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Crisisbeheersing in Regionale Context
Clingendael Magazine voor Internationale Betrekkingen Crisisbeheersing in regionale context December EU, NAVO, GOS, Afrikaanse Unie, ASEAN, ad hoc-operaties Te koop: het Olympisch ideaal! 2013 Al-Qaida en gijzelingen in de Sahel Internationale erkenning LHBT-rechten moeizaam proces www.internationalespectator.nl Inhoud Redactioneel De rol van regionale actoren in brandhaarden 1 Artikelen Europese Raad en daad? | Margriet Drent & Dick Zandee 2 Al-Qaida en gijzelingen in de Sahel: een effectieve strategie? | Sergei Boeke 5 Tot de dood(straf) ons scheidt: LHBT-rechten en Internationale Betrekkingen | Cees van Beek 10 Column Sotsji: Olympisch ideaal te koop | Bob van den Bos 15 Artikelen De rol van regionale organisaties in crisisbeheersingsoperaties en stabilisatiemissies De evolutie van VN-vredesoperaties en de rol van regionale organisaties | Gustaaf Geeraerts 18 Europese vredesoperaties: waar is de strategie? | Sven Biscop & Luk Van Langenhove 23 EU-geleide crisismanagement-operaties: minder, kleinschaliger en pragmatischer | Tim Haesebrouck & Melanie Van Meirvenne 28 De grenslegioenen van de fantoom-USSR: vredesoperaties onder het GOS | Bruno De Cordier & Joris Wagemakers 33 Is de Afrikaanse Unie klaar voor crisisbeheersing op eigen continent | Joost van Puijenbroek 39 De track record van ad hoc-coalities: Koeweit, Oost-Timor en Irak | Kees Homan 45 ASEAN, de onderschatte soft power en het belang van post-moderne diplomatie | Jan Willem Blankert 50 Opinie Oorzaak ineffectiviteit VN in weeffouten systeem | Bibi van Ginkel 55 Artikelen Slachtoffer van een VN-vredesoperatie | Sanne Maas 57 Between a rock and a hard place; geopolitieke dilemma’s rond de tweede democratische verkiezingen in Bhutan | Jeannette Mak 62 Respons EU-zelfreflectie kan tot vrede leiden | Jan Wijenberg 66 Boekbesprekingen Herman van Roijen, 1905-1991. -
Twenty-Seventh Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
TMUN TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION MARCH 1986 COMITTEEE DIRECTOR VICE DIRECTORS MODERATOR SIERRA CHOW NATHALIA HERRERA DAVIS HAUGEN TESSA DI VIZIO THE TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE TMUN COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION A Letter from Your Director 2 Topic A: Economic Reform and Institutional Restructuring 3 Uskorenie 3 Glasnost 6 Perestroika 7 Questions to Consider 9 Topic B: National Movements and Satellite States 10 Russian Nationalism 10 Satellite States 11 Hungarian Revolution, 1956 12 Prague Spring Czechoslovakia, 1968 13 Poland Solidarity, 1980 14 The Baltics 17 Kazakhstan 19 Questions to Consider 21 Topic C: Foreign Policy Challenges 22 The Brezhnev Era 22 Gorbachev’s “New Thinking” 23 American Relations 25 Soviet Involvement in Afghanistan 26 Turning Point 28 Questions to Consider 30 Characters 31 Advice for Research and Preparation 36 General Resources 37 Topic A Key Resources 37 Topic B Key Resources 37 Topic C Key Resources 38 Bibliography 39 Topic A 39 Topic C 41 1 THE TWENTY-SEVENTH CONGRESS OF THE TMUN COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION A LETTER FROM YOUR DIRECTOR Dear Delegates, Welcome to the 27thCongress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This event represents a turning point in the Soviet Union’s history, as Mikhail Gorbachev, a champion of reform and reorientation, leads his first Congress as General Secretary. My name is Sierra Chow, and I will be your Director for the conference. I am a third-year student at the University of Toronto, enrolled in Political Science, Psychology, and Philosophy. Should you have any questions about the topics, the committee, the conference, or University of Toronto in general, please reach out to me via email and I will do my best to help. -
Reform and Human Rights the Gorbachev Record
