Before the Proscribed Organisations Appeal
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Appeal No: PC/02/2006 Date of Hearing: 23rd-31st July 2007 Date of Judgment 30th November 2007 PROSCRIBED ORGANISATIONS APPEAL COMMISSION Before: SIR HARRY OGNALL (Chairman) MISS L BOSWELL QC MR S CATCHPOLE QC LORD ALTON OF LIVERPOOL & OTHERS (In the Matter of The People’s Mojahadeen Organisation of Iran) Appellants and SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT Respondent For the Appellants: Mr Nigel Pleming QC, Mr Mark Muller QC and Mr Edward Grieves Instructed by Mr Stephen Grosz of Bindman & Partners Special Advocates: Mr Andrew Nicol QC and Mr Martin Chamberlain Instructed by the Special Advocates Support Office For the Respondent: Mr Jonathan Swift and Ms Gemma White Instructed by the Treasury Solicitor for the Secretary of State __________________________________________ OPEN DETERMINATION _________________________________________ 1 A. THE HISTORICAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND (i) Introduction 1. Under Section 3(3)(a) of the Terrorism Act 2000 (the 2000 Act), on the 28th February 2001 the Secretary of State laid before Parliament, in draft, the Terrorism Act (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2001 which sought to add the PMOI (known as “the Mujaheddin-e-Khalq” or MeK) to Schedule 2 of the TA 2000 [5/A2/3-19]. The draft order was approved by affirmative resolution and the Order came into force on the 29th March 2001. 2. By an application dated the 5th June 2001 the PMOI (and Mr Abedini) applied to the Secretary of State pursuant to the provisions of section 4(1) and 2(a) to be removed from the list, or (as is sometimes expressed) to be de-proscribed [5/A5/25-40]. 3. By letter dated 31st August 2001 [5/A6/41-44], the Secretary of State concluded that he remained satisfied that the organisation was then “concerned in terrorism” as defined by the Terrorism Act 2000, in that it “commits or participates in acts of terrorism”. Accordingly, the application was refused. 4. That refusal was the subject of an application for Judicial Review. It was refused by Richards J (as he then was) on the 17th April 2002. The Judge held that, within the relevant statutory framework, the appropriate venue for challenge lay in an appeal to POAC against a refusal by the Secretary of State to deproscribe. 5. Meanwhile an appeal against the refusal to deproscribe was lodged with POAC on 12th October 2001 (the “First Appeal”), and the hearing was ultimately fixed for 30th June 2003. 6. While that appeal was still pending, on the 13th March 2003 the PMOI made a second application to the Secretary of State to de-proscribe (the “Second 2 Application”) relying on the original material supporting the application of June 2001, supplemented by further material lodged as part of the application for Judicial Review and material served on the Secretary of State pursuant to the First Appeal. Additionally, in an undated document (but in context probably sent to the Secretary of State in late May 2003) the then Appellants drew attention to (a) the voluntary surrender of their arsenal of all weapons (save for a limited number of side arms) to the occupying forces in Iraq, and (b) their total non-aggression towards the coalition forces. It was submitted that continued proscription was unjustified [5/9/52-54]. 7. In response, and by letter dated 11th June 2003, the Secretary of State maintained his refusal to de-proscribe [5/10/56-61]. 8. No appeal was made from that second decision, and in June 2003 the then appellants withdrew their still pending appeal to POAC against the Secretary of State’s first refusal of their application (this date is taken from the Appellants’ Procedural chronology [1/A4/145]). 9. We pause to note that the fact that no appeal was lodged against the second refusal, and that the First Appeal was withdrawn is said by the Appellants to have been a “protest” by the PMOI against the decision by the British and US Governments to bomb the PMOI bases within Iraq, shortly before April 2003 [2/Application Paragraph 10]. It is to be observed, however, that representations on behalf of the PMOI were made to the Secretary of State in May 2003 [5/A8/50] and a Witness Statement of Mr Mohammad Mohaddessin dated the 16th June 2003 was prepared [5/B5/224] some time after the bombing of Camp Ashraf. Mr Grosz, in a speech at the Symposium of Parliamentarians & Jurists in London in March 2005 [2/17 /12], appeared to suggest that POAC was “a hostile environment” and that “the PMOI had decided, rightly in [his] view, that their efforts, funds and time could be better spent by effectively promoting democracy in Iran, rather than paying lawyers to go through something which was effectively a charade”. 