This Matters to Us: Informal Local Governance Case Studies in Myanmar’S Rural Areas

This Matters To Us: Informal Local Governance Case Studies in Myanmar’s Rural Areas

This Matters To Us: Informal Local Governance Case Studies in Myanmar’s Rural Areas Printing Record

ထုတ္ေဝသည့္ကာလ- ၂ဝ၁၈ ခုႏွစ္၊ မတ္လ (ပထမအႀကိမ္) အုပ္ေရ- ၁၅ဝဝ မ်က္ႏွာဖုံးႏွင့္ အတြင္းဒီဇိုင္း- နန္းေပါင္းဟြမ္ ထုတ္ေဝျဖန္႔ခ်ိသူ- Pyidaungsu Institute Press Publication Series- P0318PI05-A

Author: Pauline Eloff Copyreader: Michèle De Aquino Research Assistants: May Zin Thaw Nang Nom Kham Myint Mo Chit Editor/Advisor: Leintje A De Visser Research Director: Dr. Sai Oo Translator: Myanmar Knowledge Society

Acknowledgement

We would like to express our thankfulness to the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Ltd. for funding this publication and the Euro-Burma Office – Myanmar for funding our researchers. We also would like to specially thank the interviewees from different communities, Civil Society Organizations and the local authorities/officials who collaborated in this project.

ISBN: 978-99971-0-476-2

ii Preface

Most public as well as academic debates regarding the future of Myanmar in the 21st century are characterized by an almost inflationary use of the term federalism. Both domestic and foreign experts have been continuously teaching nearly every target group in Myanmar, be it governmental or non-governmental, on the pros and cons of this concept. And yet we cannot help but noticing that despite these enormous efforts most people in this country do not seem to have a clear idea what federalism actually would mean for their daily lives, for the cohesion of their communities and their position in a structured system of state organization based on federalist principles. While the existing executive powers of Myanmar have not expressed any wish or intention to contribute to the change of the current unitary state (and probably will not do so in the near future) the proponents of a federalist future of Myanmar have to avoid getting lost in the maze of ideas surrounding their vision.

Obviously, the most important prerequisite for a well-functioning federalism would be the principal willingness of the population to support unity in the framework of one state for all. Such willingness had led to the formation of states which have become general examples of successful federalism, i.e., the United States of America, Switzerland and Germany. In all these cases smaller and independent units voluntarily decided to form a bigger unit. The wish for unity within one state, therefore, is a necessary condition for functioning federalism. But, at the same time, federalist systems depend on the ability and willingness of their populations to fill this form of state organization with vibrant life. Hence, healthy regional self-confidence would be another important requirement for good federalism. Much has been written in recent years on the success and failure of federation. And yet, there is no single recipe for Myanmar which has been tested and that can be applied without risk at any time. What we can say for sure is that the people of Myanmar need support in terms of giving shape to previously nebulous terms and concepts. They should be offered a chance to know how federalism could look like in their neighborhood.

This study by the Pyidaungsu Institute which was commissioned by the Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung (KAS) offers a well-researched contribution in the very first stage of Myanmar’s long way to a new state structure. It focuses on the local level and informal local governance institutions and, thereby, taking into consideration what is most important in a transition process like the one Myanmar is undergoing now: Democracy grows from the bottom.

KAS Myanmar is very grateful to all researchers at the Pyidaungsu Institute for their hard work in this project. We cordially thank Dr. Sai Oo for his conceptual groundwork and leadership throughout the process of completing this study.

iii It is hoped that this publication serves as inspiration and guidance to all with a desire for Myanmar’s good future at heart.

Yangon, December 2017

Dr. Norbert Eschborn Authorized Representative Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung Ltd. Myanmar Representative Office

iv Foreword

“Less centralized government promises to be better government” The Economist, 6 January

Since 2015, when the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) was signed, the country has been marching toward a “Union based on democracy and a federal system.” The need to fulfil its multi-racial calls for self-government has also been on the rise. Calls for separate statehood and self-administrative status have become louder.

The obvious answer is to develop a third-tier government, known as the local government system, where different communities independently manage their own affairs. As the Economist says, the system works better, because “more voters get more of what they want for most of the time.”

Equally obvious are the questions: Are we ready for this, when even existing states and regions are still lavishing under heavy centralization from the central government? What should they do while this devolutionary process is moving at a snail’s space?

To these questions, this research paper on the case studies of informal local governance institutions (ILGI) has provided a highly encouraging answer.

In 2017, PI teams went on a survey inside 9 localities in 4 ethnic states, where they interviewed the local people on their ILGIs. In the end, following groups were included in the case study: ■■ Campaign for Unity Preservation (UP) Shan State ■■ Lweyin Mingalar Shan State ■■ Nyo Mee Shan State ■■ Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY) Kayah State ■■ Mon Area Community Development Organization (MACDO) Mon State

All these Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) are found to have been making life easier not only for the local people, but also the local authorities, in coping with their day-to-day necessities, such as: ■■ How to navigate land regulation process under the 2012 Farmland Law ■■ Advocating authorities for return of confiscated land ■■ Resolution of local disputes ■■ Providing local transport ■■ Garbage collection ■■ Education, health and sport support ■■ Organizing events

v ■■ Overseeing local development ■■ Providing information ■■ And many others

Their greatest contribution is being intermediaries between the communities and the local authorities (whether they be civil, Tatmadaw, business companies, or armed resistance movements).

Indeed, as the country progresses toward a healthy decentralized society, services rendered by the ILGIs will be indispensable, just as lubricants are to motor vehicles.

No doubt there are other ILGIs across the country that have been volunteering services just as selfless and effective, if not more, to each locality concerned.

The government should honor them and be grateful that at this time of great need for their services, they are there.

Pyidaungsu Institute

vi Executive Summary

The introduction of various reforms in Myanmar in the last few years impacted governance on different state levels (Union, state, regional and local) and led to the creation of state and regional parliaments and some local governance mechanism (Section II). There are, for example, the indirect election of ward and village-track administrators and the creation of advisory committees that can include some community representation. In addition, Development Affairs Organisations at township level provide a significant range of services and conduct some oversight functions. However, the reforms have not yet been translated into (broader) competencies for the lower levels, especially below the state/regional government levels, or to the creation of an independent third tier of government.

A decentralised government, where the many ethnic minorities spread across the different regions, the states, and regions receive some autonomous decision-making and self-determining powers, is a widely favoured form of government for Myanmar. Despite the efforts of various actors influencing Myanmar’s institutional reforms to introduce federalist elements, the country’s governance is still very centralised: Union ministries continue to dominate and there is a limited or shallow community representation in the local sphere. The combined desire of local communities to govern and the lack of effective formal local governance led to numerous informal local governance actors providing governance-like services and influencing local communities.

Conceptual Framework (Section I) The present study fills part of the existing research-gap on informal local governance actors, provides an initial insight on informal local government institutions (ILGIs) and analyses a sample of ILGIs in rural Myanmar. It focuses on what ILGIs do and how their actions can be translated into state function, what power resources they mobilise, what the basis of their legitimacy is (i.e. what legitimises them to carry out said functions), and what motivates their decisions and actions. Although viewed as extra-legal, unofficial, or unsanctioned by official authorities, ILGIs often work with the knowledge and help of the Union Government and its sub-agencies, and frequently act as mediators between them and the local population.

The analytical framework applied to analyse the ILGIs1 structured the research and helped produce a comprehensive analysis of these institutions. The research identifies (1) the relevant institutions; analyses (2) their functions and how these can be articulated in state functions and (3) the power resources they mobilise (and when and where they exert power); studies (4) the

1 The Campaign for Unity Preservation (UP, northern Shan State), the traditional authorities Loyin Mingalar (Shan State), the Nye Mee traditional authorities (Pa’O self-administered zone in Shan State), the Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY, Kayah State), and the Mon Area Community Development Organisation (MACDO, Mon State) (see Section III).

vii basis of the ILGIs’ claim to legitimate governance authority and (5) the influence sources of ILGIs decisions and actions.

Informal Governance Actors (Section III) The analysis shows that the gap in representation in formal local governance is filled by informal organisations that sometimes take on a more important role in delivering services to and solving problems for the local population. The sometimes decades long absence of government and its services, especially in rural areas, has forced local communities to take responsibility of their own development and well-being. ILGIs can recognise needs, fill gaps, and create local ownership. It also revealed what role ILGIs play in local governance and how these functions relate to state functions.

What Roles ILGIs Play (Chapter 4.1) One of the most important insights is that ILGIs do not confine themselves to a specific topic or narrow set of functions but operate in multiple domains and deal with a variety of issues. They are usually led by (elected) leaders of a group of people or membership-based organisation (e.g. village elders (yah mi yah pha) or youth leaders).

How ILGIs interrelate with official institutions (Chapter 4.2) All functions ILGIs carry out either complement, accommodate, substitute or compete with the state, based on their objectives and the effectiveness of state institutions. A complementary relationship is often based on mutual respect and cooperation between the ILGI and official actors. ILGIs fill gaps and enhance the efficiency of local governance by contributing to a more effective delivery of state functions, especially to areas with little or no oversight.

The accommodative relationship is more prone to conflicts, as one side usually dislikes the outcomes generated by the other. ILGIs look for ways to work with existing institutions as they are not able to challenge or change the situation, still seeking incompatible objectives. Cooperation or coordination between the actors is usually indirect. ILGIs in this function do not necessarily enhance the efficiency of township or government authorities but can contribute to regional stability.

ILGIs substitute and operate in government actors’ domains and there is a strong absence of official actors and a lack of effective services delivery. Communication between the two is generally weak, inexistent, or even hostile – especially when government sees their authority questioned. The competitive relationship is characterised by ILGIs that represent a strong alternative to State governance. They are incompatible with state institutions and their potential utility for creating a third tier or local government is questionable.

Power and Legitimacy (Section V) ILGIs exercise a degree of general territorial public authority on different levels (household, local, regional or national). These positions of power within a

viii society are achieved and maintained in various ways. The forms of power ILGIs exercise are power over (which is defined as authority, control or domination); power to (empowering local communities and enable them to act and to effect change); and power with (creating shared understanding in communities and offering ways to act collectively). The analysis showed that ILGIs can be considered legitimate and that actors accept ILGIs governance roles.

Motivations and Incentives (Section VI) The ILGIs’ motivations to act and carry out certain functions can stem from historic grievances and a desire to help communities or specific groups, the need to support development and fight. Some want to offer an alternative for action beyond violence and transmit the tools and knowledge to deal with grievances. ILGIs are often driven by a sense of duty and want to help (rural) communities in need and support them in facing infrastructure and education challenges. Incentives to become and remain involved in local governance are mostly social, sometimes also political or financial, but latter are not decisive, as most analysed ILGIs work on a non-profit or voluntary basis.

ix x Contents

Preface ...... iii Foreword ...... v Executive Summary ...... vii Acronyms and Translation ...... xiii

Introduction Introduction ...... 3 Case Study: Informal Local Governance Institutions ...... 4

I. Conceptual Framework & Methodology 1.1 Research Objecitves and Conceptual Framework ...... 9 Conceptual Framework ...... 9 Analysing Informal Local Governance Insutitutions ...... 11 1.2 Methodology ...... 12 Limitation ...... 14

II. Overview: A Confusion of Governance Actors Overview ...... 17 2.1 Informal Governance Actors in Myanmar ...... 17 2.2 Formal Governance Actors in Myanmar ...... 19 2.2.1 The General Administration Department (GAD) ...... 19 2.2.2 Complementary Committees ...... 21 2.2.3 Development Affairs Organisations (DAO) ...... 23 2.2.4 Union Ministries ...... 24 2.2.5 A Confusion of Local Governance Actors ...... 26

III. The Institutions: An Overview of Collected Data 3.1 Campign for Unity Preservation ...... 31 3.2 Traditional Authorities in Lweyin Mingalar ...... 36 3.3 Traditional Authorities in Nyo Mee ...... 40 3.4. Kayan New Generation Youth ...... 44 3.5 Mon Area Community Development Organisation ...... 49

xi IV. What ILGIs Do: Functions and Interface 4.1 Functions ...... 57 4.2 Interface ...... 59 Complement ...... 59 Accomodate ...... 62 Substitute ...... 63 Compete ...... 65

V. How ILGIs Do It: Power and Legitimacy 5.1 Power ...... 69 Forms of Power ...... 70 Power Resources ...... 71 Challenges to Power ...... 73 5.2 Legitimacy ...... 74

VI. Why ILGIs Do It: Motivation and Incentives 6.1 Motivations ...... 79 6.2 Incentives ...... 80

VII. Conclusion Conslusion ...... 83

Bibliography Bibliography ...... 87

xii Acronyms and Translation

DAO Development Affairs Organisation DDA Department of Development Affairs (MoBA; existed until 2011) DDAC District Development Affairs Committee DRD Department of Rural Development (MoLFRD) EAO Ethnic Armed Organisation GAD General Administration Department HMH Hsar Mu Htaw (Taungoo District/Thandaung Twonship) ILGI Informal Local Governance Institution KMEA Kayan Minister of Ethnic Affairs (Shan State) KNGY Kayan New Generation Youth MACDO Mon Area Community Development Organisation (Ye) MoBA Ministry of Border Affairs MoHA Ministry of Home Affairs MoDA state/region Minister of Development Affairs MoLFRD Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries, and Rural Development NMSP New Mon State Party PNO/A Pa’o National Organisation/Army PYO Pa’o Youth Organisation RPF Rahmonnya Peace Foundation (Mawlamyine) SADC Security and Anti-Drug Committee (Hsenwi) SAZ Self-Administered Zone SNDP Shan Nationalities Democratic Party SNLD Shan Nationalities League for Democracy TSA Township Administrator TSDC Township Development Affairs Committee UNDP United Nations Development Programme UP Campaign for Unity Preservation (Namhkan) VTA Village Tract Administrator WA Ward Administrator W/VTA Ward/Village Tract Administrator

Municipal office Township Development Affairs Organisation District office District General Administration Office (GAD) Township office Township General Administration Office (GAD)

xiii Phradon Village headman (Pa’O SAZ) Hluttaw Parliament Nayaka Village elder — usually mentioned as members of an advisory council (also referred to as yah mi yah pha) Ohn Council representing a cluster of villages (Pa’o SAZ) Okata Chairman; in some instances: village headman Samati Village elder, member of advisory council to the Phradon (Pa’O SAZ) Sibintharyaryay Municipal office Tatmadaw Armed Forces of Myanmar Wein-nel Administrative council in each of Pa’O SAZ’s three townships — answers directly to the PNO Yah mi yah pha Literally ‘parents of the village’ — usually mentioned as members of an advisory council (also referred to as nayaka)

xiv INTRODUCTION

1 2 Introduction

Myanmar is undergoing significant governance reforms, resulting in changes to subnational and local governance, decentralisation, and the nature of central-periphery relations. At present, Myanmar can best be described as ‘quasi-federal’. While the 2008 Constitution contains certain federal features, there is a significant gap between the constitutional framework and the actual practice of governance.1 The legal and de facto centralisation and concentration of power in the Union Government means that the state and regional parliaments have little substantive power. Moreover, since the Constitution does not provide for a third tier of government, below the states and regions, local governance continues to be provided primarily through the local offices of Union ministries.2

The current debate on Myanmar’s political and structural reforms has been centred on federalism and institutional reform. The repressed ethnic minorities, and their respective ethnic armed organisations, have been particularly adamant in demanding greater devolution of power to the federal states and regions. One fundamental principle of federalism envisioned by ethnic minorities is that there should be equal status for all ethnic groups and, as such, the division of Myanmar along ethnic lines generally dominates current discussions. Without a doubt, the stability of Myanmar’s future democracy depends on addressing issues of self-determination for ethnic minorities. However, dividing up the country into ethnic federal states (as established in the 2008 Constitution) might serve to create a new minority problem, since most of the ethnic states are also inhabited by other, often large, ethnic minorities. A federal system that would increase the dominance of local ethnic majorities over local ethnic minorities might well aggravate existing intra-regional ethnic tensions.3 One alternative would be a truly devolved power-sharing federal State, in which local governance plays an important role in giving voice to even the smallest of ethnic minorities. By allowing for participation in decision making processes to people at all levels of society and of all ethnic backgrounds, grievances relating to unsatisfactory power-sharing among different ethnic groups in Myanmar might be addressed.

One of the most striking features of Myanmar’s governance system is its lack of formal local governance. In fact, local governance is the most unreformed part of Myanmar’s governance structures. The Union Government has evolved greatly since 2011 and, in turn, states and re-

1 M. Brand (2014). ‘Towards “genuine federalism”? – Myanmar’s inexorable path towards constitutional devolution and decentralised governance’, Constitutional and Legal Change in Myanmar Workshop (13-14 February 2014), Singapore. 2 M. Arnold (2016). ‘The right question to start local governance reforms’, Myanmar Times, 1 June 2016, available online at: http:// www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/20613-the-right-question-to-start-local-governance-reforms.html [hereinafter: Arnold 2016]. 3 J. Lorch and K. Roepstorff (2013). ‘Myanmar’s Peace Process: The Importance of Federal Reforms and an Inclusive National Dialogue’, SWP Comments 29, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

3 gions have increasingly asserted themselves, through the creation of their own governments and parliaments. But below these structures, reforms have been relatively superficial. Changes have been made, primarily through indirect election of ward and village-track administrators and the creation of a number of advisory committees at local levels, which feature some community representation. Additionally, all of Myanmar’s townships now have Development Affairs Organ- isations (DAOs) with responsibilities for providing a significant range of municipal services and for overseeing local economic governance.4 However, Union ministries continue to dominate.

The result is a complex mix of local offices of Union ministries and a confusing array of local management committees driven by local bureaucrats but at times with a modicum of relatively shallow community representation.5 Unfortunately, there seems to be limited political incentive to reform, restructure, and improve local governance. Lack of resources have restricted most existing governance institutions’ ability to provide services other than improvement of infrastructure and garbage collection, which is particularly significant for how such institutions are perceived by communities.6

The current peace and reform debates offer great opportunity in terms of strengthening local governance: creating a third tier of government that really responds to the aspirations of local people for greater self-determination, local control, more accountability, and better services from government. Indeed, the success of lasting peace and democracy in Myanmar depends on the devolution of power and effective local government is one way to ensure that all groups in Myanmar are able to obtain their democratic rights.

