DOCSLIB.ORG

Intervention and Detente in American Foreign Policy

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Intervention and Detente in American Foreign Policy 118 INTERVENTION AND DETENTE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY Robert S. Wood In the century after the 1648 Treaty realities underlying their calculus. States of Westphalia, the European state sys­ organized according to exclusive in­ tem was established on the basis of the ternal authority and interstate relations political principle of territoriality and of organized not by a supranational power the legal principle of sovereign equality. but by the sovereign agreement of these The former notion entailed the effective states-this was to be the pattern of control by the major princes within modern international relations. Linked established territorial limits and the with this pattern were the notions of second concept established the norm of nonintervention and domestic jurisdic­ complete political jurisdiction by the tion-princes may meet each other in prince and his government within these battle and adjust the political map of territorial boundaries unencumbered by Europe but they must resist the urge to any earthly, external authority. Al­ influence too blatantly the character of though states were unequal in material each other's type of regime and ideo­ capabilities and political influence, they logical commitment by direct or covert confronted each other in the interna­ intervention. That this conception of tional arena under the obligation to international affairs was only im­ recognize each other as masters within perfectly realized is obvious but that it their territorial domains. And, in the provided an influential normative frame intercourse of nations, agreements were of action is also clear. to be based on the norm of contracts, The evolution of the principles of the explicit or implicit, among equal part­ modern state system is attributable in ners, whatever the actual power political the first instance to the experiences of 119 the emergent states from the 14th to element -in the erosion of the classical the 16th centuries. The attempt by the principles of the modern state system. various princes to separate their do· In such a "revolutionary" situation, mains from an empire and a church with then, what is the role of the doctrine of supranational pretensions and the divi­ nonintervention? sion of Christendom in the reformation, suffused the politics of the period with Henry Kissinger and Noninterven­ a harsh ideological cast and rendered tion: From Cold War To Detente. In a problematical political regimes and terri­ real sense, the cold war is a result of the torial boundaries, all of which culmi­ convergence of ideology and ambition nated in the Thirty Years' War. The such as characterized the period prior to partial stalemate among states and the the Peace of Westphalia and the French jeopardy in which intervention placed Revolutionary-Napoleonic Wars. The every regime persuaded Europe's politi­ Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan cal leadership to evolve a system which were thus elements in an increasingly would better guarantee the stability of global revolutionary struggle the objec­ the states. The key was to separate tive of whose combatants was not only international relations from internal extended direct territorial control but politics. The separation was never com­ modification of political regimes and plete and the smaller states were never socioeconomic structures. In such a as certainly covered by the new norms context, American support, covert and as the great states, but international open, to liberal political forces in relations in rough-and-ready fashion did Western Europe was seen by the con­ conform to the new pattern until the cerned public as both necessary and wars of the French Revolution and proper. Even the extension of assistance Napoleon. to regimes more authoritarian in nature With the French Revolution, the was widely seen as a justifiable attempt nature and character of regimes became to limit Soviet influence. again a stake in the international con­ The experiences of Vietnam and the flict and ideological concerns once again political as well as economic costs of interacted with power political motives. intervention in areas of high political The defeat of Napoleon largely restored instability led many opinion leaders, the prerevolutionary notions which, however, to reassess America's interna­ despite the strains of nationalism, class tional role. There simultaneously oc­ ideologies, and racial doctrines, per­ curred a parallel reevaluation by some sisted until World War I. Since that great Western commentators of Soviet ambi­ war, however, the world has been buf­ tions. The convergence of these trends is feted by supranational ideologies and most visibly seen in the detente policy ambitions cloaked in universal principles of the Secretary of State Henry Kissin­ whose very intensity erodes political ger. boundaries and casts in doubt the dis­ If American foreign policy since tinction between domestic and interna­ World War II has been largely inspired tional politics. Moreover, with the rise by polar confrontation and doctrines of of a multitude of weak and divided political and economic reconstruction states unable to establish domestic order and nation-building among the non­ and resist foreign incursions, the prob­ Communist states, recent detente policy lem of distinguishing levels of political is aimed in the words of its primary activity and limiting political ambitions expositor, Henry Kissinger, at the en­ has been exacerbated. Some have couragement of "an environment in further cited the interdependence of the which competitors can regulate and international economy as another restrain their differences and ultimately 120 move from competition to coopera­ to