To Love Or Hate Thy Neighbor: the Role of Authoritarianism and Traditionalism in Explaining the Link Between Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice

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Political Psychology, Vol. 35, No. 2, 2014 doi: 10.1111/pops.12077

To Love or Hate Thy Neighbor: The Role of Authoritarianism and Traditionalism in Explaining the Link Between Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice

Mark J. Brandt Tilburg University

Christine Reyna DePaul University

Fundamentalism is consistently related to racial prejudice (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010), yet the mechanisms for this relationship are unclear. We identify two core values of fundamentalism, authoritarianism and traditionalism, that independently contribute to the fundamentalism-racial prejudice relationship. We also contextualize the fundamentalism-racial prejudice relationship by suggesting that fundamentalists may show prejudice based on conceptions of African Americans as violating values but show tolerance when prejudice is less justiﬁable. These ideas are tested and conﬁrmed using three data sets from the American National Election Studies. Across all three samples, fundamentalism is related to increases in symbolic racism but decreases in negative affect towards African Americans, and these relationships are mediated by both authoritarianism and traditionalism. KEY WORDS: religious fundamentalism, symbolic racism, authoritarianism, traditionalism, prejudice

Two important features of American political life are race and religion. Racism is a key component in debates on welfare politics and affirmative action (e.g., Reyna, Henry, Korfmacher, & Tucker, 2006; Sears & Henry, 2005), and religion is often implicated in debates over cultural issues such as same-sex marriage (e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Campbell & Monson, 2008). However, these two sets of beliefs, religion and racism, are not independent. Fundamentalists tend to be more prejudiced against racial minorities, such as African Americans (e.g., Feagin, 1964; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002), a finding further confirmed in a recent meta- analysis (r = .13, 95% CI = .06–.21, Hall et al., 2010). Fundamentalist prejudice against African Americans is, in many ways, surprising and not easily amenable to a “prejudice against religious value violators” hypothesis (cf. e.g., Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Jackson & Esses, 1997) because African Americans, as a group, are defined by race—not religion—and share many values and beliefs with religious fundamentalists in the United States. For example, many nationally representative samples in the United States suggest that African Americans are one of the more religious racial groups in the country (Taylor, Mattis, & Chatters, 1999), and religious fundamentalism is not related to the perception of racial and ethnic minorities as violating and threatening fundamentalists’ values (Jackson & Esses, 1997). Nonetheless, research suggests that fundamentalists tend to be more racially prejudiced.

207 0162-895X © 2013 International Society of Political Psychology Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX4 2DQ, and PO Box 378 Carlton South, 3053 Victoria, Australia 208 Brandt and Reyna

We argue that the core values of religious fundamentalism can be used to predict both when and why religious fundamentalists will be prejudiced against African Americans. First, based on the psychological deﬁnition of fundamentalism as the belief in an inerrant religious authority that “must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past” (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118), we expect that two components of the fundamentalist belief system— submission to authority and support for traditions—orient believers towards prejudice against racial and ethnic minorities that may pose a challenge to group values and traditions. Second, because not all expressions of prejudice are the same, we expect that fundamentalists will be selectively intolerant depending on whether or not the expression of racism portrays African Americans as violating values important to fundamentalists (cf. Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011; Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, & Tsang, 2009). By specifying both when and why fundamentalists will be racially prejudiced, it is possible to more fully understand the dynamics of fundamentalist belief systems, especially as it relates to other politically relevant beliefs like racism, authoritarianism, and traditionalism.

Why Are Fundamentalists Prejudiced?

There are at least two important values and social cognitive orientations associated with religious fundamentalism that we expect to directly contribute to the fundamentalism-prejudice relationship. The first is obedience and submission to religious authority—including the authority of religious texts, leaders, and supernatural beings (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). Fundamentalism is often defined and measured by the belief in the infallibility of scriptures. These scriptures are seen as the final arbiter of knowledge and are the foundation for understanding other religious texts, religious experiences, and religious behaviors (Hood et al., 2005). This all suggests that the fundamentalist meaning system may be associated with a tendency for authoritarianism, that is, the adherence to a set of values promoting obedience to and respect for established religious and civil authorities (Feldman, 2003; Stenner, 2005). The second component of the fundamentalist belief system that contributes to the expression of prejudice is moral traditionalism, i.e., beliefs and values that are oriented towards preserving the sociomoral status quo. Religious teachings are often an important part of cultural traditions, passed down through the generations for hundreds, if not thousands of years, and fundamentalism is associated with support for these traditional values and ideas (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). By supporting traditional values, fundamentalists may be able to maintain and promote their beliefs (Hood & Morris, 1985) and a sense of order and predictability (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; see also Jost et al., in press). Previous research has confirmed that fundamentalism is associated with authoritarianism and traditionalism. For example, fundamentalism is moderately correlated with both the authoritarian submission and conventionalism subscales of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism scale (Mavor, MacLeod, Boal, & Louis, 2009), the desire for obedient children (Danso, Hunsberger, & Pratt, 1997), and across several countries, the religious are more likely to endorse traditional values (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). Moreover, in a nationally representative sample of the United States, Evangelical Christians (a group that scores high on religious fundamentalism scales; Altemeyer, 2003) were the most authoritarian religious group (Hetherington & Weiler, 2009). Research also consistently indicates that authoritarianism is a strong contributor to prejudice around the world, especially towards groups who are not considered a part of the dominant social group (Napier & Jost, 2008; Stenner, 2005). Similarly, moral traditionalism is also associated with racial prejudice because interacting with a diverse array of people introduces the possibility of having one’s traditions challenged. In a representative sample of the United States, moral traditionalism was associated with more negative stereotyping of ethnic minorities and greater support for the Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 209 notion that Blacks are lazy (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), showing that traditionalism is related to racial prejudice. Others have found that moral traditionalism and absolutism is related to ethnic intolerance in 19 countries (Napier & Jost, 2008) and that values of traditionalism are often associated with greater intergroup prejudice (Schwartz, 1994). Taken together, we propose fundamentalism’s association with authoritarianism and traditionalism can account for part of the fundamentalism-prejudice relationship. Past Support. Other research has documented instances where the relationship between fundamentalism and racism is mediated by Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Laythe et al., 2002; for meta-analytic evidence, see Hall et al., 2010)—evidence consistent with our perspective. RWA consists of three subcomponents: authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission, and conventionalism (Altemeyer, 1996; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). Unfortunately, these components of the RWA scale are measured using a variety of political and religious attitudes and behaviors that closely represent traditionalism, obedience to authority, fundamentalism, and prejudice, thereby conceptually and empirically confounding fundamentalism, traditionalism, authoritarianism, and racial prejudice within the scale and making it difficult to meaningfully interpret the relationships among fundamentalism, RWA, and prejudice (for discus- sions and empirical demonstrations of these issues, see Feldman, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Mavor et al., 2009; Mavor, Louis, & Laythe, 2011; Stenner, 2005; Oesterreich, 2005; Van Hiel, Cornelis, Roets, & De Clercq, 2007). Although our predictions regarding authoritarianism and traditionalism are tentatively supported by research using the RWA scale, this prior work suffers from methodological shortcomings that obscure the potential independent contributions of authoritarianism and traditionalism to the fundamentalism-racism relationship. Support for the status quo and authoritarianism are distinguishable constructs that both differentially predict support for public policies and are affected by different political frames indicating that they should be treated as theoretically separate constructs (Stenner, 2005). Thus, by clearly distinguishing the role of authoritarianism and traditionalism in the fundamentalism and racism relationship, it may be possible to better understand and predict what groups fundamentalists will show intolerance towards and what kinds of strategies may be the most effective for reducing fundamentalist-based racism.