CASE STUDY: INFORMAL LOCAL GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS

Although effective formal local governance is lacking in Myanmar, it is generally recognised that informal actors and institutions take on various governance-related functions within local communities. Indeed, informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) have considerable influence over how large parts of the population interact with governance processes: what information they access, how they vote in elections, and in many places, ILGIs substitute the State by providing services. However, the understanding of the role that ILGIs play is limited and, possibly because of this, the discomfort with them is often fairly high.

This paper endeavours to fill this gap by providing initial insights on informal local governance institutions that, in the absence of effective central control, are providing important public goods

4 M. Arnold et al. (2015). ‘Municipal Governance in Myanmar: An Overview of Development Affairs Organisations’, Subnational Governance in Myanmar Discussion Paper Series: Discussion Paper No. 7, The Asia Foundation and MDRI-CESD [hereinafter: Arnold et al. 2015]. 5 Arnold 2016. 6 Arnold et al. 2015.

4 across rural Myanmar. Consequently, it aims to disprove the notion that only very limited public services can be provided through local government (i.e., garbage collection). Furthermore, the paper aims to establish the potential utility of informal local governance institutions for creating an effective third tier of government.

To determine whether structures for effective local governance are in place through existing ILGIs, a number of such institutions will be analysed based on: (a) who and where they are; (b) what they do and how this can be articulated with State functions; (c) what power resources they mobilise; (d) the basis of their legitimacy; and (e) what motivates their decisions and actions.7 The conceptual framework used for this paper is discussed in more detail in the next section.

Section II sets out the formal and informal actors relevant to local governance in (rural) Myan- mar. Section III gives an overview of the data collected for the included case studies. Section IV examines what ILGIs in Myanmar do (their functions) and Section V discusses how they are able to carry out their functions (power and legitimacy). Section VI explores the reasons why ILGIs carry out their activities (motivations and incentives). Finally, Section VII provides tentative conclusions and policy recommendations.

7 S. Byrne et al. (2016). ‘Analysing Informal Local Governance Institutions: Practical Guidance’, Learning Project: Engaging with Informal Local Governance Institutions, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) [hereinafter: Byrne 2016]

5 6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & METHODOLOGY

7 8 I. Conceptual Framework and Methodology

1.1 Research Objectives and Conceptual Framework

This research project was designed to examine the various governance-related functions ILGIs carry out within local communities throughout rural Myanmar. Its primary objective is to better understand the potential progression of local government. In doing so, this paper examines the nature of informal governance mechanisms, along with their interactions with formal administrative structures. The current peace and reform debates offer an unprecedented opportunity in terms of strengthening local governance in Myanmar. The ultimate aim of this paper is to contribute information that will improve the understanding of the role that informal governance mechanisms play in Myanmar, and thereby to establish the potential utility of such mechanisms for creating an effective third tier of government.

Conceptual Framework

While State institutions are key governance actors, in many parts of the world important governance functions — such as service delivery, dispute resolution, representation and electoral politics — are influenced or mediated by informal institutions that operate wholly or partly outside the formal structures of the state.8 In Myanmar, it is generally recognised that informal actors and institutions take on various governance-related functions within local communities. Indeed, informal governance institutions have considerable influence over how large parts of the population interact with governance processes (see Section 2.1).

Various types of community-based, non-state actors have been identified in Myanmar, including: village development committees, social organisations, religious organisations, political organisations, maternal/child welfare organisations, and non-state military organisations.9 However, not all community-based actors can or should be used as models for effective local government. The types of institutions that are of interest to this research project are sometimes dubbed ‘informal local governance institutions’ (ILGIs). ILGIs are governance institutions that are extra-legal, unofficial, or unsanctioned by (legitimate) authorities. These governance institutions sometimes manifest themselves as informal organisations, like traditional village councils, but are at other

8 Byrne 2016; S. Corbridge, G. Williams, M. Srivastave, and R. Veron (2005). ‘Seeing the State: Governance and Governmentality in India’, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press [hereinafter: Corbridge et al. 2005]. 9 Mike Griffiths (2016). ‘Resilience and Community Social Organisations in Rural Myanmar’, Social Policy & Poverty Reduction Group [hereinafter: Griffiths 2016], 13.

9 times more like informal institutions.10 Informal institutions, for the purpose of this study, are understood as local actors that are rooted in, and base their authority on, socially shared rules.11 Such local governance institutions have certain characteristics in common: a) They either engage actively with the State or with spaces and functions that the State is expected to work in (i.e. they take on governance functions); b) They deliver some specific service or function, and are not merely associational in character; and c) They practice generalised authority within a defined territory over an identifiable group (i.e. they are specifically local in their operations). Exam- ples of ILGIs include traditional authorities, religious authorities, and informal or semi-formal sub-municipal governance structures. By definition, institutions whose primary purpose is to organise and represent groups — rather than to take on State-like functions and deliver services — are excluded from this study.12

In short, informal organisations or institutions that can be defined as ILGIs have three defining characteristics. First, they are State-like to the extent that they enjoy general local territorial authority and deliver services and they do not confine themselves to a specific or narrow set of functions. They are considered to be generally responsible for dealing with a wide range of issues, and to exercise authority over entire locally resident populations. Second, they stand in ambiguous, variable, and contested relationships to the formal state apparatus. This relationship is most vividly illustrated in connection with the one function they that they most consistently perform: adjudicating local disputes and, if necessary, then enforcing their own rulings. Third, intermediating between ‘their’ populations and external actors constitutes a significant part of their activities. Apart from performing public activities like resolving local disputes and organising cultural events, ILGIs also determine how ‘their’ population can access government programmes like sanitation and (road) construction. They might determine how a case of local assault is presented to the police, who stands for election to the formal local council, and how villagers’ votes are cast.13

10 S.K. Mohmand (2015). ‘Customary Institutions and Public Authority: a Literature Review’, Learning Project: Engaging with Informal Local Governance Institutions, Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC) (hereinafter: Mohmand 2015), 17-18. 11 Byrne 2016, 4; This definition implies shared expectations about behaviour (not necessary shared values). Informal institutions should not be confused neither with weak formal institutions nor with informal behavioural regularities (G. Helmke and S. Levitsky (2006). ‘Informal Institutions and Democracy: Lessons From Latin America’, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press [hereinafter Helmke and Levitsky 2006], 6-8. 12 Mohmand 2015, 16-17. 13 Mohmand 2015, 16,18, 19.

10 Analysing Informal Local Governance Institutions

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, under its Democratisation, Decentralisa- tion and Local Governance learning project, has provided an excellent analytical framework to structure the analysis of informal local governance institutions. ILGIs can be analysed through six main lenses that, together, produce a comprehensive analysis of who ILGIs are, what they do, and why. These are: 1) identification; 2) functions and interface; 3) power analysis; 4) legitimacy analysis; 5) interests and incentives; and 6) good governance.14

The identification lens aims to establish who the relevant ILGIs are. ILGIs are not homogenous and, consequently, the analysed institutions might vary considerably from place to place. More- over, the role and status of ILGIs are not always constant in time. The second lens — function and interface — aims to get a general picture of what ILGIs do, the specific domains in which they are important actors and to trace the role they play in different decision-making contexts. More importantly, the interface between ILGIs and State institutions is crucial for translating the functions into state functions and ultimately understanding local governance.

In the power analysis, the aim is to generate a better understanding of how ILGIs achieve and maintain a certain position within society and when and where they exert power. The power resources of ILGIs is often based on community-level, unwritten rules and customs. These might be based in tradition but can adapt and change over time. The legitimacy analysis is closely linked to the power analysis, giving insights into the basis of the ILGIs’ claim to legitimate governance authority: why, how, and to what extent ILGIs’ power is considered ‘rightful’ by different stakeholders. Legitimacy analysis explains to what extent and on what basis different actors accept or reject ILGIs’ governance roles and provides insight in people’s expectations of governance authorities.

The fifth lens of the analytical framework —interests and incentives — delves into what influ- ences and motivates ILGIs’ decisions and actions. Interests and incentives can be very concrete factors — such as economic incentives — or very abstract — such as pre-conceived ideas about the role of different groups in society.

Finally, the good governance lens aims to analyse how ILGIs’ governance role(s) — and the way they perform — affects the quality of local governance. This is useful in understanding how the local governance system works, but also to identify potential entry points for interventions.15

14 Byrne 2016, 7. 15 Byrne 2016, 7-13

11 1.2 Methodology

The research was designed to gain a qualitative understanding of the various informal local governance institutions that are active throughout rural Myanmar. This determined how institutions were selected: focusing on functions and location. In total, nine informal institutions, spread out across four states and one region were visited. Suitable for Instutution Location Type Analysis Semi-political sub- Campaing for Unity municipal governance Namkham, Shan State Yes Preservation institution focused on protection of communities Group of community leaders from nine villages Security and Anti-Drug Hsenwi, Shan State who organised themselves No Committee to deal with local security and (drug-related) crimes Youth group focused on Pa’O Youth Taunggyi, Shan State empowerment of Pa’O No Organization youth Hopong, Pa’O Self- Semi-formal traditional Nyo Mee village tract Administered Zone, Shan Yes leadership structure State Moe Bye, Pe’kon, Shan Traditional leadership Lweyin Mingalar Yes State structure Youth group focused Kyan New Generation Loikaw, Kayah State on education and rural Yes Youth development Group of civil society Taungoo, Bago Region organisations focused on Hsar Mu Htaw and Tanddaunggyi, Kayin No connecting donors to rural State communities Civil society organisation Ramonya Peace focused on connecting Mawlamyine, Mon State No Foundation donors to rural communities Mon Area Community Civil society organisation Development Ye, Mon State focused on education and Yes Organization rural development Table 1: Organizations considered for the study

12 As shown in the table above, the nine institutions were selected to reflect geographical and func- tional variety and informal mechanisms operating in Shan State (including the Pa’O Self-Ad- ministered Zone), Kayah State, Kayin State, Mon State, and Bago Division were analysed. The decision to focus on ethnic states was made because it is principally the ethnic minorities that have been demanding greater devolution of power in Myanmar, particularly to the federal states and regions. As mentioned, this paper aims to offer an alternative — a truly devolved power-sharing State in which local governance plays an important role — and therefore focuses on informal local governance within the ethnic states.

As mentioned earlier, not all informal mechanisms operating in Myanmar also qualify as informal local governance institutions. Therefore, although all nine institutions visited for this paper carry out important functions in their target areas, not all were suitable for the purpose of our analysis. The Security and Drug Committee, although providing a service and practicing generalised authority, does not take on governance functions. Rather, they confine themselves to a specific activity — arresting suspected drug dealers and users. The Pa’O Youth Organisation is mostly associational in character, focusing on representing and empowering Pa’O youth. Hsar Mu Htaw and Ramonya Peace Foundation focus on connecting donors to communities facing development issues. Although it can be argued that these four institutions take on governance functions and deliver specific services, they do not practice generalised authority over a defined group. This report therefore focuses on the remaining five institutions.

The field research was carried out during the months June to September 2017. The primary method used for data collection was semi-structured interviews with members and leaders of the informal institutions we visited. The interviews covered the six analytical lenses described above but were conducted in a flexible manner to allow respondents space to also discuss what they deemed important. Research also involved site-visits to the projects and activities carried out by the informal institutions chosen for this paper. Wherever possible, interviews with members of the community, local headmen, and formal local authorities were also conducted. The interviews took the form of individual as well as group interviews.

Before the interviews took place, their purpose was explained and respondents were guaranteed anonymity. Although respondents received no compensation for the interviews, it was carefully explained how the research might be beneficial to the development of an inclusive model of local governance. A signed consent form was obtained from all respondents.

An interpreter translated the interviews simultanesouly and the interviews were recorded. In the interest of confidentiality, these recordings will not be made public and remain the property of the Pyidaungsu Institute (PI).

13 When field work was concluded, the gathered data was mapped according to the framework discussed above. This has provided insights into informal local governance institutions that are providing important public goods across rural Myanmar. It serves as the basis for the following report.

Limitations

The main limitation for this research project was the focus on interviews with leaders and members of ILGIs. In-depth interviews with ILGIs were required to gain a better of understanding of what ILGIs do, and how and why they do it. However, such interviews could not conclusively answer questions regarding ILGIs’ relationships with authorities, the power they yield, and their perceived legitimacy. Although it was tried to include villagers and authorities in all target areas, this was not always possible. In many instances, township authorities refused to be interviewed. Villagers that were interviewed were all introduced by (members of) the ILGIs themselves. Answers have therefore to be viewed as potentially biased or at least subjective. Consequently, further research is required on the ILGIs’ relations with authorities and their perceived power and legitimacy among communities, in order to verify conclusions drawn in this report. For the same reason, the sixth analysis lens described above — good governance — will not be discussed in this paper, as it was not possible to draw objective conclusions on the quality of ILGIs’ governance.

Furthermore, as described above, this project focused on ILGIs operating in the ethnic states and is therefore limited to these. The current research could be enhanced by comparing findings from ethnic states and Bamar regions. Unfortunately, attempts to reach out to institutions operating in Bamar-majority regions were unsuccessful. A resulting limitation is therefore that conclusions cannot be extrapolated to all of Myanmar.

Finally, access to ILGIs was at times problematic. The field research was carried out during the rainy season (June-September) and many villages and sites of ILGIs’ projects were inaccessible. Moreover, some of the ILGIs visited for this project are situated in the conflict-affected areas, and therefore — officially — off limits to foreigners. As a result, our research team was expelled twice from townships by authorities unwilling to give permission for our stay.

14 OVERVIEW: A Confusion of Governance Actors

15 16 II. Overview: A Confusion of Governance Actors

One of the most striking features of Myanmar’s governance system is its lack of formal local governance. In fact, decades-long lack of effective government control at the local level has culminated in a situation where non-state institutions are considered to be the most important providers of public goods in many of Myanmar’s rural areas. Indeed, local governance is the most unreformed part of Myanmar’s governance structures. The Union Government has evolved greatly since 2011 and, in turn, states and regions have increasingly asserted themselves, through the creation of their own governments and parliaments. But below these structures, reforms have been relatively superficial. The formal provision of goods and services at the local level is currently provided through a complex mix of township offices, municipal offices, local offices of Union ministries, and a confusing array of local management committees. Historically, lack of resources has restricted most of these formal institutions’ ability to provide services other than improvement of infrastructure and garbage collection. This is particularly significant for how formal institutions are perceived by local communities, and in this setting informal mechanisms have developed to provide the greater part of social welfare and public goods.16

Section 2.1 aims to give insight into the prevalence of such non-state informal mechanisms throughout rural Myanmar. However, to really understand the role of informal governance institutions in rural Myanmar, it is important to also understand which formal actors are in play. Therefore, Section 2.2 offers an overview of the main formal governance actors involved in the provision of public goods in rural Myanmar.

2.1 Informal Governance Actors in Myanmar

Myanmar has a long history of community-based non-state social protection and public goods provision. The prevalence of these institutions was born from necessity — the decades-long absence of effective central government and the absence of formalised, government-led public goods delivery. In this setting, public confidence in formal taxation-redistribution by government is nearly non-existent and informal local mechanisms developed to provide the greater part of social welfare and public goods.17 Currently, a diverse tangle of state and non-state institutions is visible throughout Myanmar — in areas under control of Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), in areas that have been under central government administration for decades, and in areas that

16 Arnold et al. 2015. 17 Griffiths 2016, 19 (citing Gerard McCarthy (2015). ‘Meta-frames and Buddhist Revivalism: Social Action, Moral Citizenship and the Refraction of Extremism into Local Life in Provincial Myanmar’, Paper presented at the International Conference on Burma Myanmar Studies, Chiangmai, Thailand); Gerard McCarthy (2016). ‘Building on What’s There: Insights on Social Protection and Public Goods Provision from Central-East Myanmar’, Project Report: International Growth Centre, RN: S-53308-MYA-1 [hereinafter: McCarthy 2016a], 1.

17 have mixed (both government and EAO) administration.18 In fact, an earlier report refers to the “near ubiquitous nature” of informal, community-led mechanisms in Myanmar, with various schemes delivering an average of 26.50 USD per household per year in grants, and with over eighty percent of funding coming from within the community.19 Other research suggests that seventy percent of the overall household tax burden is accrued by non-government actors. Roughly six main types of such non-state actors have been identified: village development committees, social organisations, religious organisations, political organisations, maternal/child welfare organisations, and non-state military organisations.20

Decades-long lack of effective government control has culminated in an eroded perception of the government as a competent and reliable institution of reciprocity and resulted in low participation and contact with formal institutions of government.21 This lack of reliance and confidence in state institutions does not imply, however, the complete absence of a social contract. Indeed, a cross-country survey has shown that large parts of the population considers the ward/village tract administrator and the Union and state/region governments responsible for solving local development-related problems.22 Nevertheless, especially in rural areas, government support is deemed supplementary. Non-state institutions, kinship, and family networks are considered to be providers of first and last resort, while government institutions can provide extra support and are viewed as practical partners in the delivery of public goods, such as roads, electricity, and education.23 Interestingly, recent studies show that apart from providing social protection and public goods, non-state informal mechanisms in fact enable communities to better connect with local authorities when extra support is required.24

Generally, informal mechanisms operating throughout Myanmar are working to address needs that are given high priority by the public, suggesting that most schemes emerge as a response to perceived and articulated needs by communities. In addition, the majority of previously studied schemes have proven to be broadly inclusive. Accordingly, such community-based systems offer a significant advantage over centrally administered schemes through their ability to adapt to local needs and preferences.25 Moreover, research has illustrated how these grassroots mechanisms might not only enable localised social protection but allow communities to act collectively for broader social-economic development.26

18 McCarthy 2016a, 13 [note: these conclusions are based on surveys carried out in Taungoo Township in Bago Region and Thandaunggyi Township in Kayin State and might not be representative of the whole country]. 19 Griffiths 2016, 12. 20 Griffiths 2016, 12-13, McCarthy 2016a, 13. 21 McCarthy 2016b, 2. 22 UNDP (2015). ‘Local Governance Mapping - The State of Local Governance: Trends in Myanmar - a Synthesis of people’s perspectives across all States and Regions’, UNDP Myanmar [hereinafter: UNDP 2015], 25. 23 Griffiths 2016, 19-20 (quoting Gerard McCarthy (2016). ‘Myanmar’s Horizontal Social Contract: Eco-systems of Social Assistance, Public Goods and Entitlement in Central-East Myanmar’, unpublished [hereinafter: McCarthy 2016b], 4). 24 M. Griffithd and Aung Naing (2015). ‘Engaging Communities in Social Protection’, Livelihoods and Foood Security Trust Fund [hereinafter Griffiths and Aung Naing 2015]. 25 Ei Ei Thu and Mike Griffiths (2013). ‘Strengthening Community Based Social Protection Practices for Child Protection’, Child Poverty and Social Protection Conference [hereinafter: Thu and Griffiths 2013], 8-9. 26 Mike Griffiths and Aung Naing 2015.

