DOCSLIB.ORG

Bosnia-Herzegovina Political Briefing: the Role of High Representative and European Union’S Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Zvonimir Stopić

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Bosnia-Herzegovina Political Briefing: the Role of High Representative and European Union’S Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Zvonimir Stopić ISSN: 2560-1601 Vol. 38, No. 1 (BH) March 2021 Bosnia-Herzegovina political briefing: The role of High Representative and European Union’s Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Zvonimir Stopić 1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11. +36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: CHen Xin Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01 The role of High Representative and European Union’s Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina In this briefing we will be taking a closer look into the important role of the High Representative and European Union’s Special Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, as this year will occur the first change of the head of this position after 12 years. The current head officer Valentin Inzko will be replaced by a new candidate, most probably Christian Schmidt. After an overview of the general history and function of the Office of the High Representative, important due to its deep influence on the political structures of Bosnia and Herzegovina, we will take a brief look at the current High Representative head officer Inzko and the new candidate Schmidt. Office of the High Representative (OHR) – function and history The Office of the High Representative is an international institution with a status of diplomatic mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, established in accordance to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, also known as the Dayton Peace Agreement, signed on December 14th, 1995. The OHR, as it is explained in Annex 10 of the agreement, has jurisdiction over overseeing implementation and “final interpretation” of civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement regarding the ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As it is stated on their official website, the role of the High Representative is to work with both the people and institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina and with the international community to ensure that Bosnia and Herzegovina evolves into a peaceful and viable democracy while being on the course for integration in Euro-Atlantic institutions. The OHR is working towards the point at which Bosnia and Herzegovina will be able to take full responsibility for its own affairs. The institution itself is financed by the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), with a budget over € 5.3 million in 2020 / 21, which is sponsored by the European Union (54 %), the United States of America (22 %), Japan (10 %), Russia (4 %), Canada (3.03 %), Organization of Islamic Cooperation (2.5 %), and others (5.47 %). On the account of the conclusions given at the Conference for implementation of peace held in Bonn in December 1997, the OHR was granted authority to put forward and change laws and the constitution, as well as replace politicians and other administrative officers. For instance, after there was no agreement between the local politicians, the OHR interfered and decided upon the cases of the national flag and anthem, citizenship laws, Council of Ministers law, the state 1 government, country’s election law and the city of Mostar’s statuary. Furthermore, the OHR annulled some of the decisions made by the Central election committee after elections, replaced two members of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidentship, replaced several state and local parliament representatives and had banned them of all other political activities after it established that their actions were in the breach of the Dayton peace agreement and local laws. However, most of these bans and decisions were later suspended. Overall, in the period from 1997 to 2011 the OHR implemented almost 900 different decisions based upon the Bonn agreement. When it comes to the position of relevant international actors, Great Britain and the United States have been openly supportive of the OHR and its instruments of power, while Russia is against it, demanding that the institution closes because it makes Bosnia and Herzegovina a protectorate and not a sovereign country. Peace Implementation Council (PIC) The OHR cannot make any decisions if not agreed upon by the state members of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council. The PIC was established just a week prior to the signing of the Dayton Agreement and it includes 55 states and different international organizations like the International Monetary Fund, the Council of Europe or the Red Cross International Committee. Members of the Steering Board of the PIC are United States, Russia, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, Canada, Japan, the Presidency of the European Union, European Commission and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation represented by Turkey. China was a member as well until it withdrew in May 2000. The Board resides twice a year, issues a joint statement and provides the OHR political guidelines. The main OHR officer is appointed by the PIC Steering Board and confirmed by the Security Council of the United Nations. This election usually becomes a compromise made between Russia and the Western countries led by the United States. So far, there have been seven High Representative officers appointed on the duty, all of them European diplomats. All of the appointed Principal deputies were diplomats coming from the United States. The head of the OHR is obliged to submit two reports yearly before the Security Council of the United Nations. Five political goals and the conflicts about the OHR In February 2008 at a meeting in Brussels, the Steering Board of the PIC established five major goals that need to be achieved before the OHR can be closed, but no major leaps forward have been made since. The first goal is agreeable distribution of property between the state of 2 Bosnia and Herzegovina and other levels of government in