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August 7, 2009
Dear Readers:
As China Elections and Governance (www.chinalections.org) enters its 8th year as a popular online portal for social and political issues in China, the CEG editors pose a few existential questions: Is it possible for an online platform to facilitate reform in the deliberative process between China and her citizens? What role can the Internet play in providing an outlet for China’s people to voice concerns and express public opinion? Indeed, what is the valid go- vernance potential of the Internet, and what are its limitations? This third installment of the China Elections and Governance Review therefore focuses on a theme very close to home for the CEG editors: the relationship between the Internet and political reform.
In this quarter’s Review, featured contributors Evelyn Chan, Samuel Verran and Robert O’Brien take the Internet’s potential implications on political reform as a point of departure to deliberate on Chinese “netizens.” “Netizens” are seen as a force mobilizing on issues, shaping Chinese domestic media, contributing to political discourse, and influencing Chinese public and international policy. While many of their conclusions may be sobering to optimis- tic Internet enthusiasts, the Review is not a comprehensive or authoritative statement, but ra- ther brings light to some of the trends and challenges the Internet faces in China today. CEG editors have also juxtaposed two important voices from inside China, the noted jour- nalist Xiao Shu and People’s Daily editor Fan Zhengwei. Their pieces, translated by Heather Saul and Sean Ding, represent divergent views on the emerging role of the Internet in Chi- nese governance.
We welcome feedback, comments, and concerns to this edition and look forward to contri- butions to our next quarterly installment of the China Elections and Governance Review, which will focus on mass incidents and government disclosure of information. Please send com- ments, concerns, and future contributions by October 15, 2009 to [email protected].
China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
The Internet and State Media:
The 4.5 Estate
By Evelyn Chan and Chenggeng Bi
s the large popular protests in technology brings with economic moder- Iran in June 2009 demonstrated, nization. Aauthoritarian regimes are up against a new medium that is widespread, This is not news for Chinese leaders, who accessible and rapid. The advent of web have long recognized the threat globaliza- 2.0 technology, which has given ordinary tion poses on their ability to control users the ability to easily disseminate in- thought work and the cultural market (Lynch formation via the Internet through sites 1999, 173). China therefore walks a care- like Twitter, Facebook and YouTube has ful line balancing the promotion ofmarket transformed ordinary citizens into journal- rationality with the goal of managing in- ists. In the case of Iran, cell phones be- formation flow. China’s Great Fire Wall came cameras, and tweets replaced news has successfully blocked websites of par- feeds. ticular organizations like the Falun Gong and access to Hotmail and Facebook dur- The dilemma that authoritarian regimes ing particular sensitive events, like the an- face is that the imperative to promote niversary of the Tiananmen protests. economic development, which becomes Nevertheless the sheer volume of blogs, essential for parties to shore up popular internet forums, and websites signals an legitimacy, clashes with the imperative to interesting dynamic in China. Over the control information flow (See Daniel years China’s economic growth model and Lynch). Authoritarian states that seek to shift away from Communist ideology has develop their economies inevitably face translated into greater individual freedoms. the challenge that globalization and new
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
A key question is whether the expansion market principles have introduced com- in individual freedoms and pluralism in petitive pressures, forcing media outlets to public opinion on the Internet has an in- repackage the news, catering to audience herently destabilizing effect for the regime. demands and advertisers. Similar to the This linear postulation between the rise of debate on the commercialization of Chi- the Internet and a liberalizing outcome is nese media, the discussion concerning the at the heart of several of this issue’s con- impact of the Internet and the rise of citi- tributions. Sam Verran for instance ex- zen journalism on state media also posits a amines the relationship between online liberalizing effect. Just as the introduction and offline protests. The spread of ideas of market principles has made the media in the blogosphere, giving a platform for more accountable to the people, bloggers dissident voices, has the potential to trans- and netizens serve as another competitive late into vocal protests outside of the vir- force. In essence citizen-reporting would tual world. force state-sanctioned media to report the people line over the Party. They therefore Another dimension in examining the po- watch the watchdogs (See Cooper). litical implications of the Internet is whether China’s ability to This paper seeks to analyze manage thought work is also the effect of the internet challenged by way of a Media in China has and rise of citizen journal- more autonomous and since undergone sig- ism on state-sanctioned critical press corps. The nificant change with media. The interplay of the link between media and two realms, the official democracy is that the for- the introduction of media and non-official mer helps foster the politi- Deng Xiaoping’s eco- reporting online may be cal norms and civic culture nomic reforms creating a more participa- necessary to sustain a de- tory and deliberative pub- mocracy. The exchange of free ideas and lic sphere in China, signaling a gradual criticism is embodied in a free and inde- liberal evolution. A logical hypothesis po- pendent press. sits that the rise of internet activity and spread of information creates a competi- The media in China is an interesting case tive pressure on state-media, forcing a study precisely because like in other shift away from the Party-line and towards communist regimes, it has traditionally a more people-centered approach to re- served as a mouthpiece and transmission porting. This move away from the Party’s belt for the Party. Media in China has control signals a liberalizing effect in Chi- since undergone significant change with na’s political and economic development. the introduction of Deng Xiaoping’s eco- This article explores three case studies nomic reforms. The commercialization of that occurred in 2008 and 2009, the Si- media organization and introduction of chuan Earthquake, the Sanlu Milk Scandal
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 and the Weng’an and Shishou riots to ana- pagne 2005, 49). In this perspective, jour- lyze whether a causal relationship exists nalists struggle to assert an objective view between the rise of netizen reporting and and tend to favor one group, the elites state-official media. Furthermore, it offers and the dominant ideology, the economic- an evaluation based on these cases of the liberal order (Atton 2008, 215, Cham- prospects of liberalization in China. pagne 2005, 54). Contrary to political cen- sorship under an authoritarian regime, Media and Blogging: The Fourth and market pressures work in such a way that Fifth Estate: covertly changes the values and profession of journalism. According to Champagne, Journalism in the West is under similar “The journalist ideally wants to be a stal- scrutiny and examination as the academic wart servant of the truth at any price, but discussion in China, specifically concern- he belongs to a paper that bears a price ing its autonomy and commitment to the and is situated within an economic enter- public. Similar questions concerning me- prise with its own exigencies, which are dia conglomeration, marketization and not all of the mind” (2005, 51). political influence have undermined the legitimacy of the press in the West (See It is this need to challenge the mass me- Bourdieu and Champagne). The tradition- dia’s dominance in news production and al normative role of media acting as the frame-setting that has allowed the Internet Fourth Estate that is informing the public, to give rise to an alternative form of jour- providing a forum for an exchange of nalism. Some authors have coined this as ideas and holding the state accountable is the emergence of the Fifth Estate (See increasingly under fire (Tumber 2001, 96). Cooper and Atton). Challenging the do- minant discourse in mainstream media, The literature on communication studies activism on the net serves as a form of identify a crisis in journalism, which stems public oversight on State media. Bloggers from both market pressures and the rise watch the watchdogs. The proliferation of of the blogosphere (Tumber 2001, 104). blogs, online forums and web 2.0 tech- There is an increasing gap that places tra- nology has given ordinary citizens the ca- ditional journalism further away from the pacity to become media producers, trans- public sphere (Tumber 2001, 105). In the forming their previous role as the passive first instance, media conglomeration and audience (Atton 2008, 215). The new the competition for higher ratings to se- form of journalism or the public journal- cure dominance in the market undercut ism movement enhances democracy as it the journalist’s commitment to inform empowers citizens, fosters greater discus- citizens (Tumber 2001, 96). Critical pers- sion and participation and forges online pectives of mass media emphasize how communities among citizens (Tumber the dominant liberal economic ideology 2001, 101; Atton 2008, 217). A famous acts as a hegemonic order that constantly case that has given rise to the normative threatens journalists’ autonomy (Cham-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 view of the blogosphere is the Rathergate owned firms has provided another source scandal. Bloggers successfully uncovered to strengthen China’s patronage and no- CBS News’ use of forged documents for a menklatura system (Brady 2008). With report on George W. Bush military record. increasing advertising revenue, the media CBS was forced to issue a formal apology industry has become tremendously profit- as a result of the netizen activity (Woan, able, thereby creating vested interests that 2008 115). tie the media and the Party closer together, as well as co-opting journalists (Zhao, Concerns over the integrity of journalism 2000, 15). Therefore when Chinese blog- in the West are equally applicable to Chi- gers challenge the pro-market bias in the na’s case. An essential difference however mainstream media, they are also challeng- is that the empowering and democracy- ing the Party and its market-oriented enhancing effect of the Fifth Estate has reform. In the same way that netizen ac- greater far-reaching consequences for the tivity in the West seeks to counter market Chinese polity. A more deliberative public hegemony, Chinese bloggers counter Par- space and participatory citizenry spurred ty hegemony. Both Internet forces in the by the interplay of the official and non- East and West are pushing official media may in fact A more deliberative for a more people- challenge the official line of centered approach in the Chinese Communist public space and par- their own right. Party (CCP). ticipatory citizenry may in fact challenge While it is imperative to A second difference lies in the official line of the observe whether China’s the effect of media con- Chinese Communist official media is taking glomeration and commer- the role of the Fourth cialization. In the West, Party. Estate, institutionally they marketization and the re- are very much tied to the duction in media ownership by way of Party apparatus. This is a fundamental conglomeration has shifted the media difference that makes it difficult to apply a away from public commitment. In con- normative standard on China’s media. trast, the centralization of media in China Nevertheless, it is a valuable endeavor to has greater political implications. In China, identify the parameters where official me- conglomeration in the 1990s has meant dia do act independently and critical of the greater state control and monitoring of Party. Evidence of a more critical voice media activity. There are no officially in- firstly signals a liberalizing tendency, and dependent media outlets, which must be identifying the potential causes can shed registered under a sponsored publisher or light on the larger impact of the Internet organization (Hassid 2008, 419). Further- as a medium. more the consolidation of media organiza- tions in the hands of a few large state-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