100TH-CONGRESS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES [ 1023 REFORM AND HUMAN RIGHTS THE GORBACHEV RECORD REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES BY THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE MAY 1988 Printed for the use of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON: 1988 84-979 = For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402 COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE STENY H. HOYER, Maryland, Chairman DENNIS DeCONCINI, Arizona, Cochairman DANTE B. FASCELL, Florida FRANK LAUTENBERG, New Jersey EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts TIMOTHY WIRTH, Colorado BILL RICHARDSON, New Mexico WYCHE FOWLER, Georgia EDWARD FEIGHAN, Ohio HARRY REED, Nevada DON RITTER, Pennslyvania ALFONSE M. D'AMATO, New York CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey JOHN HEINZ, Pennsylvania JACK F. KEMP, New York JAMES McCLURE, Idaho JOHN EDWARD PORTER, Illinois MALCOLM WALLOP, Wyoming EXECUTIvR BRANCH HON. RICHARD SCHIFIER, Department of State Vacancy, Department of Defense Vacancy, Department of Commerce Samuel G. Wise, Staff Director Mary Sue Hafner, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel Jane S. Fisher, Senior Staff Consultant Michael Amitay, Staff Assistant Catherine Cosman, Staff Assistant Orest Deychakiwsky, Staff Assistant Josh Dorosin, Staff Assistant John Finerty, Staff Assistant Robert Hand, Staff Assistant Gina M. Harner, Administrative Assistant Judy Ingram, Staff Assistant Jesse L. Jacobs, Staff Assistant Judi Kerns, Ofrice Manager Ronald McNamara, Staff Assistant Michael Ochs, Staff Assistant Spencer Oliver, Consultant Erika B. Schlager, Staff Assistant Thomas Warner, Pinting Clerk (11) CONTENTS Page Summary Letter of Transmittal .................... V........................................V Reform and Human Rights: The Gorbachev Record ................................................ -
The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1986
The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev 1986 Donated by A.S. Chernyaev to The National Security Archive Translated by Anna Melyakova Edited by Svetlana Savranskaya http://www.nsarchive.org Translation © The National Security Archive, 2007 The Diary of Anatoly S. Chernyaev, 1986 http://www.nsarchive.org January 1st, 1986. At the department1 everyone wished each other to celebrate the New Year 1987 “in the same positions.” And it is true, at the last session of the CC (Central Committee) Secretariat on December 30th, five people were replaced: heads of CC departments, obkom [Oblast Committee] secretaries, heads of executive committees. The Politizdat2 director Belyaev was confirmed as editor of Soviet Culture. [Yegor] Ligachev3 addressed him as one would address a person, who is getting promoted and entrusted with a very crucial position. He said something like this: we hope that you will make the newspaper truly an organ of the Central Committee, that you won’t squander your time on petty matters, but will carry out state and party policies... In other words, culture and its most important control lever were entrusted to a Stalinist pain-in-the neck dullard. What is that supposed to mean? Menshikov’s case is also shocking to me. It is clear that he is a bastard in general. I was never favorably disposed to him; he was tacked on [to our team] without my approval. I had to treat him roughly to make sure no extraterritoriality and privileges were allowed in relation to other consultants, and even in relation to me (which could have been done through [Vadim] Zagladin,4 with whom they are dear friends). -
The Kgb's Image-Building Under
SPREADING THE WORD: THE KGB’S IMAGE-BUILDING UNDER GORBACHEV by Jeff Trimble The Joan Shorenstein Center PRESS ■ POLI TICS Discussion Paper D-24 February 1997 ■ PUBLIC POLICY ■ Harvard University John F. Kennedy School of Government INTRODUCTION The KGB, under many different sets of graduate student at the Pushkin Russian Lan- initials, evokes frightening memories of the guage Institute in Moscow during the 1979-80 Soviet period of Russian history. A garrison academic year, later as Moscow correspondent state within a state, it provided the terror that for U.S. News & World Report from 1986 to glued the Soviet Union into a unitary force for 1991, Trimble observed the changes not just in evil. Few bucked the system, and dissent was the old KGB but in the old Soviet Union and, in limited, for the most part, to whispers over this paper, based on his own research, he ex- dinner or under the sheets. Millions were herded plains their significance. At a time in American into the communist version of concentration life when we seem to be largely indifferent to the camps, or transported to Siberia, or simply rest of the world, we are indebted to Trimble for executed for crimes no more serious than having his reminder that the past is not too far removed the wrong economic or ideological pedigree. from the present. The KGB, by its brutal behavior, came to be The question lurking between the lines is identified throughout the world with the Soviet whether the changes in image are in fact system of government. When the system, with changes in substance as well. -