the country. This has not been achieved as political representatives of Republika Srpska find that the property belongs solely to the entities, and not to the state. The second goal is finding an agreement on military property, which is also a continuing dispute between the Serbian and Bosniak representatives. This goal is also a condition for the membership of Bosnia and Herzegovina in NATO. The third goal is reaching a final agreement on the status of the Brčko district, which is neither part of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina or Republika Srpska, but has a specific and complicated status of “condominium”. The fourth goal is the fiscal sustainability and the fifth the revival of the rule of the law, which includes a joint state strategy on war crimes, law on foreign nationals and asylum and the state strategy for the reform of the judicial sector. Although none of the above-mentioned goals have been reached, there have been pressures to close the OHR by Russia, by the political representatives of Republika Srpska and recently even by some political parties in Croatia. This is opposed by the Western countries’ representatives in PIC as well as Bosniak and civil parties which endorse the OHR to be more politically engaged, and use its powers like it did in the past. Current head of OHR Valentin Inzko and the new candidate Christian Schmidt Currently, the OHR is presided by the seventh head officer, Austrian diplomat Valentin Inzko. He was appointed in 2009, holding the position for 12 years now. During his mandate he was much more reluctant to use the powers granted to him by the Bonn agreement than his predecessors. This is due to, in his opinion, “disagreement in the international community” about the OHR’s role in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As Inzko believes, the time for such severe outside interference has passed and the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina should take more responsibility over the political circumstances in the country onto themselves. It is also important to add that the official process of closing of the OHR had started just a year before Inzko’s appointment. Inzko is most known for two cases, one which occurred at the very start of his mandate and the other occurring at the end. In 2009 Inzko used his powers to sack two high-ranking police officials: a Bosniak police commissioner who was accused of threatening international officials involved in an investigation concerning himself, and a Serbian state agency official accused of ordering the surveillance of Inzko’s staff. In 2020, Inzko largely contributed to the removal of a plaque honoring convicted war criminal Radovan Karadžić by directly threatening Milorad Dodik with European Union sanctions. The new candidate, Christian Schmidt, was confirmed by the Germany Federal Government in January this year. He is a member of the Christian-socialist Union (CSU) since 1976. In the past, since 1990, 3 Schmidt has been a German Federal Parliament (Bundestag) member, then was a Parliamentary State Secretary in the Federal Ministry of Defence (2005 – 2013) and a German Federal Minister of Food and Agriculture (2014 – 2018). Schmidt currently holds a representative position in the German Federal Parliament and is engaged in foreign policy issues, serving on the Committee on Foreign Affairs and its Sub-Committee on the United Nations. Conclusion The Office of High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been established by an annex to the Dayton peace agreement in 1995 and ever since has been a relevant political factor in the country, with powers reaching deep inside the country’s political structures. The OHR is controlled by the Peace Implementation Council that gathers 55 countries and is headed by a board, influenced the most by representatives of the main European Union countries and institutions, the United States, Russia, Japan, Canada and Turkey. The OHR had in the past made many significant changes in the political everyday of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but since 2008, when the official gradual closing of the institutions had began, the OHR interfered less, insisting that the country’s politicians and citizens should take more responsibility.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Western Balkans | 65
    westeRn BalKans | 65 3.4 Mission Reviews Western Balkans he Western Balkans have been a testing-ground Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Kosovo. T for a huge range of political missions since the Each of these figures also has responsibility for early 1990s. These have ranged from light-weight some sort of field presence, although these are civilian monitoring missions meant to help contain not straightforward European political missions. the Yugoslav wars to long-serving presences tasked The EUSR in BiH also serves as the Interna- with promoting good governance, fair elections, tional High Representative, answering to a Peace minority rights and economic rehabilitation. Implementation Council of fifty-five countries and These long-term presences were usually organizations.1 The EUSR in Kosovo is similarly deployed to support or replace peacekeepers. double-hatted as the International Civilian Repre- The large military forces that stabilized the region sentative (ICR, answering to a Steering Group of have now downsized, while some international 28 countries that recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty). civilian missions are likely to remain in place for a The EUSR in FYROM has also acted as the head considerable time. of the European Commission’s delegation there Today, two organizations have prominent since late 2005. political missions in the Balkans. The Organization In addition to the OSCE and EU, the UN has for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) a residual presence in the Western Balkans. The maintains field presences in Albania and all the for- UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo mer constituent parts of Yugoslavia except Slovenia (UNMIK), having had executive authority and a (its presence in Croatia, however, is now an office in large civilian police arm from 1999 to 2008, has an Zagreb and will not be discussed here).
