On the Road to Belgrade Yugoslavia, Third World Neutrals, and the Evolution of Global Non-Alignment, 1954–1961 ✣ Aleksandar Zivotiˇ c´ and Jovan Cavoˇ ˇski During the second half of the twentieth century the strategy of non-alignment became one of the basic doctrinal postulates of Yugoslav foreign policy. This policy of outright disassociation from the dominant bloc structures and open non-adherence to either side in the Cold War competition represented a widely recognized feature of the Yugoslav presence in the areas of bilateral and mul- tilateral political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation. However, the sources and motivations of Yugoslavia’s peculiar foreign policy orientation are now well explained in the international historiography. Yugoslavia’s active for- eign policy conduct among leading Third World nations directly contributed to the shaping of the leading political alternative to the existing Cold War divisions. 1950–1953: Constructing Yugoslavia’s Non-Alignment From 1945 to 1948, Yugoslavia adhered to the Soviet Stalinist model in es- sentially all respects. After the painful split with the Soviet Union and its allies in 1948, Yugoslavia found itself in complete political and economic isolation. From 1948 to 1950, as closer contacts with Western countries were being slowly reestablished, especially with the United States, Yugoslavia searched for a foreign policy alternative that would secure its independence and guarantee future disassociation from the Soviet bloc while also strengthening the coun- try’s socialist system internally. Conclusion of an agreement on economic and military assistance with the United States and its allies in 1951 and an agree- ment on economic cooperation the following year, as well as indirect inclusion in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defense system through Journal of Cold War Studies Vol. 18, No. 4, Fall 2016, pp. 79–97, doi:10.1162/JCWS_a_00681 C 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 79 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00681 by guest on 30 September 2021 Zivotiˇ cand´ Cavoˇ skiˇ the Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, raised concerns in the Soviet bloc that Yugoslavia might formally ally itself with the West. Such a development would have triggered major internal changes in Yugoslavia, resulting in the gradual erosion of the authority of the ruling Communist Party.1 Squeezed between two blocs and desperately searching for its own independent po- sition, Yugoslavia tried to reaffirm its foreign policy through the forums of the United Nations (UN) as a first viable alternative. This proved to be a means of securing a much more flexible yet stable position in the international arena.2 As for the superpowers, from the beginning the United States viewed the policy of non-alignment with skepticism and deep mistrust, labeling it immoral and opportunist. U.S. attitudes underwent little change for some time. On the other hand, the Soviet Union before Iosif Stalin’s death was relatively reserved about non-alignment and largely dismissed it. However, Moscow later began to take the movement more seriously, offering first limited and then more serious political and material support.3 Even with the opening of the former Yugoslav archives, it is difficult to pin- point when Yugoslavia first became committed to a policy of non-alignment. The first straightforward manifestation of this new position might be Yu- goslavia’s vote in the UN General Assembly against the resolution allowing UN troops to cross the 38th Parallel in Korea. India, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen voted in a similar fashion, and Indonesia abstained. Together their votes suggest the rudimentary beginnings of international non-alignment.4 The Korean War gradually brought changes to Yugoslav foreign policy and the country’s position vis-a-vis` both blocs. More frequent contacts with the representatives of India and Egypt in the UN Security Council enhanced Yu- goslavia’s interest in the former colonial countries’ stances on anti-colonialism, collective security, and economic cooperation.5 One of the participants in these events, Leo Mates, argues that the foundation for future tripartite Yugoslav- Egyptian-Indian cooperation was laid during this period.6 1. Dragan Bogetic,´ “Clanstvoˇ Jugoslavije u Balkanskom savezu i NATO pakt,” Istorija XX veka,No. 1–2 (1991), pp. 65–89. 2. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 33. 3. Dragan Bogetic,´ “Razvoj sovjetskih i americkihˇ stavova prema politici i pokretu nesvrstanosti,” Istorija XX veka, No. 1–2 (1986), pp. 101–126. 4. Jadranka Jovanovic,´ Jugoslavija u OUN, 1945–1953 (Belgrade: ISI, 1985), p. 49. 5. In 1950 and 1951, Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt were non-permanent members of the UN Security Council and were therefore directly involved with all major deliberations surrounding the Korean War. 6. Leo Mates, Medunarodni- odnosi socijalistiˇcke Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Nolit, 1976), p. 123. 