Marwa Elshakry
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CHAPTER THIRTY-SEVEN ISLAM Marwa Elshakry e often think of the fi n de siècle as an era of lush decadence and modernist angst W– a gilded world of plush excess, interiority, and the thwarted illusions of a retreat into aestheticism. Yet we should not forget that for some it was also a time of intense optimism, and that the sub-theme of decadence and degeneration itself was one that also facilitated novel discourses of rise or revival. In fact, one could even argue that the two – the anticipated future and the feared apocalypse – were necessarily linked. One can catch sight of this, for instance, in the optimism generated by some of the new technologies of the era, from the telephone, telegraph and cinematograph to the automobile and steamship, where the fantastic futurism they inspired offered a prominent counterpoint to the looming sense of a dystopic technological modernity. This polarity, vacillating between an inevitable decline and a promised future, reverberated across the globe in the wake of the new imperialism. After all, the fi n de siècle was also the era in which European empires were expanding rapidly, particularly through the so-called “scramble for Africa,” and carving up the world in its wake. These events contributed to the formulation of a new sense of European civilizational and racial superiority, and just as critically to the identifi cation of so many fallen “civilizations” elsewhere. In particular, the language of decline and fall was crucial for what one historian has recently characterized as the “invention of world religions” (Masuzawa 2005). Take the late nineteenth-century depiction of Islam. The vastly transformed European empires that emerged at this time were, more than ever, empires ruling over Muslims. Indeed Europeans now found themselves collectively governing the majority of the world’s Muslims: at its height, the British Empire ruled over the largest number, followed by the Dutch, French and Russian. The Ottoman Empire came in at a distant fi fth. Unsurprisingly, contemporary Muslim discourses spoke at once to the anxiety of an encroaching Europe, and to the hubris of its newly acquired historicist, civilizational and racial claims, even as they resuscitated and transformed older discourses of reform and revival. It was no accident that this was the era in which a new generation of Muslim “reformers” was born. Helped along by the press, the classroom and the courthouse, these thinkers emerged in an utterly changed institutional landscape. 582 — Islam — This chapter attempts to sketch out, via the example of some key thinkers of the age, the main features of what was in fact a highly variegated fi n-de-siècle discourse on Islam. The subject is of course vast and no single scholar can easily hope to encompass the full extent of thinking on this topic by Muslims even within this relatively short time frame. Although this article makes reference to other works in the literature, it will focus on a number of key fi gures who wrote in both major European languages and Arabic in the late nineteenth century. Exploring the intellectual interconnectivities between colonizers and colonized, and the multiple refractions these created, it looks to both contemporary European and imperial ideas, on the one hand, and various Muslim or vernacular regional conceptions and practices, on the other. It also explores the fi n-de-siècle discourse on Islam alongside the rise of professional disciplines, particularly Orientalism and religious studies, and then shows in some detail how these commentators on Islam deployed and responded to Western efforts to defi ne a putative “Islamic civilization,” embrac- ing (and at times reversing) the concept for their own reasons and purposes. European imperialism and professional Orientalism were rapidly expanding at this time, often in tandem, as territorial conquest brought with it the demand for new knowledge and expertise. The idea in particular that there was – or had been – an identifi able “Islamic civilization” played a critical role in shaping Europe’s changing sense of itself on a world scale. But it also transformed how Arabs and other Muslims conceived of themselves and their past. Through a process of historicization the notion of a Muslim ecumene was reconceptualized in the four decades between 1880 and the end of the First World War that saw Western imperialism at its zenith. Islam was critically reimagined in western Europe during the fi n de siècle through both European imperialism and professional Orientalism. In particular, it played a critical role in shaping Europe’s changing sense of itself on a world scale. Hence it was folded both into the search for the origins of the true “universal religion” and into the new fascination with the historical progress (or retrogression) of “civilizations.” The term “civilization” had become more and more widely diffused