1 Introduction 1

Notes

1 Introduction 1. James Adams, The Financing of Terror: Behind the P.L.O., I.R.A., Red Brigades, and M-19 Stand the Paymasters: How the Groups That Are Terrorizing the World Get the Money to Do It (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), 4. 2. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 19. 3. Friedrich Schneider, “Macroeconomics: The Financial Flows of Islamic Terrorism,” in Global Financial Crime: Terrorism, Money Laundering, and Offshore Centres, ed. Donato Masciandaro (Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2004), 102. 4. C. Boucek, “The Battle to Shut Down Al-Qaeda’s Finances” (Jane’s Terrorism Intelligence Centre, 2002). 5. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 229–40. 6. Paul Pierson, “Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 2 (2000): 261. 7. Joshua Sinai, “New Trends in Terrorism Studies: Strengths and Weaknesses,” in Mapping Terrorism Research: State of the Art, Gaps and Future Direction, ed. Magnus Ranstorp, Cass Series: Political Violence (London: Routledge, 2007), 33. The closest the international commu- nity has come with regards to a consensus on a definition of terrorism is the one found in the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). It makes it illegal for a person to provide or collect funds to be used in prosecution of any of the international conventions pertaining to specific terrorist attacks (hijacking and so forth) as well as “Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any person not taking any active part in the hostili- ties in a situation of armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing an act.” Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and 170 Notes

Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: World Bank: International Monetary Fund, 2006), 1–4. 8. Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 9. 9. Ibid., 7. 10. Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d) defines terrorism as “pre- meditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncom- batant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience.” This definition is contained in Title 22 of the US Code, Section 2656f(d). Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 13. The first difference between my definition and that of the original is the addition of the word “individuals.” Its inclusion is explained in the following paragraphs. The second change is that this book will not consider acts committed by clandestine agents of a state to be terrorist attacks. Instead, I restrict the definition to only encompass nonstate actors. 11. Ibid. 12. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2 ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 34. 13. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 14. 14. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 43. 15. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 14. 16. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 25. 17. See, for example, Walter Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1987), 146, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 25. 18. Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 4 (2003): 34. Language has been added to some aspects of U.S. Law stat- ing that terrorism can be conducted by individuals, but the State Department definition has not changed. For example, Section 6001 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, PL 108–458 amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act to add the category of a lone wolf to its statutes. According to this law, a lone wolf is “a non-United States person who engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation for international terrorism.” Elizabeth B. Bazan, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: “Lone Wolf” Amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act” (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2004). 19. Bonnie Cordes, “When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 154. 20. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 199. 21. Cordes, “When Terrorists Do the Talking,” Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 13, Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 199. Notes 171

22. Daniel Byman, Peter Chalk, Bruce Hoffman, William Rosenau, and David Brannan, Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001), 3. 23. Not all terrorist groups necessarily seek to establish themselves over the long run. For example, the perpetrators of the London subway bombings in 2005 only intended to organize themselves for that one suicide mission. In such cases, obviously, long-term resourcing support will not be sought. 24. These four categories are based upon a five-category classification of capability created by RAND. Kim Cragin and Sara A. Daly, The Dynamic Terrorist Threat: An Assessment of Group Motivations and Capabilities in a Changing World (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004). 25. Byman, Deadly Connections, 15. Situations where a terrorist organization is able to compel compliance from a population in a failing of col- lapsed state will generally fall under the category of shell state, though in rare circumstances, it could also be the case of a state sponsoring group. 26. The most integrated are state-proxies, which are state agencies and clandestine agents conducting attacks on behalf of that state. Because these attacks are carried out clandestinely by government personnel, they are probably best considered as a type of special operations, a more tradi- tional military operation that is beyond the scope of this book. 27. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 188. 28. Loretta Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2004), 66–80. 29. Bruce Hoffman, “Redefining Counterterrorism: The Terrorist as C.E.O.,” RAND Review 28, no. 1 (2004): 15, Peter. L Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama Bin Laden (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 83–4. 30. Byman, Deadly Connections, 187–218, Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2000). 31. Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, Globalization in Question, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 1999), 11. 32. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve: Globalization and Interna- tional Terrorism,” International Security 27, no. 3 (2002/3): 46–51.

2 Terrorism Cannot Live on Idealism Alone 1. Adams, Financing of Terror, 251. 2. On August 11, 2001, three PIRA members, James Monaghan, Martin McCauley and Neill Connolly, were arrested in Bogata, Colombia with 172 Notes

false passports and traces of explosives in their belongings. They were charged by Colombia with training FARC. James “Mortar” Monaghan is believed to have designed the PIRA homemade mortar, and McCauley and Connolly are believed to be some of PIRA’s best explosives experts. Neither Sinn Fein nor PIRA have admitted that the three individuals were sent to Colombia to train the FARC. After the capture of the PIRA members, FARC tactics, especially those involving urban warfare, improved markedly, including the use of car bombs, secondary devices (explosive devices used to ambush responding personnel) and longer range mobile mortars, all which bore striking similarities to PIRA weapons and tactics. Mark Burgess, “Globalizing Terrorism: The F.A.R.C.-I.R.A. Connection” (CDI Terrorism Project, June 5, 2002). 3. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 99–101. 4. For instance, Islamist fighters in Chechnya reportedly provide no death benefits to the families of their suicide bombers. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 185. 5. For example, al Qaeda members were paid salaries of 500–1200 USD per month while located in Sudan. Such a salary was substantial in a country as poor as Sudan. The Irish Republican Army has reportedly paid £12,000 per year and higher to members to maintain the cease fire. Hizbullah, by its own accounting, provides aid to 1,284 families of Hizbullah members who were “martyrs” through their Philanthropic and Social Martyrs’ Institution. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 83, Naim Qassem, Hizbullah: The Story from Within, trans. Dalia Khalil (London, UK: SAQI Books, 2005), 85, Nick Kochan, The Washing Machine: How Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Soils Us (Mason, OH: Thompson, 2005), 81. 6. Benjamin J. Cohen, The Geography of Money (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 11. 7. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 87. 8. Cohen, The Geography of Money, 14–16. Cohen’s “currency pyramid” contains seven categories, ordered from most dominant and widely accepted to least dominant. Depending on a terrorist organization’s geographic location and specific needs, other currencies are certainly used. 9. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 56. 10. “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism” (Washington, DC: U.S. Defense Department Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006), 16. 11. Phil Williams, “Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 81. 12. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 200. Though the FMLN were terrorists in the 1980s, today, they are a legitimate political party in El Salvador. 13. Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, “An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers,” New York Times (October 15, 2007), Notes 173

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.h . . . 8470- a8aqID3BQkeSI0xrLjqALQ&pagewanted=print. 14. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 207–9, Weedah Hamzah, “Hezbollah Launches Another Anti-Israel Computer Game,” EUX.TV (August 15, 2007), http://www.eux.tv/article.aspx?articleId=12774. 15. “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” 17–8. 16. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 42–5. 17. Williams, “Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances,” 80. 18. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 45, Byman, Deadly Connections, 65. 19. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 45–6. 20. Ibid. 21. Ibid., 47–8. 22. Abdul Bakier Bakier, “G.I.M.F. Develops Defensive and Offensive Software for Jihadi Operations,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 18 (September 27, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article. php?issue_id=4243. 23. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 50–1. 24. “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” 17. 25. Ibid. 26. Clancy Chassay and Bobbie Johnson, “Google Earth Used to Target Israel,” Guardian (October 25, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/ technology/2007/oct/25/google.israel/print. 27. Ideology is “the consensus of grievances and objectives that a terrorist group is trying to address through violence.” Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 30, “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” 18. 28. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 37. 29. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 439. 30. See, for example, Muhammad Haniff Bin Hassan, “Key Considerations in Counterideological Work against Terrorist Ideology,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 6 (2006), Bruce Hoffman, “A Review of ‘The War for Muslim Minds’,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 3 (2006), Frank Scott Douglas, “Waging the Inchoate War: Defining, Fighting, and Second-Guessing the ‘Long War’,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 3 (2007), “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism.” 31. Bin Hassan, “Key Considerations,” 533–4. 32. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 232. 33. “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” 14–5. 34. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 32. 35. “National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism,” 15. 36. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 42. 37. “Resilience refers to a dynamic process encompassing positive adaptation within the context of significant adversity.” Adaptation results from 174 Notes

both proactive measures taken by an organization and organizational responses to exogenous shocks. Suniya S. Luthar, Dante Cicchetti, and Bronwyn Becker, “The Construct of Resilience: A Critical Evaluation and Guide for Future Work,” Child Development 71, no. 3 (2000). I wish to thank Reid Sawyer for providing this definition and concept. 38. David Rohde, “Foreign Fighters of Harsher Bent Bolster Taliban,” New York Times, October 30, 2007. 39. Ibid. 40. “Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out of Iraq,” ed. Brian Fishman (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008), http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/pdf/Sinjar_2_ July_23.pdf. 41. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 34–7. 42. Cordes, “When Terrorists Do the Talking,” 154. 43. Cragin and Daly, Dynamic Terrorist Threat, 48–50. 44. Adams, Financing of Terror, 49. The PLO conducted training for a total of about 10,000 personnel. According to Ray Cline and Yonah Alexander based on information from press reports, the PLO trained 4 members of the German Red Army Faction, 6 from the Italian Red Brigades, 4 members of the Japanese Red Army Faction, 3 from ETA, 130 Turkish Armenian extremists, 170 Iranian terrorists, 28 members of the Argentine Montoneros, and 12 terrorists from the Philippines. The PLO also provided training to the Nicaraguan army. Ray S. Cline and Yonah Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection (New York: Crane Russak, 1984), 62–3. 45. Williams, “Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances,” 80. 46. Paul Cruickshank and Mohannad Hage Ali, “Abu Musab Al Suri: Architect of the New Al Qaeda,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 1 (2007).

3 Terrorist Groups’ Resourcing Menu 1. Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989), 6. 2. Pierson, “Increasing Returns,” 252–3. 3. This framework is inspired by and based heavily upon that created by Steve Kiser. For that framework, see Steve Kiser, “Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure” (RAND, 2005), 25–7. 4. Ibid., 26–7. 5. Ibid. 6. Andrew Black, “Lebanon Another Waypoint for North Africans Headed to Iraq,” Terrorism Focus 4, no. 17 (June 5, 2007), http://jamestown. org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373446, Lorenzo Vidino, “Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe,” Terrorism Monitor 5, Notes 175

no. 20 (October 25, 2007), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=2373743. 7. “Lebanon: Fighting at Refugee Camp Kills Civilians,” Human Rights News (May 23, 2007), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2007/05/23/ lebano15992.htm. 8. This framework of needs is based on Picarelli and Shelley’s framework of the three criteria that terrorist organizations use with regard to entering specific criminal enterprises: capabilities, opportunities, and entry costs. I have added “needs” to this framework. While “needs” was not a part of their framework, it was implied elsewhere in their chapter. John T. Picarelli and Louise I. Shelley, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 9. Nikos Passas, “Terrorism Financing Mechanisms and Policy Dilemmas,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 32. 10. Raymond W. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel: Dirty Money and How to Renew the Free-Market System (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), 120. 11. Byman, Deadly Connections, 21, 59–66. 12. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 10, 17. 13. Byman, Deadly Connections, 49–51, 75–8. 14. David C. Rapoport, “Introduction,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 4. 15. Picarelli and Shelley, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 40. 16. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil: How Terrorism Is Financed—and How to Stop It (Chicago: Bonus Books, 2003), 3. 17. Picarelli and Shelley, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 41. 18. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financing,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 18. There is at least one scenario when coming to the attention of law enforcement for criminal activity might bring long-term benefits for the group. If a terrorist is arrested for a petty crime (and law enforcement are unaware of his terrorist affiliations), he may be able to use his time in prison for recruitment to his organization, as well as the possibility of making new resourcing contacts with other criminals. Picarelli and Shelley, “Organized Crime and Terrorism,” 50. For this reason, some scholars and analysts are concerned about prison populations as potential breeding grounds for terrorists. 19. Giraldo and Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financ- ing,” 18. 176 Notes

20. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road to 9/11 (New York: Vintage Books, 2006), 217–8. 21. Giraldo and Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financ- ing,” 19. 22. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 178. 23. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 36. 24. Ibid., 96. 25. Daniel Benjamin and Steven Simon, The Age of Sacred Terror: Radical Islam’s War against America (New York: Random House, 2003), 112–3. 26. Maurice R. Greenberg, William F. Wechsler, and Lee S. Wolosky, “Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force” (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), 11. 27. In particular, see Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recom- mendation 9: Cash Couriers in Schott, Reference Guide, Annex 6, 34–6. 28. Kimberly L. Thachuk, “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline: Can It Be Sev- ered?,” Strategic Forum 191 (2002): 2. 29. “Report to Congressional Requesters on Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Methods” (General Accounting Office, November 2003). 30. Karen Deyoung and Douglas Farah, “U.S. Agency Turf Battles Hamper Hunt for Untraceable Commodities,” Washington Post, June 18, 2002. 31. Adams, Financing of Terror, 157–8. 32. Thomaz G. Costa and Gaston H. Schulmeister, “The Puzzle of the Iguazu Tri-Border Area: Many Questions and Few Answers Regarding Organised Crime and Terrorism Links,” Global Crime 8, no. 1 (2007): 31–37. 33. Bernadetta Berti, “Reassessing the Transnational Terrorism-Criminal Link in South America’s Tri-Border Area,” Terrorism Monitor 6, no. 18 (September 22, 2008), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=2374428. 34. Kim Bolan, “For Hezbollah: Cheap Smokes, Fake Viagra,” Vancouver Sun (September 21, 2007), http://www.canada.com/components/ print.aspx?id=70dfb2cd-83ff-4f0f-b6db-f49f8c8b0228. 35. Adams, Financing of Terror, 167–8. 36. Douglas Farah, Blood from Stones: The Secret Financial Network of Terror (New York, NY: Broadway Books, 2004), 161, Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 137–9. 37. Brian Krebs, “Three Worked the Web to Help Terrorists,” Washington Post (July 6, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/ article/2007/07/05/AR2007070501945_pf.html,—–—, “Terrorism’s Hook into Your Inbox,” Washington Post (July 5, 2007), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/05/ AR2007070501153_pf.html. One of those captured in the UK was Notes 177

Moroccan-born Younes Tsouli, age 23, who was better known as Irhabi007 (Irhabi means “terrorist” in Arabic). Irhabi007 had been considered the de facto administrator of the Muntada al-Ansar al-Islami jihadist forum, which had been the main internet forum for Abu Musab al Zarqawi, the now-dead leader of Al Qaeda in Iraq. 38. Farah, Blood from Stones, 163 and 66–7. 39. Jen Haberkorn, “Retailers Target Online Sales,” Washington Times (October 29, 2007), http://washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/ article . . . 071029/BUSINESS/110290042/1006&template=printart. 40. Adams, Financing of Terror, 93–4. 41. In this circumstance, kidnap and ransom has a primary goal of acquiring resources for the group, along with possible political goals. This is separate from hostage taking when the goal is to try to coerce governments into some policy change, or is done with the sole intent of killing the hostage and publicize it, such as is tragically the case in Iraq, Afghanistan (such as the Daniel Pearl murder), and Chechnya. 42. Adams, Financing of Terror, 192–200. 43. Ibid., 199–201. 44. Ibid., 191–9. 45. “Al-Qaeda Turns More to Extortion, Abductions to Fund Fight, United States Says,” Associated Press (July 30, 2008). 46. Massoud Ansari, “Taliban Use Hostage Cash to Fund Uk Blitz,” London Daily Telegraph (October 15, 2007), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ core/Content/displayPrintable.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/10/14/wtali- ban114.xml&site=5&page=0. 47. Adams, Financing of Terror, 216–8. 48. Rachel Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism: How Governments around the World Have Used the Drug Trade to Finance and Further Terrorist Activity (New York: Basic Books, 1990), 124–5. 49. Ahmed Rashid, Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2002), 165–7. 50. “Opium Winfalls Fuels Afghan Insurgents: U.N.,” Reuters (November 16, 2007), http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20071116/ts_nm/afghan . . . dc_ 1&printer=1;_ylt=AupzFG9t3_QdNwA2Q2MhSyRg.3QA. 51. Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?,” New York Times (July 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/ magazine/27AFGHAN-t.html. 52. Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), xxvii, 66. 53. Ibid., 66, Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 68, 97. 54. Abu Nidal’s real name was Sabri al Banna. He is believed to have been motivated by anger that his family, a well-to-do family from Jaffa, was displaced by Israeli in 1948. “Terrorism Knowledge Database” (Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism, 2007). 178 Notes