China’s Journalists: Wearing Many The media in the post-1989 period un- Hats derwent serious restructuring and rectifi- cation that reverted the media back to its Since the launch of economic reforms and pre-reform status. Newspapers were China’s transformation from a totalitarian closed, editors were replaced, reporters state to an authoritarian one, China’s me- were arrested and existing outlets were dia has oscillated between many compet- subject to a re-registration process that ing roles, serving the Party line, the bot- recentralized Beijing’s control (Lee 38). tom line and the people line. With the Licensing was tightened and managed launch of Deng’s reform and a period of from the top, along with mandatory an- brief liberalization, the media experi- nual reviews and certification for editors mented with its limited freedom and de- and journalists (Zhao 2000, 14). The post- veloped a more critical and autonomous 1989 restructuring process ultimately ab- voice. Disbanded publications were re- sorbed the media into a corporatist insti- vived and local regions were encouraged tution, tying the journalists closer to the to develop their own newspapers, leading Party’s ideological program and propa- to a decentralization of the media and ganda bureaucracy. proliferation of publications and outlets (Esarey 2005, 39). Competition led to a Deng’s 1992 Southern Tour and push for more people-approach, giving rise to the rapid market acceleration was another de- introduction of investigative journalism, hu- cisive point in the media’s post 1989 man interest pieces and reports on corrup- transformation (Zhao 2007, 2). Given the tion (Esarey 2005, 52). political climate and critical blow to the media’s reform movement, the prevailing The Tiananmen Square protests and the mood was if journalists couldn’t beat ‘em, join decisive victory of the Party’s more con- ‘em. The process of media conglomeration servative wing however signaled an end to and the end to the media’s financial de- the journalism reform movement. The pendence on the state shifted the media media’s involvement during the Tianan- towards a pro-market ideology. Media men protests signaled two important de- managers, editors and journalists profited velopments. Firstly, despite Beijing’s ef- from state-led development and marketi- fort to restrict the media’s coverage, their zation (Zhao 2007, 4). The value of the defiance signaled a shift towards the inter- press corps changed to champion market est of the masses. Secondly their eventual ideology, and therefore support the Par- participation demonstrated the media’s ty’s role in modernizing China (Zhao 2007, desire for greater autonomy from the Par- 4). ty (Lee, 39). The Tiananmen incident hig- hlighted a key conflict for journalists be- These developments shape the three do- tween serving the Party and serving the minant paradigms for China’s journalists people (Lee, 39). that mark an ambivalence and heterogene-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
ity in the current state of media as journal- nalists do not receive pay and risk losing ists vacillate between the Party line, bot- performance bonuses (Esarey 2005, tom line, and the people-line. 58).This is a fundamental difference be- tween bloggers and journalists in state The Party Line media. For bloggers, their livelihood is not dependent on reporting and they are In this paradigm, journalists conform to therefore more willing to broach forbid- the Party’s directive and the approved sto- den topics (Esarey 2008b, 754). ry, transmitted by the national official agency, Xinhua News (Zhao 2008, 25). Commercialization has created extremely Either by direct coercion or through self- profitable media conglomerates. Journal- censorship, the media in China can be ists are enticed by the economic incentives largely acquiescent. A principle reason for to maintain quiescent on politically sensi- this complacent role lies in China’s post- tive issues. There are far greater rewards facto censorship, meaning that journalists to report on neutral topics than to push and organizations are usually reprimanded the boundaries (Brady 2006, 65). As a re- after the release of a sensitive news story sult of the market transformation, journal- (Hassid 2008, 420). The Party ists have become a part of the emerging line is not clearly defined, but middle class. They are therefore a benefi- situational-based (Zhao 2008, ciary of Deng’s economic reforms. In this …the livelihood 25). Although journalists are framework, there is a common bond be- of journalists aware that taboo topics like tween the Party and the media elite to and editors are Tiananmen Square, ethnic maintain the current status quo, which contingent on clashes and mass incidents signals the Party’s co-optation of the me- how far they are off-limits; this level of dia and an end to its watchdog role (Zhao deviate from uncertainty over what is ac- 2007, 21). the Party Line ceptable induces self- censorship (Hassid 2008, The Bottom Line 422). With the rise of the middle class, the me- Secondly, through Beijing’s corporatist dia has begun to cater to the wealthy ur- institutions, the media lacks any associa- ban elites, who are advertisers’ key target tional and institutional autonomy. The demographic (Zhao 2007, 10). Entertain- power of the Central Propaganda De- ment news and business-oriented topics, partment to authorize the firing and hiring issues which were politically neutral have of media personnel means that the livelih- become lucrative stories. Once the media ood of journalists and editors are contin- was no longer dependent on the state for gent on how far they deviate from the subsidies, advertising revenue has been Party Line (Esarey 2005, 58). The same the central life line for media organiza- goes for upward mobility within the pro- tions. The post-reform media therefore is fession. When reports are censored, jour-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 driven by profit and seek to increase rea- the state to hear public opinion and to dership and ratings. adjust unpopular policies accordingly (Yu 2009, 81). Furthermore the state has rec- The discussion on the commercialization ognized the media’s role as a pressure of the media has placed market forces and valve to channel and address social prob- Party demands at odds with each other. lems before it descends into a popular Catering to the interests of the audience, uprising or a more antagonistic movement. so as to increase advertising revenue would signal a shift away from the Party. The Tiananmen incident and participation However this dichotomy is not always of journalists marked a clear defiance true. If anything it has introduced another against the Party line and the CCP’s posi- line of fissure, namely the interests of the tion on the media’s role in society. In the business class and the people (Yu 2009). post-reform era, there has been a growth The drive for advertising revenue has in investigative journalism and more robust made media a lapdog of big businesses reporting on corruption and malfeasance (Yu 2009, 91). They are therefore willing by state officials. The concept of the “citi- to “soften negative news of major adver- zen’s right to know” and “right to speak” tisers” (Zhao 2007, 8). Furthermore in the has developed alongside a compliant and post-reform culture of profit and money pro-market culture within China’s media making, journalists have been susceptible (Yu 2009, 9) to bribes and gifts in exchange for air time and publicity (Zhao 2007, 8). The idea of a citizen’s right to know is largely the result of the social consequences of This alignment with the interests of the China’s rapid economic growth, which has economic elite also acts to erode the created significant economic disparities watchdog role of the media and shifts it sig- both intra-regionally and inter-regionally nificantly away from serving the public and high levels of corruption. Contrary to good. Furthermore given the close and in the previous two paradigms, reporters of many cases collusive relationship between the investigative journalism strand laud them- China’s business sector and the state, the selves for addressing social injustice and media’s tight relationship with the busi- giving a voice to the marginalized (Yu ness class also has the effect of streng- 2009, 96). Its development very much thening the economic base of the Party. coincides with the Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents theory, which recognizes the The People Line and the Effect of China’s Neti- interests of the masses as one of the three zens pillars in society and the Hu-Wen admin- istration’s harmonious society, which seeks to In this paradigm, the media acts as a me- redress the problems of poverty and in- diator between state and society. A more equality (Brendebach 2003, 33). people-centered approach to state- sanctioned media provides a vehicle for
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
However there are limits to the develop- (Mackinnon 2008, 36). Mainstream media ment of investigative journalism. While major later developed a more critical voice con- outlets like the Central Chinese Television cerning the state efforts to contain the (CCTV) network have caught onto the outbreak. The firing of Health Minister trend with two major investigative report- Zhangwenkang and Beijing Mayor Men ing programs, News Probe and News Focus, Xuenong ushered in a flood of coverage this people-approach to reporting is not a on SARS, signaling an air of transparency bottom-up phenomenon but is more a concerning the state’s handling of the af- top-down process. The state still retains fair (Esarey 2005, 77). the final say on the type of stories report- ers can investigate. Investigative journal- The discussion above concerning the mul- ism is criticized for only attacking low- tiple roles of China’s media demonstrates level officials and the small fish of the Party constant vacillation and ambivalence. The apparatus (Brady 2006, 66). There is little key question is whether the rise of the in- monitoring or scrutiny concerning the ternet and proliferation of blogs have had policy-making process at the top (Zhao the effect of minimizing the 2007, 14). Next, they are careful not to vacillation and incoherence report too many cases of corruption and towards a fourth estate. The There are a few illegal activities by officials, which would cases below took place in major cases signal a pervasive, systemic problem in the 2008 and 2009 and use the that demon- Chinese political system. three dominant paradigms strate how neti- above as a central framework zen journalism There are a few major cases that demon- to evaluate this question. has shifted strate how netizen journalism has shifted mainstream mainstream reporting towards the inter- Empirical Analysis: Three reporting ests of the people. The SARS outbreak in Case Studies 2003 was a particular watershed, highlight- ing the impact of the internet both on Case 1: Sichuan Earthquake state-media reporting and on government response. During the early stages of the A magnitude 7.9 earthquake hit Sichuan SARS outbreak, more investigative pieces province on May 12, 2008, which resulted were muzzled and reporters were repri- in the death of more than 80,000 people manded. Reports of cases surfaced in No- and thousands more missing. Particularly, vember and by February the Propaganda a great many classrooms collapsed in the department ordered a halt to official re- earthquake, which killed thousands of porting. The public turned to the Internet students. The official news agency was for more information (Esarey 2005, quick to report the event so as to diffuse 74).Wang Jianshuo, an engineer for Mi- rumors and alleviate public fears. Minutes crosoft in Shanghai became famous for after the Sichuan earthquake, the China his daily blog post on the SARS situation Bureau of Earthquakes publicized the epi- center and magnitude of this quake on its
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 official website. Sichuan province released In the earthquake area, thousands of class- the initial death toll. The event also led to rooms fell down but the neighborhood the first news conference by the military and government buildings remained branch to publish the progress of rescue standing, which implied that serious quali- efforts (Magnier June 5, 2008). ty problems existed in the construction of the schools. It has been widely accepted The plight of those trapped and heroic by netizens that the school buildings were rescue attempts became part of a round- “tofu” or shoddy constructions, which the-clock media blitz. Sympathy poured in were the result of government corruption from all over the country as the eyes of (Si, April 23, 2009). Parents marched and the nation watched the news unravel. The demanded answers and that Beijing pu- human interest element of the story was nish corrupt local officials who benefitted clearly the major selling point. The media from the shady building contracts. This also had a field day with Premier Wen Jia- change in tone from the individual he- bao’s visit to the disaster site and eager roism of survivors to local corruption villagers stood waiting to shake his hand. therefore shifted how the event was to be The initial coverage therefore signaled a portrayed in the mainstream media. Media shift towards a ‘people approach’. The access to the site of the earthquake was media was active on the scene, covering tightened by June 2008, silencing parents’ heroic stories of courage and the triumph stories in mainstream media (Associated of survivors and rescuers. Foreign Press, 2008)
It can be concluded that the Chinese state Netizens responded to the lack of inter- media’s reporting was fast and effective vention by Beijing. The most well-known concerning information dissemination. example of citizen journalism was the Secondly, the tremendous attention given work by Ai Weiwei, the well-known artists to the individual stories of heroism and who designed the Bird’s Nest stadium for loss was particularly people-centered. Howev- the Olympic Games. Out of frustration er, when it comes to the reasons for the with the lack of government transparency, collapse of so many school buildings, the Ai Weiwei set out to document the num- most controversial aspect of the quake, ber of student deaths, and investigated the the state media kept silent under the guid- scene and interviewed parents with a team ance of the Chinese government. There of volunteers. Their ongoing work is was thus a significant turning point in the posted on Ai Weiwei’s blog, which has event of the earthquake that led to an im- been sporadically shut down. portant shift in the state’s permission of media coverage and the media’s pursuit of One year later, authorities have restricted the story. Concerning the cause of the the foreign media’s access to the site and event, the media shifted to the Party line. the official number of deaths has not been officially reported. Ai Weiwei’s work and