When Are Fundamentalists Prejudiced?

The relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice can be vexing because most, if not all, religious orientations are rooted in belief systems that promote benevolence. Religiosity and fundamentalism are not just related to racism but also to values and behaviors related to compassion and the concern of others’ well-being (for a review, see Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Preston, Ritter, & Ivan Hernandez, 2010). For example, people from a variety of religious traditions are more likely to endorse Schwartz’s (1992) value of benevolence compared to the nonreligious (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004), and religious primes generally increase prosocial behavior (Pichon, Boccato, & Saroglou, 2007; Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). Fundamentalists, speciﬁcally, are more likely to be agreeable than their nonfundamentalist counterparts (Saroglou, 2010), and the experimental activa- tion of compassionate values leads to less out-group hostility among fundamentalists when they are motivated to uphold their religious values (i.e., after a prime of mortality salience; Rothschild, Abdollahi, & Pyszczynski, 2009). Unfortunately, the prosocial expressions of fundamentalism are often limited to ingroup members and ingroup value upholders, and it is often withheld from value violators (e.g., the selective intolerance hypothesis, Rowatt et al., 2009). Blogowska and Saroglou (2011) recently demonstrated that fundamentalists were more helpful to a person in need when that person was a member of the ingroup (a friend compared to an unknown person) or a nonvalue violator (a woman 210 Brandt and Reyna compared to a feminist woman). Research on other expressions of religiosity has found similar results (Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010; Rowatt et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, the religious are often tolerant when religious values proscribe prejudice against a particular group (e.g., racial minorities) and intolerant when the group violates religious values (e.g., Gays and Lesbians). Right-wing authoritarianism appears to mediate these associations (Laythe et al., 2002; Mavor et al., 2011). This has lead some researchers to propose two dimensions of religious prejudice (Mavor & Gallois, 2008; Mavor et al., 2011): group-based prejudice directed towards morally neutral out-groups and moral judgment-related prejudice directed towards value- violating out-groups. Building on Mavor and colleagues’ moral judgment-related prejudice, we argue that individual groups can be conceived in ways that indicate they violate or uphold important values. Analogous to the selective intolerance hypothesis, we predict that to the extent different expressions of prejudice represent African Americans as value violators or value upholders, we predict different relationships between fundamentalism and racial prejudice. Symbolic and modern forms of racism portray African Americans as violating important American/Protestant values of hard work, determination, and self-reliance (Brandt & Reyna, 2012; Henry & Sears, 2002; McConahay, 1986; Sears & Henry, 2005). In this way, symbolic racist sentiments construe African Americans as not upholding traditional values (a violation of traditionalism) and defying American and Protestant group norms (a violation of authoritarian values), suggesting that fundamentalism will be related to increased prejudice towards African Americans when expressed as symbolic racism.1 Other expressions of prejudice, such as negative emotional expressions towards African Ameri- cans as a group, do not portray African Americans as threatening fundamentalist values. Given the religiosity of many African Americans (Taylor, Mattis, & Chatters, 1999), African Americans as a group may even be construed as a value-upholding religious ingroup. Moreover, because most religious groups proscribe racial prejudice, and fundamentalists are likely to be particularly motivated to uphold religious values (including those associated with compassion and benevolence; e.g., Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004), fundamentalists may be more tolerant when racism is expressed as raw negative affect.

