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Oecd Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
OECD SECRETARY-GENERAL TAX REPORT TO G20 FINANCE MINISTERS AND CENTRAL BANK GOVERNORS Saudi Arabia July 2020 For more information: [email protected] www.oecd.org/tax @OECDtax | 1 OECD Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors Saudi Arabia July 2020 PUBE 2 | This document and any map included herein are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area. This work is published under the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official views of OECD member countries. Please cite this report as: OECD (2020), OECD Secretary-General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors – July 2020, OECD, Paris. www.oecd.org/tax/oecd-secretary-general-tax-report-g20-finance-ministers-july-2020.pdf Note by Turkey The information in this document with reference to “Cyprus” relates to the southern part of the Island. There is no single authority representing both Turkish and Greek Cypriot people on the Island. Turkey recognises the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). Until a lasting and equitable solution is found within the context of the United Nations, Turkey shall preserve its position concerning the “Cyprus issue”. Note by all the European Union Member States of the OECD and the European Union The Republic of Cyprus is recognised by all members of the United Nations with the exception of Turkey. The information in this document relates to the area under the effective control of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus. -
GOAL Global Opportunity Asset Locator Outlook for 2021 Rotation
20 November 2020 | 5:46PM GMT GOAL: Global Opportunity Asset Locator Outlook for 2021: Rotation inoculation — remain pro-risk Christian Mueller-Glissmann, CFA +44(20)7774-1714 | christian.mueller- [email protected] Goldman Sachs International Alessio Rizzi n We are pro-risk for 2021 and expect the pro-cyclical rotation across and within +44(20)7552-3976 | [email protected] assets to continue, supported by a strong economic recovery from the COVID-19 Goldman Sachs International Cecilia Mariotti shock. With a favourable growth/inflation mix and still elevated equity risk premia +44(20)7552-0450 | [email protected] we are OW equities and UW bonds. With tighter credit spreads we are N credit Goldman Sachs International but still see opportunities to move down in quality. Over a 12m horizon we are Andrea Ferrario +44(20)7552-4353 | OW commodities (N for 3m), supported in particular by a bullish oil view. [email protected] Goldman Sachs International n While absolute equity valuations are high after the sharp recovery, they remain Peter Oppenheimer +44(20)7552-5782 | attractive vs. bonds. And equities should be able to digest a gradual increase in [email protected] bond yields better than fixed income as long as they come alongside better Goldman Sachs International David J. Kostin growth. We expect more rotation within equities – the leadership in regions, +1(212)902-6781 | [email protected] sectors and styles has been unusually defensive in the recovery. Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC Kathy Matsui n Our Risk Appetite Indicator (RAI) has turned positive, which alone is not a +81(3)6437-9950 | [email protected] Goldman Sachs Japan Co., Ltd. -
FROM the G7 to a D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’S Challenges
FROM THE G7 TO THE D-10 : STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC COOPERATION FOR TODAY’S CHALLENGES FROM THE G7 TO A D-10: Strengthening Democratic Cooperation for Today’s Challenges Ash Jain and Matthew Kroenig (United States) With Tobias Bunde (Germany), Sophia Gaston (United Kingdom), and Yuichi Hosoya (Japan) ATLANTIC COUNCIL A Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security The Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security works to develop sustainable, nonpartisan strategies to address the most important security challenges facing the United States and the world. The Center honors General Brent Scowcroft’s legacy of service and embodies his ethos of nonpartisan commitment to the cause of security, support for US leadership in cooperation with allies and partners, and dedication to the mentorship of the next generation of leaders. Democratic Order Initiative This report is a product of the Scowcroft Center’s Democratic Order Initiative, which is aimed at reenergizing American global leadership and strengthening cooperation among the world’s democracies in support of a rules-based democratic order. The authors would like to acknowledge Joel Kesselbrenner, Jeffrey Cimmino, Audrey Oien, and Paul Cormarie for their efforts and contributions to this report. This report is written and published in accordance with the Atlantic Council Policy on Intellectual Independence. The authors are solely responsible for its analysis and recommendations. The Atlantic Council and its donors do not determine, nor do they necessarily endorse or advocate for, any of this report’s conclusions. © 2021 The Atlantic Council of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Atlantic Council, except in the case of brief quotations in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. -
October 24–26, 2021 2