produce internal changes in foreign . tion.,,1 The primary focus of American countries. Consciousness of our limits is policy thus becomes less the contain­ recognition of the necessity of peace­ ment-and, in effect, isolation-of the not moral callousness.,,4 In effect, Dr. Soviet Union than the development of a Kissinger contends that a stable interna­ nexus of relations which are designed to tional system thus depends in this view "create a vested interest in cooperation on an agreement about international and restraint.,,2 And whereas the earlier rules of behavior-not a common notion containment doctrine largely repre­ of justice which could well place in sented a negative policy vis-a-vis the doubt the authority of the several East and placed dominant emphasis on regimes comprising the system. To the development and maintenance of attempt to devise agreements which alliance ties with Western Europe, establish both rules of international Japan, and other states of important conduct and norms of domestic recti­ strategic interest, the practical result of tude is seen as likely to increase frustra­ recent policy is to reverse the emphasis tion and exacerbate conflict, especially and increasingly assess our alliance rela­ in an international environment charac­ tions' in terms of their contribution to terized by fundamentally different Soviet-American detente. regimes. At the same time, however, it is This approach is ultimately founded clear that Dr. Kissinger has not elevated on three assumptions: .First, that in the the doctrine of nonintervention to a words of the Secretary of State "the categorical imperative but limits it to Soviet Union has begun to practice great power, i.e., Soviet-American, rela­ foreign policy-at least partially-as a tions and couples the notion with an relationship between states rather than implicit understanding on spheres of as international civil war,,3 and that, in influence. The distinction between any case, common interests in survival domestic and international politics and and some degree of predictability are the concomitant rule of nonintervention more important factors in U.S.-Soviet are thus prudential and limited rather relations than basic changes in their than principles and universal. It is not regimes or ideological motivations; that an absolute doctrine of noninter­ second, that a strong Western military vention is simply rejected in the abstract posture and a continuing intimacy but that conditions of state security, as within the Western alliance will be well as state aspirations, are viewed as maintained; and, third, that a separation ruling out complete submission to such between domestic and international a precept. Indeed, the classical notion of politics and a clearer acceptance of power politics has always maintained a spheres of influence in the policies of distinction between great and small the Soviet Union and the United States powers and included concepts of can be established. spheres of influence. Inhibitions on In a recent reply to those critics who ideological preferences and restrictions assert that political and economic con­ on direct interference in domestic cessions by the United States to the politics arise in this view not from Soviet Union should be linked to a abstract notions of justice but from modification of Soviet domestic policies caldulations of prudence-which do in­ of emigration and, perhaps, dissent, clude, it must be noted, the elaboration Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of prudential rules of international be­ argues: "Where the age-old antagonism havior and guides for alliance main­ between freedom and tyranny is con­ tenance. In this conception then, Secre­ cerned, we are not neutral. But other tary Kissinger is not alone but in a long imperatives impose limits on our ability and dominant foreign policy tradition. 121 Although
Load more

Recommended publications
  • The Brezhnev Era (1964–1982)
    Name _______________________________________________ Date _____________ The Brezhnev Era (1964–1982) Next to Stalin, Leonid Brezhnev ruled the Soviet Union longer than any other leader. Brezhnev and his supporters stressed the ties with the Stalinist era by focusing on his good points and ignoring his crimes. 1. What is the KGB? Brezhnev strengthened the Soviet bureaucracy as well What was its as the KGB (Committee of State Security)—formed in purpose? (list 2) 1954; its mission was to defend the Soviet government from its enemies at home and abroad. The KGB suppressed dissidents who spoke out against the government at home and in the satellite countries. The Soviets also invested in a large military buildup and were determined to never again suffer a humiliating defeat, as happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Yet Brezhnev proceeded cautiously in the mid-1960s and sought to avoid confrontation with the West. He was determined, however, to protect Soviet interests. Brezhnev Doctrine (1968) 2. What was the Prague In 1968, Alexander Dubček (1921–1992) became head of the Czechoslovakia Spring? Communist Party and began a series of reforms known as the Prague Spring reforms, which sought to make communism more humanistic. He lifted censorship, permitted non-communists to form political groups, and wanted to trade with the West, but still remain true to communist ideals. Brezhnev viewed these reforms as a capitalistic threat to the socialist ideologies of communism and, in August of 1968, sent over 500,000 Soviet and Eastern European troops 3. How did Brezhnev to occupy Czechoslovakia. In the Brezhnev Doctrine, he defended the Soviet react to the Prague military invasion of Czechoslovakia, saying in effect, that antisocialist elements Spring? in a single socialist country can compromise the entire socialist system, and thus other socialist countries have the right to intervene militarily if they see the need to do so.