55. At that time, he had about 200 supporters, mainly young Palestinians resident in Iraq or related to him through family ties. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 286. 56. Carl Anthony Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” Terrorism 14 (1991): 61–3. 57. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 57. 58. Syria provided diplomatic support (such as identity papers and passports) as well as access to training facilities in Lebanon; Libya provided about 15 million USD per year. The Libyan subsidy appears to have ceased in 1989 after an internal coup within the Abu Nidal Organization. Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” 61–4. 59. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 286–8, Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 57–9. 60. Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” 61. 61. Many believe that Saddam Hussein ordered him assassinated, and some believe he is not really dead. The group remains on the U.S. State Department’s list as a foreign terrorist organization. “Terrorism Knowledge Database.” 62. Adams, Financing of Terror, 1. 63. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 105. 64. There are numerous accounts of how much Usama bin Laden inherited and what his yearly stipend was. Early estimates put his inheritance at 300 million USD, but a more current and accurate estimate provided by the 9/11 Commission is about 20–30 million USD. Lawrence Wright gives the most conservative estimate. He argues that Usama bin Laden inherited only about 7 million USD, and his stipend was only 266,000 USD per year. Nevertheless, starting an organization with millions, as well as a substantial yearly allowance, will certainly give a nascent terrorist organization a much stronger start than one that must live hand-to-mouth. Wright, Looming Tower, 165 and 65n, Peter. L Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know (New York: Free Press, 2006), 10, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 169–70. 65. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 35. 66. Peter Heller, “The Whale Warriors,” National Geographic Adventure, May 2006, 63. 67. Scholar Yossi Shain has defined a diaspora as “a people with common national origin who reside outside a claimed or an independent home territory. They regard themselves, or are regarded by others, as members or potential members of their country of origin (claimed or already existing), a status held regardless of their geographical location and citizen status outside their home country.” Yossi Shain, “Ethnic Diasporas and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Political Science Quarterly 109, no. 5 (1994–5): 814. Notes 179

68. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 3, 57–9. 69. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 35, 54. 70. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 33. 71. Though charities came to the forefront of criminal financing with the examination of al Qaeda’s funding, charities have been used for ill purposes for decades before. For instance, former Indonesian President Suharto had foundations set up which received donations that he used to enrich himself and his family. These included funds ostensibly for scholarships, orphans, the homeless, poverty alleviation, disaster relief, and the building and maintenance of mosques. 72. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 144–5. 73. Farah, Blood from Stones, 130. 74. Byman, Deadly Connections, 255. 75. Douglas Frantz, “Possible Link Seen to U.S.-Based Charity and Al Qaeda,” New York Times, June 14, 2002. 76. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 73. 77. Frantz, “Possible Link Seen to Us-Based Charity.” 78. Jessica Stern, Terror in the Name of God: Why Religious Militants Kill (New York: Harper Collins, 2003), 273. This was not the only time an al Qaeda–affiliated group used a charity as cover. When Ayman al- Zawahiri travelled in the United States in order to try to raise funds for his Egyptian al Jihad terrorist organization in 1993, he posed under his nom de guerre, Dr. Abdul Mu’iz, as a representative of the Kuwaiti Red Crescent. Wright, Looming Tower, 140–1, 203–4. 79. This is not to argue that only terrorists have utilized legitimate businesses or financial institutions to acquire, move, or store their resources. Corporations evading tax laws, criminal syndicates, and corrupt leaders also utilize such opportunities, sometimes with the connivance, or at least benign neglect, of these legitimate institutions. The most inves- tigated and publicized of these are the various bank scandals involving mafias and corrupt politicians, such as the Russian mafia’s money laundering activities with the Bank of New York, Mexican banks laundering drug money, and the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) scandal, where a large, international bank was involved in seemingly every illicit activity possible including drug money (cocaine, etc.), corrupt politicians (Nigerian military rulers, Panama’s Manuel Noriega), and terrorism (Abu Nidal’s front companies used BCCI, for example). Information on these scandals is in Kochan, Washing Machine, Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated. 80. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 95–6. 81. Ibid., 36. 82. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel, 124–6. 83. Hawalas are explained in greater detail below. 180 Notes

84. Lucy Komisar, “Shareholders in the Bank of Terror?,” Salon.com (March 15, 2002), http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/03/15/al_ taqwa/print.html. 85. Hugh Williamson and Philipp Jaklin, “Far-Right Has Ties with Islamic Extreme,” Financial Times (2001), http://specials.ft.com/theresponse/ FT38ZL6ZSTC.html. 86. Komisar, “Shareholders in the Bank of Terror?.” 87. Craig Whitlock, “Terrorism Financing Blacklists at Risk,” Washington Post (November 2, 2008), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/article/2008/11/01/AR2008110102214.html?nav% 3Drss_world/europe&sub=AR. 88. According to a raid of the Benevolence International Foundation charity branch in Bosnia, which yielded some of the best records ever regarding not only al Qaeda’s finances but also its overall structure, Suleiman Abudul Aziz al Rahji was a member of this “Golden Chain.” Also, when the SAAR Foundation was dissolved in 2000 and the Safa Group established, it was established at the same address as the SAAR Foundation and with many of the same board members. Farah, Blood from Stones, 142–55. 89. See, for example, “Milan Imam Convicted for Promoting Jihad,” Reuters (December 20, 2007), http://africa.reuters.com/wire/news/ usnL20112390.html, Damir Kaletovic and Anes Alic, “Al-Qaida’s Bosnian War Move,” International Relations and Security Network (October 3, 2008), http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/ Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=92320, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 171, 74, Sebastian Rotella, “14 Terrorism Suspects Held in Europe,” Los Angeles Times (November 7, 2007), http://www. latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-terror7nov07,1,4484478. story?ctrack=6&cset=true. 90. In November, 2007, Nasreddin was quietly taken off the U.S. and UN lists. The U.S. Department of Treasury stated that Nasreddin no longer fit the criteria for designation because he had submitted signed state- ments to the U.S. Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Asset Control that he had terminated his relationship with his former part- ner Nada and with Bank Al Taqwa. The Swiss government froze the companies’ accounts in 2001, but in 2005 they suspended their operation. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel, 124–6, Josh Meyer, “When Is a Terrorism Figure No Longer One?,” Los Angeles Times (November 28, 2007), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na- financier28nov28,1,2685130,print.story?ctrack=1&cset=true. 91. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 86. 92. Thachuk, “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline,” 2. 93. For an excellent overview of international regulation and attempts to limit money laundering and terrorism finance, see Schott, Reference Guide. Notes 181

94. Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 85, 88–9. 95. “Commodities” have been placed under legitimate businesses because there is nothing inherently illegal about holding commodities such as gold or diamonds. As many commodities which have been used by terrorist organizations are smuggled out in violation of sanctions (i.e., “blood diamonds” from Sierra Leone), commodities could, in some cases, also be considered a form of criminal resourcing. 96. Farah, Blood from Stones, 5–18. 97. “Expert and Newspaper Says Diamonds Fund Terrorists,” Jewelers Circular Keystone (July 10, 2002) and (June 6, 2001), http://www. jckgrop.com/index. 98. Ibid. 99. Farah, Blood from Stones, 23 & 55. 100. Thachuk, “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline,” 4. 101. Farah, Blood from Stones, 109–13. 102. Ibid., 113–4. 103. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 90. A similar, U.S.-Colombia informal system used by drug traffickers is the Black Market Peso Exchange. Kochan, Washing Machine, 137–41. 104. Farah, Blood from Stones, 114–5. One of the most common reasons for normally legitimate persons and companies to use hawala services is to avoid a state’s capital controls or taxation on foreign exchange. Given India’s strong trading ties to other countries, and at the same time, strict capital controls, hawala has flourished there. 105. What information is required depends on that specific merchant system, whether the hawala is licensed or operating illegally, and the laws regulating hawalas in different countries. 106. Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel, 25. 107. Kochan, Washing Machine, Baker, Capitalism’s Achilles Heel. 108. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 93. 109. Kochan, Washing Machine, 269–71. 110. “E-Gold, Ltd.” designates the company that is the market leader and originator of this type of online commodity exchange. “E-gold” (lower case) designates gold moved through such a commodity system. E-Gold, Ltd. is now only one of many companies buying and selling e-gold accounts. An offshoot of this concept is the “e-dinar.” The e-dinar is advertised as a halal (Islamically permitted) form of exchange, as gold dinar and silver dirham (akin to “cents”) coins were struck under the caliphate of Umar, one of the four Rashiduun (first four caliphs after the death of the Prophet Mohammad). E-Gold, Ltd. and E-Dinar, Ltd. were part of the same umbrella company until they were formally separated in 2004. E-Dinar, Ltd. advertises the same ease of use and universality as e-gold. As with e-gold, there are no specific cases tying e-dinars to terrorism financing, but such an anonymous system is highly susceptible to such uses. All information on e-dinars 182 Notes

above is from the E-Dinar, Ltd. Web site, “E-Dinar: The Company,” https://www.e-dinar.com/html/3_0.html#oben. 111. Ltd. E-gold, “E-Gold: Better Money since 1996,” http://www.e-gold. com/. This company also advertises that it owns subsidiaries in e-silver, e-platinum, and e-metal on its Web site. 112. “Digital Currency Business E-Gold Indicted for Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting” (April 27,2007), http://www.usdoj. gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_301.html. 113. A recent U.S. indictment argues that E-Gold, Ltd. knowingly allowed its systems to be used as a preferred means of payment by operators of “investment scams, credit card and identity fraud, and sellers of online child pornography.” Ibid, “Digital Currency Business E-Gold Pleads Guilty to Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting Charges,” Department of Justice Press Release (July 21, 2008), http:// www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/July/08-crm-635.html. 114. “Gold Rush,” Business Week (January 9, 2006), http://www.business week.com/magazine/content/06_02/b3966094.htm. 115. Thachuk, “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline,” 1–2. 116. Kochan, Washing Machine, ix. 117. For a list of possible predicate crimes, as well as an excellent overview of the status of international laws and standards as they pertain to money laundering and terrorism financing, please see Schott, Reference Guide. 118. Kochan, Washing Machine, 245. 119. Some terrorist resourcing is neither laundered nor reverse laundered. If the terrorist acquires resources by illicit means, and then spends that money on illicit means (such as a terrorist attack), then no laundering will be required. For instance, if a terrorist organization uses petty crime to pay for the purchase of explosives on the black market, they will not need to launder that money from petty crime, unless for some reason the terrorist organization is hiding its sources of resourcing from other illicit organizations. Williams, “Warning Indicators and Terrorist Finances,” 85. 120. Thachuk, “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline,” 1–2. 121. Kochan, Washing Machine, 271–3. 122. Ibid., 284.

4 The Evolution of Terrorism Resourcing 1. Adams, Financing of Terror, 53. 2. David C. Rapoport, “The Four Waves of Rebel Terror and September 11,” Anthropoetics 8, no. 1 (2002). The life cycle of waves does not correspond to that of the organizations within them, so some organizations survive longer than its associated wave. For instance, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) began in the anticolonialist wave in the 1920s and went dormant in 1998. Notes 183

3. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 83–4. 4. The period from 1892 to 1901 is considered the “Decade of Regicide” in that more monarchs, presidents, and prime ministers were assassinated during than in any other time in history. The 1890s also saw the expansion of nonregicide-related terrorism, as anarchists set off explosives in cafés, opera audiences, and the French stock exchange with about 150 killed and 460 injured from 1880 to 1914. In the United States, there were at least three major attacks attributed to anarchists: the 1886 Haymarket bombing in Chicago, the 1892 attempt to kill the manager of Carnegie Steel, and the September 1901 successful assassination of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz. The United States also saw smaller attacks attributed to anarchists in 1908. Martin A. Miller, “The Intellectual Origins of Modern Terrorism in Europe,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 28, Richard Bach Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite: Anarchist Terrorism in Nineteenth Century Europe,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 1 (2004), Richard Bach Jensen, “The United States, International Policing and the War against Anarchist Terrorism, 1900–1914,” Terrorism and Political Violence 13, no. 1 (2001). 5. The International a.k.a. the International Workingmen’s Association had been an umbrella organization for the followers of Karl Marx and Bakunin to link together, which began in the 1860s. James Joll, The Anarchists (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1964), 124, Jensen, “Daggers, Rifles and Dynamite,” 119. 6. Lindsay Clutterbuck, “The Progenitors of Terrorism: Russian Revolutionaries or Extreme Irish Republicans?,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 1 (2004): 163. 7. Besides being one of the first to discuss the importance of resourcing, Most was also one of the first to recognize the importance of the media and modern communications to terrorist actions, as well as having pioneered the letter bomb. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 56. 8. As paraphrased from Most’s anarchist newspaper Freiheit of January 12, 1884, and September 13, 1884. Ibid., 57–8. A predecessor to Most, Karl Heinzen, while not writing about the importance of resourcing to terrorist action, nevertheless recognized that the resourcing of terrorism could be used as a source of intelligence by law enforcement. In 1848, he wrote that “the head of the assassins” (the terrorist cell leader in today’s language) will receive considerable sums of money without knowing the source so that if discovered or arrested, he cannot betray others even if he wishes to do so. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, “From the Dagger to the Bomb: Karl Heinzen and the Evolution of Political Terror,” Terrorism and Political Violence 16, no. 1 (2004): 109. 9. Miller, “Intellectual Origins,” 44. 10. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 96. 11. Ibid., 112. 184 Notes

12. Ibid., 96–7, Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, “The ‘Golden Age’ of Terrorism,” in The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 191. 13. The Social Revolutionaries were a political party with a militant wing, and hence, that wing had access to more resourcing than other contemporary terrorist groups. Yves Ternon, “Russian Terrorism, 1878–1908,” in The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 145–73. 14. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 100. 15. Ibid., 51. Given the nature of anarchism, with its view of all hierarchies as oppressive, anarchists by definition will rarely engage in an international structure. Even today, most anarchist gatherings, such as those at the 2004 Republican and Democratic national conventions, are coor- dinated via posting notices, with strategic or tactical decisions made through exhaustive consensus processes. Randy Borum and Chuck Tilby, “Anarchist Direct Actions: A Challenge for Law Enforcement,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 3 (2005). 16. David C. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” in Encyclopedia of Government and Politics, ed. Mary Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan (New York: Routledge, 2004), 1064. 17. To assist in leaderless resistance, the first Do-It-Yourself terrorism manuals were published during the anarchist wave. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 7. 18. Rapoport argues that the first wave begins with the conclusion of World War I and the breakup Germany, Austria and Turkey’s empires, but I find clear evidence that this nationalist wave had begun prior to World War I. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the immediate precipitating event for World War I, was accomplished by a nationalist terrorist organization with state sponsorship, as I note above. 19. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 47–64. 20. Narodna Obrana had been forced by Serbia to disarm in 1909, at which point it switched to cultural activities. The Black Hand (officially, the Ujedinjenje ili Smrt, Union of Death) was formed in 1911 by hard- line nationalists who had disdain for what they considered the Serbian capitulation when Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908. Tim Judah, The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, 2nd ed. (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2000), 95–6. 21. John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a County, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 90–1. 22. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 11–14. 23. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” 1055. Notes 185

