118

INTERVENTION AND DETENTE

IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Robert S. Wood

In the century after the 1648 Treaty realities underlying their calculus. States of Westphalia, the European state sys­ organized according to exclusive in­ tem was established on the basis of the ternal authority and interstate relations political principle of territoriality and of organized not by a supranational power the legal principle of sovereign equality. but by the sovereign agreement of these The former notion entailed the effective states-this was to be the pattern of control by the major princes within modern international relations. Linked established territorial limits and the with this pattern were the notions of second concept established the norm of nonintervention and domestic jurisdic­ complete political jurisdiction by the tion-princes may meet each other in prince and his government within these battle and adjust the political map of territorial boundaries unencumbered by but they must resist the urge to any earthly, external authority. Al­ influence too blatantly the character of though states were unequal in material each other's type of regime and ideo­ capabilities and political influence, they logical commitment by direct or covert confronted each other in the interna­ intervention. That this conception of tional arena under the obligation to international affairs was only im­ recognize each other as masters within perfectly realized is obvious but that it their territorial domains. And, in the provided an influential normative frame intercourse of nations, agreements were of action is also clear. to be based on the norm of contracts, The evolution of the principles of the explicit or implicit, among equal part­ modern state system is attributable in ners, whatever the actual power political the first instance to the experiences of 119 the emergent states from the 14th to element -in the erosion of the classical the 16th centuries. The attempt by the principles of the modern state system. various princes to separate their do· In such a "revolutionary" situation, mains from an empire and a church with then, what is the role of the doctrine of supranational pretensions and the divi­ nonintervention? sion of Christendom in the reformation, suffused the politics of the period with and Noninterven­ a harsh ideological cast and rendered tion: From To Detente. In a problematical political regimes and terri­ real sense, the cold war is a result of the torial boundaries, all of which culmi­ convergence of ideology and ambition nated in the Thirty Years' War. The such as characterized the period prior to partial stalemate among states and the the Peace of Westphalia and the French jeopardy in which intervention placed Revolutionary-. The every regime persuaded Europe's politi­ and the cal leadership to evolve a system which were thus elements in an increasingly would better guarantee the stability of global revolutionary struggle the objec­ the states. The key was to separate tive of whose combatants was not only international relations from internal extended direct territorial control but politics. The separation was never com­ modification of political regimes and plete and the smaller states were never socioeconomic structures. In such a as certainly covered by the new norms context, American support, covert and as the great states, but international open, to liberal political forces in relations in rough-and-ready fashion did Western Europe was seen by the con­ conform to the new pattern until the cerned public as both necessary and wars of the French Revolution and proper. Even the extension of assistance . to regimes more authoritarian in nature With the French Revolution, the was widely seen as a justifiable attempt nature and character of regimes became to limit Soviet influence. again a stake in the international con­ The experiences of Vietnam and the flict and ideological concerns once again political as well as economic costs of interacted with power political motives. intervention in areas of high political The defeat of Napoleon largely restored instability led many opinion leaders, the prerevolutionary notions which, however, to reassess America's interna­ despite the strains of , class tional role. There simultaneously oc­ ideologies, and racial doctrines, per­ curred a parallel reevaluation by some sisted until World War I. Since that great Western commentators of Soviet ambi­ war, however, the world has been buf­ tions. The convergence of these trends is feted by supranational ideologies and most visibly seen in the detente policy ambitions cloaked in universal principles of the Secretary of State Henry Kissin­ whose very intensity erodes political ger. boundaries and casts in doubt the dis­ If American foreign policy since tinction between domestic and interna­ World War II has been largely inspired tional politics. Moreover, with the rise by polar confrontation and doctrines of of a multitude of weak and divided political and economic reconstruction states unable to establish domestic order and nation-building among the non­ and resist foreign incursions, the prob­ Communist states, recent detente policy lem of distinguishing levels of political is aimed in the words of its primary activity and limiting political ambitions expositor, Henry Kissinger, at the en­ has been exacerbated. Some have couragement of "an environment in further cited the interdependence of the which competitors can regulate and international economy as another restrain their differences and ultimately 120 move from competition to coopera­ to produce internal changes in foreign . tion.,,1 The primary focus of American countries. Consciousness of our limits is policy thus becomes less the contain­ recognition of the necessity of peace­ ment-and, in effect, isolation-of the not moral callousness.,,4 In effect, Dr. than the development of a Kissinger contends that a stable interna­ nexus of relations which are designed to tional system thus depends in this view "create a vested interest in cooperation on an agreement about international and restraint.,,2 And whereas the earlier rules of behavior-not a common notion doctrine largely repre­ of justice which could well place in sented a negative policy vis-a-vis the doubt the authority of the several East and placed dominant emphasis on regimes comprising the system. To the development and maintenance of attempt to devise agreements which alliance ties with Western Europe, establish both rules of international Japan, and other states of important conduct and norms of domestic recti­ strategic interest, the practical result of tude is seen as likely to increase frustra­ recent policy is to reverse the emphasis tion and exacerbate conflict, especially and increasingly assess our alliance rela­ in an international environment charac­ tions' in terms of their contribution to terized by fundamentally different Soviet-American detente. regimes. At the same time, however, it is This approach is ultimately founded clear that Dr. Kissinger has not elevated on three assumptions: .First, that in the the doctrine of nonintervention to a words of the Secretary of State "the categorical imperative but limits it to Soviet Union has begun to practice great power, i.e., Soviet-American, rela­ foreign policy-at least partially-as a tions and couples the notion with an relationship between states rather than implicit understanding on spheres of as international civil war,,3 and that, in influence. The distinction between any case, common interests in survival domestic and international politics and and some degree of predictability are the concomitant rule of nonintervention more important factors in U.S.-Soviet are thus prudential and limited rather relations than basic changes in their than principles and universal. It is not regimes or ideological motivations; that an absolute doctrine of noninter­ second, that a strong Western military vention is simply rejected in the abstract posture and a continuing intimacy but that conditions of state security, as within the Western alliance will be well as state aspirations, are viewed as maintained; and, third, that a separation ruling out complete submission to such between domestic and international a precept. Indeed, the classical notion of politics and a clearer acceptance of power politics has always maintained a spheres of influence in the policies of distinction between great and small the Soviet Union and the powers and included concepts of can be established. spheres of influence. Inhibitions on In a recent reply to those critics who ideological preferences and restrictions assert that political and economic con­ on direct interference in domestic cessions by the United States to the politics arise in this view not from Soviet Union should be linked to a abstract notions of justice but from modification of Soviet domestic policies caldulations of prudence-which do in­ of emigration and, perhaps, dissent, clude, it must be noted, the elaboration Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of prudential rules of international be­ argues: "Where the age-old antagonism havior and guides for alliance main­ between freedom and tyranny is con­ tenance. In this conception then, Secre­ cerned, we are not neutral. But other tary Kissinger is not alone but in a long imperatives impose limits on our ability and dominant foreign policy tradition. 121 Although the imperative of noninter­ conclusions for the future too. vention is traditionally linked with the The major one that is.reflected in notions of legal sovereignty and the final document is this: No one equality, all three conceptions are ulti­ should try to dictate to other mately founded on a situation of inter­ peoples, on the basis of foreign national anarchy and on the principle of policy considerations of one kind self-help. Both Naturalists and Positi­ or another, the manner in which vists historically expressed this rela­ they ought to manage their in­ tionship by reference to the doctrine of ternal affairs. It is only the people state "rights" which are not.normative of each given state, and no one commands in any meaningful sense at else, that has the sovereign right all but simply prudential imperatives to resolve its internal affairs and arising from the problem of self­ establish its internal laws. A dif­ preservation in the midst of anarchy. ferent approach is a flimsy and Such prudential imperatives need not, perilous ground for the course of however, be calculations of short-term international cooperation.6 self-interest but in fact may demand By reiterating a principal provision of attention to some modicum of predicta­ the conference declaration, some dele­ bility and order in the international gates were led to wonder whether