    [Show full text]
  • Russia and the European Security Order Revisited: from the Congress of Vienna to the Post-Cold War
    European Politics and Society ISSN: 2374-5118 (Print) 2374-5126 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rpep21 Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war Tuomas Forsberg To cite this article: Tuomas Forsberg (2019) Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war, European Politics and Society, 20:2, 154-171, DOI: 10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182 © 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 30 Nov 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 571 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rpep21 EUROPEAN POLITICS AND SOCIETY 2019, VOL. 20, NO. 2, 154–171 https://doi.org/10.1080/23745118.2018.1545182 Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war Tuomas Forsberga,b aHelsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland; bTampere University, Tampere, Finland ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Russia’s role in the international order is often explained with Russia; international order; reference to historical examples, analogies and longue durée security order; European trends. This article examines Russia’s role in, and visions of, the security international order from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Cold War. The article also discusses the lessons, and perhaps also the wrong lessons, that the current Russian leadership and elite have drawn on the basis of past grand bargains.
    [Show full text]
  • The Concert of Europe and Great-Power Governance Today
    BUILDING A SUSTAINABLE INTERNATIONAL ORDER A RAND Project to Explore U.S. Strategy in a Changing World KYLE LASCURETTES The Concert of Europe and Great-Power Governance Today What Can the Order of 19th-Century Europe Teach Policymakers About International Order in the 21st Century? Perspective EXPERT INSIGHTS ON A TIMELY POLICY ISSUE C O R P O R A T I O N Contents What Was the Concert of Europe? .........................................................................2 What Were the Concert’s Foundational Principles? ..............................................5 Why Was the Concert Considered Desirable? ......................................................8 When and Why Did the Concert Decline? ........................................................... 14 What Can We Learn from the Concert? ...............................................................17 Appendix .............................................................................................................. 23 Notes .................................................................................................................... 26 Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 30 About the Author .................................................................................................. 33 The RAND Corporation is a research organization that develops solutions to public policy challenges to help make communities throughout the world safer and more secure, healthier and more prosperous.
    [Show full text]
  • The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire'
    H-Diplo Hoebelt on Michell, 'The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire' Review published on Saturday, January 12, 2019 A. Wess Michell. The Grand Strategy of the Habsburg Empire. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018. 416 pp. $35.00 (cloth), ISBN 978-0-691-17670-3. Reviewed by Lothar Hoebelt (University of Vienna)Published on H-Diplo (January, 2019) Commissioned by Seth Offenbach (Bronx Community College, The City University of New York) Printable Version: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showpdf.php?id=53014 When a US assistant secretary of state publishes a book on grand strategy, it is bound to attract attention. If he deals with Prince Metternich and the Habsburg monarchy, it is also bound to kindle memories of Henry Kissinger’s A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 (1954). Kissinger was a German exile who tried to teach European statecraft to idealistic Americans. A. Wess Mitchell is a native-born Texan who has come to sympathize with the problems the Habsburg monarchy faced. When Kissinger analyzed Metternich’s diplomacy between 1812 and 1822 in depth, he relied on a huge amount of published sources about the period around the Congress of Vienna. Mitchell’s task is more ambitious and burdensome: he covers the period from 1700 (when the rollback of the Turks had rounded off the hereditary lands to the East, the ties of the Habsburg dynasty to Spain were severed, and the Central European part of their domains emerged as “a stand-alone unity” [p. x]) to the battle of Königgrätz in 1866 (when the monarchy ceased to be a great power, as Mitchell argues).
