DISSONANT VOICES a Discourse Analysis of Turkish Language Media in Germany

Home , Mass media in Turkey, Samanyolu TV, Zaman (newspaper)

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

DISSONANT VOICES A Discourse Analysis of Turkish Language Media in Germany

Can Soysal

Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Culture and Society in partial fulfillment of the requirement for the Degree of Master of Arts

International Migration and Ethnic Relations

Malmö University January 2012

Supervisor: Anna Sofie Roald

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

Abstract

On the 50th anniversary of the labour recruitment agreement between Germany and Turkey, Turkish migrants in Germany continue to occupy a central position as the objects of the on-going public discussions on immigration and integration. This study explores, with a transnational perspective, how the discourses on migrant integration are formulated in the transnational Turkish language media in Germany, as well as, if and how those discourses differ from, comply with or resist the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany. To reach this aim, discourse analysis on empirical material consisting of 97 articles from the European editions of newspapers Zaman and Hürriyet, has been conducted within the theoretical perspective informed by the ideas of Michel Foucault. The study concludes that there are conflicting and overlapping discourses on integration manifested in the Turkish language media in Germany, which are in varying degrees resisting to and in conformity with the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany. The resistance and compliance occurs in a complex and transnational way, in the reflection of the political and ideological fault lines in Turkey.

Keywords: immigration, integration, media, discourse, Turkish, Germany, Zaman ,Hürriyet

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

Table of Contents

1. INTRODUCTION ...... 4 1.1. Aim of the Research, Research Questions, Delimitations ...... 5 2. BACKGROUND ...... 6 2.1. Turks in Germany ...... 6 2.2. Turkish Print Media in Germany ...... 9 2.3. Zaman and Hürriyet ...... 10 2.3.1. Zaman and Political Islam ...... 12 2.3.2. Hürriyet and Media Wars ...... 18 3. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY ...... 23 3.1. Theoretical Background ...... 23 3.1.1. Language and Reality: Modernism, Structuralism and Post-Structuralism ...... 23 3.1.2. The Power of Words: Discourse, Power, Knowledge, Ideology and Resistance .... 28 3.2. Methodology ...... 33 3.2.1. Discourse Analysis ...... 35 3.2.2. Research Design ...... 38 4. MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION ...... 41 5. DOMINANT DISCOURSE IN GERMANY ...... 44 6. ANALYSIS...... 51 6.1. Meaning of ‘Integration’ ...... 51 6.2. The Place of Religion ...... 55 6.3. Language ...... 59 6.4. Media Representation ...... 61 6.5. Political Participation ...... 64 6.6. Culture ...... 66 7. CONCLUSION...... 71 References ...... 75 Newspaper Articles ...... 79

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

1. INTRODUCTION

2011 marked the official celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the labour recruitment agreement between Turkey and Germany. Through most of the last 50 years immigrants in Germany , and Turks specifically, has been a central element of continuous discussions, struggles, plans , policies, measurements, restrictions , negotiations, identity and cultural formations, thus over half a century ,millions of Turkish immigrants in Germany became an important part of the contemporary history of Germany. Not only of Germany, with the transnational world they created, Turks in Germany have also had an important role in the contemporary history of Turkey.

While the second half of 2000s in Germany was marked with the proclamation of the ‘death of multiculturalism’, the record high sales of a controversial anti- immigrant book, the reveal of extreme-right violence and the growth of the far-right parties, it has also been the period that more Turks started to move to Turkey than the Turks coming to Germany. Many of those coming to Turkey were born in Germany. German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke out about this new trend and claimed that young Turks who received good education in Germany and have multi- lingual skills are utilizing the job opportunities in Turkey (04.10.2011).

In the shadow of the central position of migrants in contemporary histories of host societies and the recent anti-immigration movements, what is striking about the discussions on the topics like migration, immigrants or integration is that the voice of the people who are the topic of the discussions are usually absent in the discussions, and Germany is no exception for this. There is often a deliberate neglect of migrants’ transnational affiliations and ethnic media (Kosnick 2007:17). But of course the absence in the discussions in mainstream media does not mean that the Turks are not discussing these issues. Along with the varieties of print media, the rise of internet media and availability to more than 50 TV stations, including

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Turkish language TV stations specific to Europe besides the regular Turkish TV stations, creates a massive transnational space where ideas and counter-ideas are produced and shared on the issues related to migration, as those issues are central to the lives of Turkish migrants in Germany.