The Current Study

The goal of the current study is to advance our understanding of the fundamentalism and racial prejudice relationship by elaborating and contextualizing the fundamentalism-prejudice relationship conﬁrmed by Hall et al.’s (2010) meta-analysis. First, we elaborate by following the example of political scientists and psychologists (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005) and use measures of authoritarianism and traditionalism that are not confounded with one another to test these two potential mediators of the fundamentalism-racial prejudice relationship (cf. Feldman, 2003; Mavor et al., 2009; Mavor et al., 2011; Stenner, 2005). Currently, the literature is unclear whether authoritarianism, traditionalism, or both mediate the fundamentalism-racism relationship. Second, we contextualize this relationship by specifying the conditions under which fundamentalism will result in greater levels of racial prejudice and when it will result in more racial tolerance, allowing us to test more nuanced hypotheses. Third, we use three nationally representative samples to test our hypotheses. Like much work on prejudice (Henry, 2008), previous work on

1 The recent meta-analysis by Hall et al. (2010) did not find differences between measures of symbolic or modern racism and other alternative measures of prejudice. There are many potential causes of this null finding, but it is worth noting that only two studies that measured fundamentalism also measured symbolic or modern racism, and the remainder of the studies used a variety of less established scales. Additionally, many of the studies relied on student samples that may have different social norms regarding prejudice than the general public (cf. Henry, 2008). Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 211 fundamentalism and racism has primarily used student samples (e.g, Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Laythe et al., 2002; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), though some have used conve- nience samples of the community (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Feagin, 1964).2 These latter approaches should be commended for expanding their samples beyond university students; nonetheless, it would be informative to know if the fundamentalism and racism relationship holds in more representative samples of the population. We tested two primary hypotheses. First, we predict that religious fundamentalism will be related to higher levels of racial prejudice when it portrays African Americans as violating values important to fundamentalists.We expect religious fundamentalism to positively predict symbolic racism because symbolic racism portrays African Americans as violating values associated with traditionalism and authoritarianism (e.g., Sears & Henry, 2005). Religious fundamentalism is also expected to negatively predict a measure of raw negative affect towardsAfricanAmericans because many religions denounce racism, and African Americans as a group tend to uphold religious values. Thus, the direction of the relationship between fundamentalism and racism depends on the form of racism in question. Second, we predict that authoritarianism and traditionalism will both mediate the relationship between fundamentalism and racial prejudice. Specifically, we expect that regardless of the type of prejudice (symbolic or raw negative affect), both traditionalism and authoritarianism will be related to increased levels of prejudice. In the case of raw negative affect, by removing the variance of authoritarianism and traditionalism from fundamentalism, the negative relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice will become stronger (a suppression effect; MacKinnon & Fairchild, 2009), suggesting that fundamentalism is in conflict with the values of authoritarianism and traditionalism in this situation (cf. Malka & Soto, 2011). We also include a measure of raw negative affect towards gay men and lesbians in all of our analyses. This measure is the same as the measure of raw negative affect towards African Americans, but it is directed towards gay men and lesbians. Because we predict fundamentalists will be prejudiced towards groups portrayed as violating values, we expect a positive association between fundamentalism and raw negative affect towards gays and lesbians. This is an important demonstra- tion because it indicates that the predicted differential association between fundamentalism and racism depending on the measure or racism (symbolic racism vs. affect) is due to perceived value violation and not due to the wording of the particular scale. Even though the measures of raw negative affect towards African Americans and raw negative affect towards gays and lesbians are identical (besides the name of the target group), we expect the association between fundamentalism and these two measures to be opposite of one another. In fact, we expect the relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice towards gay men and lesbians to have a similar pattern as fundamentalism does with symbolic racism. Multiple measures of prejudice can help us reveal the common- alties between fundamentalism and different manifestations of prejudice (Kirkpatrick, 1993; McFarland, 1989) and rule out effects due to method variance.

Method

Participants and Procedures

We used data from the 2000, 2004, and 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES) to ensure that any results we obtain are generalizable beyond a student sample and are not due to the issues and cultural milieu surrounding any one particular election year. All of our measures of interest were not available prior to the 2000 ANES. Participants were selected using a multistage

2 Rowatt et al. (2009) used a nationally representative sample; however, their focus was on prejudice towards ethnic minority groups more generally rather than racism directed towards African Americans speciﬁcally. 212 Brandt and Reyna area-probability sampling with face-to-face interviews to obtain a representative sample of the American population.

We analyzed data from 675 participants in 2000 (332 men, 343 women, Mage = 45.0, SDage = 15.4), 817 participants in 2004 (393 men, 424 women, Mage = 46.5, SDage = 16.9), and 1,630 participants in 2008 (726 men, 902 women, Mage = 46.0, SDage = 16.3). Participants primarily iden- tiﬁed themselves as White (2000: 80.6%; 2004: 74.8%; 2008: 64.3%) or Black (2000: 9.2%; 2004: 14.1%; 2008: 24.0%).

