Jan Zofka, Postsowjetischer Separatismus. Im Moldauischen

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Jan Zofka, Postsowjetischer Separatismus. Im Moldauischen 692 Book Reviews Jan micro-level of ethnic entrepreneurs, theirZofka, Postsowjetischer Separatismus. Die pro-russländischen Bewegungen motives, discourses, and strategies. Some- im moldauischen Dnjestr-Tal und auf what misleadingly, Zofka uses the term der Krim 1989-1995, Göttingen: Wall- ‘political opportunity structures’ here, but stein Verlag, 2015 (Moderne europäische his objective is not to make the case studies Geschichte 10), 437 pp., ISBN 978-3-8353- comparable (and to isolate key factors) but 1634-8, 39,90 € rather to underline the impact of the pro- cess itself and contingent factors. The com- What happened to Jan Zofka is the worst parison between Crimea and Pridnestrov’e nightmare of any historian or political sci- proves the futility of a comparative study entist: just as you are about to finish your of root causes. All obvious factors (history, PhD thesis, your object of study suddenly economic crisis, ethnicity, homeland, etc.) reinvents itself, effectively falsifying the would have predicted a violent and suc- main conclusions of your analysis. Zofka’s cessful secessionist movement in Crimean dissertation on post-Soviet separatism on Sevastopol’ and a meek copy in Tiraspol’, the left bank of the Dniester River in Mol- Transnistria’s capital. Referring to the cur- dova and on the Crimean peninsula, sub- rent Ukrainian crisis, the author points out mitted at the University of Leipzig in 2013, that despite the overbearing geopolitical argues that Crimea (unlike Pridnestrov’e/ manoeuvring by Moscow, local ethnic en- Transnistria) had never experienced a pow- trepreneurs are much more than puppets of erful, violent secessionist movement. Alas, the Russians. In sum, the first chapter is an Vladimir Putin decided otherwise in early excellent, stand-alone, and concise rethink- 2014. Zofka’s decision not to wholly rewrite ing of multidisciplinary nationalism stud- his thesis for its adaptation as a book in ies since the classics of Benedict Anderson, 2015 is understandable in more than one re- Rogers Brubaker, and Donald Horowitz. spect. He has focused on the process of mo- There are few, to say the least, Western bilization and framing in the early stages of historians or political scientists who have postcommunism rather than the root causes published more than once (in English, or outcomes of this process. Paradoxically, German, or French) on Moldova. Select- Crimea’s secession from Ukraine even adds ing only those who have dealt with the credence to his claim that it is impossible Dniester conflict in their studies reduces to define a set of criteria that would predict this group to a mere handful. Immediately the success of mass mobilization and seces- conspicuous, therefore, are Zofka’s omis- sionist agendas. sions of works such as Stefan Ihrig’s Wer The book’s first chapter offers a com- sind die Moldawier? (2008) or the ‘Moldova: mendable discussion of older studies of The Forgotten Republic’ special issue of the national conflicts and separatism, and Nationalities Papers of the same year. More makes short shift of their unremitting importantly, he has overlooked a key argu- quest to define independent variables as ment as far as the local activists, the key root causes of ethnic conflict. Following players of his study, are concerned. He ar- Brubaker and others, Zofka warns against gues that it is much easier to make a case ‘group-ness’, the assumption that conflict is for Crimea as a historical entity than for predetermined by national identity. As he Pridnestrov’e, even though local historians states convincingly (albeit somewhat insist- in Tiraspol’ have tried, against all odds, to ently) in this theoretical chapter, most lit- construct an uninterrupted historical narra- erature in the field ignores the agency of the tive from ‘primordial society to our days’. Book Reviews 693 He also points out that Crimea had been an Rybnica, Bălți, and Chișinău) were mobi- administrative territorial unit throughout lized by managers and the workers’ collec- the Soviet era, whereas the Moldavian Au- tives, the United Work Collective Councils tonomous Republic (1924-1940) was short- (Ob’edinennyy Sovet trudovykh kollektivov, lived and only partially coincided with the OSTK). Following these processes of fram- current Pridnestrovian Moldovan Repub- ing and mobilization reveals the individual lic. Scholars such as Brubaker and Yuri ‘entrepreneurs’ at work and fleshes out Slezkine have indeed underlined the im- their biographies, and also their economic portance of previous recognized territorial- motives. The dichotomies and dynamics of ities. What is missing in Zofka’s argument the escalation was, as it turns out, consider- is the special position of