hand, this this expected sequence of events would again strategy enables him to thwart criticism with fall in line with the pattern of strategic institu- regard to overzealous presidentialism. After tional design mapped out above. all, the institutional modifications do weaken However, executive authoritarianism the power of the executive and ensure demo- as a power-seeking strategy appears to have cratic checks and balances. On the other hand, backfired, at least for the moment. In an un- the “new Georgian parliamentarism”, which expected turn, Saakashvili’s United National reinforces the powers of the Prime Minister, Movement was dealt a severe blow in the par- provides Saakashvili an opportunity to re- liamentary elections of October 2012. Amid a turn to power as Prime Minister after the next prison torture scandal and, in particular, in- parliamentary elections if the opposition fails creasing critique of his perceived obsession to meet expectations. This would potentially with personal power, the United National enable him to shape policy for a time period Movement was upset by an opposition coali- no longer subject to term limits. In either case, tion known as the Georgian Dream and headed by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. 2 With the exclusion of the Baltic States.

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 19 Michael Dobbins

presidential power-seeking strategies and the Hale, H., 2006. Democracy or autocracy recent “accidental” outcome from Saakashvi- on the march? The colored revolutions as li’s perspective once again have substantially normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism, transformed institutions of government in Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39 (3), Georgia – but this time with the ironic twist pp. 305-329. that Georgia actually has actually moved clos- Holzinger, K. and Knill, C., 2005. Causes er to western parliamentary democracy as ini- and conditions of cross-national policy tially aspired for. convergence, Journal of European Public Policy 12, 5 (Special Issue), pp. 775-796. References Kandelaki, G., 2006. Georgia’s Rose Areshidze, I. 2007. Democracy and Autocracy Revolution: A Participant’s Perspective. United in Eurasia. East Lansing: Michigan State States Institute of Peace: Special Report, pp. 1-12. University Press. King, C., 2004. Rose among Thorns: Georgia Civil Georgia, 2010a. Key Points of newly Makes Good, Foreign Affairs March-April, adopted constitution Civil.Ge, [online], pp.13-18. Available at: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article. Law on Courts of Justice – Saerto php?id=22757 (accessed 30 March 2010). Sasamartloebis Shesakheb 2009, 12.4. Civil Georgia, 2010b. Venice Commission Lanskoy, M. and Areshidze, G. 2008. Georgia’s Releases Final Opinion on Georgia’s year of turmoil, Journal of Democracy 19:4, pp. Constitution. Civil.Ge, [online], Available at: 154-168. http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=22763 Marcus, S. 2010. Georgia Shifts Leaders’ (accessed 30 March 2010). Powers, but Some See a Political Ploy, New Corso, M., 2010. Georgia: Saakashvili Push York Times, [online] 15 October, Available at: for New Constitution Generates Controversy, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/16/world/ [online] Eurasianet, October, Available at: europe /16georgia.html, (accessed 1 December http://www.eurasianet.org/node/62098, 2010). (accessed 30 March 2010). Papava, V., 2006. The Political Economy of Dolowitz, D. and Marsh, D., 2000. Learning Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Orbis: A Journal of from Abroad: The Role of Policy Transfer in World Affairs. Fall 2006, pp. 657-667. Contemporary Policy Making. Governance Saakashvili, M., 2004. Interview with Rustavi 13(1), pp. 5-23. TV, 3 February 2004. Fairbanks, C., 2004. Georgia’s Rose Revolution, Sakartvelos Mtavrobis, Uplebamosilebisa da Journal of Democracy 15(2), pp. 110-124. sakmianobis zesis shesaxeb [General Laws on Hale, H., 2005. Interpreting the Color the Structure of the Georgian Government, its Revolutions and Prospects for Post-Soviet Authorities and Activities], 2010. Democratization’. Ponars Policy Memo 373, pp. Scholtbach, A.P. and Nodia, G., 2006. The 35-42. Political Landscape of Georgia: Political Parties:

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Achievements, Challenges, and Prospects. Delf: stirring up rallies in Central Asia. Christian Eburon. Science Monitor, 10 Feburary, Available Shields, S., 2010. Georgia Law Gives New at: http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0210/ Life to Leader, Wall Street Journal Online, 16 p01s03-wosc.html, (accessed 14 February October, Available at: http://online.wsj.com/ 2012). article/SB10001424052748704049904575554120 268295144.html#, (accessed 15 March 2010). Stone, D., 1999. Learning Lessons and Transferring Policy across Time, Space and Disciplines, Politics 19, 1, pp. 51-59. Stone, D., 2004. Transfer agents and global networks in the ‘transnationalization’ of policy, Journal of European Public Policy 11(3), pp. 545-566. Weir, F., 2005. Democracy rising in ex-Soviet states: aftershocks of Ukraine and Georgia are

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 21 “The Armenians were the first to Adopt Christianity as the State Religion”. The Understanding of Statehood and Collective Symbolism in Armenia by Anush Yeghiazaryan, University of Konstanz

Abstract This paper focuses on the concept and phenomenon of statehood in Armenia. The divergence of the actual status of nation state and the traditional idea of state in Armenian narratives is the topic of the article. The role of religion and the reference to the territory for the conception of the Armenian state are discussed against the historical background and the context of Europeanization and westernization. In this regard the traditional collective symbols and those of the present national state are observed and compared.

1. Introduction does the Armenian state confront processes of Europeanization and westernization? What is he editors of this issue of Euxeinos have meaningful for these processes and how can Tset the aim of illustrating processes of they be explained? Thus, the central question Europeanization in the countries Armenia, is how the state is conceived of. Georgia and Azerbaijan. The main focus of at- tention is placed on these three sovereign na- 2. The Armenian state tions and their relationship to Europe. Each of these three peoples cultivated relationships Long before the origin of the Armenian to the cultures of Europe at an early stage nation state, concepts for Armenian statehood through trade, religion and culture. However, were drawn up. The notion of an Armenian the contributions to this issue will discuss the state is much older than the establishment of processes which target these states as such the nation state. “Armenia is the first coun- (in contrast to the peoples that inhabit them). try that accepted Christianity as the state re- Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, three ligion”: this is a classical sentence which one independent nation states have come into be- can read in many texts on Armenia and the Ar- ing in the region. While the Republic of Arme- menians. The sentence pertains, in particular, nia, Europe and Europeanization will be part to events in the early 4th century, when the Ar- of my reflections in this essay in a broader menian King Tiridat decided to define Christi- sense, I will focus above all on the concept anity as the official religion in his empire (see and phenomenon of statehood. In doing so, Mahé, 1995). Ever since Christianity has devel- I wish to address several cultural elements, oped into the main religion for the Armenian which influenced the perception of statehood people and a centerpiece of Armenian culture, in Armenia. The conditions and the history of and thus had a significant impact on the po- the contemporary Armenian nation state im- litical development of the region, among other pact the perception and handling of the state things. The concept of statehood pertains to the and the corresponding measures introduced administrative system of Armenia at that time. by the state, which included those aimed at The Armenian dynasties ceased to exist in the Europeanization. The question impacts both 11th century. After many years of foreign rule the perception of the state within Armenia as and the dispersion of Armenians around the well as the perception of the state by external world, the first Armenian Republic was not es- observers and partners. What does statehood tablished on the historically Armenian territo- mean for Armenia? In what constellations ries until 1918. The Second Armenian Republic

