On the Road to Belgrade Yugoslavia, Third World Neutrals, and the Evolution of Global Non-Alignment, 1954–1961

✣ Aleksandar Zivotiˇ c´ and Jovan Cavoˇ ˇski

During the second half of the twentieth century the strategy of non-alignment became one of the basic doctrinal postulates of Yugoslav foreign policy. This policy of outright disassociation from the dominant bloc structures and open non-adherence to either side in the Cold War competition represented a widely recognized feature of the Yugoslav presence in the areas of bilateral and mul- tilateral political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation. However, the sources and motivations of Yugoslavia’s peculiar foreign policy orientation are now well explained in the international historiography. Yugoslavia’s active foreign policy conduct among leading Third World nations directly contributed to the shaping of the leading political alternative to the existing Cold War divisions.

1950–1953: Constructing Yugoslavia’s Non-Alignment

From 1945 to 1948, Yugoslavia adhered to the Soviet Stalinist model in es- sentially all respects. After the painful split with the Soviet Union and its allies in 1948, Yugoslavia found itself in complete political and economic isolation. From 1948 to 1950, as closer contacts with Western countries were being slowly reestablished, especially with the United States, Yugoslavia searched for a foreign policy alternative that would secure its independence and guarantee future disassociation from the Soviet bloc while also strengthening the country’s socialist system internally. Conclusion of an agreement on economic and military assistance with the United States and its allies in 1951 and an agreement on economic cooperation the following year, as well as indirect inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense system through

Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 18, No. 4, Fall 2016, pp. 79–97, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00681 C 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology

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the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, raised concerns in the Soviet bloc that Yugoslavia might formally ally itself with the West. Such a development would have triggered major internal changes in Yugoslavia, resulting in the gradual erosion of the authority of the ruling Communist Party.1 Squeezed between two blocs and desperately searching for its own independent position, Yugoslavia tried to reaffirm its foreign policy through the forums of the United Nations (UN) as a first viable alternative. This proved to be a means of securing a much more flexible yet stable position in the international arena.2 As for the superpowers, from the beginning the United States viewed the policy of non-alignment with skepticism and deep mistrust, labeling it immoral and opportunist. U.S. attitudes underwent little change for some time. On the other hand, the Soviet Union before Iosif Stalin’s death was relatively reserved about non-alignment and largely dismissed it. However, Moscow later began to take the movement more seriously, offering first limited and then more serious political and material support.3 Even with the opening of the former Yugoslav archives, it is difficult to pin- point when Yugoslavia first became committed to a policy of non-alignment. The first straightforward manifestation of this new position might be Yu- goslavia’s vote in the UN General Assembly against the resolution allowing UN troops to cross the 38th Parallel in Korea. India, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen voted in a similar fashion, and Indonesia abstained. Together their votes suggest the rudimentary beginnings of international non-alignment.4 The Korean War gradually brought changes to Yugoslav foreign policy and the country’s position vis-a-vis` both blocs. More frequent contacts with the representatives of India and Egypt in the UN Security Council enhanced Yu- goslavia’s interest in the former colonial countries’ stances on anti-colonialism, collective security, and economic cooperation.5 One of the participants in these events, Leo Mates, argues that the foundation for future tripartite Yugoslav- Egyptian-Indian cooperation was laid during this period.6

1. Dragan Bogetic,´ “Clanstvoˇ Jugoslavije u Balkanskom savezu i NATO pakt,” Istorija XX veka,No. 1–2 (1991), pp. 65–89. 2. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 33. 3. Dragan Bogetic,´ “Razvoj sovjetskih i americkihˇ stavova prema politici i pokretu nesvrstanosti,” Istorija XX veka, No. 1–2 (1986), pp. 101–126. 4. Jadranka Jovanovic,´ Jugoslavija u OUN, 1945–1953 (Belgrade: ISI, 1985), p. 49. 5. In 1950 and 1951, Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council and were therefore directly involved with all major deliberations surrounding the Korean War. 6. Leo Mates, Medunarodni- odnosi socijalistiˇcke Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), p. 123.

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As Soviet pressure on the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito receded after Stalin’s death, Yugoslavia continued to develop relations with former colonial countries. This policy was considered to be a direct means of staying apart from both East and West. Mates claims that, at the end of 1952, Yugoslav diplomats received instructions to intensify contacts with the representatives of African and Asian countries that were in a position similar to that of Yugoslavia.7 The instructions suggested that Yugoslavia had abandoned a Eurocentric approach to problems of international relations and was attempting to work with non-bloc countries on a global scale. At the same time, the Yugoslav press started to publish a series of articles about the problems of anti-colonial policy and development in the newly independent African and Asian countries. In addition, Yugoslav ofﬁcials often emphasized during public appearances that this new approach to foreign policy would help safeguard the country’s independence.8

1954–1956: Tito Openly Joins the Non-Aligned Flock

A key step in the development of mutual cooperation occurred at the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 during Tito’s visit to India and Burma. In the words of historian Darko Bekic,´ the trip represented “an intellectual catharsis of its own kind, through which Tito got rid of his Balkan selfishness and Eurocentric horizons, and overnight he had become a citizen of the world and a world leader.”9 As one Indian diplomat vividly pointed out, Tito was “the first great European statesman who came to Asia not as a representative of colonizers, but as a great friend of Asian nations.”10 For Yugoslav leaders, the trip was significant because it allowed officials to familiarize themselves with the experiences of the countries that were the first to proclaim non-alignment as their credo and that had in common the experience of protecting their own independence. Jawaharlal Nehru viewed Yugoslavia, despite its close ties with the West, as a potential model for other countries, particularly China, to leave