18 Consequently, if a third tier of government — one that truly responds to the aspirations of communities for greater self-determination, local control, more accountability, and better services from the government — is to be created, the existing social infrastructure cannot be neglected. It is imperative that policy-makers in Myanmar’s newly elected government harness the intellectual, financial, political, and social capital present within community organisations. In fact, due to their ‘self-determining capacity’ and the reservoirs of public trust they hold, these institutions are essential for developing faith in government as an effective provider of local goods and might even serve as models for formal local government.27

To date, few studies have documented the potential utility of community organisations for creating a third tier of local government in Myanmar. The following research aims to fill this gap by analysing a number of such informal institutions according to various governance indicators.

2.2 Formal Governance Actors in Myanmar

Before analysing the various informal local governance institutions visited for this project, the following section offers an overview of the main formal governance actors involved in the provision of public goods in rural Myanmar: the General Administration Department, Development Affairs Organisations and local offices of Union ministries — most notably the Department of Rural Development.

2.2.1 THE GENERAL ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT

The General Administration Department (GAD), which is a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA), is central to the functioning of the administrative apparatus across the country. As the Union administration’s vertical core, the GAD supports coordination and communication between the Union Government’s 36 ministries and also connects the central government to approximately 16,700 wards and village tracts. It provides basic administrative and coordination functions for the region/state governments, the region/state hluttaws (parliaments), the district, township, ward, and village tract offices, as well as for Union ministries’ state/region and township departments.28 Although many governance reforms have been implemented in Myanmar’s public sector since the 2008 Constitution was enacted, one of the great constants during the transition is the ongoing centrality of the GAD to the functioning of the State, particularly at subnational levels.29

27 Griffiths 2016, 20; McCarthy 2016b, 14; Robert D. Putnam (1993). ‘The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life’, 4(13) The American Prospect 35, 5. 28 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and Matthew Arnold, ‘Administering the State in Myanmar: an Overview of the General Administration Department’ [2014] Subnational Governance in Myanmar Discussion Paper Series: Discussion Paper No. 6, The Asia Foundation [hereinafter: Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold 2014], 1, 14, 26, 30 29 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), 1-2.

19 Admin and Logistic Division

General Division

Land Division

Excise and Revenue Division

Training and Research Division

Budget and Accounts Division

GAD International Relations Division (Head Office) State/Region Institute of Development Administration Governments

Region/State Naypyidaw Ex-officio GAD GAD Secretary

GAD (East & North Shan State) GAD’s Objectives

(1) To ensure rule of law (b) To ensure community peace and Sefl Administrat- Self Administrat- tranquility District GAD ed Division ed Zone (c) To carry regional development (d) To serve Public interest

Township GAD

Town GAD

Ward/Village Tract Adminis- trator’s Office Diagram 1: Organizational Structure of General Administration Department (GAD)

The Township General Administration Offices (township offices), under the leadership of a GAD township administrator (TSA), are where key functions of government take place. Township offices function under the executive authority of TSAs and do not constitute elected representative bodies. Overall, the township office is responsible for coordinating the functions of assorted government actors at the township level, including the Union ministries’ field offices. However, in reality there is very little horizontal contact between the different and various departments30. The township offices also have a plethora of other duties ranging from supervising village administration, to assorted land management tasks, local dispute resolution, and tax collection31.

30 UNDP (2015). ‘Local Governance Mapping - The State of Local Governance: Trends in Shan’, UNDP Myanmar [hereinafter: UNDP/ Shan 2015], 38. 31 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), 31-32.

20 Notably, throughout Myanmar, very few people know their TSA, and even less consider the TSA to be responsible for development issues. This is especially interesting because the TSA has more control over such issues than, for example, the ward and village tract administrators, who are generally considered responsible.32

The ward and village tract administrators (W/VTA) are the interface between the central state and most of Myanmar’s population. Administration at this level has seen various reforms under the 2012 Ward and Village Tract Administration Law. In fact, unlike at township level, W/VTAs are (indirectly) elected33. However, the GAD maintains a central role in ward and village tract administration, most notably through the continued appointment of ward and village tract clerks by the GAD’s township administrators.34 The 2012 Law formally removed the position of ‘100 Households Head’ (roughly equivalent to a village headman) which is thought to have been an attempt to dilute local representation and concentrate power in the ward/village tract position. Interestingly, throughout Myanmar, the W/VTA is seen as the person foremost responsible for solving development issues, although this is not officially one of his roles. W/VTAs’ tasks include tax collection, land registration, and maintaining security, law and order.35

In conclusion, since 2008 the GAD has shifted from being a centralised actor working only for the Union Government, albeit at local levels, to an increasingly decentralised department with a mandate to respond to the demands and dictates of new subnational governments. Nevertheless, the GAD continues to function as the administrative core of Myanmar’s vertical subnational state structure, which revolves around its hierarchy of administrators. Consequently, townships, wards and village tracts remain simply administrative units of the Union and the state and region governments, rather than a third tier of government.36

2.2.2 COMPLEMENTARY COMMITTEES

Since 2011, reforms focusing on ‘people-centred development’ have seen the creation of a number of advisory committees at district, township and ward/village tract levels. At township level, the Development Support Committees and Development Affairs Committees have elected members and are chaired by an ‘elected influential person’. At ward/village tract level, both committees are chaired by the W/VTA and have elected members.37

32 UNDP 2015, 23. 33 W/VTAs are elected by 10-household leaders, who nominate candidates from among themselves and then elect by secret ballot. The process is overseen by five yah mi yah pha, appointed by the TSA (2012 Ward or Village Tract Administration Law, Articles 6-8); While significantly more democratic, this election process falls well short of universal suffrage (Helene Maria Kyed, Annika Pohl Harrison and Gerard McCarthy (2016). ‘Local Democracy in Myanmar: Reflections on Ward and Village Tract Elections in 2016’, Roundtable Summary; Danish Institute for International Studies [hereinafter: Kyed et al. 2016], 2.) 34 2012 Ward or Village Tract Administration Law, Article 2(f). 35 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), 2, 34; UNDP 2015, 23, 25. 36 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), 15-16. 37 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), Annexes 2-3.

21 District Level 1. District Management Committee 2. District Development Support Committtee 3. District Farmland Management Body

Township Level 1. Township management Committee 2. Township Development Support Committee 3. Township Farmland Management Committee 4. Township Development Affair Committee 5. Township Planning for Implementation Committee Ward and Village Tract Level 1. Ward/Village Tract Development Support Committee 2. Ward/Village Tract Farmland Management Body

Diagram 2: Subnational Development and Management Committees (Asia Foundation 2014)

At township level, the Management Committee, Development Support Committee, and Devel- opment Affairs Committee coordinate to establish local development priorities. They also have authority over how available development funds — including the Poverty Reduction Fund, the Rural Development Fund, and the Constituency Development Fund — are spent. The Township Management Committee, specifically, was established to improve coordination between Union Ministry departments, Development Affairs Organisations, and the TSA.38

At ward and village tract level, the new bodies have led to increased responsibilities for local administrators. For instance, the introduction of various local development funds since 2012 has seen the W/VTA, in cooperation with the development support committee, playing a key role in identifying development projects and overseeing implementation. Additionally, the W/ VTA chairs the Farmland Management Body at a time of increasing conflict over land and innumerable land disputes throughout the country. Although some of these feature community representation, the GAD remains central to coordinating (between) these subnational committees and communicating their recommendations and decisions within the state administration and up to the state and region governments.39

38 Arnold et el. 2015, 41; UNDP (2015). ‘Local Governance Mapping - The State of Local Governance: Trends in Kayah’, UNDP Myanmar [hereinafter: UNDP/Kayah 2015], 53. 39 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), 34-37; S. Kempel (2016). ‘Myanmar’s forgotten local elections’, Myanmar Times, 16 February 2016, online at: https://www.mmtimes.com/opinion/19009-myanmar-s-forgotten-local-elections.html [last accessed: 12 September 2017] [hereinafter: Kempel 2016].

22 2.2.3 DEVELOPMENT AFFAIRS ORGANISATIONS (DAO)

As detailed above, Myanmar has two tiers of government (the Union and state/region-levels). There is effectively no third tier of ‘local government’ that has distinct responsibilities and revenue sources, and discretion over managing those. The only exceptions to this situation are Develop- ment Affairs Organisations (DAOs or municipal offices), officially created in 2011. DAOs are under the full authority of the state/region Minister of Development Affairs. At township level, DAO offices have two complementary entities: The Township Development Affairs Committee (TDAC) and a Township DAO Office. The TDACs are generally composed of seven members, including four indirectly elected community representatives. The Township DAO Office is composed of professional DAO civil servants, led by a DAO Executive Officer.40

Chair

State Development Affair Minister

Nominated by Community Vice Vice Nominated by Community Leaders (Kyingtong Area) Chair Chair Leaders (Lashio Area)

Joint Joint Secretary Secretary Secretary

Deputy Director Deputy Director (State DAO) Director

Member Member Member Member Member Member Member

(3) Representatives from (3) Representatives from (1) Representative Social or Economic Issues Expert from Organisations Organisations Local Development Department

Diagram 3: Organizational Structure of Shan State Development Affair Organization (DAO) Whereas their predecessors — Township Development Committees under the Ministry of Border Affairs (MoBA) — dealt with municipal governance and rural development, DAOs focus only on municipal governance.41 Their core purpose is to provide a wide range of social services to urban communities and economic governance for local businesses. Social services provided by DAOs include: trash collection, construction and maintenance of small roads and bridges, drain-

40 Arnold et al. 2015, 1-2, 8, 16-17; Note: In Mon State, Yangon, and Shan State, DAOs differ slightly in that their state/region DAO Offices also have Development Affairs Committees (DDAC) to mirror those at township level (Ibid., 12). 41 Until 2011, the Department of Development Affairs, and its Township Development Committees (under the Ministry of Border Affairs (MoBA)) was responsible for municipal governance and rural development. The 2008 Constitution moved the Department of Development Affairs out of MoBA and spread its component subnational offices between the fourteen states and regions. These subnational offices became Development Affair Organisations (DAOs) and focus only on municipal governance (Ibid., 2,8).

23 age, street lighting, and management of cemeteries and crematoriums. DAOs receive no funding from the Union Government or their respective state/region government. All their activities must be self-funded, and revenue comes from a variety of local sources. Notably, the funds DAOs raise can only be used in the townships where they were collected. Priorities for expenditures are locally defined but, in terms of capital expenditures, emphasis is generally placed on roads and bridges, drainage, and trash collection. The Township DAO Office is responsible for day-to-day management of municipal service delivery and economic governance matters, and its Executive Officer has paramount authority.42

TDACs are specifically significant within the DAO framework because, for the first time, the Union Government has authorised a form of citizen representation and substantive oversight over a government body at township level. Public members are indirectly elected from communities through different methods. While indirect elections have arguably improved community representation in TDACs, they fall short of universal standards for representative local democracy and democratic elections. In fact, elections are often held at meetings overseen by the Town- ship DAO Office and the GAD, and GAD ward administrators frequently play a key role. The respective roles and responsibilities of the TDAC vis-à-vis the Township DAO Office are not clearly set out in the state/region municipal laws but there is an emerging consensus that the TDAC has overall decision-making power for DAO affairs, is responsible for setting municipal priorities, ensuring coordination with other government actors and communities, deciding on local development projects, and conducting public outreach.43

In conclusion, the fact that there is no significant connection between DAOs and the Union Government presents an opportunity for state and region governments to further Myanmar’s decentralisation. However, it has also presented major challenges for DAOs because they must learn to be self-sufficient, both in terms of basic financial resources and more generally in terms of policy development, human resources, and procurement, since they no longer have a ‘mother ministry’.44

2.2.4 UNION MINISTRIES

Many Union ministries have offices at the state/region, district, and township levels that engage directly with local communities. Hierarchically, these offices answer to their respective Union ministries. Examples include the:

■■ General Administration Department (Ministry of Home Affairs) — discussed in detail above;

42 Ibid., vii-ix, 17, 32-32. 43 Arnold et al. 2015, ix, 35-36. 44 Arnold et al. 2015, 18.

24 ■■ Department of Rural Development (Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries and Rural Develop- ment) — discussed in detail below; ■■ Internal Revenue Department (Ministry of Finance) — collects various taxes and duties; ■■ Settlement and Land Records Department (Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation) — over- sees the registration and transfer of land; ■■ Township Police (Ministry of Home Affairs) — sustains law and order, provides recommendations; ■■ Township Health Department (Ministry of Health) — providing for hospitals and clinics, public health issues, disease control; ■■ Township Education Department (Ministry of Education) — providing for schools and teachers, implementation of educational programmes and policies; ■■ Forest Department (Ministry of Natural Resources and Environmental Conservation) — responsible for sustainable management of forest resources (including community forestry) and for conservation of wildlife.

This list is far from a comprehensive register of the Union Government’s presence at the local level and excludes many ministries. Nonetheless, it reveals the strong presence of the Union even in basic government functions at the local level.45 The importance of the General Administration Department has been described above. However, in order to understand the formal provision of public goods and service delivery in rural Myanmar, it is useful to also examine the Department of Rural Development (DRD).

Historically, the Department of Development Affairs (DDA, part of the Ministry of Border Affairs (MoBA)), and the underlying Township Development Committees, were responsible for two functions: municipal governance and rural development. However, in 2011, the department was moved out of MoBA and its component subnational offices were spread between the fourteen states and regions, becoming DAOs. While DAOs became responsible for municipal governance, the MoBA’s mandate to manage rural development did not similarly shift to the state and region governments. Rather, responsibility for rural development went to the newly constituted Ministry of Livestock, Fisheries, and Rural Development (MoLFRD) in June 2013. Within this new ministry was a dedicated Department of Rural Development (DRD).46

Consequently, responsibilities over urban areas (DAOs) and rural areas (DRDs) are officially separate. Given this separation, Township DAO Offices concentrate on urban areas, while township DRD offices concentrate on rural areas, i.e. village tracts (zoned by the GAD). This is not always a precise divide and there is often overlap, largely because Myanmar is largely rural, and

45 J. Bissinger and L. Maung Maung (2014). ‘Subnational Governments and Business in Myanmar’, Subnational Governance in Myanmar Discussion Paper Series: Discussion Paper No. 2, The Asia Foundation [hereinafter: Bissinger and Maung Maung 2014], 11-12. 46 Arnold et al. 2015, 2,8.

25 the distinction becomes subjective to local officials. In fact, DAO projects can still take place within limited parts of village tracts, especially those that border urban concentrations. DAOs can designate areas within village tracts as ‘development affairs areas’ where commercial activities are increasing, and municipal services are needed — for instance, if there is a market in a large village. Moreover, DAOs and DRDs may cooperate on a development project such as establish- ing or maintaining a bridge. Nevertheless, there seems to be an inherent dynamic for DAOs to concentrate on urban areas, i.e., wards, given that the DRD receives significant resources from the Union Government, as well as from international donors for its work in rural areas/village tracts. DAOs by contrast must raise their own revenues primarily from the businesses concentrated in urban areas, so they prefer to be able to concentrate their scarce resources in those areas47.

2.2.5 A CONFUSION OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE ACTORS

In conclusion, local administration in Myanmar has seen various reforms over the past years. Most notably through indirect election of ward/village-track administrators and the creation of a number of advisory committees at local levels, which feature some community representation. Additionally, all of Myanmar’s townships now have Development Affairs Organisations (DAOs) with responsibilities for providing a significant range of services and for overseeing municipal governance. However, Union ministries continue to dominate. The result is a complicated mix of local offices of Union ministries and a confusing array of local management committees driven by local (GAD) bureaucrats, at times with a modicum of community representation.48

The roles of the GAD and DAOs, especially, are highly convoluted. While the township office (GAD) is generally considered more powerful, it cannot direct the actions of the municipal office (DAO). Generally, the GAD’s role focuses on coordination of local offices of Union ministries and township management functions, while municipal offices focus on providing economic governance and delivering various services. Nevertheless, a significant amount of overlap, coordination and dependence exists between these actors. For instance, both the GAD and municipal offices collect land taxes — the DAO in urban areas and township GADs in rural areas where there are no DAOs.49

Furthermore, although the TSA is responsible for the coordination of the numerous government related offices and departments active in the respective township, in fact there is very little horizontal contact among the various departments. As such, a single township administration — as the departments are often called — does not exist. It is rather a fairly large group of very different and often loosely connected departments based in and covering the same territorial unit.50

47 Arnold et al. 2015, 8-9, 19 48 Arnold et al. 2015; M. Arnold (2016). ‘The right question to start local governance reforms’, Myanmar Times, online available at: http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/opinion/20613-the-right-question-to-start-local-governance-reforms.html [last accessed 1ebruary 2018]. 49 Kyi Pyar Chit Saw and M. Arnold (2014), 33; Bissinger and Maung Maung 2014, 15. 50 UNDP/Shan 2015, 38.

26 Finally, it is unfortunate that the provision of services at ward/village tract level falls outside the mandate of DAOs, the only truly decentralised mechanism of local governance in Myanmar. At ward and village tract level, the GAD maintains its central administrative role through tax collection, land registration, and so forth, while rural development is left mostly to the respective township DRD office that remains under Union Government control. Interestingly, a country-wide survey by the UNDP illustrates a localisation of development issues (e.g. infrastructure) which might in fact be ascribed to this formal division of tasks between DAOs for urban areas and the DRD for rural areas.51 This formal local governance gap, visible in most of the country’s rural areas, is one of the main reasons why informal governance institutions are so prevalent and — as discussed below — so powerful at sub-township level.