24. Rapoport, “Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” NORAID was certainly not the first U.S.-based group to fund and supply Irish separatists. By the late 1840s, many Irishmen seeking independence from England were located in the United States. In the 1860s, the Fenian Brotherhood (also known as the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, IRB) was well established in the United States. For instance, in 1867, it sent rifles and volunteers on the ship Erin’s Hope, but they arrived after a local rebellion had already been quenched. In 1873, the group Clan na Gael (United Irishmen) was established in the United States to use physical force against the United Kingdom to establish an Irish state. Clan na Gael has the notoriety as the first to bomb the London Underground in October 1883 with seven bombs (three detonated in or close to car- riages full of passengers; four in the left luggage office). It also had the distinction of one of the first modern cases of smuggling weapons via the international trade regime, when in June 1881, the steamer SS Malta arrived from New York to Liverpool ostensibly with a cargo of cement. In each of the casks marked with a crossed “t” they found an improvised explosive device (IED) with a timed detonator. Other IEDs were found on other ships from the United States in subsequent days. Clutterbuck, “Progenitors of Terrorism,” 159– 60, 69–72, Jack Holland, The American Connection: U.S. Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland (New York: Viking, 1987), 13. 25. Kochan, Washing Machine, 85. 26. Adams, Financing of Terror, 151–5. 27. Rapoport, “Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” Besides tangible support and money, Jewish terrorist groups also received intangible support, such as the diplomatic support of the passage of resolutions in the U.S. Congress condemning “British oppression” and reaffirming U.S. support for a Jewish state in Palestine. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 51. 28. Rapoport, “Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” 29. The age of modern international terrorism is generally agreed to have begun on July 22, 1968, when the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an El Al flight en route from Rome to Tel Aviv. This was by far not the first hijacking, but in this one, the nation- ality of the hijacked plane—that of El al, the Israeli national airline— had symbolic importance, as was the goal of trading the passengers for Palestinian terrorists held in Israeli jails. It also forced the Israeli government to deal directly with the terrorists, lest the passengers and plane be destroyed, and the entire event was designed to be a major media event. Algeria provided sanctuary to the terrorists and their hostages throughout the ordeal, providing an example of state sponsorship. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 63–5, Walter Enders and Todd Sandler, The Political Economy of Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41–4. 186 Notes

30. This includes DM115,000 seized in Kassel, DM158,000 in Munich, DM19,000 in Hanover, DM237,000 in Kiel, DM134,000 in Kaiser- slautern, and DM315,000 in Berlin. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 97. 31. Ibid. 32. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” 1056, Adams, Financing of Terror, 187–214. 33. Rapoport, “Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” 34. Adams, Financing of Terror, 187–8. It is possible that the Irish Republican Army (IRA), or its later successor, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), was actually the first organization to form an alliance with organized crime. In the 1950s, then-IRA member George Harrison established a smuggling network to supply arms to the IRA from the United States. His weapons supplier was a Corsican-American named George DeMeo, who was described as “on the fringe of the Mafia.” It is unclear how involved DeMeo was with the Mafia, though he was Harrison’s main weapons supplier through the 1980s, so it is unclear what relationship the IRA had with the Mafia at that time. This network fell into disuse in the early 1960s, only to be revived by PIRA in 1970s. In 1976, a joint Irish-Italian Mafia operation robbed an armory in Danvers, Massachusetts. The weapons were somehow acquired by George Harrison, and by 1977, they were on their way to PIRA in Ireland. Harrison acquired six M-60 machine guns from this robbery, which became “prestige weapons” for PIRA, such as in propaganda posters. It is unclear what sort of relationship George Harrison had with the Irish and Italian mafias involved, and thus, how closely tied he was to organized crime, though certainly, there must have been some very close ties for him to receive these weapons. Holland, American Connection, 71–91. 35. While narcoterrorism is associated with Latin America, its first use to fund political violence was in 1952, when communist rebels facing a cash shortage in Laos confiscated Laos’ opium crop and sold it in Thailand, using the profits to buy arms from China. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 14. 36. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 293. 37. Adams, Financing of Terror, 217. 38. Ibid., 218, Ehrenfeld, Narcoterrorism, 98–9. 39. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 98. While the estimated 10 million USD per month is derived from information in the 1980s, a 2008 United States Department of Justice press release states that FARC members had been sentenced in the United States, in part, for laundering as much as 5 million USD per week for the group, so clearly, the groups still reap tremendous profits from narcoterrorism. “Foreign Nationals Sentenced to Alien Smuggling and Conspiracy to Support the F.A.R.C.” (February 29, 2008), http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2008/ February/08_crm_156.html. 40. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 204, 74–5. Notes 187

41. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” 1065. 42. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 275–6, 80–4, Cline and Alexander, Terrorism: The Soviet Connection, 45–9. 43. On a few occasions, the Soviet-bloc countries cooperated with the West in apprehending terrorists, and the bloc signed some antiterrorist resolutions at the United Nations during the same era. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 276–7. 44. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 259–61. 45. Ibid., 79. 46. Adams, Financing of Terror, 86–7. The Fatah faction is not the only business- oriented faction. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine established the Modern Mechanical Establishment as a front company providing a near monopoly on iron and steel for building con- struction in southern Lebanon, as well as becoming a major supplier of forged documents. The fact that this faction has been so successful in capitalism is particularly ironic given that it is ostensibly Marxist. Adams, Financing of Terror, 97–8. Another Palestinian group that has done well is business is the Abu Nidal Organization. In addition to state support as a terrorist-for-hire, it has also became a weapons broker, including Polish T-72 tanks that were supposed to be delivered to Iraq before then-Iraqi president Saddam Hussein changed his mind. Prior to the eastern European revolutions of 1989, it operated the SAS Trade and Investment firm, which acted as a middleman in trading goods from Eastern Europe to Iraq and Iran. The Bank of International Credit and Commerce (BCCI) was also responsible for its three front companies, and it moved money on behalf of the terrorist group. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 57–8, Wege, “The Abu Nidal Organization,” 60–1. 47. Adams, Financing of Terror, 88–9, 93–104,19–22, 230–3. 48. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 99. The actual yearly income of the PLO remains in dispute, with 300 million USD per year as a more conservative figure. For instance, Bruce Hoffman has estimated the annual income flow as about 600 million USD per year. Hoffman, Inside Ter- rorism, 79. 49. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 99. 50. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 49. 51. Ibid., 38. 52. Ibid., 54–6. 53. Though al Qaeda developed an extensive corporate-like structure with an extremely high degree of complexity and organization, unlike groups such as HAMAS, Hizbullah, and the IRA, it has never engaged as exten- sively in social work to gain support. While it has supported some charitable works, such as its original Maktab al Khadimat (Services Bureau), which funneled Arabs into the fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and that some of its associated charities have used at least some funds for charitable work, this has never been to the same level 188 Notes

as that of, for example, HAMAS. Instead, al Qaeda has relied more on sympathetic (or sometimes, unsympathetic) Islamic political parties to engage in propaganda, recruitment, and fundraising on its behalf. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 226. 54. Unlike the PLO, PIRA was not nearly as effective at turning a profit due to mismanagement, and the co-op was probably always a drain on resources. Adams, Financing of Terror, 175–7. 55. While Hizbullah has its own substantial internal resourcing, much of these social projects have been underwritten by Iran, and its logistics lines run through Syria. Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 81–90. 56. For example, though only 6 percent of all terrorist attacks in 1998– 2004 were religiously oriented, they caused 30 percent of the casualties. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 86–8. 57. Rapoport, “Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” 58. Paul Wallace, “Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis of Identity,” in Terrorism in Context, ed. Martha Crenshaw (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995). 59. Cecile Van de Voorde, “Sri Lankan Terrorism: Assessing and Responding to the Threat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (L.T.T.E.),” Police Practice and Research 6, no. 2 (2005). 60. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 97–118. 61. Ibid., 258. 62. Adams, Financing of Terror, 73. 63. Matthew Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances: Funding the Party of God,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 137. 64. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 258. 65. Rapoport, “Four Waves of Rebel Terror.” 66. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” 1065. 67. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 173. 68. Farah, Blood from Stones, 140. 69. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 142–4. 70. Matthew Levitt, Hamas: Politics, Charity, and Terrorism in the Service of Jihad (New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 2006), 80–106. 71. The first use of the Internet by an insurgent group was the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) in the early 1990s. It became a model for all sorts of insurgent and terrorist organizations. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 202–4. 72. Ibid., 204–6, 10–2. 73. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 91. 74. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 146–7. 75. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 187–9. Notes 189

76. Rapoport, “Terrorism,” 1065, Krebs, “Three Worked the Web to Help Terrorists,” Rapoport, “Terrorism’s Hook into Your Inbox.” 77. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda. 78. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 145–8. 79. Levitt, Hamas, 70–2. 80. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 149, Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 94. 81. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 77, Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 164. 82. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 40, 61–2, 157, United States of America, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Ahmed Ressam, Also Known as Benni Antoine Noris (2006). 83. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 203. 84. Ibid., 271. 85. Ibid., 203.

5 The Multinationals of Terrorism 1. Adams, Financing of Terror, 244. 2. Ibid., 16. 3. Levitt, Hamas, 53–4. 4. Jacob N. Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities and Inef- ficiencies: A Rational Choice Perspective,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stan- ford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 61. 5. Giraldo and Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financ- ing,” 19. 6. Ibid., 7–8, 10. 7. Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities,” 69. 8. Jamal al Fadl, in court testimony, claims he took extra commissions from Al Qaeda companies. When caught, he was told to pay back the money, which he claims he could not. He then left Sudan (where al Qaeda was based at the time), approached an unnamed U.S. consulate, stood in the visa line, and when he came to the front of the line, offered information on Usama bin Laden and the al Qaeda group. Information he provided was used in the court case United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et. al in 2001 for the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. Benjamin Weiser, “How to Keep an Ex-Terrorist Talking,” New York Times (December 9, 2007), http://www. nytimes.com/2007/12/09/nyregion/09qaeda.html?th=&emc=th& pagewanted=print. The original transcripts of this testimony regarding his embezzlement of al Qaeda funds (as well as al Qaeda’s relationship with the Sudanese government, Usama bin Laden’s interest in uranium, and some information on front companies) can be found at United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al. (2001). 190 Notes

9. Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities,” 65–6. 10. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 218. 11. Adams, Financing of Terror, 108–16. Also, because of the PLO’s quasis- tate status, it has been a member of international economic institutions, has had delegates attend economic conferences and so forth. 12. Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 75, 85–7. 13. Anthony H. Cordesman, Arab-Israeli Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Santa Barbara, CA: Preaeger Security International, 2006), 319–20. 14. John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’—Financing the Provisional I.R.A.: Part 1,” Terrorism and Political Violence 11, no. 2 (1999): 10. 15. The IRA was created in 1919 with the goal to fight for Irish independence, and after the partition of the island for the Republic of Ireland (an independent country) and Northern Ireland (the six counties still part of the United Kingdom) to be rejoined under their rule. In 1969, the bulk of the IRA split off from its parent organization, becoming the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), also known as the “Provisionals.” In 1970, the IRA’s political wing Sinn Fein moved its support from the IRA to PIRA, and in that same year, the arms and money smuggling lines from the United States also moved their alle- giance to PIRA. The original IRA gradually faded from existence in the 1970s. Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the I.R.A. (London, UK: Pan Books, 2004), 106, 16. 16. In theory, GACs should be held yearly, but due to security considerations, no GACs were held from 1970 to 1986. Ibid., 114. 17. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 19–20. 18. As senior IRA leader Peadar O’Donnell is quoted in a directive in the 1930s, “That each unit shall as a minimum be responsible for an amount equal to one penny per week per member, arrears not to exceed three months without special sanction of Army Council.” As English notes, in 1962, “Funding had dried up, they were short of weapons and there were not enough Volunteers coming through to replace those who had been imprisoned or killed.” English, Armed Struggle, 51, 83. 19. John Horgan and Max Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’—Financing the Provisional I.R.A.: Part 2,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 2 (2003): 3–4. 20. Ibid., 4. 21. Ibid., 5. PIRA member Bobby Sands was in prison for the October 1976 bombing of the Balmoral Furnishing Company (it was his second time in jail for PIRA activities). He later became the PIRA commander in the Long Kesh prison, and in April 1981 (while in prison and on a hunger strike) was elected to the British parliament. On March 1, 1981, he began a hunger strike to protest PIRA prisoners being treated as criminals, rather than given special status as political prisoners (such Notes 191

status had recently been revoked because British authorities felt it provided legitimacy to PIRA). Sands died on May 5, 1981. PIRA was able to propagandize on Bobby Sands’ death, claiming that it was the British intransigence that killed him, leading to worldwide demonstrations and additional money and support pouring in to PIRA and its associated charities (such as NORAID). Nine others would also die in their hunger strike before PIRA eventually had to call off the strike on October 3, 1981, without achieving their demands, though on October 6, 1981, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland did make some concessions. English, Armed Struggle, 193–203. 22. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 2,” 5. 23. Ibid., 34–5, Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 8. 24. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 2,” 36. 25. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 12–3, 21. Until 1994, the United Kingdom Inland Revenue authorities used to consider extortion payments “legitimate expenses,” and up to 40 percent of the money paid to paramilitaries could be claimed back as a tax allowance. Andrew Silke, “In Defense of the Realm: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part One: Extortion and Blackmail,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21 (1998): 349. 26. Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” 349. 27. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 8–12. There is considerable disagreement over whether PIRA took part in drug dealing. It seems against Sinn Fein’s interest to conduct drug-associated resourcing while at the same time trying to garner votes. Moreover, Sinn Fein has taken part in a number of urban antidrug campaigns, and ambushed a splinter group, the Irish People’s Liberation Organization (IPLO), which was involved in drug dealing, kneecapping 16 members and killing one. PIRA members were caught in drug smuggling. For instance, Joseph Paul Murray pleaded guilty in a Boston court of “rid- ing shotgun” on the ships Marita Ann and Valhalla, which were smuggling arms to PIRA and smuggling marijuana to the United States. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 25–30, Andrew Silke, “Drink, Drugs, and Rock’n’roll: Financing Loyalist Terrorism in Northern Ireland—Part Two,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 23, no. 2 (2000): 116–7. 28. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 2,” 8–9. The fact that one finance director controlled finances for both PIRA and Sinn Fein belied any formal separation between the two. 29. The information on PIRA’s accounting comes from one of the three aforementioned accountants, nicknamed “W” by Horgan and Taylor from their personal interviews with him. Ibid., 11–6, 40. 30. Ibid., 37–8, Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 16. 31. Adams, Financing of Terror, 135 – 6. T h i s i ncluded t he a r re st of NOR A I D members for arms smuggling by the FBI in 1983. The arms smuggling 192 Notes

