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TCU DAILY SKIFF Vol TCU DAILY SKIFF Vol. 87, No. 9 FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 1986 Fort Worth, Texas Policy violation results in fine By Kathy Fuller Trask said she respects the group's effort to have an on-campus non- Staff Writer alcoholic activity, but they need to be Phi Gamma DAta fraternity has careful because violations by a few been fined $300 for an alcohol policy members can damage the whole violation that occurred Thursday, chapter. "Mixers can be fun and "till be free Sept. 4. The fine was assessed after an Inter- from alcohol," she said. "Eating ice fraternity Council Judicial Board cream, pizza and maybe renting a hearing Sept. 9, said Jeff Harvey, a movie are just a few of the things to member of the board. do." Phi Gamma Delta and Pi Beta Phi Trask said she admits the new sorority learned just how serious TCU drinking age will be a challenge to is about keeping alcohol consumption many students and organizations. within the boundaries of both the It is up to each officer of every club, Texas state law and the university she said, to monitor the actions of his alcohol policy, which allows only or her group. Staff members, faculty, those over 21 to have alcohol in their house directors and the campus police are working together to help enforce rooms. Police Chief Oscar II. Stewart said the guidelines and help students ad- that on Sept. 4 a foot patrol officer just to new social activities. observed several fraternity men out- Rachel Ryan, a Pi Beta Phi who was side their house with beer cans and in attendance at the mixer, said the whole idea of the gathering was "to cups. TCU Dally Skiff; Joe Williams When a patrol car arrived at the Phi have Cokes, popcorn and watch a Stalag Shorley - Karen Cueni and Karen Marion chat outside Sherley once workmen begin replacing the tile roof of the dormitory All cars in the movie." Hall Wednesday The temporary fence is intended to protect students Gamma Delta house where they were north parking lot were to be removed by 8 a.m. Friday. hosting a mixer with the Pi Beta Phis, 'Students need to realize the officers ran inside, Stewart said. Unable to reach the Greek resident that the university alco- adviser, Stewart said the sergeant in charge went to the door of the hol policy is the state Daniloff arrest raises questions fraternity house to see if there were law-we had no choice! any violations. MOSCOW (AP)-The arrest of ANNE TRASK, assistant seeking partner in superpower rela- in the Politburo opposed to Gor- vinced that arrest of Daniloff was the Stewart said the campus police re- American reporter Nicholas Daniloff tions. bachev. best way to gain the release of corded the names and ID numbers of director of student raises questions about Mikhail S. Gor- U.S. outrage over the arrest raised The KGB is a powerful political Zakharov. the approximately 50 to 75 students at activities bachev's relationship with the KGB speculation it might hinder prepara- force and at times has acted with vir- the mixer. Stewart said this was done and about how the Kremlin lead- It is also possible the Kremlin may tions for the next U.S.-Soviet summit. tual autonomy. Many Western ex- in order for the sergeant to write the Brian Zempel, Phi Gamma Delta ership balances the demands of its in- simply have underestimated the recording secretary, said he doesn't These are the main questions: Did perts believe no one can become par- report. ternal security forces with it; foreign Gorbachev, who is on vacation out- ty chief without KGB backing. scope of the American response or After i.ampus police spoke with the feel this incident has given his orga- policy goals. assumed the Reagan administration nization a "bad name." He said the side Moscow, know about the arrest But many Western Kremlinologists presidents of the organizations host- fraternity will definitely continue to KGB agents grabbed Daniloff near- would quietly negotiate a swap. ing the mixer, Stewart said Assistant in advance? Did he know hut was believe Gorbachev has enjoyed good have chapter room mixers because of ly two weeks ago after a Soviet ac- Gorbachev may have been under Director of Student Activities Anne powerless to stop it? Or did Gor- relations with the KGB and that its convenience. quaintance allegedly handed him a bachev personally approve the arrest? chief, Viktor Chebrikov, is one of his pressure to act swiftly and harshly af- Trask was called. Stewart said Trask "But obviously this same thing packet of secret documents. One school of thought is that Gor- backers. Gorbachev's reputed men- ter the Zakharov