SCIENCE · INNOVATION · POLICIES WORLD HEALTH SUMMIT BERLIN, GERMANY & DIGITAL OCTOBER 24–26, 2021 2 “No-one is safe from COVID-19; “All countries have signed up to Universal no-one is safe until we are all Health Coverage by 2030. But we cannot safe from it. Even those who wait ten years. We need health systems conquer the virus within their that work, before we face an outbreak own borders remain prisoners of something more contagious than within these borders until it is COVID-19; more deadly; or both.” conquered everywhere.” ANTÓNIO GUTERRES Secretary-General, United Nations FRANK-WALTER STEINMEIER Federal President, Germany “We firmly believe that the “All pulling together—this must rights of women and girls be the hallmark of the European are not negotiable.” Health Union. I believe this can NATALIA KANEM be a test case for true global Executive Director, United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) health compact. The need for leadership is clear and I believe the European Union must as- sume this responsibility.” “The lesson is clear: a strong health URSULA VON DER LEYEN system is a resilient health system. Health President, European Commission systems and preparedness are not only “Governments of countries an investment in the future, they are the that are doing well during foundation of our response today.” the pandemic have not TEDROS ADHANOM GHEBREYESUS Director-General, World Health Organization (WHO) only shown political leader- ship, but also have listened “If we don’t address the concerns and to scientists and followed fears we will not do ourselves a favor. their recommendations.” In the end, it is about how technology SOUMYA SWAMINATHAN Chief Scientist, World Health can be advanced as well as how Organization (WHO) we can make healthcare more human.” BERND MONTAG President and CEO, Siemens Healthineers AG, Germany “The pandemic has brought to light the “Academic collabo ration is importance of digital technologies and in place and is really a how it can radically bridging partnership. -
D20- LTIC & Finance in Common Summit
D20- LTIC & Finance in Common Summit On the occasion of the Italian G20 Presidency Enrico Petrocelli, Head of International Institutional Relations, Cassa Depositi e Presti Cassa Depositi e Prestiti Investing in Tomorrow 2021 International events hosted by Italy Youth4Climate: Driving Ambition” Special event for young people 28-30 September, Milan PreCop26 Summit Preparatory Meeting 30 September-2 October, Milan This year Italy chairs the Group of Twenty for the first time since its inception. The COP26 led by UK in co-partnership with Italy will provide the The three keywords embody the overarching opportunity to reinforce a joint commitment in support of common priorities of the Italian G20 Presidency and these actions for climate and sustainable development are People, Planet and Prosperity 2 D20-Long Term Investors Club D20- Long Term Investors Club (D20-LTIC) What is the D20-LTIC? • Club that brings together 21 financial institutions and institutional investors from 4 continents • Founding Members: Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP), Caisse des dépôts et consignations (CDC, France), Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW, Germany), European Investments Bank (EIB) • Created to meet the demand for long-term investments in infrastructure (transport, TLC, energy and urbanization), innovation and environment in advanced and developing countries 4 D20- Long Term Investors Club (D20-LTIC) Club objectives • Improve the conditions for long-term investments for growth • Formulate policy recommendations addressed to international public institutions (G20) • Encourage the exchange of best practices and strengthen cooperation among Club members 5 D20-LTIC & G20 1 The Club's Agenda has progressively aligned itself with that of the G20 In 2019, LTIC was renamed «D20 Long-Term Investors Club» (D20-LTIC). -
G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance CIGI G20 Papers | No
G7 TO G8 TO G20: EVOLUTION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE CIGI G20 PAPERS | NO. 6, MAY 2011 Gordon S. Smith G7 TO G8 TO G20: EVOLUTION IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY Summary 3 This paper provides a brief history of the evolution of Acronyms 3 the Group of Seven (G7) from its origins in the aftermath of the 1971 breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance 4 exchange rates and the oil crisis in 1973. It then discusses Russia’s participation at summits after the fall of the Works Cited 8 Berlin Wall, formally joining the group in 1997, thus becoming the Group of Eight (G8). The paper gives a CIGI G20 Resources 9 concise account of the formation of the Group of Twenty About CIGI 10 (G20) finance ministers and central bank governors in the late 1990s, in the wake of financial crises in Asia and Latin America, which was elevated to a leaders’ summit forum at the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. The paper wraps up with a discussion of the differences in the G8 and G20 models, concluding that the G20 process is still the best option for meeting the challenges of complex global governance issues. ACRONYMS 3G Global Governance Group ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations AU African Union BMENA Afghanistan, the Broader Middle East and North Africa CFGS Centre for Global Studies G5 Group of Five G7 Group of Seven G8 Group of Eight G20 Group of Twenty IMF International Monetary Fund Copyright © 2011 The Centre for International Governance Innovation. -