Mos­ sphere and thus concern for the long­ cow was signaling its intention to forego term implications of state actions. While its prerogative to intervene militarily in anarchy may imply self-help, scholars East Europe in order to maintain Com­ and statesmen alike have been con­ munist governments friendly to the cerned with informing the notion of Soviet Union. Although Prime Minister self-help with such restraints and limita­ Harold Wilson of Great Britain felt that tions that it does not also entail chaos. such a declaration by the General Secre­ Nonintervention is thus recommended tary would make invocation of the less by reference to legal commitment so-called Brezhnev doctrine more diffi­ than to prudential calculations.5 cult in the future, most observers ap­ parently believed that the real intent of The Soviet Polity, Peaceful Co­ the statement was to inform the West existence, and the Doctrine of Noninter­ that the human rights section of the vention. The concept of noninterven­ conference declaration could not be tion espoused by Secretary Kissinger used to press for the of appears therefore to be motivated by the East European regimes. If this latter calculations of prudence and qualified interpretation is accepted, it might still by an implicit doctrine of spheres of be argued that Brezhnev was, however, influence. An important question is prepared to accept a generalized non­ whether or not the Soviet Union is intervention doctrine also qualified by a animated by similar considerations. On sphere of influence notion. If so, this the face of it, the statement by Leonid convergence of views, along with the Brezhnev, General Secretary of the fear of nuclear war, might provide a Soviet , before The basis for a long-term Soviet-American Conference on Cooperation and Se­ detente. One can be excused for some curity in Europe appears to accept a degree of skepticism on this point as more unqualified and principled com­ well. mitment to nonintervention. Speaking The Soviets have consistently insisted of the conference and its final act, Mr. that "the sphere of class and national­ Brezhnev declared: liberation struggle" cannot be brought The experience of the work of the within "" and that, conference provides important indeed, detente has given "a powerful 122 impulse to the national-liberation move­ sonianism has been disparaged for ment of colonial and oppressed enthusiasm, much as high Angli­ peoples. " Brezhnev has argued that cans disapproved of the Meth­ detente is a result of "a new relationship odists of 18th-century England. of f-orces"-that is, the ascendency of And yet the Methodists, had they the Soviet-Socialist forces. Hence, as an been ordained, almost surely commentator recently con­ would have kept the English tended, "the process of detente does people in the church, and possibly not mean and never meant -the freezing also their bishops. Instead the of the social-political status quo in the people wandered away into wqrld" and in fact nothing cQuld .or nothingness. Does not the Ameri­ should prevent the Soviet Union from can faith in democracy face some­ giving "sympathy, compassion, and sup­ thing of this dilemma, and are we port" to these forces of "national­ not adopting much the same liberation." In this view, then, detente course at the silent behest of men or peaceful coexistence involves direct who know too much to believe state relations between the United anything in particular and opt States and the Soviet Union, particu­ instead for accommodations of larly in the strategic area, but is not reasonableness and urbanity that designed to prevent Soviet support for drain our world position of moral "favorable developments" in various purpose?8 third states.7 Wilsonianism expressed a belief com­ mon from the early days of the Repub­ The American Polity, Contemporary lic-that the American experiment in International Politics, and the Doctrine government was not for the United of Nonintervention_ If some commenta­ States alone but provided a standard tors doubt the commitment of the and harbinger for the nations of the Soviet regime to a doctrine of noninter­ world. Thomas Jefferson, reflecting on vention, even one qualified by notions the meaning of the Declaration of Inde­ of spheres of influence, we can also pendence, wrote in 1826: justly raise questions whether such a May it be to the world what I doctrine is compatible with the charac­ believe it will be: to some parts ter of the American polity. In a remark­ sooner, to others later, but finally able article entitled "Was Woodrow to all-the signal of arousing men Wilson Right?" Daniel P. Moynihan to burst the chains ... The mass argued: of mankind has not been born Wilson conceived of patriotism with saddles on their backs for a not as an instrument of the state, favored few, booted and spurred, but as an expression and exten­ ready to ride them by the grace of sion of the moral capacities of the God but to govern themselves by individual, specifically of men the grace of God, and they will by seeking freedom in its many mani­ the grace of God. 9 festations. He saw that in the age Abraham Lincoln speaking of the then commencing such a patriot­ Declaration in 1861 expressed a similar ism would be meaningful only as belief: "Something in that Declaration it manifested itself in a world [gave] liberty, not alone to the people setting, engaging its energies in a of