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 22 Anush Yeghiazaryan

(Soviet Republic of Armenia) followed in 1922 of the preservation of the cultural treasures, and in 1991 the Third Republic after Armenia while the church became a place and center regained its independence. This emergence of of Armenian narratives. The separation of the statehood, which was interrupted for several Armenian Church from the Roman church centuries, provides the historical context for also took place in the 5th century. Through its contemporary Armenian statehood. This in- separation from its Roman counterpart, the cludes a notion of the state as a central admin- Armenian Church became a unifying factor istrative mechanism, reflected in narratives for Armenians. This is also apparent in sym- about the adoption of the Christian religion, bolic combinations. Saint Mesrop translated for example. Armenian statehood is viewed as the bible into Armenian and Saint Vardan suc- a holistic unit, which was restored in the late cumbed while defending the Christian-Arme- 20th century and in which the centuries with- nian faith against the great powers (Zekiyan, out statehood are conceived as part of, thus 1996, p. 52). These two important elements, as an additional integral component to some which enabled Armenians to demarcate them- extent. In order for this holistic unit to even be selves from their surroundings, also played a conceived of, in particular during the period decisive role during the years without a state without statehood, the church took on an im- and during the establishment of the Diaspora portant role as an organizing and administrat- centers. Dispersion and distance were often ing institution, and therefore as a center for all thereby compensated for by the church. A Armenians. large part of the important Armenian symbols reflect ties to the church and the Christian re- 3. The link between statehood and ligion. These include the Armenian Mountain Christianity Ararat as a biblical place, the ancient Arme- nian alphabet, the Saint Vardan – the fighting The notion of statehood in the Armenian martyr from the 5th century - and others. The tradition is closely linked with Christianity. main events and figures can be viewed in this The history of Armenia and the Armenians religious context (Dabag, 1995, p. 22). dates back to long before the Christian era. Nevertheless, the adoption of Christianity 4. Territory and state as the state religion in the early 4th century is together with the Armenian language the An additional element, which contains central pillar of Armenian identity. This has the traditional notion of statehood and poses exerted a strong impact on the independent difficulties for the contemporary state, is its development of the nation and its demarca- territorial reference. The ground on which the tion from its neighbors. The Armenian alpha- country is located is an additional central sym- bet also became an important element of the bolic factor, which impacts collective symbol- Armenian culture and self-conception. It was ism. It gives rise to pomegranates, apricots as created by the monk Mesrop Maschtoz in the well as works of art from stone and other sub- early 5th century, who was the first to trans- stances. This relationship to the earth, to the late the bible to Armenian (and before that to historical territory and to everything which Old Greek and Aramaic). The Armenian lan- man can create, elaborate and produce from guage, alphabet and letters became a symbol it, draws parallels to many important notions:

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 23 Anush Yeghiazaryan

the territory is what is older than the church. It 5. Official state symbolism today provides the link to times of grandeur, powerful dynasties and great victories, when Arme- I now wish to place this traditionally un- nia could measure its strength with that of the derstood notion of statehood in relationship to great world powers of the time. At the same the contemporary nation state and its symbols. time it offers continuity. In many ways reli- The Armenian nation state emerged upon the gious themes and other references to the ter- collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s. The ritory are interweaved with one another. The Soviet years thus had a profound impact on cross stones are a Christian symbol, as their the earliest phase of the independent Arme- name already suggests, and at the same time nia. The Soviet Republic was clearly not a they symbolize strong demonstrations of will sovereign state, but did benefit in some ways and the strength to produce something artistic from the Soviet period in terms of its organi- from the dry and barren Armenian landscape zation and development. Within the Soviet (see Ieni, 1996). However, in terms of their am- Union, the security and existence of Armenia biguity the attachment to the territory and its as well as its remaining territory were protect- perception are also problematic for the state. ed, even though Armenia was forced to adapt The territory that is referred to is larger than to the system. A radical transformation of po- what the borders of the contemporary state litical institutions, in particular, was enforced: allow for. Another significant Armenian sym- all parties except for the communist party as bol – the biblical mountain of Ararat – is an well as the church were banned. However, additional aspect in this context. The historical like the parties, the church was able to contin- territories and the relationship to them define ue with its activities in the Diaspora centers. the perception of what is Armenian. Several of the main Armenian symbols thus The exile-Armenians and their centers are were preserved within the Diaspora, in par- another factor that widens the perceptions of ticular. As the traditional church-related sym- the boundaries of the contemporary nation bols could not be cultivated in Armenia, the state beyond its territory. For the self-concep- Diaspora centers became ever more important tion of the Armenians the Armenian Diaspora for preserving traditions. The political parties is just as important as the population of Ar- also further pursued their activities in the ex- menia. Armenians are not primarily under- ile centers. It was not until the Second World stood as citizens of the Armenian state, rather War that the church gained some degree of as people with an Armenian cultural back- freedom in Soviet Armenia. The language and ground. The affiliation with the Armenian Ap- alphabet (independent of the church) thus ostolic Church, knowledge of the Armenian had become the main conveyors of Armenian language, as well as the family and everyday identity and also provided a basis for research, background play an important role. In this re- writings and publications in Armenia. gard, Armenian collective symbolism concen- The independent Armenian state was es- trates on themes which surpass the boundar- tablished in 1991 as the “territorial legacy” of ies of the contemporary Armenian state. Soviet Armenia. However, as an independent state it aimed to herald a new phase in Arme- nian statehood, as the successor of the First Republic and the Armenian Kingdoms. The