    [Show full text]
  • Perestroika the Demise of the Communist World?
    Introduction Perestroika The Demise of the Communist World? Francesco Di Palma With the rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, a range of exten- sive reforms were initiated under the headings of glasnost (openness) and perestroika (restructuring). Among other objectives, they sought to make the regime less bureaucratic, to tackle increasing financial woes and to reduce foreign trade imbalances. Given the leading role that Soviet Russia played in bi- and multilateral relations between communist par- ties on both sides of the Iron Curtain, however, these reforms had impor- tant effects not only in the USSR. This book examines both the encounter with Gorbachev’s policies by select European communist parties and the historical actors who helped to guide those policies’ reception and implementation—topics that the historical literature has hitherto failed to analyze systematically.1 It is concerned with the parties’ responses in two respects: firstly, with regard to their mutual political, cultural, and not least financial connections; and secondly, within the context of their bilateral relationships to the hegemonic CPSU. While the “export”2 of Perestroika has been widely acknowledged and extensively described, historians have rarely broached the topic of the independent reformist policies among communist parties that emerged in the 1970s, nor whether and to what extent Gorbachev and his aides may have drawn upon already existing doctrines to buttress their restruc- turing.3 Moving beyond the impact of Perestroika on the Soviet Union and its foreign policy (e.g., the abandonment of the Brezhnev Doctrine), Notes for this chapter begin on page 17.
    [Show full text]
  • 2018 Sartorius Christopher Ma
    UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS Norman, OK 2018 WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY ___________________________ Dr. Ronald K. Gaddie, Chair ___________________________ Dr. Colin M. Barry ___________________________ Dr. Deven E. Carlson ___________________________ Dr. Jorge L. Mendoza ___________________________ Dr. Shad B. Satterthwaite © Copyright by CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 2018 All Rights Reserved. This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all intelligence professionals, military and civilian, past and present, who have dedicated their lives to protecting our great nation and our allies. Acknowledgements Working on this doctoral dissertation has been both a joy and a challenge. This work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of countless individuals. At the most personal level, I would like to thank my wife, Fulvia, for her support over the past three years of this doctoral program and for her care and love over the past 25 years. I wish to thank my son, Konrad, for providing inspiration, much needed breaks in my work routine, and for sharing lunch together at the OU cafeteria followed by our fun table tennis matches. I also would like to thank my parents, Tim and Wanda Sartorius, for instilling in me the value of a great education. I would also like to thank Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, always friendly, open, and upbeat for enthusiastically encouraging me to pursue a doctoral degree at OU and Dr.
    [Show full text]
  • Paper 2 Superpower Relations and the Cold War C1941-‐91
    Year 11 Revision Period Study – Paper 2 Superpower Relations and the Cold War c1941-91 Revision Programme – Paper 2 Superpower Rivalry 1941-91 Paper 2 is one hour and forty five minutes long. It has two distinct sections ; Section A – Period Study - Superpower Rivalry 1941-91 ( 50 minutes) Section B – British Depth Study – Elizabethan England 1588-1601 (55 minutes) Section A – Three Questions. All assess AO1 and AO2. All rely on factual knowledge and understanding. Question 1- Explain two consequences of …. ( 8 marks) Allow 10 minutes for this answer. Write about two consequences – you only need to write half a page so be brief. Focus should only be on the effect of an event – good discourse markers to use would be as a result of; as a consequence; the effect was; so Question 2 Write a narrative account analysing… ( 8 marks) Allow 15 minutes. This answer expects a narrative explaining how events lead to an outcome. You are given two information prompts but are expected to add to this to gain the best marks. The key is to write an organised answer, putting events into the right order and most importantly showing how each event links to the next. There should be a clear beginning, middle and end to this response Question 3 Explain two of the following… the importance of xxx for …. ( 16 marks) Allow 25 minutes. You need to choose TWO from the three listed. You must explain the impact of an event – thinking what did this event lead to? What difference did this event make ? KEY TIP : Throughout revision focus on what events are; the effect they have on each other and the overall Cold War tensions.
