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Russian-Election-Ope SPECIAL RAPORT 12/06/2018 RUSSIAN ELECTIONS - OPERATION “THE PreSIDENT” The Warsaw Institute Foundation OPERATION “THE PRESIDENT” In the presidential election in Russia on March 18, 2018, won Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin (Russian: Vladimir Владимирович Путин), which was announced by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. The most intriguing word in this announcement is „election”. Did presidential election really take place in Russia? VLADIMIR PUTIN IN THE POLLING STATION. SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU The political phenomenon observed on broadcast visit to the bridge over the Kerch that day in Russia was more like a plebiscite Strait, which will connect Russia with Crimea, or a referendum. If you look for analogies bypassing Ukraine. with similar cases from political life, then you can easily risk the hypothesis that the The exceptional mobilization of voters on political spectacle with its backstage from March 18, in which all the organizations March 18 this year, was almost identical to dealing with propaganda, special services, the referendum on the accession of Crimea army, state and industrial administration, the to Russia. It was not a coincidence that the Orthodox Church were involved, brought election was scheduled for March 18, the the desired effect. All these institutions fourth anniversary of this event. The final of have concentrated their efforts so that their Putin’s election campaign was his nationally employees fulfill their civic duty and vote for 2 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org OPERATION “THE PRESIDENT” the future of Russia. The word „Russia” was - 76.69%. Putin received 56 million 430 on the lips of both television commentators, thousand votes. Thus, for the organizers of playing the role of contemporary agitators, „The President” operation, Putin’s legitimacy, as well as managers of factories, offices, as well as the „Kremlin party”, to exercise workplaces, pops, military commanders. power has no right to raise any doubts - it is particularly strong. And the world should It was similar in the Crimea, when four years face that fact too. (Let us remind that Putin ago, in the shadows of the „little green men”, received 52.9 percent in the election in 2000, as it later turned out, soldiers from the Pskov 71.3 percent in 2004 and 63.6 percent in Division1, the votes for „Great Russia” were 2012). collected and falsified. And later, that evening, when the results were known, Putin appeared It would be petty to remind in this context on the TV screens, the winner of the operation that in many state institutions there were, just „Crimea is ours”, even shed a tear of happiness in case, different ways of controlling electoral - Crimea returned to the Homeland. These behavior. For example, on the day of voting, two referendums are similar to each other. you had to come to the company and show your supervisor the photo of the completed In this year’s March referendum, however, election card from your mobile phone. In the the Kremlin enriched, in comparison opinion of the Central Election Commission to earlier operations, the „electorate (rus: Центральная Избирательная Комисся management” strategy, whose main goal was Российской Федерации - ЦИК РФ - The to demonstrate the lack of alternatives to Central Election Commission of the Russian Putin’s leadership, defender and reformer of Federation) violations of electoral procedures Russia, strengthening his national leadership were scarce. This was claimed by the Central and world leader’s myth. Implementation of Election Commission, which canceled the election results in five local committees. Observers of the elections recorded cases of forgery and violations of the voting procedure, but found no grounds to challenge the election. It was said that it was better than in A much better result 2012, during the elections to the State Duma. was achieved - 76.69 The faith in Russia’s future and Putin turned out to be decisive. An analyst from the percent. Putin Moscow Center Carnegie Andrei Kolesnikov received 56 million (rus. Андрей Колесников) tried to explain the phenomenon of Putin’s high electoral 430 thousand votes. support: „...you have to refer to the classic concept of crowd psychology. It is better to be in the mainstream, do everything in the same this goal required very high voter turnout and way as a neighbor, rather than stand out from the best result of the election: it was assumed the crowd with the risk of being excluded. that the turnout should not be lower than 70 / ... / Putin is a symbol of the country, a percent. A much better result was achieved synonym of Russia, its brand, and in this www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 3 OPERATION “THE PRESIDENT” symbolic dimension receives support. / ... / I including financial ones, on which Sobchak am Russian, which means I belong to Russia, agreed to take part in the operations are not so I am for Putin. Voting in the elections in known to the public. She admitted in one of this context was a vote for the national leader. the