convictions ended any pretense in the United States that NORAID was a charity providing support to the underprivileged in Ireland. Adams, Financing of Terror, 138–40, 51–3. 32. Holland, American Connection, 27–62. 33. English, Armed Struggle, 117, Holland, American Connection, 30–1. 34. Adams, Financing of Terror, 143. This was the primary source for PIRA’s favorite weapons, the Armalite (better known as the AR-15, a civilian version of the M-16). George Harrison only acquired the weapons and shipped them to a middle man in the United States who would then arrange transportation. He claims he did not know who took care of transportation, nor did they know who he was. His entire operation was never more than five–six at a time. This weapons smuggling ring largely fell apart after an FBI sting in the early 1980s. Holland, American Connection, 63–113. 35. Adams, Financing of Terror, 142–3. 36. Holland, American Connection, 31–2, 98, 106. 37. This is despite the fact that the Gardai (Irish Police) are believed to have recovered 45–60 percent of the weapons acquired from Libya in the 1980s, and given that the U.S. supply lines have decreased dramatically since the 1980s. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 5–6. 38. Ibid., 6–7. These salaries were far too low to sustain a family; such payments were designed to supplement social welfare payments (full-time members were often required to claim unemployment benefits) or to supplement full or part-time salaries from legitimate jobs. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 16. 39. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 6. 40. Ibid., 7, 23. 41. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 2,” 50. 42. Ibid., 54. The case study involved PIRA’s primary accountant (Accountant X) possibly enriching himself through his ownership of a hotel. 43. Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 17. In contrast, the loyalist terrorist organizations such as the Ulster Defense Association (UDA, with attacks claimed under its Ulster Freedom Fighters, UFF) and Ulster Volunteer Forces (UVF) had much looser controls on its members and their means of resourcing, to the point where they were considered little more than gangsters. This was especially true in the realm of drug dealing, which was seen as a means of fund raising far more by loyalists than PIRA. The two exhibited some levels of formal institutionalization, but not nearly to the level of PIRA. Of the two, the UVF was considered the smaller, but more disciplined group due to its recruitment of ex-military personnel. Like PIRA, as these organizations became more political, they sought to “clean up” their resourcing sources, at least rhetorically. For an in-depth study of loyalist terrorist Notes 193

resourcing structures (or lack thereof), please see Silke, “In Defense of the Realm,” Silke, “Drink, Drugs, and Rock’n’roll.” Part 1 of Silke’s study also provides an excellent explanation into the various means of extortion conducted by terrorist organizations, and different means that the victims (who can, at times, also act as perpetrators) can respond. 44. “I.R.A. Statement,” Guardian (July 28, 2005), http://www.guardian. co.uk/politics/2005/jul/28/northernireland.devolution. 45. “Nineteenth Report of the Independent Monitoring Commission,” ed. U.K. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland (Office of Public Sector Information, September 2009), 6–8. 46. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 74–5. 47. Levitt, Hamas, 3. 48. Ibid., 9–13. 49. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 73. 50. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances.” Iran tends to employ “a performance-based approach,” providing funding based on the success of a group’s terrorist attacks. Iran demands proof of successful attacks, such as videotapes of the attacks. Also, unlike other external sources of income, much Iranian support goes directly to operational HAMAS units, and not through charities or other forums. Levitt, Hamas, 172–4. Iran also has backed the HAMAS-led Palestinian Authority government that was elected in January 2006. Iran had pledged 250 million USD to the Palestinian authority if Israel and the United States cut it off from funding. Aaron D. Pina, “Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality” (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2006), 3. 51. The importance of this private Saudi funding is indicated by the financial problems HAMAS encountered since the Saudi government cracked down on Islamic charities and private donations in 2004. A Saudi government–run committee, the Saudi Committee for the Support of the al Aqsa Intifada, has provided over 5000 USD to the families of Palestinians killed in the Intifada, regardless of how that person died (i.e., whether as an innocent bystander or a suicide bomber) using accounts at the Arab Bank. Officially, the Saudi government ended all support HAMAS in 2002. Levitt, Hamas, 15, 173, 91–2. 52. The speaker may have based this claim on the fact that the dean of the Islamic University was Ismail Haniya, until he was expelled to Lebanon in the early 1990s. Haniya was the Palestinian Prime Minister in the HAMAS-led government that was elected in January 2006 until forced out in a showdown with Fatah’s Mahmud Abbas in June 2007. He remains HAMAS’ political leader in the Gaza Strip. Pina, “Fatah and Hamas: The New Palestinian Factional Reality,” 2, “Has Hamas Split?,” Economist, November 10, 2007. 53. Levitt, Hamas, 81–2, 119. 54. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 74. This holding company was incorporated in the United States under the name Beit al-Mal, Inc. (aka BMI, 194 Notes

Inc.) in 1985 in New Jersey, and it operated subsidiaries such as BMI Leasing, Inc., BMI Real Estate Development, Inc., and BMI Trade and Investment, Inc. Levitt, Hamas, 165. 55. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 74, Levitt, Hamas, 165. 56. Levitt, Hamas, 69, 78. 57. In October 2007, a mistrial was declared in the trial against the Holy Land Foundation and five of its backers. The trial included 197 counts, but the foundation was not accused of paying directly for suicide bombings, but rather, for sending contributions to the social arm of HAMAS. Leslie Eaton, “U.S. Prosecution of Muslim Group Ends in Mistrial,” New York Times (October 22, 2007), http://www. nytimes.com/2007/10/23/us/23charity.html?_r=1&th=&emc=th& pagewanted=print. Matthew Levitt, the author for whom much of this HAMAS data is derived, testified in the court case against the Holy Land Foundation. Jason Trahan, “Prosecutors: Holy Land Foundation Key in Hamas Effort,” Dallas Morning News July 25, 2007. Because one of the original leaders of HAMAS, as well as much of its resourcing arm located outside Israel, began under Musa Abu Marzuk (now the deputy head of HAMAS’ politburo and residing in Damascus, Syria) in the early 1980s when he resided in the United States, HAMAS has had a large resourcing presence there. In the early 1990s, Marzuk ran the international funding efforts and provided oversight for the Qassam Brigades from the United States. His resourcing from the United States included not only money, but also weapons. Levitt, Hamas, 40–3. 58. Levitt, Hamas, 70–2, 165, Jason Trahan and Tanya Eiserer, “Holy Land Foundation Defendents Guilty on All Counts,” Dallas Morning News (November 25, 2008), http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/ dws/dn/latestnews/stories/112508dnmetholylandverdicts.1e5022504. html. 59. Levitt, Hamas, 56–7. Al Islah is mandated by HAMAS to handle central West Bank distribution. The al Tadhoman organization in Nablus coordinates distribution in the northern West Bank and the southern West Bank is serviced by the Hebron Islamic Charity Society. Levitt, Hamas, 163. 60. Levitt, Hamas, 47, 59. 61. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 63. 62. Bergen, Holy War, Inc. 63. Don Van Natta, “Running Terrorism as a New Economy Business,” New York Times, November 11, 2001. 64. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 242–3. 65. Hoffman, “Redefining Counterterrorism.” 66. Alan Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive,” Atlantic Monthly 294, no. 2 (2004): 60, 67. Notes 195

67. Farah, Blood from Stones, 142. A subset of the “Golden Chain” is the “Jeddah Five,” five Saudi businessmen who have funded al Qaeda and assisted in setting up its resourcing empire. The members of the Jeddah Five overlap with those of the larger Golden Chain. The Jeddah Five is documented in Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 125–6. 68. Don Van Natta, “Terrorists Blaze a New Money Trail,” New York Times, September 28, 2003, “Suspected ‘100 Million Dollar Al-Qaeda Financier’ Netted in Iraq” (Agence France-Presse, October 4, 2007), Craig Whitlock and Robin Wright, “Saudis Say They Broke Up Suicide Plots,” Washington Post (April 28, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/27/AR2007042700649. html?hpid=topnews 69. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 68–9. This is not to argue that all terrorists with some tie to al Qaeda are part of a monolithic group. Indeed, part of al Qaeda’s strength has been its ability to operate on at least four levels: the central core of al Qaeda, al Qaeda’s affiliates and associates, local groups with a loose affiliation with al Qaeda, and homegrown radicals with no identifiable links to al Qaeda. The institutionalization noted above is for that first, core organization. While other aspects of al Qaeda have also demonstrated a strong degree of resourcing institutionalization, namely Jemaah Islamia (JI) in Indonesia, it is the core of Al Qaeda which is by far the most institutionalized. Bruce Hoffman, “The Global Terrorist Threat: Is Al-Qaeda on the Run or on the March?,” Middle East Policy 14, no. 2 (2007). 70. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 61–68. 71. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 168–9. In a 1996 interview, Usama bin Laden himself claimed his economic and financial establishment was present in 13 countries: Albania, Pakistan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Romania, Russia, Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq and various Gulf States.—–—, Terror Incorporated, 130, United States of America v. Usama bin Laden et al. 72. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 33. 73. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 67–9. 74. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 63. 75. This e-mail exchange was found in a computer bought by Wall Street Journal reporter Alan Cullison, which is believed to have come from al Qaeda’s (now deceased) military commander and senior 9/11 planner Muhammad Atef, from his Kabul office. Cullison, “Inside Al-Qaeda’s Hard Drive.” 76. Jacob N. Shapiro, “Bureaucratic Terrorists: Al-Qa’ida in Iraqi’s Management and Finances,” in Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al-Qa’ida’s Road in and out of Iraq, ed. Brian Fishman (West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, 2008). Scans of all of the original Sinjar documents in their original Arabic as well as translations into 196 Notes

English can be found at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/Sinjar2. asp. 77. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 67. 78. Some authors, such as Nick Kochan, have argued that the LTTE’s com- plex front company activity predates that of the PLO. The LTTE, however, was not formally created until 1975, while, as noted above, the PLO had already formally institutionalized much of its resourcing in the late 1960s, so the PLO still holds the record as the first terrorist organization to formalize its resourcing institutions and create front companies. Kochan, Washing Machine, 98, Shanaka Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” in International Conference on Countering Terrorism (Colombo, Sri Lanka: Centre for Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism, 2007), 12. 79. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” Omar Karmi, “Feeding the Tiger: How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War,” Janes Intelligence Review (August 10, 2007), http://www. janes.com/news/security/jir/jir070810_1_n.shtml. 80. Matthew Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka Rebel Arms-Buying Goes Global,” Associated Press (November 5, 2007), http://news.yahoo.com/s/ ap/20071105/ap_on_re_as/sri_lanka_tiger_inc__abridged. 81. Karmi, “Feeding the Tiger: How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War.” 82. Ibid., Kochan, Washing Machine, 97–9. The Sri Lankans claimed to have sunk the Tiger’s last gun-running vessel. Peter Foster, “Tamil Tiger Suicide Squad in Audacious Strike,” London Telegraph (October 24, 2007), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/core/Content/displayPrintable. jhtml . . . CFF4AVCBQYIV0?xml=/news/2007/10/23/wlanka123. xml&site=5&page=0. 83. Shanaka Jayasekara, “L.T.T.E. International Network: The Next Major Challenge,” Sri Lanka Ministry of Defense, http://www.defence.lk/ new.asp?fname=20090326_02. 84. Iqbal Athas, “The L.T.T.E. And the ‘K.P. Factor’,” The Hindu (October 15, 2003), http://www.hindu.com/2003/10/15/stories/ 2003101511111000.htm. 85. Rohan Gunaratna, “The Transformation of Terror?,” Asia Times (September 25, 2002), http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/ DI25Df05.html. 86. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 4. 87. Jayasekara, “L.T.T.E. International Network.” 88. While analysts agree that the Aiyanna Group was in charge of intelligence, there is some disagreement as to how involved it was in the financing and other resourcing. For instance, Jane’s Intelligence Review considered them as a critical conduit, while Shanaka Jayasekara of the Center for Policing, Intelligence and Counterterrorism considered the evidence not yet strong enough to make the assertion. According to Notes 197

a Human Rights Watch report, at least some LTTE representatives have collected money claiming to be under Pottu Amman’s orders, so the Aiyanna Group is considered here to have been at least mar- ginally involved in direct funding. Pottu Amman was not just in charge of resourcing; he also ran the intelligence branch and the Black Tigers, which was the portion of the LTTE that conducted suicide missions and extremely dangerous missions such as assas- sinations. “Pottu Amman’s Safe House Captured—Mullaittivu,” Sri Lankan Ministry of Defense, http://www.defence.lk/new. asp?fname=20090324_10. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 10, “Funding The ‘Final War’: L.T.T.E. Intimidation and Extortion in the Tamil Diaspora” (Human Rights Watch, 2006), 21, Karmi, “Feeding the Tiger: How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War.” 89. Karmi, “Feeding the Tiger: How Sri Lankan Insurgents Fund Their War.” 90. Four defendants pled guilty in January 2009. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 11–2, “Four Defendants Plead Guilty to All Charges, Including Conspiring to Acquire Anti- Aircraft Missiles and Provide Material Support to the L.T.T.E., a Foreign Terrorist Organization,” U.S. Department of Justice, http:// newyork.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/nyfo012709b.htm. 91. C. Christine Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies: Insights from the Khalistan and Tamil Eelam Movements,” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 11, no. 1 (2005): 139. 92. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 1. 93. “Air Force Destroys Tamil Tigers’ Satellite Communications Center, Military Says,” International Herald Tribune (November 25, 2007), http://www.iht.com/bin/printfriendly.php?id=8466546. 94. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 1–2. 95. Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka Rebel Arms-Buying Goes Global.” 96. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 2. 97. Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 144. 98. Gunaratna, “The Transformation of Terror?.” 99. Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 144. 100. Rosenberg, “Sri Lanka Rebel Arms-Buying Goes Global.” 101. “Funding The ‘Final War’,” 1. 102. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 10. 103. “Funding the ‘Final War’,” 2. 104. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 3. 105. Stewart Bell, “Tigers Sought $3m from Canada,” National Post (Canada) (May 6, 2008), http://www.nationalpost.com/news/story. html?id=494174. 106. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 10. 198 Notes

107. Stewart Bell, “Tamil Movement Held to Account,” National Post (Canada) (April 14, 2008), http://www.nationalpost.com/news/ canada/story.html?id=443518. 108. “Treasury Targets Charity Covertly Supporting Violence in Sri Lanka,” (November 15, 2007), http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp683. htm. 109. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 5, 8–9. 110. Barbara Ross, “Sri Lankan Terror Gang Busted in A.T.M. Heist Plot,” New York Daily News (October 16, 2007), http://www.nydailynews. com/news/crime_file/2007 . . . an_terror_gang_busted_in_atm_ hei-2.html?print=1. 111. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 4. 112. Kochan, Washing Machine, 97–9, Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 6. 113. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 8–9. 114. Jayasekara, “L.T.T.E. International Network.” 115. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 6. 116. Kochan, Washing Machine, 97–9. 117. Ibid., 99. 118. Jayasekara, “Terrorist Fundraising and Money Transfer Operations,” 7. 119. Fair, “Diaspora Involvement in Insurgencies,” 141–5. 120. As evidence of a crackdown against the LTTE, not only did Canada crack down on the group and its associated NGOs, as noted above, but in April 2008, the LTTE representative in the United States, Karunakaran Kandasamy, nicknamed Karuna, was arrested by New York’s Joint Terrorism Task Force. (Note that this is a different “Karuna” from the former LTTE member with the same name who is now a minister in Sri Lanka) http://www.fbi.gov/page2/ jan08/tamil_tigers011008.html , http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/nye/ pr/2007/2007Apr25.html 121. Giraldo and Trinkunas, “The Political Economy of Terrorism Financ- ing,” 16–7, Shapiro, “Terrorist Organizations’ Vulnerabilities.”

