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Politics, Terrorism, and the Sunni Divide
Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes A Catalyst for Ideas Distributed via Fax & Email and Posted at www.fpri.org September 2009 POLITICS, TERRORISM, AND THE SUNNI DIVIDE By Samuel Helfont This E-Note is based on Mr. Helfont’s forthcoming monograph, The Sunni Divide: Understanding Politics and Terrorism in the Arab Middle East, a product of FPRI’s Center on Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Homeland Security. Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood are two distinct forms of Sunni Islamism. They have separate histories and separate worldviews. In reality they are not even the same type of movement. Their origins were largely unrelated. Their historic missions have been completely different, as are their current goals and means of achieving those goals. Unfortunately, these differences too often are overshadowed by a false Sunni-Shia dichotomy that tends to lump all Sunni Islamists together. But learning the differences between Sunni Islamists is critical to understanding politics and terrorism in the Arab Middle East. One could even argue that the most important division shaping Arab politics is not between Sunnis and Shias but between the Wahhabis and the Brotherhood. Before delving into current issues, however, it is first necessary to define differences between Wahhabism and the Muslim Brotherhood. Wahhabism stems from the theological teachings of Muhammad ibn abd al-Wahhab, the eighteenth century reformer. Abd al- Wahhab was one of several “revivalist” thinkers to emerge from that century. The mission of these revivalists was to purify and thereby revitalize Islam. They carried the banner of reform but unlike modern reformers, they wanted to transform Islam on traditionally Islamic grounds. -
The Role of Deobandi Ulema in Strengthening the Foundations of Indian Freedom Movement (1857-1924)
The Role of Deobandi Ulema in Strengthening the Foundations of Indian Freedom Movement (1857-1924) The Role of Deobandi Ulema in Strengthening the Foundations of Indian Freedom Movement (1857-1924) * Turab-ul-Hassan Sargana **Khalil Ahmed ***Shahid Hassan Rizvi Abstract The main objective of the present study is to explain the role of the Deobandi faction of scholars in Indian Freedom Movement. In fact, there had been different schools of thought who supported the Movement and their works and achievements cannot be forgotten. Historically, Ulema played a key role in the politics of subcontinent and the contribution of Dar ul Uloom Deoband, Mazahir-ul- Uloom (Saharanpur), Madrassa Qasim-ul-Uloom( Muradabad), famous madaris of Deobandi faction is a settled fact. Their role became both effective and emphatic with the passage of time when they sided with the All India Muslim League. Their role and services in this historic episode is the focus of the study in hand. Keywords: Deoband, Aligarh Movement, Khilafat, Muslim League, Congress Ulama in Politics: Retrospect: Besides performing their religious obligations, the religious ulema also took part in the War of Freedom 1857, similar to the other Indians, and it was only due to their active participation that the movement became in line and determined. These ulema used the pen and sword to fight against the British and it is also a fact that ordinary causes of 1857 War were blazed by these ulema. Mian Muhammad Shafi writes: Who says that the fire lit by Sayyid Ahmad was extinguished or it had cooled down? These were the people who encouraged Muslims and the Hindus to fight against the British in 1857. -
Bangladesh Decision – 28Th July 2018
Bangladesh Decision – 28th July 2018 Today on 28th July 2018 under the guidance of the Ulama of Bangladesh, the elders of the effort and the government of Bangladesh, approximately 600,000 to 700,000 people gathered in Dhaka. The following six matters were agreed: 1) Jamhoor Ulama are unanimous that because of three reasons, following Moulana Muhammad Saad Kandhlawi is not permissible. a) Incorrect and personalised interpretations of the Quran and Hadith. b) To enhance the importance of the effort of Dawah, resorting to degrading other efforts of Deen. c) Moving away from the methodology of the previous three elders; Hazrat Moulana Muhammad Ilyas (R), Hazrat Moulana Muhammad Yusuf (R) and Hazrat Moulana Inamul Hasan (R). 2) The disregard of Moulana Muhammad Saad of the Shura methodology adopted by Hazrat Moulana Inamul Hasan (R) and his insistence upon being Amir. This will not be accepted in Kakrail in any form. 3) Darul Uloom Deoband’s fear that Moulana Muhammad Saad has moved away from the ideology of Ahlus Sunnah Wal Jama’ah and has resorted to create another group. Therefore, at the moment it is strongly advised that no Bangladeshi Jamat etc travels to Nizamuddin. Similarly, no Jamat from Nizamuddin will be allowed a route in any area of Bangladesh. 4) The effort of Dawah has gained acceptance as per the methodology adopted by the previous three elders. Therefore, this effort will continue on this methodology and under the guidance of the elders of Deoband. No new methodology will be adopted. Kajrail, Tongi an all other Marakiz will work accordingly only. -
Gulf July 2016