In Memoriam Jan Herman Van Roijen (1905-1991)
341 IN MEMORIAM JAN HERMAN VAN ROIJEN (1905-1991) The death of Herman van Roijen meant not only the disappearance of a very important personality from Dutch public life but also of a man of unusual qualities who made a special contribution to international relations of our age. His career was crowned by the outstanding ambassadorships in Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom. In all of these countries Herman gained not only personal friends, but also forged deep links, profound mutual understanding between governments of his country and the host state. He did much more, he contributed to the development of friendship between peoples. For he was indeed an unusual man. He prepared his doctoral thesis at Utrecht University in 1929 on 'The Legal Status of International Recognition of Newly Created States and Governments'. He could hardly guess that twenty years later he would be heading his country's delegation preparing a round table conference with Indonesia, a country which, formerly under control of the Netherlands, gained independence as one of the newly born states of the world community. Thus life offered him very many surprises but he lived up to them due to his capacity of mind and the special features of his character. Up to his last fatal illness he reflected his unusual personality, the eagerness to know and of absorbing as much knowledge as possible. Not insisting to convince people to his views he much rather helped them to find their own way. Hence it was his own courtesy -more I would say kindness- which attracted so many to seek his company. -
2018 Sartorius Christopher Ma
UNIVERSITY OF OKLAHOMA GRADUATE COLLEGE WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGEMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE FACULTY in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY By CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS Norman, OK 2018 WARNING INTELLIGENCE IN NUCLEAR CRISIS MANAGMENT: AVOIDING CATASTROPHIC MISCALCULATION A DISSERTATION APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE BY ___________________________ Dr. Ronald K. Gaddie, Chair ___________________________ Dr. Colin M. Barry ___________________________ Dr. Deven E. Carlson ___________________________ Dr. Jorge L. Mendoza ___________________________ Dr. Shad B. Satterthwaite © Copyright by CHRISTOPHER M. SARTORIUS 2018 All Rights Reserved. This dissertation is dedicated to my family and all intelligence professionals, military and civilian, past and present, who have dedicated their lives to protecting our great nation and our allies. Acknowledgements Working on this doctoral dissertation has been both a joy and a challenge. This work would not have been possible without the support and encouragement of countless individuals. At the most personal level, I would like to thank my wife, Fulvia, for her support over the past three years of this doctoral program and for her care and love over the past 25 years. I wish to thank my son, Konrad, for providing inspiration, much needed breaks in my work routine, and for sharing lunch together at the OU cafeteria followed by our fun table tennis matches. I also would like to thank my parents, Tim and Wanda Sartorius, for instilling in me the value of a great education. I would also like to thank Dr. Shad Satterthwaite, always friendly, open, and upbeat for enthusiastically encouraging me to pursue a doctoral degree at OU and Dr. -
Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents
