North Star QRA Update Chlorine and VCM Plant (Rafnes)
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Working together for a safer world North Star QRA Update Chlorine and VCM plant (Rafnes) Report for: Wood Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Date: 11 January 2019 Document history Revision Date Description/changes Changes made by Draft 30.11.2018 First issue of report Andrea Risan / Ingebjørg Valkvæ / Stian Jensen Final 11.01.2019 Comments from client Andrea Risan / Ingebjørg Valkvæ incorporated Executive summary Lloyds Register (LR) has been engaged by Wood and INOVYN Norge to conduct an update of the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of the Chlorine and VCM plant at the Rafnes Industrial Site (Grenland, Norway) to accommodate any changes in the risk picture due to the North Star project. The North Star project includes implementation of several modifications to the facility which will increase the total production capacity with around 10 %. The QRA update is conducted by using the existing risk model of the facility and adding the events potentially caused by the planned modifications. A similar approach as applied in the existing QRA is applied in the risk assessment of the North Star modifications. In that manner the risk level before and after the modification can be compared. The risk acceptance criteria proposed by DSB are applied in the study. Hence, the focus in the study is directed towards major accident events that may cause fatal exposure outside of the boundary of the facility. The main conclusion of the study is that the North Star project only contributes with a modest risk increase to third parties, and that the main risk drivers remain unchanged after the update. It is still toxic releases of chlorine and HCl that dominates the risk picture, in addition to BLEVE events in the VCM storage area. The calculated risk picture is shown in the below figure. Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Page ii Date: 11 January 2019 ©Lloyd’s Register 2019 Glossary/abbreviations ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable AT The Norwegian Labour Inspection Authority (Arbeidstilsynet). A governmental agency under the Ministry of Labour, focused on occupational safety and health BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics DSB Norwegian Directorate for civil protection (Direktoratet for Samfunnssikkerhet og Beredskap) EDC Ethylene DiChloride, 1,2-dichloroethane ESD Emergency Shut Down EX Ex-equipment or explosive protected equipment, both electric and mechanical. FTM Forslag Til Modifikasjoner Hazardous substances Flammable, reactive, pressurised and explosive substances HAZID Hazard Identification Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Page iii Date: 11 January 2019 ©Lloyd’s Register 2019 HCl Hydrogen Chloride HTDC High Temperature Direct Chlorination IR Individual Risk LFL Lower Flammability Limit LNF Landbruk-, Natur- og Friluftsområde LOC Loss Of Containment OHCL Oxy HydroChlorination PSD Process Shut Down QRA Quantitative Risk Analysis RAC Risk Acceptance Criteria Safeti Safeti QRA software tool - A user-friendly, industry standard method for carrying out Quantitative Risk Assessments (QRA) of onshore process, chemical and petrochemical facilities. Developed by DNV-GL. Third party (3rd person) People outside the production plant that may be affected by its activities. (2nd person: People that are not directly related to the operation of the plant, but benefit from being close to the plant 1st person: People who are directly involved in the operations of the plant, i.e. the employees at the plant) VCM Vinyl Chloride Monomer Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Page iv Date: 11 January 2019 ©Lloyd’s Register 2019 Table of contents Page 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Background 1 1.2 Objective 1 1.3 Scope of work 1 1.4 Presumptions and limitations 1 1.4.1 Presumptions 1 1.4.2 Limitations 1 1.5 Regulations and standards 2 2 Framework 2 2.1 Methodology 2 2.2 Assumptions and input data 4 2.3 Acceptance criteria 4 3 System description 5 3.1 General description 5 3.2 Process description 5 3.2.1 Chlorine – INOVYN scope 5 3.2.2 VCM – Wood scope 6 3.3 North Star project 7 3.3.1 VCM plant modifications 7 3.3.2 Safety measures for the new HTDC module 8 3.3.3 Water curtain in the HTDC module 8 3.3.4 Chlorine plant modifications 9 3.4 Safety measures 9 3.4.1 Pressure monitoring and shutdown 9 3.4.2 Chlorine absorption system 9 3.4.3 Gas detection and emergency shutdown 9 3.4.4 Fire proofing of storage spheres 9 3.4.5 Emergency preparedness 9 4 Selection of hazardous events 9 4.1 Existing QRA 9 4.2 Scenarios for the new HTDC module 11 4.3 Scenarios for the new OHCL reactor 12 4.4 Risk screening of other North Star modifications 12 5 Frequency analysis 14 6 Consequence analysis 15 6.1 Event tree 15 6.2 Fatality criteria 16 6.3 