7. Ibid., p. 124. 8. Svetozar Rajak, “In Search of a Life outside the Two Blocs: Yugoslavia’s Road to Non–Alignment,” in Velike sile i male drzaveˇ u Hladnom ratu—sluˇcaj Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2005), pp. 89–92. 9. Darko Bekic,´ Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: Odnosi s velikim silama 1949–1955 (Zagreb: Plava biblioteka,1988), p. 674. 10. “Conversations at the Dinner Given by the Attache´ of the French Embassy in Burma,” 23 November 1954, in Diplomatic Archives of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DASMIP), Political Archives (PA), Year 1955, Folder 9, Doc. 41835.

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one of the blocs and join the flock of the non-aligned.11 At the same time, Yugoslavia’s significant political, ideological, and military influence in Burma had helped to shape Rangoon’s internal and foreign policies and became a strong factor in Belgrade’s attempts to promote its own authority among the newly independent countries. In many ways, Yugoslavia’s policy toward Burma made Belgrade a rising star in the non-aligned flock and opened the doors of Asia to Tito.12 The special importance of Tito’s trip to India and Burma is reflected in the specific identification of interests shared by all three countries and the efforts they made to find ways of overcoming their differences. Despite the obvious economic and social dissimilarities, Tito insisted on finding common ground and mutual interests with an eye to future cooperation. During the trip he constantly emphasized the need to build ties and create means for closer coordination among the emerging non-aligned countries. The initiative was envisioned as creating favorable bilateral ground for political coordination between countries with similar international problems. Tito’s endeavor was interpreted in the West as an attempt to set up a so-called third bloc, although this was not actually his intent.13 During official talks with Nehru, Tito took the initiative, continually insisting that a secure path of cooperation and coexistence would be found only through a comprehensive analysis of corresponding European and Asian issues.14 Nehru, viewed the idea of peaceful coexistence as a means by which India would adjust its relations with all its neighbors and calibrate its position in Asian affairs, whereeas Tito averred that the concept of non-alignment had become a primary com- ponent in the redefinition of Yugoslavia’s role in the international arena. Both Tito and Nehru put forward “the necessity of peaceful co-existence not merely as an alternative, but as an imperative,” making a clear distinction between the principles of “non-alignment” and “neutralism” (i.e., passivity) and claiming that non-alignment was a “positive, active, and constructive policy

11. “The Colombo Conference: Neutrality the Keynote,” The World Today (London), Vol. 10, No. 7 (July 1954), pp. 293–300. 12. Jovan Cavoˇ ˇski, “Arming Nonalignment: Yugoslavia’s Relations with Burma and the Cold War in Asia, 1950–1955,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 61, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, 2010. 13. Dragan Bogetic,´ Koreni jugoslovenskog opredeljenja za nesvrstanost (Belgrade: ISI, 1990), pp. 233– 235. 14. “Transcripts of Conversation between Tito and Nehru at the Rashtrapati Bhavan Residency in New Delhi,” 18 December 1954, 18:00 hours, in Archives of Yugoslavia (AJ), 837, Cabinet of the President of the Republic (KPR), I-2/4–1.

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seeking to lead to collective peace, on which alone collective security can really rest.”15 On 5 February 1955, on the way back from India and Burma, Tito made a brief stop-over at the Suez Canal, where, on his yacht Seagull,he hosted the new Egyptian president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Earlier, in a series of long, substantive conversations with the Yugoslav ambassador, Marko Nikezic, Nasser, without hiding his admiration for Tito and his foreign policy style, had expressed interest in Yugoslavia’s revolutionary experience, economic and social reforms, and armed forces.16 Nikezic then offered Nasser his assessment of the problems Egypt was facing, pointing out that the new tendency toward non-alignment in Yugoslavia could induce Yugoslav leaders to devote greater economic attention to Egypt and, indeed, the whole Arab world, which was striving for independence. Facing constant pressure from the British but not wanting to achieve a rapprochement with the Soviet Union, Nasser approached Tito and Yugoslavia, seeing in them a possible model for a new foreign policy course for Egypt.17 When Tito described his visits to India and Burma, Nasser sought to find out more about Tito’s hosts, whom he was about to meet on the eve of the Bandung Conference. After this first meeting between Tito and Nasser, relations between them grew steadily closer. Tito was intrigued by Nasser’s decisiveness and energy, and Nasser valued Tito’s revolutionary experience, his reasoning, and his views on international problems.18 Yugoslavia and Egypt established various forms of cooperation. Nasser was particularly interested in the Yugoslav experience of nationalization as a way to eliminate foreign economic influence, and the lessons he learned from Tito were later put into practice when Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal.19 After Tito’s visit to India, many influential people in New Delhi had started to see Yugoslavia and its leader in a different light. They pointed out the many similarities that could serve as a basis for an even stronger alliance of non-aligned states. One of the reports made by the Indian embassy in Belgrade noted:

15. “Joint Communique´ of the President of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia and the Prime Minister of the Government of the Republic of India,” 22 December 1954, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/4–1. 16. “Report of Marko Nikezic,”´ 5 February 1955, in DASMIP, PA, 1953, f-21, 416746. 17. “Ofﬁcial Record of Marko Nikezic´ on the Conversation with Nasser,” in AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/2– 144. 18. “Transcript of the Conversation between Josip Broz Tito and Gamal Abdel Nasser,” pp. 17–18, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/4–4. 19. “Ibid., pp. 16–18.