1.1. Aim of the Research, Research Questions

The aim of this research is to understand how discourses on migrant integration in Germany are formulated in the transnational Turkish language media in Germany, and, if and how the discourses differ from the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany. To reach this aim, the study will analyse, with a transnational perspective, articles from Turkish language newspapers that are prepared and printed in Germany, with the goal of identifying common themes of argumentations and comparing them with the arguments of the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany.

The following research questions are formulated to reach the aim of the study:

 What are the common themes of argumentation in Turkish language print media on the topic of migrant integration?  If and how do the discourses differ among Turkish language print media on the topic of migrant integration?  If and how do the discourses in Turkish language print media on migrant integration differ from the dominant discourse in Germany?

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

2. BACKGROUND

In order to be able to place the object of analysis in a broader socio-political contexts, under this section, a detailed background of Turkish migrants in Germany, the Turkish language press in Germany, the background information on Zaman, with a focus on transnational political Islam, and the background information on Hürriyet, with a focus on its place within the political struggles in Turkey, will be given.

2.1. Turks in Germany

While the year 2011 marked the official celebrations of the 50th anniversary of the labor recruitment agreement between Turkey and Germany, it has also been the year in which heated public debate was sparked by the arrest of a member of a neo-Nazi organization, which is accused of being responsible for the infamous “Döner Killings” that took place between 2000 and 2007, targeting 8 small business owners of Turkish origin , and by the possible links of German domestic intelligence service ,BfV (The Guardian ,15.11.2011).

Even though Turkish migration to Germany goes back centuries with Ottoman elites establishing trade relations and training at educational institutions, Turkish labour migration to Germany is commonly considered to have started with the bilateral labour recruitment agreement signed between Turkey and Germany in 1961 (Kosnick 2007:7; Mueller 2006:420).

After the World War II, the Federal Republic of Germany was experiencing a post- war economic boom and labor power became a scarce resource by the mid-1950s, a situation which was similar in other West European countries. This labour shortages was tried to be eliminated by recruiting temporary workers from Mediterranean countries and after the agreements with Italy(1955),Spain(1960) and Greece(1960), in 1961 Turkish and German governments concluded a labour recruitment agreement (Schönwälder, Ohliger&Triadafilopoulos 2003:168).The recruitment of so-called Gastarbeiter (guestworkers) was not only aimed to sustain the economic

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expansion but also to be a useful industrial “reserve army” that would keep labour union demands at bay (Kosnick 2007:7).

The first train full of Turkish workers arrived at Munich train station.Following the decision of the GDR in August 1961 on closing the all remaining border checkpoints and thus leaving the factories of West Berlin without employees1 as many of them were stuck on the Eastern side of the wall, when the newly opened Istanbul branch of the West German Federal Employment Office (Bundesanstalt für Arbeit or BFA) began to recruit workers, Berlin became a prime destination (ibid).

German employers seeking workers had to apply to the BFA and pay a fee, then the BFA selected suitable workers, tested their health condition and checked their police and political records2 (Kaya 2005:220). Even though in the early stages of the migration Turkish migrants were mainly young men with above average skills and education, in the second half of the 1960s the recruitment primarily consisted of rural workers (ibid).From 1961 until November 1973, when the recruitment process stopped by the German government due to oil crisis and related economic stagnation, more than 700.000 workers were recruited from Turkey, initially on short-term contracts that usually lasted 2 years (Kosnick 2007:8). The “rotation principle” (Rotationsprinzip), which was forcing the immigrant workers to return to Turkey after 2 years, was abandoned by the government in 1964 due to successful lobbying activities by the employers who realized that the principle was disrupting productivity (ibid).

