Plato's Introduction of Forms

Cambridge University Press 0521838010 - Plato’s Introduction of Forms R. M. Dancy Frontmatter More information

PLATO’S INTRODUCTION OF FORMS

Scholars of Plato are divided between those who emphasize the literature of the dialogues and those who emphasize the argument of the dialogues, and between those who see a development in the thought of the dialogues and those who do not. In this important book, Russell Dancy focuses on the arguments and defends a developmental pic- ture. He explains the Theory of Forms of the Phaedo and Symposium as an outgrowth of the quest for definitions canvased in the Socratic dialogues, by constructing a Theory of Definition for the Socratic dialogues based on the refutations of definitions in those dialogues, and showing how that theory is mirrored in the Theory of Forms. His discussion, notable for both its clarity and its meticulous schol- arship, ranges in detail over a number of Plato’s early and middle dialogues, and will be of interest to readers in Plato studies and in ancient philosophy more generally.

r. m. dancy is Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University. He is the author of Sense and Contradiction: A Study in Aristotle (1975) and Two Studies in the Early Academy (1991), and editor of Kant and Critique (1993).

PLATO’S INTRODUCTION OF FORMS

R. M. DANCY Florida State University, Tallahassee

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C R. M. Dancy 2004

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First published 2004

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For Margaret

Contents

Preface page xi Note on the text xii Abbreviations xii

1 Introduction 1 1.1 The dialogues 4 1.2 The genesis of the Theory of Forms: Aristotle’s account 11 1.2.1 Forms and deﬁnitions: the Argument from Flux 14 1.2.2 The Argument from Relativity: a forward glance at the dialogues 18

part i a socratic theory of definition 2 Socrates’ demand for definitions 23 2.1 Preliminary: on the vocabulary for “defining” 23 2.2 Defining and living right 26 2.2.1 Laches 26 2.2.2 Protagoras 28 2.2.3 Gorgias 29 2.2.4 Charmides 30 2.2.5 Euthyphro 31 2.2.6 Hippias Major 31 2.2.7 Lysis 34 2.2.8 Republic I 34 2.2.9 The importance of definition 35 2.3 The Intellectualist Assumption 35 2.3.1 Euthyphro 42 2.3.2 Hippias Major 47 2.3.3 Republic I 49 2.3.4 Laches 52 2.3.5 Protagoras 56 2.3.6 Charmides 57

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2.3.7 Lysis 61 2.3.8 The alleged ambiguity of “know” 64 3 Fixing the topic 65 3.1 Existence, unity, causality, and Platonism 65 3.2 Existence claims in the Socratic dialogues 68 3.2.1 Protagoras 68 3.2.2 Charmides 75 3.2.3 Hippias Major 76 4 Socrates’ requirements: substitutivity 80 4.1 A Socratic theory of deﬁnition: preliminary 80 4.2 The Substitutivity Requirement 81 4.3 Necessary and sufﬁcient conditions 82 4.3.1 Laches 82 4.3.2 Charmides 92 4.3.3 Lysis 104 4.3.4 Euthyphro 5c–6e 105 4.4 Leibniz’s Law 107 4.4.1 Charmides 169e–175b 107 4.4.2 Charmides 165c–e 108 4.4.3 Charmides 160d–161b 109 5 Socrates’ requirements: paradigms 115 5.1 Parade©gmata: some examples 116 5.2 Self-Predication 117 5.3 Generically abstract noun phrases 120 5.4 Euthyphro 6e 123 5.5 Euthyphro 6e–8a 124 6 Socrates’ requirements: explanations 134 6.1 Explaining content 134 6.2 Euthyphro 6de 137 6.3 Euthyphro 9d–11b 137 7 Socrates’ requirements: explaining by paradigms 148 7.1 Protagoras 330–331, 332–333 150 7.2 Charmides 160d–161b 151 7.3 Charmides 164c–166b 151 7.4 Hippias Major 156 7.4.1 Hippias Major 286c–287e 156 7.4.2 Hippias Major 287e–289d 158 7.4.3 Hippias Major 289d–291c 166 7.4.4 Hippias Major 291d–293c 167 7.4.5 Hippias Major 293c–294e 170

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7.4.6 Hippias Major 295b–296d 174 7.4.7 Hippias Major 296d–297d 177 8 Explaining: presence, participation; the Lysis 186 8.1 Participation and partaking 187 8.2 Presence 188 8.2.1 Charmides 189 8.2.2 Gorgias 191 8.2.3 Euthydemus 300e–301a 192 8.2.4 Lysis 216c–221d 193