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The significance of the fact that a European country, whose influence in international affairs is disproportionate to its size or importance, has subscribed to our Panch Shila, is already evident, and will increase with the passage of time.... Already, in Tito’s public statements, there is a marked similarity to Indian pronouncements on international questions....Further,inregardtoin- ternal developments in India, Tito has declared that the direction is the same as in Yugoslavia.... This has given a somewhat similar alignment to the policies of the two countries in both the external and internal spheres. What Tito has observed in India is already beginning to influence his domestic policies.20

At the same time, many Western diplomats in Belgrade were deeply nervous about the possibility that India and Yugoslavia, together with Egypt, could form a bloc of neutral countries that might stand confidently between East and West. The conference of Asian and African countries in Bandung from 18 to 24 April 1955 encouraged the forging of stronger bonds among the non-aligned countries. During this conference, many Asian and African countries endorsed the non-bloc or neutralist orientation. (This was the first time the leaders of formerly colonized states demonstrated their ability to discuss international problems seriously and to offer concrete solutions for them.) In addition, the participants increased their demands for total decolonization and racial equality, while actively promoting economic and cultural cooperation, thus politically galvanizing the newly named Third World. Following this new spirit in international affairs, Yugoslavia decided to intensify its contacts with leading non-aligned states to try to gain a more prominent role within the Third World. In 1955 Tito met with the leaders of Burma, India, Egypt, and Ethiopia. Tito and Nehru met in Yugoslavia from 30 June to 7 July 1955 and achieved a further convergence of attitudes. Nehru and his daughter, Indira Gandhi, visited historical sites in Yugoslavia and had intensive encounters with the Yugoslav leadership on international issues during the eight-day visit.21 Nehru sent a confidential letter to one of his ministers reporting: “I had long talks with Marshal Tito and his Ministers. These talks were even more frank and intimate than elsewhere. There was so much in common between our outlook and Marshal Tito’s in regard to world

20. “Monthly Report of the Embassy of India in Belgrade, for the Period Ending 28 February 1955,” in National Archives of India (NAI), Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), F 62—R&I/55(s). 21. “Monthly Report of the Embassy of India in Belgrade, for the Month of July 1955,” in NAI, MEA, F 62—R&I/55(s).

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affairs that we could discuss matters without any inhibition.”22 The visit thus helped to cement the foundations of Indo-Yugoslav strategic partnership.23 Tito’s visit to Ethiopia in December 1955 and to Egypt from late Decem- ber 1955 to early January 1956 had special significance for the development of Yugoslav cooperation with these two countries. The two delegations held talks over several days, and the two presidents expressed similar views on a range of international issues. Much of the conversation was taken up by appraisals of the current international situation. The two delegations achieved consensus on the need to organize a wider movement of countries unaffiliated with either bloc. In addition, both sides distanced themselves from a policy of creating military pacts in the Middle East, focusing instead on strengthening military, economic, and cultural-educational cooperation.24 They also agreed to an exchange of military and economic delegations. Most important, the meeting fostered a close personal relationship between the two presidents. As was the case with India’s Nehru and Burma’s U Nu a few months before, personal diplomacy came to the forefront of bilateral relations, adding special flavor to the interstate exchanges. These first contacts between the Yugoslav president and the leaders of India and Egypt established a basis for the future development of mutual cooperation. The next phase was a trilateral meeting. Tito believed summit diplomacy was the best way to forge strong bonds among leaders and firmly establish the core of what would ultimately become the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The lessons of Bandung were still fresh, and the Yugoslav president wanted to get support for his project from two eminent world leaders whom he also considered friends. This undertaking was closely followed by the thaw in Soviet-Yugoslav relations (when Tito and Nikita Khrushchev each paid a visit to the other’s country) and Yugoslavia’s gradual move away from the Balkan Pact. After much planning, a summit between Tito, Nasser, and Nehru took place on the Brioni Islands on 18–19 July 1956. The three statesmen again confirmed the similarities of their approaches to various international issues. They agreed that their mutual contacts directly contributed to the affirmation of the principles of active and peaceful coexistence and confirmed that their approach

22. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 29 (Second Series): 1 June 1955–31 August 1955,(New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2001), p. 281. 23. Jovan Cavoˇ ˇski, “Inseparable Allies: The Formation of the Indo-Yugoslav Strategic Partnership in the 1950s,” in India and the Cold War (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, forthcoming). 24. “Report of Josip Broz Tito to Federal Executive Council on the Visit to Egypt and Ethiopia,” January 1956, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/5–2.