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 24 Anush Yeghiazaryan

first independent state founded in 1918 with that the history of the most recent form of state- its history of just two years became the main hood is a history of breaches. In terms of their source of the symbolism of the contemporary design, the three republics of the 20th century Armenian state. Thus while differentiating have broken in their own ways with existing itself from the USSR, the independent Arme- traditions and embarked on processes of inter- nian state adhered to and preserved many of nal reorganization. Armenia’s functioning as a the symbols of the First Republic. The memory nation state nowadays also constitutes such a of the Armenian Kingdoms, four Armenian breach, not least because the concept of nation dynasties and their emblems were reflected in state is not an Armenian concept. the contemporary national coat of arms of the In what constellation does the Armenian Republic of Armenia. The new symbols were state confront processes of Europeanization immediately decided on. The Dashnaktsutyn and westernization? This is taking place, on Party, to which several main symbols (the flag, the one hand, in a phase of orientation to- the anthem) of the nation state can be traced wards the future in which many aspects of back, is not and was not a unifying element life must be set up and continuously evalu- for the Armenian society. In Armenia parties ated and devolved. On the other hand, the did not play a significant role and many com- historical breach must be overcome, which is peting parties operated in the Diaspora. The occurring against the background the coun- adherents to the other parties in the Diaspora try’s self-confident position of passed down reject the flag of Armenia up to today as a sign unity, a long history, cultural tradition and of their attitude towards the Dashnaktsutyn cultivated relationships. The Europeanization Party. While the symbols discussed here – measures can be of great significance for the whether regarding the religion or the coun- structuring, orientation and organization of try – have the capacity to unify all Armenians, many areas as well as for the integration of the the symbols of the nation state are based on new state into the community of states. The themes which are primarily divisive. They do approximation with Europe can also provide not reflect the central themes of the established a basis for fruitful exchange while developing understanding of statehood. A discrepancy new concepts, but only to the extent that they between recognized collective symbols and of- draw on existing traditions. ficial national systems is occurring. The state is becoming a necessary structure, but is not Translated from the German by Michael Dobbins sufficient to encompass the collective. References Conclusions Dabag, M. 1995. Gedächtnis und Identität. In: What does the state mean for Armenia? In Platt, K. et al. ed., 1995. Armenien: Wiederent- this essay, multiple dimensions of continuity deckung einer alten Kulturlandschaft. Tübingen: of a religious, territorial and cultural nature Wassmuth, pp. 19-25 have been created. At the same time, breaches in this continuity can be identified in the con- Ieni, G. 1996. Die darstellenden Künste und temporary state symbolism, which are only die Chaschkare. In: Novello, A. A. ed., 1996. seldom reflected on though. One could argue Die Armenier: Brücke zwischen Abendland und

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 25 Anush Yeghiazaryan

Orient. Stuttgart etc.: Belser, pp. 225-261 ued her study in Konstanz University. Cur- rently she is working at her PhD thesis. Her Mahé, J.-P. 1995. Armenien: Das Land, die dissertation project explores the meaning of Menschen und ihre Geschichte. In: Platt, K. et the so called Vardan myth for Armenian iden- al. ed., 1995. Armenien: Wiederentdeckung einer tity. The Vardan myth is a moral victory of alten Kulturlandschaft. Tübingen: Wassmuth, the head of the Armenian army Vardan in the pp. 19-25 battle for the religious freedom of the Arme- nian Christians against Persian rule in the 5th Zekiyan, B. L. 1996. Das armenische Volk: Ein century. The central question of the study is historischer Rückblick. In: Novello, A. A., ed., the continuity of the power of this myth and 1996. Die Armenier: Brücke zwischen Abendland its embeddedness in the collective memory of und Orient. Stuttgart etc.: Belser, pp. 47-67. the Armenians. Publications: Yeghiazaryan, A., 2013. Col- About the author: lective Symbols in Period of Transition. The Myth of Vartan Mamikonyan in Independent Anush Yeghiazaryan obtained her Bachelor Armenia. Bulletin of Yerevan University,Social and Master degrees in Sociology at Yerevan Sciences. to appear in print. State University, Armenia. Then she contin- e-mail:[email protected]

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 26 The Development and Establishment of Political Identity in the Republic of Azerbaijan

by Yusuf Özcelik, EuroKaukAsia, Bonn-Berlin

Abstract There is no doubt that the Azerbaijani people have experienced a very unsteady history for at least two centuries, which has had a deep impact on their national identity. Many times the country has faced a situation of radical changes between self-determination and foreign dominance, consequently leading to mass cultural influence and modernization, but also manipulation and destruction. Against this background, Azerbaijan looks back at a very rocky and tedious process of nation-building. As shown in this essay, the developments are still ongoing. However, the Republic of Azerbaijan has managed to finally reach a balance with regard to its political identity and culture.