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 ongoing netizen activity therefore demon- infants had suffered from kidney stones strates the emergence of alternative jour- from drinking an unknown brand of milk nalism when official media fails. Online powder on September 9, 2008 (Shen, activity however has not generated into 2008). Then Xinhua Net reproduced this sufficient pressure for the state to hold article. Though the article did not point to local officials accountable. When the this brand as “Sanlu”, it attracted the at- event focused on the natural disaster, the tention of all domestic media organiza- story’s human interest angle allowed for tions and netizens discussed the incident unfettered media coverage. Media investi- on community forums. Several days later, gation, however, into the cause of the the Office of the State Council announced quake and the grievances of parents de- the safety problem was caused by Sanlu monstrates the limits of the people-centered milk powder. reporting. The case aptly shows how in- vestigative reporting must be politically There are two reasons for the slow re- neutral. sponse by mainstream media. One is that Sanlu offered bribes to the state media for Case 2: Sanlu Milk Scandal sealing information Today, the reporters through advertising deals Sanlu, located in Hebei are trapped under the (Fu April 23, 2009). For province, is a national general trend towards instance, Baidu, a leading brand of milk powder in a market economy Chinese search engine is China. The infamous Milk accused to have been scandal unraveled and ap- and also subjected to paid by Sanlu to prevent peared in mainstream me- various news restric- bad press from surfacing dia after the Beijing Olym- tions online (ChinaSmack, pics. Based on the investi- 2008). In a blog, the au- gation by the Chinese government in Sep- thor of the original article in Lanzhou tember 2008, there were 6244 diagnosed Morning Post explains that journalists babies who suffered major health prob- were reluctant to publish the name of the lems due to the tainted Sanlu milk powder milk company precisely because of the (Yu and Zhang, ) Of these, 158 suffered pressures against defaming a corporation. from acute renal failure. In this case, Chi- “Today, the reporters are trapped under na’s state media failed to fulfill its social the general trend towards a market econ- responsibilities, since as early as March omy and also subjected to various news 2008, complaints about the quality of San- restrictions… They find themselves as the lu milk powder had been reported to ‘little reporter guys’ that the big corpora- some media outlets. They did not publish tions could order about or else send to the the name of Sanlu until September. defendant's seat in court.” (Fu, September 14, 2008). Secondly, the local government It was the Lanzhou Morning Post that in Hebei prevented the reports of the published the first article to reveal that 14
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 tainted Sanlu milk powder to protect its A teenage girl in Weng'an County died in own economic interest. As a major enter- June, 2008. Local residents believed that prise in Hebei, Sanlu contributed huge tax she was raped and killed by someone who revenues to the local government. While had close connections with the county complaints about Sanlu surfaced in early government. Local residents and the girl's August, the Sanlu group asked the Hebei family then attacked the police station and government to assert pressure on the me- set fire to government buildings. This dia to avoid information leaking out to the event became a national focus through the press (Lei, October 3, 2008). Furthermore Internet very quickly. The governor in the media was pressured by authorities to Guizhou province rushed to the scene and report positive news in the weeks leading up criticized the local government. Under his to the Olympics. In the end, twenty-one guidance, the cause of the death was de- members of the Sanlu Group were sen- termined to be drowning. Though no citi- tenced for the contamination, including zens believed this explanation, they could the Chairperson of the company, Tian not change the official statement and the Wenhua who is to serve life imprisonment. riot ceased. However no local officials in Hebei have been held responsible. Unlike the natural disaster in Sichuan, the Weng’an riot marked public dissatisfaction The milk scandal case is a clear example in the CCP’s authority directly, so any in- of how the media are affected by the bot- formation on the Weng’an riot would be tom line. It was in fact through BBS forums very sensitive. However, Xinhua news that copies of letters concerning Baidu’s covered the reports of the Weng’an event involvement in the case first surfaced. Ne- just one day after the riot occurred. In ad- tizens have also warned citizens of other dition, “Weng’an” was not blocked on the cases of food contamination after news of Internet by the Great Firewall. It should the melamine contamination (China Digi- be noted, however, that this is not a ref- tal Times, 2008). In this example, online lection of China’s information openness activities did not spur mainstream media but a typical method for the Chinese gov- attention but they served as an alternative ernment to manage the media directly source of information in light of citizen during the process of mass incidents. distrust of mainstream media as well as a Therefore in addition to censorship and space for critical evaluation against the suppression, the Chinese government will media. A liberalizing effect is minimal in intervene to frame the official story. this case, as the government attempted to present the incident as a corporate irres- After the riot, the related posts with ponsibility with Sanlu as the main culprit. Weng’an in major websites were deleted as quickly as possible. For instance, at Case 3: Reporting Mass Incidents – Weng’an Tianya Forum, it was estimated that a and Shishou Weng’an-related post had an average life-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 time of 15 seconds before being deleted because of technology such as video- by the administrators. Pictures and video phones and Twitter, people could obtain of the rioting on the Internet were also immediate information from the ground. deleted quickly. In addition, the Chinese The Shishou government’s information government employed web commentators blocking not only failed to achieve its aim to write pro-government comments on but also deepened the local people’s dissa- major websites. For instance, more than a tisfaction and exacerbated the riots. In dozen teachers were selected by the June, a surprising editorial was written by Weng’an government as Internet com- the People’s Daily which cited that the mentators to guide Internet discussion. government’s failure to provide sufficient These commentators worked with Xinhua transparency contributed to the escalation news reporters to publish timely informa- of violence and rioting. While the editorial tion. signals a significant shift in the mindset of the state-press, it is noted that mainstream In addition, local officials media including the realized that netizens were People’s Daily has not not satisfied with their con- …the Chinese gov- commented on the allega- trol over media, so they ernment employed tions of collusion and arranged for the China web commentators to maintains the suicide sto- News Weekly, a state-run ry (Ren-hou, July 2, 2009). paper based outside the write pro-government province media outlet, to comments on major In the first case of interview officials. Howev- websites Weng’an, the govern- er, this was just a ploy to ment’s media manage- placate angry citizens, since ment was praised by the the media was also in collusion with the People’s Daily, the news organ of the government. CCP (Lu June 24, 2009). It said that the public doubts were adequately addressed In June, 2009, a similar event occurred in by the timely news published by the media Shishou, in Hubei province, where riots and the information transparency was the emerged after the mysterious death of a most important reason that the Weng’an hotel cook. Protestors rejected claims he riot subsided quickly. However, Shishou’s committed suicide and rumors surfaced information blocking was criticized, since about drug-cartels operating in the hotel it was futile and counterproductive. in cooperation with local officials. Con- trary to the Weng’an government’s persu- In the cases of mass incidents, it is certain asion strategy to the media, the Shishou that the media will toe the Party Line. Riot- government tried to block the information ing and protests are sensitive issues that about the riots. They disconnected the force a heavy-hand by the State. In the Internet and even the electricity. However, Shishou case, while mainstream media
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were complacent to question the suicide dia to the Party and the central propagan- story, the Weng’an case demonstrates fur- da apparatus is able to maintain its carrot ther subservience of the state media as the and stick approach to control media, it is Party actively shaped the discourse both in unlikely for state-media to develop into a the press and online. Fourth Estate regardless of the rise of ne- tizen activity. However such a conclusion Evaluation: A Conditional Approach to should not negate the tremendous contri- People-Centered Reporting bution new technology has afforded ordi- nary Chinese citizens. While they may not The discussion above of three major cases significantly alter mainstream media, they in 2008 and 2009 demonstrate that Chi- provide a forum to produce a counter- nese media is still torn by competing roles. hegemonic discourse. Rather than acting The Fourth Estate is still far from being to alter the state of China’s official media, achieved in any de-facto they provide an alternative source for sense. The important task public deliberation and information flow. …a bottom-up, therefore is to determine un- When state media fails to take a people- liberalizing der what circumstances can approach, citizens have the internet for process be- the media take a more auto- recourse. Ai Weiwei’s blog is a key exam- tween the in- nomous and critical approach. ple of civil society developing on the web ternet and From the cases above it can as a result of state failure and complicity state-media is be concluded that a bottom- by official media. A simple causal relation- not present up, liberalizing process be- ship to determine a liberalizing outcome tween the internet and state- therefore does not exist between a rise in media is not present. In the netizen activity and more autonomous cases where official media is media. Rather both the liberalization of more vocal, it is contingent media and the liberalization of society will upon the will and approval by the Party. most likely occur in tandem and more ex- In the three cases, citizen-journalism had peditiously through a split at the top and a little effect in liberalizing the position of deliberate decision to liberalize. state media. The state remained resolute in its position on Sichuan, the Milk Scandal and the Weng’an and Shishou riots. Media reporting did not launch sufficient criti- cism to challenge the State’s stance. While there lacked a liberalizing outcome and sufficient change on the part of the gov- ernment, this does not mean that the Blo- gosphere is a futile endeavor or that it fails to act as the Fifth Estate. As long as a corporatist institution exists to tie the me-
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Sources
Associated Press. “Reporters kicked out Cooper, Stephan D. (2005) Watching the of China city where schools collapsed” Watchdogs: Bloggers as the Fifth Estate. Spo- June 12, 2008. Accessed July 20, 2009. kane, Washington: Marquette Books, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i- c2006. TY53mT_omuVEH6m_vXYxeMB2_Q Edgerton-Tarpley, Katherine (2009). Atton, Chris. (2008) “Alternative Media “Chinese Responses to Disaster: a View Theory and Journalism Practice” in Digi- from the Qing” in China in 2008: A Year of tal media and democracy : tactics in hard Great Significance. Ed. Kate Merkel-Hess, times. Ed. Megan Boler. Cambridge, MA : Kenneth L. Pomeranz, and Jeffrey N. MIT Press, c2008. Wasserstrom. New York: Rowman & Lit- tlefield Publishers, Inc. Bourdieu, Pierre (2005). “The Political Field, the Social Science Field and the Esarey, Ashley. (2005). “Cornering the Journalistic Field” in Bourdieu and the Jour- Market: State Strategies for Controlling nalistic Field Ed. Rodney Benson and Erik China’s Commercial Media” Asian Perspec- Neveu. Cambridge, UK: Polity. tive 29.4: 37-83
Brady, Anne-Marie. (2008). “Guiding Fu Jianfeng. “Sanlu event: let me peel off Hand: the Role of the CCP Central Prop- the skin of the media” April 23, 2009. aganda Department in the Current Era.” Nanfang Daily. Accessed July 15, 2009. Westminister Papers in Communication and
Brendebach, Martin (2003). “Public Opi- Fu Jianfeng. “Why did I name Sanlu for nion – a New Factor Influencing the PRC having bad milk powder?” September 14, Press” ASIEN 96: 29-45. ] 2008. EastSouthWestNorth. Accessed July 21, 2009. China Digital Times. “Netizen: List of
Lei, Yi. “Sanlu’s management and coor- dination to the media” October 3, 2008. People’s Daily. Accessed: July 14, 2009.