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to international relations should be governed by the ten Bandung principles. Peace, they agreed, could not be achieved by deploying more weapons rather, it should be underpinned by collective security and the completion of the pro- cess of decolonization. The three countries’ negative experiences with foreign political and economic domination, including the lack of any leeway in foreign policy, dictated their firm commitment to end the domination of one country over another. The presidents agreed to the preconditions for disarmament that would ultimately lead to the establishment of collective security. Disarmament was a matter of extreme importance to countries that did not belong to either bloc, insofar as rising tensions between the world’s two great military alliances increased the existential threat faced by all countries. The three leaders also achieved consensus on the need to cooperate fully in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition, they reiterated the need to accelerate efforts to promote the economic development of the Third World and to alleviate global poverty. They urged that such efforts be directed through special UN development funds, and they called for the elimination of all obstacles to free international trade. This was an important issue for the developing world, where leaders insisted that fierce competition on international markets between developed industrial countries hindered the economic performance of underdeveloped countries. Tito, Nehru, and Nasser further identified three world regions (Central Europe, the Middle East, and the Far East) as the most likely places where an armed conflict might erupt and engulf the wider world. They offered concrete solutions, arguing that an intensive dialogue and exchange of opinions could bring more stability to Germany, promote China’s return to its rightful place in the UN Security Council, and solve the grievances of the Palestinians without alienating Israel. Particularly on this last issue, Tito and Nehru did everything they could to placate Nasser. All three leaders also called for the immediate cessation of colonial domination and expressed strong support for the Algerian struggle for independence.25 The future shape of the NAM was clearly visible at this summit, which emphasized collective security, peaceful and active coexistence, political and economic independence, disassociation from bloc divisions, concrete economic assistance to developing countries, and negotiated solutions for current international problems as a guarantee of world peace.

25. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 34 (Second Series): 21 June–31 August 1956, (New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru Memorial Fund, 2005), pp. 297–304.

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The meeting on Brioni had special significance for each of the three leaders. For Tito, it was visible proof of his international prestige and his rising influence in the international political arena. With this meeting he succeeded in forging a direct link with the Arab world and India and its Asian allies, thus positioning Yugoslavia as the glue that would hold the non-aligned world together. For Nehru, the meeting confirmed his towering role among Third World leaders. For Nasser it provided a means of entry into the inner circles of the non-aligned movement and enhanced his prestige in the Arab world.26 Until the convening of the Belgrade Conference in September 1961, the Brioni joint statement represented the doctrinal foundations of the evolving world- wide movement. The Brioni summit signaled that the impact of the Bandung initiative had been extended to the Mediterranean region, and it heralded the beginning of a new phase in the realization of the principles of non-alignment in world politics. By establishing the active core of the future movement, the Brioni conference also marked a milestone in relations between Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt.27 Staunch support for the conclusions of the Brioni meeting came quickly from other major countries that adhered to a non-aligned foreign policy or were committed to the Bandung principles. The day after the tripartite meeting, Cambodia’s ruler, Norodom Sihanouk, paid his first official visit to Yugoslavia and readily attached his name to the Brioni joint statement. Two months later, on 12–18 September 1956, President Sukarno of Indonesia visited Yu- goslavia and gave his unconditional support to the principles proclaimed at the Bandung Conference and Brioni meeting.28 Both countries emphasized the need for mutual relations based on the principles of active and peaceful coexistence, equality and mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and the recognition of the right of every nation and state to develop independently regardless of ideological, socioeconomic, and other differences. Similarly, they agreed that current international problems should be approached through negotiations on the basis of mutual understanding.29 The importance of a European country choosing to pursue a foreign policy similar to that of Asian and African countries was immense and proved

26. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and Nonaligned World, p. 75. 27. “The Bulletin of News of Foreign Agencies from July 19, 1956,” p. 1, in AJ, 112, Tanjug, f-205. 28. “Note on the Conversations between Josip Broz Tito and Sukarno,” 18 September 1956, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/643. 29. “Report of the Embassy in Jakarta to the Foreign Secretariat, September 1956, in DASMIP, PA, 1956, f-34, 423508.

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to be a decisive factor in Tito’s wide acceptance in the Third World as an authentic non-aligned leader and close friend. Yugoslavia went on to play a decisive role in the formation of the NAM. Out of these efforts, Yugoslav- Indian and Yugoslav-Egyptian alliances were also created. At the beginning, these alliances had no significant or even apparent political framework, and on the military and economic level they had just begun to develop. However, the Brioni meeting revealed the nascent political orientation of these alliances, an orientation that would soon bloom with the Egyptian nationalization of the Suez Canal. When the Suez Crisis deteriorated in response to intensive domestic and world reaction to Nasser’s actions, Indonesian President Sukarno was in Yu- goslavia for a planned visit. Generally interpreted as an extension of the Brioni summit, official talks between the Indonesian and Yugoslav delegations took place on 13 September. According to available sources, the only international issue discussed during the visit was the Suez Crisis. Both delegations agreed that Egypt required urgent assistance. The Indonesian side, in line with its anti-colonial policy, thought that the insistence of Great Britain and France on preserving Anglo-French positions in the Suez Canal was designed to prolong their imperialist policies. Tito readily agreed with this assessment. He claimed that the “Egyptian fight for the Suez is the decisive battle of decolonization” and argued that British Prime Minister Anthony Eden’s suggestion to create a Suez Canal Association was just “a camouflage for aggression and the expression of the mentality more concerned about ships than about people.”30 Because the countries supporting Egypt had thus far rendered only moral support and were acting in isolation from one another, Tito proposed that they forge stronger ties and act in closer coordination. Sukarno again suggested that a second Afro- Asian conference be convened; for the sole purpose of bringing together the countries supporting Cairo, including Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union, and some East European countries. Tito readily endorsed the proposal, but he suggested that it was a global issue and that only a broad international conference could find appropriate solutions. What he had in mind was the UN, and soon afterward this proposal became common Yugoslav, Indian, and Indonesia policy line on the issue. Tito emphasized that “the support for Egypt must be concrete, not platonic.”31

30. “Transcript of the Conversation between Yugoslav and Indonesian State Delegations,” September 1956, p. 3, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-3-a/1443. 31. “Communication on the Conversations between Yugoslav and Indonesian State Delegations,” September 1956, in DASMIP, PA, 1956, f-34, 423508.