51 See for example: UNDP/Shan 2015, 51.

27 28 THE INSTITUTIONS: An Overview of Collected Data

29 30 III. The Institutions: An Overview of Collected Data

Informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) are not homogenous and, consequently, the institutions analysed for this paper vary considerably from place to place. The following section will provide an overview of the institutions used as case studies for the analysis. The overview focuses on the geographical context in which they operate, their leadership structures, functions, and resources. Finally, the ILGI’s role will be discussed based on the issues for which various actors approach them for assistance and the issues for which they are either the main decision-maker or convener.

3.1 Campaign for Unity Preservation

The Campaign for Unity Preservation (UP) operates in Namhkam Township, northern Shan State. Historically, many of Namhkam’s elders were involved in local politics as members of either the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD) or the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party (SNDP). By unwritten agreement the SNLD focused on the development of Namhkam, while the SNDP’s focus was political — at Union and state level. A conflict about political strategy caused a break between the SNLD and the SNDP in August 2015. After the SNLD’s Namhkam Township Central Executive Committee (CEC) openly sided with the SNDP, they were sacked by SNLD’s headquarters on 13 August 2015. Immediately, the CEC’s former members founded the Campaign for Unity Preservation (UP),52 to take over developmental activities in Namhkam.

The UP’s main goals are: a) to create a system of justice in unity for all people in Namkham; and b) to protect the civilians of Namkham from decisions by the Union or state governments, crony companies, and foreign investors that may negatively impact the community or the environment. The twenty-three original members of the UP are considered yah mi yah pha (elders) in Namkham’s communities.

3.1.1 GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT AND FORMAL GOVERNANCE

Shan State’s history is characterised by conflict and challenges to consolidated central power. Agriculture plays an important role in the economy of the state, with a variety of crops farmed. Natural resource extraction, including mining, forestry, and hydropower also plays a major role. Furthermore, the vicinity to international trading routes and long history of conflict and governance problems have made Shan State one of the main areas of narcotics production — and use.

52 The Shan name of the Campaign for Unity Preservation is ‘Koht Lurt’, which literally translates into: ‘tying together of the blood’.

31 Map 1: Namkham Township, Muse District and Kaung Haur Village Tract, Hsenwi Township, Lashio District (Consult Myanmar)

The opium, heroin and meth-amphetamine produced in Shan State are an important — though illegal — contribution to the state’s economy.53 Northern Shan State is generally home to Shan, Palaung, Kachin, Lisu, and Kokang ethnicities. There are also people who belong to the Bamar (mostly in urban centres) and Karen groups. Seventy-six percent of northern Shan State’s population lives in rural areas; thirty-seven percent of the population lives below the poverty line.54 The UP operates in Namhkam Township, Muse District. Namhkam is situated on the southern bank of Shweli River near the border with Kachin State and China. The township consists of fourteen wards and forty-three village tracts.55

Throughout Shan State, the ward/village tract administrator (W/VTA) is the formal authority best known to the public and is considered foremost responsible for solving (development) problems. In fact, a UNDP survey shows that only three percent of Shan State’s rural population knows who their township administrator (TSA) is (compared to eighty percent knowing their W/VTA).56 However, the perceived roles of the W/VTA vary, the main ones being: a) mediation in conflicts; b) ensuring peace and security in the village; c) bringing village problems to the township administration; and d) ensuring that people participate in community labour. Relatively few see the W/VTA as a civil servant who collects taxes and ensures law enforcement. Citizen

53 UNDP/Shan 2015, 7, 12-13. 54 UNDP/Shan 2015, 13-14. MIMU, online available at: http://themimu.info/states_regions/shan [Last accessed: 14 September 2017]. 55 UNDP/Shan 2015, 10 (2014 Census). 56 UNDP/Shan 2015, 70.

32 participation in ward/village discussions and decision-making regarding public sector issues is very low throughout Shan State, although such participation is markedly higher in rural areas. One factor that limits direct active participation is that many people in Shan State are not com- fortable to publicly express their opinion about government performance. This suggests that the majority relies for their participation on representation, underlining the importance for having proper elections for ward/village tract administrators and various committees57.

3.1.2 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

The UP’s twenty-three original members form the Working Committee of the institution. The Working Committee consists of two Chairmen, two Secretaries, an Executive Committee (five members), three Community Outreach Officers, two Budget Officers, two Legal Officers, three Communication Officers, and four general members. At annual meetings between all (seventy-five) UP-members, the various roles are redistributed, through nomination and majority vote.

Most decisions — whether about activities to carry out, disputes, or institutional matters — are made by all members of the Working Committee, through majority vote. For urgent matters, the Standing Committee (the Executive Committee, together with the two Chairmen and the two Secretaries) may decide. Decisions by the Standing Committee are evaluated at monthly Working Committee meetings.

Chairman I Chairman II Standing Committee (9 Members) Working Committee Chairmen (23 Members) Secretaries Executive Committee Secretary I Secretary II

Executive Committee (5 Members)

3 Community 2 Budget Officers 2 Legal Officers 3 Communication 4 General Members Outreach Officers Officers

Diagram 4: Organizational Structure, Campaing for Unity

57 UNDP/Shan 2015, 50, 53-55, 71.

33 3.1.3 FUNCTIONS

The UP gives regular capacity building trainings in Namhkam. For instance, the UP is currently advising farmers in Namhkam on how to navigate the land registration process under the 2012 Farmland Law. They also organise monthly trainings on local and international politics, so that communities can understand ongoing political developments.

They further monitor all (government-led) development plans, potential (foreign) investments, and political developments that might negatively impact communities living in Namhkam. After analysing investment and development plans, they draw up reports on potential human rights violations (e.g., forced displacement) and expected negative effects to the communities or the environment. These reports are used to advocate to township, state, and Union government authorities for sustainable development, return of confiscated land, protection of the environment, and cessation of fighting between Myanmar’s armed forces Tatmadaw( ) and EAOs in the area. Furthermore, the UP regularly organises discussion groups (tea talks) to inform citizens of all local, security, or political developments. At these meetings, communities may voice their grievances and the UP advises them on their rights, and on how to deal with decision-making authorities. They also hold monthly stakeholder meetings with the SNDP, SNLD, village and township authorities, religious leaders, civil society organisations (CSOs), and other community organisations. In fact, township authorities often involve members of the UP — in their capacity as yah mi yah pha — in decisions relating to township development.

After being notified of community grievances, the UP often organises meetings between township authorities and affected communities, giving authorities a chance to explain their decisions regarding certain plans, and to react to the villagers’ concerns. If such meetings are unsuccessful, the UP initiates meetings with all local authorities, government actors, and companies involved and, if necessary, submits reports to the state/Union government on behalf of the affected communities. Currently, for example, the UP is representing several communities from Namhkam in ongoing discussions with state and Union authorities about restoration of land confiscated by Tatmadaw over the past decades. If such discussions also prove unsuccessful, the UP organises and leads protests against the authorities and companies involved (such as blocking roads to prevent mining trucks from reaching the mountains). The UP’s involvement in land and human rights violations have generally been effective. Examples include: stopping a housing project that led to land confiscations; persuading authorities to deny permission for dams and water distribution projects that would have negatively impacted farmers; convincing authorities to halt silicon mining activities that polluted Nam Shelwi River and the soil in surrounding farmlands; and preventing the Chinese government from changing the official border between China and Myanmar and thereby effectively confiscating land belonging to farmers from Namhkam.

34 The UP is also an important dispute resolution actor in Namhkam. They mediate a variety of local conflicts — Namhkam’s communities are very divided since the split between SNLD and SNDP and due to the ongoing conflict among local EAOs — by organising meetings in which parties can voice grievances. UP leaders try to offer mutually acceptable solutions. The UP also facilitates dialogue and mediates conflicts between community members and companies/investors (e.g. in case of land conflicts); between community members and Tatmadaw (e.g. land confiscations); and between community members and EAOs (e.g. human rights violations).

The institution further provides a variety of services in Namhkam (though these are not considered to be their ‘main activities’). For instance, they support funeral services, and have provided Namhkam with a township hearse and a community ambulance. Members of the UP also founded the Tai Travel & Tour Company, which built a primary and middle school for Kaung Sa village, and which is involved in training and hiring teachers for a number of local schools. The UP further provides welfare-support to community members in need. For example, due to the ongoing armed conflict, many people from surrounding regions have sought refuge in Namhkam, where there is relative peace. The UP cooperates with various other CSOs, religious organisations, and community organisations to provide land and services to these internally displaced people (IDPs).

Finally, the UP, in cooperation with the Shan Literature and Culture Association, is involved in numerous activities to promote Shan culture. They organise yearly historic festivals, focusing on Shan music and history telling. They furthermore cooperated with ward/village tract administrators (W/VTAs) to prevent the township administrator (TSA), who was unable to pronounce Shan names, from doing away with traditional names of wards and village tracts and working only with numbered ‘quarters’. Instead, all wards and village tracts in Namhkam now have signposts in Shan, Burmese, and English, stating the traditional Shan name.

3.1.4 RESOURCES

All UP members are expected to make regular donations to the institution to finance activities. Moreover, donations from members, together with donations from villagers, the SNDP, and other CSOs, are used to start businesses in Namhkam (e.g., petrol station, water purifying plant). All community members are offered a chance to invest in these businesses. Profits are used to pay out dividends to community investors, to enhance the company’s sustainability; and for local investments and development. The (financial) support Namhkam receives from community members, other CSOs, community organisations, and EAOs are vital to the institution’s success.

35 3.1.5 ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

The UP works to support all communities in Namhkam, regardless of ethnicity or social class. Although not elected, the citizens of Namhkam view the UP as their representative when dealing with developmental, environmental, or human rights issues. The township authorities and the state/Union government are the main decision-makers for large-scale development projects, foreign investments, land reforms, etc. However, community members perceive the authorities’ interests to be contrary to their own. Because the communities feel that they are powerless to counter authorities’ decisions, they approach the UP for support. As a result, the UP has become the main convenor of community members, authorities, and other actors. The UP believes that without their support, people in Namhkam would truly suffer: they would lose land to investors, cronies, and the military; their culture and tradition would be lost; and the environment would be severely damaged. Nevertheless, they maintain that it should be the township authorities that represent the people of Namhkam and address community grievances. However, these actors do not have the capacity, and are often afraid to go against foreign investors or crony companies because they enjoy support from higher authorities. The UP therefore remains the main voice of Namhkam’s citizens.

The UP cooperates with the SNDP in all matters — the UP supporting communities at the local level and the SNDP advocating for Namhkam’s development at the state/Union level. The UP reiterated numerous times that they operate independently of political parties or other actors. Indeed, the separate roles and responsibilities of the UP and SNDP are formalised in various regulations. In reality however, community members and township authorities view the UP and SNDP as one group.

3.2 Traditional Authorities in Lweyin Mingalar

Lweyin Mingalar is a village in Moe Bye Village Tract, Pékon Township, consisting of four wards and 350 households. Decades-long lack of government support forced Lweyin Mingalar’s leaders to take responsibility for their own development, and provision of public goods and services. The village is completely self-sufficient, both administratively (with a traditional leadership structure) and in terms of local development and services. The administrative structure in place has proven truly effective and, in fact, the Shan State government named them as ‘best village-level local governance unit’ in 2014, based on crime record, crop production, unity within the village, and community development.58

58 Interview Lweyin Mingalar 16/8.

36 3.2.1 GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT AND FORMAL GOVERNANCE

Shan State’s geographic context and formal governance was previously described in general (see section 3.1.1.). However, there are some noteworthy differences between northern and southern Shan State. For instance, southern Shan State is generally home to Shan, Pa’O, Bamar, Danu, Intha, Thaungyor, Kayin/Karen, and Kayan ethnic groups. The urban/rural divide is similar to the north (about seventy-six percent live in rural areas) but the poverty rate is lower: twenty-six percent of the population lives below the poverty line.59

Map 2: Taunggyi Township, Taunggyi District and Moe Bye Village Tract, Pékon Township, Taunggyi District (Government Census Report)

59 UNDP/Shan 2015, 10 (2014 Census), 13-14; Myanmar Information Management Unit, available online at: http://themimu.info/ states_regions/shan [Last accessed: 14 September 2017].

37 3.2.2 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

Lweyin Mingalar’s administrative structure is headed by the village Okkata and an administrative council which consists of a vice-Okkata, a secretary, a vice-secretary, a treasurer and four (elected) ward leaders. The administrative council coordinates six village committees: municipal, education, culture and tradition, electricity, health and sports and youth. Parallel to the administrative council exists a Nayaka council, consisting of eleven tribal leaders (Nayakas) representing the eleven tribes in Lweyin Mingalar. Nayakas are elected by members of their tribe.

Village Committees

Nayaka Council (11 tribal leaders) Okkata (Chairman) Municipal Administrative Council

Vice Okkata Leader Ward 1 Education

Secretary Leader Ward 2 Culture & Tradition

Vice Secretary Leader Ward 3 Electricity

Health & Sports Treasure Leader Ward 4

Youth Diagram 5: Administrative Structure-Lweyin Mingalar

3.2.3 FUNCTIONS

One of the traditional leaders’ main functions is dispute resolution in the village. If disputes cannot be resolved by the families involved, they get referred to the respective tribal Nayaka. If the Nayaka cannot resolve the dispute, it gets referred to the ward leader, and finally theOkkata , both who will try to solve the dispute together with the respective Nayaka. Finally, if the dispute remains unresolved, it is referred to the Nayaka council, which decides in its entirety.

The Nayaka council, together with the Okkata, is responsible for writing rules and regulations and codes of conduct, which are distributed among all households. The rules include provisions on marriage, prohibition of drug use, and community voluntary services. The four ward leaders may also set specific rules and regulations for members of their own wards. The primary respon-

38 sibility for enforcement of rules lies with the Nayakas. When village rules and regulations are violated, the respective Nayaka fines the wrongdoer. If a person continues to ignore the rules and regulations, the Nayaka refers the situation to the Nayaka council. When a villager violates rules and regulations more than three times, he may be forced to leave the village. In criminal matters (e.g., cattle theft, breaking and entering), the Okkata is responsible for deciding on a punishment.

Nayakas further advise members of their tribe on personal and family issues (e.g., marriage, social problems). The Nayaka council also offers guidance to villagers on: roles and responsibilities in religious and cultural events, and maintaining traditions (e.g., dance, instruments).

The Okkata, together with the relevant village committees and advised by the Nayaka council, is responsible for village development, transportation, and various services. The municipal committee is responsible for road construction (planning grids, building bridges, irrigation), transportation, waste systems, garbage collection, village sanitation, village settlement, drainage, organising funerals, etc. The education committee is responsible for constructing new school buildings, renovating existing buildings, paying teachers’ salaries, building teacher accommodation, and cooperating with the Moe Bye VTA and Pékon TSA to get school supplies and qualified teachers. The health and sport committee, in cooperation with the Moe Bye VTA, set up a free clinic in the village. The electricity committee is responsible for supplying all villagers with electricity and fixing broken streetlights or cables. The cultural and tradition committee is responsible for maintaining, innovating and promoting Kayan/Lweyin dance and traditional instruments and organises a variety of annual events to promote Lweyin culture and tradition.

The Okkata further represents the village in monthly meetings with the Moe Bye VTA. The VTA passes on information from the Pékon TSA and government offices regarding development plans (e.g. roads between villages), regional issues (e.g., security and drugs), and other information (e.g. information on H1N1). The Okkata informs the ward leaders and Nayakas, who pass on the information to their ‘constituents’. When important information regarding village affairs needs to be communicated, the Okkata will speak to the villagers after the church service on Sundays.

3.2.4 RESOURCES

Since 1992, each household in Lweyin Mingalar has been donating two baskets of paddy (rice plants) at the end of each year. Half of the proceeds are divided between the Okkata, the ward leaders, other members of the administrative council, and the local priest. The other half of the donated paddy goes into a ‘paddy bank’. This paddy yields about one hundred sacks of rice per year that can be sold off when necessary. The money raised is used for development projects, funerals and festivals, loans (that have to be paid back with interest), and to support villagers in need. When extra funding is required for activities and projects, each household will make ‘voluntary donations’ based on their incomes.

39 3.2.5 ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

As described above, the leadership structure in Lweyin Mingalar aims to represent all members of the community. Each tribe elects its own Nayaka to represent them in the Nayaka council. Each ward elects a leader to represent them in the administrative council, and the whole village elects the Okkata. Generally, the Okkata and the administrative council focus on village administration while the Nayakas focus on dispute resolution. However, the Nayaka council advises the Okkata and administrative council on all decisions. Villagers usually implement the decisions of the Okkata or Nayakas without question, simply because traditionally, that is what is expected of them.

3.3 Traditional Authorities in Nyo Mee

Nyo Mee is a village tract in Hopong Township, one of the three townships constituting the Pa’O Self-Administered Zone (SAZ). As will be described in greater detail below, the Pa’O SAZ sub-township administration is based on traditional structures, of which Nyo Mee offers an example.

3.3.1 GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT AND FORMAL GOVERNANCE

Shan State has five self-administered areas: four Self-Administered Zones (Danu, Kokang, Palaung, and Pa’O) and one Self-Administered Division (Wa).

Hopong is one of the Pa’O SAZ’s three townships. It consists of six wards and twenty-two village tracts. Nyo Mee village tract is located near the border between Hopong Township and Taunggyi Township. A majority (eighty percent) of the population in Hopong lives in rural areas, which is more than in the rest of southern Shan State60.