1 After the USSR gave the authority of East Berlin to civilian government in 1955, in 1956 the GDR government restricted virtually all travels to the West. However with the absence of no physical barrier, measures such heavy penalties were ineffective. Until 1961 an estimated number of 3.5 million people ,which was about %20 of the whole GDR population, migrated to West Germany through West Berlin (Dawty 1989:122).On Saturday, 12 August 1961, the GDR State Council chairman Walter Ulbricht signed the order to close the border and erect a wall. At midnight, the East German army began to close the border and, by Sunday morning, 13 August, the border with West Berlin was closed (Burkhard 2011).

2 For a detailed story and photographs of the labour migration to Federal Republic of Germany see the book of Berger et al. 1975, A Seventh Man.

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After 1973, even though around 400.000 Turkish workers returned to Turkey, family reunions remained as a legal migration route for Turkish people since many workers decided to bring family members to Germany rather than returning to Turkey (ibid).Consequently the period 1973-1989 was characterized by a very large increase in the number (from 700.000 to 1.7 million) of Turks in Germany (Gülcicek 2006:5; Kaya 2005:220). This was followed by a wave of political migrants in the form of asylum-seekers, mostly Kurdish, due to instability and armed conflict in the south east region of Turkey, and by the mid-1990s the number of Turkish citizens Germany reached 2 million (Kaya 2005:220).

This number has been gradually falling since then as from 1994 on Turkish citizens started to acquire German citizenship in growing numbers, reaching from yearly 13.000 in 1993 to the peak number of 100.000 in 1999 (SBD, Federal Statistical Office 2011) . Since the beginning of 2000s the number of naturalization has been falling and to 26.000 in 2010. Now just above 1.6 million Turkish citizens and in total around 3 million people with Turkish origin live in Germany, constituting around %4 of the German population (ibid). Even though there is no official statistics on the number of electors with Turkish origin, according to Sahilyol there were an estimated number of around 600.000 people with Turkish origin who voted in the elections in 2009 (2011:1).

Since 2009 there is a growing trend of returning to Turkey, mostly among young educated people, with yearly net emigration to Turkey numbering from 10.000 to 20.000. Recently German Chancellor Angela Merkel spoke out about this new trend and claimed that young Turks who received good education in Germany and have multi-lingual skills are utilizing the job opportunities in the growing economy on Turkey and Germany failed to provide good job opportunities for these people (euroaktiv.com.tr, 04.11.2011).

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2.2. Turkish Print Media in Germany

According to the president of Europe Turkish Journalist Union (ATGB) Gürsel Köksal, Turkish press in Europe has grown on two historical traditions (Köksal 2004). The first is the revolutionist newspapers that were produced, mostly in France and Britain, by the Young Turks in the end of 19th century, which later on constituted the political and intellectual basis in the establishment of the Republic and the modernist reforms (Akkaya 2006:58).The second tradition is the Turkish labour migration.

In the years following the arrival of the first Turkish guest-workers in Germany, major Turkish newspapers were brought from Turkey by plane, with a couple of days of delay. The first newspapers brought in this way were Hürriyet, Milliyet and Tercüman (ibid). This was followed by the first newspaper, Aksam, to have been printed in Munich in 1970 and later the other newspapers also started to be printed in Germany (Heinemann&Kamcili 2003:105). Thus, the Turkish newspapers passed through three stages : in the first stage they were brought by plane ; in the second stage the newspapers established offices in Germany and the news material from Germany was sent to Turkey, and the printed edition was brought again by plane to Germany; and in the last stage the news material were sent from Turkey and the newspapers were prepared in Germany as a mix of news from Turkey and Europe , printed in Germany and distributed in Europe 3(Akkaya 2006:72).

It is argued by Akkaya that seemingly low sales numbers of Turkish newspapers in Germany are partly due to the fact that since 1960s it has been common for one newspaper to be read by many, and the habit of newspaper sharing has been continuing in coffee houses, cafes, associations etc. (2006:59). On the other hand , the rise of internet media and availability to more than 50 TV4 stations including

3 Zaman has separate editions printed in different locations for the U.S.,Germany(Zaman Avrupa), Austria,Scandinavian countries, Netherlands,Benelux countries,Bulgaria,Romania and Macedonia.