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Yugoslavia quickly agreed with the Soviet position that Egypt should turn to the UN Security Council for protection, and Tito called for the Bandung group to be the sponsor of any joint action inside the UN. The harmonization of views between Yugoslavia and Indonesia, as well as the close coordination with India and Egypt, became the cornerstone of efforts to create the NAM. During the Suez Crisis, the Yugoslav government demonstrated a new foreign policy doctrine that was based on the principles of political disassociation from both the Western and Eastern blocs, while expanding ties to the non-aligned countries that represented the new, rising alternative.32 In trying to deal with the Suez Crisis, Yugoslavia acted preemptively to promote international stability and protect its own national security. Furthermore, the crisis allowed Yugoslavia to take on an important role inside the UN and to send peacekeep- ing forces to the Sinai Peninsula, thus ensuring the continuance of its political presence in the Middle East. The Brioni meeting and the subsequent Suez Crisis marked the end of the ﬁrst phase of Yugoslav efforts to create a completely new movement to represent countries that stood between the two blocs. These events soon had a signiﬁcant impact on Belgrade’s relationship with both East and West.

1956–1959: Non-Alignment Faces Both East and West

Western powers looked unfavorably on Yugoslavia’s new foreign policy course, which they interpreted as a harbinger of new winds enveloping the non-aligned world and alienating it from the West.33 Nevertheless, the West, particularly the United States, reacted positively to Yugoslavia’s contribution to the bal- anced character of the Brioni declaration, which mirrored Tito’s conciliatory attitude toward both Nasser and Nehru.34 This dual response foreshadowed the later U.S. interpretation of Yugoslavia’s non-aligned position and its status among African and Asian countries as a reliable deterrent to Soviet or Chinese penetration into the Third World.35 Yugoslavia, U.S. observers concluded,

32. Dobrivoje Vidic to Veljko Micunovic, Telegram, September 1956, in DASMIP,PA, 1956, strictly conﬁdential, f-1, 232. 33. Bekic,´ Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu, pp. 740–743. 34. “Report of the Embassy in Washington to the Foreign Secretariat,” September 1956, in DASMIP, PA, 1956, f-90, 411648. 35. “Yugoslav Policy in the Underdeveloped Countries,” 26 April 1961, in National Archives and Records Administration, Record Group 59, 668.00/4–2661.

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appealed to developing countries because it was “a small country which ... provides a model for economic development ... it has followed a policy of non-alignment while obtaining economic aid from both East and West ... and economic and technical aid from Yugoslavia allows them [the non-aligned countries] to minimize entanglement with the major blocs.”36 Statements of solidarity by the Yugoslav, Egyptian, and Indian leaders were a clear signal to the United States that the three countries had abandoned passive neutrality as a foreign policy and were now pursuing an actively non-aligned policy.37 In the case of Yugoslavia and the Balkan Pact, this new course did not mean the end of cooperation among the three Balkan states, but it did signal the marginal- ization of such pacts in Yugoslavia’s approach to international relations.38 Nonetheless, Moscow’s complete indifference to events in Yugoslavia left many officials in Belgrade surprised. According to the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Micunovi´ c,´ Soviet officials had shown no interest at all in the trilateral meeting. Probably, this was an intentional response to Tito’s refusal to receive Soviet Ambassador Nikolai Firyubin on Brioni on 18 July. The Soviet ambassador had special instructions to meet with Tito and Nasser, but the Yugoslav side refused.39 In response, the Soviet Union offered no official reaction, and the mass media on both sides conveyed little information about the Brioni summit. When, immediately after the trilateral meeting, Anastas Mikoyan traveled to Yugoslavia to propose a new economic deal between Yugoslavia and the Soviet bloc, this only confirmed that the Yugoslav tactic of maneuvering between both blocs while expanding contacts with leading non-aligned figures was starting to bear fruit for Yugoslaavia.40 The end of the 1950s was marked by a new round of ideological confrontation between Yugoslavia and the rest of the Soviet bloc. Tito’s close personal relationship with Nehru and Nasser was considered detrimental to Soviet and Chinese interests in the Afro-Asian states. Both Moscow and Beijing viewed Tito’s attempts to convene a conference of non-bloc countries, as well as his close ties with Nehru, Nasser, U Nu, and Sukarno, as a way of “undermining

36. “Outlook for Yugoslavia—NIE 15–61,” 23 May 1961, in Yugoslavia—From “National Commu- nism to National Collapse: US Intelligence Community Estimative Products on Yugoslavia, 1948–1990 (Washington, D.C.: National Intelligence Council, 2006), p. 264. 37. Lorraine W. Lees, OdrzavanjeTitanapovrˇ ˇsini: Sjedinjene Drzave,ˇ Jugoslavija i Hladni rat (Belgrade: BMG, 2003), p. 204. 38. Dragan Bogetic,´ “Clanstvoˇ Jugoslavije u Balkanskom savezu i NATO pakt,” Istorija XX veka,Nos. 1–2 (1991), pp. 65–89. 39. “Note on the Conversation between Srdja Prica and Firjubin,” July 1956, in DASMIP,PA, 1956, f. 90, 411659. 40. Veljko Micunovi´ c,´ Moskovske godine (1956–1958) (Zagreb: Knjizevneˇ novine, 1977), pp. 111–112.