Map 3: The Pa’O Self-Administered Zone consists of three townships: Pinlaung, Hopong, and Hsi Hseng (Source: https://webshus.ru)

60 UNDP/Shan 2015, 10 (2014 Census).

40 The Pa’O SAZ was formed in August 2010 as per Section 56(a) of the Constitution. The administrative set up in the Pa’O SAZ, like in the other the self-administered areas, differs from the formal local governance structures described in the previous chapter. The SAZ is administered by a ‘Leading Body’, consisting of Pa’O National Organisation (PNO) and Tatmadaw representatives. The leader of the PNO is the Okkata (chairperson) of the Leading Body. He is responsible to the Chief Minister of Shan State. Each of the Pa’O SAZ’s three townships have a Wein-nel, i.e. an administrative executive committee answering directly to the Leading Body.61

Although, this system differs from the rest of Myanmar, in reality the legislative and executive powers of the Pa’O Leading Body are marginal at best. First, the General Administration Depart- ment (GAD, see Chapter 2.2.1) remains central to administrative functions in the SAZ: it serves as the Office of the SAZ, and the Head of the GAD in the Pa’O SAZ serves as the Secretary of the Leading Body. Government departments are also represented in the SAZ as in any other area, and the arrangements for service delivery are similar. Second, while the Leading Body is vested with legislative powers relating to various municipal and developmental affairs, their laws must comply with the Constitution and Union and state laws. Consequently, the GAD, Development Affairs Organisations (DAOs, Chapter 2.2.3), and the Department of Rural Development (DRD, Chapter 2.2.4) continue to act as principal formal service providers in the SAZ, while the Leading Body can, realistically, only manage special development programmes that are directly remitted to the SAZ, such as the Border Affairs Fund. Notably, only eight percent of people living in the SAZ consider the Leading Body to be responsible for development issues, while thirty-seven percent consider the state or Union government responsible instead.62

The main difference between the Pa’O SAZ and non-self-administrative areas is the existence of a Leading Body as a representative and guiding organ at supra-township level. Even though, in terms of service delivery, the autonomy of the Leading Body has yet to become fact, the Pa’O SAZ has a legal framework that guarantees a degree of local autonomy that cannot easily be withdrawn.63

3.3.2 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

Moreover, whereas the 2012 Ward and Village Tract Administration Law formally removed the position of traditional village headman (100 Households Head) in Myanmar, the Pa’O Leading Body has embraced quasi-formal traditional leadership structures at sub-municipal level. Each township is divided into clusters of villages (similar to village tracts), that are headed by Ohn councils (led by an Ohn Okkata)64.

61 Interview 10/8/2017, Nyo Mee; UNDP/Shan 2015, 34-37. 62 UNDP/Shan 2015, 53. 63 UNDP/Shan 2015, 34-35, 37-38, 48. 64 Note: The Ohn Okata position is best comparable to that of VTA in non-SAZ territories in Shan State. Indeed, the word Ohn is often used in the Shan language when referring to the VTA.

41 Nyo Mee consists of forty-eight villages. These villages are further divided into clusters, each Pa’O SAZ Leading Body represented by one member in the Ohn council (eleven in total). Each individual village further Hopone Wein-Nel has its own Phradon (headman), supported by a council of Samati (elders).65 Nyo Mee Village Tract 3.3.3 FUNCTIONS Ohn Okkata Community dispute resolution is the most important task of the leaders in Nyo Mee. The Phradon serves as the first instance, after family Ohn Council members failed in their meditation attempts. He mediates between parties and, if necessary, decides the issue together with the Samati 48 Villages council. If parties disagree with the decision, the Ohn-representative of that village brings Phradon Samati the issue before the Ohn council, that tries to mediate and negotiate a solution. If parties still disagree, the Ohn council can submit the case — Diagram 6: Administrative structure-Pa’O SAZ in Hopong in writing — to the Hopong Wein-nel. However, Township the Ohn council is generally considered to be the final instance of dispute resolution. Other issues (e.g., relating to drugs, security, or development) are resolved similarly, starting with the Phradon and ending with the Hopong Wein-nel.

Nyo Mee does not have written rules and regulations to guide the activities and behaviour of the traditional leaders or the villagers. All behavioural rules are customary. The Ohn council, the Phradons, and the Samati councils are responsible for making sure these customary rules are known and understood by all villagers. The Samatis are primarily responsible — at village level — for ensuring compliance with the village tract customary rules. When villagers violate the rules, the Phradon decides on a ‘punishment’. In case of repeated violations or crimes, the case is referred to the Ohn council. Criminal matters are usually referred to the Pa’O National Army.

At village level, the Phradon (advised by the Samati council) is responsible for a range of services, including education support (e.g., materials, teachers), infrastructure (e.g. roads), village upkeep (e.g. garbage collection) and security. The Phradon is further responsible for organising numerous festivals and collecting contributions for them. Development works within villages are usually an implementation of municipal policies set by the Ohn council, that is responsible

65 Interview notes 10/8/2017, Nyo Mee.

42 for the overall development of Nyo Mee village tract. They make and implement decisions regarding infrastructure, especially roads and bridges between the villages and construction of schools and other public buildings. The council is also responsible for strategic guidance to farmers (distributing seeds, cultivation trainings). In some instances, the Hopong Wein-nel or government offices like the DRD task the Ohn with certain development tasks within the forty-eight villages, usually related to infrastructure or electricity.

Finally, The Wein-nel usually informs the Ohn council on any regional matters (e.g., development policies, security issues). The Ohn council, in turn, informs the Phradons, who spread the information in their respective villages.

3.3.4 RESOURCES

The Phradons and the Ohn council collect taxes and donations for each individual development activity or event. Within villages, the respective Phradon collects money from each household. These contributions go towards development projects, festivals, donations to monasteries, etc. When development plans involve the whole village tract (e.g., inter-village roads, electricity lines), the Ohn tasks all Phradons to collect money in their villages to finance the project. For long term projects, the Ohn council works together with each village’s ‘financial manager’, aSamati chosen by the Phradon to take care of village ‘savings’. The financial managers regularly collect donations from villagers (this can go on for years), until the required amount has been saved up.

3.3.5 ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

The various traditional leadership roles in Nyo Mee can — to a certain extent — be described by comparing them to sub-municipal roles outside the Self-Administered Zone. The village tract is headed by an Ohn council, led by an Ohn Okata (or VTA). Each village is represented by a Phradon (or 100-Household Head) and a Samati council (or yah mi yah pa). However, unlike the VTA, the Ohn Okata has no individual authority. His main role is organising and leading the work of the Ohn council, which is the collective-decision making body. The Ohn council is the main decision-maker on supra-village development and infrastructure development and serves as intermediary between the communities in Nyo Mee village tract and the Wein-nel in Hopong and other authorities. The Phradons represent their villages and are responsible for village development and a range of services. The Samatis serves as an advisory body, a source of expertise, to the Phradon and to villagers.

43 3.4 Kayan New Generation Youth

Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY) is an institution focused on youth in name and membership only. KNGY strives toward a peaceful, developed, free, and just Kayah State. The institution was founded in Mae Sot, Thailand, in 2002 to counter EAOs’ narrative of violence, and to offer Kayan youth an alternative way to deal with their grievances, by focusing on capacity building and development. After leading a campaign against the proposed constitution in 2008, there was a crackdown by the government and Tatmadaw, leading to arrests of numerous members, and forcing remaining members to go underground. Due to the political changes in 2011, KNGY’s Conference66 decided to bring the organisation out in the open again, opening offices in Pékon (2012) and Loikaw (2013) and liaison offices in See Byu, Tout Yay Kha, and Yay Nyi.

Through the years, KNGY members have become more than just leaders of Kayah youth. By all accounts, they are an important local governance actor in Kayah State, with the Kayan Minister of Ethnic Affairs (Shan State) even claiming: “If there would be no government at all in Myanmar, the KNGY would be the local government in Kayah State, they work like a local government.”

3.4.1 GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT AND FORMAL GOVERNANCE

Kayah (Karenni) State lies in the eastern-central part of Myanmar. It has two districts, seven townships and hundred-six wards/village tracts. Fifty-six percent of Kayah’s population is Kayan. Other ethnicities include Bamar, Shan, and Karen. Twenty-five percent of the population lives in the urban part of Loikaw Township. The majority of Kayah’s population lives in villages of less than one hundred people. Most of Kayah is mountainous and therefore difficult to access. Because many villages can only be reached by foot, a large part of Kayah’s population is very isolated. The conflict — together with uneven development and resource allocation — has resulted in a huge difference in living conditions and social indicators in Kayah State, especially between Loikaw and remote villages.67 Map 4: Kayah State has two districts — Loikaw and Bawlake. (Government Census report 2015)

66 A meeting between all (130) KNGY-members, every three years. 67 UNDP (2015). ‘Local Governance Mapping - The State of Local Governance: Trends in Kayah’, UNDP Myanmar [hereinafter: UNDP/ Kayah 2015], 18-21; UNHCR 2014: Kayah State Profile; updated 2014.

44 Crop farming is the most important economic activity. In recent years, large-scale mining and timber production has brought more income into Kayah State, but also additional problems related to deforestation and land grabbing. Furthermore, Kayah is rich in natural resources (timber, minerals, hydropower), which has historically been one of the sensitive issues between the government, ethnic armed organisations and local communities.68

In Kayah State, social services are provided by a combination of government and non-government service providers, including the KNGY. Of the various formal actors, the Union/State government and the W/VTAs are considered most responsible for service delivery and solving problems at the ward/village tract level. Citizens have varying perceptions as to the W/VTA’s roles. Mostly, they are considered to have bridging capacity, by bringing village problems to the TSA (and bringing government information to the people), mediating in conflict situations, and ensuring peace and security. Indeed, the fact that the W/VTAs come from and belong to the community — contrary to the TSA and other government officials69 — puts them in the position of connecting the people’s demands and perspectives to those of the State/Union. Nevertheless, citizen participation in ward/village discussions and decision-making regarding public sector issues is very low throughout Kayah State, although such participation is slightly higher in rural areas. Again, this suggests that the majority relies for participation on representation, underlining the need for proper elections for W/VTAs and township committees.70

3.4.2 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

The main decision-maker within KNGY is the Executive Committee (twenty-three members), which is elected by all 130 KNGY-members every three years during the Conference. The Con- ference reviews KNGY’s Constitution and the activities and results of the previous years and sets policies for the following years. Finally, members are nominated to form a new Executive Com- mittee, followed by a vote if more than twenty-three members are nominated. KNGY-members who were nominated but not elected form an Auxiliary Executive Committee, which supports the Executive Committee whenever necessary.

The Executive Committee is responsible for making policy and organisational decisions, con- trolling the performances of other members, and representing KNGY at meetings with stakeholders. Members of the Executive Committee often also perform other roles within KNGY. The Executive Committee elects a Chairperson, a General Secretary, and a Joint Secretary from within their own members. They also elect Programme Directors (not necessarily from their own

68 UNDP/Kayah 2015, 19-20; N. Schuler (2013). ‘Kayah State Socio-Economic Analysis’, European Union, AVSI, ACF, CARE, Mercy Corps. 69 Notably, members of the community are considered more responsible for solving (development) problems than the township authorities (UNDP/Kayah 2015, 38). 70 UNDP/Kayah 2015, 38, 46-48, 52, 86-87, 97.

45 members) for the KNGY’s six Committees: Education, Human Rights and Politics, Regional Affairs, Culture and Literature, Finance, and Administration/Office.

The Chairperson is the highest authority within KNGY and the institution’s main representative. Although the Executive Committee usually decides all matters together, it is the Chairperson who must implement decisions. He can also override decisions of the six Programme Directors when it is in the interest of the institution.

Conference

Executive Committee (23 Members)

Chairperson

General Secretary Joint Secretary

Education Human Rights and Finance Politics

Regional AFfair Cuture and Admin/Office Lietrature

Zone organizers for clusters of 5-15 villages throughout Kayah State

Diagram 7: Organisational structure - Kayan New Generation Youth

46 3.4.3 FUNCTIONS

Due to difficult communication and bad infrastructure in Kayah, many communities are extremely isolated and are mostly unaware of what is happening in the rest of the State. KNGY’s Regional Affairs Committee collects and provides information throughout Kayah. In order to reach all communities, KNGY appoints Zone Organisers for clusters of five to fifteen villages throughout the State (seventy in total). The Zone Organisers inform village leaders and communities in their clusters about regional developments (politics, land and human rights abuses, development projects). Village leaders and communities also share their issues and grievances with the Zone Organisers, who report back to KNGY. Quarterly meetings are organised for all Zone Organisers, in which experiences and information can be shared.

KNGY further distributes ‘dispute resolution forms’ to all village heads and Zone Organisers in Kayah. In case of disputes among communities or between communities and government actors, companies, or EAOs, parties can contact their village heads or Zone Organisers, who submit the forms to KNGY. The forms are analysed by KNGY-members, who then organise meetings with parties and stakeholders — individually to gather information, and then together — where KNGY mediates and negotiates solutions.

KNGY monitors government-led development plans, political developments, the ongoing armed conflict, and displacement and land issues throughout Kayah State. They submit regular reports on potentially harmful interventions, human rights violations, and the lack of services in Kayah’s most rural areas to the state and Union governments. They also participate in numerous meetings with EAOs and government-actors, where they advocate for the rights of the Kayan people, sustainable development, and recognition of (land-) rights for Kayah’s communities. When communities face human rights violations due to government-led or sanctioned development projects, KNGY advises them on how to deal with the decision-making authorities. They give human rights and land law trainings in affected villages to inform communities of their rights, and help villagers to elect representative committees who can speak on their behalf to government-actors. Their involvement in land and human rights violations have generally been effective, leading to fair compensations and even restoration of land rights.

KNGY is furthermore an important service-provider. For instance, they train nurses and provide medical supplies for clinics in Kayah’s most remote areas. In addition, eighty percent of the schools in the state are built and funded by KNGY. They also train teachers and supply the schools with materials. Because KNGY teachers do not meet government-set criteria, these community schools and their teachers do not receive government funding. KNGY’s leaders therefore regularly engage with state and Union authorities to advocate for recognition and funding for KNGY-trained teachers; for financial support for community schools; and for mother tongue based multilingual education.

47 KNGY has also initiated numerous community driven development projects in the state: organising village meetings in which a committee is elected, which then receives technical trainings on micro finance, budgeting, and sustainable development. KNGY provides the committee with a ‘core fund’ with which to finance community development projects, and visits them every quarter visits to assess the projects, consult with the villagers, and offer technical support.

Finally, KNGY’s Literature and Culture Committee, together with the Regional Affairs Commit- tee strive to develop a shared Kayan identity throughout Kayah State, by searching for common denominators in the various Kayan ethnicities. They aim to reunite the region by promoting Kayan customs, traditional dress, dance, and music. The Literature and Culture Committee also organises annual festivals on Kayan New Year, which include traditional competitions (cooking, dancing), history telling, and traditional music.

3.4.4 RESOURCES

KNGY is dependent on support they receive from members of the communities, Kayan politicians, and other youth groups and CSOs. Until 2011, KNGY was funded solely by community donations. Now, KNGY receives the gross of their funding from the Project for Local Empowerment 71and the Myanmar Education Consortium. Nevertheless, communities still make donations when KNGY carry out activities (e.g., trainings and workshops) in their villages. Some communities have also donated farmland to KNGY. The profits from this land are used for the institution’s activities and to invest in community development.

3.4.5 ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

KNGY strives to support all communities in Kayah, regardless of ethnicity or religion, as well as Kayan communities in other states and regions. According to KNGY’s chairperson: “[KNGY is] not a group that only criticises the government, but also we provide help to fill the gaps in government [services].” Community needs are identified by KNGY ‘Zone Organisers’ who are active throughout the state. KNGY projects are based on their reports. Previously, some Buddhist communities were distrustful of KNGY because its members are mainly Christian. However, through ongoing dialogue, KNGY has managed to overcome most of such misgivings.

Although government-actors are the main decision-makers for large-scale development projects, foreign investments, land reforms, etc., many communities consider the KNGY to be their rep-

71 A joint initiative of the International Rescue Committee (IRC), the Border Consortium (TBC), Mae Tao Clinic, and World Education, funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

48 resentative in dealing with developmental and human rights issues. Indeed, KNGY is a powerful actor, whose voice cannot be ignored. Whereas government-actors and EAOs previously considered the KNGY to be “trouble-makers”, they have since come to understand the importance of including KNGY in decision-making on policies regarding the development of Kayah State. Furthermore, KNGY is an important convenor of community members and leaders, authorities, regional CSOs, EAOs, and other actors in the region. According to some villagers: “KNGY is the only channel through which communities can reach the government, through which communities can fight for their rights, and even get to know their rights.”

3.5 Mon Area Community Development Organisation

Mon Area Community Development Organisation (MACDO) is a community-based organisation operating in and around Ye and Yebyu Townships (Mawlamyine District) and Dawei Township (Dawei District, Tanintharyi Region). The eighteen original founders established MACDO in order to coordinate sustainable development in Mon State, after an intensive three-month training on organisational development they participated in. Initially, the institution focused on communities who lost land due to the armed conflict and development projects (specifically the Yadanar Gas Pipeline) but the focus soon shifted to the general development of all Mon communities. MACDO is considered an important regional actor in terms of local and rural development. Unlike government actors, INGOs, and CSOs, who support development projects in a piecemeal fashion, MACDO strives towards sustainable development by remaining active in the region and through constant follow-up and improvement.

3.5.1 GEOGRAPHIC CONTEXT AND FORMAL GOVERNANCE

Mon State has a diverse population comprising Mon, Bamar, Kayin, and Pa’O people — Burmese and Mon languages are most prominent. Mon has two districts (Mawlamyine and Thaton), ten townships, and 463 wards/village tracts. Seventy-two percent of the population lives in rural areas.72 Accordingly, the people in Mon rely extensively on agriculture for their livelihoods. Fishing along the State’s western coast has historically supplemented incomes and diets. Mining is also an emerging industry in Mon State, with antimony, granite, and gold mined in various places.73

Of the various formal actors in Mon State, the Union/State government and the W/VTAs are considered most responsible for service delivery and solving problems at the ward/village tract

72 UNDP, (2014). Local Governance Mapping - The State of Local Governance: Trends in Mon’, UNDP Myanmar [hereinafter: UNDP/ Mon 2014], 9; UNHCR (2014). South-East Myanmar Information Management Unit, ‘Mon State Profile’ [hereinafter: UNHCR/Mon 2014], 1. 73 UNHCR/Mon 2014, 7.