6 State Sponsored Groups 1. In contrast to this book, for statistical purposes, the United States Department of State does consider such clandestine agents to be terrorists. 2. Byman, Deadly Connections, 5–6. 3. Ibid., 10–15. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., 13. Notes 199

6. In international law, a state is considered to have acted with due diligence if it attempts to use the means at its disposal to prevent and sup- press terrorist activity on its territory. The conditions under which a state has acted with due diligence must be considered (such as if the stated is a failed state). Tal Becker, Terrorism and the State: Rethinking the Rules of State Responsibility, ed. Craig Scott, Hart Monographs in Transnational and International Law (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 132–3. 7. By ma n , Deadly Connections, 69–70. 8. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 17, 84–5. 9. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 146. 10. Byman, Deadly Connections, 65–6. 11. Ibid., 59–64. 12. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, xvii. 13. Byman, Deadly Connections, 60–1. 14. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 100. 15. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism, 148. 16. Rapoport, “Introduction,” 4. 17. Byman, Deadly Connections, 75–7. 18. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 100. 19. Byman, Deadly Connections, 75–8. 20. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 268. 21. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 258–9. 22. Byman, Deadly Connections, 36–40. 23. Ibid., 22. 24. Ibid., 41–7. 25. Magnus Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 30. 26. Byman, Deadly Connections, 42–3. 27. Ibid., 47–9. 28. Ibid., 50–2. 29. Grant Wardlaw, “Terror as an Instrument of Foreign Policy,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 253. 30. Byman, Deadly Connections, 51–2. 31. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 68–9. 32. David Th. Schiller, “A Battlegroup Divided: The Palestinian Fedayeen,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 95. 33. The Fatah faction itself was founded in October 1959 by Yassir Arafat (his real name was Mohammad Abd Ar-Raouf; he was also known as Abu Amar), Salah Khalaf (aka Abu Iyad), Khalil al Wazir (aka Abu Jihad) and Faruq al Qaddumi in Egypt. Fatah received assistance and training from Algeria; once the country had gained its independence in 1962. After the Syrian Ba’athist coup in 1966, Syria began supporting Fatah with 200 Notes

military training, facilities, and arms. Ibid., 96, Kenneth Katzman, “The P.L.O. And Its Factions” (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2002), 1, Rami Ginat and Uri Bar-Noi, “Tacit Support for Terrorism: The Rapprochement between the U.S.S.R. Adn Palestinian Guerrilla Organizations Following the 1967 War,” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 2 (2007): 264. 34. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 217–8. 35. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 42. 36. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 218. 37. The PLO was officially recognized by Arab governments as the sole representative of the Palestinian people in the Rabat Arab summit of 1974. Ginat and Bar-Noi, “Tacit Support for Terrorism,” 269. 38. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 216. 39. The bulk of the training for these weapons took place in the USSR, though some also occurred in other Warsaw Pact countries. Ibid., Ginat and Bar-Noi, “Tacit Support for Terrorism,” 278–9. 40. David C. Rapoport, “The International World as Some Terrorists Have Seen It: A Look at a Century of Memoirs,” in Inside Terrorist Organiza- tions, ed. David C. Rapoport, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 47–8, 53. 41. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 97. 42. Ibid., 93. 43. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 62. 44. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 91. 45. Rapoport, “International World,” 49. 46. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 98. 47. Ibid., 99. 48. Rapoport, “International World,” 49. 49. Its official name was the Front of Palestinian Forces Rejecting Capitulationist Settlements. Anders Strindberg, “The Damascus-Based Alliance of Palestinian Forces: A Primer,” Journal of Palestinian Studies 29, no. 3 (2000): 61. 50. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 102. 51. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 220–1. 52. Nevertheless, Arafat met with Syrian and Libyan officials in 1986 at a Non-Aligned Movement meeting in a move to mend their relationship. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 103–5. 53. Ibid., 97–8. 54. Rapoport, “International World,” 48–9. 55. Ibid., 53. 56. Byman, Deadly Connections, 142. 57. Nevertheless, these countries came together to fight the 1973 Yom Kippur War, demonstrating their own realpolitik with one another as well as through their terrorist proxies. 58. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 100. Notes 201

59. Byman, Deadly Connections, 117–8, 25, 32–3. 60. Kiser, “Financing Terror”, 41. Money still comes in from states to fund the Palestinian Authority, which in the West Bank is run by Fatah. This has enabled some funds to be diverted to terrorism. Moreover, states such as Iraq under Saddam Hussein have donated money to the families of suicide bombers, some of whom belonged to PLO factions. These payments, however, are a fraction of the state support the PLO used to receive. Ehrenfeld, Funding Evil, 75–6, 93–4, 107. 61. Strindberg, “Damascus-Based Alliance,” 63. 62. Ibid., 60. 63. Neither PIJ nor HAMAS has ever been a part of the PLO, and neither of them has significant other sponsors. Iran provides funding and other resources to both groups, and HAMAS has its own substantial resourcing sources. The PFLP launches occasional mortar attacks against Israeli towns through its militant wing, the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades. Its last major attack was in October 2001, when it killed Israeli Minister Rehavan Zeevi. The DFLP has conducted limited mortar and rocket attacks against Israeli targets from Palestinian Authority territory, sometimes working with the PLO-associated Al Aqsa Martyr’s Brigade. “Terrorism Knowledge Base.” 64. The MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base listed the PFLP-GC’s last attack as July 1993; Fatah-Uprising’s as May 1990; and Sa’iqa’s as November 1985. Ibid. 65. These three factions are the Palestinian Revolutionary Communist Party (PRCP); the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF, though confusingly, the organization shares a name with the PFLP-GC’s pre-1967 name); and the Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF). National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism, “Damascus-Based Alliance” (College Park, MD), “Terrorism Knowledge Database.” 66. Strindberg, “Damascus-Based Alliance,” 62. 67. Byman, Deadly Connections, 142–3. 68. Ibid., 141. 69. Schiller, “Battlegroup Divided,” 91–2. 70. Byman, Deadly Connections, 6, 259–60. 71. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 42–3. 72. Byman, Deadly Connections, 291. 73. The United States State Department placed Libya on its list of state sponsors of terrorism in 1979 and imposed economic sanctions. These sanctions were strengthened in 1982 and again in 1986. Such sanction, however, was largely unilateral, though European states did generally maintain a “gentlemen’s agreement” to prevent their companies from taking advantage of the departure of U.S. ones. International sanctions generally began after the aircraft bombings, and the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions in 1992. Meghan L. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism (Washington, 202 Notes

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 174–82, Stephen D. Collins, “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions?,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 27, no. 1 (2004). 74. Byman, Deadly Connections, 294–5, Collins, “Dissuading State Sup- port.” 75. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 285. 76. O’Sullivan, Shrewd Sanctions, 204, Collins, “Dissuading State Support.” 77. Byman, Deadly Connections, 296–7. 78. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 78–9. For an in-depth explanation of the various international counterterrorism treaties related to terrorism, please see Schott, Reference Guide, “Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004).

7 Medium Autonomy Groups—Franchises and Bundled Support 1. Graham Bannock, R.E. Baxter, and Evan Davis, The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 6 ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 162, Andrew Black, “The Ideological Struggle over Al-Qaeda’s Suicide Tactics in Algeria,” Terrorism Monitor 6, no. 3 (February 7, 2008), http://www. jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373953. 2. Bannock, Baxter, and Davis, The Penguin Dictionary of Economics, 162–3. 3. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 268. 4. Ibid., 108. 5. Imtiaz Ali and Craig Whitlock, “Al-Qaeda Commander Moved Freely in Pakistan,” Washington Post (February 4, 2008), http:// www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/03/ AR2008020303147_pf.html, “Militants Gaining Ground in Pakistan,” New York Times (November 1, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/apon- line/world/AP-Pakistan-Militants-Gain.html?_r=1&oref=slogin, Mark Mazzetti, “Intelligence Chief Cites Qaeda Threat to U.S.,” New York Times (February 6, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/ washington/0 . . . l?_r=1&th=&oref=slogin&emc=th&pagewanted=print. 6. Most attendees represented Shia groups, but there were also some Sunni groups there. Adams, Financing of Terror, 73, Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 26–36. 7. Sandra Mackey, The Iranians: Persia, Islam and the Soul of a Nation (New York: Plume, 1998), 313. 8. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 137. Other authors argue that Hizbullah receives less money from Iran, though all agree that Hizbullah receives substantial amounts. For instance, Norton asserts than Iran provides Hizbullah about 100 million USD per year, rather than double that Notes 203

amount which Levitt asserts. Augustus Richard Norton, Hezbollah—a Short History, ed. Dale F. Eickelman and Augustus Richard Norton, Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007), 110. 9. Though Hizbullah was founded in 1982, it was not until the mid-1980s that it was a consolidated, coherent group. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 25, Norton, Hezbollah, 34. 10. Due to the variety of sectarian groups in Lebanon—Shia, Sunni, various Christian groups, Druze, and so forth—Hizbullah as a political party remains ambivalent in its desire to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon. While its founding documents and manifesto have stated as such, Hizbullah leadership also recognizes the impossibility of such a task in this multicultural state and participates in the political process and creates governing alliance with other sectarian groups. Hizbullah’s willingness to work within the larger Lebanese political and sectarian structures has caused considerable tensions with Iran. Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 57–69, “How Nasrallah Survived an Overthrow Attempt in Lebanon,” YaLibnan (October 11, 2007), http://yalibnan.com/ site/archives/2007/10/how_nasrallah_s.php, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 26–30. 11. Mackey, The Iranians, 303, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 33–40. 12. Norton, Hezbollah, 80. 13. The suicide attacks and some abductions were conducted under the nom de guerre of Islamic Jihad and Islamic Amal, but most scholars today consider them to be a mere cover name for those early Hizbullah operations. Hizbullah is credited with at least 12 suicide bombings. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 38, 62–3. 14. Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 81, 111–2. 15. Norton, Hezbollah, 109. 16. Qassem, Hizbullah, 83–5. 17. Norton, Hezbollah, 140. The money is meant to pay for rent and fur- niture while Hizbullah builds new homes. Jeremy M. Sharp et al., “Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict” (Library of Congress Congressional Research Service, 2006), 14. 18. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 137, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon. 19. A January 2006 Zogby International poll found that Al Manar was the sixth most popular satellite channel in the Arab World. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 139, Norton, Hezbollah, 93, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 39. 20. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 141. 21. Ray Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic, ed. Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Times Books, 2006), 70–1, 206–7, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 50, 114. 22. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 139–41, Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 39, Matthew Levitt, “Iran and Syria: State Sponsorship in the Age of Terror 204 Notes

Networks,” in Confronting Terrorism Financing (Lanham: University of America Press, 2005), 54. 23. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 116–9. 24. Norton, Hezbollah, 35. 25. Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 29–40. The relationship between secular, Ba’athist Syria, and Shia Iran is purely a marriage of convenience. The relationship allows Iran an Arab ally and access to the Arab world, especially the border with Israel. Syria, also a pariah state, receives an ally as well, plus oil and other economic assistance. Nevertheless, spats between the two occur regularly as each pursues its own foreign policy interests in the region. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 110–16. 26. Norton, Hezbollah, 72. 27. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 141. 28. Norton, Hezbollah, 109. 29. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 142–3. Though Fadlallah was generally recognized as the spiritual leader of Hizbullah, he did not claim that title for himself. Martin Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” in Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind, ed. Walter Reich (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press; dis- tributed by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 140, Sharp et al., “Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict,” 24. 30. Farah, Blood from Stones, 163. 31. John L. Lombardi and David J. Sanchez, “Terrorist Financing and the Tri- Border Area of South America: The Challenge of Effective Governmental Response in a Permissive Environment,” in Terrorism Financing and State Responses, ed. Jeanne K. Giraldo and Harold A. Trinkunas (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), 234, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 71, Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 146–7. 32. Lombardi and Sanchez, “Terrorist Financing,” 232–3. The Tri-Border Area (also known as the TBA) consists of the areas around the cities of Ciudad del Este in Paraguay, Foz do Iguaca in Brazil, and Puerto Iguazu in Argentina. 33. Farah, Blood from Stones, 19–24. 34. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 145. 35. Kramer, “The Moral Logic of Hizballah,” 132–4. 36. Qassem, Hizbullah, 60. Qassem was a founding member of Hizbullah in 1982 and is currently its deputy secretary general. It is interesting that while his account admits to this hierarchical structure and provides information and statistics on Hizbullah’s social networks, he does not discuss its financing or other resourcing networks, nor does he provide an overall budget for the organization. The work describes the close relationship between Iran and Hizbullah and that Iran trains Hizbullah fighters; however, it does not explicitly state that Hizbullah receives a high level of monetary support from Iran. Notes 205

37. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 45. Most are clerics who have been on the council since its formation in 1982. Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 53–4. 38. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 45. Demonstrating the extensive influence Iran has over Hizbullah, one or two Iranian military of diplomatic representatives from the Pasdaran or from Iran’s embassies in Beirut or Damascus are also represented on the committee. 39. The Majlis al-Shura al-Karar is headed by Sheikh Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, and handles all strategic planning. Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 54, Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 45. 40. Ranstorp, Hizb’allah in Lebanon, 45. 41. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 148. 42. Palmer Harik, Hezbollah, 94. 43. Levitt, “Hezbollah Finances,” 149. 44. Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princ- eton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 254–5. 45. Wright, Looming Tower, 208–9. 46. Michael Scheuer, “Al-Qaeda and Algeria’s G.S.P.C.: Part of a Much Bigger Picture,” Terrorism Focus 4, no. 8 (April 3, 2007), http://www. jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373295. 47. Jonathan Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next Generation of Terror, ed. Washington Institute for Near East Policy (New York: Special Press International, 2005), 22. 48. Zawahiri had maintained a blind-cell structure on his group inside Egypt, where members of one cell would not know the identities of those in other cells. Egyptian forces captured the EIJ’s membership director—the only man with all the names—in the early 1990s. An estimated 800 members of EIJ were arrested in Egypt as a result. Wright, Looming Tower, 209–10. 49. Though Zawahiri’s attacks were generally failures, his tactics are notori- ous. A 1993 suicide bombing introduced the use of suicide bombings by al Qaeda-affiliated groups (the attack killed only the bomber and his accomplice). He also began taping suicide bombers before their operations for use of propaganda. Ibid., 207–10. 50. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 266. 51. Besides Bin Laden (who signed as an individual) and Zawahiri (signing on behalf of the EIJ), the Egyptian Islamic Group (the representative, Rifai Taha, later rescinded his group’s endorsement), Pakistan’s Jamiat Ul Ulema, Pakistan’s Harakat al Ansar, and Bangladesh’s Harakat al Jihad also signed it. The name “al Qaeda” did not appear on the document. Wright, Looming Tower, 294–6. 52. Egyptians make up much of the inner circle of al Qaeda. Bin Laden says he trusts the Egyptians because they, like him, cannot go home without being arrested, and thus they are men without a country. Ibid., 380. 206 Notes

53. Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 98–9. 54. Rashid, Taliban, 135–6. 55. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 121–3, Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 106. 56. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 116. 57. Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 100–1. 58. Wright, Looming Tower, 216–7, Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 104–5. 59. Hattab was apparently able to facilitate the transfer of GIA’s European networks to GSPC. Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 107, Andrew McGregor, “Leadership Disputes Plaque Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb,” Terrorism Focus 4, no. 30 (2007), http://www.jamestown. org/terrorism/news/article.php?issue_id=4240. 60. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 124–5. 61. Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 95–6. 62. While this is not the first time the Mauritania has had problems with Islamist violence (a bomb plot was foiled in the late 1990s, for instance), the Islamist attacks in 2007 were specifically ascribed to AQIM. Anouar Boukhars, “Mauritania’s Vulnerability to Al-Qaeda Influence,” Terrorism Focus 4, no. 24 (July 24, 2007), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/ news/article.php?articleid=2373570, Souad Mekhennet et al., “A Threat Renewed: Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” New York Times (July 1, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/ world/africa/01algeria.html?ref=africa#, Rashid, Taliban, 137, Naomi Schwarz, “Suspected Terrorists Flee Mauritania after Allegedly Killing Tourists,” Voice of America (December 26, 2007), http://voanews. com/english/2007–12–26-voa30.cfm?renderforprint=1. 63. McGregor, “Leadership Disputes Plaque Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb.” 64. Nevertheless, it is unclear how much money AQIM actually raised by formally allying with al Qaeda, as there is little evidence of much support coming from the core group. Instead, AQIM is mostly self- financed. In North Africa, AQIM garners income from kidnap and ransom, muggings, and the narcotics trade. Algerian Minister for the Interior Noureddin Yazid Zerhouni has stated that 115 terrorism-related kidnappings netted AQIM about 20 million USD, while blackmail and robbery netted another 3.3 million USD. In Europe, AQIM gathers money from drug trafficking, immigrant smuggling, and document forgery, though much of the network has apparently been rolled up in Europe, with arrests of AQIM financiers as recently as June 2008. Nevertheless, the leadership of AQIM may be short of funds because of its decentralized funding structures. Local emirs (leaders) control their own financing, and it is unclear how much of that is passed up the chain of command. “Illegal Tender: Funding Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb,” Jane’s Intelligence Review (September 16, 2008), http://jir. janes.com/public/jir/terrorism.shtml. Notes 207

