118 INTERVENTION AND DETENTE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY Robert S. Wood In the century after the 1648 Treaty realities underlying their calculus. States of Westphalia, the European state sys­ organized according to exclusive in­ tem was established on the basis of the ternal authority and interstate relations political principle of territoriality and of organized not by a supranational power the legal principle of sovereign equality. but by the sovereign agreement of these The former notion entailed the effective states-this was to be the pattern of control by the major princes within modern international relations. Linked established territorial limits and the with this pattern were the notions of second concept established the norm of nonintervention and domestic jurisdic­ complete political jurisdiction by the tion-princes may meet each other in prince and his government within these battle and adjust the political map of territorial boundaries unencumbered by Europe but they must resist the urge to any earthly, external authority. Al­ influence too blatantly the character of though states were unequal in material each other's type of regime and ideo­ capabilities and political influence, they logical commitment by direct or covert confronted each other in the interna­ intervention. That this conception of tional arena under the obligation to international affairs was only im­ recognize each other as masters within perfectly realized is obvious but that it their territorial domains. And, in the provided an influential normative frame intercourse of nations, agreements were of action is also clear. to be based on the norm of contracts, The evolution of the principles of the explicit or implicit, among equal part­ modern state system is attributable in ners, whatever the actual power political the first instance to the experiences of 119 the emergent states from the 14th to element -in the erosion of the classical the 16th centuries. The attempt by the principles of the modern state system. various princes to separate their do· In such a "revolutionary" situation, mains from an empire and a church with then, what is the role of the doctrine of supranational pretensions and the divi­ nonintervention? sion of Christendom in the reformation, suffused the politics of the period with Henry Kissinger and Noninterven­ a harsh ideological cast and rendered tion: From Cold War To Detente. In a problematical political regimes and terri­ real sense, the cold war is a result of the torial boundaries, all of which culmi­ convergence of ideology and ambition nated in the Thirty Years' War. The such as characterized the period prior to partial stalemate among states and the the Peace of Westphalia and the French jeopardy in which intervention placed Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars. The every regime persuaded Europe's politi­ Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan cal leadership to evolve a system which were thus elements in an increasingly would better guarantee the stability of global revolutionary struggle the objec­ the states. The key was to separate tive of whose combatants was not only international relations from internal extended direct territorial control but politics. The separation was never com­ modification of political regimes and plete and the smaller states were never socioeconomic structures. In such a as certainly covered by the new norms context, American support, covert and as the great states, but international open, to liberal political forces in relations in rough-and-ready fashion did Western Europe was seen by the con­ conform to the new pattern until the cerned public as both necessary and wars of the French Revolution and proper. Even the extension of assistance Napoleon. to regimes more authoritarian in nature With the French Revolution, the was widely seen as a justifiable attempt nature and character of regimes became to limit Soviet influence. again a stake in the international con­ The experiences of Vietnam and the flict and ideological concerns once again political as well as economic costs of interacted with power political motives. intervention in areas of high political The defeat of Napoleon largely restored instability led many opinion leaders, the prerevolutionary notions which, however, to reassess America's interna­ despite the strains of nationalism, class tional role. There simultaneously oc­ ideologies, and racial doctrines, per­ curred a parallel reevaluation by some sisted until World War I. Since that great Western commentators of Soviet ambi­ war, however, the world has been buf­ tions. The convergence of these trends is feted by supranational ideologies and most visibly seen in the detente policy ambitions cloaked in universal principles of the Secretary of State Henry Kissin­ whose very intensity erodes political ger. boundaries and casts in doubt the dis­ If American foreign policy since tinction between domestic and interna­ World War II has been largely inspired tional politics. Moreover, with the rise by polar confrontation and doctrines of of a multitude of weak and divided political and economic reconstruction states unable to establish domestic order and nation-building among the non­ and resist foreign incursions, the prob­ Communist states, recent detente policy lem of distinguishing levels of political is aimed in the words of its primary activity and limiting political ambitions expositor, Henry Kissinger, at the en­ has been exacerbated. Some have couragement of "an environment in further cited the interdependence of the which competitors can regulate and international economy as another restrain their differences and ultimately 120 move from competition to coopera­ to produce internal changes in foreign . tion.,,1 The primary focus of American countries. Consciousness of our limits is policy thus becomes less the contain­ recognition of the necessity of peace­ ment-and, in effect, isolation-of the not moral callousness.,,4 In effect, Dr. Soviet Union than the development of a Kissinger contends that a stable interna­ nexus of relations which are designed to tional system thus depends in this view "create a vested interest in cooperation on an agreement about international and restraint.,,2 And whereas the earlier rules of behavior-not a common notion containment doctrine largely repre­ of justice which could well place in sented a negative policy vis-a-vis the doubt the authority of the several East and placed dominant emphasis on regimes comprising the system. To the development and maintenance of attempt to devise agreements which alliance ties with Western Europe, establish both rules of international Japan, and other states of important conduct and norms of domestic recti­ strategic interest, the practical result of tude is seen as likely to increase frustra­ recent policy is to reverse the emphasis tion and exacerbate conflict, especially and increasingly assess our alliance rela­ in an international environment charac­ tions' in terms of their contribution to terized by fundamentally different Soviet-American detente. regimes. At the same time, however, it is This approach is ultimately founded clear that Dr. Kissinger has not elevated on three assumptions: .First, that in the the doctrine of nonintervention to a words of the Secretary of State "the categorical imperative but limits it to Soviet Union has begun to practice great power, i.e., Soviet-American, rela­ foreign policy-at least partially-as a tions and couples the notion with an relationship between states rather than implicit understanding on spheres of as international civil war,,3 and that, in influence. The distinction between any case, common interests in survival domestic and international politics and and some degree of predictability are the concomitant rule of nonintervention more important factors in U.S.-Soviet are thus prudential and limited rather relations than basic changes in their than principles and universal. It is not regimes or ideological motivations; that an absolute doctrine of noninter­ second, that a strong Western military vention is simply rejected in the abstract posture and a continuing intimacy but that conditions of state security, as within the Western alliance will be well as state aspirations, are viewed as maintained; and, third, that a separation ruling out complete submission to such between domestic and international a precept. Indeed, the classical notion of politics and a clearer acceptance of power politics has always maintained a spheres of influence in the policies of distinction between great and small the Soviet Union and the United States powers and included concepts of can be established. spheres of influence. Inhibitions on In a recent reply to those critics who ideological preferences and restrictions assert that political and economic con­ on direct interference in domestic cessions by the United States to the politics arise in this view not from Soviet Union should be linked to a abstract notions of justice but from modification of Soviet domestic policies caldulations of prudence-which do in­ of emigration and, perhaps, dissent, clude, it must be noted, the elaboration Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of prudential rules of international be­ argues: "Where the age-old antagonism havior and guides for alliance main­ between freedom and tyranny is con­ tenance. In this conception then, Secre­ cerned, we are not neutral. But other tary Kissinger is not alone but in a long imperatives impose limits on our ability and dominant foreign policy tradition. 121 Although