49 level. Citizens have varying perceptions as to the W/VTA’s roles. Generally, they are considered responsible for ensuring peace and security in the village and mediating conflicts among villagers. Interestingly, ensuring that people participate in community labour is also considered an important W/ VTA function. Actual participation in village/ward/township meetings in Mon State is very low, suggesting that the majority relies for their participation on representation. Moreover, one survey shows that eighty-eight percent of respondents in Mon State are unaware of the new township and village tract committees, which have civilian participation.74 Interestingly, ever since the New Mon State Party (NMSP) signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in Map 5: Mawlamyine Township and Ye Township, 1995, Mon State has seen an integration Mawlamyine District of state and non-state service sectors in Mon State - with the government and the NMSP both playing significant — and concurrent — roles in public life. As a result, the foundation for the public sector is well established — especially in terms of education and health care. However, the NMSP’s role in direct service provision has declined over the last decade, with CSOs proliferating to fill the gaps, working with the government and NMSP to continue the delivery of non-state services.75

3.5.2 LEADERSHIP STRUCTURE

MACDO’s organisational structure, in contrast to the institutions described above, is not based on elections and nominations but rather resembles that of an NGO. The MACDO Board, an advisory committee established mainly because it is one of the requirements for officially registering a CSO, initially consisted of eighteen founders. Currently, all CSOs in Mon State that work with MACDO also have a representative on the MACDO Board. The Advisory Board consists of

74 UNDP/Mon 2014, 30, 38, 40; UNDP 2015, 64. 75 UNDP/Mon 2014, 9; UNHCR/Mon 2014, 7-9.

50 representatives form MACDO’s main funders: the Human Rights Foundation of Monland, the Pattanarak Foundation, and the Slingshot Development Fund.

MACOD Board Advisory Board

Director

Program Coordinator

Admin/Finance

Project Coordina- Project Coordinator Project Coordina- tor Development Village Infrastruc- tor Agriculture/ Awarness ture Livelihoods

Technician

Village Facilitator Village Facilitator Village Facilitator Village Facilitator (Ye) (Yebyu) (Yebyu) (Dawei)

Diagram 8: Organisational structure- Mon Area Community Development Organisation

The Director is appointed by the Advisory Board and MACDO Board and is, by unwritten agreement, chosen from within the members of the MACDO Board. All other appointments are also made by the two boards together. The Program Coordinator connects with donors and supports the Project Coordinators. The Project Coordinators are each in charge of one of MACDO’s focal points: development awareness, village infrastructure, and livelihoods.

3.5.3 FUNCTIONS

MACDO has supported dozens of communities in the region to build kindergartens, primary schools, and high schools, and various other infrastructure projects like roads and water sanitation systems. To ensure local ownership, MACDO organises village meetings in which a committee

51 is elected to organise and oversee the construction. Villagers are also asked to make donations, and to participate in the construction. The village committee receives financial and organisational trainings from MACDO, and are then given the funds for construction. MACDO’s Project Co- ordinator remains involved throughout the project to provide technical support and to follow up. MACDO also organises Micro Finance Groups in the region’s most poor and rural villages. Interested villagers form a committee (up to sixty members in certain villages), and donate an agreed amount to a mutual fund. MACDO provides micro-financing and livelihood trainings to these villagers, helps them create rules and regulations, budgets, and accounting systems. Villagers in the Group can take loans for livelihood projects from the mutual fund, that have to be repaid with interest. MACDO’s Project Coordinator visits these Groups every quarter to get feedback and provide support.

Furthermore, MACDO gives regular health and family planning trainings in rural communities. These are done household by household, because issues might be sensitive or because women might be unable or unwilling to join village-level trainings. MACDO also provides trainings to help villagers deal with (infringements of rights by) authorities or companies. Currently, MAC- DO is carrying out systematic land-registration trainings throughout the region (in sixty-eight villages at time of writing).

Finally, MACDO serves as an intermediary communication point between communities and government actors, as well as between communities and the NMSP. For instance, they connect communities to projects planned by the Department of Rural Development and various ward/ village tract Development Support Committees. These institutions offer local authorities (W/ VTAs) funding for development within specific projects (e.g., the DRD’s Mya Sein Ya project). When money runs out or a project is finished, these institutions disappear again from the region and, as such, development does not happen in a sustainable manner. By contrast, MACDO focuses on sustainable development through constant presence in the region and local ownership over development projects. MACDO also regularly meet with village leaders and VTAs to offer advice on development strategies

Since early 2017, educational services were no longer deemed priority and attention shifted to drug awareness and land rights. However, development of village infrastructure and livelihood support — in terms of livelihood trainings, agricultural micro financing, technical support — remain MACDO’s main focal points.

52 3.5.5 RESOURCES

MACDO depends on the support they receive from members of the communities in which they operate. Villagers participate in all of Namhkan’s activities, whether by supporting development projects, or by participating in awareness or livelihood trainings. Moreover, as mentioned above, MACDO requires villagers to donate money and physical support when they carry out development projects, to ensure local ownership. MACDO also receives financial support from local monks. However, most of MACDO’s funding comes from the Pattanarak Foundation, the Slingshot Development Fund, and the Human Rights Foundation of Monland. Lately, MACDO’s ability to carry out activities has been constrained due to cuts in funding by these donors.

3.5.4 ROLE IN THE COMMUNITY

MACDO works with all communities living in their target areas, irrespective of ethnicity or religion. Most of the communities in these areas are very remote and, according to some villagers: “this area is completely ignored by the government for development of infrastructure or for building schools.” Decades of ‘being ignored’ have forced communities take to responsibility for their own development. Although MACDO does not — officially or unofficially — represent these communities, they support their development. Indeed, MACDO strives to fill the governance gap by maintaining a permanent presence in the region, in order to achieve sustainable development. MACDO’s projects are based on actual community needs, as reported by village leaders and the institution’s four Village Facilitators, that keep up constant communication with all communities in the target areas.

53 54 WHAT ILGIs Do: Functions and Interface

55 56 IV. What ILGIs Do: Functions and Interface

The function and interface analysis aims to offer a better understanding of what kind of role(s) the ILGIs described above play in local governance. This section aims to sketch a general picture of the functions ILGIs in Myanmar perform and how these functions relate to State functions.

4.1 Functions

ILGIs generally do not confine themselves to a specific or narrow set of functions. As was discussed in the previous chapters, the ILGIs visited for this report operate in multiple domains, take on a wide range of activities, and are considered to be generally responsible for dealing with a variety of issues. The ILGIs’ various functions can be subdivided into different categories.76

ILGIs are the (elected) leaders of a group of people or membership-based organisations. In Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee, the ILGIs are traditional leaders of the community, and the twenty-three original members of the Campaign for Unity Preservation (UP) are considered yah mi yah pha in Namhkam’s communities. The leaders of Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY) are youth leaders, but also considered to be “like a local government” that works for all people in Kayah State. By comparison, Mon Area Community Development Organisation’s (MACDO) leadership role is less obvious, visible mainly in their capacity as advisors to village leaders and Village Tract Administrators (VTAs).

ILGIs broker information: they serve as intermediary communication point between citizens and state actors. The UP, KNGY, and MACDO connect communities in their target areas to (local) authorities, informing them of development plans or political issues, speaking to authorities on their behalf, and, when necessary, organising meetings between aggrieved communities and relevant authorities. The traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee also connect villagers with VTAs and other authorities (like the Hopong Wein-nel).

ILGIs connect communities to different official service providers. The UP connects communities to township service providers, like in Bing Kang ward, where they persuaded Namhkam’s Development Affairs Organisation (DAO) to fix roads that had been left broken after the placing of a new pipeline. KNGY regularly engages with authorities to advocate for funding for teachers and schools in Kayah. MACDO connects communities to projects planned by the Department of Rural Development (DRD) and various ward/village tract Development Support Committees.

76 Byrne 2016, 9, 19.

57 The Okata of Lweyin Mingalar informs the VTAs of required services and support at monthly meetings. The Ohn Okata of Nyo Mee connects his communities to numerous service providers, including the Wein-nel of Hopong and Ward Administrators in Taunggyi.

ILGIs provide advice on personal and family issues within communities, as well as how to deal with state authorities. The traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee advise the communities they represent on various personal matters, and offer guidance on village rules and regulations, and villagers’ roles and responsibilities in religious and cultural events. The UP, KNGY, and MACDO advise communities facing human rights violations or environmental damage on their rights and on how to deal with decision-making authorities.

ILGIs represent and participate in advisory councils and meetings on behalf of the community. The UP and KNGY represent communities in meetings with authorities, EAOs, and companies, whenever they face environmental or human rights issues. Moreover, a number of the UP’s members, represent Namhkam’s communities as members of township and village tract Development Support Committees. The Okata of Lweyin Mingalar represents his village in monthly meetings with the Moe Bye VTA, while the Ohn Okata represents Nyo Mee’s villages in meetings with the Hopong Wein-nel, General Administration Department (GAD), and various authorities in Taunggyi.

ILGIs monitor the local political context, the delivery of services, and potentially harmful interventions of formal government actors, government cronies, and (foreign) investors. For instance, the UP and KNGY monitor government-led or sanctioned development plans, potential (foreign) investors, and political developments that might (negatively) impact the communities living in Namhkam and Kayah State respectively. They submit regular reports on potentially harmful interventions, human rights violations, and the ongoing lack of services to the local, state, and Union authorities.

ILGIs raise awareness among communities and mobilise citizens to act or participate. UP, KNGY, and MACDO organise regular educational trainings on politics and development, and awareness trainings on land and human rights. The UP and KNGY further help communities organise themselves and lead protests against decisions by authorities that (may) lead to human rights violations, or otherwise negatively impact local communities or the environment.

ILGIs resolve disputes and mediate local conflict within the community as well as conflicts among communities and other actors, including government actors, EAOs, and companies. As described in greater detail above, community dispute resolution is the most important task of the traditional authorities in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee. The UP and KNGY are more involved in conflicts among communities and outside actors (authorities, companies, or EAOs). By con-

58 trast, MACDO is rarely involved in dispute resolution. The institution maintains that disputes are best solved at village level, and respects traditional dispute resolution.

ILGIs provide services that can be considered state-like. Examples include: the funeral support and ambulance service provided by the UP; the community schools built and supplied, and teachers trained by the KNGY; and the dozens of kindergartens, primary and high schools and other infrastructure projects (roads, water sanitation systems) built by MACDO. As described above, the traditional authorities in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee are primarily responsible for delivery of all services in their community: from road construction, to building schools, providing electricity, and garbage collection.

ILGIs make (unwritten) rules and regulations and codes of conduct for their communities or followers. They also enforce the rules and regulations in the community and ensures compliance. This is especially true under the traditional authorities in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee who make the rules and regulations for their communities, and enforce them by imposing fines or other punishments in case of non-compliance.

ILGIs provide welfare-support to community members in need. The UP cooperates with various other CSOs, religious organisations, and community organisations to provide land and services to internally displaced persons that have fled to Namhkan over the past decades. MACDO supports the region’s most poor and rural villages by setting up Micro Finance Groups (described above). In Lweyin Mingalar, the Okata provides villagers in need with (monetary) support whenever necessary (e.g., funeral costs).

ILGIs promote the culture and literature of the ethnic group(s) they represent. They also organise cultural and religious events. All visited ILGIs, except MACDO, organise yearly festivals focusing on traditional music, history telling, and dance. They also aim to maintain their cultures by promoting and innovating their dance and instruments.

Finally, ILGIs invest own funds, or generate funds from external sources for local investments. While, members of the UP invest personal funds, the KNGY and MACDO generate funds from community donations and various donors. The traditional authorities collect taxes and donations from their constituents.

59 4.2 Interface

To establish how the functions ILGIs perform relate to State functions the following section will determine whether the ILGIs in our case studies complement, substitute, accommodate or compete with the State, based on their objectives and the effectiveness of State institutions.77

COMPLEMENT

When State institutions are perceived to be effective and State and informal local governance institutions’ objectives are compatible: ILGIs complement State institutions.

Nyo Mee Village Tract

Nyo Mee’s administrative structure fits perfectly within — and complements — the governance structure in the Pa’O SAZ and, to a certain extent, mirrors village tract administration in the government-administered territories. In fact, although the Okata of the Ohn council emphasised that: “the Pa’O people in the Self-Administered Zone do not follow Burmese rules or Burmese authorities,” he also added that: “we are not against the Burmese government and the Ohn often works with Burmese authorities.”

Indeed, there seems to be mutual respect between government actors and the traditional leaders in Nyo Mee. The Ohn council often cooperates with the GAD and with government offices present in Hopong. Moreover, due to their vicinity to Taunggyi, Nyo Mee’s leaders also work with W/ VTAs outside the SAZ. For instance, the Ward Administrator from Kyauk Gong (a ward under Taunggyi Township, adjacent to Nyo Mee village tract), works together with the Ohn council and the individual Phradons in Nyo Mee to organise mobile health clinics (for vaccines, child care, maternity issues) and big festivals. Additionally, when the Ohn council needs (financial) support for development projects, the Kyauk Gong Administrator sometimes advocates on its behalf to the local DAO-office. In fact, Nyo Mee receives more support from the Taunggyi DAO office than from the SAZ Leading Body.

Naturally, the Ohn council also cooperates with the PNO authorities in the SAZ. The Ohn Okata has regular meetings with Leading Body and Wein-nel representatives, in which community needs and development policies are discussed.The Wein-nel may request the Ohn council to collect money for certain development projects. However, the Ohn council decides how much money can be raised. Additionally, as described above, matters that cannot be resolved at Ohn council level can be forwarded to the Hopong Wein-nel, and eventually the Leading Body, for

77 Helmke and Levitsky 2006; Note: The analysis in Chapter 4.1 is based only on interviews with the ILGIs and can therefore only offer tentative conclusions. Follow-up interviews with authorities are necessary to confirm the conclusions drawn here.

60 a final ruling. Finally, the Pa’O National Army works with the Ohn council to deal with crimes committed in Nyo Mee.

In conclusion, the Ohn council fills a sub-municipal gap in local governance and addresses issues not dealt with by government or PNO institutions. As such, they enhance the efficiency of local governance by contributing to a more effective delivery of state functions.

Mon Area Community Development Organisation

As described above, State authorities and the NMSP both playing significant — and concurrent — roles in public life. However, as the NMSP’s role in service provision started declining, CSOs like MACDO have proliferating to fill the gaps. Consequently, MACDO and local government/ State/NMSP representatives are active in a number of similar domains, including: education, rural development, and land governance.

MACDO cooperates closely with the NMSP’s Department of Education to bring education to the region. In fact, MACDO has become the most important actor, in the target areas, for providing education support and building Mon National Schools. MACDO further cooperates with State actors, for instance by connecting communities to development projects planned by government institutions like the Department of Rural Development. Recently, government authorities have started asking MACDO’s advice in deciding on development policies. Consequently, MACDO does not simply exist alongside State/NMSP institutions, but rather plays a key role contributing to a more effective delivery of functions by addressing issues not dealt with by authorities.

Moreover, MACDO tries to enhance the efficiency of State institutions by ensuring local knowledge and participation. For instance, MACDO cooperates with the Ye, Yebyu, and Dawei Township Farmland Management Bodies (and the underlying W/VTA Farmland Management Bodies) and the Settlement and Land Records Department township offices, to provide systematic land-registration trainings based on the 2012 Farmland Law throughout the target areas.

Because MACDO is decidedly non-political and because their objectives are compatible with State institutions’, authorities do not take issue with their activities. In fact, the majority of MAC- DO’s work takes place in extremely rural areas where government/NMSP actors have little to no oversight. Nevertheless, MACDO informs township and NMSP authorities of all activities, especially when they give trainings. MACDO’s relationship with village tract and village level authorities is closer, as these leaders are involved in all MACDO’s development activities and trainings (e.g., the respective VTAs are always members of the village committees set up by MACDO to organise/oversee local development projects).

61 In conclusion, MACDO contributes to regional stability and development by contributing to the efficiency of township and government authorities.

ACCOMMODATE

When State institutions are perceived to be effective and State and informal local governance institutions’ objectives are incompatible: ILGIs accommodate State institutions.

Campaign for Unity Preservation

The UP does not directly contest or compete with township or state/Union government authorities. They dislike the outcomes generated by these authorities, but are unable to change or openly violate the official rules. Instead, they search for ways of working with the existing institutions, while seeking incompatible objectives.

The UP and official actors are active in a number of similar domains. There is, however, no direct cooperation or coordination between the two actors. The UP approaches township authorities through its members who, as yah mi yah pha, are involved in township, ward and village tract affairs. Similarly, formal actors approach UP-members in their capacity as elders. Divergent interests between the UP and authorities are visible especially with regard to local development. According to the UP, Namhkam’s development should be sustainable, based on community needs and protection of the environment. Official institutions’, on the other hand, seek development through large-scale (investment) projects by government cronies and foreign companies. Potential (negative) effects on Namhkam’s communities or the environment seem to be largely ignored, with some citizens stating that township authorities support “their own or Burmese interests” rather than considering what is best for Namhkam. There is a running joke between UP members and township authorities: “whenever a new [development project] is planned the Township Administrator asks us to please cover our eyes, and we ask the Administrator how much pocket money he received.”

Although there is no official recognition of the UP as an organisation representing ‘the voice’ of Namhkam’s communities, township authorities seemingly acknowledge the importance of working with the them. The UP’s role as broker of information and intermediary communication point allows authorities to reach communities and to understand potential grievances. Moreover, village leaders and VTAs put a lot of trust in the UP and, consequently, the UP can help township authorities gain support from village-level leaders. Furthermore, as a mediator of local conflicts, the UP simply cannot be ignored: they represent communities in disputes with Tatmadaw, EAOs, and authorities. Finally, the UP’s close relation to EAOs and the fact that they have their ear to the ground in all Namhkam’s communities, makes them a valuable source of information on local security issues and (drug-related) criminal matters.

62 In conclusion, although the UP does not necessarily enhance the efficiency of township or government authorities, they contribute to regional stability by dampening the ever growing demands for change.

SUBSTITUTE

When State institutions are perceived to be ineffective and State and informal local governance institutions’ objectives are compatible: ILGIs substitute State institutions.

