Crimes Act 1961
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Criminal Law Reform with the Hon Jarrod Bleijie
The Great Leap Backward: Criminal Law Reform with the Hon Jarrod Bleijie Andrew Trotter∗ and Harry Hobbs† Abstract On 3 April 2012, the Honourable Member for Kawana, Jarrod Bleijie MP, was sworn in as Attorney-General for Queensland and Minister for Justice. In the period that followed, Queensland’s youngest Attorney-General since Sir Samuel Griffith in 1874 has implemented substantial reforms to the criminal law as part of a campaign to ‘get tough on crime’. Those reforms have been heavily and almost uniformly criticised by the profession, the judiciary and the academy. This article places the reforms in their historical context to illustrate that together they constitute a great leap backward that unravels centuries of gradual reform calculated to improve the state of human rights in criminal justice. I Introduction Human rights in the criminal law were in a fairly dire state in the Middle Ages.1 Offenders were branded with the letters of their crime to announce it to the public, until that practice was replaced in part by the large scarlet letters worn by some criminals by 1364.2 The presumption of innocence, although developed in its earliest forms in Ancient Rome, does not appear to have crystallised into a recognisable form until 1470.3 During the 16th and 17th centuries, it was common to charge the families of a prisoner sentenced to death a fee for their execution, but ∗ BA LLB (Hons) QUT; Solicitor, Doogue O’Brien George. † BA LLB (Hons) ANU; Human Rights Legal and Policy Adviser, ACT Human Rights Commission. The authors thank Professor the Hon William Gummow AC for his helpful comments on earlier drafts and the editors and anonymous reviewers for their assistance in the final stages. -
1661-1700 (Pdf)
1 Scottish Books 1661-1700 (Aldis updated) 1661 1682 Academiæ Edinburgenæ gratulatio, ob serenissimi, augustissimiq; monarchæ Caroli II . Britanniarum, Galliæ & Hiberniæ regis, fidei defensoris, in solium paternum restitutionem, oblate illustrissimo dynastæ, D. Johanni Middiltonio, Middiltonii comiti, clarimontis… 4to. Edinburgh: G. Lithgow, 1661. Wing E165; ESTC R11311 [Voyager 3150808] NLS holdings: Gray.1033(1); UMI 315:01; UMI 428:14 (identified as Wing M1972) Other locations: E U Leighton(fragment) *1682.3 [Act of Committee of Estates, 13 Aug. 1650] West-kirk the 13. day of August, 1650. The Commission of the Generall Assembly considering that there may be just ground of stumbling from the Kings Majesties refusing to subscribe & emit the Declaration offered unto him by the Committee of Estates, and Commissioners of the Generall Assembly concerning his former carriage and resolutions for the future, in reference to the cause of God … . s.sh. Edinburgh: E. Tyler, 1661. Reprint of 1650 edition, Aldis 1395.6 and 1395.7; not recorded by ESTC [Voyager 3771044] NLS holdings: MS.14493, fol.1 Other locations: 1682.5 Act for raising ... 480,000 pound. fol. Edinburgh: E. Tyler, 1661. NLS holdings: Other locations: Private Owner 1683 [Act of Parliament, 1 Feb. 1661] Act of Parliament, against saying of mess [sic], Jesuits, Seminary and Mess [sic] priests, and trafficking papists. At Edinburgh, the first day of February, 1661. s.sh. Edinburgh: E. Tyler, 1661. Wing S1119; Steele 2200; ESTC R183918 [Voyager 2231141] NLS holdings: Ry.1.1.33(13); Mf.SP.133(21); UMI 2710:22 Other locations: Signet Library 1684 [Act of Parliament, 20 Feb. -
Crimes Act 1961
Reprint as at 1 October 2012 Crimes Act 1961 Public Act 1961 No 43 Date of assent 1 November 1961 Commencement see section 1(2) Contents Page Title 23 1 Short Title, commencement, etc 23 2 Interpretation 24 3 Meaning of convicted on indictment 31 4 Meaning of ordinarily resident in New Zealand 31 Part 1 Jurisdiction 5 Application of Act 31 6 Persons not to be tried in respect of things done outside 32 New Zealand 7 Place of commission of offence 32 7A Extraterritorial jurisdiction in respect of certain offences 32 with transnational aspects 7B Attorney-General’s consent required where jurisdiction 34 claimed under section 7A 8 Jurisdiction in respect of crimes on ships or aircraft 35 beyond New Zealand Note Changes authorised by section 17C of the Acts and Regulations Publication Act 1989 have been made in this reprint. A general outline of these changes is set out in the notes at the end of this reprint, together with other explanatory material about this reprint. This Act is administered by the Ministry of Justice. 1 Reprinted as at Crimes Act 1961 1 October 2012 8A Jurisdiction in respect of certain persons with diplomatic 37 or consular immunity 9 Offences not to be punishable except under New Zealand 39 Acts 10 Offence under more than 1 enactment 39 10A Criminal enactments not to have retrospective effect 40 10B Period of limitation 40 11 Construction of other Acts 41 12 Summary jurisdiction 41 Part 2 Punishments 13 Powers of courts under other Acts not affected 41 Death [Repealed] 14 Form of sentence in capital cases [Repealed] -
