Power in the Age of Empire

Home , Adam Zamoyski, A World Restored, Conservative Order, Klemens von Metternich

chapter 1 Power in the Age of Empire

As a result of their chase for resources and new markets, many of the major powers, including Great Britain, France, Tsarist Russia and Imperial Germa- ny, expanded on a global scale during the Age of Empire.1 Unable to keep up with the military might of the larger powers, smaller European states like Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden-Norway – some of which had earlier carried out imperialist policies themselves – were therefore forced to seek alternative ways of securing their political and economic interests. Ferry de Goey points out that the growing significance of the consular service in Western countries resulted from the rise of the nation-state, the European expansion into Asia and Africa, and the growing rivalry between industrializing Western countries during the nineteenth century. States with maritime interests were the first to develop consular institutions because they were more dependent upon it than others.2 These states commanded large commercial fleets, made up of thousands of seafarers, which created the need for a strong administration and well-orchestrated economic and social support. In the late nineteenth century, the United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway maintained a global network of about 100 consulates and 800 consular offi- cials.3 Swedish-Norwegian consuls not only operated in metropolises like Lon- don, Hamburg, New York and Shanghai but also in smaller cities and outposts like Guayaquil in Ecuador, Honolulu, and Port Louis in Mauritius. Norway’s merchant fleet was one of the world’s largest commercial fleets during that era, and therefore it came naturally to decision-makers to incorporate shipping and trade into their policy considerations and to attempt to profit from the imperialist expansion of other Western powers.4

1 Andrew Porter, European Imperialism, 1860–1914 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994). On Russia, see Nicholas Papastratigakis, Russian Imperialism and Naval Power: Military Strategy and the Build-Up to the Russo-Japanese War (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011). 2 de Goey, ‘The Business of Consuls’, 1. 3 Emanuelson, Den svensk-norska utrikesförvaltningen 1870–1905, 138–140. 4 Nilsson, Sweden-Norway at the Berlin Conference, 35.

1 Sweden-Norway during the Age of Empire: Shipping, Trade and Globalization

The 1815 Vienna Congress restored peace and stability after more than two decades of revolution and the Napoleonic wars. The Congress has often been described as the restoration of a conservative order which ignored the strong winds of liberalism and nationalism connected to the French Revolution. Ac- cording to this narrative, this would eventually lead to renewed domestic unrest in several European countries, not least in France and Germany. But Vien- na has also been praised for the stabilization of relations between nations. The restored international order achieved by leaders including Charles Maurice de Talleyrand, Klemens von Metternich, Robert Stewart (Viscount Castlereagh), Tsar Alexander I and Karl August von Hardenberg, created the political condi- tions for the following processes of industrialization. Europe was spared major conflict until the Crimean War of 1853 to 1856. Even wars that did break out between larger powers, like the Austro-Prussian War or the Franco-German War, were rather short-lived. Historians such as Paul W. Schroeder and the former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger therefore consider 1815 as the starting point for a century of genuine political, social and economic development on the European continent.5 These representatives of what can be called the traditional school focus on Europe, diplomacy, and the balance of power between major nations.6 Yet critics have accused the traditional school for ignoring the minor conflicts and domestic unrest across Europe, culminating in the revolu- tions of 1848/1849. More recent research has thus taken a different approach, turning the focus from the centre to the periphery and arguing for the need to include colonized territories and peoples in the analysis. Global historians like Christopher Bayly and the Polish-British historian Adam Zamoyski point to the domestic con- ditions after 1815 as important drivers of inter-state conflict, highlighting the interplay between home affairs and foreign policy. Zamoyski is particularly critical of Kissinger’s and Schroeder’s portrayal of the nineteenth century as a peaceful era. He acknowledges that the Congress of Vienna accomplished its foremost goal – to end a belligerent quarter of a century – but also links the

5 Paul W. Schroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763–1848 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 575–576. A more recent account reaching similar conclusions can be found in Mark Jarrett, The Congress of Vienna and Its Legacy: War and Great Power Diplomacy after Napoleon (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 149–157. 6 Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812– 1822 (Brattleboro, VT: Echo Point Books & Media, 2013[1957]).