this country, but hope to the world world struggle. Democracy in one for all future time. It was that which country was not enough simply gave promise that in due time the because it would not last. In weight should be lifted from the 20th-century America Wil- shoulders of all men, and that all should 123 have an equal chance."l 0 Lincoln then was kindled after the Second World expressed the belief that, while the War, very much under the leadership of Declaration offered a vision, it did not the United States. It is true that in the in itself provide guidance for the con­ late 1960's, America began to suffer the struction of free government. That task same crisis of confidence which had was only accomplished in the text of gripped European society earlier. It is, the Constitution of the United States. however, the contention of such ob· In similar vein, Americans have tradi­ servers as Daniel Moynihan that the tionally viewed not only the Declaration a bandonment of important liberal of Independence as potentially universal beliefs is not in fact fatalistically reo in scope but also the principles and quired by the world situation and that structures of constitutional government. such a surrender would be harmful to The American experiment in constitu­ the foundations of the American polity tional democracy has thus been viewed itself. If the vision of Wilson can no not only in domestic but in global longer be accepted in unqualified terms. fashion, neither can it be completely In a real sense, the American ap· jettisoned without damage to the proach to government and international American soul and indeed to the quest affairs has represented in almost quint­ for a legitimate world order. A foreign essential form the modern liberal per­ policy whose appeal is primarily to spective in politics-animated by , power balances, spheres of notions fundamentally different from influence, and avoidance of war may in those which undergird Soviet and much this view be not so much irrelevant as of non-Western society but confident inadequate. that those liberal notions represent the Even assuming, however, that Ameri­ basis for just societies everywhere. The can and Western foreign policy should belief in the universality of rationalism be animated by the very principles of and individualism which characterized their own political founding, it is still a the 18th century Enlightenment re­ matter of debate as to what degree of ceived its best expression in the Ameri· external activism and indeed inter­ can political experiment and its finest vention this requires. The United States, rhetorical statement in the words of the for instance, as many liberal socie.ties, Declaration of Independence: "We hold has fluctuated in its policies between these truths to be self-evident ...." The relative noninvolvement in international 19th century elaboration of these En­ politics, on the one hand, and messianic lightenment principles in the notions of engagement on the other. In the first the free flow of peoples, goods, and case, one heard the argument that ex­ ideas became standards by which we not ternal political entanglement would only judged the performance of our damage material interests and risk moral government but other regimes as well. contamination and that exemplary be­ To a substantial degree, however, havior at home would act as a beacon confidence in the liberal notion of and redeeming model for the rest of the politics and law has been eroded within world. In the case of more extensive Western society itself and the applica­ external. engagement, this was recom­ bility of such notions to much of the mended on the basis of direct threats to rest of the world cast in doubt. It is a the core values of American society and fact, nonetheless, that the malaise con­ the necessity of reestablishing an inter­ cerning liberal thought affected the rest national environment in which the of the Occident earlier and much more natural spiritual and material links profoundly than the United States. among peoples would no longer· be Indeed, a renewed sense of confidence subordinated to authoritarian control. 124

Indeed, many Enlightenment and Mazzini completes this evolution by 19th century liberal commentators arguing that the rule of nonintervention addressed themselves to the question as had become an instrument of the status to what conditions, if any, would justify quo employed by the great powers to not only extensive foreign policy activ­ protect "legitimate" governments while ism in general but direct intervention restricting transnational liberal ties and within other societies. Archetypical ex­ assistance.I4 In effect, the erosion of amples of the various approaches might the Cobdenite principle stemmed from be found in the writings of Richard the dynamics of anarchical competition Cobden, John Stuart Mill, Immanuel itself and the conflicting political visions Kant, and Joseph Mazzini. of the state actors. Basically, Cobden stated the most Although there is little question that uncompromising theory of noninterven­ the counsel of Richard Cobden is most tion-one founded on the partiality of appealing to Americans today, it must states in defining universal notions of also be noted that the conditions under­ right and on the relative efficiency of lying Cobden's advice are missing nonintervention in serving over the long­ throughout much of the world-the free