Measures

The measures were consistent across all three samples. Religious fundamentalism. Religious fundamentalism was assessed in terms of Christian fundamentalism (the most prevalent religion in the United States). Religious fundamentalism has been measured a variety of ways, but the measures often focus on the perceived infallibility of the Bible as a key component of fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hood et al., 2005). Thus, the first item of our religious fundamentalism measure indexed participants’ feelings about the Bible. The item reads “Which of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible?” Answers were given on a 3-point scale with the labels 1 (“The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally, word for word”), 2 (“The Bible is the word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word”), and 3 (“The Bible is a book written by men and is not the word of God”). This item was reverse scored so that higher numbers indicated more fundamentalism and is similar to the measure used by Brandt and Reyna (2010, Study 1). The second item in our measure consisted of participants’ impressions of Christian Fundamentalists on a feeling thermometer. Along with a variety of other groups, participants rated the extent Christian Funda- mentalists are favorable and warm or unfavorable and cold. The scale ranges from 0 (unfavorable) to 100 (favorable). Past researchers have used this type of item to measure affiliation with political parties and the extent of participants’ endorsement of liberal or conservative ideology (e.g., Conover & Feldman, 1981). The Christian fundamentalists’ feeling thermometer and feelings about the Bible were standardized and averaged together to form our measure of religious fundamentalism (2000: r = .42, p < .001; 2004: r = .54, p < .001; 2008: r = .40, p < .001).3 Mediator Variables: Authoritarianism and Traditionalism. Our measures of authoritarianism and traditionalism were originally included and validated in the ANES studies to measure the value of personal autonomy (the conceptual opposite of authoritarianism; see Stenner, 2005) and moral traditionalism (see Bowers, 1995). The measure of authoritarianism asks participants to choose between four pairs of “desirable qualities” and to indicate which one was more important for a child to have. The pairs were “independence or respect for elders,” “curiosity or good manners,” “obedience or self-reliance,” and “being considerate or well-behaved.” Participants received a score of 5 if they chose the more authoritarian of the options (“respect for elders,” “good manners,” “obedience,” and “well-behaved”) anda1iftheychose the more nonauthoritarian, or autonomous, of the options (“independence,” “curiosity,” “self-reliance,” and “being considerate”). Participants received a score of 3 if they said, “both were important.” Items were averaged together to form a measure of authoritarianism (2000: α=.59, 2004: α=.61, 2008: α=.59).4 This measure of authoritarianism, although significantly different than the typical RWA scale (Altemeyer, 1996), has been used by political scientists and psychologists to measure

3 This two-item measure of religious fundamentalism from the ANES correlated strongly with Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) short-form religious fundamentalism scale, r(78) = .78, p < .001, in a student sample. 4 These reliabilities, while relatively low, are consistent with those found in past research with this measure (e.g., Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 213 authoritarianism (e.g., Brandt & Henry, 2012; Federico, Fisher, & Deason, 2011; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Hetherington & Suhay, 2011; Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Stenner, 2005). More- over, researchers have consistently noted the strong link between child-rearing values, measures of authoritarianism, and outcomes of authoritarianism (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Feldman, 2003). Like others before us, “We believe that this dimension of child-rearing values provides an excellent, nonobtrusive measure of authoritarian predisposition” (Feldman & Stenner, 1997, p. 747) because it more directly measures core values rather than authoritarian attitudes and behaviors and does not conflate authoritarianism with fundamentalism, traditionalism, social conservatism, or prejudice (for theoretical and empirical forms of this argument and the theoretical and statistical consequences of using the RWA scale, see Hetherington & Weiler, 2009; Mavor et al., 2009; Mavor et al., 2011; Stenner, 2005).5 Traditionalism was measured with two items commonly used by political scientists to measure moral traditionalism (e.g., Federico et al., 2011; Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Goren, 2005; Hetherington, 1998). These items read “The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society” and “This country would have many fewer problems if there were more emphasis on traditional family ties.” Participants responded on a 5-point scale labeled 1 (agree strongly),2(agree somewhat),3(neither agree nor disagree),4(disagree somewhat), and 5 (disagree strongly). Both items were reverse scored and averaged together to form our measure of traditionalism (2000: r = .44, p < .001, 2004: r = .59, p < .001, 2008: r = .44, p < .001). Because measures of authoritarianism often overlap with measures of traditionalism (van Hiel et al., 2007), we wanted to be sure that these two constructs appeared distinct. There are at least two pieces of evidence in support of this hypothesis. First, in all three samples, the two constructs are only moderately correlated (r’s ranged from .32 to .38; after removing the variance from the control variables, pr’s ranged from .25 to .30; see Table 1). These Pearson correlations are further attenuated when their shared association with fundamentalism is removed (pr’s ranged from .17 to .20). Second, we extracted two factors with a principle-axis exploratory-factor analysis that used a direct oblimin rotation (see Table 2). Across all three samples, the four authoritarianism items most strongly loaded onto the first factor, and the two traditionalism items most strongly loaded onto the second factor. Outcome variables. We included two expressions of racial prejudice: symbolic racism and negative Black affect. Symbolic racism was measured with four items traditionally used to measure symbolic racism (e.g., Henry & Sears, 2002) that read “Irish, Italians, Jewish and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same without any special favors”; “Generations of slavery and discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Blacks to work their way out of the lower class”; “Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve”; and “It’s really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if Blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as Whites.” Participants responded on a 5-point scale labeled 1 (agree strongly),2(agree somewhat),3(neither agree nor disagree), 4 (disagree somewhat), and 5 (disagree strongly). The first and fourth items were reverse scored and averaged together so that higher scores indicated higher levels of symbolic racism. The measure formed a reliable scale (2000: α=.73, 2004: α=.79, 2008: α=.70). Negative Black affect was measured with a feeling thermometer like that used in our measure of Fundamentalism. The scores on this measure were reverse scored so that higher numbers indicated more negative feelings. Because differences between symbolic racism and negative Black affect could be due to method variance, we also included a feeling thermometer measure to assess negative affect towards gays and lesbians. Gays and lesbians typically violate fundamentalist values (e.g.,

5 Using student samples, Hetherington and Suhay (2011) and Ekstrom, Visser, and Brehm (2012) report correlations of .54 and .49, respectively, between the ANES authoritarianism measure and the RWA scale. 214 Brandt and Reyna

Table 1. Correlations (below the diagonal), Partial Correlations Removing the Inﬂuence of Covariates (above diagonal), Means (M), Standard Deviations (SD), and Distributional Properties of Fundamentalism, Authoritarianism, Traditionalism, and Three Measures of Prejudice