arrest. In the past, verified that a non-alcoholic mixer won't happen again," Zempel said. was in progress. Since then, there has been specula- bachev would not have condoned the tor, the late President Yuri V. Andro- he has shown he can be very tough when pushed by foreign poweri on "This act was not an undercover op- "Students need to realize that the tion but no conclusive evidence about arrest, since it runs counter to his pov, was head of the KGB for 15 security issues. eration," Stewart said. The police university alcohol policy is the state who authorized the arrest and what it efforts to improve the image of the years. law-we had no choice," Trask said. If Gorbachev knew about the plan- Earlier this year, the British gov- were just patrolling the area as usual says about the Kremlin's effort to pre- Soviet Union and his campaign to end when the students were^seen drinking "And we're serious about enforcing ned arrest but didn't approve of it, the ernment sparked a round of tit-for-tat it." sent a more open and modern face to nuclear testing. outside their house. notion of a power imbalance between expulsions by kicking out 25 Soviets Stewart, who said he has a com- the outside world. That theory said Daniloff was "Only about 10 to 15 students were the KGB and the party gains credibil- identified by a KGB defector as in- ; plete security staff nf 27 for the firsj. The Soviets claim they can prove arrested without Gorbachev's know- -i violation nf the univenftv oolirv " h ity However, even if Gorbachev had telligence auents. icverai n*arv s<*iu i/.e fieip ot Onniloff »w «nyinS. "» th* V S ledge in a reflex action hy thr KGR no advance word, he most likely was the TCU community to enforce alco- Gorbachev matched every expul- incident and Anne made closer in- News £r World Report correspondent after Soviet U. N. employee Gennadiy advised beforehand of the espionage hol regulations will enable the cam- sion and eventually forced the British says the KGB framed him in retalia- Zakharov was arrested in New York charges filed against Daniloff more spection of tl problem pus police to continue to focus atten- to halt the actions after two rounds. "And that's our job," Stewart said. tion for the arrest of a Soviet citizen in on spying charges. than a week after he was arrested. tion on other areas of the campus. "We don't act as judge or jury of any New York. If that is true, it suggests the Com- If the Soviet leader did approve of In the Daniloff case, Gorbachev Harvey said he thought the case munist Party general secretary does the arrest, it is not clear why he was could have felt he needed to show an situation." was "kind of weak," and he does not In either case, Daniloff* s indict- Trask said the incident was referred not have full control of the secret willing to risk possible diplomatic iron hand to satisfy those who may think either group was trying to serve ment on three counts of espionage to the lnterfraternity Council Judici- police. damage. fear his calls for modernizing Soviet alcohol. seemed to be a blow to a Kremlin ary Board for "inspection and disci- public relations campaign that sought Some Western diplomats have sug- It is possible Gorbachev was pre- society and opening it a bit more to plinary discussion." She would not "The police went overboard," Har- gested Daniloff* s arrest might even be sented with what appeared to be a the outside world could lead to a to portray the Soviet Union as the comment on the matter. vey said. peace-loving and compromise- an overt move by conservatives with- good case against Daniloff or con- Cityslackening of security getsand disciplinediscipline, commentnew on me ■»■■■ . sex symbol- — Skater defeats obstacle, SAN ANTONIO, Texas (AP)- Magazine mentions aren't new for preferably, a touch ol luxe," the arti- Aecording to Saturday Review maga- Cisneros. Playboy listed him among cle states. zine, San Antonio Mayor Henry Cis- its top 10 best-dressed men, and Es~ Cisneros is a sex symbol for the neros is a sex symbol. quire added him to its list as an out- thinking woman; he is a person who achieves college success Using a dated black-and-white standing American under age 40. • turns your mind on, the magazine photograph of Cisneros, the magazine couragement ol her parents, whom "My goal in life is to be a friend Saturday Review said looks are not says. offers a two-page spread of a cast of sex By Jerry Madden she describes as her "guiding indeed toafriend In need," Nichols enough, even though Cisneros is de- "If it was simply on looks, I symbols, including a "Miami Vice" Staff Writer force," said.
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