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Rainer Zitelmann Exposes, Dissects, and Quantifies the Twin Vices Has Only Been Sporadic Research Into Stereotypes of Envy and Covetousness

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Rainer Zitelmann Exposes, Dissects, and Quantifies the Twin Vices Has Only Been Sporadic Research Into Stereotypes of Envy and Covetousness $24.95 What do people in the United States and Europe think about the rich? There are several thousand books and articles on stereotypes and prejudices directed at women, people of various races or nationalities, and even the poor. In contrast, there “Rainer Zitelmann exposes, dissects, and quantifies the twin vices has only been sporadic research into stereotypes of envy and covetousness . and makes it impossible for future about the rich and no published comprehensive, generations to ignore: Atlas Shrugged—with numbers and footnotes.” scientific study on the topic—until now. Negative prejudices and stereotypes have repeat- —GROVER NORQUIST, president, Americans for Tax Reform edly been used to justify the exclusion, expulsion, persecution, and murder of minorities who have Rainer Zitelmann “Rainer Zitelmann raises the awareness for the general biases of the been scapegoated at times of social crises. The media against the people who have created value not only for themselves 20th century is full of examples of wealthy people, is a historian and sociologist. He started his career but especially for the society they live in. This makes the book a great including capitalists, kulaks, and other groups, at the Central Institute for Social Science Research read for everyone interested in the intersection of sociology and economics.” who were victims of deadly persecution. These were at the Free University of Berlin. Later, Zitelmann exceptional situations but, even in moderate forms, worked in book publishing and the newspaper —FRANK SCHÄFFLER, president, Prometheus – Das Freiheitsinstitut, Berlin prejudice against social groups harms society as a industry. He headed various departments at one of whole—not just the rich—through economic or Germany’s leading daily newspapers, Die Welt, before “This is a timely and relevant book, not least because while ‘eat-the-rich’ physical destruction, and declining prosperity. founding his own public relations firm. Zitelmann rhetoric may be good politics, it is demonstrably a poor guide to policy.” In The Rich in Public Opinion: What We Think When We is the author of 23 books, which have been published KRISTIAN NIEMIETZ, Think about Wealth, historian and sociologist Rainer worldwide in numerous languages. His two most — head of political economy, Institute of Economic Affairs Zitelmann examines attitudes about wealth and recent books are The Wealth Elite (2018) and The Power of the wealthy in four industrialized Western coun- Capitalism (2019). He writes for prestigious European “Zitelmann destroys empirically and logically the virtue-signaling arguments that tries: Germany, the United States, France, and media such as Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Switzerland); Die so often attack the rich. [He] does a superb job of revealing the media and public Great Britain. Consisting of three parts, this Welt, Focus, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (Germany); bias against the very people that allowed most of the world to overcome poverty book first surveys the literature about stereotypes and The Daily Telegraph and City AM (London). Every and reach the middle class. An important contribution that sets the record straight!” and prejudices. Zitelmann then reports on never- Monday, he publishes a column on Forbes.com. —WOLF VON LAER, CEO, Students for Liberty before-seen data commissioned by the polling firm Ipsos MORI and from the Allensbach Institute, “This is a very timely book about the rarely mentioned prejudice, which conducted identical surveys of residents of four countries regarding various aspects of their JACKET DESIGN BY FACEOUT STUDIO, LINDY MARTIN classism, and denigration of those with wealth and status. Zitelmann WHAT WE THINK WHEN WE THINK ABOUT WEALTH attitudes toward wealth. Lastly, The Rich in Public JACKET IMAGERY BY SHUTTERSTOCK AND GETTY IMAGES systematically and scientifically explores why this attitude is so pervasive.” Opinion looks at the portrayal of the rich in media —MADSEN PIRIE, president, Adam Smith Institute and film. Rainer People often admire the wealthy, but Zitelmann Zitelmann shows that people can also envy them—a sometimes toxic envy that can put lives at risk. This book aims JOIN THE CONVERSATION ON to examine how we think about a minority that, while undeniably powerful, can still be the subject of negative stereotypes, prejudice, and scapegoating— often with dire effects for us all. @CatoInstitute #CatoBooks The Rich in Public Opinion-DJ-v3.indd 1 2/10/20 10:06 AM.
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