Introduction closely related to “Azerbaijani” was even established as the (diplomatic) language of the here is no doubt that the Azerbaijani peo- Persian Empire under Shah Ismail I. in the Tple have experienced a very unsteady his- early 16th century, while Azerbaijanis were tory since the beginning of the 19th century. generally referred to as “Turks” or “Turk- This essay aims to reflect on this highly vari- meni” (Efendiyev 2007, p. 36). However, in able period, which has had an enormous im- the Russian Empire they were referred to as pact on the development of the political iden- “Tartars”. Although the Russian administra- tity of the population, by exploring external tion dealt with the terms Azerbaijani and Turk signs of political identity such as titles, lan- very restrictively, Azerbaijani intellectuals guages and flags. resisted this perceived injustice. The national awakening, which affected the Turkic areas Eventful history and the development of of the Russian Empire and the Ottoman Em- the Azerbaijani identity pire as of the late 19th century, was based on a pan-Turkish national movement, in which The signing of the Treaty of Turkmenchay Azerbaijani intellectuals played a crucial role. in 1828 heralded the beginning of Russian rule Already in 1891 Mehemmed aga Shakhtakhtli over the territory of contemporary Azerbaijan wrote in an article in the newspaper “Kaspi” and with it a period characterized by para- entitled “What should the trans-Caucasian doxical developments. On the one hand, Rus- Muslims be called” that the Turkish-speaking sian rule initiated an ominous era of massive nation consists of Azerbaijanis (Muradaliyeva cultural influence, manipulation and domi- & Aziz 2010, p. 136). Upon the foundation of nance, while on the other hand, the period was the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, the marked by modernization and westernization, term “Turk” emerged, which was enforced which led to greater cultural and social pros- in the Soviet Union as the sole term used for perity for both Azerbaijan as well as the sur- Azerbaijanis, while all things “Turkish” were rounding predominantly Muslim territories. oppressed and eradicated. These “termino- As a result of the colonization, the country logical tensions” did not subside until 1992 came under the influence of western and mod- when the country regained its independence ernist ideas. and “Azerbaijani” asserted itself as the only Previously, the Azerbaijanis played a de- formally correct term. However, the national cisive role in the development of Iran over identity is no longer limited exclusively to the several centuries. In fact, a form of Turkish “Turkish” family of cultures (Alakbarov 2012).