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China’s new Bandung conference, simultaneously fighting the Soviet and Chinese influence among these countries,” and “attempting to sever relations between Afro-Asian and socialist countries.”41 As Chinese Foreign Minister Chen Yi indicated, the greatest problem with Yugoslavia stemmed from the fact that African and Asia governments generally trusted the Yugoslavs.42 So- viet and Chinese criticism of “Yugoslav revisionism” did not win them many supporters in Africa and Asia, especially because the Soviet bloc had already demonstrated that it would terminate all political and economic ties with any country that exercised different ideological tendencies.43 In 1959, Soviet and Chinese relations with New Delhi, Jakarta, and Cairo soured over the political and economic issues that had been plaguing their bilateral relations, and in the case of India even led to open military conflict. Indonesia’s rough treatment of Chinese traders who, in Sukarno’s eyes, threatened the country’s economic independence created a crisis that led to the mutual expulsion of diplomats and citizens, including the repatriation of thousands of overseas Chinese.44 Nehru’s urgent dispatch to all Indian embassies instructing them to back Yugoslavia in its dispute with the Soviet Union spurred Moscow to put additional pressure on India to back off. Al- though Nehru initially decided to keep a low profile, he ultimately stood firm at the side of his Yugoslav friends.45 With Nasser, the Soviet bloc rejected his policy of Arab nationalism as reactionary, particularly criticizing his attempts to overthrow the new revolutionary government in Baghdad and incorporate Iraq into his United Arab Republic (UAR), which he had created against Soviet advice. Nasser’s draconian persecution of Egyptian and Syrian Communists was also considered intolerable. The Soviet bloc was convinced that Tito had enormous influence over Nasser’s behavior.46 However, Tito, too, disapproved of Nasser’s clampdown on Communists and his accusation that Communism was the main source of instability among Third World countries.47

41. “Foreign Ministry’s Circular Telegram to All Embassies and Consulates on the Policy of Relations with Yugoslavia,” 16 December 1958, in Chinese Foreign Ministry Archive (CFMA), 109–00860–01. 42. “Talks with Foreign Minister Chen Yi,” 9 July 1958, in Russian State Archive for Recent History (RGANI), Fond (F.) 5, Opis (Op.) 49, Delo (D.) 131, Listy (Ll.) 169–170. 43. Yugoslav Embassy in Cairo, Telegram, 24 May 1958, in DASMIP, PA, 1958, f-132, 412344. 44. “Transcriptsof Talksbetween Foreign Minister Chen Yi and Indonesian Ambassador, 12 December 1959, in CFMA, 105–00389–03. 45. “Prime Minister’s Secretariat on Yugoslavia’s Conﬂict with the Socialist Camp,” 15 June 1958, in Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), Subimal Dutt Collection, File 32. 46. “On the Situation in the UAR,” July 1959, in RGANI, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 302, Ll. 77–98. 47. See, for example, Tito’s comments transcribed in DASMIP,1960, strictly conﬁdential, f-2, 71; and AJ, 837, KPR, I-5-b/UAR.

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One of the main goals of Tito’s trip to Asia and Africa in 1958–1959 was to increase the degree of political and foreign policy coordination among countries that did not belong to either of the ideological blocs but shared the basic values upheld by the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” and the ﬁnal declarations of the Bandung Conference and the Brioni summit. This journey was an integral part of Yugoslavia’s continuing efforts to organize a conference of the non-aligned countries, but the establishment of a “third bloc,” even if remotely contemplated, was at that time still out of the question. During talks with Ceylon’s Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Tito explained his position:

Some say we want to set up a ‘third bloc.’ Of course, this is absolutely ridiculous.... Our only intention is to strengthen our friendly ties and ﬁnd possibilities to expand not only bilateral cooperation, but also international cooperation ...we have so many common views with these [non-aligned] countries.48 Tito was aware that any mention of a “third bloc” would be ﬁercely opposed by Nehru and some of the other non-aligned leaders, who considered the idea anthitetical to their own interests. At the same time, Tito was well aware that these newly independent states had neither the economic nor the military power to subvert the bipolar global order or to impose their will on the superpowers. He was convinced, however, that the global ideological confrontation and the obvious contradictions within the international system presented an opportunity for developing countries to assume a balancing posture in world affairs. The sensitive balance of power between Moscow and Washington could be used for the direct advantage of the non-aligned countries, he believed. Speaking frankly to his Ceylonese hosts, Tito said:

We consider that in today’s world the joint action of all peaceful countries is necessary to preserve world peace and recognize the principle of equality in international relations. We think that this kind of action and our insistence on it represent an important element of realization of the principles of active peaceful coexistence.49 Tito also toyed with the idea of organizing a conference of non-aligned countries to deal with the pressing issues of nuclear disarmament, East-West relations, a reduction of tensions, economic development, and so on. However, his proposals were constantly being rejected by Nehru, who was not ready

48. “Transcripts of Yugoslav-Ceylonese Talks Held in Colombo,” 21 January 1959, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/11–5. 49. Ibid.