SECTION 5: Non-Communist Europe and Israel Konrad Adenauer and the Cuban Missile Crisis: West German Documents access agency, the exchange of mutual non-aggression declara- d. Note: Much like the other NATO allies of the United tions and the establishment of FRG-GDR technical commissions. States, West Germany was not involved in either the ori- Somehow the proposals leaked to the German press, leading gins or the resolution of the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.1 Secretary of State Dean Rusk to protest the serious breach of confi- EBut, of course, nowhere in Europe was the immediate impact of dence. Hurt by the accusation, Adenauer withdrew his longstand- Khrushchev’s nuclear missile gamble felt more acutely than in ing confidante and ambassador to Washington, Wilhelm Grewe. Berlin. Ever since the Soviet premier’s November 1958 ultima- Relations went from cool to icy when the chancellor publicly dis- tum, designed to dislodge Western allied forces from the western tanced himself from Washington’s negotiation package at a press sectors of the former German Reich’s capital, Berlin had been the conference in May. By time the missile crisis erupted in October, focus of heightened East-West tensions. Following the building Adenauer’s trust in the United States had been severely shaken.4 of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the October stand-off The missile crisis spurred a momentary warming in the between Soviet and American tanks at the Checkpoint Charlie uneasy Adenauer-Kennedy relationship. Unlike other European crossing, a deceptive lull had settled over the city.2 allies, Adenauer backed Kennedy’s staunch attitude during the cri- Yet the Berlin question (centering around Western rights sis wholeheartedly, a fact that did not go unnoticed in Washington. -
SPECIAL ISSUE the Collapse of the Soviet Union
IntroductionKramer SPECIAL ISSUE The Collapse of the Soviet Union (Part 2) Introduction Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/jcws/article-pdf/5/4/3/700378/152039703322483747.pdf by guest on 28 September 2021 ✣ The four articles in this special issue look at some of the major in- ternal and external factors that helped precipitate the breakup of the Soviet Union. These articles should be read in conjunction with the four that ap- peared in our ªrst special issue on the collapse of the USSR, published in Vol- ume 5, No. 1 (Winter 2003). Our ªnal special issue on this topic, to be pub- lished in Volume 6, No. 3 (Summer 2004), will deal with domestic political and economic trends that destabilized the Soviet regime and contributed to the demise of the Soviet state. The Social Context The ªrst article in the current issue, by Walter Connor, discusses the social context of the dramatic events in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. In the 1960s a number of Western scholars, inºuenced by the burgeoning lit- erature on “modernization,” argued that long-term changes in Soviet soci- ety—increased literacy and education levels, industrialization, increased ur- banization, greater occupational differentiation, generational change, the advent of modern communications, and other such trends—were mitigating the Soviet regime’s ability to exercise tight political and economic control.1 Al- 1. See, for example, the essays collected in Zbigniew Brzezinski, ed., Dilemmas of Change in Soviet Pol- itics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969). A related theme is developed by Richard Lowenthal, “Development versus Utopia in Communist Policy,” in Chalmers Johnson, ed., Change in Communist Systems (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1970), pp. -
NEW EVIDENCE on the WAR in AFGHANISTAN Introduction
COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN Introduction By Christian Friedrich Ostermann hat was behind the Soviet decision in December a substitute foothold in Afghanistan and worried about main- 1979 to invade Afghanistan? And when and why taining its credibility with communist world allies. Soviet lead- Wdid Mikhail Gorbachev decide to pull out Soviet ers were genuinely concerned that Afghan strongman troops nearly ten years later? What was the role of the US Hafizullah Amin was either a US agent or prepared to sell out covert assistance program, in particular the Stinger missiles? to the United States. At the CWIHP conference, former US What role did CIA intelligence play? How did the Afghan Charge d’Affaires J. Bruce Amstutz as well as other partici- War’s history, a key step in the rise of militant Islam, intersect pants forcefully refuted allegations of Agency links to Amin. with the history of the final decade of the Cold War? These In his five conversations with Amin in the fall of 1979, Amstutz were among the questions addressed at a major international remembered, the Afghan leader did not in any way suggest conference, “Towards an International History of the War in that he was interested in allying himself with the United States. Afghanistan,” organized in April 2002 by the Cold War Inter- US relations with successive communist regimes in Af- national History Project (CWIHP) in cooperation with the ghanistan had been volatile since the April 1978 communist Woodrow Wilson -