    [Show full text]
  • The High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina
    February 2021 KAS Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina ''Future as a duty'' – the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina Sven Petke, Suljo Ćorsulić A new High Representative will assume office in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the coming months. Valentin Inzko, an Austrian, has been holding this position since 2009. He made repeated efforts to maintain a diplomatic and fair relationship with the key political actors in Bosnia and Herzegovina. An important pre-requisite for the work of a High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina includes vast political experience and support by the international community. An important step for the second pre-requisite has been made with the inauguration of the US President Joe Biden: It is expected that the United States of America and the European Union will again closely coordinate their political engagement in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the neighbouring countries. Office of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina (OHR) The citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina have lived in peace for more than 25 years. Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina gained independence following an independence referendum in 1992 after the disintegration of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks were the belligerent parties in the ensuing war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After a four-year war with over 100,000 dead, hundreds of thousands of wounded and millions of refugees, the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement was facilitated by the international community. The Peace Agreement ended the war and guaranteed the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
    [Show full text]
  • Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S
    Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Steven Woehrel Specialist in European Affairs August 27, 2009 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R40479 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Bosnia: Current Issues and U.S. Policy Summary In recent years, many analysts have expressed concern that the international community’s efforts since 1995 to stabilize Bosnia are beginning to come apart. They noted that the downward trend has been especially evident since 2006, with the election of leaders with starkly divergent goals. Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska (RS), one of the two semi-autonomous “entities” within Bosnia, has obstructed efforts to make Bosnia’s central government more effective and has at times asserted the RS’s right to secede from Bosnia. On the other hand, Haris Silajdzic, a member of the central government collective presidency from the Bosniak ethnic group, has condemned the Republika Srpska as an illegitimate product of genocide. He has called for the abolition of the entities and a dominant central government. Efforts to reform Bosnia’s constitution have made little progress. There has been a debate about the future role of the international community in Bosnia. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), chosen by leading countries and international institutions, oversees implementation of the Dayton Peace Accords, which ended the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia. An EU peacekeeping force, called EUFOR, is charged with keeping the peace in Bosnia and overseeing the Bosnian armed forces. The international community has vowed to close OHR after Bosnia meets a series of reform objectives, ending direct international oversight.
    [Show full text]
  • The Balkan Summer of 2011
    The Balkan Summer of 2011 by Michael Haltzel, Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations “Turning point” has become somewhat of a cliché as a description of where a country or a region stands at a point in time. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said “you cannot step twice into the same stream” and, to be sure, life is the story of constant change and turns. Nonetheless, individuals and countries are occasionally confronted with choices so important that the course taken will likely determine subsequent events for years, even decades. Several of the countries of the Western Balkans face these kinds of decision in the summer of 2011, as does the European Union, and to some extent, the United States. First, the exceptions. Slovenia, in the northwestern corner of the region, is solidly entrenched in NATO and the European Union. Once the most economically developed republic in the old Yugoslavia, it has retained that regional distinction twenty years into independence. Although the global financial and economic crisis has hit Slovenia hard, it is a member of the euro zone, and it continues to participate in Balkan peacekeeping and in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. In its vibrant democracy, which has seen orderly electoral changes of administrations, Slovenia’s populace has no hesitation about expressing discontent. In short, stable Slovenia is one of the success-stories of post-communist Europe. As it struggles to overcome its current economic difficulties, Ljubljana would not seem to be facing fundamental challenges. Slovenia’s neighbor Croatia is also on a positive path. Unlike Slovenia, however, after the break-up of Yugoslavia, Croatia did not immediately embark upon a democratic course, voting instead for a semi-authoritarian HDZ government under its first President Franjo Tudjman, himself an actor in Yugoslavia’s demise.
    [Show full text]
  • Introduction
    Introduction “As I have said time and again, my job is to get rid of my job. I am quite clear that the OHR is now into the terminal phase of its mandate”, said then High Representative for the international community in BIH Paddy Ashdown in his speech in front of the Venice Commission1 in October 2004. For over eight years now the international community has been discussing the downscale of its presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina2, which since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in 1995 has been run as a virtual protectorate. But not much has changed since Ashdown’s speech. Although the country has gone forward in all fields and the security situation has improved drastically since 1995, with the number of NATO peacekeeping forces decreasing from 60,000 to only 1,6003 and with BIH currently a temporary member of the UN Security Council, no arrangements have been made to grant more sovereignty to local politics. And due to recent negative developments in politics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the prospect of getting rid of the ‘informal trusteeship’ now seems more distant than it was at the time of Ashdown’s speech. The OHR, acronym for Office of the High Representative, is the international body responsible for overseeing the implementation of the civilian aspects of the treaty which ended the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is governed by a council of 55 countries and international organizations charged with overseeing Bosnia’s reconstruction, formally organized into an umbrella organization called the Peace Implementation Council (PIC). It is the PIC who 1The European Commission for Democracy through Law, better known as the Venice Commission, is the Council of Europe's advisory body on constitutional matters.