80 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00681 by guest on 30 September 2021 On the Road to Belgrade As Soviet pressure on the Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito receded after Stalin’s death, Yugoslavia continued to develop relations with former colonial countries. This policy was considered to be a direct means of staying apart from both East and West. Mates claims that, at the end of 1952, Yugoslav diplomats received instructions to intensify contacts with the representatives of African and Asian countries that were in a position similar to that of Yugoslavia.7 The instructions suggested that Yugoslavia had abandoned a Eurocentric ap- proach to problems of international relations and was attempting to work with non-bloc countries on a global scale. At the same time, the Yugoslav press started to publish a series of articles about the problems of anti-colonial pol- icy and development in the newly independent African and Asian countries. In addition, Yugoslav officials often emphasized during public appearances that this new approach to foreign policy would help safeguard the country’s independence.8 1954–1956: Tito Openly Joins the Non-Aligned Flock A key step in the development of mutual cooperation occurred at the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955 during Tito’s visit to India and Burma. In the words of historian Darko Bekic,´ the trip represented “an intellectual catharsis of its own kind, through which Tito got rid of his Balkan selfishness and Eurocentric horizons, and overnight he had become a citizen of the world and a world leader.”9 As one Indian diplomat vividly pointed out, Tito was “the first great European statesman who came to Asia not as a representative of colonizers, but as a great friend of Asian nations.”10 For Yugoslav leaders, the trip was significant because it allowed officials to familiarize themselves with the experiences of the countries that were the first to proclaim non-alignment as their credo and that had in common the experience of protecting their own independence. Jawaharlal Nehru viewed Yugoslavia, despite its close ties with the West, as a potential model for other countries, particularly China, to leave 7. Ibid., p. 124. 8. Svetozar Rajak, “In Search of a Life outside the Two Blocs: Yugoslavia’s Road to Non–Alignment,” in Velike sile i male drzaveˇ u Hladnom ratu—sluˇcaj Jugoslavije (Belgrade: Arhiv Jugoslavije, 2005), pp. 89–92. 9. Darko Bekic,´ Jugoslavija u Hladnom ratu: Odnosi s velikim silama 1949–1955 (Zagreb: Plava biblioteka,1988), p. 674. 10. “Conversations at the Dinner Given by the Attache´ of the French Embassy in Burma,” 23 November 1954, in Diplomatic Archives of the Serbian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DASMIP), Political Archives (PA), Year 1955, Folder 9, Doc. 41835. 81 Downloaded from http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/JCWS_a_00681 by guest on 30 September 2021 Zivotiˇ cand´ Cavoˇ skiˇ one of the blocs and join the flock of the non-aligned.11 At the same time, Yugoslavia’s significant political, ideological, and military influence in Burma had helped to shape Rangoon’s internal and foreign policies and became a strong factor in Belgrade’s attempts to promote its own authority among the newly independent countries. In many ways, Yugoslavia’s policy toward Burma made Belgrade a rising star in the non-aligned flock and opened the doors of Asia to Tito.12 The special importance of Tito’s trip to India and Burma is reflected in the specific identification of interests shared by all three countries and the efforts they made to find ways of overcoming their differences. Despite the obvious economic and social dissimilarities, Tito insisted on finding common ground and mutual interests with an eye to future cooperation. During the trip he constantly emphasized the need to build ties and create means for closer coordination among the emerging non-aligned countries. The initiative was envisioned as creating favorable bilateral ground for political coordina- tion between countries with similar international problems. Tito’s endeavor was interpreted in the West as an attempt to set up a so-called third bloc, although this was not actually his intent.13 During official talks with Nehru, Tito took the initiative, continually insisting that a secure path of coopera- tion and coexistence would be found only through a comprehensive analysis of corresponding European and Asian issues.14 Nehru, viewed the idea of peaceful coexistence as a means by which India would adjust its relations with all its neighbors and calibrate its position in Asian affairs, whereeas Tito averred that the concept of non-alignment had become a primary com- ponent in the redefinition of Yugoslavia’s role in the international arena. Both Tito and Nehru put forward “the necessity of peaceful co-existence not merely as an alternative, but as an imperative,” making a clear distinction be- tween the principles of “non-alignment” and “neutralism” (i.e., passivity) and claiming that non-alignment was a “positive, active, and constructive policy 11.