Lweyin Mingalar

The functions of Lweyin Mingalar’s administrative and tribal leaders — as set out above — all fall within domains in which the government and local authorities should be active: dispute resolution, justice, legislating, law enforcement, provision of services, municipal governance, and welfare support. However, for decades, Lweyin Mingalar has experienced a complete lack of effective government-led service delivery or community development. State institutions in the region are weak and, as a result, the leaders of Lweyin Mingalar are doing what State institutions are meant — but fail — to do.

There is no real distribution of decision-making responsibilities between the leaders of Lweyin Mingalar and other local authorities or government actors. In fact, the leaders have absolutely no contact with the Pékon TSA. Moe Bye’s village tract’s VTA meets with all village leaders once a month. In these meetings, the VTA passes on information from higher authorities and village leaders can update the VTA on the situation in their village and express their needs and grievances. Until 2015 Lweyin Mingalar’s Okata had to ask permission for any development activity, cultural event, etc. Since this is no longer necessary, Lweyin Mingalar is now mostly ignored by the VTA. They often ask for support for planned development projects, but the VTA’s budget is so small that such requests are always denied (the only exception being when the VTA helped Lweyin Mingalar secure two million kyats for a new school building from the Department of Education).

Lweyin Mingalar’s leaders do not communicate with Union government authorities, nor with security actors (police, Tatmadaw, EAOs). The Department of Rural Development has never carried out activities in Lweyin Mingalar or — to the leaders’ knowledge — in the immediate region. The Departments of Healthcare and Education are, to a small extent, more involved, providing: monthly vaccination schemes, funding for new school buildings, and salaries for six teachers.

Relations with the government have gotten slightly better since the end of the military regime, under which Lweyin Mingalar was continually targeted by Tatmadaw because it was considered

63 a “place where people would meet underground.” Moreover, as mentioned above the Shan State government officially recognised the effectivity of Lweyin Mingalar’s administrative structure in 2014.

Kayan New Generation Youth

KNGY and local/Union government officials operate in a number of same domains: education, conflict mediation, land governance. However, government institutions in Kayah are notoriously weak and, in some instances, lack authority due to decades of conflict and the region’s remote- ness. They are therefore incapable of effectively carrying out their functions. KNGY tries to fill the gaps in service and public goods delivery and rural development by carrying out functions that authorities fail to.

KNGY has good relations with ward/village tract and township administrators, due to compatible objectives: development of infrastructure and communication and improving education in Kayah. Many local authorities are embracing the changes happening in Myanmar, and are helping KNGY organise and secure government-permission for trainings and demonstrations, and helping them set up the community-led development committees. Conflicts only arise when dealing with land and human rights issues arising from large-scale (investment) projects by government cronies or foreign companies. The township authorities support government decisions in these matters, while KNGY’s priority is the well-being of local communities and the environment.

Because KNGY is not registered, official cooperation between Union government authorities and the institution is difficult. According to the Kayan Minister of Ethnic Affairs (KMEA): “The government is very cunning. They hold KNGY’s non-registration above their head while simultaneously enjoying the fact that KNGY is carrying out government tasks.” Moreover, because KNGY is considered to be ‘anti-authority’, attempts at cooperation often end in conflict. KNGY is of the opinion that authorities object to their activities mainly because, even with the democratic changes taking place in Myanmar, they cannot accept other actors carrying out governance functions. Even in the education domain, where KNGY’s role is undeniable, cooperation with the government remains a thorny issue. For years, KNGY has been advocating for funding and recognition for KNGY-trained teachers and KNGY community schools, mostly to no avail. According to the KMEA, the government should accept KNGY as an important governance actor in the State which they can, and should, use to gain a better understanding of local issues.

Interestingly, over the last year, government and security actors have slowly but surely become more open-minded towards KNGY and their activities. For instance, some security actors are embracing change and participating in KNGY human rights trainings. Authorities have also started acknowledging the important role KNGY plays in bringing education to Kayah’s most remote area and, increasingly, they are inviting KNGY to policy meetings on education and health.

64 Indeed, under the current government, changes in KNGY’s role have slowly become visible, with the institution becoming more of a link (or a buffer) between authorities and local communities. Although KNGY remains critical of the government, they are no longer working (mostly) against it and, consequently, are able to connect government services and public goods to remote communities that have been isolated from the government for the past six decades.

COMPETE

When State institutions are perceived to be ineffective and State and informal local governance institutions’ objectives are incompatible: ILGIs compete with State institutions. Non of the ILGIs visited for the purpose of this project truly compete with formal institutions. Nevertheless, such institutions certainly exist in Myanmar, most notably in the form of ethnic armed organisations. EAOs in Myanmar can co-exist with State institutions (e.g. Karen National Union) or not (e.g. Kachin Independence Organisation), but in all instances their objectives are decidedly incompatible. In some regions of Myanmar, the State is weak and therefore unable to bring EAOs under its control, thus the EAOs present a strong alternative to State governance. Because the EAOs are based on different systems and procedures, the rules and decisions of the State and EAOs differ and it is consequently very difficult for communities to adhere to both sets of rules and decisions at the same time. As a result, it is difficult to imagine the potential utility of EAOs for creating a third tier or local government in Myanmar.

65 66 HOW ILGIs DO IT: Power and Legitimacy

67 68 V. How ILGIs Do It: Power and Legitimacy

The previous section offered an analysis of what kind of roles ILGIs play in Myanmar’s local governance and, specifically, how the ILGIs interrelate with official institutions. The following chapters aim to generate a better understanding of a) how the ILGIs achieve and maintain a certain position within society (power); and b) why, how, and to what extent the ILGIs’ power is considered rightful by different stakeholders (legitimacy).78

5.1 Power

ILGIs exercise a degree of general territorial public authority. This can happen at any level: household, local, regional, or national:

■■ The Campaign for Unity Preservation (UP) exercises a degree of authority over the communities living in Namhkam Township and is considered a powerful actor by locals and government actors alike. ■■ In Lweyin Mingalar, the elected ward leaders and Nayakas exercise authority over a number of households, while the Okata and the Nayaka council have authority over the whole village. ■■ In Nyo Mee, the Phradons and Samatis exercise authority over their respective villages, while the Ohn council has authority over all forty-eight villages in the village tract. ■■ Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY) exercises a degree of authority over all of Kayah State (and Kayan communities living elsewhere) and is considered a powerful actor by local communities and state/government authorities. ■■ Mon Area Community Development Organisation (MACDO) exercises a degree of authority over all people living within their target areas (Ye, Yebyu, and Dawei townships).

The following section focuses on visible (observable) and hidden (behind the scenes) dimensions of power. Internalised beliefs about power relations (invisible power), while relevant in Myan- mar’s context, fall outside the scope of this analysis. Instead, the focus will lie on the forms of power that the ILGIs exercise (power over, power to, or power with) and the different power resources harnessed by them.79

78 Byrne 2016, 10; Note: The analysis in Chapter 5 is based to a large extent on interviews with the ILGIs and can therefore only offer tentative conclusions. Follow-up interviews with (more) authorities and community members are necessary to confirm the conclusions drawn here.. 79 Byrne 2016, 10; Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (2011). ‘Tool 2: Drivers of Change’, SDC East Asia Division, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Political Economy and Development Network [hereinafter: SDC 2011], 12; A. M. Acosta and J. Pettit (2013). ‘Practical Guide: A Combined Approach to Political Economy and Power Analysis - Discussion Note Prepared for the Swiss Development Cooperation’, Swiss Development Cooperation, Institute of Development Studies, Democratisation, Decentralisation and Local Governance Network (work in progress paper) [hereinafter: Acosta and Pettit 2013] 11-12, 15-16.

69 FORMS OF POWER

The most commonly recognised form of power exercised by ILGIs is power over. At its most basic, power over can be defined as authority, control, or domination. The traditional leaders in Nyo Mee and Lweyin Mingalar, who base their authority on written and unwritten rules and customs, control decision-making processes and resources. As the Ohn Okata In Nyo Mee explained: “Traditionally the Pa’O […] put a lot of trust in their leaders and always follow their decisions.” Power over has many negative associations (repression, discrimination, abuse). Although such associations were not mentioned by villagers spoken to, further research is necessary to establish the negative implications of forms of power exercised by traditional authorities in Myanmar’s rural, remote areas. Indeed, it is easy to see how such leaders might control — and constrain — the powerless in their communities. For instance, according to the Lweyin Mingalar’s Rules and Regulations, a couple who gets married without the permission of the village leaders will be fined 15,000 kyat. If a villager marries someone of a different religion, a fine of 30,000 kyat applies.80

ILGIs also exercise power to, by making communities aware of their ability to act and to effect change. Most of the UP’s activities, for instance, are geared towards empowering local communities to understand their rights. KNGY similarly empowers communities: from the early years when they offered Kayan youth an alternative to violence as a way to deal with their grievances, to their current mission which focuses on educating Kayan people to know their rights. MACDO’s power is also derived from their ability to bring ‘power to’: developing communities’ skills and capacities by giving livelihood, land, and development trainings. KNGY and MACDO further empower villagers and village leaders to take responsibility for and ownership of their own development by setting up community-driven development projects.

Finally, ILGIs exercise power with (collective action). The UP aims to create shared understand- ings and unity between Namhkan’s communities and offers villagers a platform for collective action against government-led or sanctioned projects. KNGY supports collective action against the government, Tatmadaw, and investors. They give trainings on human rights, land rights, and the environment, and when such rights are violated by government-led or sanctioned development projects, KNGY helps villagers form representative committees and organise protests.

The forms of power exercised by ILGIs do not always fit into the mentioned categories. The UP’s authority, for instance, goes beyond empowering and unifying local communities. They also represent local communities in disputes with EAOs, companies, and authorities (including Tatmadaw). Indeed, villagers approach UP for a variety of issues, because: “the UP does not just talk, they really represent us and help us for our development.” KNGY’s authority similarly goes beyond empowering local communities to act for their own rights and development. As one of

80 Lweyin Mingalar Rules and Regulations, Rule 1.

70 KNGY’s leaders explained: “Villagers come to us for all their issues, for basically everything, because we form the main link between them and the authorities.” In fact, as described above, KNGY is so involved in Kayah State’s governance (e.g., dispute resolution; protection against violations of land and human rights; providing education), that some consider them to be a “like a local government”.

POWER RESOURCES

Power, for the purpose of this paper, can be further examined through the degree of control over material, human, intellectual, and financial resources exercised by ILGIs. The extent of power of an ILGI is correlated to how many different kinds of resources they can access or and control. The ILGIs in our case studies base their authority on a number of resources including: position (social or spiritual), financial resources, knowledge and experience, negotiation capacity, or networking.

ILGIs can have position power. They achieve influence through good image, visibility, and reputation, and through their ability to influence formal decision-makers. The UP’s members, as yah mi yah pha, are trusted and respected by local communities. As members of various Devel- opment Support Committees, and through their close relationships with EAOs and other regional armed groups, they influence decisions about Namhkan’s development regional security. KNGY similarly achieves influence through visibility and reputation and, more recently, through their access to the decision-making table. According to the Kayan Minister of Ethnic Affairs (Shan State): “many Kayan communities think the government is useless and not important. KNGY has been around longer than the government and have a very good reputation because they are effective.” The traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee derive their authority from their positions within the (customary) institutional structure. Villagers implement their leaders’ decisions without question, simply because it is what is expected of them. For example, in Lwe- yin Mingalar, the Ohn council is traditionally considered to be the final decision maker even though all matters may be referred to the Hopong Wein-nel. In fact, due to traditional beliefs and social control, villagers who choose to refer to the Wein-nel risk becoming estranged from their communities. Interestingly, both sets of traditional leaders have noticed that, lately, younger generations are becoming more vocal and are less ‘afraid’ to challenge their leaders’ decisions.

Some ILGIs have financial power: They base their power on the financial resources they can mobilise. The UP, for instance, is able to carry out a wide range of activities through the funds they generate from member and community donations and contributions from other organisations (especially the SNDP). KNGY has seen a great expansion of their activities and, consequently, better relations with local communities, after they started receiving funding from a variety of donors since 2013. MACDO similarly has financial power. As a village headmen in Ye Township

71 (Thé Kone village) mentioned: “[MACDO] has a lot of funding for development projects while village leaders can only access donations from villagers and monasteries.”

ILGIs might have expert power: Their power is based on their knowledge and experience. The UP’s members constantly keep abreast of the political situation and planned development in Namhkan, and share this information with communities through trainings and discussion groups. In Kayah State, the education level is very low and communities have great respect for KNGY because its members are deemed knowledgeable about politics, human rights, and regional af- fairs81. Members of KNGY and MACDO are also influential because they are considered experts in local community development. For instance, a village headman in Ye Township explained: “[MACDO] has a lot of experience and we need them share their knowledge with us so that we can make good decisions about Thé Kone’s development.” The traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee also achieve influence through knowledge and experience. Nayakas in Lweyin Mingalar are considered to be “wise old men, who know about the village, the tribes, and [the] values.” The Nayaka council is considered, by virtue of the the Nayakas’ collective knowledge and experience, to be the most powerful actor in the village. In Nyo Mee, the Samati council serves as an advisory body, a source of expertise gathered, not from formal studies or employment, but rather “from life itself, the endless process of trial and error — their own and that observed of others.” Ohns are usually former Samatis, and are chosen for their good leadership skills. Communities put a lot of trust in the knowledge of the Ohns.

ILGIs further have negotiation power: Their power is based on their good communication and social skills, as well as their negotiation and advocacy skills. The UP, for instance, is the main facilitator of dialogue in local disputes: between political parties and EAOs active in the region, between EAOs and local communities, and between local communities and authorities. The influence of the UP and KNGY is also based to a large extent on their ability to negotiate and advocate for communities facing land and human rights violations. KNGY and MACDO have further built relationships with all W/VTAs and village headmen in their target areas and uphold these relationships through their Zone Organisers and Village Facilitators respectively, who remain in constant communication with local communities. Furthermore, UP, KNGY, and MACDO involve village leaders and communities in all steps of decision-making, which is why their decisions are accepted by villagers. Villagers in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee put a great trust in their traditional leaders’ ability to resolve disputes and decide on village matters due to their good communication and social skills and the way they manage conflicts. Leaders are very involved with their ‘constituents’ and easy to approach, and all matters are decided by consensus. When disagreements arise, all opinions and facts are publicly reviewed.

81 Although KNGY-members are deemed very knowledgeable by local communities, KNGY’s leaders feel that the lack of education of KNGY’s members (only thirty percent have finished high-school), is one of the main challenges the institution faces.

72 Finally, ILGIs might have networking power: Through various alliances they are able to increase their leverage in dealings with government actors. The UP and KNGY, through their various formal and informal alliances with political parties, other CSOs, and community organisations, have been able to more effectively carry out activities in Namhkan and Kayah State respectively. For instance, the UP cooperates with eight other local civil society and community-based organisations to provide land and services to IDP’s based in Namhkam. Moreover, the UP’s alliances with EAOs and people’s militia groups have increased their leverage with township actors who need their support when dealing with armed groups.

CHALLENGES TO POWER

The greatest challenge to the five ILGIs’ power is the (lack of) cooperation with and hostility from (local) authorities. Township authorities in Namhkam regularly threaten the UP with arrests or fines, especially when they carry out unsanctioned protests. KNGY is considered a ‘trouble maker’ by authorities, and because they are not registered, getting a seat at the decision-making table is very difficult. Simultaneously, KNGY fears that if they do register, authorities would misuse the information that KNGY would then be obligated to supply about their activities, members, and budget. Moreover, since KNGY is providing services that should be provided by the government, they fear that, once registered, the government would shut down their activities. MACDO’s biggest challenge is the (required) cooperation with authorities. For instance, MACDO is currently systematically helping villagers in their target areas to register their land. However, as the Director explained: “authorities are always busy, and don’t want to help us.” The traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar’s authority is also compromised by lack of recognition and support from government authorities. For instance, their requests for a second power transformer for the village have been ignored for over a year.

Other (powerful) local actors, also threaten the ILGI’s authority. For instance, when the UP was leading protests against the silicon mining activities of several Chinese companies, the companies offered members of Namhkam’s Township Development Support Committee (also members of the UP) two-hundred-million kyat bribes to stop the protests. After refusing, the leader of the talks was attacked in his home (although it was never established who carried out the attack). Moreover, many (foreign) companies are supported by People’s Militia Groups, who threaten members of the UP when they carry out activities against the companies. The UP’s members have also been sued by companies who have had to discontinue activities due to protests.

The biggest challenge to the power of traditional leaders’ in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee is their financial capacity. Although the leaders have many big (long term) development plans, villagers are very poor and can only donate small amounts at a time — regular small amounts in Nyo Mee and yearly bigger amounts in Lweyin Mingalar. It can therefore take years to save enough money for a project.

73 5.2 Legitimacy

The legitimacy analysis is closely linked to the power analysis. Without legitimacy, power can only be exerted through coercion or force. However, as described above, only the traditional leaders in Nyo Mee and Lweyin Mingalar actually have ‘power over’ their constituents, and there is no evidence that these actors exert their power through force. The ILGIs’ must therefore also be considered legitimate. The following analysis aims to give insight into why, and to what extent ILGIs’ power is considered ‘rightful’, by examining on what basis different actors accept the ILGIs’ governance roles. The ILGIs in our case studies base their legitimacy on a number of resources including: custom and tradition, everyday practice, public authority, the services they provide, and external recognition.82

The legitimacy of ILGIs can be based on custom and tradition, their being culturally imbedded in local contexts. Indeed, all five ILGIs base their legitimacy in part on a sense of shared culture and history with the communities they represent (as opposed to Burmese authorities). This is especially visible in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee. The legitimacy of traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar comes from having deep historical roots and from having become institution- alised in everyday practice over time. For generations, Lweyin Mingalar’s administration system has remained the same. Nevertheless, over the last few decades, as the village grew from one hundred to 350 households, calls for more transparency and better representation have led to changes that illuminate the leadership structure’s flexibility — more Nayakas to represent new tribes in Lweyin Mingalar and better territorial representation in the form of elected ward-leaders. Accordingly the leadership structure remains highly representative, which is a further source of their legitimacy. The traditional leadership structure in Nyo Mee (and the rest of the Pa’O SAZ) has similarly been in place for generations. The Ohn Okata in Nyo Mee was adamant that: “the Pa’O people in the Self-Administered Zone do not follow Burmese rules or Burmese authorities.” Indeed, unlike in many other places in Myanmar, the traditional authorities have been maintained and even sustained alongside the growth of modern formal institutions in the Pa’O SAZ. The main source of the leaders’ legitimacy seems to be the familiarity that community members have with them. They understand how they function, and trust the values of their leaders. However, with new generations becoming more vocal against traditional leaders and practices, the legitimacy enjoyed by traditional leaders in the Pa’O SAZ might become less automatic in the future. Nevertheless, this traditional leadership structure remains culturally imbedded, and maintains legitimacy by representing community interests.