4 There are both European editions of Turkish TV stations, such as EuroD (European edition of KanalD, which is owned by Dogan Media Group) , Samanyolu Avrupa ( European edition of

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Turkish language TV stations specific to Europe besides the regular Turkish TV stations, and the weak Turkish language skills of younger generations can also be counted as reasons that keeps sales numbers under pressure (Genel 2011:49).

2.3. Zaman and Hürriyet

This section will be a brief discussion on the transnational ideological and political movements in Turkey that Zaman and Hürriyet are affiliated with. Broadly speaking, it would not be wrong to say that while Zaman mostly represents the ideological standpoints of contemporary political Islam in general and views of Gülen Movement in particular, Hürriyet represents the standpoints of modernist ideology. To be able to better understand the discourses on integration of the Turkish language newspapers in Germany, it is necessary to at least have an introductory level familiarity with the Turkish political scenery. This necessity appears clearer when it is considered how an analysis of the contemporary Turkish politics cannot be complete without considering the Turkish political movements in Europe, for example, the Kurdish political movement, or the Milli Görüs movement, which the current governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) has its roots in. Both have been two important elements of the Turkish politics in the last 15 years.

Kosnick claims that there is often a deliberate neglect of migrants’ transnational affiliations in Western European integration discourses and ethnic media policies with the aim of encouraging local identifications, and Turkish case is not different (Kosnick 2007:17). However a bulk of studies on Turkish language media in Europe reveals the importance of cross-border ties and orientations that link migrants to people and institutions, conflicts and debates in Turkey (ibid).

Samanyolu TV , which is owned by Feza Media Group) , ATV Avrupa ; and TV stations which are established and producing all their content in Germany such as TD1, Kanal Avrupa, Düzgün TV, Dügün TV (Wedding TV) and SU TV .

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Before moving on to each newspaper in detail, to acquire an overview of the political and ideological fissures of the Turkish media landscape, Murat Somer’s study appears to be useful.

Somer’s study on the “elite values” as represented in the Turkish newspapers reveals interesting insight on how different the two newspapers, Zaman and Hürriyet, are. Somer applies content analysis to track the relative attention to, and different views and judgments in the three “religious-conservative”, including Zaman and two “pro- secular” newspapers with respect to 13 categories (electoral democracy, liberal democracy, social pluralism, political pluralism, secularism, human rights, the Islamic headscarf controversy, group identity and grievances, nationalism, modernization, market economy, the western world, and foreign news) between 1996 and 2004 (2010:560).

According to Somer’s analysis, both “religious” and “secular” press viewed liberal democracy as an insurance of themselves and their ideological interests. The idea that “liberal democracy is a means for Muslims to protect themselves through rights and freedoms” was approved in the religious press in %83 of all the times this idea was coded. Similarly, the idea of liberal democracy “as a system protecting and insuring universal rights and freedoms, secularism and the seculars” was approved %85 percent (Somer 2010:564).

However ,in his analysis Somer found that more than one third of the codings in religious newspapers about social pluralism was critical, thus he argues that the religious newspapers are more divided on, and on average considerably less open to, the expression and coexistence of different religious, cultural, philosophical, or sexual preferences in social life (2010:571).Another important difference that Somer found in his analysis, which is also relevant for my analysis, is about how the newspapers approach the question of national identity. The two types of newspapers gave similar weight to territorial base (Anatolia or Turkey) in defining national identity, however , “with respect to the importance of Islam versus Turkishness, the religious newspapers emphasized the former much more than the other”(ibid: 568).

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Even though European editions of both Zaman and Hürriyet features similar sections , such as news, politics, economics, family, health, culture, columnists, there are two sections that differs in Zaman and Hürriyet : while Hürriyet features a paparazzi section Zaman features a section called “Kürsü (Pulpit)” where articles of Fettullah Gülen, who is the leader of Gülen Movement, is published.

2.3.1. Zaman and Political Islam Zaman Zaman is the flagship newspaper under Feza Gazetecilik (Feza Media Group), a news corporation that started operating in 1986, which now produces Turkey’s most circulated news daily ,Zaman5.