interviews that before the decision on the In this sense, these elections turned out to be candidacy was announced she had met with more acclamations, expressions of approval.”2 Putin to inform him about her presidential plans however he was not pleased with her IMITATION OF DEMOCRACY decision3. „Electorate management” has already begun at the stage of preparing the list of candidates The other participants of „The President” for the president’s office. As first, Kremlin operation were recruited from various precluded Putin’s only, real competitor from fractions forming the broad Kremlin’s power running in the election. The one above- camp: the nationalist Vladimir Zhirinovsky mentioned is Alexei Navalny (rus. Алексей (rus. Владимир Жириновский); a Stalin- Навальный), who has been fighting for glorifying communist Pavel Grudinin (rus. leadership in Russian opposition for years. Павел Грудинин), the director of Lenin With his real chance of support of about 10-15 pro cent, he had a good capital to continue his political activity and to build a real alternative for the patrimonial system. Officially, Navalny was not registered by the None of Putin’s rivals Central Election Commission because he had the slightest had been legally convicted by the court for an economic offense. The interested party and chance of taking a his supporters were convinced that the trial had been fabricated to limit his elective rights. political combat with Navalny has the reputation of a politician who is not controlled by the Kremlin. What is more him. he even violated the fundamental principle of the Kremlin’s power party - he was looking Sovkhoz producing the best strawberries in for corruption among party’s top politicians Russia unexpectedly replaced in this election (i.a. he posted a film about properties and Gennady Zyuganov (rus. Геннадий Зюганов) wealth of Dmitry Medvedev (rus. Дмитрий - the leader of the Communist Party of the Медведев), the Prime Minister of the Russian Russian Federation Коммунистическая Federation. партия Российской Федерации - CPRF); a representative of the party Communists of Authorities chose related to them and to Russia (rus. Коммунисты России) Maxim liberals Ksenia Sobchak (rus. Ксения Собчак) Suraykin (rus. Максим Сурайкин), claiming – a celebrity, journalist and a daughter of that his party has nothing to do with CPRF Anatoly Sobchak (rus. Анатолий Собчак), and that its representatives are the most former mayor of Petersburg who helped Putin ideological communists of Russia, and CPRF to launch his career. Sobchak involvement claims that Suraykin’s party is its spoiler; Boris in the operation caused another conflict Titov, a Kremlin’s official „competing” with in liberal-opposition milieu. Conditions, Putin who is at the same time Presidential 4 Special Report www.warsawinstitute.org OPERATION “THE PRESIDENT” VLADIMIR PUTIN WITH HIS OPPONENTS. SOURCE: KREMLIN.RU Commissioner for Entrepreneurs’ Rights minor traces of liberalism. In fact, they posed and the leader of the Party of Growth (rus. a symbolic reference to the ongoing conflicts Партия роста), and the owner of champagne about fundamental issues for Russia, rather factory; Grigory Yavlinsky (rus. Григорий second and third plan of the operation. Явлинский), a liberal and founder of Their participation in it is a pure imitation „Yablonko” party (rus. Яблоко), second apart of democracy and a real life in Russia – a from Zhirinovsky, political veteran, who for landscape directed to a domestic recipient the first time ran for the presidential election but also to the creative usage by „Russia in 1996 and received 7.34 precent of votes; Today”, a channel which specializes in political Sergey Baburin (rus. Сергей Бабурин) propaganda customized for Kremlin. a conservative nationalist, the founder of Russian All-People’ Union (rus. Российский GOOD NEWS MACHINE общенародный союз) and the organizer of The list of Putin’s opponents appeared in nationalist „Russian Marches” in Moscow4. public when the media had already been running the „good news” program for five None of Putin’s rivals had the slightest chance months, managed by the Kremlin. The of taking a political combat with him. Since economic situation in the country before the beginning of the campaign they provided the election was bad, as the organizers of a colorful background for the incumbent the program noted. The social welfare of president. They presented different shades the Russians, who will have to choose the of nationalism and communism, sometimes president has a significant impact on the www.warsawinstitute.org Special Report 5 OPERATION “THE PRESIDENT” electoral result. To prevent the election them in mind, especially social promises. happening in the atmosphere of depression, The strongest emphasis in propaganda was Putin’s employees developed a plan under put on Putin’s role in Russia’s foreign policy, the slogan „life is improving”. The authorities on restoring Russia’s status of a great power of the regional authorities were obliged to and defending Russia against an increasingly send „good news” about improving life, new aggressive NATO.
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