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 27 Yusuf Özcelik

The etymological origin of the term “Azer- Central Asia. The national movement was a baijan” has not yet been fully clarified. The modernist movement, which was largely driv- most prominent explanation is derived from en by European ideas. With the foundation Atropathene, which in turn can be traced back of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijani in to the Satrap Atropates under Alexander the 1918, which occurred nearly simultaneously Great, who also served in the Persian Empire. with the establishment of the Georgian and The term Atropatene essentially described the Armenian Republics during the chaos of the contemporary province of Azerbaijan in Iran, October Revolution in the Russian Empire, the which is also known as Southern Azerbaijan. Turkish nationalists asserted their demand for In ancient times, the territory of the contem- independence (Resulzade 1993, p. 40). Shortly porary republic was called “Albania” and thus afterwards, voting rights for women were in- named after the ancient Caucasian people troduced as a sign of modernization. Howev- known as Albanians, who had nothing to do er, the young republic only survived for two with the contemporary Albanians (Shkipet- years before it was incorporated into the So- ars) in the Balkans except for the common for- viet Union. eign appellation. During the late antique pe- The name Azerbaijan did not result auto- riod during the Persian Sassanid Empire, the matically as the denomination of the young word Atropatene developed into Aturpatakan, republic. The naming of the republic was pre- while under the Arab rule as of the 7th century ceded by discussions, during which – besides it evolved into Azerbaijan under the influence Azerbaijan – “Turkey” was also considered, as of Arabic (Gink & Turanszky 1980, p. 11). the Republic of Turkey did not yet exist (the By majority, the contemporary popula- neighbouring country was still formally the tion of Azerbaijan can be categorized as part Ottoman Empire) (Resulzade 1993, p. 47, Al- of the Turkic family of peoples. Under the rule akbarov 2012). The founding father and Presi- of the Turkish Seljuqs which began in 1025 and dent Memmed Emin Resulzade was able to due to the immigration of Turkish tribes from assert the name “Azerbaijan”), because in his western Central Asia, in particular, the ethnic view “Azerbaijan” referred to the Azerbaijan- composition of the territory rapidly changed Turks as an ethnic denomination (Resulzade (Gink & Turanszky 1980, p. 16). Even though 1993, p. 48). The nation was constituted by the earlier migration of Turkic tribes above Azerbaijani Turks and the language was Turk- all from the contemporary Southern Russian ish, but it is important to note that this was the steppe is well documented, such early waves Azerbaijani variation of the language. of migration did not have a formative impact With the establishment of the republic in (Qeybullaev 1994, p. 8). 1918 a red flag with a crescent and eight-edged When Russian rule was established in the star based on Ottoman flag of the 19th centu- early 19th century based on the Treaty of Turk- ry was introduced. Later on, the Azerbaijani menchay, the Azerbaijani intelligentsia became national activist Ali Bey Huseynzade added an integral part of the Turkish national move- the colours blue and green to the red in order ment between Istanbul and Tashkent. This to represent the Turkish heritage (i.e. “Turk- had far-reaching consequences for politics, the dom”) and Islam (Aliyev & Maharramov territory of Azerbaijan, contemporary Turkey, 2008, p. 14). the Crimean Peninsula, the Ural region and

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 28 Yusuf Özcelik

The Azerbaijani SSR (1920-1991) and regarding the written language. While the Sovietization Christian peoples neighbouring Azerbaijan – the Georgians and Armenians – were allowed The incorporation of Azerbaijan into the to maintain their century-old alphabets, the Soviet Union initially masked the national Azerbaijanis and all other Muslim peoples in question. Initially, under the leadership of the the Union had to replace their also century- Azerbaijani revolutionist Nariman Narimanov old alphabets based on Arabic first with the the establishment of Soviet power was consti- uniform Latin alphabet and several years later tuted in a smooth manner. However, with the with a Cyrillic alphabet with partially differ- increasing stabilization of the Union and the ent letters (Fenz 2003, p. 113). ongoing cultural revolution, severe changes For many ethnic groups this was praised were imminent in the cultural identities of as cultural progress with the trivial and dubi- the Muslim peoples, in particular, which had ous justification that they did not yet have their a significant impact on the following dimen- own language of literature. However, this ex- sions. planation cannot be accepted at face value. As First, at the linguistic level, the denomi- described above, since there was previously nation of and later the content and substance no need for an own standard language based of the official language became a central issue on a local dialect, this function was generally of power politics. For those peoples, who did fulfilled by passed down standard languages not yet have an own standard language as a such as Chagatai (Turki, Eastern Turkish) language of literature and culture, the devel- in Central Asia or Turkish (Azerbaijani vari- opment of the standard and literary language ant) in the Caucasus. The consequence of the on the basis of their local dialects became a re- change in alphabets was that the Soviet lead- quirement. For example, this was the case with ership now had come to control the funda- the Central Asian peoples who used Chagatai mental issue of identity and was able to dilute (Turki, Eastern Turkish), which is the linguis- all previously strong ties between neighbour- tic “forerunner” of contemporary Uzbek. This ing Muslim peoples. created an artificial barrier between the lin- The additional changes affected the iden- guistically related peoples. tity and the historical self-conception of the This also applied to Azerbaijani, as the Azerbaijani nation. The national realignment targeted language policy led to its alienation practically took place over night. While dur- from Ottoman/ Anatolian Turkish and the ing the early years of the Soviet Union the other Turkic languages. This policy involved designation “Turk” was printed as the nation not only a list of forbidden words, which cor- of the Azerbaijanis in their personal identity responded with the common vocabulary of documents, this was changed to “Azerbaijan- these languages. The Soviet authorities also is” in 1937. From that point on, it was not only promoted the targeted construction of ne- frowned upon to call Azerbaijanis Turks or the ologisms and borrowed words from Russian, language Turkish, but also forbidden (Mikay- which in turn facilitated a decade-long “lin- iloglu 2009). This also had an impact on the guistic estrangement” up to the collapse of the censorship policy. Even the famous Azerbai- Soviet Union in 1991 (Alakbarov 2012). jani poet Samad Vurgun was affected by cen- The second dimension was the policy sorship. He began his translation of “Yevgeni