According to Zaman, in their newspaper “news and comments are clearly separated. Zaman is against discrimination on the basis of race,religion,language and gender. It embraces the acquisitions of democratic, secular Turkish Republic. It advocates human rights and freedoms” (22.03.2011).

According to a founding journalist at Feza Media, the motivation to start a newspaper was to “correct fake news….Journalists [in Turkey] were totally leftist, atheist people…so, there were aspirations to do something about this” (Hendrik

5 According to the distributor company YAYSAT , Zaman has a weekly circulation of 977.000 and Hürriyet has 422.000 in Turkey( YAYSAT,2011).The circulation of Zaman has increased from around 100.000 in the mid 1990s to almost a million in 15 years. However there has been a continuing debate about these numbers: Zaman is sold only 20.000 in stores but 956.000 copies are distributed as subscription, while the other newspapers are only sold in stores. It is not uncommon to find free copies of Zaman at the doorsteps in the mornings, thus it is widely argued that the subscriptions were financed by the members of Gülen Movement, and distributed to Gülen affiliated dorms, schools, businesses but also in the last years to public organizations and police stations (Arioglu 2008:194; Kaya&Cakmur 2010:537). Zaman and the government repeatedly rejected the accusations. Zaman claims that they are controlled by independent auditors and there are no free copies given out, and the government claims that public institutions purchase various publications in accordance with the law.

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2011:44). In the mid-1990s, at Fettullah Gülen’s request, a handful of young men, who met at a Gülen Movement dorm in Istanbul in the early 1990s, attended journalism school in the U.S.A. to elevate Zaman’s journalism to “global standards” and upon their return in 2001, Zaman underwent what one interviewee in Hendrik’s study described as a ‘rebirth’ (ibid). Now in their mid-forties, these men are executives at Feza Media, and are considered by inner-circles to be the architects of the Gülen Movement’s renovated presentation (ibid). The English language Today’s Zaman ,the European edition Zaman Avrupa (Europe) ,which is one of the publications that this study uses as analysis material, and the other editions for different countries and regions are the direct products of the above described process of change that Gülen affiliated media has undergone.

Zaman Avrupa, although started as a single European edition printed in Germany, now has 7 sub editions printed in 7 different locations: Zaman Europe for Germany, Zaman Scandinavia, Zaman England, Zaman Benelux, Zaman France, Zaman Austria, Zaman Switzerland. Thus although European edition of Zaman has divided into 7 parts, the main part, Zaman Europe has been focusing mainly on the news of Germany.

Transnational Political Islam

Since 2002, Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi) which is led by Tayyip Erdogan is governing Turkey. When the party won the elections in 2002, it was a new and untested party. However the leading cadre of the party and Erdogan was well known, as Erdogan was the mayor of Istanbul from the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi) and the leading cadre consisted of well-known figures of the Welfare Party and of the Milli Görüs movement.

Welfare party was from a tradition of religiously oriented conservative parties which were led by Necmettin Erbakan. In 1987, he established the Welfare Party along the same line as the two former parties he led, which were closed down by the military interventions of 1971 and 1982. Erbakan described his parties’ ideology as one with a National Outlook (Milli Görüs), describing all the other parties as simply mimics

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of the West (Erbakan 1975 in Mecham 2004:342).Major themes of Welfare Party's campaigns included the importance of social justice, Turkey's exploitation by the West, religious freedom, creation of an interest-free6 “Islamic economy” and denunciations of an “imperialist Zionist system” that threatened Turkey's national independence (Mecham 2004:342).

The leading politicians who established the AKP in 2001, were the reformist wing in the Welfare Party and in the Virtue Party, which was established after the Constitutional Court ruled for the closure of Welfare Party in 1998 on the grounds of performing “actions against the principles of the secular Republic” (Mecham 2004:345).The new party made it clear early on that it would support a market economy and push for Turkey's admission into the European Union (Mecham 2004: 344).