run the material interest of peoples. It flow of peoples, ideas, and goods. The must be noted that a basic assumption transnational society about which so undergirding Cobden's view was that, much has been written in recent years is transcending interstate relations, there not really universal in its scope. Indeed, is a plethora of relations between much of Henry Kissinger's diplomacy peoples. Goods, people, and ideas are to might be construed as an attempt to cross frontiers freely, thus ameliorating establish various links-economic, tech­ state conflicts and bindjng nations to­ nical, political, cultural-between the gether: "as little intercourse as possible West and the East in such a way as to betwixt the governments, as much con­ bring gradually the states of Eastern nection as possible between the nations Europe into a more transnational of the world." Hence, coupled with his society, in the preservation of which doctrine of nonintervention was a they would then have a stake. The fact liberal world vision which provided for of the matter, however, is that these the interpenetration of peoples. 1 1 Mill, states are still only marginally con­ Kant, and Mazzini, while accepting nected with that transnational world much of Cobden's vision, provided in and that much of the character of their varying degrees for a policY of state regimes militates against the same type intervention. of interlinkages allowed by liberal poli­ Mill enunciated the doctrines of tics. At the same time, the homogeneity limited humanitarian intervention to of political principle and aspiration protect lives and property from barba­ which might allow the acceptance of a rous acts of violence and to end dead­ sphere of influence doctrine and limited locked civil wars and of counterinter­ noninterventionism, does appear still to vention to uphold the rule of noninter­ be lacking. Indeed, under such condi­ vention.I2 Kant perhaps eroded the tions, Mazzini's observation that the limitation on intervention even further rule of nonintervention may be used to by his notion that stable rules of inter­ protect and legitimize authoritarian con­ national behavior depend on a radical trol is apt and much akin to commen­ revision of international society into taries on Brezhnev's public espousal of republican regimes. Moreover, the nonintervention. league of states in Kant's schemes might In effect, to the degree that the also possess a right of intervention in United States and the West are still 1 behalf of the republican order. 3 motivated by classical liberal notions of 125 politics, the counsels of John Stuart Mill study?-"And because in revolutionary and Immanuel Kant are likely to be situations the contending systems are attractive-that is, the notion of coun­ less concerned with the adjustment of terintervention to uphold the principle differences than with the subversion of of intervention and the Kantian vision loyalties, diplomacy is replaced either of the spread of republicanism as a by war or by an armaments race. ,,16 precondition of international stability. The character of nuclear armaments, the If in fact Soviet foreign policy is still desire of the superpowers for a modi­ inspired by Leninist political principles cum of stability in their relations, the and the United States is similarly in­ challenge of other international pres­ fluenced by liberal perspectives, then sures, and the press of internal demands any detente must be conceived as -all these forces may indeed sustain a limited in nature and much more closely limited detente which impedes war and akin to what the Russians call peaceful stabilizes arms races. Indeed, it is these coexistence. The notion of peaceful forces which provide the foundation for coexistence does not rule out areas of Kissinger's detente strategy-but it must cooperation where material interests be emphasized that the predominantly converge or where the fear of de­ Hobbesian nature of these inducements stabilizing and potentially suicidal war­ fails to preclude a rather intense politi­ fare becomes dominant. But one must cal contest which makes talk of non­ be skeptical as to whether anything intervention and even accepted spheres more intimate sustains current Ameri­ of influence premature. can-Sovie.t relations. The belief held by Henry Kissinger has, in effect, been both sides in varying degree that "what arguing that the involvement of the is mine is mine and what is yours is United States in the complications of subject to historical transformation­ power politics and equilibrium policy is with some fraternal assistance," is likely permanent and can only be reversed at to continue in force. Indeed, the ex­ the peril of our national security. amples of Portugal, and especially Should we either withdraw from the Angola, may very well be cases in point. game of nations with all of its moral Despite announcements on the un­ contradictions or should we act on lamented end of the cold war, we are assumptions of natural harmony, univer­ probably still living in a revolutionary sal justice, or too blatant a notion of international system. As Henry Kissin­ American uniqueness, we may ger wrote many years ago: "The charac­ jeopardize the survival both of our teristic of a stable order is its spon­ political influence and of our national taneity; the essence of a revolutionary values. The reduced margin of our situation is its