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Community Development Program Final Performance Evaluation

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Community Development Program Final Performance Evaluation COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION - 12 FEBRUARY 2014 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International. COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 1 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION Contracted under #AID–OAA–I–10–00002, Task Order #AID–306–TO–12–00004 Measuring Impact of Stabilization Initiatives (MISTI) Project DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. CONTENTS ACRONYMS AND OTHER ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................... iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................... 1 Key Findings ....................................................................................................................... 2 Recommendations ............................................................................................................... 2 Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... 3 INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................................................... 4 Context ................................................................................................................................ 5 Purpose of the Evaluation ................................................................................................... 8 Key Evaluation Questions................................................................................................... 9 Project Design and Engagement ................................................................................... 9 Implementation ........................................................................................ 9 Perceptions and Outcomes ........................................................................................ 9 Oversight and Coordination ........................................................................................ 9 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 9 Limitations ........................................................................................................................ 12 FINDINGS .................................................................................................................................... 13 Project Design and Engagement ....................................................................................... 13 Were Projects Designed With the Appropriate Stakeholders, and Did They Meet the Three Criteria for Selection? Were Government and Community Engagement Processes Effective? ...................................... 13 Implementation ................................................................................................................. 16 Was Laborer Recruitment Appropriately Targeted and Perceived to Be Fair? Were Payment Processes Perceived to Be Effective, Fair, and Transparent? ...................................................................................... 17 Were Procurement Processes Perceived as Fair, Efficient, and Transparent? ........... 18 Were Training and Maintenance Plans Well Designed and Effective? ...................... 18 Perceptions and Outcomes ................................................................................................ 19 How Did Stakeholders (Including the Community) Perceive the Project in Terms of Attribution and Quality of Work? ........................................... 19 What Were the Project Outcomes? ............................................................................ 20 How Did Projects Benefit Laborers and Their Families (Including Marginalized Groups Such as Women, the Disabled, and Returnees)? ...................................................................................... 21 Oversight and Coordination .............................................................................................. 22 Were Monitoring Systems Effective? ........................................................................ 22 Was Coordination between USAID and CADG Effective? ....................................... 24 Did the Program Meet Its Performance Management Plan Targets? ......................... 25 RECOMMENDATIONS ............................................................................................................. 26 Observations ..................................................................................................................... 26 General Recommendations ............................................................................................... 27 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................ 28 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION i ANNEX A. COMPLETE LIST OF PROJECT SITES VISITED ........................................... 30 ANNEX B. NUMBER OF INTERVIEWS, BY PROVINCE ................................................... 31 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION ii ACRONYMS AND OTHER ABBREVIATIONS AGE antigovernment element ALP Afghan Local Police ANA Afghan National Army ANP Afghan National Police AOR Agreement Officer’s Representative CADG Central Asian Development Group CDP Community Development Program COIN counterinsurgency DDA District Development Assembly DDP District Development Plan FIRUP Food Insecurity Response to Urban Populations FPO Field Program Officer FY fiscal year GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan GPS global positioning system IED improvised explosive device ISAF International Security Assistance Force KTD key terrain district MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock MISTI Measuring Impacts of Stabilization Initiatives MOU memorandum of understanding NDS National Directorate of Security NGO nongovernmental organization OSM Onsite Monitor PMP Performance Management Plan USAID United States Agency for International Development COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM: FINAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION iii EXECUTIVE SUMMARY From March 2009 to September 2013, the Central Asian Development Group (CADG) implemented hundreds of labor-intensive infrastructure projects in some of the most insecure areas of Afghanistan under a cooperative agreement with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The Community Development Program (CDP), which changed names over the years, represented one of USAID’s longest-running stabilization efforts in Afghanistan. With a ceiling of approximately $266 million, it was also one of the greatest investments. Its closure in September 2013 marks an opportunity to document CDP successes and challenges and to reflect on lessons learned that can be applied in future stabilization programs, both in Afghanistan and elsewhere. This report describes the findings from the final performance evaluation of CDP’s fourth and fifth program phases, in which CADG implemented 73 projects in seven provinces of eastern and southern Afghanistan from April 2012 through August 2013. Originally called the Food Insecurity Response to Urban Populations, the program officially adopted stabilization objectives in September 2010 and shifted focus to primarily rural areas identified by USAID field staff in coordination with International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF). Despite changing program objectives, over its lifespan CDP implemented the same type of infrastructure projects, without relying on subcontractors. CDP employed many combat-age men to work on labor-intensive infrastructure projects, usually for 30 to 90 days. Unlike many USAID partners, CDP took a low-profile approach to security instead of hiring a security firm. By the fourth phase of CDP, efforts to create more linkage and visibility between communities and government were included. Following the evaluation scope of work, the team considered the following key questions: • Were projects designed with the appropriate stakeholders, and did they meet the criteria for selection? • Were community engagement processes effective? • Were government engagement processes effective? • Was laborer recruitment appropriately targeted and perceived to be fair? • Were payment processes perceived to be effective, fair, and transparent? • Were procurement processes perceived as fair, efficient, and transparent? • Were training and maintenance plans well designed and effective? • How did stakeholders (including the community) perceive the project in terms of attribution and quality of work? • Were monitoring systems effective? • Was coordination between USAID and CADG effective? • Did the program meet its Performance Management Plan targets? The evaluation team consisted of one expatriate and one Afghan evaluator, based in Kabul, and at least one interviewer in each province who could travel in the project districts. In total, more than 300 interviews were conducted with stakeholders, including USAID and CADG staff, Afghan government officials, community elders, project laborers, and other members of the community in all seven provinces where CDP worked during phases 4 and 5. The Kabul-based team reviewed
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