65. Mekhennet et al., “A Threat Renewed: Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda.” 66. “Not Again, Please,” Economist (August 23, 2008), http://www. economist.com/world/mideast-africa/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ ID=11975470, Souad Mekhennet, Michael Moss, Eric Schmitt, Elaine Sciolino, and Margot Williams, “A Threat Renewed: Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” New York Times (July 1, 2008). 67. Craig Whitlock, “Algiers Attacks Show Maturing of Al-Qaeda Unit,” Washington Post (December 13, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost. com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/12/12/AR2007121202441_ pf.html, Fiona Govan, “Al-Qa’eda Admits to Algerian Bombings,” London Daily Telegraph (September 10, 2007), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/ core/Content/displayPrin . . . ?xml=/news/2007/09/10/walgeria110. xml&site=5&page=0. 68. Schwarz, “Suspected Terrorists Flee Mauritania after Allegedly Killing Tourists,” Mekhennet et al., “A Threat Renewed: Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” Andrew Black, “Recasting Jihad in the Maghreb,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 20 (October 25, 2007), http:// www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373742. 69. Hattab was forced out of the GSPC leadership in 2001 and he is currently on the run, though he insists that he is still a member of the group. Though inactive with regard to terrorist violence since 2004, he continues to voice his concerns with AQIM via Internet and other communications means, and he is at odds with AQIM’s current leader. McGregor, “Leadership Disputes Plaque Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Magreb,” Mekhennet et al., “A Threat Renewed: Ragtag Insurgency Gains a Lifeline from Al Qaeda,” Black, “The Ideological Struggle over Al-Qaeda’s Suicide Tactics in Algeria,” Andrew Black, “A.Q.I.M. Employs Martyrdom Operations in Algeria,” Terrorism Focus (September 18, 2007), http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/ article.php?articleid=2373656. 70. Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 102. 71. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 124–5, Schanzer, Al-Qaeda’s Armies, 96. 72. Alison Pargeter, “North African Immigrants in Europe and Political Violence,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 8 (2006). 733–5. 73. Black, “The Ideological Struggle over Al-Qaeda’s Suicide Tactics in Algeria.” 74. That this document was published from an Egyptian prison has led to speculation that his renouncing of violence was made under duress. He has not been the first EIJ member to renounce terrorism—two other leaders in Egypt did so in 2004. Nevertheless, Dr. Fadl’s statement led to a condemnation of his new position from Zawahiri in a video released in July 2007. Jarret Brachman, “Leading Egyptian Jihadist Sayyid Imam Renounces Violence,” Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 1, no. 1 (2007): 12–14. 208 Notes

75. “Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in Al-Qa’ida from 1989–2006,” Harmony Project, Combating Terrorism Center (September 2007), http://ctc.usma.edu/. 76. Michael C. Fowler, Amateur Soldiers, Global Wars: Insurgency and Mod- ern Conflict (Westport, CN: Praeger Security International, 2005), 33. 77. Diasporas are “immigrant communities established in foreign countries.” Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, xiv. 78. English, Armed Struggle, 297–302. 79. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 59. 80. Adams, Financing of Terror, 136. 81. Ibid., 131, English, Armed Struggle, 344. 82. Sinn Fein candidates fared worse in the Republic of Ireland. For instance, in the 1994 general election, Sinn Fein won 2.4 percent of the vote, but that was better than 1.6 percent it had won in 1992. English, Armed Struggle, 227, 77–8, 94–5. The U.S. diaspora was the only Irish diaspora to give substantial support. There was some cash provided by Irish-Canadians, but these were very small sums compared to those of the American diaspora, and they were apparently funneled through the U.S. NORAID. Also, there were at least 3 intercepted arms shipments from Canada, but the total of all 3 combined were only 49 guns, 18,000 rounds of ammunition, and 10 hand grenades. Moreover, the Canadian authorities worked closely with Irish authorities to minimize any such resourcing. M. McKinley, “The Irish Republican Army and Terror International: An Inquiry into the Material Aspects of the First Fifteen Years,” in Contemporary Research on Terrorism, ed. Paul Wilkinson and Alasdair Stewart (Aberdeen, UK: Aberdeen University Press, 1987), 301–2. 83. Adams, Financing of Terror, 135. 84. Cahill was a member of PIRA’s Army Council, the leading body of PIRA. Holland, American Connection, 29–32. 85. Ibid., 32. 86. For the first few years, money was sent to the Belfast Northern Aid Committee. Though NORAID registered as a foreign agent in support of the Northern Aid Committee in Belfast in 1971, the American government finally succeeded in coercing NORAID to register as an agent of PIRA in 1984 in the hopes that this would discourage American citizens from giving donations to a group formally linked to a terrorist organization. It did not become illegal for American citizens to mon- etarily support most foreign terrorist organizations until the 1990s. There was also a parallel funding system that went directly to PIRA’s General Headquarters rather than taking a detour through the Green Cross. Adams, Financing of Terror, 137, J. Bowyer Bell, The I.R.A. 1968–2000: Analysis of a Secret Army, ed. David C. Rapoport and Paul Wilkinson, Cass Series on Political Violence (London, UK: Frank Cass, 2000), 187. Notes 209

87. Holland, American Connection, 61. 88. Bell, The I.R.A. 1968–2000, 168. 89. Ibid., 171. 90. English, Armed Struggle, 115. 91. Holland, American Connection, 71. 92. Ibid., 43, 72–3, 83, 110. 93. English, Armed Struggle, 117. 94. Adams, Financing of Terror, 143. Another primary source of PIRA arms was Libya, who saw supplying PIRA as a means to burnish its anti-imperialism, proliberation movement credentials, while at the same time, using PIRA as a proxy to attack its foe the United Kingdom. Libyan weapons were first shipped to PIRA in the 1973 (at least 5 tons of weapons were shipped), but became the most substantial smuggling route upon the closure of the American arms smuggling pipeline in the mid-1980s. In the 1980s, 45–60 percent of weapons recovered by the Gardai (Republic of Ireland police) originated in the Middle East, especially Libya. Brendan O’Brien, The Long War: The I.R.A. And Sinn Fein, ed. Sanford Sternlicht, 2nd ed., Irish Studies (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999), 133–53, McKinley, “Irish Republican Army,” 194–5, Horgan and Taylor, “Playing the ‘Green Card’ Part 1,” 5. 95. Bell, The I.R.A. 1968–2000, 183. 96. Adams, Financing of Terror, 143–4, Holland, American Connection, 72–3. 97. Bell, The I.R.A. 1968–2000, 183–4. 98. This was not an entirely irrational goal, as lobbying by Irish-Americans is credited with the American government putting pressure on Great Britain in the early twentieth century—one of the reasons Great Britain gave statehood to the Republic of Ireland in 1922. Chaliand and Blin, “The ‘Golden Age’ of Terrorism,” 186. 99. This caucus suffered serious internal disputes and splits throughout its history. While helpful to the Irish overall, though not the PIRA cause, Irish-American lobbying by various groups and politicians led to various aid packages and other American support toward peaceful settle- ment of the conflict. Adams, Financing of Terror, 136–7, Holland, American Connection, 114–51. 100. English, Armed Struggle, 273. 101. Adams, Financing of Terror, 141. 102. McKinley, “Irish Republican Army,” 305. 103. Holland, American Connection, 57. 104. Lord Mountbatten had been the last Viceroy of India. He was assassinated by a 50 pound bomb that had been hidden among gear on his boat as he went for a fishing outing. With him were his daughter, her husband, her 80-year-old mother-in-law, their twin 14-year-old sons, and a 15 year-old local boy. Lord Mountbatten, the mother-in-law, 210 Notes

one of the sons, and the local boy were killed and the rest were seri- ously wounded. On the same day, a British army truck was destroyed by an improvised explosive device consisting of 1200 pounds of explosives hidden beneath hay in another truck, killing 18 soldiers. Bell, The I.R.A. 1968–2000, 186–7, Adams, Financing of Terror, 138–40, McKinley, “Irish Republican Army,” 315. 105. Holland, American Connection, 34–5. 106. Adams, Financing of Terror, 141. 107. PIRA claimed the radio-controlled bomb was set off by the British Army’s countermeasures, but in reality, the bomb was not a radio-controlled one, but a time bomb, and the bomb had gone off at the wrong time. As Sinn Fein leader Gerry Adams admitted, “In my view the IRA are freedom fighters. They made a terrible mistake at Enniskillen.” Bell, The I.R.A. 1968–2000, 186–7, English, Armed Struggle, 255. 108. McKinley, “Irish Republican Army,” 307, Holland, American Connection, 58. 109. Holland, American Connection, 48. 110. Adams, Financing of Terror, 142. 111. Holland, American Connection, 44. 112. Adams, Financing of Terror, 143–53. 113. PIRA still continued to attempt to ship weapons from the United States from time-to-time. In 1999, the FBI uncovered yet another PIRA weapons plot in Florida. Ibid., 145, English, Armed Struggle, 328. 114. Adams, Financing of Terror, 153.

8 Lone Wolf Groups 1. Beam also pioneered such terrorism innovations as the use of computer bulletin boards for communication among members, and was one of the early users of the Internet for similar purposes. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 115. 2. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 151. 3. The term “autonomous radicalization” was coined by Dutch security forces to describe terrorist organizations such as the Hofstad Group, in which a group of young men and women apparently radicalized themselves based on the Internet and other media, a process the Dutch domestic security service AIVD (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst) has noted among radical violent Islamist groups in the Netherlands. A member of the Hofstad Group killed artist Theo Van Gogh in 2004. Jessica Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 134, Lorenzo Vidino, “The Hofstad Group: The New Face of Terrorist Networks in Europe,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 30, no. 7 (2007): 585. Notes 211

4. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 136, Douglas Long, Ecoterrorism (New York: Facts on File, 2004), 45–6. 5. Jeffrey Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” in Inside Terrorist Organizations, ed. David C. Rapoport, Cass Series on Political Violence (London: Frank Cass, 2001), 260. 6. The term “bunch of guys” refers to a self-organized network of friends who spontaneously organize themselves from the bottom-up. They may have no formal leadership positions, and may not even have a name (though names may be given to them by others such as law enforcement. For instance, the so-called Hofstad Group, which killed artist Theo Van Gogh, had no name; the nickname “Hofstad Group” was given to it by Dutch police). The Royal Canadian Mounted Police first used the term to describe the group of like-minded individuals who supported Ahmed Ressam, the so-called “Millenium Bomber” who was caught trying to cross the U.S.-Canadian border on his way to attack Los Angeles International Airport on December 31, 1999. Since then “bunch of guys” is becoming a recognized, established term for such groups. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 69, Vidino, “The Hofstad Group.” 7. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 141, 65. 8. Beam credits the term “Leaderless Resistance” to Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss in a 1962 essay on tactics against a communist invasion and con- quest in the United States. Beam’s essay caught the attention of watch- dog groups at a time when the American government was studying what had gone wrong at Waco, as well as neo-Nazi and militia-type antistate terrorism. Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” 264–6. 9. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 34. 10. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 147–71. 11. Kaplan, “Leaderless Resistance,” 260. 12. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 173. 13. Walter Laqueur, “Postmodern Terrorism,” in The War on Terror, Foreign Affairs Editors’ Choice (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002), 11. 14. Ian O. Lesser et al., “Countering the New Terrorism” (RAND Project Air Force, 1999), 21. 15. Ibid., 53. 16. Borum and Tilby, “Anarchist Direct Actions.” 17. Tsouli is also highlighted in Chapter 3 for his use of identity theft to forward money and other resources to al Qaeda–associated operatives 18. Gordon Corera, “Al-Qaeda’s 007,” Times of London (January 16, 2008), http://women.timesonline.co.uk/tol/life_and_styl . . . ticle3191517.ece ?print=yes&randnum=1200596833531, “A World Wide Web of Terror,” Economist (July 12, 2007), http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9472498. 212 Notes

19. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 173. 20. Lesser et al., “Countering the New Terrorism,” 29. That bomb was made by an experienced bomb maker: Ramzi Youssef. It was not designed by amateurs. 21. Ibid., 20. 22. Philippe Migaux, “Al Qaeda,” in The History of Terrorism from Antiquity to Al Qaeda, ed. Gerard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2007), 326. 23. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 113–4, 40–1, Lesser et al., “Countering the New Terrorism,” 29. 24. Sageman, Leaderless Jihad, 39. 25. Ibid., 144. 26. Ibid., 116–7, 21. 27. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 34. 28. Stern, “The Protean Enemy,” 34. 29. Joll, The Anarchists, 133–5. 30. Though ecoterrorist groups are usually leftists, there are right-wing ecoterrorists as well. Ecoterrorists are either classified according to their group’s political leanings (left versus right) or as single-issue or special- issue terrorism. An example of right-wing ecoterrorism was an April 2000 sabotage on oil wells in Alberta, Canada, by Wiebo Ludwig, an ultraconservative former Christian Reformed Church minister. Long, Ecoterrorism, 3–4, Paul Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance and Ideological Inclusion: The Case of the Earth Liberation Front,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 3 (2007): 363. 31. “Putting Intel to Work against E.L.F. And A.L.F. Terrorists,” Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june08/ ecoterror_063008.html. 32. Stefan H. Leader and Peter Probst, “The Earth Liberation Front and Environmental Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence 15, no. 4 (2003): 37. 33. Arne Naess and George Sessions, “Platform Principles of the Deep Ecology Movement,” in The Deep Ecology Movement: An Introductory Anthology, ed. Alan Drengson and Inoue Yuichi (Berkeley, CA: North Atlantic Books, 1995). 34. Leader and Probst, “Earth Liberation Front,” 39–40. 35. Ibid., 38, Donald R. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism: Radical Environmental and Animal Liberation Movements (Westport, CN: Preaeger, 2006), 6. 36. Ann Berlin, “Animal Liberation Front: Worldwide News and Information Resource About the A.L.F.,” Animal Liberation Front, http://animal liberationfront.com/index.html. 37. Ibid. 38. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 41–2. 39. ALF’s name was created by explicity copying that of the Earth Liberation Front. Noel Molland, “A Spark That Ignited a Flame: The Evolution of Notes 213

the Earth Liberation Front,” in Igniting a Revolution: Voices in Defense of the Earth, ed. Steven Best and Anthony J. Nocella II (Oakland, CA: A.K. Press, 2006), 49–51. 40. Leader and Probst, “Earth Liberation Front,” 40. A personal view of the Web site on February 15, 2008 did not provide goals for the organization. It did confirm, however, that, as the Web site stated, “There is no ELF structure; ‘it’ is non-hierarchical and there is no centralized organization or leadership.” There was also quite a large disclaimer on the homepage that there is no “membership” to ELF, and that the Web site is merely to inform. Finally, it provided the disclaimer that “this web site’s management, webmasters, affiliates, or other participants are not to be considered spokespersons, members, or affiliates of the Earth Liberation Front.” “Earth Liberation Front,” Earth Liberation Front, http://www.earthliberationfront.com/index.htm. 41. Leader and Probst, “Earth Liberation Front,” 41–2. 42. “Eco-Terror Indictments: ‘Operation Backfire’ Nets 11,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/page2/jan06/elf012006.htm. 43. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 66. 44. Leader and Probst, “Earth Liberation Front,” 38. 45. “Eco-Terror Indictments.” 46. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 40–8. 47. Kaczynski was not a proponent of radical environmental movements or their causes; rather, his interest was in the collapse of “the tech- noindustrial system” as soon as possible. Long, Ecoterrorism, 49–56, Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 105–7. Kaczynski’s “Industrial Society and Its Future,” better known as “The Unabomber Manifesto,” can be viewed on a number of Web sites, including http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/ Industrial_Society_and_Its_Future. 48. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 11, 113. 49. Leader and Probst, “Earth Liberation Front,” 38. 50. Ibid., 39. 51. Ibid. 52. Berlin, “Animal Liberation Front.” 53. In the United States, providing financial or material support to terrorist organizations is itself a crime, even if that supporter himself is not engaged in terrorist activity. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 70–1. 54. Berlin, “Animal Liberation Front,” “Earth Liberation Front.” 55. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 64, “Frequently Asked Questions about the Earth Liberation Front (E.L.F.),” North American Earth Liberation Front Press Office, http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/ ELF/elf_faq.pdf. 56. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 42, Anonymous, “The Animal Liberation Primer,” http://www.animalliberationfront.com/ALFront/primer3.pdf. 57. “Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Monkeywrenching,” http://www.omni- presence.mahost.org/inttxt.htm. 214 Notes

58. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 11. 59. Ibid., 50–1. 60. Leader and Probst, “Earth Liberation Front,” 44, Jamie Doward and Mark Townsend, “Beauty and the Beasts,” Guardian (August 1, 2004), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2004/aug/01/animalwelfare.world. 61. Liddick, Eco-Terrorism, 41. 62. Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance,” 352, 61. 63. Berlin, “Animal Liberation Front.” 64. Joosse, “Leaderless Resistance,” 356. 65. The use of ELF tactics can even provide a good cover for common insur- ance fraud, as someone can commit arson and spray paint “elves were here” at the site, leading authorities to believe the motive was ecoterrorism. Ibid., 361. 66. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism, 203.