Party Conference Did Not Help Gorbachov
Click here for Full Issue of EIR Volume 15, Number 29, July 22, 1988 whelming majority of speeches at the conference were a catalogue of statements demanding that measures be taken to stop the worst food and consumer goods shortages in dec ades, to tum around the collapse in living and health stan dards, and to establish rigid autarchy (including "food self Party Conference did sufficiency," i.e., to eliminate large-scale food imports from the West) as soon as possible. not help Gorbachov The intersection of this crisis with the political faction fight was highlighted by the fact that Ligachov, in his capac ity as head of the Central Committee Secretariat, was con by Konstantin George firmed to be in overall charge of economic policy. Three days after the conference, on July 4, the Politburo Contrary to most Western media, the Soviet Party Confer convened for an emergency discussion on the economic cri ence which began in Moscow on June 28 marked a stinging sis. That meeting produced an announcement that a Central defeat for Mikhail Gorbachov. The conference certified the Committee Plenum to deal with the economic crisis would removal of the general secretary from exercising any real be held "at the end of July," with a bare three weeks' notice. power, by passing a resolution on establishing a "new" pres Several commissions were announced, each consisting of idency, under which Gorbachov will be kicked upstairs into leading members of the Politburo and Central Committee that new post. The conference also marked a resounding Secretariat, to draft measures to deal with the economic mess, victory for the hardline, Russian chauvinist party majority, for submission to the plenum. -
The KGB in Kremlin Politics
FINAL REPORT TO NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR SOVIET AND EAST EUROPEAN RESEARC H TITLE : THE KGB IN KREMLIN POLITIC S AUTHOR : Jeremy R. Azrael Rand Corporation/UCLA CONTRACTOR : Rand/UCLA PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR : Jeremy R. Azrael COUNCIL CONTRACT NUMBER : 801-4 DATE : September, 198 8 The work leading to this report was supported by funds provided b y the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . Th e analysis and interpretations contained in the report are those o f the author . CONTENT S PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY i v INTRODUCTION 1 THE SECRET POLICE AND THE ELIMINATION OF BERIA 4 THE SECRET POLICE IN THE MALENKOV-KHRUSHCHEV STRUGGLE 6 THE KGB AND THE " ANTI-PARTY GROUP " 1 1 THE KGB AND " THE ZHUKOV AFFAIR " 1 6 THE REPLACEMENT OF SEROV 2 0 CHAIRMAN SHELEPIN 2 2 THE FALL OF SHELEPIN 2 7 THE 1967 SETTLEMENT 3 0 THE DOWNFALLS OF AKHUNDOV AND SHELEST 3 3 THE RISE OF ANDROPOV 3 7 THE KGB AND THE BREZHNEV - ANDROPOV SUCCESSION 4 3 THE INTERREGNUM 4 6 THE CHEBRIKOV - GORBACHEV ALLIANCE 5 0 THE BREAKDOWN OF THE CHEBRIKOV - GORBACHEV ALLIANCE 5 3 CONCLUSION 6 5 BIBLIOGRAPHY WORKS CITED 68 PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT S This report has been prepared in fulfillment of a contract betwee n the RAND-UCLA Center for the Study of Soviet International Behavior an d the National Council for Soviet and East European Research . The autho r is indebted to both of these organizations for generous financial an d moral support . Sincere thanks also go to , Lilita Dzirkals and Te d Karasik, for their expert research assistance ; to Valerie Bernstein, to r her devoted secretarial services ; to Julia Azrael, for her help as a proofreader and editor ; and to Frank Fukuyama, Harry Gelman, and othe r colleagues who gave me the benefit of their critical comments an d suggestions on a draft version of the text .