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Lynch, Daniel. (1999). “Dilemmas of Yu, Haifei and Chengliang Zhang. “A re- ‘Thought Work’ in Fin-de-Siècle China” view on social responsibilities of media The China Quarterly 157: 173-201 from the report of “Sanlu problematic milk powder incident”. Asian Social Science. Mackinnon, Rebecca. (2008) “Flatter Vol. 5, No. 4 World and Thicker Walls? Blogs, Censor- ship and Civic Discourse in China”. Public Yu, Haiqing. (2009). Media and Cultural Choice 134: 31-46. Transformation in China. New York: Route- ledge. Magnier, Mark. June 8, 2008 “China tigh- tens media limits loosened after Sichuan Zhao, Yuezhi. (2000). “From Commercia- earthquake”. Los Angeles Times. Accessed lization to Conglomeration: the Trans- July 14, 2009 formation of the Chinese Press within the
Ren-hou, Shi. “Beijing aims to stemm Zhao, Yuezhi. (2007). “Underdogs, Lap- mass incidents” July 2, 2009. Asia Times dogs, Watchdogs: Journalists and the Pub- Online. Accessed July 18, 2009. lic Sphere Problematic in Reformed Chi-
Si, Lu. “The government should investi- gate the reason of “Tofu” construction in Wenchuan earthquake”. April 23, 2009. Baidu Blogs. Accessed: July 15, 2009.
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
The Role of the Internet in State-society Relations and the Consequences for Popular Protests
By Samuel Verran
he rise of an online civil society in has been based in part on its adaptability China presents an informative and on three central pillars of economic Tpoint of focus in assessing the development, selective repression and na- impact that popular Internet access can tionalism. On top of this, the Govern- have on authoritarian rule. When com- ment has learned from the mistakes of the pared to the crisis that Eastern European Soviet states and has worked to reduce the communist states experienced in the impact of systemic problems such as cor- 1990s, the Chinese ruling party appears ruption, lack of unifying ideology, rising anomalous in its ability to retain power public protests, and increasing irrelevance while liberalizing its rule, developing the of the Party in people’s lives. economy, and relaxing control over social and economic relationships. Due to deli- The Chinese government’s ability to adapt berate government attempts to broaden to changing circumstances is nowhere Internet access over the past decades of more evident that in the CCP’s handling reform, Internet use has expanded at a of the Internet. Like broader economic drastic rate. This has occurred, however, and social reforms, the Chinese govern- without a serious threat to government ment in its development of the Internet security and the Internet has not risen as has granted greater freedom and autono- an obvious catalyst for change. my to its citizens, while still defining the outer limits of the public exercise of such As outlined by David Shambaugh in Chi- freedoms. It is the purpose of this essay to na's Communist Party: Atrophy and Adaptation, outline how government controls over the the ability of the Chinese government to public use of the Internet have effectively develop from a totalitarian state, based on neutralized the threat that public discourse mass mobilization and Leninist ideology, and networking on the Internet presents. to a market based soft-authoritarian state, Ultimately the government has managed
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 to use the internet to reinforce its rule, Cyber-ocracy dealing swiftly with any threat to its power, while permitting benign forms of protest Institutional means of dividing and isolat- and channeling people’s discontent to- ing different sectors of the population, wards its own aims. such as the strict form of Hukou registra- tion and the segmentation of society that Extending Internet coverage for the pur- occurred under the planned economy pose of improving business, education, have been abandoned with reforms, and and information exchange has become an the increased development of the nation’s important task for the Chinese govern- economy and transportation and commu- ment. According to the China Internet nication sectors have reduced the ob- Network Information Center: “By the end stacles for political mobilization. This of 2008, the total of netizens in China had more integrated society poses an increas- increased to 298 million, with an annual ing threat to the government’s ability to growth rate of 41.9%. The Internet pene- deal with organized opposition. tration rate reached 22.6%, slightly higher than the average level in the Citizens’ increased ability world (21.9 %)”. As a major to network online has economy in the international By the end of 2008, developed alongside market the Chinese govern- the total of netizens in increased freedom of ment, has perceived the In- China had increased expression. According to Ashley Esarey and ternet as an essential tool for to 298 million, with developing the economy, Xiao Qiang in their ar- particularly since the coun- an annual growth ticle “Political Expres- try’s inception into the World rate of 41.9% sion in the Chinese blo- Trade Organization. gosphere”, blogs in China have reduced the government’s Two points of view on the potential im- ability to act as gatekeepers regarding pact of the Internet on Chinese authorita- whose voice can be heard, and what opi- rian rule have been summarized by Re- nion can be expressed. Online bloggers becca Mackinnon in a talk hosted by the are often able, through careful wording, to Carnegie Endowment for International push the boundaries of acceptable dis- Peace as: cyber-tarianism, which describes course and express commonly held fru- a situation where internet use reinforces stration over government rule. An esti- authoritarian government rule; and cyber- mated 30-50 million bloggers post online ocracy, in which the Internet is seen as in China, a potential human resource pool having a more revolutionary impact, from which the country’s next revolutio- where public discourse online reduces the nary leader may arise. state’s grasp on power and leads to the development of an organized opposition. To insure that online discourse does not threaten government rule, the Chinese
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 government operates an extensive hierar- in defining interactions on the Internet, chical system of censorship. Censorship in and while it cannot control all that occurs China operates at the state, business, and online and in the blogosphere, it can set individual level. At the macro level, access the outer limits of what is and is not ac- to the World Wide Web in China is chan- ceptable. While free to discuss political neled through 6 licensed interconnecting events to a degree unimaginable 30 years networks, over which the government has ago, citizens understand the danger they considerable control. The government is face if discourse crosses the line. Internet able to not only block access to websites censorship in China is constantly adjusting that it does not approve of, but also block to the social-political environment, ensur- specific content on accessible websites, ing the ability for citizens to communicate, limiting negative information. Culpability but stopping short of allowing them to for online infractions operates at the busi- organize or spread discontent. ness and individual level. In an article by Tamara Renee Shie titled The Tangled Web: Government crackdown on the Charter does the Internet offer promise or peril for the 08 initiative illustrates the government’s Chinese Communist Party?, one of the great- ability to limit public mobilization. Charter est tools of censorship that the govern- 08 has been portrayed in the news media ment possesses is its ability to solicit self- as the most substantial threat to the Chi- censorship through fear of persecution. If nese government in recent history. In online content moves beyond what cen- reaction against government authoritarian sors permit, government enforcement rule, disregard for the constitution, and agencies work well in combating such the lack of rule of law in China, Charter threats to CCP power. 08 calls for increased social and political freedoms including freedom of speech, Thus though the Internet does pose new freedom of press, freedom of assembly, challenges for the Chinese government, institution of a republican and democratic due to the effectiveness of the system out- government, and broad commitment and lined above, combined with China’s im- adherence to the principle of Human pressive enforcement capacity, political rights. The western news media has cov- organization online has been minimal. ered the Charter ’08 story with enthusiasm The government’s ability to head off or- and rare optimism. For example, accord- ganized unrest, effectively neutralize po- ing to a report by the Christian Science Moni- tential leadership, and discourage individ- tor, while similar calls for systematic uals from risking government repression, changes have occurred before, Charter 08 has proven effective. Shanthi Kalathil and marks a new and significant threat to CCP Taylor C. Boas in their book Open Net- rule. This is due to two main reasons; first, works, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Inter- thousands of individuals from different net on Authoritarian Rule write that the social, economic, and political lines have Chinese government is winning the battle all supported the proposal. Also, the role
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 of the Internet in extending the reach of the internet to serve as an organizing tool the initiative, despite the lack of a central in helping to network a diverse group of organization, makes it a particularly individuals and coordinate action, without unique threat to the CCP, which predo- strong individual leadership it will be diffi- minantly focuses its attention on orga- cult for the Charter to be anything more nized opposition. The government’s fear than a powerless call for change, success- of mobilization across social boundaries, fully repressed by the government. particularly for such an overtly anti- establishment cause, explains the tough Cyber-tarianism government crackdown. The Internet also influences state society While Charter 08 certainly shows public relations in China by way of Cyber- anti CCP sentiment, and the potential for tarianism. The Internet in China has the the Internet to help dissidents network, it potential to strengthen the government’s also illustrates the government’s continu- control as it makes it easier for the gov- ing repressive capacity and ernment to address citizens the problems that leaderless concerns, increasing the protest movements face. The Chinese govern- Party’s legitimacy. A sys- While participation is cer- ment is potentially tem of E-governance that includes online mechan- tainly impressive, 8,000 sig- able to use the Inter- natures is by no means re- isms for citizen feedback, volutionary. Police have net as a way to enable complaints and sugges- detained and interrogated citizens to engage tions, enables the gov- numerous signers, confis- more ernment to make small cated property, and kept concessions through im- key dissidents under surveillance. The proving the “service” as- most prominent example is Liu Xiaobo, pect of governance and reduce discontent one of China’s most prominent Human without resorting to electoral or repre- Rights activists who achieved great noto- sentative governance. According to Re- riety for his part in the 1989 student pro- becca Mackinnon: “The Chinese govern- tests in Tiananmen and recently for his ment is potentially able to use the Internet role as one of the original signers of Char- as a way to enable citizens to engage more ter 08, was detained 4 days before the with the government, feel more engaged, document was published and remains in feel like they have more recourse without custody today. The Government has also having to resort to multi-party elections limited news coverage of the publication, and democratic institutions.” and while support continues to grow for the proposal, it has slowed to a crawl. Daniel Drezner, professor of international Though the lack of leadership is cited politics at the Fletcher School of Law and above as illustrative of the potential for Diplomacy at Tufts University, points to a tendency among scholars to focus on the