9 All the Rest—Shell States, State Sponsoring Groups, and Transnational Corporation Groups 1. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 66–80, 181. 2. Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Sanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 90–2. 3. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 67, 75, 145–6. 4. Ibid., 77. 5. Ibid., 147. 6. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 288. 7. Bel l, The I.R.A. 1968–2000, 192. 8. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1966), 14. 9. Ray Takeyh and Niklas Gvosdev, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?,” Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2002): 98. 10. Fowler, Amateur Soldiers, 46. 11. Byman, Deadly Connections, 66. 12. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 75. 13. The PLO was not the only entity to erect shell states in Lebanon during that time. Lebanon was essentially carved up into warlord fiefdoms during its civil war, which began in 1975. Though most of the PLO’s fighting forces were located in Lebanon, and though it had control over refugee camps, Lebanon did not contain a majority of Palestinians. According to 1982 estimates, there were 400,000–600,000 Palestinians living in Lebanon, comprising 9 percent (American figures) or 13 percent (PLO figures) of the total Palestinian population. By far the largest concentration lived in Israel and what is now the Palestinian Authority, which included 38–39 percent of the Palestinian population. The rest were scattered mostly throughout the Arab world. Ibid., 71–2, Helena Notes 215

Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 9. 14. Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 14, 47–8. 15. “Lebanon: Fighting at Refugee Camp Kills Civilians.” 16. Laqueur, The Age of Terrorism, 218. 17. Adams, Financing of Terror, 83–5. 18. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 51, 68. 19. Neil Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the P.L.O.: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War against Israel and the United States (New York: William Morrow, 1990), 173. 20. Adams, Financing of Terror, 89, Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 68–9. 21. Napoleoni, Terror Incorporated, 68–9. 22. SAMED’s interests were also substantial outside Lebanon, including duty free stores, investments in airlines and agricultural holdings and factories outside Lebanon. Adams, Financing of Terror, 96, Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 191–2. 23. Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 175. 24. The evacuation of PLO fighters from Lebanon involved 8,000 fighters leaving the city and embarking for about 6 countries. All of the major PLO offices in Lebanon, which had been the PLO’s unofficial headquarters since 1971, were badly damaged or destroyed. As Jordan, Egypt, and Syria would not permit Palestinian guerrilla activity, this ended any con- tiguous zone with Israel that the PLO had for conducting operations. Ibid., 175–8, Cobban, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, 3–6. 25. Adams, Financing of Terror, 96–7. 26. Ibid., 98–9, Adam Zagorin, “Auditing the P.L.O.,” in The International Relations of the Palestine Liberation Organization, ed. Augustus Richard Norton and Martin H. Greenberg (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press, 1989), 202, Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 165. 27. Adams, Financing of Terror, 99, 105, Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 170, 91. 28. Adams, Financing of Terror, 229–32, Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 191. 29. Adams, Financing of Terror, 232–3. 30. In 1988, the PLO and Palestinian National Fund published some broad budgeting numbers, but unfortunately, they do not break the budget into specifics, nor does it specify what was spent on its area of control in Lebanon versus in other locales. Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 171–2, 84–95, Zagorin, “Auditing the P.L.O.,” 199. 31. Livingstone and Halevy, Inside the P.L.O., 172. 32. Yassir Arafat and other high officials’ pay at this time was officially about $900 per month plus a cost of living allowance. Zagorin, “Auditing the P.L.O.,” 199. 33. Greenberg, Wechsler, and Wolosky, “Terrorist Financing,” 5. 216 Notes

34. The Taliban government of Afghanistan was recognized only by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Even without official recognition, however, Afghanistan could still offer many trap- pings of recognized states, such as the use of the national airline. 35. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 253. 36. Rohan Gunaratna alleges that, in addition to Bin Laden’s funding, other funding for these camps came from Iran. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 158–9. 37. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 253, Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the C.I.A., Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 271. 38. Takeyh and Gvosdev, “Do Terrorist Networks Need a Home?,” 101. 39. Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 157. 40. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 58–9. 41. The first World Trade Center attack occurred in 1993, and though the mastermind, Ramzi Youssef, was a nephew to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, it is unclear if al Qaeda actually had anything to do with this original attack. The Dhahran attack actually occurred right after Usama bin Laden was forced to leave Sudan, but most of the planning had taken place while Usama bin Laden was still in Sudan. Ibid., 59–62. 42. Byman, Deadly Connections, 187–218, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 61–2, 40, Rashid, Taliban. 43. Usama bin Laden did not immediately set up an alliance with the Taliban—he actually sent out feelers to a number of groups, including that of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, at the time a staunch opponent of the Taliban. He did not begin to cement his relationship with the Taliban until September, 1996. Also, at the time, Usama bin Laden was rather short of money, having had all his assets in Sudan confiscated by the Sudanese government when he left, though he apparently had other funding pipelines available. Wright, Looming Tower, 260, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States., 9/11 Commission Report, 65. 44. Though it appears that al Qaeda protected drug production and pro- cessing areas, it probably did not directly profit from their production and sale. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 273, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 58–61. 45. Rashid, Taliban, 139. 46. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 253–4. 47. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 165. 48. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 66. 49. Migaux, “Al Qaeda,” 321. 50. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 66–7. Notes 217

51. Migaux, “Al Qaeda,” 321. 52. Jeffrey Haynes, “Islam and Democracy in East Africa,” Democratization 13, no. 3 (2006): 498. 53. Hirst and Thompson, Globalization in Question, 9–11. 54. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 143–4. 55. Ibid., 248. 56. Kurth Cronin, “Behind the Curve,” 46–51. 57. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 274–7. 58. Bruce Hoffman, “The Leadership Secrets of Osama Bin Laden: The Terrorist as C.E.O.,” Atlantic Monthly 291, no. 3 (April 2003): 26–27. 59. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 31. 60. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 144–5. 61. Hoffman, “Global Terrorist Threat,” 45–6. 62. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 250–5, Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda, 57–8. 63. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 259–60. 64. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Al Qaeda after the Iraq Conflict” (Congressional Research Service, May 23, 2003), 3. 65. Heraldo Munoz, “First Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team Appointed Pursuant to Resolution 1526 (2004) Concerning Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities” (UN Security Council, August 25, 2004), 7. 66. Boucek, “The Battle to Shut Down.” 67. Van Natta, “Terrorists Blaze.” 68. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 47–8. 69. Wright, Looming Tower, 90, Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 51. Most sources researched noted Bin Laden graduated with degrees in economics and public administration. Some sources, however, claim he graduated with degrees in economics and engineering instead. Benjamin and Simon state Bin Laden claimed his engineering background helped him pre- dict the damage the 9/11 attacks would do to the World Trade Center. Benjamin and Simon, Age of Sacred Terror, 98. 70. Hoffman, “Redefining Counterterrorism,” 14. 71. Usama bin Laden has claimed that he went to Afghanistan within days after Soviet troops invaded in 1979, but his brother-in-law and former best friend (who later denounced Bin Laden) Jamal Khalifa stated that Bin Laden did not go until 1984. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 53–4, Wright, Looming Tower, 109. 72. Bin Laden offered a place ticket, residence, and living expenses for Arab fighters and their families, which amounted to about 300 USD per month per household. Even with this offer, there were never more than 3,000 Arab volunteers. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 54, Wright, Looming Tower, 117–21. 73. Greenberg, Wechsler, and Wolosky, “Terrorist Financing,” 5. 218 Notes

74. In 1998, Bin Laden swore a pledge of loyalty to Taliban leader Mullah Omar, acknowledging him as “the leader of the faithful.” Wright, Looming Tower, 152, 62–5, 86–7, 250–2, 326. 75. Mark Mazzetti and David Rohde, “Terror Officials See Al Qaeda Chiefs Regaining Power,” New York Times (February 19, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/19/world/asia/19intel.html?_r= 1&oref=slogin. 76. There are numerous accounts of how much Usama bin Laden inherited and what his yearly stipend was. Early estimates put his inheritance at 300 million USD, but a more current and accurate estimate provided by the 9/11 Commission is about 20–30 million USD. Lawrence Wright gives the most conservative estimate. He argues that Usama bin Laden inherited only about 7 million USD, and his stipend was only 266,000 USD per year. Nevertheless, starting an organization with millions, as well as a substantial yearly allowance, will certainly give a nascent terrorist organization a much stronger start than one which must live hand- to-mouth. Wright, Looming Tower, 165 and 65n, Bergen, The Osama Bin Laden I Know, 10, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Report, 169–70. 77. Rensselaer Lee, “Terrorist Financing: The U.S. And International Response” (Congressional Research Service, December 6, 2002), 8. 78. Frantz, “Possible Link Seen to Us-Based Charity.” 79. “Expert and Newspaper Says Dimaonds Fund Terrorists,” http://www. jckgrop.com/index 80. Kevin McCoy and Daniel Cauchon, “The Business Side of Terror: Al Qaeda Network Runs Like Fortune 500 Firm,” USA Today, October 16, 2001. 81. Greenberg, Wechsler, and Wolosky, “Terrorist Financing,” 9–10. 82. Hoffman, “Redefining Counterterrorism,” 15, Wright, Looming Tower, 190–2. 83. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 83–4, United States of America V. Usama Bin Laden, Et Al, United States of America,Plaintiff-Appellant V. Ahmed Ressam, Also Known as Benni Antoine Noris. Bin Laden’s company controlled roughly 80 percent of the world’s supply of gum arabic. Loretta Napoleoni, “Money and Terrorism,” Strategic Insights 3, no. 4 (2004). Lawrence Wright argues that only about 500 people worked for Bin Laden while he lived in Sudan. This book uses the higher number provided by Peter Bergen because this seems a more reasonable number of employees, given the number of businesses and the size of various projects. For Wright’s estimate, see Wright, Looming Tower, 191–2. 84. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 83. 85. Wright, Looming Tower, 191. 86. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 105. Lawrence Wright contends that Bin Laden was not very interested in his businesses. Other authors, however, Notes 219

describe him as very business savvy. Nevertheless, most scholars agree that he left Sudan with few or no assets from there. For Wright’s con- tention, please see Wright, Looming Tower, 222–5, 53–4. 87. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 84. 88. Ken Opala, “Dreaded Somali Terrorist Group Taps into Sugar Racket,” Daily Nation (Kenya) (April 10, 2009), http://www.nation.co.ke/ News/-/1056/559404/-/view/printVersion/-/vke76t/-/index.html. 89. The Embassy bombings not only shared a modus operandi for financing and cover businesses, but also shared the same Egyptian technician to build the bombs. Bergen, Holy War, Inc., 113–5. 90. William Rosenau, “Al Qaida Recruitment Trends in Kenya and Tanzania,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 28, no. 1 (2005): 3. Fazul is linked with Al Shabaab, the militia group associated with al Qaeda that is smuggling sugar. The sugar is apparently being shipped into the Somali port of Kismayo before being further transported to Kenya across the land border. Opala, “Dreaded Somali Terrorist Group Taps into Sugar Racket.” 91. United States of America V. Usama Bin Laden et al., 353. 92. Wright, Looming Tower, 359, Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 48. 93. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 55. 94. Lee, “Terrorist Financing: The U.S. And International Response,” 3, Boucek, “The Battle to Shut Down,” 2. 95. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 38. 96. Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 269. 97. “Report to Congressional Requesters on Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Methods,” 30. 98. Bruce Riedel, “Al-Qaeda Five Years after the Fall of Khandahar” (Brookings Institution, January 18, 2007). 99. Whitlock and Wright, “Saudis Say They Broke up Suicide Plots,” “Saudi Arrests Suspects Planning Oil Attacks” (Reuters, April 27, 2007). 100. There has been some disagreement over how closely Fatah al Islam is related to al Qaeda. Rebecca Bloom, “Backgrounder: Fatah Al-Islam” (Council on Foreign Relations, June 8, 2007). Even if Shakir al Absi, leader of Fatah al Islam, never actually swore bayat to Usama bin Laden, it is clear given the close affiliations of those he trains, as well as his relationship with Abu Musab al Zarqawi, that he has had extremely close ties with the al Qaeda network. For information on European recruits training in Lebanon, see Vidino, “Current Trends in Jihadi Networks in Europe.” For information on North African-affiliated terrorists (such as those of al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb) using Fatah al Islam training centers, see Black, “Lebanon Another Waypoint for North Africans Headed to Iraq.” 220 Notes

101. Riedel, “Al-Qaeda Five Years after the Fall of Khandahar.” 102. Mohammed M. Hafez, “Al-Qa’ida Losing Ground in Iraq,” CTC Sentinel 1, no. 1 (2007). 103. For a discussion of the use of the Internet by Islamic extremists and jihadists, see, for example, Gabriel Weinmann, “Virtual Disputes: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Debates,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 7 (2006), Chassay and Johnson, “Google Earth Used to Target Israel,” “A World Wide Web of Terror,” Evan F. Kohlmann, “The Real Online Terrorist Threat,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (2006), Michael Moss, “What to Do about Pixels of Hate,” New York Times October 21, 2007. 104. The use of the Internet for recruitment should not be overblown. Though the Internet can certainly provide an underlying foundation or interest in Islamic extremism, and even jihad, an individual is rarely recruited solely through Internet or similar communications. As Michael Tarrnby has noted, “Reading and sending messages about the Jihad on the Internet may make these individuals receptive to its appeal, but direct involvement requires interaction.” Thus, person- to-person contact remains critical. Michael Taarnby, “Recruitment of Islamist Terrorists in Europe: Trends and Perspectives” (January 14, 2005), http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/ Forskning_og_dokumentation/Rekruttering_af_islamistiske_ terrorister_i_Europa.pdf, Stern, Terror in the Name of God, 265. 105. Mazzetti and Rohde, “Terror Officials See Al Qaeda Chiefs Regaining Power,” “National Intelligence Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland” (Office of the Director of National Intelligence, July 2007), Dirk Laabs and Sebastian Rotella, “Terrorists in Training Head to Pakistan,” Los Angeles Times, October 14, 2007, Souad Mekhennet and Michael Moss, “Europeans Get Terror Training inside Pakistan,” New York Times, September 10, 2007, Hassan Abbas, “Increasing Talibanization in Pakistan’s Seven Tribal Agencies,” Terrorism Monitor 5, no. 18 (September 27, 2007), http://jamestown.org/terrorism/ news/article.php?articleid=2373679. 106. Josh Meyer, “Cutting Money Flow to Terrorists Proves Difficult,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 2003. 107. Van Natta, “Terrorists Blaze.” 108. Deyoung and Farah, “Us Agency Turf Battles.” 109. Van Natta, “Terrorists Blaze.” 110. Thachuk, “Terrorism’s Financial Lifeline,” 2. 111. “Report to Congressional Requesters on Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agencies Should Systematically Assess Terrorists’ Use of Alternative Financing Methods.” 112. Deyoung and Farah, “Us Agency Turf Battles.” Notes 221