123456 2000 ANES 1. Symbolic Racism – .21** .25** .15** .18** .17** 2. Negative Black Affect .27** – .34** −.16** −.02 .03 3. Negative Gays and Lesbians Affect .28** .32** – .14** .23** .27** 4. Fundamentalism .16** −.13* .24** – .31** .28** 5. Authoritarianism .20** .01 .32** .42** – .25** 6. Traditionalism .24** .05 .36** .38** .33** – M 3.43 33.40 52.24 0.00 3.28 3.94 SD 0.97 20.80 26.33 0.84 1.15 0.94 Skewness −0.32 0.21 0.13 −0.17 −0.31 −0.88 Kurtosis −0.41 0.06 −0.27 −0.38 −0.69 0.24 2004 ANES 1. Symbolic Racism – .19** .21** .25** .23** .33** 2. Negative Black Affect .27** – .32** −.17** .04 .02 3. Negative Gays and Lesbians Affect .26** .29** – .20** .22** .29** 4. Fundamentalism .21** −.20** .32** – .32** .42** 5. Authoritarianism .23** −.01 .32** .46** – .30** 6. Traditionalism .33** .004 .37** .52** .38** – M 3.33 27.94 50.02 0.00 3.27 3.73 SD 1.01 18.96 26.63 0.88 1.18 1.11 Skewness −0.32 0.19 0.30 −0.31 −0.31 −0.71 Kurtosis −0.57 −0.45 −0.32 −0.47 −0.76 −0.39 2008 ANES 1. Symbolic Racism – .15** .15** .20** .18** .25** 2. Negative Black Affect .22** – .29** −.17** −.01 .05* 3. Negative Gays and Lesbians Affect .17** .26** – .15** .16** .25** 4. Fundamentalism .15** −.28** .19** – .30** .32** 5. Authoritarianism .14** −.08* .26** .43** – .25** 6. Traditionalism .25** −.003 .31** .40** .32** – M 3.39 28.53 49.35 0.00 3.64 3.81 SD 0.93 20.58 27.29 0.83 1.11 1.01 Skewness −0.25 0.18 0.26 −0.31 −0.57 −0.77 Kurtosis −0.33 −0.57 −0.34 −0.39 −0.35 0.02 *p < .01, **p < .001.

Table 2. Pattern Matrices for Authoritarianism and Traditionalism Items with Principle Axis Factoring and Direct Oblimin Rotation

2000 ANES 2004 ANES 2008 ANES

121212 Independence or Respect Elders .39 −.18 .33 −.14 .37 −.12 Curiosity or Good Manners .59 −.07 .66 −.01 .64 .04 Obedience or Self-Reliance .56 −.10 .60 −.10 .55 −.07 Considerate or Well-Behaved .43 .10 .47 .08 .48 .06 The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown −.04 −.73 −.09 .65 .04 −.60 of our society. This country would have many fewer problems if there .10 −.57 .05 .87 −.02 −.72 were more emphasis on traditional family ties. Variance Explained 26.3% 7.9% 31.0% 9.6% 25.4% 8.1% Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 215

Jackson & Esses, 1997; Mavor & Gallois, 2008), and so we expect the results for this measure to be similar to the results for symbolic racism, despite the differences in method of measurement, and to be signiﬁcantly different than the results for negative Black affect, despite the shared method of measurement. This pattern of result would indicate that the differences between symbolic racism and negative Black affect are not merely reﬂections of their different method of measurement. Control variables. Ethnicity, gender, age, education, and income were included in the analyses. We also controlled for participants’ self-reported frequency of prayer (1 = several times a day to 5 = never), so that the fundamentalism effects we observe are not due to fundamentalists’ tendency to be devout.

Results

We tested our hypotheses using path models estimated with Mplus version 6.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 1998–2010). In all models, we controlled for ethnicity, gender, age, education, income, and prayer. All of the models (except where noted) are saturated models, and thus model ﬁt is not reported. See Table 1 for the correlations, means, standard deviations, and distributional properties of the focal variables.

Does the Relationship Between Fundamentalism and Racism Depend on the Type of Racism?

We predicted that fundamentalism would be positively related to racism framed in terms of value violations and negative affect towards gays and lesbians, but negatively related to negative Black affect, a conception of racism that is not compatible with religious values of compassion. We tested this hypothesis by regressing the three measures of racism and negative affect towards gays and lesbians on fundamentalism while holding the control variables constant (see coefficients left of the slash in Figure 1). Consistent with predictions, fundamentalism was positively related to symbolic racism in all three samples, negatively related to negative Black affect in all three samples, and positively related to negative affect towards gays and lesbians in all three samples. To test if the three slopes between fundamentalism and racism and negative affect towards gays and lesbians were significantly different from one another, we computed several additional models. In these models, we standardized the three outcome variables so that the different scaling of response options between the measures were less likely to influence the size of the coefficients. The first model constrained all three paths to equality, and this constraint significantly decreased model fit in all three samples (all χ2’s [2] > 59.37, all p’s < .001) indicating that at least one of the paths was significantly different from the other paths. Follow-up models confirmed that the path to negative Black affect was significantly different from the path to symbolic racism (all χ2’s [1] > 41.36, all p’s < .001) and negative affect towards gays and lesbians (all χ2’s [1] > 47.11, all p’s < .001). The symbolic racism and negative affect towards gays and lesbians paths were statistically equal to each other in all three samples (all χ2’s [1] < 3.51, all p’s > .06). These analyses demonstrate the fundamentalism-symbolic racism path and the fundamentalism-negative affect towards gays and lesbian paths are significantly different than the path between fundamentalism and negative Black affect. When racism is framed as a violation of groups’ norms and values, fundamentalists are predictably more prejudiced; however, when racism is not framed as a value violation, fundamentalists demonstrate tolerance.

Do Authoritarianism and Traditionalism Mediate the Fundamentalism-Racism Relationship?