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impact of the Internet in lowering transac- authoritarian deliberation, where authoritarian tion costs between members in civil socie- governments seek to facilitate public dis- ty, by increasing their organizational pow- course and input, while maintaining strict er vis-à-vis the government. However, he authoritarian rule, as a means of increasing claims that it is important to remember effectiveness and legitimacy of governance. that the Internet also reduces government According to He and Warren: “authorita- transaction costs, by increasing its ability rian deliberation… can be understood as to monitor and govern the population. an elite response to problems of gover- The Chinese government’s impressive nance within increasing complex, multi- censorship capacity, as well as its benefi- actor, high-information, high-resistance cial use of the Internet in improving go- environments.” Besides the existence of vernance, is an example of this principle. formal institutionalized means of delibera- tive mechanisms in China, E-governance The ability of citizens to ex- and the government’s response to online press discontent also alerts social movements reflects the govern- The ability of the central government of ment’s use of deliberative-style public in- citizens to ex- local malfeasance and impor- put to reinforce its own power and avoid press discon- tant instances of civil unrest. commitment to more formal democratic tent also alerts This can be seen in the reso- institutions. He and Warren write: the the central gov- lution of a few high profile “deliberative mechanism may serve to ernment of lo- cases, including the Deng channel and contain political demand by mobi- cal malfeasance Yujiao case of May 2009. lizing popular participation, civilizing While cases such as Deng power, improving administrative capaci- Yujiao’s are often portrayed ties, reducing and controlling conflict…”. as illustrative of the power of the internet to give voice to public griev- The second component to the theory of ances and increase the volume of opposi- Cybertarianism is the idea that the Inter- tion to the government, they also serve to net also diffuses discontent by allowing help alert the Center of public discntent, citizens to let off steam in a non- helping identify and neutralize the source threatening manner. According to MacK- of such outbursts and placate discon- innon, by loosening permissible political tented communities. Without the oppor- discourse but retaining a strong bottom tunity for citizens to voice their grievances, line, the government allows individuals to the Central government would be in many vent grievances to diffuse discontent, cases blind to such instances of discontent while still insuring that free expression until substantial opposition developed. does not lead to citizens organizing and mobilizing. Such interactions between the govern- ment and citizens echoes what He Bao- gang and Mark E. Warren have termed
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Broader Social Trends news sources detail rising levels of discon- tent in China, the same networks clamor This ability of the government to channel to explain the perceived apathy in Chinese citizens’ discontent into constructive ave- society, particularly during the recent an- nues of expression and to head off orga- niversary of the Tiananmen Square inci- nized opposition is reflective of broader dent. contemporary and historic socio-political dynamics in China. While the CCP’s rule According to Elizabeth Perry in her article is by all accounts relatively stable, extreme Challenging the Mandate of Heaven: Popular inequality and increased levels of corrup- Protests in Modern China, Chinese leaders tion have stressed social stability and at have historically been accepting of mass times undermined central government public movements in a manner distinct control. In order to understand protest from most totalitarian states. From dynas- movements online, the dynamic of social tic acceptance of localized, economic pro- movements in general need to be ex- tests, to Mao era promotion of “conti- amined. Decentralization, implemented to nuous revolution”, even modern CCP to- benefit economic development, has re- lerance of rural protests and nationalist duced the Central government’s ability to movements, the history of popular police local government actions. Central movements in China stands in contrast to government attempts to implement bene- many other regimes worldwide. Protests ficial tax and legal reforms aimed at reduc- and social movements in China receive ing civil discontent have often been widely varied government reactions de- thwarted by local government corruption. pending on their scope and aim. Protests This continues to cause much localized over specific regional economic griev- civil unrest and conflict between local ances have historically received a much populations and local governments. greater degree of tolerance from Central leaders than protests that are thought to As Peter Lorentzen details in his article represent a diverse set of interests or chal- Regularized Rioting : The Strategic Toleration of lenge the Central government’s rule. Public Protest in China, while a viable and organized opposition movement has yet The need to address social discontent and to be realized, civil unrest and public identify and reduce local corruption ex- demonstrations of anger against local gov- plains the government’s tolerance of cer- ernment corruption are increasingly tain forms of protest. As detailed by Ke- common in rural and urban China. A large vin O’Brien and Lianjiang Li in their book portion of Western discourse on protests Rightful Resistance in Rural China, Rightful in China focuses on this juxtaposition of Resistance describes a contemporary so- increasing social unrest with the stark lack cial-political dynamic in which the gov- of organized anti-establishment move- ernment is, to some extent, supportive of ments. At the same time that Western popular protests. Rightful Resistance de-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 tails a dynamic in which protestors use the Thousands of workers protested, staging a language of central government laws, di- sit-in on the city’s main railway tracks. rectives, and principles, to protest local Even though the sizes of the protests government corruption, aligning them- were impressive, and their actions severely selves with the Center and calling upon disrupted the city’s economy, the govern- Beijing for redress. For their part, the ment arrested only a few key leaders and Central government deals relatively favor- agreed to pay the workers stipends. ably with such protests, sometimes meet- ing protestors’ demands and addressing Protests that do not fit squarely within the cause of public unrest. This degree of this dynamic, those that offer little or no tolerance is shown to rightful resisters as it information regarding corruption, orga- ultimately aids the Chinese government in nized protests which represent diverse identifying and dealing with discontent, class or regional interests, or those that and combating official corruption that it directly challenge CCP rule, are typically would otherwise be unaware of. dealt with swiftly and ruthlessly by the Central government. The leaders of such This form of social movement helps rein- protests are detained, information of the force government legitimacy and control. event is suppressed, and police force is In essence, the Central gov- often dispatched to sup- ernment has tipped the bal- press any physical gather- ance of power away from …citizens are able to ing. Over the last 20 years local governments, towards vent their frustra- the CCP and security or- local residents without re- tions, and in return do ganizations such as local sorting to institutionalize not challenge the rule police, the People’s public oversight. This re- Armed Police, the legions of the CCP flects deliberative policies of ‘reported’ Internet po- outlined above. Others lice, and even the have described this as a People’s Liberation Army central component of an unspoken pact, have become adept at combating orga- whereby the government insures econom- nized opposition. Like government at- ic development, stability, and tackles cor- tempts to limit online political organiza- ruption, while citizens are able to vent tion, the government has taken great pains their frustrations, and in return do not to limit any and all organized groups in challenge the rule of the CCP. society that might challenge its rule. The ability to suppress public protests that are An example of this dynamic can be seen harmful to the legitimacy of the CCP is in workers protests in Jiamusi in 2002, pivotal if the Chinese government is to when a state-owned textile factory that allow some forms of unrest, while retain- had reneged on paying its employees’ re- ing control over the limits to which dis- dundancy benefits, filed for bankruptcy. content can be expressed.
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
Evidence of the Impact of the Internet boosting government support. Flooded with positive information about the re- By many measures government online gime and negative information about for- censorship appears to be working. Ac- eign powers, nationalism has found fertile cording to MacKinnon the vast majority grounds online. The government has sup- of Chinese bloggers are a-political, and ported Han nationalism in part as a unify- survey results indicate the number of indi- ing ideology to replace socialism. Since the viduals using proxy servers to access sen- very early days, a strong nationalist sitive information is dwindling. Growing movement, particularly among the young- up in a time of prosperity, many Chinese er generations in China, has developed youths prefer not to risk contemporary rapidly. A long list of political incidents, social freedoms and economic advantages including perceived prejudicial coverage for the pursuit of greater political rights. of the Atlanta Olympics, the bombing of This underscores Chinese resentment of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1998, western portrayal of Chinese citizens as followed more recently by oppressed by the government and blindly Western news coverage of the obedient to its command. Many see the riots in Lhasa and the turmoil freedoms that they have online as substan- surrounding the Olympic While the public tial. MacKinnon also maintains that: torch relay, has further stoked discourse on the “Chinese bloggers and blog-hosting busi- nationalist fires. A popular Internet will nesses themselves have generally viewed belief that China is a victim of not directly censorship as part of the necessary tra- the West attempting to limit challenge CCP deoff for online speech…” its rise, has exploded onto on- rule, it may line blogs, BBS, and a host of complicate go- It is also important to note that most neti- other networking tools. vernance zens are the urban educated and wealthy elite. This group has benefited the most Long Term and Short Term from CCP rule and has the most vested in Consequences the continuation of the status quo. Ac- cording to China Internet Network In- While the public discourse on the Internet formation Center: “71.6% of netizens are will not directly challenge CCP rule, it may urban residents. 28.4% are rural residents”. complicate governance. The scale of pub- This demographic represents the winners lic protests over official corruption is like- of China’s years of reform, and the least ly to be increased by public use of the In- likely to risk all the freedoms and eco- ternet. This can be seen in the recent cases nomic success they have gained under the in Shishou, where already smoldering pub- CCP. lic resentment against local officials was ignited by the death of a 24 year old resi- In Evan Osnos article, “Angry Youth” for dent named Tu Yuangao. Local residents the New Yorker, a strong nationalist and the family of Tu Yuangao’s consi- movement has also developed online,
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 dered his death suspicious, and rumors of Conclusion police and government coverage sparked public protests. News and images of the The introduction and development of the event, transmitted online via Twitter post- Internet in China will not in and of itself ings and pictures, helped ignite public pro- lead to a revolution. So far the Chinese tests and precipitate much greater public government has been able to perpetuate participation than would have been possi- the same socio-political dynamic online as ble without the Internet. It is reported it has offline, whereby citizen mobilization that 40,000 protestors took to the streets, is diverted into state approved channels smashing police cars and fire trucks and reinforcing government rule. The Chinese setting the hotel alight. The government government has been effective in provid- responded by sending in 10,000-armed ing enough freedom and economic devel- military police. What this incident shows opment to minimize widespread anti- is that widespread discontent can be easily system discontent while also providing influenced by information online, and constructive outlets for peoples’ anger, while it may not lead to an organized po- and by making an example of those that litical opposition, it can increase govern- challenge its rule, insuring citizens do not ment costs in maintaining order. express their discontent through anti- system mobilization. Thus, lacking the will Finally looking at a longer time frame the or the ability to form organized opposi- Internet may also aid in the development tion offline, a revolutionary movement of civil society and bolster public policy has yet to arise online. As Drezner discourse, leading to acute pressure for an states: ”In societies that value liberal increasingly participatory form of gover- norms—democracies—the Internet clear- nance. As detailed by Yang Guobin in his ly empowers non-state actors to influence article The Internet and Civil Society in China: the government. In arenas where liberal a preliminary assessment, reforms in China norms are not widely accepted—interstate have resulted in the emergence of a timid negotiations and totalitarian governments- civil society as social organizations have the Internet has no appreciable effect”. proliferated, social organizations and indi- The Chinese government has thus far viduals enjoy more autonomy, and a ge- handled the development of the Internet nuine public sphere has emerged. The In- well, benefiting from the economic op- ternet has played a central party in this portunities it presents, while controlling development, creating greater space for civil use of the Internet and reinforcing its public discourse. Despite challenges and hold on power. weakness in each of these achievements, this overall trend increases the develop- ment of a freer civil society and streng- thens deliberative mechanisms.