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 29 Yusuf Özcelik

Onegin“, a work by the great Russian author the massacre of Khodjali, in which civilians Pushkin, with the words “I have translated were killed by Armenian fighters, the path to the masterpiece of Russian poetry into the lan- power had been paved for the People’s Front. guage of the Turks for the first time”. Due to Azerbaijan’s independence was preceded the ban on the term “Turk” for Azerbaijanis, by mass protests starting in 1988, which had he had to convert the introduction “into the been organized by the People’s Front in par- language of Vaqif”, an Azerbaijani poem and ticular. During this phase, the old flag of the prime minister of the Azerbaijani Khanate of Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan from 1918 Karabakh from the 18th century, who was ac- re-emerged for the first time in decades. Al- knowledged to have written poetry in “Turk- ready in February 1991, thus eight months ish” (Hilal qizi 2011). before formal independence, the old flag was The Soviet government first introduced a again officially introduced. flag based on the Turkish flag with a crescent After Azerbaijan regained independence and star. However, it was already replaced in in 1991 and under the leadership of the Peo- 1921 by a new flag based on the Soviet com- ple’s Front headed by Ebülfez Elçibey, the munist flag which was then modified several name Azerbaijan was not a subject of debate. times under Soviet rule. It was widely accepted in society and had es- The development of the issue of identity tablished itself as the designation of the Azer- was to be substantiated by historical events. baijanis as the titular nation. Instead, the de- Here the so called “Median hypothesis” was bate raged with regard to the designation of put forward that the Azerbaijanis were only the language. For the People’s Front, Azerbai- Turkicized Medians, an antique Iranian peo- jani was a variation of Turkish in the tradition ple which settled in modern-day southern of the founding father Memmed Emin Resul- Azerbaijan. zade. Subsequently, Turkish was defined as Last but not least, the Stalinist terror re- the language of the country in the constitu- gime proved to be a severe incursion into so- tion. Simultaneously, the People’s Front pur- cietal discourse in Azerbaijan. Nationalist po- sued a linguistic and cultural convergence ets such as Huseyin Djavid were deported to with Turkey, by aligning the alphabet with the Siberia after 1937 if they were not murdered modern Turkish alphabet based on Latin and beforehand. by imposing a language policy similar to that of Turkey. Also, the Median hypothesis was Regained independence (1991) ultimately discredited. However, these policies were ridden with The new independence of Azerbaijan in conflict potential. They were not preceded 1991 was characterized by the conflict with by an open political discourse, so that Azer- the Armenians. In this phase under the leader- baijanis of other ethnical origins indeed felt ship of Ayaz Muttalibov, the identity-related blindsided, leading to increased social ten- status quo was maintained to a great extent. sions (Babayev 2007, p. 61). However, opposition movements such as the People’s Front were able to largely assert their demands vis-à-vis official state policy. Once Muttalibov was forced to resign as a result of