    [Show full text]
  • Nuclear Arms Control: Coming Back from Oblivion, Again
    SYMPOSIUM Nuclear Arms Control: Coming Back from Oblivion, Again Dakota S. Rudesill* INTRODUCTION As tensions between the United States and Russian Federation have spiraled in recent years, the outlook for the bilateral nuclear arms control regime has become increasingly grim. Comparisons to the early 1980s Cold War are common. Now, as then, Washington and Moscow are geopolitical adversaries. A key arms con- trol agreement has been abandoned. Nuclear modernization accelerates. Old nu- clear hands warn that the potential for nuclear war is rising. Amid growing unease, practitioners and commenters debate nuclear policy priorities, how the arms control process might resume, and how best to reduce nuclear risks. This essay analyzes the comparison of our present moment of nuclear destabi- lization with the Cold War's frigid and perilous depths in the early 1980s. It argues that the analogy is not perfect, but it is instructive. The Cold War teaches us that nuclear arms racing is hazardous and that nuclear arms control can come back from oblivion. By focusing on the right priorities ± strategic stability in particular ± and generating ideas now, a pragmatic slate of actionable stability- enhancing proposals can be ready when the geopolitical currents change and prospects for nuclear arms control recover. I. THE COLD WAR COMPARISON The nuclear age was nearly four decades old when ªThe Day Afterº aired in November 1983. The public was accustomed to hearing about nuclear dangers, but the TV movie had a powerful impact thanks to its major-network billing and depiction of average people dying in a mid-American town.1 Thirty-®ve years later came another unsettling nuclear ªday after:º rising concern about nuclear * Assistant Professor, Moritz College of Law, and Af®liated Faculty, Mershon Center for International Security Studies, The Ohio State University.
    [Show full text]
  • THE CONCERT of NATIONS: MUSIC, POLITICAL THOUGHT and DIPLOMACY in EUROPE, 1600S-1800S
    THE CONCERT OF NATIONS: MUSIC, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, 1600s-1800s A Dissertation Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Cornell University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Damien Gérard Mahiet August 2011 © 2011 Damien Gérard Mahiet THE CONCERT OF NATIONS: MUSIC, POLITICAL THOUGHT AND DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE, 1600s-1800s Damien Gérard Mahiet, Ph. D. Cornell University 2011 Musical category, political concept, and political myth, the Concert of nations emerged within 16th- and 17th-century court culture. While the phrase may not have entered the political vocabulary before the end of the 18th century, the representation of nations in sonorous and visual ensembles is contemporary to the institution of the modern state and the first developments of the international system. As a musical category, the Concert of nations encompasses various genres— ballet, dance suite, opera, and symphony. It engages musicians in making commonplaces, converting ad hoc representations into shared realities, and uses multivalent forms that imply, rather than articulate political meaning. The Nutcracker, the ballet by Tchaikovsky, Vsevolozhsky, Petipa and Ivanov, illustrates the playful re- composition of semiotic systems and political thought within a work; the music of the battle scene (Act I) sets into question the equating of harmony with peace, even while the ballet des nations (Act II) culminates in a conventional choreography of international concord (Chapter I). Chapter II similarly demonstrates how composers and librettists directly contributed to the conceptual elaboration of the Concert of nations. Two works, composed near the close of the War of Polish Succession (1733-38), illustrate opposite constructions of national character and conflict resolution: Schleicht, spielende Wellen, und murmelt gelinde (BWV 206) by Johann Sebastian Bach (librettist unknown), and Les Sauvages by Jean-Philippe Rameau and Louis Fuzelier.