    [Show full text]
  • Political Rituals and Discourses: the Case of Carinthia
    doi:10.7592/FEJF2015.60.fikfak POLITICAL RITUALS AND DISCOURSES: THE CASE OF CARINTHIA Jurij Fikfak Abstract: This article discusses selected ritual practices in Klagenfurt (Sln. Celovec), the capital of the southernmost Austrian state of Carinthia (Germ. Kärnten). The first ritual is connected with October 10, when the 1920 plebiscite is commemorated on the streets of Klagenfurt. In this plebiscite, the majority of people voted for remaining a part of Austria, the successor state to Austria-Hun- gary. The second ritual is a more recent one, known as the Memorial Walk (Germ. Gedenkgehen, Sln. Spominska hoja). Various cultural practices are analysed, as well as the use of symbols and space, media, state, and national discourses. Keywords: alternative practice, memorial walk, Nazism, plebiscite, ritual prac- tices, use of discourse Political rituals are practices set in concrete chronotopes. They express and materialise a sense of belonging, the formation of identities, and the establishment of local, regional, ethnic, national, or state entities. They also represent an area of social cohesion, self-identification, the marking of social affiliation and the exclusion of the Other. Political rituals are unavoidable in social integration (Lukes 1975), socialisation of hierarchies, relations, and the use of power. They are used repeatedly, year after year, to define, embody, and materialise ethnic, language, and other barriers which do not allow a single person, socialised in any community, to remain unaffected or undecided. As Steven Lukes has put it, political rituals mobilise bias, but they also raise questions about the relationships between different discourses, for example, between the official political discourse of the ruling parties, media discourses, the so-called common sense discourse, and the subcultural discourse present mainly among various extremist groups.
    [Show full text]
  • Bosnia-Herzegovina by Dino Jahic´
    Bosnia-Herzegovina by Dino Jahic´ Capital: Sarajevo Population: 3.8 million GNI/capita, PPP: US$9,650 Source: The data above are drawn from the World Bank’sWorld Development Indicators 2014. Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Scores 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Electoral Process 3.25 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 3.25 Civil Society 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 Independent Media 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 National Democratic Governance 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.75 Local Democratic Governance 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 4.75 Judicial Framework and Independence 4.25 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.25 Corruption 4.50 4.25 4.25 4.25 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.75 Democracy Score 4.18 4.07 4.04 4.11 4.18 4.25 4.32 4.36 4.39 4.43 NOTE: The ratings reflect the consensus of Freedom House, its academic advisers, and the author(s) of this report. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the author(s). The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level of democratic progress and 7 the lowest.
    [Show full text]
  • Security Council Distr.: General 30 June 2021
    United Nations S/2021/597 Security Council Distr.: General 30 June 2021 Original: English Letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter dated 3 June 2021 addressed to the Secretary-General from Valentin Inzko, High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina, announcing the appointment of his successor, Christian Schmidt, by the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board (see annex). I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council. (Signed) Christoph Heusgen 21-08905 (E) 060721 *2108905* S/2021/597 Annex to the letter dated 24 June 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council I am writing to inform you that the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board has decided to appoint former Federal Minister Christian Schmidt of the Federal Republic of Germany as the next High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Mr. Schmidt will take up his duties as the High Representative on 1 August 2021, upon which my resignation will become effective. The Peace Implementation Council Steering Board has asked me to inform you of this appointment. The transfer of duties between Mr. Schmidt and I is planned for 1 August 2021. Mr. Christian Schmidt is a German politician, with vast experience and knowledge on Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the wider region.
    [Show full text]
  • The EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Democracy Promotion Within the Limits of the ‘Ethnic Conflict’ Paradigm
    EARLY DRAFT – DO NOT QUOTE WITHOUT PERMISSION The EU and Bosnia and Herzegovina: Democracy promotion within the limits of the ‘ethnic conflict’ paradigm Paper presented at the EUSA Biennial International Conference, Boston, 3-5 March 2011 Panel 2I: ‘Does one size fit all? The substance of EU democracy promotion’ Abstract Seeking to contribute to the emerging debate about the substance of EU democracy promotion policies, this paper takes as its focus Bosnia and Herzegovina, where the EU‟s current democracy promotion efforts are primarily focused on reform of the country‟s constitution. Bosnia‟s current constitution, established by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, provides for consociational power- sharing and extensive territorial decentralisation. While EU officials have stressed the inadequacies of the present constitutional arrangements, over time the reforms demanded have become more limited in scope. As such, I suggest that the outcome of any successful constitutional reform negotiations will be technical fixes to the present constitution, allowing the country to meet the obligations of future EU membership, rather than its wholesale redesign. Rather than promoting liberal democracy as it has elsewhere, then, in Bosnia the EU supports the perpetuation of consociational structures, which EU officials regard as the most realistic option given the country‟s post-conflict political context. Faced with the lack of a constitutional norm within the Union, let alone a consociational one, EU policy-makers have instead chosen to refer to a particular reading of the history of the European integration project itself in order to lend support to their approach in Bosnia, which continues to privilege group over individual rights.