since the end of the eighteenth century, but it was not until the fi rst third of the nineteenth century that it gained real force with the fl owering of European liberal thought (Benveniste 1971; Bowden 2009; Febvre 1973; Starobinski 1993). Among the fi rst to bring these various threads together was the French statesman and historian François Guizot. His 1828 A History of Civilization in Europe was essentially an elaboration on the theme of Europe’s place at the summit of world history, a history that was told as a story of material and moral progress over other “savage” and “barbarous” peoples. Guizot’s text was popular outside as well as within Europe, and it was frequently cited in the Arabic, Turkish and Farsi press (e.g. Kohn 2009). His ideas – together with those of J. S. Mill and others – were circulating in the Arabic press just as the notion of an “Islamic civilization” was gaining ground among Muslim thinkers. Sometime between the 1830s and 1880s, we can begin to chart the rise of a new fascination with al-hadara al-islamiya or medeniyet-i Islamiye, or “Islamic civilization” (e.g. Tahtawi 2004; Aydin 2007). That is not to say that the notion of civilization (as either hadara or madaniya) had not existed before. Indeed, Ibn Khaldun’s fourteenth-century Muqaddima (or 583 — Marwa Elshakry — Introduction) to his three-volume historico-geography of the Arabs and the barabra (which we can render as Berbers or barbarians) repeatedly makes reference to this idea. Yet, in Ibn Khaldun’s work, it meant something quite different: there were refer- ences to the rise and fall of specifi c “civilizations,” meaning civitas or urban polities in particular; but there was no single, ecumenical Muslim “civilization.” In the four- teenth century, the notion of a Muslim ecumene was already covered by the term umma, the community or commonwealth of people, in this case tied together over time and place by the bonds of a common religious faith. Of course, the notion of a Muslim umma would itself be reformulated in the course of the long nineteenth century, and under pressure from European imperial and socio-institutional encroach- ment, it would get refashioned at the century’s end under the rubric later scholars would signal through talk of “pan-Islamism.” The late nineteenth-century view of Islam as a civilization – whether treated in European or Muslim hands – was drawn from an eclectic set of sources and discur- sive traditions, which we can neither reduce to an insular genealogical purity nor to mere mimicry. They included early historical geographies like Ibn Khaldun’s, whose fashionable revival among European audiences at precisely this time – note the appearance of abridged versions of his works in English and French through the nineteenth century – reinforced his growing popularity among Muslim readers. But others too spoke to these ideas, many of whom were less known such as Abu al- Hasan al-Mas’udi (d. 956) or Muhammad Ibn Iyas (d. 1524). With the rise of pro- fessional Orientalism, and the “recovery” of Muslim texts in that context, as well as with the rapid and widespread print publication of older texts, the tracing of a Muslim discursive tradition in the nineteenth century is no simple matter. The revival of interest in Ibn Rushd, for instance – which was as bound up with the works of Ernest Renan on Averroës as it was with the long-standing corpus of writings inspired by Abu Hamid al-Ghazali – forms a good example of how classical texts were both reappropriated and reformulated in this era (Kugekgen 1996). Guizot himself was not the only infl uential nineteenth-century liberal thinker to be dis- cussed outside Europe – others included J. S. Mill, Herbert Spencer and, for Arabic readers perhaps above all, Gustave Le Bon, whose 1884 La Civilisation des Arabes in translation provided a popular source. As ideas moved to and fro between Arabic and European languages, the works that contained or generated them were critically transformed. Partly this was a question of translation. Le Bon’s own highly racialist terminology and conception of history, for instance, was often elided in Arabic discussions where the older term “umma” was typically used in place of the original “race” when speaking of the “Arab” or “Semitic” peoples. The general reference to a peoples or community would have been understood, even as it overrode its common religious valence; operat- ing this way in translation, it lacked the hierarchical connotations of the original (Selim 2009). But these critical conceptual tensions at the intersection of talk of civilization, race and religion also refl ected disciplinary ambivalences. Ernest Renan (one of the key originators of the idea of Semitism itself) put it this way in 1883 while speaking of the confusing interrelation of these categories in reference to France: “We French, for instance, are Roman by language, Greek by civilization and Jewish by religion” (Renan 1896, 84).