    [Show full text]
  • A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 Online
    cDgNW (Ebook pdf) A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 Online [cDgNW.ebook] A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 Pdf Free Henry A. Kissinger ePub | *DOC | audiobook | ebooks | Download PDF Download Now Free Download Here Download eBook #456040 in Books Kissinger Henry a 2013-06-20Original language:EnglishPDF # 1 9.02 x .84 x 5.98l, 1.30 #File Name: 1626549788376 pagesShips from Vermont | File size: 61.Mb Henry A. Kissinger : A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22 before purchasing it in order to gage whether or not it would be worth my time, and all praised A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-22: 5 of 5 people found the following review helpful. This is a classic, of course. Elegantly written ...By Graeme P. AutonThis is a classic, of course. Elegantly written, insightful, philosophically sophisticated, with a lot of insight for those who want to understand international relations. Castlereagh simply wanted to maintain a balance of power in Europe following the Napoleonic Wars in order to facilitate Britain's security. Metternich, representing an Austria that was in the center of Europe and could not simply seek a discrete balance, wanted a conservative social contract at a time when the forces of nationalism were ultimately destined to sunder the Austro-Hungarian Empire. They wanted the same thing for different reasons. Castlereagh, dealing with resistance from his own Parliament, wanted a realpolitical solution. Metternich, the ultimate practitioner of "Machtpolitik," understood nonetheless the importance of ideas and ideology.
    [Show full text]
  • World History/Gorbachev and Reagan. May 8, 2020
    ISD Virtual Learning World History/Gorbachev and Reagan. May 8, 2020 World History Lesson 35: May 8, 2020 Objective/Learning Target: I can explain diplomacy and reform through the efforts of Gorbachev and Reagan. Warm Up What does this political cartoon show? Warm Up What does this political cartoon show? Students may not recognize Reagan and Gorbachev, but they should notice how each frame sees a less hostile outlook by each man. Represents the evolving relationship the two men had. Meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev List of Soviet Union–United States summits First one: Reagan and Gorbachev: The Geneva Summit The Gorbachev Revolution ◆ Mikhail Gorbachev, who came to power in 1985 as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), recognized that the Soviet Union could not remain politically and economically isolated and that the Soviet system had to be changed if it was to survive. Gorbachev's Five-Point Plan ◆ The key pieces to Gorbachev's plan for the survival of the Soviet Union were a series of reforms: 1. Glasnost (openness) – greater freedom of expression 2. Perestroika (restructuring) – decentralization of the Soviet economy with gradual market reforms 3. Renunciation of the Brezhnev Doctrine (armed intervention where socialism was threatened) and the pursuit of arms control agreements 4. Reform of the KGB (secret service) 5. Reform of the Communist Party The Objective: Survival ◆ Gorbachev knew that the Soviet Union would have to change if it was to survive. ◆ Central planning in a modern industrial economy brought many inefficiencies. ◆ The factory management system provided little incentive to make technological improvements and every incentive to hide factory capacities to ensure low quotas ◆ The socialist farm system was inefficient – there were poor worker incentives and storage and transportation problems.
    [Show full text]
  • Burden of the Brezhnev Doctrine: New Perspectives on the Collapse
    Matthew Newton JSIS A530 Dr. Jones Autumn Quarter 2016 The Burden of the Brezhnev Doctrine: New Perspectives on the Collapse Even before the inception of the Soviet Union, debate raged about how best to achieve socialism in the ailing Romanov empire. The extreme left, Leon Trotsky in particular, advocated for global communism achieved by international revolution. His successor, and later murderer, Joseph Stalin, co-opted Lenin’s policy of “Socialism in one country;” the Soviet Union would be the world’s paragon in the ascent to socialism. Once it achieved it, the workers of the world would unite and build communism globally, and the borders between nations would wither away in accordance with Marxism-Leninism. However, at the end of World War II, the Red Army found itself occupying eight quasi-sovereign states in Eastern and Central Europe. The relationship between the Soviet Union and the subjugated states shifted soon after their integration into the Warsaw Pact (formerly known as the Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation, and Mutual Assistance). During the Soviets’ march to Berlin and the early post-war years, the Red Army carried out a massive transfer of wealth and assets from the peripheries of occupied territory to Moscow. (Applebaum, 2012) Nonetheless, in financially supporting these nations and their leading communist parties, the Soviet empire gradually overextended itself from the inside outward. The relationship between Moscow and its European satellites proved tenuous and politically unviable as early as 1956, when what would become known as the Brezhnev Doctrine was used to retroactively justify the invasion of Hungary. Meanwhile, Nikita Khrushchev wielded the policy of nuclear brinksmanship in order to scare the United States out of initiating nuclear war.
    [Show full text]