. The Effectiveness of the Indonesian Civil Service

Donald P. Warwick*

How effective is the Indonesian civil service in implementing national policies? To what extent does the civil service lead to actions or other results that benefit others? Examples would be a programme to grow rice that, through the efforts of the civil . service, encourages substantially greater rice production, or a programme to expand primary schooling that results in a much larger enrolment of eligible children. The main problem in appraising the effectiveness of civil service systems concerns the specific criteria used to judge success or failure. This paper will contrast the results obtained by applying two sets of criteria to the Indonesian civil service. The first, . which derives from conventional theories of public administration, is concerned with how well the civil service system holds together. Are the personnel regulations con- sistent and do they add up to a workable way of dealing with government employees? , Is the level of staff benefits large enough to generate the motivation needed for action? Is there enough training to show civil servants what they should be doing? The second set of criteria, which is derived from conceptual models of implementa- tion, deals with what civil servants actually do in the field. Whatever the formalities of their personnel system, how well do they work when they are given specific tasks to carry out, such as running a rice growing or primary education programme? The core issue is field effectiveness rather than conformity to a given system of personnel administration. These two sets of criteria are helpful in evaluating civil service per- formance in .' I

History The Indonesian civil service system must be understood as an influence on and an outcome of the country's history. Unlike many countries once administered by Great Britain or France, Indonesia never had a fully developed model of its civil service. Except for British rule from 1811 to 1816, what is now Indonesia had been under . the Dutch from 1602 until the Japanese occupation in 1942. The Dutch East Indies Company, which operated there from 1602 to 1798, was not interested in a civil ser- vice system and worked mainly through local chieftains. More was done on public service when Indonesia was directly under the Dutch government, but by 1942 there was still no well-articulated civil service system. Since Indonesia's independence in 1945, the civil service and the military have been at the centre of national politics. Under the Soekarno government civil servants were heavily involved in party politics. There were over 100 ministries, the number

*Fellow, Harvard Institute for International Development

40 41 of civil servants was large, and party activities became key influences in promotions. To handle the large costs involved the government reduced civil service compensa- tion to close to zero in real terms. This process was part of an overall collapse of fiscal and monetary restraint that led to inflation of around 1000 per cent in 1966. There was then an upsurge in corruption so that agencies seeking to retain their staff had to come up with bundles of emoluments in kind. Even before Soekarno's fall from power senior officials and the military talked about civil service reform, but could do little in the face of the President's disinterest. After taking power in March 1966, General Soeharto immediately began reform- ing the civil service. He cut the number of departments, froze civil service hiring, and started to professionalize government employment. In 1968 he appointed a minister of state for administrative reform, a position that still exists. Indonesia now has a government with strong presidential leadership. Theoretically the highest organ of the state is the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), but this with a of over meets once in five The body, membership 960, just years. government ' is run by the president, who is the head of state, the chief administrator, and the commander of the armed forces. Indonesia has 17 cabinet department§, three minister coordinators, and four ministers of state. The civil service and employees of the many state-owned enterprises now number over 2.5 million. The main legislative body is the Council of People's Representatives (DPR), whose 460 members also belong to the People's Consultative Assembly. Indonesia's judicial system has general, religious, military, and administrative courts. Regional government operates at four levels: provinces, regencies, sub-districts, and villages. Both in appointments and in administrative reorganization Soeharto has maintained tight control over the regions. The agency responsible for most ap- pointments is the Department of Home Affairs, a unit of the central government. In 1979 the village was made the lowest level of administration. Regions such as South Sumatra, which had a different system, were pushed toward a uniform national model. The direction of administrative reforms since 1966 has been to put local areas and their officials more directly under the authority of the central government. A crucial feature of Indonesian politics, and one directly involving civil servants, is the number of legitimate political organizations. The government dislikes the term "", especially when it is applied to its own organization, Golkar. Under a 1975 law there are only three legitimate political organizations: Golkar, an acronym for Golongan Karya or "functional group"; the Development Unity Party (PPP); and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). Golkar was founded by the military in 1964, and remains largely under military control. The government's organization for civil servants (KORPRI) and a related unit for women, are part of Golkar. Civil servants were asked to join Golkar, for "... there was to be no neutrality or non- partisanship where the government's development strategy was concerned" (Bunge, 1983:198-99). With members spread across the country, and direct connections to local leaders who are not civil servants, Golkar has been able to do work usually done by political parties, such as mobilize support for its candidates and policies. It has been helped by the government ban on village politics except for a brief period around elections. Conventional party politics are outlawed, but Golkar can operate through the normal channels of the civil service and the military. The other two