Russian-speaking ably more complicated than simply a mani- ‘Pridnestrovians’ as a nomenklatura net- festation of a rural-urban divide, or a split work. These functionaries had started their between Russian speakers and Moldovans professional careers in economic manage- championing reunification with Romania, ment, culture, politics, or administration in etc. Correspondingly, the strategies and Tiraspol’ in the 1930s and took over most discourses used to mobilize and enrage of the nomenklatura positions in Chișinău the constituencies varied. after the Second World War. In the capital Similar complexities come to the fore in of the new Moldavian SSR everyone knew the case of Crimea, though here the com- who was a Bessarabian and who was a ‘left- petition is between individual managers, banker’. This dichotomy’s consolidation industrial branches, or major cities rather in subsequent decades meant that the left- than between nationalities. Zofka manages bank nomenklatura of the Moldavian SSR to make the arcane adventures of separa- possessed the high expectations of an im- tism readable and concise, populated as perial elite. Michael Bruchis, Ronald Hill, they were by varied short-lived local or- and I long ago identified this non-territo- ganizations made up of environmental rial corporate identity as a potent factor. activists, afgancy (Afghanistan war veter- The two substantial case studies on these ans), and Memorial anti-Stalinists. In stark two movements, of about one hundred and contrast to typical narratives taken up with fifty pages each, surpass in detail and in- clashes of civilizations, geostrategic inter- sight what had previously been written ests, and ‘nations’, Zofka’s book makes in- on each of these two conflict zones. The dividual actors and specific groups come case studies are based on a broad range of to life in his (collective) biographies. In the local newspapers, interviews, and archi- end, the ‘plea for an actor-centred perspec- val documents. In retrospect the two case tive on intrastate territorial conflicts’ (408) studies have an asymmetrical relationship. may be somewhat overstated as a counter- Zofka’s foremost ambition is to understand weight to the traditional and flawed macro- the dynamics of separatism on the Crimean perspective that takes ethnicity for granted peninsula. Pridnestrov’e is a contrasting and does so largely without considering case based on interviews and newspaper agency. Zofka unsettles the field of conflict articles, but not on archival material. The studies by arguing convincingly that ‘intra- in-depth analysis confirms that the initial state territorial conflicts are processes and mobilization was not an ethnic one (or an not predictable cases’ (409). Reconstructing internationalist, Soviet one). On both banks the inner workings of a domestic conflictin of the Dniester River the workers in the hindsight may be good enough for a histo- large industrial companies (in Tiraspol’, rian, but policymakers and political scien- 694 Book Reviews tists court as a stage for addressing his Serbian are bound to continue their quests for root audience. causes and unequivocal remedies. For this Several authors address their frustrationvery reason, the book is a must-read for all with the termination of the trial before thethree constituencies—fellow historians, policymakers, judgement(s), dealing with the ‘Rule 98 bis and conflict analysts. Decision on the Motion for Judgement of Wim Acquittal’, in an attempt to determine the van Meurs (Nijmegen/Kleve) extent to which this legal decision may be reliable or usable in the historical evalua- Timothy William Waters, ed, The Miloše- tion of Milošević’s criminal guilt and his- vić Trial. An Autopsy , Oxford: Oxford torical role. Jens Meierhenrich sees the University Press, 2014, 696 pp., ISBN motion as a tool to reestablish authority in 978-0-1997-9584-0, £100 .00 the courtroom (324), while Timothy Waters points out the structural insufficiencies of This edited volume is a comprehensive the interim document itself and its inabil- collection of well-researched articles by ity to contribute to an ‘authoritative nar- some of the most important scholars in the rative’ of the past (315). Christian Axboe field of transitional justice. The subtitle’s Nielsen compares the motion with final ‘autopsy’ metaphor governs the book’s judgments in related cases, looks at how arrangement: the chapters are divided ac- evidence was evaluated by other chambers, cording to a chronology of sickness (assess- and speculates about potential consequenc- ment of vital signs), causes of death, report es this might have for the Milošević case. of the demise, reanimation, even biopsy. Florence Hartmann, adding to this discus- With seven parts, thirty-four articles, and sion, reviews the prosecution’s charges in a timeline
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