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
“Ask the Premier” is a out their work, why does everyone feel the need to rush to the internet to voice their Burden the Internet opinions?" Why does the "E-Lianghui" Cannot Bear encounter such an explosion every year?
Clearly the Internet, as an already widely By Xiaoshu, translated by Heather Saul accepted communication platform in Chi-
na, has had undeniable benefits. However,
Translation this does not mean that the Internet is infallible. If there is no corresponding sys-
tem to connect Internet dialogue with ac- [About the author: Xiao Shu is a journalist for tual dialogue, no matter how wonderful the Southern Weekend. He graduated in 1984 the Internet may be, it is often just a mi- from Zhongshan University with a degree in his- rage in the desert that will ultimately fade tory. He is well-known in China for his definitive away. The expectation that the Internet biography of Liu Wencai and his historical anal- can be a major medium through which to ysis of China's perceptions of democracy in the push for reforms is a burden the Internet 1940's: The Harbinger in History--the Solemn cannot bear. Commitments Half a Century Ago. The original article in Chinese can be found at .]
Before the national Lianghui, or “two ses- sions,” has even begun, netizens have al- ready parted the curtains for the opening of the "E-lianghui." The traditional topic of conversation, "I have a question to ask the Premier," has become a staple for ma- jor websites. Discussion and comments flood online forums as the Lianghui at- [Wen Jiabao interacting with netizens] tracts a craze of internet users anxious to discuss the upcoming decisions of the Na- The establishment of a systematic method tional People's Congress and the Chinese by which popular will can be voiced vs. People's Political Consultative Conference. the Internet is much like the main course vs. the dessert. The dessert may be very This is actually a cause for celebration. It delicious but it cannot substitute for the proves that the Chinese people are not main course. Just as the health and devel- complacent about politics. Yet it also leads opment of people depends on the nutri- us to ask an inevitable question: "If the tion of the main course, the health and Lianghui representatives are truly perform- development of a society depends on the ing their duties effectively and carrying perfection of the system. For example,
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 every year during the Lianghui there is To properly determine and extract public bubbling public opinion and classic Inter- opinion requires passing through the fire- net-style discussions and proposals. Yet wall security barriers. On the one hand, this is not equal to Lianghui representative there must be refusal of the misuse of po- committee members actually carrying out litical power, thus eliminating the perver- their duties. When all is said and done, sion of public opinion. On the other hand, Lianghui representative committee mem- there must be a rejection of populism, re- bers have a set of established procedures ducing the likelihood of a bubble in public they can rely on. As long as they earnestly opinion. This is actually an already well- pursue their work, the proposals of the developed and mature mechanism representatives will not fall by the wayside throughout the world. Democratically and will come to effect change in the elected representative government, free- promotion of reforms. In- dom in the media, referen- ternet public opinion is dum decisions by vote, the basically disorganized— The fairy tale of the public hearing system and not only are opinions ex- Internet is conti- so on have already be- pressed in a disorderly nuously perpetuated come separate mechan- manner, but responses to isms, effective for several and is a burden the comments posted on the hundred years, which web are even more scat- Internet cannot bear make up an essential part tered. As these responses of the collective civiliza- can be summoned at any tion of mankind. At least time, they can also be dismissed for any our current system of the National reason. So-called Internet public opinion People's Congress has to a large degree is always fluctuating, and moreover often taken these consensus mechanisms as a differs greatly from actual public opinion. model. It is therefore possible to pave a smooth avenue for public opinion using So-called public opinion is not "whoever the current system, and there is no need to yells the loudest" determines what is true; romanticize the Internet. public opinion is a science with strict qua- lifications and conditions. Public opinion The fairy tale of the Internet is conti- must be in the hands of the people other- nuously perpetuated and is a burden the wise it will only be a cobra dancing to the Internet cannot bear. In fact, it serves as a tune of the snake charmer’s flute. This is foil to the inadequacies of the current sys- not real public opinion; determining pub- tem. One small voice on the Internet is a lic opinion and popular will requires a set mighty force that can turn into a torrential of established procedures, standards and rain. If conventional channels were inter- protections. Those comments that are connected, if public sentiment and public instantaneous, frivolous, and fragmented opinion were usually ascertained promptly, are not real public opinion either. we would not be in this situation. Moreo-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 ver, this is cause for alarm and is worth effort. It cannot be motivated out of self- our attention and dedication. interest or be biased in any way. The mag- ical Internet may assist and promote There is truly no need for everyone to ask change, but it cannot replace the reality of the Premier a question. Modern society is change. The transformation of China in- built on the division of labor and every deed depends on netizens, but netizens person has his/her own role. For exam- are citizens at their core. Without legal ple we already have an oversight body for civil rights, netizens are nothing, the In- foodstuffs (i.e FDA). There is no need ternet is nothing. Therefore, the right for everyone to become a specialist in path includes the adoption of a realistic food safety, only that people learn com- approach, namely from the perspective of mon sense. Similarly, we already have me- legal civil rights, and requires improving chanisms for public safety in our society. the system, and normalizing the role of There is obviously no need for everyone the Internet. to become a policeman, but rather for people to adopt common sense when it comes to safety. Likewise, since we have the National People's Congress and People's representatives, there is no harm in letting our representatives pose ques- tions to the Premier. Of course, there must be preparations and this means Hu Jintao Calls for People's representatives that are fully Use of the Internet as competent and committed. This in turn requires that the People's representatives a Tool of Democracy follow the necessary principle of protect- ing popular choice and accepting public By Fan Zhengwei, translated by Sean Ding oversight. Also, they must be replaceable by the people at any time, as Carl Marx said. Only in this way can one faithfully entrust responsibility to the People's rep- resentatives so that they may carry out [Fan Zhengwei is the deputy director of the their duties effectively. People’s Daily’s department of commentary and a The rights of our citizens are the founda- senior editor of the People’s Daily Online web site. tion of our country. Only when looking The original Chinese commentary can be found at from the perspective of establishing civil http://www.chinaelections.org/NewsInfo.asp?Ne rights can a country establish its basic in- wsID=150810] stitutions. This work is arduous and re- quires everyday attention and coordinated
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
year ago, on June 20, 2008, Hu While officials proactively use the Internet Jintao visited the People’s Daily as a governance and policy tool, the Inter- AOnline and interacted with neti- net itself is playing a significant and po- zens through an online forum. This visit werful role in disseminating social though- has been an unforgettable memory and ts and amplifying public opinion. Hun- opened a new chapter in China’s internet dreds of millions of candid expressions, development. vibrant discussions and heated debates flourish on personal blogs and news web- During the past year, the internet has be- sites. For example, throughout the past come a new channel for an increasing year, many local incidents have received number of officials to understand public national attention due to the netizens’ per- opinion, and a new platform for providing sistence in discovering the truth. A few public service. For instance, public offi- examples include: the dam collapsing in cials have themselves engaged in online Loufan, Shanxin Province; a prisoner’s debates, obtaining “folk wisdom” on pub- mysterious death in Yunnan (the “hide lic affairs from online forums; political and seek” incident); the Nanjing bureau leaders such as provincial Party secretaries chief’s expensive cigarettes, the cross- “opened their hearts” by communicating provincial police pursuit of an online fo- directly with netizens; deputies of the rum poster in Henan; and the conviction People’s Congress and members of the of Deng Yujiao, a young waitress who People’s Political Consultative Conference stabbed a drunk official during a rape at- posted their proposals online for public tempt. All these incidents have led people scrutiny; government official briefings to believe that the significance of the In- were broadcasted live through the internet; ternet has reached far beyond technology; many draft laws and regulations were also rather, it reinforces media supervision and published on the internet before coming has become a salient political force that into effect in order to encourage public would nurture socialist democracy. feedback. Several concepts delineated in the 17th Party Congress may help one understand the implications of the internet: “people’s democracy is the essence of socialist de- mocracy, developing socialist democratic politics is our Party’s unswerving goal”; “we must improve the institutions of de- mocracy, enrich its means, and broaden its channels; we must implement democratic elections, democratic decision-making, [Hu Jintao visiting People’s Daily Online] democratic management and supervision according to the laws in order to ensure
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 people’s right to know, right to participate, governors asking netizens for critiques and right of expression and supervision”. successfully illustrate the close attention Indeed, understanding public opinion the Party and the government pays to through the Internet is precisely a demon- public opinion on the web. With the syn- stration of “enriched means” and “broa- ergy created by the passion of over 300 dened channels” of democracy. million netizens and the efforts of the government, the practice of socialist de- Technology is an important factor that mocracy will be undoubtedly advanced, supports the development of democracy. and the development of China’s demo- As Carl Marx once said, “Steam, electricity, cratic politics will be further promoted. powered machinery were revolutionists of a rather more dangerous cha- Certainly, while the inter- racter than even citizens net has a great impact on Barbes, Raspail and Blanqui”. With regards to Chi- democratic development, th Since the dawn of the 20 na, the significance of we must see that neti- century, technological ad- the Internet in the de- zens alone cannot vancements such as the evo- represent the entire citi- lution from newspaper to velopment of democ- zenry. At the current radio and television have racy is enormous moment, it is necessary contributed profoundly to for us to enhance the the process of democracy. netizens’ capability of Nowadays, with the internet discussing and participat- becoming the most convenient, widely ing in political affairs. We must also be used and fair media of communication, its alarmed that the Internet is a double- impact on democratic politics and public edged sword, because it may create a “dig- life cannot be underestimated. ital gap”, resulting in deepened inequality and greater information asymmetry. In The ways and extent to which the modern order for “Democracy 2.0” to fully blos- technology of communication affects som in China, we cannot rely solely on the democratic politics are related to the be- internet. Instead, the impetus of demo- havior of the owner of the technology and cratic development needs to be unearthed the response from the political sector. from the socio-economic life itself, and With regards to China, the significance of democratic life needs to be practiced with- the Internet in the development of de- in an institutionalized path. mocracy is enormous. While gauging pub- lic opinion through the web is on the rise, netizens are becoming increasingly pas- sionate about political participation. Fur- thermore, examples such as Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao interacting with netizens and
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
Loud and Clear: How China’s Angry Youth Use the Internet to Magnify Their Voices and Impact International Relations
By Robert D. O’Brien