The Prematurity Doctrine in Habeas Corpus—A Critique
Washington University Law Review Volume 1966 Issue 3 January 1966 The Prematurity Doctrine in Habeas Corpus—A Critique Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview Recommended Citation The Prematurity Doctrine in Habeas Corpus—A Critique, 1966 WASH. U. L. Q. 345 (1966). Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1966/iss3/4 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. THE PREMATURITY DOCTRINE IN HABEAS CORPUS- A CRITIQUE While the constitutional rights of persons charged with criminal offenses have been strengthened and expanded by recent Supreme Court decisions,' in some situations federal post-conviction remedies have not kept pace with this trend. This incongruity is most pronounced when a state or federal prisoner challenges a sentence which he has not commenced to serve, basing his challenge on an alleged violation of these rights.' If federal habeas cor- pus is the remedy utilized, and if the prisoner is currently serving a valid sentence, relief is denied because the request is "premature."'3 In this situa- tion, where the challenged sentence commences in futuro, other federal post- conviction remedies have been equally unsuccessful.4 While this note will deal primarily with the prematurity doctrine of federal habeas corpus, a re- view of these other remedies is necessary to demonstrate their inadequacy and the subsequent need for an abolition of the prematurity doctrine estab- lished by McNally v. -
The Constitution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 Santa Clara L
Santa Clara Law Review Volume 52 | Number 2 Article 2 1-1-2012 The onsC titution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning Stephen A. Siegel Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Stephen A. Siegel, The Constitution on Trial: Article III's Jury Trial Provision, Originalism, and the Problem of Motivated Reasoning, 52 Santa Clara L. Rev. 373 (2012). Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss2/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 31550_scl_52-2 Sheet No. 48 Side A 04/16/2012 17:10:32 2_SIEGEL FINAL.DOC 3/14/2012 2:57:38 PM THE CONSTITUTION ON TRIAL: ARTICLE III’S JURY TRIAL PROVISION, ORIGINALISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVATED REASONING Stephen A. Siegel* TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction I. Article III’s Jury Trial Mandate from the Founding to 1900: The No-Waiver Rule Established and Respected A. The Constitution’s Text B. Common Law Tradition C. Federal Practice and Supreme Court Precedent D. Nineteenth-Century Constitutional Theory: Jury Trial as a Public Right II. Dissenting Voices in the Early-Twentieth Century III. The Overthrow of Article III’s Jury Trial Mandate and the No-Waiver Rule in 1930 A. The Patton Decision 1. -
Legislation Title
FALKLAND ISLANDS _____________ Crimes Ordinance 2014 (No: 13 of 2014) ARRANGEMENT OF PROVISIONS CHAPTER 1 – PRELIMINARY PART 1 – PRELIMINARY AND INTERPRETATION Section 1. Title and commencement 2. Interpretation PART 2 – GENERAL PRINCIPLES Criminal liability 3. Age of criminal responsibility 4. Inferences as to intent 5. Automatism Offences committed outside the Falkland Islands 6. Offences committed partly outside the Falkland Islands 7. Offences to which sections 8 to 13 apply 8. Jurisdiction in respect of Group A offences 9. Questions immaterial to jurisdiction in the case of certain offences 10. Rules relating to the location of events 11. Conspiracy and encouraging 12. Extended jurisdiction in relation to certain attempts 13. Relevance of external law Alternative verdicts 14. Conviction of offence other than that charged 1 15. Person tried for offence may be convicted of ancillary offence Miscellaneous 16. Proceedings by and against spouses 17. Application of Ordinance to corporations 18. No requirement for corroboration PART 3 – ANCILLARY OFFENCES Attempts 19. Attempts generally 20. Application of procedural and other provisions to offences of attempt 21. Procedural rules 22. Effect of sections 19 to 21 on common law Conspiracy 23. Conspiracy 24. Conspiracy to commit offences outside the Falkland Islands 25. Exemptions from liability 26. Penalties 27. Restrictions on the commencement of proceedings 28. Conspiracy under other enactments 29. Effect of acquittal of other defendant 30. Abolitions, savings, transitional provisions Encouragement of offences 31. Offence of encouragement 32. Proving an offence under section 31 33. Supplemental provisions 34. Defences 35. Jurisdiction 36. Extended jurisdiction in certain cases 37. Commencement of proceedings, etc. for an offence 38. -
Unusual Punishments” in Anglo- American Law: the Ed Ath Penalty As Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual John D
Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy Volume 13 | Issue 4 Article 2 Spring 2018 The onceptC of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo- American Law: The eD ath Penalty as Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual John D. Bessler Recommended Citation John D. Bessler, The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo-American Law: The Death Penalty as Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual, 13 Nw. J. L. & Soc. Pol'y. 307 (2018). https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njlsp/vol13/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Northwestern Journal of Law & Social Policy by an authorized editor of Northwestern Pritzker School of Law Scholarly Commons. Copyright 2018 by Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law `Vol. 13, Issue 4 (2018) Northwestern Journal of Law and Social Policy The Concept of “Unusual Punishments” in Anglo-American Law: The Death Penalty as Arbitrary, Discriminatory, and Cruel and Unusual John D. Bessler* ABSTRACT The Eighth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, like the English Bill of Rights before it, safeguards against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” To better understand the meaning of that provision, this Article explores the concept of “unusual punishments” and its opposite, “usual punishments.” In particular, this Article traces the use of the “usual” and “unusual” punishments terminology in Anglo-American sources to shed new light on the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. The Article surveys historical references to “usual” and “unusual” punishments in early English and American texts, then analyzes the development of American constitutional law as it relates to the dividing line between “usual” and “unusual” punishments. -
Download (1MB)
Kennedy, Lewis (2020) Should there be a Separate Scottish Law of Treason? PhD thesis. https://theses.gla.ac.uk/81656/ Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission or charge This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the author The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the author When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given Enlighten: Theses https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ [email protected] SHOULD THERE BE A SEPARATE SCOTTISH LAW OF TREASON? Lewis Kennedy, Advocate (MA, LLB, Dip LP, LLM) Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy School of Law College of Social Sciences University of Glasgow September 2020 Abstract: Shortly after the Union, the Treason Act 1708 revoked Scotland’s separate treason law in favour of England’s treason law. Historically, English treason law was imposed on Scots criminal law and was not always sensitive to the differences in Scottish legal institutions and culture. A review of the law of treason is in contemplation, it being under general attention more than at any time since the end of World War II. If there were to be a revival of UK treason law, the creation of a separate Scottish treason law may be a logical development given Scotland’s evolving devolution settlement. -
Imperial Laws Application Bill-98-1
IMPERIAL LAWS APPLICATION BILL NOTE THIS Bill is being introduced in its present form so as to give notice of the legislation that it foreshadows to Parliament and to others whom it may concern, and to provide those who may be interested with an opportunity to make representations and suggestions in relation to the contemplated legislation at this early formative stage. It is not intended that the Bill should pass in its present form. Work towards completing and polishing the draft, and towards reviewing the Imperial enactments in force in New Zealand, is proceeding under the auspices of the Law Reform Council. It is intended to introduce a revised Bill in due course, and to allow ample time for study of the revised Bill and making representations thereon. The enactment of a definitive statutory list of Imperial subordinate legis- lation in force in New Zealand is contemplated. This list could appropriately be included in the revised Bill, but this course is not intended to be followed if it is likely to cause appreciable delay. Provision for the additional list can be made by a separate Bill. Representations in relation to the present Bill may be made in accordance with the normal practice to the Clerk of the Statutes Revision Committee of tlie House of Representatives. No. 98-1 Price $2.40 IMPERIAL LAWS APPLICATION BILL EXPLANATORY NOTE THIS Bill arises out of a review that is in process of being made by the Law Reform Council of the Imperial enactments in force in New Zealand. The intention is that in due course the present Bill will be allowed to lapse, and a complete revised Bill will be introduced to take its place. -
The Victim in Criminal Law and Justice