10 Conclusions 1. The international treaties include Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft (1963); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizer of Aircraft (1970); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (1971); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Offenses against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents (1973); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages (1979); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (1980); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil Aviation (1988); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (1988); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection (1991); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (1997); and International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (1999). For a complete discussion of these international treaties, see “Legislative Guide to the Universal Anti-Terrorism Conventions and Protocols” (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2004). 2. For a description of passive support, see Daniel Byman, Deadly Connec- tions: States That Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 219–58. 3. The first American act specifically criminalizing financial support to terrorist organizations in the United States was the Providing Material Support for Terrorists Act (Title 18 US Code § 2339A) in 1994. These measures have been strengthened with the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), enacted in 1996; Executive Order 13224 “Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who commit, Threat to Commit, or Support Terrorism; and the USA PATRIOT Act” (Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism). Steve Kiser, “Financing Terror: An Analysis and Simulation for Affecting Al Qaeda’s Financial Infrastructure” (RAND, 2005), 111–20. 4. Paul Allan Schott, Reference Guide to Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: World Bank; International Monetary Fund, 2006). 5. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 168. 6. Ibid., 170–6. 7. Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), vii. 8. Ibid., 145–6. 222 Notes

9. Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), 158–62. 10. For an explanation of these and other terrorism resourcing related protocols, see Schott, Reference Guide. 11. Kiser, “Financing Terror,” 185–9. 12. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed. (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2005), 49–55. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 46–9. 15. Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003), 130. 16. Ian O. Lesser et al., “Countering the New Terrorism” (RAND Project Air Force, 1999), 137. 17. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 94. 18. These concepts and components of regenerative capacity were origi- nally developed by Reid Sawyer, Director of the Combating Terrorism Center, and the concepts above are based on communications with him in 2006 and 2007. 19. Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 141. 20. Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 221. 21. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy, 56. 22. Ibid., 217. Index

Note: Page numbers ending in “f” refer to figures. Page numbers ending in “t” refer to tables

Abrams, Robert, 116 Anarchist Wave, 51–4 Adams, Gerry, 115–18 Andreas, Daniel, 129 Adams, James, 13, 38, 51, 63, 138 Anticolonialist Wave, 51, 54–5 al Aziz, Abd al Qadir Ibn Abd, 113 Arafat, Yassir, 37, 44, 57–8, 67, al Fadl, Jamal Ahmad, 31, 65, 75 91–5, 138–40 al Qaeda Argentine Monteneros, 23 acquiring resources, 26–8 Assad, Hafez, 140 and bin Laden, 75, 142–5, 148–54 Assad, Rifaat, 140 and charities, 60, 150 Aufhauser, David, 149 and commodities, 44–5 autonomy, 4–7, 9f, 10f, 28, 166 as evolutionary group, 1–2 autonomy groups, 99–120 and ideology, 21–2 Azzam, Abdullah, 149 and multinationals, 65, 74–6 as nonstate franchisee, 107–13 Bah, Ibrahim, 45 personnel, 16 Baker, Raymond, 46 and “seed money,” 62 Bakunin, Mikhail, 52 and state sponsoring, 8, 142–5 Bale, Christian, 39 and transnational corporations, bank robberies, 28, 34–5, 53–6, 58 147–56 banking institutions, 42–4 al Sharif, Sayyid Imam Abd al Aziz Beam, Louis, 121, 122 Imam, 112–13 Bektasevic, Mirsad, 124 al Suri, Abu Musab, 23 Bell, J. Bowyer, 116, 137 al Turabi, Hassan, 142 Benjamin, Daniel, 156 al Wadoud, Abu Mus’ab Abd, 110 Best, Steven, 130 al Zarqawi, Abu Musab, 110 Biaggi, Mario, 116 al Zawahiri, Ayman, 76, 108–9, bin Laden, Mohammad Bin 112, 130, 143, 145, 150 Awad, 149 al Zawahiri, Mohammed, 109 bin Laden, Usama Alexander II, Tsar, 52 and al Qaeda, 75, 142–5, 148–54 ALF Primer: A Guide to Direct and al Zawahiri, 108–9, 130, Action and the Animal 145, 150 Liberation Front, 131 businesses of, 149–52 al-Nasser, Gamal Abd, 91 providing funds, 107, 110 Amman, Pottu, 78 trading assistance, 62 An Phoblacht, 118 wealth of, 1, 26, 31, 38, 42 224 Index

Block, Nathan “Exile,” 131 donations, 38–41, 158–9 “blood diamonds,” 44–5, 106, 150 Droudkel, Abdelmalek, 110, 112 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 111 drug smuggling, 49, 61, 71, 73, 81, Brennan, Philip, 116 105–6, 136, 140 Brosnan, Pierce, 39 drugs, 36, 61 bundled-support organizations, 7, 8, see also narcoterrorism 105, 113–20 business holdings, 41–7, 149–52 Ecodefense: A Field Guide to Byman, Daniel, 5, 14, 85, 86 Monkeywrenching, 131 ecoterrorism, 127–33 Cahill, Joe, 115 Encyclopedia of Jihad, The, 125 Carlos the Jackal, 57 extortion, 35, 37, 69, 72, 106 Carnot, President, 52 cash smuggling, 31–3 Fadlallah, Sheikh Mohammed Cassella, Stefan, 49 Hussein, 105 categories of organizations Fazul, Mohamad Abdullah, 152 analyzing, 166–7 Ferdinand, Franz, 54 description of, 7–10, 9f, 10f financial institutions, 42–4 future of, 157–8 Fish, Hamilton, 116 see also organizations Flannery, Michael, 70, 115, 117, 119 charities, 38–41, 60–1, 73–4, “following the money,” 164–5 81, 150 Foreman, Dave, 129, 131 Chouinard, Yvon, 39 franchise organizations, 7–8, 74–5, Comerford, James, 116 99–120, 157, 166 command and control structure, fraud, 29, 33–4, 58, 61, 69, 81, 106 18, 21–2, 85–6, 113, 122 commodities, 32, 42–5, 61, Gadhafi, Mohammar, 92, 97 106, 150 Galula, David, 137 see also resourcing Gilman, Benjamin, 116 communications, 15–23, 40, 55, Giraldo, Jeanne, 31, 83 64–5, 160–1 Gleason, Teddy, 117 Coronado, Rodney, 131 goal-based typologies, 2–3 cost of terrorist attack, 14–17, 63 gold, 45, 48 Countering the New Terrorism, 124 Gramm, Phil, 1 counterterrorism considerations, 3, Guerin, Veronica, 68 158, 164–7 counterterrorism forces, 21, 30, 65, HAMAS 108, 121–4, 147, 166 and financial institutions, 42–3 criminal activities, 30–8, 61, multinationals, 72–4 105–6, 165–6 smuggling operations, 32 and state-sponsored terrorism, De Mao, George, 116 55, 60–2 DeJoria, John Paul, 39 Harrison, George, 70, 116–17, 119 diamonds, 44–5, 106, 150 Hattab, Hassan, 110 diasporas, 39–40, 78–83, 113–15 hawalas, 45–7 Index 225

Hirst, Paul, 145 life necessities, 15–16 Hizbullah lone wolf groups, 7, 14, 54, 62, and communications, 17 121–33, 159 smuggling operations, 32–3, 45 as state franchisee, 102–7 McManus, Sean, 117 and state-sponsored terrorism, medium autonomy groups, 99–120 55, 60–2 message, broadcasting, 20–3 Hoffman, Bruce, 3, 62, 132, message generation infrastructure, 133, 148 15–23 Holland, Jack, 119 see also communications Horgan, John, 68, 69 Mitchell, Paul, 39 Huber, Ahmed, 42 Mohammed, Khalfan Khamis, 152 money, following, 164–5 idealism, 13–23 money laundering ideology, 20–3, 158, 165–7 and autonomy groups, 106 import-export firms, 45–7 as financial instrument, 41–2 intangible resources, 13–14, 18–20, and multinationals, 64, 69–70, 26–8, 27t 73, 81–2 “inverse money laundering,” 48–50 and resourcing, 9–10, 26–9, 157, investments in businesses, 41–7 161, 165 Irish People, The, 118 role of, 48–50 Irish World, 53 and transnational corporations, Iyad, Abu, 93, 94 146–8 money needs, 13–15, 26–8, 27t Jamison, Wesley, 130 Moro, Aldo, 35 Joosse, Paul, 132 Most, Johann, 53 Mu’az, Abdul, 109 Kaczynski, Theodore, 129 Mubarak, Hosni, 143 Kansi, Mir Aimal, 124 Muhammad, John Allen, 126 Kaplan, Jeffrey, 123 multinationals Keane, Jack, 117 and al Qaeda, 65, 74–6 Khalaf, Salah, 93 and HAMAS, 72–4 Khettab, Mourad, 111 and money laundering, 64, Khomeini, Ayatollah, 102, 103 69–70, 73, 81–2 kidnappings, 35–6, 56, 71, 105 and Palestine Liberation Kiser, Steve, 74, 158, 161 Organization, 64–7 Kochan, Nick, 48 and Provisional Irish Republican Kroptkin, Peter, 52 Army, 64, 67–72 and Tamil Tigers, 65, 77–83 Laqueur, Walter, 53–4, 89 Munro, Lyle, 130 Leader, Stefan, 127, 130 Mussolini, Benito, 37 Lenin, Vladimir, 163 Leninist model, 163–4 Nada, Youssef Mustafa, 42 Levitt, Matthew, 63, 104, 106–7 Naess, Arne, 128 Liddick, Donald R., 131 narcoterrorism, 8, 36–7, 56, 136 226 Index

Nasar, Mustafa Setmariam, 23 personnel, 15, 16 Nasreddin, Ahmed Idriss, 42 Pillar, Paul, 3, 164, 166 Nechaev, Sergei, 52 plausible deniability, 89–90, 101, 119 needs of terrorist groups, 13–28 political narrative, 20–3 New Left Wave, 51, 55–9 political violence, 162–4 New York Times, 37, 129 Prabhakaran, Velupillai, 77 Newkirk, Ingrid, 130 Princip, Gavrilo, 54 Nidal, Abu, 37, 57 Probst, Peter, 127, 130 9–11 Commission Report, The, 144 propaganda networks, 16, 34, 54, nongovernmental organizations 60, 87, 100, 104, 160 (NGOs), 40–1, 60, 80–1 propaganda value, 108, 119, 138 NORAID, 39, 70, 114–20 Provisional Irish Republican Army Norton, Augustus, 105 (PIRA) and Anticolonialist Wave, 55–6 O’Callaghan, Sean, 68 income source for, 32 O’Conaill, Daithi, 115 and multinationals, 64, 67–72 Odeh, Mohammed Saddiq, 152 and New Left, 57–9 Omar, Mullah, 75, 144 and NORAID, 114–20 operational resources, 17–18 preserving, 157 operational security, 19–20 and training, 14 operational space, 18–19 organizations Rahman, Omar Abdul, 34 analyzing, 166–7 RAND, 124, 164 capabilities of, 4–7, 9, 10f ransoms, 35–6 categories of, 7–10, 9f, 10f Rapoport, David, 51, 52, 88, 94 defeating, 166–7 Ravachol, Francois-Claudius, 126 future of, 157–8 Reagan, Ronald, 119, 120 see also specific organizations realpolitik, 92, 104, 158 recruitment pools, 22, 103, 165 Pacheco, Alex, 131 Religious Wave, 51, 59–62 Palestine Liberation Organization resourcing (PLO) acquiring resources, 26–8, 47–8 costs for, 14 criminalizing, 158 and multinationals, 64–7 evolution of, 51–62 and New Left, 57–8 explanation of, 1–3 personnel, 16 means of, 166–7 preserving, 157 menu for, 25–50 and robberies, 35 and money laundering, 9–10, and shell states, 138–41 26–9, 157, 161, 165 and state-sponsored terrorism, and technology, 47–50, 124–6 90–8 typology of, 7–10 training courses, 23 variations in, 27t, 28–9 wealth of, 1 Ressam, Ahmed, 62 Pathmanathan, Kumaran, 77–8 “reverse money laundering,” 29, patrician currencies, 15 41–2, 49–50 Index 227 robberies, 28, 34–5, 53–6, 58, 69 HAMAS, 55, 60–2 Rodina, Peter, 116 Hizbullah, 55, 60–2 Rossa, Jeremiah O’Donovan, 53 Palestine Liberation Ryan, Liam, 119 Organization, 90–8 pros and cons of, 87–98 Sageman, Marc, 125, 159 Stern, Jessica, 101, 142, 146, 148 sanctuary, 18–19, 23, 87 Strindberg, Anders, 95 Sands, Bobby, 68, 119 Sunder, Shad, 39 Schiller, David, 92, 93 “seed money,” 62, 104, 110 Takeyh, Ray, 143 Shabib, Muin, 73 Tamil Tigers Shapiro, Jacob, 64, 83 and commodities, 42 Sheen, Martin, 39 and diasporas, 39–40 shell states and multinationals, 65, 77–83 classes of, 136–7 and New Left, 58 establishing, 160 personnel, 16 example of, 138–41 preserving, 157 explanation of, 7, 8, 135–41 tangible resources, 13–18, 26–8, 27t future of, 159–60 Taylor, Charles, 45 growth of, 159–60 Taylor, Max, 68, 69 Sidqi, Atef, 109 technology and resources, 47–50, Simon, Steven, 156 124–6 Singer, Peter, 130 terror networks, 159 smart cards, 47–8 see also specific networks smuggling terrorism of cash, 31–3 defining, 3–4 of diamonds, 44–5, 150 financial support of, 158–9 of drugs, 49, 61, 71, 73, 81, multinationals of, 63–84 105–6, 136, 140 war on, 52, 133, 153 of weapons, 70–1, 115–17, waves of, 51–62 119, 142 terrorism resourcing Special Forces, 17 criminalizing, 158 Special Forces 2: Tale of the Truthful evolution of, 51–62 Pledge, 17 explanation of, 1–3 state resourcing, 29–30 means of, 166–7 see also resourcing menu for, 25–50 state sponsoring organizations typology of, 7–10 example of, 142–5 variations in, 27t, 28–9 explanation of, 7, 8, 141–2 see also resourcing future of, 157 terrorist attack costs, 14–17, 63 pros and cons of, 89–98 terrorist needs, 13–28 and Religious Wave, 62 terrorists, hiring, 37–8 state-sponsored groups Thatcher, Margaret, 120 explanation of, 7, 85–7 Thompson, Grahame, 145 future of, 157 Tommasi, Joseph, 122 228 Index training tactics, 14, 23, 38, 87, 166 War on Terrorism, 52, 133, 153 transnational corporations (TNCs) Washington Post, 129 example of, 147–56 Watson, Paul, 39 explanation of, 7–9, 145–7 waves of terrorism, 51–62 future of, 160–1, 166 weapons smuggling, 70–1, 115–17, growth of, 160–1 119, 142 and money laundering, 146–8 Weaver, Randy, 122 Trinkunas, Harold, 31, 83 Wolf, Lester, 116 Troen, Roger, 131 Wright, Lawrence, 107, 144 Tse-tung, Mao, 156, 160, 162–3 Wynn, Steve, 39 Tsouli, Younes, 124 Yassin, Sheikh Ahmed, 74 variations in resourcing, 27t, 28–9 Veneremos, 17 Zacher, Joyanna “Sadie,” 131