The Nondemocratic Benefits of Elections - the Case of Cambodia
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Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law Volume 28 | Issue 2 1996 The ondeN mocratic Benefits of Elections - The Case of Cambodia Nhan T. Vu Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Nhan T. Vu, The Nondemocratic Benefits of leE ctions - The Case of Cambodia, 28 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 395 (1996) Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol28/iss2/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. THE NONDEMOCRATIC BENEFITS OF ELECTIONS - THE CASE OF CAMBODIA Nhan T. Vu* I. INTRODUCTION WHEN ONE THINKS OF THE ADMINISTRATION of free and fair elec- tions' there is a tendency to concentrate on one possible electoral benefit - democracy. Scholars have written much literature on the possibility for democracy, how to bring about democracy, and what constitutes democra- cy.2 However, democracy is only the most obvious possible product of elections. The holding of elections may have benefits other than the * Associate, Russin & Vecchi, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam. J.D., Yale Law School (1995); A.B., Harvard University (1992). I would like to thank Professor George Priest and Professor Owen Fiss of the Yale Law School for their helpful comments and encouragement. I would also like to thank the Ford Foundation for its research grant which allowed me to travel to Cambodia to study this subject firsthand. This Article was originally to be published in late 1995, but was delayed due to technical difficul- ties. The views expressed are my own, as are all errors contained within the Article. ' Unless otherwise stated, in this Article, the word "elections" refers to elections that are free and fair. "Free and fair" is a specialized term in international law denoting an election that substantially represents the will of the people. See infra text accompanying notes 287-90; see also 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948) art. 21, para. 1; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 6 I.L.M. 368; International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360; Larry Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing (1984); W. Michael Reisman, InternationalElection Observation, 4 PACE Y.B. INT'L L. 1 (1992); David Padilla & Elizabeth Houppert, International Election Observing: Enhancing the Principle of Free and Fair Elections, 7 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 71 (1993); Michelle Evans & Darilyn T. Olidge, What Can the, Past Teach the Future? Lessons from Internationally Supervised Self-Determination Elections 1920-1990, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1711 (1992); Gregory H. Fox, The Right to Political Participation in InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J. INT'L L. 539 (1992); David Stoelting, The Challenge of U.-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371 (1992). 2 See generally ROBERT A. DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE: DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE LATE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1991); BARRINGTON MOORE, JR., SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DEMOCRA- CY AND DICrATORSHIP (1966); GUnLiERMO O'DONNELL & PHILIPPE C. SCHMrrrER, TRANSITIONS FROM AUTHOrrARIAN RULE: TENTATIVE CONCLUSIONS ABOUT UNCERTAIN DEMOCRACIES (1986); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (J. P. Mayer ed. & George Lawrence trans., 1988). 396 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. [Vol. 28:395 creation of a democratic political system.3 The elections held in Cambodia from May 23-28, 1993, under the auspices of the United Nations provide a good example. As Cambodia entered the 1990s, the likelihood that a stable democratic government4 could be formed was minuscule according to any theory of democracy formation.5 The economy was in a shambles, the people of Cambodia had no experience with democracy, and the major parties in Cambodia all had the means to ignore the call for democracy and continue their armed conflict. The economy, which had never been well-developed in the first place, took a step backward due to the fighting and the forced agrarianization of the urban centers by the Khmer Rouge during their four-year rule. The economy was largely agrarian with little industry other than resource-stripping activities such as lumber cutting and gem mining. It seemed unlikely that the people of Cambodia had achieved the standard ' For an opposing opinion, see Richard D. Fisher, Averting A Failure of U.N. Peacekeeping in Cambodia, HERT. FOUND. REP., Dec. 15, 1992, at 1, asking President Clinton "[n]ot [to] equate UNTAC's success with merely holding elections. The U.N.'s success must be judged on Cambodia's successful transition to democracy." ' There is a difference between a