    [Show full text]
  • The Speeches of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina: Cosmopolitanism in Practice?
    The speeches of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina: cosmopolitanism in practice? By: Emma E.M. de Leeuw 3495612, University Utrecht, Languages and cultures (TCS), OZS III Cosmopolitanism, Supervisor: Marijke Huisman, Word count: 8284, Date/Place: Sarajevo, 29-7-1016 The speeches of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina: cosmopolitanism in practice? “I believe in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I believe in you. But what really matters is that you believe in yourselves.” [Ashdown, Paddy. 2003] This thesis was written in honour of all the people inside and outside Bosnia and Herzegovina who work hard to provide people in Bosnia and Herzegovina with a better future. In that light I would like to thank some people and organisations that assisted me in getting to know the country Bosnia and Herzegovina and its people: First of all, the Dutch Young Democrats in cooperation with Mladi Liberali who introduced me to Bosnia and Herzegovina, secondly ‘The Erasmus + EVS program’ and the Centre for Conflict Studies and Human rights of the University of Utrecht who provided me with a deeper knowledge and more understanding of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its conflicts. Last, but most importantly, all my friends and family in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Netherlands who always supported me and helped me to reflect on all the new experiences and knowledge. Picture front page: Sarajevo today By: Emma de Leeuw (April 2016) 1 The speeches of the High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina: cosmopolitanism in practice? Summary This paper tries to answer the question how the High Representative (HR) for Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) expressed cosmopolitan notions in his public speeches between 1995 and 2015 and what changes in these expressions can be seen after the general elections of 2006.
    [Show full text]
  • This Is an Accepted Manuscript of an Article Published by Taylor
    This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in the Journal of Intervention and Statebuidling on 22 July 2016, available at: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/17502977.2016.1208992 Deconstructing Dayton: Ethnic politics and the legacy of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina Patrick Pinkerton Abstract Twenty years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) which brought the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to an end, the dysfunctional nature of the Bosnian state means that the question of how political actors in BiH engage with the DPA as a response to the war remains vitally important. This article argues that moving beyond the ethnicisation of politics in BiH enacted by the DPA can be achieved by challenging the understandings of the war which informs the DPA while simultaneously challenging the effects of these understandings in the present. By advancing what I term a ‘deconstructive conclusion’ of the DPA, this article demonstrates the practical utility of Jacques Derrida’s thought for engaging with the legacy of war in BiH. Keywords: Derrida; supplement; Dayton Peace Accords; Balkans; February 2014 protests. Word Count: 8, 351 Introduction The twentieth anniversary in late 2015 of the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA), which brought the devastating war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to an end, was the occasion for numerous high-profile commemorative and reflective events, in BiH, Dayton, Ohio and elsewhere. The anniversary of the DPA, which was negotiated between Slobodan Milošević, Alija Izetbegović and Franjo Tuđman, the Presidents of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, BiH and Croatia respectively, and delegates from the USA, UK, France, Germany, Russia and the EU, also prompted calls from analysts to revisit the DPA in the search for solutions to contemporary conflicts such as the ongoing war in Syria (Stavridis, 2015).
    [Show full text]
  • Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina
    Decision Enacting the Law on Amendments to the Law on Citizenship of Bosnia and Herzegovina In the exercise of the powers vested in the High Representative by Article V of Annex 10 (Agreement on Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement) to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to which the High Representative is the final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the said Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement; and considering in particular Article II.1. (d) of the last said Agreement, according to the terms of which the High Representative shall "[F]acilitate, as the High Representative judges necessary, the resolution of any difficulties arising in connection with civilian implementation"; Recalling paragraph XI.2 of the Conclusions of the Peace Implementation Conference held in Bonn on 9 and 10 December 1997, in which the Peace Implementation Council welcomed the High Representative's intention to use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of any difficulties as aforesaid "by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary" on certain issues including, under sub-paragraph (c) thereof, "measures to ensure implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and its Entities"; Mindful of the fact that the peace implementation process, which continues to be pursued under the aegis of the General Framework Agreement
    [Show full text]