Consequence modelling 16 7 Risk picture and risk evaluation 18 7.1 Total risk picture 18 Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Page v Date: 11 January 2019 ©Lloyd’s Register 2019 7.2 Risk from the chlorine plant 19 7.3 Risk from the VCM plant 21 7.4 Individual risk at nearest resident 24 8 Uncertainties 26 9 Potential conservatism in the QRA 26 9.1 Release durations and transient effects 26 9.2 Terrain effects 27 9.3 Release modelling 27 9.4 Event frequencies 27 9.5 BLEVE 27 9.6 Flash fire envelope 27 10 Conclusion and recommendations 28 10.1 Recommendations 28 10.2 Conclusions 28 11 References 29 Appendix A – Assumptions and input data Appendix B – Risk screening workshop – VCM plants Appendix C – Risk screening workshop – Chlorine plant Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Page vi Date: 11 January 2019 ©Lloyd’s Register 2019 1 Introduction 1.1 Background Lloyd’s Register (LR) has been engaged by Wood and INOVYN Norge to carry out an update of the quantitative risk assessment (QRA) for INOVYN’ s Chlorine and Vinyl Chloride Monomer (VCM) plant at the Rafnes Industrial Site (Rafnes) conducted in 2015 (Ref. /1/). The North Star project introduces several modifications to the Chlorine and VCM plant in order to increase the production capacity of the plant. The modifications include: • Installation of a new High Temperature Direct Chlorination (HTDC) module • Replacing the existing Oxy HydroChlorination (OHCL) reactor with a new one • Several other modifications to process vessels and equipment in the VCM plant to allow for the increased capacity • Installation of a new electrolyser in the chlorine plant • Replacement of the hydrogen compressor, chlorine compressor and chlorine cooler. INOVYN Norge is classified as a so called major accident facility according to “Storulykkeforskriften” (Ref. /9/). Hence, the facility is required by regulations to minimize the risk for major accidents. The QRA can be seen as part of the effort to reach this objective. 1.2 Objective The objective of the QRA update is to investigate the impact of the North Star project on the existing risk picture at INOVYN’s facility at Rafnes. The modifications will be assessed and included in the existing QRA of the facility. Potential risk drivers will be identified, and it will be evaluated if the project introduces significant change in the risk for third parties. The proposed risk acceptance criteria by DSB (Ref. /2/) are applied in the risk assessment. 1.3 Scope of work The scope of work involves using the risk model developed in the existing QRA of INOVYN’s facility at Rafnes as a starting point. The risk model is implemented using the Safeti software. Events introduced by the North Star project will be handled in a similar manner as in the existing QRA by using, e.g., the same event frequency references, fatality criteria and overall assumptions as a basis. The focus in the QRA is to address major accidental events that may influence the extent of risk zones (“hensynssoner” in Norwegian) around the facility. 1.4 Presumptions and limitations 1.4.1 Presumptions The following presumptions apply to the study: 1. Normal operation including regular shut down and maintenance and start up activities are the base of the QRA. 2. If risk reducing measures are disengaged during operation, it is a prerequisite that compensating measures are implemented so that the barrier’s function is kept. If compensating measures are not taken, the QRA is not valid. 1.4.2 Limitations The following limitations apply to the study: 1. Events while ship is at sea or mooring are not included 2. The ships on-board systems (tanks, pumps, piping) are not included Report no: PRJ11090011 Rev: Final Page 1 Date: 11 January 2019 ©Lloyd’s Register 2019 3. The tunnel with export pipelines to Herøya is not included. A separate risk assessment for the tunnel has been conducted, Ref. /3/ 4. Escalation effects have not been quantified. An escalation is defined as an initial event on the site, e.g. a fire that impairs other equipment containing flammable or toxic material on the same site. Thereby leading to a larger fire or more severe toxic effects. One exception is the inclusion of Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE) events in the QRA. A BLEVE can be considered as an escalated event, since a prerequisite for such a scenario to occur is long exposure time to relatively high heat loads, i.e. fire exposure. 5. Domino effects, e.g. events where fire and explosion triggers new release scenarios (or other effects) from equipment in adjacent facilities, have not been calculated specifically. Domino effects are discussed in the risk analysis from 1991 and 1998 (Ref. /4/ and /5/) and in the report "Vurdering av dominoeffekter mellom fabrikkanleggene på Borealis AS, Noretyl AS og Hydro Polymers AS i forbindelse oppdatering av Sikkerhetsrapporten for Hydro Polymers og Noretyl", Ref.