he Internet has proven to be one Though the Internet has expanded rapidly of the most transformative forces on the mainland, such expansion has been Tin modern history, streamlining far from seamless. Debates over how the information, increasing communication Web is to be used have frequently left the both within and between countries, and government at odds with foreign officials changing the face of nearly every major and businesses as well as domestic mem- facet of society. China, whose 300 million bers of civil society and individual citizens. netizens constitute the largest such popu- The fact that the Chinese Communist Par- lation in the world, has hardly been ex- ty (CCP) has allowed significant space for empt from such changes. Indeed, it was the development of many different types the introduction of the Internet to the of websites, including blogs and social mainland in 1994 that pried ajar the doors networking platforms, is irrefutable. It of a Chinese state that was rhetorically remains equally true, though, that the gov- open to the world but in reality still tightly ernment does not hesitate to restrict restricted in its interactions with the inter- access to these sites when it deems neces- national community. As a result, PRC citi- sary and still limits the publication of po- zens today are far more informed about litically or otherwise “inappropriate” ma- and integrated into the world around them terial. As a result, many liberal groups, than they were fifteen years ago. based both within China and abroad, have had their websites “harmonized” (he xie), the Chinese euphemism for blocked. In
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 recent months, several popular interna- posture include an analysis of their own tional communication platforms have movement. been added to the list of those who have fallen victim to government censorship. The Origins of the Angry Youth Youtube, Facebook, Twitter, and at times, even Google have been inaccessible with- The rise of China’s angry youth was nei- out the use of a proxy or international ther sudden nor mysterious. Rather, it was VPN client. Not all groups, however, have the natural result of a confluence of fac- been stifled in their development. Those tors – the implementation of the One that seem to serve the interests of the Par- Child Policy in 1979-1980, China’s ever- ty have been allowed to thrive. Among increasing importance in international re- them, few have become more prominent lations since the advent of reform and than the angry youth (fen qing). opening, and, most importantly, the intro- duction of the Internet to the mainland in Though some mock the fen qing, sardoni- the mid-1990s. cally noting that retaining the same pro- nunciation while changing Though the world still the first Chinese character awaits the definitive in the word changes its The rise of China’s an- scholarly work on how meaning to “shit youth,” the gry youth was the the One Child Policy has young men and women who natural result of the affected the personalities occupy the movement’s implementation of the of those born since its enactment in 1979-1980, ranks have grown to be a One Child Policy in certain characterizations formidable force in modern 1979-1980 international society. Born of the post-1980 genera- out of a combination of so- tion have come to be cial conditions and the advent of the In- widely accepted. Among these characteri- ternet, these ardent nationalists, well- zations, the most prominent focus on the educated but often quite simplistic in their overabundance of attention they receive. worldviews, burst onto the scene in 1996 The Chinese commonly refer to them as and have consistently had a significant xiao huangdi, or little emperors, a reference impact on China’s foreign affairs. Though to how spoiled they are. Founding Google they lack the ability to elect their leaders, China President Li Kaifu used the status they have found a way to influence them, difference between two well-known ani- leaving their mark on Chinese relations mals to describe them, noting that “before with countries such as the United States, 1980, the kids were raised like pigs; after 1 Japan and France. In doing so, they have 1980, the kids were raised like Pandas.” necessitated that any serious assessment of China’s current and future diplomatic Not every individual born since 1980 fits these characterizations. Many, in fact, are not even only children, a testament to the
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 policy’s many loopholes as well as the did occur during their lifetime, the Tia- widespread failure of local officials to en- nanmen Square Incident, was over before sure its enforcement. On the whole, how- most of them were politically conscious ever, the post-1980 generation is undoub- and was subsequently erased from the tedly used to getting what they want, public memory. The result is a generation when they want it. More importantly, they of Chinese youth whose pride in their have no qualms about loudly voicing their country is almost completely untempered dissatisfaction when confronted with in nature. something that does not please them. This attribute, when combined with the natio- The propensity of the one child genera- nalist values inculcated in them through tion to voice their dissatisfaction coupled China’s Patriotic Education Campaign, with the tremendous amount of pride they has led them to be much more active in take in China’s historical and contempo- criticizing the West than rary successes has led many the Tiananmen Generation of them to react loudly that preceded them. Since the implementa- and often bellicosely to tion of reform and Western criticisms of the The PRC’s phenomenal PRC. Indictments of the opening in the closing domestic development and CCP in the Western press rapid rise in international months of 1978, China and foreign governments’ economic and political cir- has known little more calls for the protection of cles has further inflated the than success human rights, distinct one child generation’s al- processes that are viewed ready latent sense of pride in Chinese his- by some among China’s youth as two tory and civilization. Since the implemen- components of a larger Western plot to tation of reform and opening in the clos- undermine Chinese growth and sovereign- ing months of 1978, China has known ty, inspire irritation amongst the fen qing. little more than success. Its GDP has sky- Though the agitation such action incites rocketed, military conflict has largely been often recedes rather quickly, it does not avoided, and it has become increasingly entirely disappear and has been known to prominent in world affairs. Unlike pre- boil over in the wake of international cris- vious generations, whose love of state and es. civilization was humbled and confused by government created disasters such as the Though the effect of the One Child Policy Great Leap Forward and the Cultural and China’s post-1978 success created Revolution, those born after reform and fertile conditions for the development of a opening have had relatively few reasons to class of angry youth in the PRC, it was the question the trajectory of their nation or Internet that gave this group their voice. the wisdom of its leadership. The one ma- The World Wide Web has provided the fen jor instance of man-made calamity that qing with the opportunity to organize, dis-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 seminate information and share their Some have tried to characterize the angry thoughts with both each other and the youth as a government directed group. outside world. Their stance on any given Such claims, though, prove frivolous. issue may represent neither the urban While there have been reports of Chinese Chinese mainstream nor the sentiments of web-monitors, known as “The Fifty Cent the country’s hundreds of millions of rural Party” (they receive half a yuan for every denizens. Their access to and expert use pro-government chat room post), inflating of the Internet, however, has allowed the presence of the CCP on blogs and in them to magnify their voice, optimizing chat rooms,3 the angry youth movement is their impact on the creation and imple- irrefutably a social phenomenon, not a mentation of Chinese public policy. With government initiative. To be sure, the or without the Internet, China would have government has at times provoked some angry youth. Without the Internet, how- of the fen qing’s anger and harnessed the ever, the angry youth movement would be resulting energy, but the volume of their nowhere near as large or influential as it is Internet comments, their real-life actions, today. and informal or formal meet- ings with those who identify Who are the Angry Youth? themselves as angry youth all the government speak to the independence of has at times Though the angry youth vary in the ex- the movement. provoked some tremity of their nationalist ardor and often of the fen qing’s occupy a diverse array of different occu- How the Angry Youth Use anger and har- pational and social theaters, they share the Internet to Influence nessed the re- several defining characteristics. Broadly Chinese Foreign Policy sulting energy speaking, the term “angry youth” refers to young men and women born after reform Through the promulgation and opening who are intensely proud of of their unique brand of Chinese civilization’s history and recent Chinese nationalism, the angry youth have success, but dissatisfied with its place in made a name for themselves both inside the current international political and eco- and outside of the PRC. Their reputation, nomic order. As a movement, the angry though, is that of a socio-cultural pheno- youth is made up of more males than fe- menon, one that is entertaining, maybe males, is largely urban, features predomi- even moderately frightening, but not to be nantly individuals in their mid-to-late taken too seriously. The aforementioned twenties, and has well-educated adherents. moniker “shit youth,” frequently used to In its actions, it tends to be more reactive describe the group, speaks to how many than proactive, responding to crises rather outside observers view the movement’s than identifying problems and producing value to and impact on society. There is solutions.2 substantial evidence, however, suggesting that the angry youth have more of an in-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 fluence on foreign policy decision-making strategic partners. Such a state of affairs than previously thought. Numerous CCP has been particularly true in the case of officials, including President Hu Jintao, China’s bilateral relationships with the Premier Wen Jiabao, and former Foreign United States and Japan. Minister Li Zhaoxing have admitted to browsing the Internet to gauge public In the spring of 1999, U.S. led NATO opinion, specifically mentioning visiting forces bombed and destroyed China’s several nationalist-run sites. In addition, it embassy in Belgrade, killing several Chi- is widely known that the State Council nese nationals. In the days that followed, Information Office and the Information college forums (BBS) and large Internet Department of the Foreign Ministry regu- web portals across the mainland were larly summarize Internet news and discus- awash in anti-American sentiment. With sions, two realms where the angry youth President Clinton stating that the bomb- reign supreme, for quick consumption by ing was accidental, the result of outdated Chinese diplomats and civil servants.4 In maps, young Chinese hackers, incredulous addition to the movement’s influence on as to the veracity of Clinton’s claims, the day-to-day practice of international waged a cyber war against the U.S., defac- relations, the fen qing have been known to ing numerous American government web- have a major impact on Chinese diploma- sites and shutting down cy in the wake of significant international www.whitehouse.gov for three days.5 incidents. In recent years, their strength Meanwhile, the Chinese government, has been on display most prominently in bolstered by street protests organized on the midst of crises in China’s bilateral rela- the internet by the fen qing, engaged in dip- tionships with the United States, Japan lomatic warfare with their American col- and France. leagues, postponing high-level military contacts with the U.S. and canceling all There is a perception in the West that the bilateral discussions of human rights, the angry youth, through their overt displays non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and of nationalism, provide the Chinese gov- international security.6 China’s rage was ernment with the support it needs domes- made even more explicit in the U.N. Secu- tically to play a strong hand on the inter- rity Council, where PRC representative national scene. While this characterization Qin Huasun referred to U.S. actions as of the situation is not entirely flawed, it is “barbaric” and issued the strongest possi- also not perfectly accurate. Though the ble protest, labeling the bombing a clear actions of the angry youth often do offer violation of Chinese sovereignty and a the government the political capital neces- blatant transgression of international law.7 sary to press its case diplomatically, they Two years later, when an American EP-3 have also been known to plunge the CCP spy plane collided with a Chinese fighter into awkward and potentially volatile situ- jet, killing the People’s Liberation Army ations with key economic and political pilot, a similar series of events unfolded –