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to join decisively with other non-aligned leaders. India’s near-great-power status among the non-aligned countries, and Nehru’s desire to deal with the superpowers directly, underscored for Tito the need to intensify actions among the African and Asian countries in order to force Indian officials to accept future Yugoslav, Egyptian, and Indonesian initiatives.50 In addition, Sukarno remained eager for another Bandung-like conference at which he could play the central role, but Nehru’s reluctance and Tito’s concentration on the ideological conflict with Moscow and Beijing put this idea on hold indefinitely.51 On the other hand, the situation Nasser was facing vis-a-vis` the great powers had many similarities to the situation in which Yugoslavia found itself. Like never before, these two countries, despite their geographic distance, were acting in a concerted fashion. They had become the core around which all other non-aligned countries might gather in an effort to improve their unfavorable position on the world stage. Egypt especially suffered from its hegemonic policies of pan-Arabism, which brought to Cairo many enemies at all levels, and Yugoslavia, as a European country, had to double its efforts to promote itself as the axis around which other non-aligned countries could close ranks.52 However, in mid-1959 the inseparable Cairo-Belgrade duo began to form the backbone of the future NAM. Because this newly projected movement would have no centers of decision-making nor any strict hierarchical relations, the massive participation of African and Asian countries seemed likely.

1960–1961: Non-Alignment on the Road from New York to Belgrade

Because the United States and the Soviet Union had often endangered international stability, the perceived need for joint action inside the non-aligned camp was more urgent than ever. The Yugoslav ambassador in New Delhi, Duˇsan Kveder, was instructed to approach Nehru again about the organization of a meeting of non-aligned countries that would mediate between the blocs and ﬁnd suitable options for maintaining peace and security in the world. The Yugoslav government was concerned that “Nehru still underes- timate[d] the potential of non-bloc countries in Asia” and insisted that the “activation of Indian relations with great powers should be the main issue in

50. Yugoslav Embassy in India, Telegram, 6 April 1960, in DASMIP, PA, 1960, f-37, 49575. 51. “Visit of Indonesia’s PM Djuanda to Yugoslavia,” 11 October 1958, in CFMA, 105–00866–08. 52. “Initiative for the Meeting of the Heads of State of Uncommitted Countries,” n.d. (c. mid-1959), in AJBT, CPR, I-5-b, UAR.

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Indian policy.”53 Nehru’s response, as expected, was again negative. Having received Kveder cordially and explained his government’s position, he then de- clined further meetings, warning that they would only “demonstrate disunity among these [non-aligned] countries.” The Indian leader suggested instead that the consultations mechanism between Tito, Nasser, Sukarno, and himself be strengthened.54 The 15th Session of the UN General Assembly offered a valuable opportunity for Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno, and Ghana’s Kwame Nkrumah to present to the world their proposals for solving pressing international issues and their renewed appeal to Soviet and U.S. leaders to resume direct dialogue, thus contributing to increased international stability. This initiative was widely viewed as marking the creation of a “neutralist bloc” in the UN, even though Western diplomatic maneuvering ultimately compelled five of the sponsoring countries to withdraw their resolution before the final vote. Nevertheless, the resolution was a moral victory for the major non-aligned countries. Tito used the opportunity to forge closer ties with these leaders and strengthen direct cooperation with them, and he was convinced that from then on both blocs would have to “take into account these new forces” representing not only “the public opinion of these countries and the yearning of their nations, but also the majority of countries [in the world].”55 For Tito these events confirmed that sufficient political will existed for the non-aligned countries to pursue joint action in the service of global issues. He believed that thorough exchanges of views and consultations with leading Third World leaders could aid in defusing international tensions. As in 1958– 1959, Tito in February 1961 found new allies among the newly independent West African and North African states. In mid-February, he embarked on a two-month cruise around Africa during which he paid official visits to Ghana, Togo, Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Morocco, Tunisia, and the UAR, a grouping that included some of the pioneers of non-alignment in the region (the oth- ers were mostly West-leaning).56 Tito concentrated his efforts on promoting comprehensive political and economic cooperation between Yugoslavia and these states. One of the motives for the voyage was Tito’s desire to organize a

53. Foreign Secretariat to the Embassy in New Delhi, Telegram, 25 November 1959, in DASMIP,PA, 1959, f-38, 430547. 54. Yugoslav Embassy in India, Telegram, 25 November 1959, in DASMIP, PA, 1959, f-38, 431138. 55. “Report Submitted by Tito at the Session of the Federal Executive Council,” 13 October 1960, in AJ, 837, KRR, I-2/12. 56. “Tito’s Report on the Visit to Countries of West and North Africa,” 29 April 1961, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/13.