We predicted that fundamentalism would be associated with authoritarianism and traditionalism and expected that both authoritarianism and traditionalism would mediate the relationship between fundamentalism and racial prejudice. Speciﬁcally, regardless of the type of prejudice (symbolic or 216 Brandt and Reyna

2000 ANES .13** Authoritarianism 2 R = .28 .02 Symbolic Racism .32*** .17** R2 = .19 .16*** / .08 .23***

-.18*** / -.21*** Negative Black Fundamentalism .19*** Affect .15*** / .03 R2 = .09 .36*** .12*** Negative Gays and .29*** .09+ Lesbians Affect R2 = .24 Traditionalism .23*** R2 = .24

2004 ANES Authoritarianism .13*** 2 R = .28 .09* Symbolic Racism .36*** .13*** R2 = .26 .29*** / .12** .22***

Fundamentalism -.20*** / -.28*** Negative Black .11*** Affect .23*** / .07 2 R = .13 .35*** Negative Gays & .48*** .26*** .10* Lesbians Affect R2 = .24 Traditionalism .23*** R2 = .33

2008 ANES Authoritarianism .10*** 2 R = .28 .03 Symbolic Racism .32*** .10*** R2 = .18 .23*** / .13*** .17***

-.18*** / -.23*** Negative Black Fundamentalism .08*** Affect .16*** / .06+ 2 R = .18 .30*** .20*** Negative Gays & .35*** .11*** Lesbians Affect R2 = .19 Traditionalism .22*** R2 = .22

Figure 1. Authoritarianism and traditionalism mediate the association between fundamentalism and symbolic racism, negative Black affect, and negative Gays and Lesbians affect. Path coefficients are standardized estimates. Coefficients to the left of the slash are the direct effects of fundamentalism on prejudice. Coefficients to the right of the slash are the direct effects of fundamentalism on prejudice after including the mediators in the model. The standardized association between authoritarianism and traditionalism is .17 in 2008, .20 in 2004, and .18 in 2000 (all p’s < .001) but is not displayed for simplicity. Ethnicity, gender, age, education, income, and prayer were used as control variables in each model. Solid lines highlight significant paths and dashed lines highlight nonsignificant paths. +p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 217

Table 3. Total Effect of Fundamentalism and Mediated Effects of Fundamentalism Through Authoritarianism and Traditionalism on the Three Measures of Prejudice

Outcome Variable: Outcome Variable: Outcome Variable: Negative Symbolic Racism Negative Black Affect Gays and Lesbians Affect Effect (SE) Effect (SE) Effect (SE) [95% CI] [95% CI] [95% CI] 2000 ANES Total Effect .18 (.05) −4.46 (1.15) 4.58 (1.41) [.08–.28] [−6.64– −2.14] [1.77–7.35] Authoritarianism .05 (.02) .17 (.37) 1.66 (.41) [.02–.08] [−.56–.90] [.95–2.56] Traditionalism .04 (.02) .62 (.36) 2.07 (.67) [.01–.08] [−.02–1.39] [1.28–3.10] Total Mediated Effect .09 (.02) .79 (.44) 3.73 (.60) [.05–.14] [−.05–1.68] [2.69–5.08] 2004 ANES Total Effect .33 (.05) −4.37 (.91) 6.90 (1.23) [.24–.42] [−6.15– −2.59] [4.38–9.22] Authoritarianism .05 (.02) .66 (.31) 1.41 (.42) [.02–.09] [.09–1.30] [.66–2.30] Traditionalism .14 (.03) 1.03 (.47) 3.25 (.62) [.09–.19] [.15–1.98] [2.10–4.55] Total Mediated Effect .19 (.03) 1.69 (.52) 4.66 (.69) [.14–.25] [.68–2.72] [3.40–6.10] 2008 ANES Total Effect .25 (.03) −4.53 (.69) 5.36 (.95) [.19–.32] [−5.84– −3.18] [3.54–7.24] Authoritarianism .04 (.01) .27 (.22) 1.06 (.30) [.02–.05] [−.16–.71] [.49–1.67] Traditionalism .08 (.01) .92 (.25) 2.48 (.38) [.05–.10] [.47–1.47] [1.78–3.24] Total Mediated Effect .11 (.02) 1.19 (.31) 3.54 (.47) [.08–.14] [.59–1.84] [2.66–4.51] Note. Bolded coefficients highlight significant effects. Confidence intervals that do not cross zero are considered statistically significant. 95% CI = 95% bias and corrected confidence intervals. negative Black affect), both traditionalism and authoritarianism will be related to increased levels of prejudice. In the case of negative Black affect, by removing the variance of authoritarianism and traditionalism from fundamentalism, the negative relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice should become stronger, suggesting that the motives of fundamentalism are in conflict with the effects of authoritarianism and traditionalism on racism. The significance of the mediation effects was calculated using 5,000 bias-corrected bootstrapped samples to estimate the confidence intervals around the effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). As expected, in all three samples fundamentalism significantly predicted authoritarianism and traditionalism (see Figure 1). Also consistent with predictions, authoritarianism and traditionalism were independently and significantly positively associated with symbolic racism, and both were significant mediators of the fundamentalism-symbolic racism association in all three samples (see Table 3). These two mediators accounted for between 45% and 58% of the total effect of fundamentalism on symbolic racism. Authoritarianism and traditionalism also played a role in the relationship between fundamentalism and negative Black affect; however, these relationships were less consistent (see Figure 1 and 218 Brandt and Reyna