self·consciousness. Princi­ power has meant that both a completely ples of obligation in a period of legiti­ negative policy of containment toward macy are taken so much for granted our adversaries or a perception of total that they are never talked about, and consensus with our allies will destroy such periods therefore appear to pos­ our flexibility and endanger our terity as shallow and self-righteous. Prin­ national interests. In the past, he has ciples in a revolutionary situation are so argued, central that they are constantly talked ... we had margin for error about."lS ... we acted as if the world's If the future is to see the continu­ security and economic develop­ ance of revolutionary clashes among ment couId be conclusively in­ different notions of public order, are we sured by the commitment of then subject to the conclusion which American resources, know·how, Kissinger reached in that same earlier and effort. We were encouraged- 126 even impelled-to act as we did by appealed to equilibrist notions not dis­ our unprecedented predominance similar to' those of Henry Kissinger. in a world shattered by war and However, there still persists a tension the collapse of the great colonial between Kissinger and his bipartisan empires. At the same time the foreign policy critics which goes beyond central character of moral values details of policy. There is what appears in American life always made us to be an almost instinctive reaction acutely sensitive to purity of against the implications of Kissinger's means-and when we disposed of doctrine for the definition of the nation overwhelming power we had a itself. From the beginning of the nation, great luxury of choice. Our moral the American polity has been defined certainty made compromise diffi­ not only as a nation among nations but cult; our preponderance often as a great experiment in government made it seem unnecessary. 1 7 with relevance not only to this people It is the passing of this pre­ but to peoples everywhere. Our sense of ponderance coupled with the permanent ultimate political harmony arising from necessity to engage in the complex consent, of the application of rational maneuvers of diplomatic-strategic rela­ techniques, and of special political tions which defines our current prob­ destiny, are all intimately tied to that lems-and which, in Kissinger's view, great revolutionary experiment of 1776 compels not only a modification of and its completion in constitution­ policy but a transformation of our making in 1787. In this view, it is not to traditional views of world politics. In the European past that we should turn such a world, we would better see but to our own. ourselves in the European tradition of James Madison defined the constitu- equilibrist statesmen who sought not tion-making task thusly: only concert with allies but collabora­ To secure the public good and tion with enemies-a world of con­ private rights against the danger of trolled' conflict and limited cooperation [a passionate majority] and at the rather than a community of justice or a same time to preserve the Spirit world of unambiguous enemies and un­ and form of popular government shakable friends. In Kissinger's view, is the great object to which our i?creasing' interdependence, declining inquiries are directed. resources, and the rising demands and, In similar vein, the foreign policy task is in some cases, power potential of the to reconcile the soul of American "Third World" states make power democracy with the exigences of in­ politics and the equilibrist perspective volvement in a world which shares few more rather than less compelling. of our assumptions. Hostility to Kissin­ To an extraordinary degree, Kissin­ ger may in part stem from a belief that ger's perspective has defined the prob­ he is too little concerned with that lem not only for the Republican soul-despite his latter-day sermons on Administration but the Democratic American destiny and moral purpose­ Party opponents. Although Jimmy and too willing, in order to meet the Carter speaks of a "democratic concert demands of international politics, to of nations" and international human adopt alien political models. In fact, rights as a primary focus of American however, both the claims of American policy-themes to which the Adminis­ democratic-republicanism and the tration has responded in this Presi­ exigences of an increasingly insecure dential election as well as bicentennial globe must be met. As we enter the year-both Carter and Zbigniew Brzezin­ third century of our national existence, ski, a Carter foreign policy advisor, have the task we face is no less complex-or 127 exhilirating-than the one faced by molecules of knowledge and COm­ James Madison and his cohorts. passion are not allowed to move It is thus probably unrealistic to view across from one half of the world . detente as foreclosing struggles over the to the other. This is a grave character of regimes both within and danger: THE STOPPAGE OF without presumed spheres of influence. INFORMATION between the Debate within Western societies would parts of the planet. Contemporary be better directed less toward the desira­ science knows that such stoppage bility of intervention than toward the is the way of entropy, of universal modalities of such involvement. It destruction. Stoppage of informa­ appears inevitable that under current tion makes international signa­ conditions this must