part ii between definitions and forms 9 The Meno 209 9.1 The Intellectualist Assumption and the Socratic paradoxes 210 9.270a–80d: a Socratic mini-dialogue 210 9.2.171e–73c: the excellences 211 9.2.273c–74b: the ability to rule 215 9.2.377b–79e: desire and power 216 9.2.479e–80d: perplexity 217 9.380de: Meno’s Paradox, I 218 9.481a–86c: the Doctrine of Recollection 221 9.4.1 Recollection 222 9.4.2 Meno’s Paradox, II 225 9.4.381e–86c: Recollection illustrated 226 9.586c–100c: the Method of Hypothesis and the teachability of excellence 236 9.5.186c–e: the Intellectualist Assumption 236 9.5.286e–87b: the Method of Hypothesis 237 9.5.387b–89c: application of the method; excellence is teachable 238 9.6 The metaphysics of the Meno 240

part iii platonic forms 10 Phaedo 64–66: enter the Forms 245 10.164c: an existential admission 245 10.265a–66a: the Forms and the senses 245 10.3 Simmias’ agreement 248 10.4 The ease of forgetting the distinction 251 11 Phaedo 72–78: the Forms and Recollection 253 11.172–73: Recollection again 253 11.2 Being reminded of something 255

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11.2.1 The Prior Knowledge Requirement 255 11.2.2 A sufﬁcient condition for Recollection 256 11.374a: the Ancillary Argument, I 264 11.474a–d: the completion of the Core Argument, I 265 11.4.174a–c: ideal and mundane objects 266 11.574c–75a: the Ancillary Argument, II 273 11.675a–76d: the completion of the Core Argument, II 276 11.6.175cd: the scope of the argument 278 11.6.275d–76d: forgetting and being reminded 279 11.776d–77a: the upshot of the argument 281 12 The Beautiful in the Symposium 284 12.1 Diotima’s immortality 284 12.2 Climbing to the higher mysteries 285 12.2.1 Fromone body to all bodies 285 12.2.2 The beauty of the soul 286 12.2.3 The beauty of knowledge 286 12.2.4 The beauty of it all 287 13 Phaedo 95a–107b: Forms and causes 291 13.197b–99d: Anaxagoras, teleology, and mechanism 292 13.299d–103c: Forms as Causes – The Safe Theory 294 13.2.1 Socrates’ previous failure (99d–100a) 295 13.2.2 The method (100a, 101d–102a) 296 13.2.3 The reintroduction of the Forms (100a–c) 299 13.2.4 The application to causes (100c–101d) 301 13.2.5 Socratic assumptions 304 13.2.6 The semantics of the theory (102a–d) 306 13.2.7 The exclusion principle (102d–103c) 308 13.3 Intermediates as causes: the Learned Safe Theory (103c–105c) 310 13.4 105c–107b: immortality and the Forms 312 14 Conclusion 314

References 316 Index of passages cited 336 General index 344

Preface

In the spring of 1966, Gregory Vlastos invited me (among others) to submit a paper for consideration for an issue of the Monist he was editing. I did. Gregory did not accept the paper, but generously (as was his way always) provided me with detailed comments. One of those comments was: “To do this, you’d have to write a book.” Here it is. Along the way I have incurred an enormous number of intellectual debts. There is no possibility of my thanking all of those who have helped; for one thing, I would have to include all the students in seminars who have asked penetrating questions and made perceptive comments. So I’ll confine myself to the oldest debt, that owed to Gregory Vlastos, and the most recent ones. Michael Ruse sat through the better part of a seminar I gave on the book in 2002–2003, was obstreperous (often helpfully), and got me to submit the manuscript to Cambridge University Press. I won’t say that without his prodding the book would never have got out, but I won’t deny it either. Hilary Gaskin, of Cambridge University Press, also pushed me to submit it. She has been unfailingly encouraging throughout the entire process. She had it sent on to two referees, who gave me further reason to push on. One of them, Eric Brown, gave me very extensive comments indeed. Among other things, the book was far too long, and he had a lot of suggestions for ways to shorten it (one of the most important was to stop short of the Republic, which was part of the original design; another was to curtail references to the secondary literature). Angela Blackburn did the copyediting, and was at all times understanding and helpful. She uncovered more errors than I’ll admit to; if any remain, mea culpa. Lastly, my wife Margaret has been unflagging in editing, transferring computerfiles fromone word processing systemto another, asking questions such as, “Do you really need to say this?” and so on. The book is accordingly dedicated to her, although, quite possibly, she may never want to see it again. xi

Note on the text

Translations fromthe Greek are mineunless otherwise noted.

Square brackets ([ ]) enclose material that is in manuscripts or standard editions of the Greek that should not be there.

Angle brackets (<>) enclose material that is missing from manuscripts and standard editions of the Greek.

Curly brackets ({}) enclose translator’s supplements, as well as the Greek where this is cited within the translation. I have also used curly brackets to enclose words of my own when I have included them in quotations from other authors.

In matters of logic, initial universal quantiﬁers whose scope is the whole formula are mostly suppressed. Frequently I ﬂag a conclusion that is inter- mediate – one drawn on the way to a further conclusion – with an “L” – “(L1),” for example. The “L” stands for “Lemma.”

Abbreviations

DK H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. W. Kranz, 9th edn., Berlin 1960 LSJ H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, A Greek–English Lexicon, Oxford 1996.

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