Table 3 for relevant statistics). In the 2000 sample, authoritarianism and traditionalism were not significant mediators. In the 2004 sample, both values were significant mediators, and in the 2008 sample, traditionalism, but not authoritarianism, significantly mediated the fundamentalism-negative Black affect relationship. Because these significant mediation effects are associated with increases in racism, the mediated effect is in the opposing direction as the direct effects of fundamentalism, indicating that authoritarianism and traditionalism increase negative Black affect, whereas fundamentalism decreases it. That is, when the variance from authoritarianism and traditionalism is statistically removed from fundamentalism, fundamentalism is more strongly linked with tolerant racial attitudes despite the increased racism associated with authoritarianism and traditionalism. These results for negative Black affect cannot be attributed solely to method variance because the results for negative affect towards gays and lesbians were strikingly consistent with the results for symbolic racism and strikingly different from the results for negative Black affect. Authoritarianism and traditionalism both mediated the relationship between fundamentalism and negative affect towards gays and lesbians in each of the three samples. These two mediators accounted for between 66% and 81% of the total effect of fundamentalism on negative affect towards gays and lesbians. Across the three nationally representative samples, two mediators, and three outcome variables, 15 out of 18 of our predicted mediation effects were significant. There are two overall patterns of results within the mediation effects worth highlighting. First, authoritarianism and traditionalism were more consistent mediators of symbolic racism and negative affect towards gays and lesbians than negative Black affect. We predicted that fundamentalism would predict symbolic racism because symbolic racism portrays Blacks as deviating from the norms of tradition and authority and so the consistency and strength of these mediation effects across samples is consistent with our assertion. Second, across the samples and measures, it is interesting to note that the mediation effects of traditionalism were typically more consistent and stronger than the effects of authoritarianism. This suggests that violating the norms of tradition may be more egregious than defying the norms of authority.

General Discussion

The link between religious fundamentalism and racial prejudice is both a recurring relationship in social science research and a vexing one. On the one hand, fundamentalism is associated with motives that would make a person wary of alternative values and cultural beliefs; yet fundamentalists are also especially aware of their religion’s proscriptions against hatred toward fellow human beings. By examining the motivational components of fundamentalism—via fundamentalism’s association with authoritarianism and traditionalism—we can gain a better understanding of this persistent and seemingly contradictory association. Specifically, we found that because fundamentalists are more prone to endorse authoritarian and traditional values, they are more likely to express racism when the group is believed to violate (gays and lesbians) or framed as violating (symbolic racism) values central to fundamentalists. Conversely, because fundamentalists are also particularly motivated to uphold their religious values (including those related to compassion and tolerance), we found that fundamentalists were less likely to express racism that does not explicitly suggest value violations and is proscribed by religious values. That is, when considering symbolic racism, the results of our study are consistent with the recent meta-analysis by Hall et al. (2010), such that the correlations between fundamentalism and symbolic racism fall within the 95% confidence interval identified by the meta-analysis (.06 to .21). However, when considering negative Black affect, our results tell a different story. Negative Black affect was always negatively correlated with fundamentalism. These effect sizes are all outside the bounds of the meta-analytic confidence interval, and all suggest the association between fundamentalism and racism is negative rather than positive. Thus, our results from three nationally representative samples Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 219 suggest that the fundamentalism-racism association is highly dependent on the form of racism in question. Furthermore, we demonstrate that core components of fundamentalism—authoritarianism and traditionalism—significantly account for part of the relationship between fundamentalism and racial prejudice. When it comes to expressions of symbolic racism, both authoritarianism and traditionalism significantly account for the positive relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice. These results are consistent with previous work indicating that RWA may mediate the association between fundamentalism and racial prejudice (Laythe et al., 2002; Mavor et al., 2011); however, our findings go beyond these results by demonstrating that both authoritarianism and traditionalism independently account for the fundamentalism-prejudice relationship. This is an important contribution to the literature because numerous scholars have identified the methodological perils of the RWA scale; however, with the methods used here, we were able to demonstrate the independent, mediating roles of authoritarianism and traditionalism with alternative measures of these constructs. The underlying motives of authoritarianism and traditionalism also played a role, albeit an inconsistent role, in negative Black affect. Although fundamentalism was inversely related to negative affect towards African Americans, traditionalism (and sometimes authoritarianism) provided some motive to express prejudice in these otherwise unjustifiable contexts. Although these effects are consistent with our predictions, it is interesting that authoritarianism and traditionalism were more consistent mediators for the measure of symbolic racism. It may be that the measure of symbolic racism portrays African Americans as more clearly violating these two values, whereas the measure of negative Black affect is not as clearly relevant to these values. Thus, the associations between the two mediators and racism are more consistent for the measure of symbolic racism compared to the measures of blatant forms of racism. The significant mediation effects of authoritarianism and traditionalism on negative Black affect resulted in significant suppression effects. Specifically, when the variance from traditionalism and authoritarianism was pulled out of fundamentalism, the negative relationship with negative Black affect became even more negative. This suggests that even with proscribed forms of prejudice (e.g., against groups that share ingroup values), traditionalism especially (and authoritarianism occasion- ally) may provide some motive or rationale for prejudice. Because authoritarianism and traditionalism predicted increased prejudice while fundamentalism simultaneously predicted decreased prejudice with regard to negative Black affect, these results also indicate that fundamentalists’ tendency to be tolerant is in part independent and in opposition to the concomitant values and motivations of authoritarianism and traditionalism (see also Malka & Soto, 2011).6 From some perspectives, it might be comforting to know that religious fundamentalists are less likely to endorse raw negative affect towards African Americans; however, raw prejudices have played less and less of a role in political decision making over the last decades (Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997). Symbolic racism, authoritarianism, and traditionalism, on the other hand, play a large role in politics, with each a significant predictor of important political outcomes like support for racial policies (Sears & Henry, 2005), support for the war on terrorism (Hetherington & Suhay, 2011), and trust in the government (Hetherington, 1998), among others.