Gulf July 2016 Boycott is over? Participative trends in Gulf’s Muslim Brotherhood In the Arab Gulf region, contemporary although different trends in government-opposition dialectic have been surfacing. Broadly looking at state-society relations, Kuwait, Jordan and Bahrain are representative case-studies to identify and compare paths of political moderation or exclusion in an age of regional instability. All these countries will held parliamentary elections by two years. In Kuwait, candidates belonging to the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM, also known as al-Harakat al-Dusturia al-Islamiya, HADAS) will run for the 2017 parliamentary elections. The Muslim Brotherhood- linked movement (even though no more formally affiliated with the international Brotherhood organization) boycotted last elections in 2012 and 2013 to criticize the electoral law, as many Salafi groups did as well. In Jordan, the Muslim Brotherhood has been experiencing a “crisis of political identity” still unsolved and it often opted in the past for the electoral boycott, as occurred in 2010 and 2013. Notwithstanding rising intra-Ikhwan fragmentation, all the parties who claim for the Muslim Brotherhood’s legacy (the Islamic Action Front proceeding from the original movement funded in 1942, the Society registered in 2015 and the reformist initiative Zamzam) will take part to the legislative elections scheduled the 20th of September, although limited change is expected from the consultation. In Bahrain, the main Shia political society, al-Wefaq, was dissolved on July 2016 by an administrative judicial act, under the accusation of “violating the law” (with regard to the new amendments to the Political Societies Law, banning the mix of politics and religion) and “favouring terrorism”. -
From the Editor
EDITORIAL STAFF From the Editor ELIZABETH SKINNER Editor Happy New Year, everyone. As I write this, we’re a few weeks into 2021 and there ELIZABETH ROBINSON Copy Editor are sparkles of hope here and there that this year may be an improvement over SALLY BAHO Copy Editor the seemingly endless disasters of the last one. Vaccines are finally being deployed against the coronavirus, although how fast and for whom remain big sticky questions. The United States seems to have survived a political crisis that brought EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD its system of democratic government to the edge of chaos. The endless conflicts VICTOR ASAL in Syria, Libya, Yemen, Iraq, and Afghanistan aren’t over by any means, but they have evolved—devolved?—once again into chronic civil agony instead of multi- University of Albany, SUNY national warfare. CHRISTOPHER C. HARMON 2021 is also the tenth anniversary of the Arab Spring, a moment when the world Marine Corps University held its breath while citizens of countries across North Africa and the Arab Middle East rose up against corrupt authoritarian governments in a bid to end TROELS HENNINGSEN chronic poverty, oppression, and inequality. However, despite the initial burst of Royal Danish Defence College change and hope that swept so many countries, we still see entrenched strong-arm rule, calcified political structures, and stagnant stratified economies. PETER MCCABE And where have all the terrorists gone? Not far, that’s for sure, even if the pan- Joint Special Operations University demic has kept many of them off the streets lately. Closed borders and city-wide curfews may have helped limit the operational scope of ISIS, Lashkar-e-Taiba, IAN RICE al-Qaeda, and the like for the time being, but we know the teeming refugee camps US Army (Ret.) of Syria are busy producing the next generation of violent ideological extremists. -
Articles Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions About the Pre-2001 Period by Don Rassler
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 11, Issue 6 Articles Al-Qaida and the Pakistani Harakat Movement: Reflections and Questions about the pre-2001 Period by Don Rassler Abstract There has been a modest amount of progress made over the last two decades in piecing together the developments that led to creation of al-Qaida and how the group has evolved over the last 30 years. Yet, there are still many dimensions of al-Qaida that remain understudied, and likely as a result, poorly understood. One major gap are the dynamics and relationships that have underpinned al-Qaida’s multi-decade presence in Pakistan. The lack of developed and foundational work done on the al-Qaida-Pakistan linkage is quite surprising given how long al- Qaida has been active in the country, the mix of geographic areas - from Pakistan’s tribal areas to its main cities - in which it has operated and found shelter, and the key roles Pakistani al-Qaida operatives have played in the group over the last two decades. To push the ball forward and advance understanding of this critical issue, this article examines what is known, and has been suggested, about al-Qaida’s relations with a cluster of Deobandi militant groups consisting of Harakat ul-Mujahidin, Harakat ul-Jihad Islami, Harakat ul-Ansar, and Jaish-e-Muhammad, which have been collectively described as Pakistan’s Harakat movement, prior to 9/11. It finds that each of these groups and their leaders provided key elements of support to al-Qaida in a number of direct and indirect ways. -
Jihadi-Salafism in Afghanistan— Beyond Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Daesh