involve attention tures and treaties unreal: within to tactics of intervention and counter­ the zone of STUNNED SILENCE intervention. In a world where transna­ any treaty can easily be reinter­ tional flows are important and growing, preted at will or, more simply, the Cobdenite eschewal of state inter­ covered up, as if it had never vention in favor of the interpenetration existed (Orwell understood this of peoples has much to commend it. beautifully). Within the zone of Where such communication is impeded stunned silence lives-seemingly and assistance is rendered to various not Earth's inhabitants at all-a national groups who would further re­ Martian expeditionary force, strict the transnational flow of goods, knowing nothing whatever about people, and ideas, then the problem for the rest of the Earth and ready to Western governments becomes the de­ trample it flat in the holy convic­ velopment of effective instruments to tion that they are "liberating" influence the domestic evolution of it.I8 various critical countries. In the current At the same time, if the character of debate within the United States over the international system impels concern how to restrict American involvement for interventionary policies and their abroad, including the intelligence prudential and principled limitations, it apparatus of the United States, one may would be a mistake to elevate interven­ lose sight of the fact that the United tion itself to a matter of first principle States has an interest in developments and general norm of international con­ within certain countries, as indeed does duct. If the international 'society makes the Soviet Union. It is a legitimate it unlikely that Cobden's advice will be concern that the modalities of American widely accepted, so one must recognize influence be compatible with the very the dangers of too enthusiastically em­ principles they are intended to uphold. bracing notions of revolutionary inter­ Moreover, an American policy too ex­ vention and counterintervention. Per­ clusively dominated by realpolitik may haps the only position is to maintain have fewer constraints and lead to more ambiguity rather than sanction nasty extensive commitments than one ani­ conduct or impose impossible rules of mated by attention to the first princi­ behavior. In any case, nothing in the ples of the American regime. On the character of the Soviet and American other hand, if such attention is given, regimes or in the political and economic then one cannot totally ignore the structures of the emerging states indi­ warning of Alexander Solzhenitsyn: cates that the requisite stalemates, We are also threatened by the tolerance, or internal stability have been catastrophe that the physically achieved so that international regimes of squeezed, constrained world is not nonintervention after the fashion of allowed to become one spiritually; Westphalia may yet be established. Pre- 128 mature movement in that direction will vention but will consecrate the victory not reaffirm the doctrine of noninter- of one form of intervention.

NOTES

1. "Secretary Kissinger's statement on U.S.-Soviet Relations," News Release of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Office of Media Services, Washington, D.C., Special Report, 19 September 1974, No.6, pp. 3-4. 2. "Secretary Kissinger at Pacem in Terris," News Release of the Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, Office of Media Services, Washington, D.C., 10 October 1973, pp. 4-5. 3. Ibid., at 4. 4. "Secretary Kissinger's Statement of U.S.-Soviet Relations," op. cit. at footnote I, p. 3. 5. For an excellent discussion of the classical arguments for and against intervention, as well as historical and contemporary practice, see R.J. Vincent, Nonintervention and International Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974). 6. The New York Times, August I, 1975, p. 2:4- 7. V. Matveyev, Izvestia, 2 December 1975, p. 4. 8. DanielP. Moynihan, "Was Woodrow Wilson Right?" Commentary, May 1974, p. 29. 9. As cited by Archibald MacLeish, The Great American Fourth of July Parade (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1975), pp. 46-50. 10. Roy P. Basler, eeL, Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953), voL 4, p. 240. 11. See The Political Writings of -Richard Cobden, ed., F.W. Chesson (London: Cassell, 1886), esp. his essays on "England, Ireland and America" and "Russia." 12. See J.S. Mill, "A Few Words on Non-intervention," in Dissertations and Discussions: Political, Philosophical, and Historical (London: Longmans, 1875), vol. III, pp. 153-178. 13. See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill, 1957). Also C.J. Friedrich, Inevitable Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948). 14. See J. Mazzini, Life and Writings of Joseph Mazzini, 6 vols. (London: Smith & Elder, 1890), esp. voL 6, appendix on "Non-intervention." 15. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, nd), p. 3. 16. Ibid. 17. "The Future and U.S. Foreign Policy," Secretary Henry A. Kissinger before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Bicentennial Hearings on Foreign Policy Choices for the 70's and 80's, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Washington, D.C., 16 March 1976, p. 2. 18. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, Nobel Lecture (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1972), p. 25. ----'¥----