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 the commencement of a U.S-China cyber The scope and scale of the angry youth’s war and strong condemnations of Ameri- influence on Sino-American relations, ca by the Chinese government, though though significant, pales in comparison to this time students were kept from protest- their impact on the relationship between ing.8 China and Japan. At times, their actions present the CCP with support in dealing In both cases, the Chinese government’s with the Japanese. Other times, they need- position was strengthened by domestic lessly instigate trouble, forcing the Chi- public support. With large protests, led by nese government find a measured and the angry youth, making clear the will of clever diplomatic solution to the problem. the Chinese masses, the CCP minced no words in criticizing American actions In the spring of 2005, two separate events while asking for compensation as well as a mobilized the angry youth. In April, mass formal apology. There have also been in- anti-Japanese protests erupted across Chi- stances, however, where the vitriolic na after it became clear that Japan’s new words of the angry youth have, in the eyes middle school textbooks glossed over of the Chinese government, wartime atrocities such as unnecessarily threatened the Nanjing Massacre. the continuance of positive Ultimately, the chat Organized online by the relations between the U.S. room postings had lit- young nationalists, they and China. After the Sep- tle to no impact on the lasted three weeks before tember 11th attacks, several being systematically maintenance of Sino- fen qing posted messages brought to a close by the indicating that the tragedy American relations Chinese government.10 was comeuppance for During roughly the same America’s heavy-handed period of time, patriotic approach to international relations. When Chinese netizens, both at home and the American government and media abroad, turned out in the millions to sign picked up on the statements, the CCP or- a petition demanding that Japan not be dered all web portals not to publish such given a permanent seat on the United Na- inflammatory comments.9 Ultimately, the tions Security Council. On June 30, the chat room postings had little to no impact petition, signed by between 41 and 42 mil- on the maintenance of Sino-American lion people, was presented to Secretary relations. The very fact that the Chinese General Kofi Annan at the UN headquar- government was forced to silence the an- ters in New York.11 In both cases, Chinese gry youth, however, spoke to the dangers grassroots activism, stimulated by the an- they posed to China’s most important bi- gry youth and the websites they ran, drew lateral relationship. the world’s attention to Japan’s failure to apologize for its past violations of human rights, giving the CCP the perceived moral
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 high ground in pushing the Japanese gov- trast between the amazingly hot Sino- ernment to take responsibility for its Japanese economic relationship and the World War II-era atrocities. quite cold Sino-Japanese political relation- ship, the angry youth’s actions proved ex- Some angry youth instigated incidents, cessively threatening to bilateral relations, however, have placed the Chinese gov- re-hashing an issue that had been pur- ernment squarely between a rock and a posefully put on the diplomatic side burn- hard place, forcing them to walk a fine er by the Far East’s two great powers. line between supporting domestic natio- nalism and not needlessly damaging rela- In the Sino-American and Sino-Japanese tions with Japan. In the mid-1990s, the relationships, the angry youth’s presence decades old Sino-Japanese dispute over and activism has been both a blessing and the Diaoyu Islands spilled over onto the a curse, sometimes aiding the Chinese Internet, with citizens in both countries government as it seeks to ad- using the Web to organize expeditions to vance its interests and some- the islands. In 1996, a patriotic Japanese times endangering the contin- the angry group sailed to the islands, where they uation of positive relations. In youth’s pres- erected a buoy and brazenly claimed Ja- the case of France, the angry ence and activ- pan’s sovereignty over the territory. The youth’s impact has not been ism has been mission immediately led to outbursts of as schizophrenic. both a blessing anger on the Chinese blogosphere, espe- and a curse cially campus BBS sites. Looking to avoid Though French support for direct confrontation with the Japanese the Dalai Lama has long irri- over the issue, the CCP shut down stu- tated the fen qing, their anger dent blackboards and blocked access to and subsequent wrath have numerous Western websites.12 The initial intensified greatly in the last 16 months. intensity of the angry youth’s reaction In the wake of the March 2008 Tibetan would fade, but it did not entirely dissi- unrest, the Olympic Torch’s visit to Paris pate. In 2003, a group of young Chinese was marked by large-scale protests. As men and women used a nationalist web French President Nicolas Sarkozy consi- site to organize their own expedition to dered boycotting the opening ceremonies the islands and landed themselves in the of the Games in order to protest China’s custody of Japanese officials. Forced to treatment of Tibet, the angry youth roared respond to the detainment of these activ- to life, organizing groups to protect the ists, the CCP sent a carefully worded letter torch throughout the remainder of its to Japan’s government demanding the safe world tour and calling for a boycott of return of the voyagers while avoiding any Carrefour, a French-owned retail giant.14 incendiary remarks about who was the The passing of the Olympics failed to rightful owner of the islands.13 In an era bring a cessation in hostilities: the Chinese that was already characterized by the con- government canceled its visit to a Euro-
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 pean summit after Sarkozy met with the begs the question of how they will influ- Dalai Lama in the fall of 2008, and Prem- ence international relations in the future. ier Wen Jiabao conspicuously skipped Paris while visiting several prominent Eu- Over the course of the last thirteen years, ropean nations in early 2009.15 More re- the angry youth have made a name for cently, the battled continued; in response themselves via ostentatious displays of to the Parisian mayor naming the Dalai hyper-nationalism. Since the incident of Lama an honorary resident of the city, unrest in Tibet last year, they have been over 95 percent of participants in an In- particularly vocal, hypersensitive to any ternet poll conducted by China’s Global media reports or government proclama- Times stated that Paris lacked the qualifica- tions that emanate from the West and call tions to be a friend to Beijing.16 Chinese policy into question. In the wake of the July 5th riots in Xinjiang, they were It goes without saying that the relation- loud and clear in their response, proclaim- ship between China and ing that Xinjiang is and France is not nearly as im- always will be a part of portant as the Sino- …the angry youth China, vilifying “outside American and Sino- have made a name for forces” for instigating the Japanese relationships in uprising, and castigating themselves via osten- guaranteeing the PRC’s de- the West for its reaction velopment and security. tatious displays of hy- to the violence; this all Nevertheless, its souring per-nationalism before major Western provides another clear ex- governments or media ample of how the angry outlets had even levied youth, with the Internet at any serious criticism upon their fingertips, can impact international the CCP for its handling of the event.17 If relations at the government-to- such sensitivity remains pervasive, a se- government and not just people-to-people rious international incident on the scale of level. the 1999 Belgrade bombing, the 2001 EP- 3 Incident, or the 2005 Japanese textbook The Angry Youth’s Future Impact on revisions could prove disastrous for Chi- International Relations na’s relationship with any one of a num- ber of countries. With the angry youth The continued growth of the Internet in pushing a hard-line agenda, the Chinese China coupled with increases in the PRC’s government would be placed in the extra- comprehensive national power will inevit- ordinarily difficult position of either pleas- ably lead to the expansion of the angry ing their domestic audience or securing a youth movement. With the fen qing already harmonious international environment. having a definitive impact on Chinese for- The possibility of them achieving both eign policy, the swelling of their ranks objectives without damaging either their
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009 ties to the angry youth movement or the Notes: foreign country in question seems remote. 1. Li Kaifu. “Understanding China’s ‘An- Such a scenario, one that appears likely gry Youth’: What Does the Future Hold?” within the context of the movement’s his- The Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C. April 29, 2009. tory and present trajectory, inspires con- cern within not only the international 2. Xu Wu. Chinese Cyber Nationalism: Evolu- community but also the ranks of the CCP tion, Characteristics, and Implications. New leadership. The Chinese government is York: Lexington Books, 2007. well aware of the historical tendency of patriotic student movements to switch 3. Xu Wu. “Understanding China’s ‘Angry their focus from the evils of rulers abroad Youth’: What Does the Future Hold?” to the failings of rulers at home. Moreover, The Brookings Institution. Washington, D.C. April 29, 2009. they recognize that the angry youth are not necessarily pro-Party, but rather pure 4. David Bandurski. “China’s Guerrilla Chinese nationalists, apt to support the War for the Web.” Far Eastern Economic CCP as long as they believe it is advancing Review. July 2008. the interests of the Chinese people, but not blindly follow its leadership. The fen 5. Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism, 181- qing may very well remain a force that 182. does more to help than harm the interests 6. Susan Shirk. China: Fragile Superpower. of the Chinese government. Such a future, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007. however, is far from assured. 7. Ellen Messmer. “Kosovo Cyber-War Regardless of whether the coming years Intensifies: Chinese Hackers Targeting feature a cooperative relationship between U.S. Sites, Government Says.” CNN. May the angry youth and the CCP or one that 12, 1999. is defined by tension, the fen qing seem 8. “Clinton Apologises for Embassy destined to leave their impact on Chinese Bombing.” BBC. May 10, 1999. foreign policy. At a time when the PRC is growing increasingly important in world 9. “China, At Security Council Meeting, affairs, the anxiety that such a fact inspires Registers Strongest Possible Protest Over in the hearts of China watchers around Attack Against Its Embassy in Belgrade.” the globe is far from unreasonable. UN Press Release: SC/6674. May 8, 1999.
10. Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism, 55. 11. Shirley A. Kan. “China-U.S. Aircraft
Collision Incident of April 2001: Assess- ments and Policy Implications.” CRS Re- port for Congress. October 10, 2001.
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China Elections and Governance Review Issue 3 | August 2009
12. Susan Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 237.
13. Xu Wu, 61. INTERNSHIP OPPORTUNITIES 14. Joseph Kahn. “China Is Pushing and The Carter Center is committed to waging Scripting Anti-Japanese Protests.” New peace, building hope, and fighting disease, York Times. April 15, 2005. and interns have the opportunity to work for Carter Center programs that contribute 15. Shirk, China: Fragile Superpower, 140-144. to this mission. Carter Center interns make vital contributions to the Center's work. In 16. Zixue Tai. The Internet in China: Cy- turn, The Carter Center provides a subs- berspace and Civil Society. New York: tantive learning experience that serves as a Routledge, 2005. basis for interns to explore their career options and to develop professional skills. 17. Xu Wu, Chinese Cyber Nationalism, 26. Internships are offered during three ses- sions per year to undergraduate juniors 18. Ibid., 74-76. and seniors, graduate students, and recent graduates (graduated in the past 24 19. Carol Matlack. “France’s Carrefour months). Feels China’s Ire.” Business Week. April The China Program prefers individuals 22, 2008. with a background or coursework in inter- national relations, political science, or oth- 20. “Beijing Assails Sarkozy for Meeting er related fields. Applicants should com- the Dalai Lama.” New York Times. De- municate well in Mandarin Chinese and be cember 7, 2008. current in Chinese affairs and U.S.-China relations. Interns should be skilled con- 21. “France Snubbed on Chinese Prem- versationalists and researchers, with basic ier’s Europe Tour.” Radio France Interna- technological proficiency (such as Web tional. January 27, 2009. page creation, PowerPoint and Excel), capable of working independently. Dedi- 22. “Paris Mayor Persists in Offending cation to the program's objective is man- China, Gives Dalai Lama Title of ‘Hono- datory. rary City Resident.’” Global Times. June 8, Interns will perform a variety of tasks, 2009. including administrative assistance, docu-
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