\ POLICY BRIEF 6 \ 2017 Jihadi-Salafism in Afghanistan— Beyond Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Daesh Options for German foreign and development policy Katja Mielke\ BICC Nick Miszak\ TLO Recommendations \ Urge the government of the Islamic \ Provide support for Afghanistan’s Republic of Afghanistan (GoIRA) to future generations formulate an effective policy on religious An estimated 46 per cent of the Afghan population institutions and curricula is under 15 years of age. Given the deteriorated Any new initiative at Islamic education sector reform security situation in many parts of the country since must be preceded by a critical analysis of why previous 2009, religious education is often the only option reform attempts did not succeed, and religious scholars to learn. With the increasing influence of Salafi did not engage. The GoIRA should change budgeting madrassas and mosques, a growing share of youth priorities and consider allocating more resources to the gets exposed to potentially radical thoughts through construction and financing of community mosques and basic education. Thus, it is of utmost importance to religious schools (madrassas) so that the field is not expand and improve technical and financial support left to Wahhabi- and Salafi-inspired donors. External for non-partisan basic education, vocational training influences and funding for religious institutions and high-quality secondary and higher education for regardless of sect should be cut off. Afghanistan’s youth. \ Support debates about the role of \ Capture lessons learned to prevent religion and ideology in Afghan society the spread of violent extremism and The notion of Islam has increasingly become contested (co-)radicalization in Afghanistan due to the fragmentation of the political Critically review German foreign and development and religious landscape over the last decades. -
Usama Bin Ladin's
Usama bin Ladin’s “Father Sheikh”: Yunus Khalis and the Return of al-Qa`ida’s Leadership to Afghanistan Harmony Program Kevin Bell USAMA BIN LADIN’S “FATHER SHEIKH:” YUNUS KHALIS AND THE RETURN OF AL‐QA`IDA’S LEADERSHIP TO AFGHANISTAN THE COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT www.ctc.usma.edu 14 May 2013 The views expressed in this paper are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Combating Terrorism Center, the U.S. Military Academy, the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. Author’s Acknowledgments This report would not have been possible without the generosity and assistance of the director of the Harmony Research Program at the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC), Don Rassler. Mr. Rassler provided me with the support and encouragement to pursue this project, and his enthusiasm for the material always helped to lighten my load. I should state here that the first tentative steps on this line of inquiry were made during my time as a student at the Program in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton University. If not for professor Şükrü Hanioğlu’s open‐minded approach to directing my MA thesis, it is unlikely that I would have embarked on this investigation of Yunus Khalis. Professor Michael Reynolds also deserves great credit for his patience with this project as a member of my thesis committee. I must also extend my utmost appreciation to my reviewers—Carr Center Fellow Michael Semple, professor David Edwards and Vahid Brown—whose insightful comments, I believe, have led to a substantially improved and more thoughtful product. -
Book Pakistanonedge.Pdf
Pakistan Project Report April 2013 Pakistan on the Edge Copyright © Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2013 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt., New Delhi - 110 010 Tel. (91-11) 2671-7983 Fax.(91-11) 2615 4191 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://www.idsa.in ISBN: 978-93-82512-02-8 First Published: April 2013 Cover shows Data Ganj Baksh, popularly known as Data Durbar, a Sufi shrine in Lahore. It is the tomb of Syed Abul Hassan Bin Usman Bin Ali Al-Hajweri. The shrine was attacked by radical elements in July 2010. The photograph was taken in August 2010. Courtesy: Smruti S Pattanaik. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this Report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute or the Government of India. Published by: Magnum Books Pvt Ltd Registered Office: C-27-B, Gangotri Enclave Alaknanda, New Delhi-110 019 Tel.: +91-11-42143062, +91-9811097054 E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.magnumbooks.org All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, sorted in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photo-copying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). Contents Preface 5 Abbreviations 7 Introduction 9 Chapter 1 Political Scenario: The Emerging Trends Amit Julka, Ashok K. Behuria and Sushant Sareen 13 Chapter 2 Provinces: A Strained Federation Sushant Sareen and Ashok K. Behuria 29 Chapter 3 Militant Groups in Pakistan: New Coalition, Old Politics Amit Julka and Shamshad Ahmad Khan 41 Chapter 4 Continuing Religious Radicalism and Ever Widening Sectarian Divide P. -
Pakistan's Institutions