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summit of the non-aligned leaders on the eve of the 16th UN General Assem- bly in order to allow all of the non-aligned countries the opportunity to reach consensus on outstanding issues and then present a united resolution to both superpowers at the UN.57 Tito and Nasser took on the sensitive role of sponsoring the summit. The event’s success or failure would likely determine their political futures, as well as their countries’ relative position on the international stage. The two leaders agreed to take on this challenge during Tito’s visit to Cairo on 17–22 April 1961. “Because “new confrontations between the great powers might happen” and because the uncommitted countries “must appear united,” Tito and Nasser agreed to dispatch separate letters to the heads of state of the 21 non-aligned countries, inviting them to a preparatory meeting in Cairo and explaining the character and criteria of the planned conference.58 Nehru continued to harbor reservations about such initiatives, labeling them premature and unnecessary, but he did not reject them outright. His pref- erence was still the promotion of direct dialogue between the superpowers, and he feared that a non-aligned conference would only bring to the surface inher- ent differences among the non-aligned countries. Sukarno, however, quickly joined the Yugoslav and UAR initiative as one of the leading ﬁgures in the creation of the movement, which initially was founded exclusively on a regional basis. At the time, he was forcefully promoting, together with China, the idea of a second Bandung Conference, but he decided to support Tito’s and Nasser’s initiative for a conference of non-aligned states, not least because the possibility of convening an Afro-Asian conference was negligible.59 India, despite Nehru’s reservations, had its hand forced by the many invitees who had responded positively to the invitation from Tito and Nasser. Hence, the Indian government eventually accepted, too, even becoming one of the co-sponsors. Yugoslavia’s diplomatic push for a movement of non-bloc states reached its apex during preparations for the Belgrade Conference. This conference of the heads of state or government of uncommitted countries represented a wa- tershed moment in the formation of the NAM as an institutionalized response of the developing countries to the U.S.-Soviet standoff. The conference ultimately created conditions for Yugoslavia to stabilize its international position

57. Yugoslav Embassy in India, Telegram, 17 February 1961, in DASMIP, PA, 1961, f-116, 45196. 58. “Note on the Conversations between Delegation of FPRY and Delegation of the UAR,” 20 April 1961, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-2/13–7. 59. “Indonesia’s Attitude toward the Conference of Neutral Countries,” 11 May 1961, in CFMA, 105–01043–01.

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and not feel continual pressure to find short-term solutions acceptable to both East and West. The preparatory meeting in Cairo in early June was dedicated mainly to organizational matters, but because it was convened on the level of foreign ministers, it also helped to establish the minimal consensus between the participating countries on key international issues. Furthermore, the meeting established five basic principles of non-alignment: an independent foreign policy based on principles of peaceful coexistence; support for national liberation movements; a refusal to allow foreign military bases on the country’s territory; abstention from military alliances or pacts concluded with the blocs; and participation in regional military alliances only when such alliances were concluded outside the context of the great-power rivalries. In recognition of Yugoslavia’s leading role in the non-aligned world, the participants at the preparatory meeting, with strong backing from Indonesia and the UAR, decided to hold the summit in Belgrade in early September 1961.60 The conference took place on 1–6 September with 25 fully participating countries and three observer countries (Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador). Even though it was a heterogeneous conference with a diverse group of participating states from four continents, concord was reached on several “low fruit” issues, including condemnation of colonialism, condemnation of the arms race, and strong support for the national liberation struggles in Algeria, Angola, Congo, and Palestine.61 In addition, consensus was reached on the issue of expanding certain UN bodies, particularly the economic ones, to include significantly more representatives from the developing countries. Conference participants also insisted that increased economic and technical assistance to the underdeveloped countries should be provided through the UN.62 In essence, conference participants, through the active mediation of Yugoslavia, managed to reach agreement on all key international issues.

Conclusion

Despite the participation of 25 countries, the Belgrade Conference did not lead to the ofﬁcial formation of a movement as Tito and his associates had

60. “Final Report of the Cairo Preparatory Meeting,” June 1956, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a. 61. “Note of conversation between President Tito and President Nkrumah at the Federal Assembly,” 30 August 1961, in AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a. 62. “Review of Positions of Countries on Current Conference Issues until 31 August,” in AJ, 837, KPR, I-4-a.

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envisioned. Contrary to the dominant views in the domestic and foreign lit- erature and among the wider public, the Belgrade Conference was not the founding conference of the NAM, although it was the first formal meeting of the countries that later constituted the movement. Several more years were needed to set up such an organization formally, but the “spirit of Belgrade” and the decisions taken at the September 1961 gathering undoubtedly signaled the emergence of a global alternative to the bloc divisions in world politics. Many participants later opposed similar Yugoslav initiatives, fearing the evolution of something resembling a “third bloc” that would jeopardize their political, military, and economic relations with the superpowers. Nonetheless, the Belgrade Conference helped to shape the political consciousness of developing countries, raising awareness that through joint action with similar countries they could strengthen their international position and influence the delicate balance of forces of the Cold War.63 The Third World was compelled to reinvent its role in world affairs, and the policy of non-alignment provided the necessary preconditions. This soon became obvious within the UN as the developing countries proved to be a tight voting bloc. The concept of regionalism as an alternative to the Yugoslav concept of universalism had completely failed. The key problem was the lack of readiness of newly liberated countries to be involved in a movement in which China and the USSR would undoubtedly have had a leading role. Countries liberated from the colonial yoke, having gained national independence through immense effort, were not ready to exchange former colonial masters for new bosses. The concept of a broad movement without hierarchical relations and decision-making centers was much more acceptable to the Third World. The struggle for peace and stability and against tension and conflict, the promotion of mutual cooperation and development—these and other efforts required a much broader international coalition than just the Asian and African countries. From this impetus the non-aligned movement developed, eventually taking on its definitive form after the Cairo Conference of 1964 and the Lusaka Summit of 1970.

63. Leo Mates, Poˇcelo je u Beogradu: 20 godina nesvrstanosti (Zagreb: Knjizevneˇ novine, 1982), pp. 46– 53.

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