G20/OECD Effective Approaches for Implementing the G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing
G20/OECD Effective Approaches for Implementing the G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing July 2018 At their Summit in Antalya in November 2015, G20 Leaders welcomed and agreed on the G20/OECD High-Level Principles on SME Financing, recognising the importance of improving SME access to finance. In their 2015 Antalya Action Plan (and in 2016), G20 Leaders expressed their intention to continue to work on identifying effective approaches to facilitate their implementation. G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors expressed support for the implementation of the Principles at their meetings in Shanghai on 27 February 2016, in Washington on 15 April 2016, and in Chengdu on 24 July 2016. This document contains the final report on Effective Approaches for Implementing the G20/OECD High Level Principles on SME Financing. It is transmitted to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors. The report has benefited from comments received from the OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship during its meetings in April 2017, October 2017 and April 2018, and from the G20/OECD Task Force on Institutional Investors and Long-Term Financing during its meetings in May 2017 and May 2018, and through written procedure in October 2017. Comments on Principle 7 were also received from the OECD International Network on Financial Education during its Technical Committee meeting in November 2017 and under written procedure in 2018. A draft final report was discussed during a joint meeting of the OECD Working Party on SMEs and Entrepreneurship and the G20/OECD Task Force on Institutional Investors and Long-Term Financing on 23 May 2018. -
Asia's Strategic Participation in the Group of 20 for Global Economic
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration Asia’s Strategic Participation in the Group of 20 for Global Economic Governance Reform: From the Perspective of International Trade Taeho Bark and Moonsung Kang No. 74 | February 2011 ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration Economic Governance Reform: From the Perspective of International Trade Taeho Bark+ and Moonsung Kang++ The original draft of this paper was prepared for the conference “Reshaping Global Economic Governance No. 74 February 2011 and the Role of Asia in G20,” organized by the Asian Development Bank and the Peterson Institute for International Economics, and supported by the Persidential Committee for the G20 Summit, Seoul, Replublic of Korea, 25–26 October 2010. The paper is funded by RDTA 7501 Asia’s Strategic Participation in the Group of Twenty for Global Economic Governance Reform. +Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea. thbark@ snu.ac.kr ++Professor, Division of International Studies, Korea University, Republic of Korea. [email protected]. The ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration focuses on topics relating to regional cooperation and integration in the areas of infrastructure and software, trade and investment, money and finance, and regional public goods. The Series is a quick-disseminating, informal publication that seeks to provide information, generate discussion, and elicit comments. Working papers published under this Series may subsequently be published elsewhere. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views and policies of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. -
The Group of Twenty (G20) : Setting the Global Agenda
Briefing January 2015 The Group of Twenty (G20) Setting the global agenda SUMMARY The Group of Twenty (G20) is an informal forum for international cooperation, and consists of 19 major economies plus the European Union. It gained in prominence in 2008 – when regular summits at the level of leaders commenced – taking on the role of 'global crisis management committee'. While the majority of observers argue that the G20 did remarkably well to contain the financial and economic crisis in 2008 and 2009, it has been less successful in finding consensus and making progress on its agenda since the urgency and immediate pressures diminished. The outcomes of recent summits have therefore been rather modest, if not disappointing. The gap between agreed commitments and their implementation varies across policy areas and member countries but, for many observers, threatens to undermine the G20's credibility. The assessment of G20 policies remains mixed as its achievements are often accompanied by stalled progress and failure to implement. However, there are limits as to what can be accomplished due to the G20's voluntary rather than legal character, and lack of a formal enforcement mechanism. The G20 and the EU have the potential to mutually advance their agendas. The EU is strongly represented in the G20 which, according to some, gives it some influence on the G20's agenda. At the same time G20 commitments have had substantial impact on Europe's reforms of its financial sector. The November 2014 Brisbane summit was hailed as a success by the leaders, whereas the view of commentators was more mixed. -
Japan's G20 Presidency for 2019