The Victim in Criminal Law and Justice Tyrone Kirchengast The Victim in Criminal Law and Justice This page intentionally left blank The Victim in Criminal Law and Justice Tyrone Kirchengast University of Newcastle, Australia © Tyrone Kirchengast 2006 All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of this publication may be made without written permission. No paragraph of this publication may be reproduced, copied or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance with the provisions of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, or under the terms of any licence permitting limited copying issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency, 90 Tottenham Court Road, London W1T 4LP. Any person who does any unauthorized act in relation to this publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil claims for damages. The author has asserted his right to be identified as the author of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. First published 2006 by PALGRAVE MACMILLAN Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS and 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010 Companies and representatives throughout the world PALGRAVE MACMILLAN is the global academic imprint of the Palgrave Macmillan division of St. Martin’s Press, LLC and of Palgrave Macmillan Ltd. Macmillan® is a registered trademark in the United States, United Kingdom and other countries. Palgrave is a registered trademark in the European Union and other countries. ISBN 13: 978–1–4039–8610–8 hardback ISBN 10: 1–4039–8610–X hardback This book is printed on paper suitable for recycling and made from fully managed and sustained forest sources. -
Criminal Law Act 1967
Status: This version of this Act contains provisions that are prospective. Changes to legislation: There are currently no known outstanding effects for the Criminal Law Act 1967. (See end of Document for details) Criminal Law Act 1967 1967 CHAPTER 58 An Act to amend the law of England and Wales by abolishing the division of crimes into felonies and misdemeanours and to amend and simplify the law in respect of matters arising from or related to that division or the abolition of it; to do away (within or without England and Wales) with certain obsolete crimes together with the torts of maintenance and champerty; and for purposes connected therewith. [21st July 1967] PART I FELONY AND MISDEMEANOUR Extent Information E1 Subject to s. 11(2)-(4) this Part shall not extend to Scotland or Northern Ireland see s. 11(1) 1 Abolition of distinction between felony and misdemeanour. (1) All distinctions between felony and misdemeanour are hereby abolished. (2) Subject to the provisions of this Act, on all matters on which a distinction has previously been made between felony and misdemeanour, including mode of trial, the law and practice in relation to all offences cognisable under the law of England and Wales (including piracy) shall be the law and practice applicable at the commencement of this Act in relation to misdemeanour. [F12 Arrest without warrant. (1) The powers of summary arrest conferred by the following subsections shall apply to offences for which the sentence is fixed by law or for which a person (not previously convicted) may under or by virtue of any enactment be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of five years [F2(or might be so sentenced but for the restrictions imposed by [F3section 33 of the Magistrates’Courts Act 1980)]] and to attempts to committ any 2 Criminal Law Act 1967 (c. -
1 the Anti-Terrorism Legal Regime of Pakistan and the Global Paradigm
The Anti-Terrorism Legal Regime of Pakistan and the Global Paradigm of Security: A Genealogical and Comparative Analysis Syed Sami Raza (University of Peshawar, Pakistan) Introduction In his article The Creation and Development of Pakistan’s Anti-terrorism Regime, 1997- 2002 Charles H. Kennedy critiques Pakistan’s anti-terrorism legal regime. The subject matter of his critique revolves around two juridical derogations: a) suspension of the rule of law by way of enacting anti-terrorism laws and allowing for preventive detention, b) suspension of regular courts of judicature by way of setting up special courts, for instance anti-terrorism and martial courts, and allowing for the practice of speedy justice, which here stands for extraordinary procedure and summary execution. It should be noticed that the two juridical derogations constitute a state of affairs, which in critical legal studies, is termed state of exception. After highlighting the fallouts of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism legal regime, Kennedy concludes his article with a counterintuitive piece of advice for the West: “The tortured history of Pakistan’s anti-terrorism regime should give pause to prospective latecomers to the process (e.g., the United States, Britain, EU, Australia)”.1 The advice, benign on the face of it, is however quite provocative. It at once begs the questions: Is the West really a latecomer in introducing an anti-terrorism legal regime? Apparently, the answer is yes. Because one of the major Pakistani anti-terrorism laws was passed on August 14, 2001, about a month before the terrorist attacks of 9/11, while in the US and the UK some of the major anti-terrorism laws were passed after 9/11, Kennedy’s advice makes good chronological sense.2 But inasmuch as 1 Charles H.