democracy and a stable democracy. Technically, Cambodia is a democracy since the government in power was chosen in democratic elections and has evinced an intention to continue governing the country through democratic means. However, one way to answer the question of whether a country is democratic is to take a snapshot of the political conditions in that country. In contrast, the term "stable democracy" connotes some sort of extended time period. Although I use the term "stable democracy" to mean any democracy that has a substantial chance of remaining democratic in the near future, the term stable democracy has no inherent definition. One noted expert on democracy has suggested a two-turnover test, requiring that the party in power relinquish control of the government at least two times to the victorious opposition party before one can say that a democratic system of governance has a good chance of success. HUNTINGTON, supra note 2, at 266-67. ' Most theories of democracy formation fit into two categories: theories which de- pend upon socioeconomic factors and theories which depend upon psychological factors. Those relying on socioeconomic factors link democracy to prosperity; i.e., prosperity increases leisure time, education, free press, and other commodities which increase the likelihood of democracy. See, e.g., SEYMOUR M. LIPSET, POLITICAL MAN (1960); Phillips Cutright, National Political Development: Its Measurement and Social Corre- lates, in POLmcs AND SOCIAL Lim, 569 (Nelson W. Polsby et al. eds., 1963). Theories dependent upon psychological factors argue that expectations of and acclima- tion to concepts of democracy are important. Thus, they emphasize prior experience with democracy. They also look to the diversity level of a society to see if the people are accustomed to openly airing dissension or solving problems through compromise. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, WHO GovERNs? (1961); VALDnIER 0. KEY, JR., PUBIC OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1961). 19961 CAMBODIAN ELECTIONS 397 of living necessary to provide them the surplus leisure time and income necessary to educate themselves about and participate in democratic processes. And to make matters worse, almost everyone with the techni- cal, professional, and political skills necessary to bring economic improve- ment to Cambodia had been killed by the Khmer Rouge or had fled to other countries. Furthermore, with one brief exception,6 the Cambodian people had never experienced any sort of truly democratic government. Of the four major Cambodian factions, none had any experience with democracy.7 Each of the factions had controlled the country at one time or another and all had used nondemocratic or sham-democratic8 forms of gover- nance. Thus, it was more likely that the Cambodian leaders would subvert any democratic processes for their own purposes rather than abide by the will of the people. And even if the elites did not destroy the democratic process, there was no way to predict whether the Cambodian people would participate in elections in a meaningful and useful manner. In fact, armed conflict had long been the standard means of resolv- ing disputes in Cambodia. There had been over twenty years of civil war, interrupted only by four years of "peace" filled with terror and mass murder.9 It is estimated that in the latter period, the Khmer Rouge killed at least one million persons out of a population of approximately six to eight million."0 Although Vietnam had withdrawn all of its troops and 6 The elections held in 1955 after Cambodia gained its independence from the French were probably free and fair under the standards of international law. See infra text accompanying notes 55-59. ' It is true, however, that, in the opinion of this author, all the factions currently support some sort of economic and political liberalization, at least in word. ' By "sham-democratic," I mean a government that uses democratic rhetoric but does not allow its citizens true political choice in their governance. ' Although the well-publicized activities of the Khmer Rouge during their reign are often referred to as "genocide," that is not technically correct. "Genocide" has tradi- tionally referred to situations in which persons of one race or nationality have systemat- ically killed persons of another race or nationality. If genocide merely denoted causing death on a massive scale, most major wars would be genocidal. The actions of the Khmer Rouge are, therefore, genocide when committed against ethnic Vietnamese, but are "mass murders" when committed against ethnic Cambodians. "0 The estimates of the numbers of those murdered vary greatly. The People's Re- public of Kampuchea, the Cambodian government installed by the Vietnamese after they defeated the Khmer Rouge, estimated three million dead. DONALD M. SEEKINGS, HisToRIcAL SETING IN CAMBODIA: A COUNTRY STUDY 51 (Russell R.