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS Japan’s G20 Presidency for 2019: Potential Agendas and Issues Masahiro Kawai Introduction Japan will assume the G20 presidency for 2019. For this, Japan intends to demonstrate its greater leadership in the G20 process on the basis of its efforts at, and contributions to, G20 Summits thus far. This is the first time Japan hosts the G20 Summit on Financial Markets and the Global Economy, which will be held in Osaka on 28-29, June 2019. This chapter reviews the potential agenda and issues that will be implemented by Japan on its 2019 G20 presidency.1 1. G20 Summit The G20 Summit is an annual meeting for the political leaders of Group of Twenty (G20) economies, i.e., Argentina, Australia, Brazil, PENSAMIENTO PROPIO 48 PENSAMIENTO 185 Japan’s G20 Presidency for 2019: Potential Agendas and Issues Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indo- nesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Rep. of, Mexico, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Several countries, such as Spain, Singapore and the African Union chair country, as well as major international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), are in- vited to the Summit. Other invited countries vary depending on the consideration of the G20 presidency. The G20 Leaders’ Summit was launched in November 2008 as a forum for the political leaders of major advanced and emerging economies to cope with the global financial crisis that had culminated following the Lehman shock. Nonetheless, there was a G20 process for finance ministers and central bank governors that had started in 1999; but in 2008 it was decided to upgrade this ministerial process to a leaders’ process.2 The G20 Summit was held twice a year in 2009 and 2010, and has been held annually since 2011. -
Explaining the BRICS Summit Solid, Strengthening Success1
Explaining the BRICS Summit Solid, Strengthening Success1 John J. Kirton John J. Kirton —Professor, co-director, BRICS Research Group, co-director, G20 Research Group, director, G8 Research Group, Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, 1 Devonshire Place, Room 209N, Toronto, Ontario M5S 3K7, Canada; E-mail: [email protected] Abstract The BRICS have emerged as a solid, increasingly comprehensive, cooperative success, both alone and within the G20, on behalf of all emerging countries, as demonstrated by its summit performance since its start on the margins of the G8’s Hokkaido Summit in 2008 through to its gathering at the G20’s Brisbane Summit in 2014. This success is due primarily to the failure of the other international institutions from the 1944–45 and 1975 generations to give the leading emerging powers an equal, effective place and thus to solve the new, compounding global financial crisis and other challenges arising since 2008. The BRICS is a plurilateral summit institution growing in its level, membership, agenda and interaction intensity, with its summit performance rising substantially across an increasing array of major dimensions of global summit governance. This performance has been driven somewhat by the global financial, economic and food shocks since 2008, but primarily by the failure of the multilateral organizations from the 1940s, the G8-plus process from 2003 to 2009 and the first two G20 summits to give the big emerging powers the equal role, rights, responsibilities and effective influence warranted by their rising relative capability and international openness and needed to solve the new challenges of an intensely interconnected world. -
Creating Compliance with G20 and G7 Climate Change Commitments Through Global, Regional and Local Actors
Creating Compliance with G20 and G7 Climate Change Commitments through Global, Regional and Local Actors John Kirton, Brittaney Warren and Jessica Rapson University of Toronto Paper prepared for the annual convention of the International Studies Association, April 7–10, 2021. Version of April 1. Key words (three tags): G20, G7, climate change Abstract The greatest global change, where the process of globalization is now complete, is climate change and the existential threats it brings. How do the central global governance institutions of the Group of Seven (G7) major democratic powers from the rich North and the Group of 20 (G20) systemically significant states, including countries of the emerging South, create and comply with commitments to control climate change, by working with key actors at the multilateral, regional, sub-national, local and civil society levels? Using data and previous findings from the Global Governance Program, this paper analyzes how the compliance of G7 and G20 members with their leaders’ summit climate change commitments is affected by invoking the International Monetary Fund and World Bank Group, by invoking the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, European Union, the United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement and the Asia- Pacific Economic Co-operation forum, and by invoking local actors such as sub-national states and provinces, cities, and business, as well as Indigenous Peoples. It identifies ways in which the involvement of such “local” actors can improve compliance, through their inclusion in the substance of G7/G20 commitments and through the civil society engagement groups that seek to shape those commitments. It recommends that, to improve compliance, G7 leaders make more climate change commitments, make more highly binding ones, focus them on the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s Glasgow Summit and link them to sustainable development.