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 30 Yusuf Özcelik

4.1. Stabilization under Haydar Aliyev Ilham Aliyev. (1993-2003) The new Azerbaijani alphabet on the basis of the modern Latin-based Turkish alpha- The rule of the People’s Front did not last bet became more widespread under Aliyev. very long and was terminated by a military The long-term rule of Aliyev also resulted in coup in 1993 led by colonel Surat Huseynov, a strong focus on the national issue, where- the later Prime Minister. In this time of politi- by the term Azerbaijani corresponds with a cal chaos Haydar Aliyev was able to assume broad social consensus. In internal and exter- the presidency and stabilize the country and nal discussion there is no doubt regarding the bring it back from political crisis with a more national denomination: all parties and societal balanced approach. He essentially further groups have come to accept the term Azerbai- pursued the national policy of his predecessor jani for the people and language as an expres- Ebülfez Elçibey. In view of the lasting conflict sion of their national identity, however the so- with neighbouring Armenia over Nagorny- cietal discourse is still ongoing (Babayev 2007, Karabakh and an increasingly unpleasant p. 67). “sandwich position” between the two pro- Armenian governments of Russia and Iran, Outlook he also felt compelled to sustain the strategic western orientation of his predecessor. In this Azerbaijan looks back at a very rocky and regard, he proved to be a rather skilful “bal- tedious process of nation-building. The devel- ancing actor” between the powerful Russian opments show that the process is still ongo- neighbour and western allies (Bagirov 2011, p. ing. However, it is apparent that the choice 182). for Azerbaijan as the name of the country was When he assumed power, the constitu- constructive for the still young nation. The tional modification introduced by the Elçibey term, which at that time was perceived as eth- administration, according to which the lan- nically neutral, was able to give many repre- guage of the republic was “Turkish”, was re- sentatives of smaller Muslim ethnic groups, modified in 1995 to make “Azerbaijani” the such as Avars, Kurds, Ingiloy and Tats, the national language. The titular nation is no sense that they are part of the overarching tit- unambiguously designated as Azerbaijanis. ular nation (Alakbarov 2012). This process of Other terms such as “Turks”, “Azeris” or “Az- homogenization is not yet entirely complete, eri-Turks” are now entirely absent in official but already very advanced. language usage (Alakbarov 2012). This had the effect that the domestic political discourse Translated from the German by Michael Dobbins was somewhat relaxed and ethnic tensions dismantled. References At the same time Aliyev attempted to up- hold the “bridge to the western brother coun- Alakbarov, F., 2012. Türk Cümhuriyyətinə try” Turkey, by speaking of two countries and nədən «Azərbaycan» adı verildi? [Why was one nation during numerous visits to Turkey. the Turkish Republic named Azerbaijan?] This policy is being further pursued by his son Modern.az [online], Available at: http://mod-

Euxeinos 9 (2013) 31 Yusuf Özcelik

ern.az/articles/22735/1/ (accessed 4 July 2012). Towers, Mosques]. Hanau: Dausien.

Alakbarov, F., 2012. Biz kimin varisiyik: Milli Hilalqizi, S., 2011. Senzura Səməd Azərbaycanın, yoxsa Sovet Azərbaycanın? Vurğunu Məcbur Edirdi Kİ [The Cen- [Whose heirs we are: Those of National- sorship forced Samed Vurgun to…], Azerbaijan or Soviet-Azerbaijan?], Modern. Available at: http://www.musavat. az [online], Available at: http://modern.az/ar- com/new/%C3%96lk%C9%99/110304- ticles/21059/1/, (accessed 2 November 2012). SENZURA_S%C6%8FM%C6%8FD_ VUR%C4%9EUNU_M%C6%8FCBUR_ Alakbarov, F., 2012, Türk dili Azərbaycan ED%C4%B0RD%C4%B0_K%C4%B0..., dilinə necə çevrildi?, [How was the Turk- (accessed 16 October 2011). ish language was changed to the Azerbaijani Language?], Modern.az [online], Available at: Muradaliyeva, E.B. and Aziz, B.O., 2010. http://modern.az/articles/32237/1/ (accessed Şimali Azərbaycan XIX Əsrin 70-ci illəri – 12 October 2012). XX Əsrin əvvəllərində [Northern Azerbaijan in the 70s of the 19th Century]. In: Rzayevin Aliyev, I., Maharramov, E., 2008. Azərbaycan A.Ə., 2010. Azerbaycan Tarixi, [History of Azer- Respublikasının Dövlət Rəmzləri, [The Symbols baijan], Baku: University of Baku Press, pp. of the Republic of Azerbaijan], Baku: Nurlan. 121-151.

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Euxeinos 9 (2013) 32 Yusuf Özcelik

About the author:

Yusuf Özcelik has obtained his diploma degree in Business Administration and master’s degree in Regional Sciences - Central Asia and the Caucasus. He is founding member and board member of the academic association EuroKaukAsia e.V., specialist in Psychology of Ethnic Conflicts. Recent publications: Özce- lik, Y., 2009. Ethnische Vielfalt in Kaukasien, Eurokaukasia.de, [online] Arbeitspapier, Juni 2009; Özcelik, Y., 2009. Psychologie ethnischer Konflikte. Historische Wurzeln und psycholo- gische Mechanismen ethnischer Konflikte am Beispiel Kaukasiens. Eurokaukasia.de, [online] Arbeitspapier. e-mail: [email protected]

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