Contributions of the Current Research

The current study contributes to the literature on religion and racial prejudice in many ways. First and foremost, the current study adopted measures of authoritarianism and traditionalism that

6 Others have reported that when controlling for RWA, the association between fundamentalism and racism becomes negative and significant (Hall et al., 2010; Laythe et al., 2002). It has been demonstrated, however, that this example of a suppression effect is primarily an artifact due to statistical and conceptual overlaps of the RWAand fundamentalism scales (Mavor et al., 2009, 2011). 220 Brandt and Reyna are not conflated with each other, with prejudice, or with religiosity. Researchers have identified this conceptual ambiguity as being especially problematic for the study of religion and prejudice (for discussion and demonstrations, see Mavor, Macleod et al., 2009; Mavor, Louis, & Laythe, 2011) By employing these more conceptually pure measures, we were able to avoid the conceptual overlap of the RWA scale and highlight two values associated with fundamentalism that contribute to the fundamentalism-prejudice association. Second, we demonstrated both when and why fundamentalists would express prejudice towards African Americans. Previous studies have primarily focused on establishing the existence of the relationship and identifying a potential mediator (e.g., RWA; Hall et al., 2010); however, based on fundamentalists’ limited expression of prosociality (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011) and selective intolerance (e.g., Rowatt et al., 2009), we were able to predict instances where fundamentalists would be more tolerant as well. That is, whereas some studies have found that fundamentalists will be more intolerant of value-violating groups (e.g., gays and lesbians), but relatively more tolerant of racial minority groups (Jackson & Esses, 1997; Laythe et al., 2002), we find that the association between fundamentalism and racism also changes depending on whether or not African Americans are portrayed as violating values or not. Finally, previous work has demonstrated that when fundamentalism is related to racism, it is mediated by Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Consistent with this work, we found that authoritarianism and traditionalism are both consistent mediators of the association between fundamentalism and symbolic racism. Authoritarianism and traditionalism are often conflated in measures of Right-Wing Authoritarianism, so it is important to distinguish their independent contributions to symbolic racism in the current study. The independent routes to racism via authoritarianism and traditionalism may indicate different routes to reducing racism among fundamentalists (cf. Stenner, 2005) and suggest that the constructs are not one and the same. Third, we were able to demonstrate these effects in nationally representative samples that were collected over the last decade, suggesting that our effects are largely robust in a broad sample of participants and sociopolitical milieus. The current study also contributes to our understanding of political psychology. Religious beliefs, traditionalism, authoritarianism, and racism all play important roles in politics and are often a predictor of a person’s positions on a number of public policies (Hetherington, 1998; Mockabee, 2007; Sears & Henry, 2005; Stenner, 2005). Rather than addressing the oft-studied association between these variables and political policies, the current study sought a deeper understanding of the interrelationship between them.

Limitations of the Current Research

Unfortunately, the use of the ANES resulted in several limitations related to measurement. First, the use of the ANES forced us to rely on a simple measure of religious fundamentalism, negative Black affect, and negative affect towards Gays and Lesbians. While we were able to demonstrate that Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (2004) measure of fundamentalism was strongly associated with our simple measure in a student sample, it may be the case that in the more heterogeneous ANES datasets, the association would not be so strong. Similarly, the single-item measures of negative affect, while face valid, may not accurately assess the complexities of people’s racial attitudes. Second, the ANES also did not contain a measure of compassionate or tolerant values, and so we are unable to directly test our proposed mechanism for the negative association between fundamentalism and blatant racism. Third, the measures of authoritarianism and traditionalism appeared to be distinct measures in the three samples we used, based on factor analysis, their intercorrelations, and their independent effects on racism; however, some of this independence may be due to the different wording and styles of the items that make up each scale. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that recent factor analytic work with the RWA scale has found evidence for three factors, including conventionalism and submission subscales conceptually similar to our two Fundamentalism and Racial Prejudice 221 measures (Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). The question as to whether traditionalism (or conventionalism) is a necessary component of the overarching authoritarianism construct should be considered by future research and theory. Although these limitations may allow for some ambiguity in the interpretation of our results, they also allowed us to test our hypotheses in a broad sample of participants, something that is sorely missing in much research on racism and fundamentalism. Our analyses also implied causal models whereby fundamentalism predicts authoritarianism and traditionalism, which in turn predicts racism. We cannot make, and do not intend to make, any deﬁnitive statements about the causal directions of the effects, and alternative causal models are plausible. We can, however, conclude that fundamentalism’s association with traditionalism and authoritarianism accounts for a signiﬁcant amount of variance in the relationship between fundamentalism and prejudice. Finally, although many of the effects we predicted were consistent across samples, many of these effects were small to medium-sized effects (see, e.g., Table 1) that might not be observed in smaller samples. With the recent meta-analysis, the consistency across samples, especially in regards to symbolic racism, indicates that they are robust effects in heterogeneous samples.

Conclusion

The present study provides an explanation of when and why religious fundamentalism might be related to racial prejudice. Fundamentalists are torn between motives to protect and uphold values that are dictated by their authority figures and traditions, yet they are also motivated to uphold religious values that promote compassion and humanitarian tolerance. Although in many instances, these motives are aligned when it comes to certain groups in society (e.g., religious ingroups or culturally dominant groups), when it comes to racial minorities, these motives may be in conflict. The present research uncovers a consistent pattern that reflects the reconciliation of these clashing motives. When negative racial attitudes are raw and emotional, fundamentalists exert tolerance and acceptance. After all, raw prejudice goes against core Christian teachings. However, when racial minorities are framed as violating important values central to Christian doctrine, expressions of prejudice in these terms may be more justifiable for religious fundamentalists.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

We would like to thank members of the Laboratory of Social Science Research and three reviewers for helpful comments on a previous draft of this article. Correspondence concerning this article should be sent to Mark J. Brandt, Tilburg University, Department of Social Psychology, P.O. Box 90153, Tilburg, 5000 LE, Netherlands. E-mail: [email protected]

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