ILGIs’ popular legitimacy can also be based on their everyday practice: their connection with constituents, decision-making processes, and accessibility. The five ILGIs derive legitimacy from popular belief that, in contrast to government officials, they understand the local context

82 Byrne 2016, 10-11, 21-22; Mohmand 2015, 12-15.

74 and prevailing norms. According to one villager in Namhkam: “Burmese authorities do not share our interests and values. Authorities just want companies and investors to come. But the UP understands our interests, that is why we trust them.” Similarly, villagers in Lweyin Min- galar and Nyo Mee implicitly trust the values and ethics of their leaders. In Lweyin Mingalar, this trust is further ensured by the fact that any leader who deviates from commonly accepted norms can be replaced by a ‘decision by consensus’ of his constituents. The decision-making processes within the five ILGIs are a further source of legitimacy. As the villager in Namhkan explained: “Whenever [the UP] does something, they have community meetings to inform the community about their plans. They also ask agreement from the people for the activities. If the community disagrees with the activity, they don’t do it. […] No other leaders are so humble and so honest towards the community.” KNGY and MACDO’s decision-making processes, which is based on continuous public consultation, is similarly a source of trust and legitimacy. Moreover, unlike government institutions that carry out development projects in a piecemeal, unsustainable manner, KNGY and MACDO are constantly involved in development of their target areas, not least through their respective Zone Organisers and Village Facilitators. Traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee similarly take decisions in a way that is considered socially just: by consensus and after hearing all parties.

The ILGIs in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee further derive legitimacy from the exercise of public authority. Legitimacy and public authority are mutually reinforcing. To effectively exercise their authority the traditional leaders need legitimacy. However, by exercising their public authority, the leaders claim and maintain their legitimacy. Leaders in Lweyin Mingalar make rules and regulations, which are implemented by villagers without question. These leaders can further exercise their public authority by fining or otherwise punishing those who do not implement their decisions or those who violate (customary) rules and regulations. In Nyo Mee, the traditional leaders’ exercise of public authority is most aptly illustrated through customary dispute resolution practices. Indeed, the fact that choosing to refer a dispute or legal matter to the Hopong Wein-nel or a Burmese court risks ostracisation by other villagers shows how the Ohn council maintains its legitimacy through exercising its public authority.

Legitimacy is further based on output, the services ILGIs provide. The failure of local and Union government authorities to effectively carry out their functions is in itself a significant legitimat- ing factor for ILGIs in Myanmar. In Namhkam, because authorities fail to protect citizens from harmful interventions, communities turn to the UP for help. KNGY tries to fill the gaps left by notoriously weak government institutions in Kayah that cannot effectively provide services, public goods, or development. People in remote areas have no choice but to rely on KNGY-services (especially for education and community development). Similarly, MACDO aims to fill a governance gap left by the NMSP, whose role in public service delivery declined over the past decades. Again, the inability of State and NMSP authorities to fulfil their responsibilities itself

75 legitimates MACDO as a local governance actor. As the village headman from Thé Kone explained: “The government should be performing these activities because it’s their job. Building schools and infrastructure falls under the government. However, they are not doing it, so MAC- DO has to.” The success of Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee’s traditional leadership structures is also a reflection of the failure of formal institutions to fulfil their roles and responsibilities, as the absence of government provided services has forced villagers to turn to informal systems. Interestingly, whereas elsewhere in Myanmar attempts have been made to dilute the power of traditional authorities, public officials in the Pa’O SAZ have often encouraged traditional leaders (like in Nyo Mee) to take on governance-functions that they are unable to fulfil, thereby validating their utility and presence and reinforcing their legitimacy.83 In all five cases it can be argued that ILGIs legitimacy and sustainability is partly ensured until authorities are able to effectively carry out their roles and responsibilities.

Finally, recognition by external actors can have impact on ILGIs’ internal legitimacy. First, their legitimacy may stem from the nature of their relationships with (formal) stakeholders. Indeed, all five ILGIs have gained some legitimacy through (informal) recognition by authorities and other stakeholders. In Namhkan, authorities, EAOs and other local actors recognise the UP as an important governance actor, especially with regard to regional security and protection of local communities. In Kayah State, government authorities have started recognising the importance of including KNGY in policy decisions with regard to health and education. MACDO is recognised by both government and NMSP-authorities as an organisation that is vital to Mon State’s rural development. Nyo Mee’s traditional leadership structure is maintained and sustained by the Leading Body of the Pa’O SAZ (as described above), as well as by Burmese authorities who often work directly with the Ohn council on rural development issues, rather than going through the SAZ’s Leading Body. Even Lweyin Mingalar’s leaders, who rarely cooperate with authorities, have seen their structures partly legitimated by the recognition they received from the Shan State government as ‘best village-level local governance unit’ in the State in 2014. Second, ILGIs are recognised intermediaries through which authorities and citizens can connect with each other. For instance, township and ward/village tract authorities are often tasked with providing a wide range of public services with limited resources. These local actors often rely on ILGIs like the UP, KNGY, and MACDO to connect to communities and for support in carrying out development projects. They thereby provide and underscore the legitimacy of the institution. Finally, KNGY’s legitimacy specifically has been strengthened by recognition from (international) donors and correlated increase in funding since 2012, which has led to an expansion of activities and, therefore, to better relations with local communities.

83 The 2012 Ward and Village Tract Administration Law formally removed the position of ‘100 Households Head’ (roughly equivalent to a village headman) which is thought to have been an attempt to dilute local representation and concentrate power in the ward/ village tract position.

76 WHY ILGIs DO IT: Motivations and Incentives

77 78 VI. Why ILGIs Do It: Motivations and Incentives

The next component of the analytical framework delves into what motivates the ILGIs decisions and actions. In the previous chapters we examined what the ILGIs do (Section 4), and how they are able to do certain things (Section 5). The following chapter explores the question why ILGIs carry out certain functions. The discussion below is based on two themes that were addressed by ILGIs during interviews: a) their motivations; and b) their incentives.84

6.1 Motivations

The motivations of members of the UP, KNGY, and MACDO stem from (historic) grievances, wanting to help own communities and ethnic groups, and a strong sense of ‘giving back’ to the community. The UP’s members got involved in Namhkam’s politics and development because of grievances due to decades-long discrimination, human rights violations, and land grabs and environmental damage committed by government authorities, crony companies, and Tatmadaw in Namhkan. Most of the members participated in the ’88 Revolution’, and were later involved with various ethnic armed organisations. However, they no longer consider violence to be the way forward, and believe instead that by getting involved in local politics they can more effectively protect local communities.

KNGY’s founding members wanted to offer Kayan youth an alternative to the narrative of violence used by EAOs to mobilise displaced youths to join their ranks, offering them shelter and teaching them different methods to deal with their grievances. Now that the focus has shifted to development of the whole Kayah State and its people, KNGY-members remain motivated to carry out their activities because a) they grew up in Kayah and faced challenges due to general lack of development, infrastructure and communication, and education opportunities; or b) they grew up as refugees in Thailand, and want to support the region’s development so that more refugees can return.

MACDO founders’ main motivation was to support communities displaced by armed conflict and development projects. Although the attention soon shifted to the development of all communities living in the target areas, the motivation has remained the same: to support rural communities in their development needs. The current leaders and staff of MACDO grew up in the rural areas around Ye and faced many challenges due to lacking infrastructure and education opportunities. They are motivated to reach the underdeveloped remote areas that are ‘forgotten’ by the government and the NMSP, because villagers there remain uneducated and unaware of their rights.

By contrast, the main motivation for traditional leaders in Lweyin Mingalar and Nyo Mee for taking on their roles stems from a sense of duty. As the Okata of Lweyin Mingalar explained:

84 Byrne 2016, 12.

79 “If villagers elect us, we cannot decline. We should do the right thing for the village, help the village. This is our duty.” Similarly, the Phradons in Nyo Mee’s villages cannot refuse the position, once elected by the Samati council. According to Nyo Mee’s Ohn Okata: “The Phradons do not dare oppose [the Samati-council’s] decision as that would signify disrespect. They know how to choose a good leader who can do a lot for the village, in terms of unity, understanding and development.” The Ohns, elected by villagers they represent, can reject the offer but this only happens when an elected Ohn believes he would be unable to fulfil his duties.

6.2 Incentives

ILGIs’ incentives to become or remain involved in local governance are mostly social. Members are often greatly respected by local communities. According to the Ohn Okata in Nyo Mee: “It is a great honour to be chosen as Phradon or Ohn.” ILGIs’ like UP, KNGY, and MACDO are often also respected by local authorities and politicians.

The incentives for UP and KNGY members to remain involved are also partly political. Al- though the UP formally operates independent of the SNDP, its origins and motivations are decidedly political. Many members believe that change can be effected only through politics, making the SNDP a vital partner in the UP’s activities. Political incentives are also important for KNGY-members, many of which view membership as a stepping stone to getting involved in local or state politics.

ILGIs can also have financial incentives to carry out activities. For instance, before the current Okata’s election in 1992, no-one in Lweyin Mingalar wanted to take this role because of the highly volatile security situation at the time. Tatmadaw and EAOs would regularly come to the village and force the Okata to collect tax or nominate villagers to become porters. It was then decided that each household would donate a basket of paddy at the end of each year to compen- sate the Okata for security concerns that came with his position. This system is still in place, but the proceeds are now divided between all members of the administrative council. MACDO pays all staff members a monthly salary, certainly an incentive in an area where unemployment rates are high.

Nevertheless, financial incentives are not decisive. The UP’s members work as volunteers and are, in fact, expected to make yearly contributions to the institution. Nayakas in Lweyin Min- galar do not receive any form of financial compensation for their time or efforts, neither do any of the traditional leaders in Nyo Mee. KNGY ’staff’-members do not receive salaries for their work but receive a monthly stipend and are given a bed in the ‘KNGY-house’, where food is also provided. According to one leader: “We are like a family, we live together and we work together. When one member needs extra money to get married or for a funeral, we try to help.” General members and Zone Organisers do not receive any financial support, but are compensated whenever possible for their costs (e.g., travel expenses).

80 CONCLUSIONS 82 VII. Conclusions

The analysis of the five informal local governance institutions (ILGIs) brought some useful insights into their functions and how these can be translated into state functions; the power resources they mobilise; their basis of their legitimacy for these functions; and their motivations for certain decisions and actions. Although viewed as extra-legal, unofficial, or unsanctioned by official authorities, ILGIs often work with the knowledge and help of the Union Government and its sub-agencies, and frequently act as mediators between them and the local population.

They have three defining characteristics: 1. They are state-like, i.e. they enjoy general local territorial authority and deliver services dealing with a wide range of issues and exercising authority over entire locally resident populations; 2. They stand in ambiguous, variable, and contested relationships to the formal state apparatus; 3. Their mediation duties between ‘their’ populations and external actors constitutes a significant part of their activities. Apart from performing public functions, they determine how ‘their’ population can access government programmes (e.g. sanitation, (road) construction.

ILGIs functions depend mostly on the needs of the communities they represent, the geographical or political situation. Some ILGIs focus more on certain functions than on others. These include brokering information / being an intermediary between citizen and state actors or between communities and (local) authorities /service providers and so create mutual understanding. They also actively engage with authorities on behalf of the communities and fundraise for their services (e.g., to fund teachers, schools).

Dispute resolution and mediation is done within the community, between different communities and other actors, including government actors. Community dispute resolution is frequently one of the most important tasks of ILGIs that have roots in traditional authorities. In contrast, ILGIs that do not have these roots leave such functions to traditional dispute mediator. Within the community, ILGIs provide advice and guidance on personal and family issues and on how to deal with authorities in general or in specific cases (e.g. human rights violations or in cases of environmental damage). In many cases ILGIs represent their community in advisory councils and meetings.

Often ILGIs monitor political context and economic development, the delivery of services by the authorities and potentially harmful interventions (by government actors or others) and document such violations and lack of service and submit regular reports to the local state and Union authorities. They also raise awareness among communities and mobilise citizens to act or participate.

83 For this purpose, they organise educational training on politics, development, and human rights. The analysis of the five ILGIs show without doubt that they provide services that can be considered as state-like. They make (unwritten) rules and codes of conduct for their communities or followers and enforce these law-like rule in the communities and ensure compliance and sanction breaches, when necessary.

ILGIs can also provide welfare for community members in need. As the analysis has shown, they also include internally displaced persons coming from other areas or communities. ILGIs also promote culture in order to maintain cultural and religious values and traditions, and to this goal organise various events. Most ILGIs generate their own funds from communities (taxes or donations) or externally.

Through the functions ILGIs carry out they can interrelate with official institutions in various ways: they can complement, accommodate, substitute or compete with the state, based on their objectives and the effectiveness of state institutions.

Complement (e.g. Nyo Mee Village Tract or MACDO): state institutions are perceived to be effective and State and ILGIs’ objectives are compatible. This relationship is often characterised by mutual respect and cooperation between the ILGI and official actors. ILGIs fill gaps and enhance the efficiency of local governance by contributing to a more effective delivery of state functions, especially to areas with little or no oversight.

Accommodate (e.g. UP): state functions are perceived to be effective and State and ILGIs’ objectives are incompatible. This relationship is more prone to conflicts, since one side usually dislikes the outcomes generated by the other side. Since ILGIs are not able to challenge or change the situation, they look for ways to work with existing institutions, still seeking incompatible objectives. Cooperation or coordination between the actors is usually indirect through other traditional ways. ILGIs in this function do not necessarily enhance the efficiency of township or government authorities but can contribute to regional stability.

Substitute (e.g. Lweyin Mingalar, Kayan New Generation Youth): state institutions are perceived to be ineffective and State and informal local governance institutions’ objectives are compatible. Due to a strong absence of official actors and a lack of effective services delivery, ILGIs often operate in government actors’ domains. Communication between the two is generally weak, inexistent, or even hostile – especially when government sees their authority questioned. There is no distribution of responsibilities or support of the ILGIs financially. But with the recent push towards more democratic governance, the government has become more open-minded towards such ILGIs and their activities, acknowledging the importance of the services they provide.

84 Compete: state institutions are perceived to be ineffective and State and informal local governance institutions’ objectives are incompatible. Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs, such groups are not included here) are usually groups that compete with government. EAOs present a strong alternative to State governance but differ so inherently from state institutions that it is difficult for communities to adhere to both sets of rules and decisions at the same time. The potential utility of EAOs for creating a third tier or local government in Myanmar is questionable.

ILGIs acquire, exercise, maintain and legitimate their authority on different levels and in various ways. Power can be exercised in the form of power over (e.g. Nye Mee and Lweyin Migalar authority based on customs and traditions), power to (e.g. UP, KNGY or MACDO’s activities to empower local population), and power with (e.g. UPs and KNGY’s support for collective action). But the forms of power exercised by the analysed ILGIs does not always fit in these simple categories they overlap or are more complex to fit into a scheme.

The degree of power they exercise over human, material, intellectual and financial resources correlates with their access and control to the different kinds of resources, such as position in communities, financial resources, knowledge and experience, etc. Some of the analysed ILG- Is have positions of power (i.e. the ability to influence formal decision makers or traditional leaders), financial power, expert power (knowledge and experience), negotiation power (good social, communication, negotiation and advocacy skills) and networking power (ability to build formal and informal alliances).

A serious challenge to ILGIs power is the (lack of) cooperation with and hostility from (local) authorities. When ILGIs are not accepted by the authorities, there is often a lack of mutual understanding or cooperation. Threats to ILGIs’ authority can also come from other (powerful) local or international actors. One of the biggest challenge to the power of traditional leaders is their (lack of) financial capacity, especially when they depend on donations from local communities. The analysis showed that ILGIs can be considered legitimate and that actors accept ILGIs governance roles. None of the analysed ILGIs exerted power through force or coercion. The acceptance is based on different resources, such as • custom and tradition: most ILGIs were culturally embedded in local contexts and share culture and history with the communities they represent (e.g. traditional leaders of Lweyin Migalar and Nyo Mee); • everyday practice: meaning the ILGIs connection with constituents (trust), decision-making processes (public consultation), and accessibility (e.g. KNGY and MACDO’s decision making processes which are based on continuous public consultations); • public authority, which is generated and reinforced by legitimacy (e.g. Lweyin Migalar and Nyo Mee); • the services provided, especially in cases were the official actors fail to effectively provide

85 them (e.g. KNGY or MACDO; and • external recognition, either by authorities or other stakeholders (such as EAOs or international donors) (e.g. UP, KNGY and MACDO).

The ILGIs’ motivations to act and carry out certain functions can stem from historic grievances (e.g. decades-long discrimination and human rights violations, land dispossession) and a desire to help communities or specific groups, the need to support development and fight. Some want to offer an alternative for action beyond violence and transmit the tools and knowledge to deal with grievances. ILGIs are often driven by a sense of duty and want to help (rural) communities in need and support them in facing infrastructure and education challenges. Incentives to become and remain involved in local governance are mostly social, sometimes also political or financial, but latter are not decisive, as most analysed ILGIs work on a non-profit or voluntary basis.

The current peace and reform efforts taking place in Myanmar offer a great opportunity to strength- en local governance: finding out what modes of representation are possible and acceptable can push reforms in the right direction and offers a significant contribution to the debate concerning the autonomy of ethnic groups and their aspirations to self-determination, local control, and more accountability. The research aimed primarily at understanding the role informal governance mechanisms – or per definitionem: local actors that are rooted in, and base their authority on, socially shared rules – play in Myanmar and at understanding their potential to support the creation of an effective third tier of government.

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