3 10. We are also aware of other events that may have affected the PMOI at around this time. In particular on the 17th June 2003 the offices of the NCRI near Paris were raided [4A/3-4]. A large number of NCRI members were held, some of whom (including Maryam Rajavi) were remanded in custody. Although a substantial sum of money was found, no prosecutions were brought. In July 2003, the Metropolitan Police arrested a number of MeK sympathisers in the UK and searched associated MeK premises. 11. The circumstances surrounding these events may provide a more realistic explanation as to why the PMOI did not continue with the appeals to POAC in June 2003. Of course, it is not necessary for this Commission to decide why the First Appeal and Second Application were not pursued by the PMOI. There appears to be no limit to the number of applications to deproscribe (and appeals) that can be made by or on behalf of a proscribed organisation. However, we note the explanation given on behalf of the PMOI and the relevant timetable and surrounding circumstances as this seems, at least to this Commission, to be an example of the unhelpful approach taken by and behalf of the PMOI to events and the evidence. Nothing is quite what it seems. We refer to this in some detail below in relation to the evidence of Mr Mohammed Mohaddessin that we have had to consider. 12. Much complaint is made on behalf of the PMOI in relation to propaganda put out by the Government of Iran and its supporters. In our view the PMOI can equally be criticised for the propaganda that they appear to rely upon and for the shifting approach to the evidence and material which we have had to consider. (ii) The PMOI 13. A short summary of the history of the PMOI appears in the Appellants’ Written Submissions [1/A3/33 and following]. 14. The PMOI is an Iranian political organisation and a member of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) (which is not proscribed in the UK). It 4 was founded in 1965. The purpose was initially to oppose the regime of the Shah. Its present stated purpose is, and has been for some years, the replacement of the existing theocracy with a democratically elected, secular government in Iran. 15. It took an active part in the protest within Iran that ultimately led to the downfall of the Shah in 1979. Thereafter, it speedily came into conflict with the succeeding fundamentalist regime of the Ayatollah Khomeini. The PMOI contend that there followed for several years within Iran a sustained regime of oppression, violence and killings orchestrated by the clerical rulers of the country. This campaign within Iran was contemporaneous with the war between that country and Iraq during the years 1980 to 1988. 16. Towards the end of 1981, many of the members of the PMOI and supporters went into exile. Their principal refuge was in France. But in 1986, after negotiations between the French and the Iranian authorities, the French government effectively treated them as undesirable aliens, and the leadership of the PMOI with several thousand followers relocated to Iraq. 17. There, they were located in a number of areas, but principally in Camp Ashraf – a location some 60 miles North of Baghdad where they constructed what eventually became a small town of about 3000 inhabitants. There they kept, until the invasion of Iraq by the coalition forces in 2003, a formidable arsenal of weapons including tanks and rocket launchers. The significance of this equipment and its ultimate surrender to the forces of the United States features in arguments on both sides which we will hereafter address. 18. From Iraq they lent military support to their hosts in the war against Iran until its conclusion. They conducted violent operations inside Iran until 2001. The nature and the extent of those operations, and the circumstances surrounding their conclusion in 2001 were the subject of considerable controversy. We will review those issues elsewhere. 19. Since the proscription in 2001 and the occupation of Iraq in 2003 the PMOI have continually pursued a campaign to legitimise their status as a secular, 5 democratic movement intent upon the peaceful overthrow of the present undemocratic regime in Iran, to which end they seek to enlist support at the highest level in the United Kingdom (and elsewhere) for the promotion of that object. The organisation has engaged the sympathy of a number of members of both Houses of Parliament. The present Appellants are thirty five in number (one since deceased), being sixteen members of the House of Commons and nineteen members of the Upper House. Included in the latter group are one former Lord of Appeal in Ordinary and five QCs. 20. These Parliamentarians maintain that the continued proscription of the PMOI invokes the constraints imposed by virtue of section 12 of the Terrorism Act 2000 from their otherwise right to support the PMOI by all available democratic and lawful means.