Pakistan’s Institutions: Pakistan’s Pakistan’s Institutions: We Know They Matter, But How Can They We Know They Matter, But How Can They Work Better? Work They But How Can Matter, They Know We Work Better? Edited by Michael Kugelman and Ishrat Husain Pakistan’s Institutions: We Know They Matter, But How Can They Work Better? Edited by Michael Kugelman Ishrat Husain Pakistan’s Institutions: We Know They Matter, But How Can They Work Better? Essays by Madiha Afzal Ishrat Husain Waris Husain Adnan Q. Khan, Asim I. Khwaja, and Tiffany M. Simon Michael Kugelman Mehmood Mandviwalla Ahmed Bilal Mehboob Umar Saif Edited by Michael Kugelman Ishrat Husain ©2018 The Wilson Center www.wilsoncenter.org This publication marks a collaborative effort between the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars’ Asia Program and the Fellowship Fund for Pakistan. www.wilsoncenter.org/program/asia-program fffp.org.pk Asia Program Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars One Woodrow Wilson Plaza 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20004-3027 Cover: Parliament House Islamic Republic of Pakistan, © danishkhan, iStock THE WILSON CENTER, chartered by Congress as the official memorial to President Woodrow Wilson, is the nation’s key nonpartisan policy forum for tackling global issues through independent research and open dialogue to inform actionable ideas for Congress, the Administration, and the broader policy community. Conclusions or opinions expressed in Center publications and programs are those of the authors and speakers and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Center staff, fellows, trustees, advisory groups, or any individuals or organizations that provide financial support to the Center. -
Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’S Posture Toward Afghanistan Since 2001
Old Habits, New Consequences Old Habits, New Khalid Homayun Consequences Nadiri Pakistan’s Posture toward Afghanistan since 2001 Since the terrorist at- tacks of September 11, 2001, Pakistan has pursued a seemingly incongruous course of action in Afghanistan. It has participated in the U.S. and interna- tional intervention in Afghanistan both by allying itself with the military cam- paign against the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida and by serving as the primary transit route for international military forces and matériel into Afghanistan.1 At the same time, the Pakistani security establishment has permitted much of the Afghan Taliban’s political leadership and many of its military command- ers to visit or reside in Pakistani urban centers. Why has Pakistan adopted this posture of Afghan Taliban accommodation despite its nominal participa- tion in the Afghanistan intervention and its public commitment to peace and stability in Afghanistan?2 This incongruence is all the more puzzling in light of the expansion of insurgent violence directed against Islamabad by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant organizations that are independent of the Afghan Taliban but that nonetheless possess social and po- litical links with Afghan cadres of the Taliban movement. With violence against Pakistan growing increasingly indiscriminate and costly, it remains un- clear why Islamabad has opted to accommodate the Afghan Taliban through- out the post-2001 period. Despite a considerable body of academic and journalistic literature on Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan since 2001, the subject of Pakistani accommodation of the Afghan Taliban remains largely unaddressed. Much of the existing literature identiªes Pakistan’s security competition with India as the exclusive or predominant driver of Pakistani policy vis-à-vis the Afghan Khalid Homayun Nadiri is a Ph.D. -
WAHHABISM and POWER in SAUDI ARABIA: a PRACTICAL TEST of WEBERIAN THEORY by Abdullah Alrebh
WAHHABISM AND POWER IN SAUDI ARABIA: A PRACTICAL TEST OF WEBERIAN THEORY By Abdullah Alrebh A THESIS Submitted to Michigan State University in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Sociology 2011 ABSTRACT WAHHABISM AND POWER IN SAUDI ARABIA: A PRACTICAL TEST OF WEBERIAN THEORY By Abdullah Alrebh Weber‘s theory of authority is an important tool when studying power and its relationship to human collectives, especially religious groups. Weber focused on the rise of Protestants‘ power in the West and how this group created and maintained economic power which helped them gain political control in various countries, including the U.S. In this paper, I incorporate Weber‘s insights about the Protestant ethic, bureaucracies, and types of authority to examine Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. I compare Saudi Wahhabism with Protestantism, analyzing the rise of the Saud family as controllers of the economy and politics. The role of bureaucracies in these processes will also be discussed. The similarities and differences between Protestantism and Wahhabism are used to investigate power inside their respective societies. These comparisons will highlight the types of authority which allowed each sect to enhance power and how those processes of creating, consolidating, and maintaining power relate to the larger social climates in both Saudi Arabia and the Western world. Finally, I investigate images of the Saudi State in the The London Times between 1927 and 1937 to explain how power in the hands of a Wahhabi king was presented to Western readers. Copyright by Abdullah Alrebh 2011 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Special thanks go to my helpful advisor, Dr.