The transnational Milli Görüs Movement, similar to Muslim Brotherhood, can be considered as a part of the Islamist movements in Europe, which, under the pressure from secular or authoritarian states in the Middle East and North Africa, fled to Europe in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s to escape the political repression they were subject to, reorganized among the immigrant population and created transnational ties (Boubekeur 2007:17). Following the closure of Necmettin Erbakan’s National Order Party in 1971, members of the Milli Görüs Movement organized themselves in Germany, with headquarters in Cologne, primarily as mosque organizations. Mosque played an important role in the community life of Turkish migrant workers who came with the first wave of immigration in the 1960s (Andrews 2011:516). Starting from Germany the movement grew to a European wide organization bringing together more than 30 associations and a network mosques and over 250.000 members in many European countries, possessing banks , businesses and media institutions (Boubekeur 2007: 25,26).

6 Islam forbids charging interest for a loan: “Those who consume interest cannot stand [on the Day of Resurrection] except as one stands who is being beaten by Satan into insanity. That is because they say, ‘Trade is [just] like interest.’ But God has permitted trade and has forbidden interest” (Quran 2:275-276).

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The transnational Milli Görüs’s network has become an important element on the economic transformation of Turkey and the struggle of religious conservative political movements, which carried Erdogan’s AKP to power. Extensive network of banks, businesses and charity organizations has financially supported the Anatolian bourgeoisie during 1980s and 1990s, which constituted the economic base for the success of AKP and Gülen Movement (Hendrick, 2009:350).

Hosgör identifies different waves of industrialization in the inner regions of Anatolia: in the initial stage in 1960s, the then governments had first channeled the remittances of the Turkish immigrants in Europe to village cooperatives (Hosgör 2011:344). Two developments in the 1980s created opportunities for a second wave of industrialization in Anatolia: The first was the growth of the Middle Eastern economies, and the second was the remittances of Turkish guest workers in Europe (Hosgör 2011:345). The savings were initially collected to finance religious and cultural services for migrant communities in Europe, and they were later directed in investments back in Turkey, both through Islamic interest free banks and through informal relations of kinship, since the market deregulation and export orientated neo-liberal economic policies created new opportunities for them (ibid). Thus, the migrant remittances constituted an important source of capital for the second wave of industrialization in Anatolia (ibid).

Unlike the central state sponsored economic elite in Istanbul, the new economical elite received no subsidies from Ankara, most of them framed their enterprises in accordance with their religious leanings, which led to their collective recognition as Turkey’s emergent ‘Islamic bourgeoisie’(Hendrick 2009:350). The political consciousness and the financial support of the Turkey’s “new capitalist” was central to Milli Görüs Movement’s success in 1990s and the success of the coalition of AKP and Gülen Movement in 2000s (Hendrik 2009:350; 2011:344).

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Gülen Movement

Fettullah Gülen was a state appointed imam in the western coastal city of Izmir during 1960s, where he attracted devoted students who were drawn to his unique ability to synthesize a religious identity within 20th century Turkish nationalism and by the late 1970s Gülen was attracting thousands to his sermons (Hendrik 2009:345).7

Contrary to Erbakan’s Milli Görüs Movement’s anti-system rhetoric, Gülen Movement tried to stay relatively close to the system during late 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s. For example in an article of Fettullah Gülen , named “The Last Outpost” (referring to the last remaining part of the Ottoman Empire, that is Anatolia),which was published in Gülen Movement’s periodical Sizinti (‘Trickle’), he complained about the conflicts during 1970s and praised army for the 1980 military coup (Gülen 1980).8

Hendrik clarifies this possibly confusing difference between Milli Görüs’s and Gülen Movement’s relationship with the Turkish State, by suggesting that Gramsci’s concept of “passive revolution”, which refers to the process of antithetical social groups moving patiently through the hierarchy of institutions that comprise the production centers of a society’s super-structure, is useful to understand the

7 After the 1980 military coup, Gülen’s followers turned the existing dormitories of the movement into private education institutions, so that military could not take the dormitories (Hendrik 2009:345).After the return to civilian rule, these institutions provided a model for the emergence of similar learning institutions throughout the country. In order to avoid state suppression, the curriculum at these schools was careful to follow the requirements in secular education. By the mid- 1990s, the Gülen Movement owned and managed schools in Russia, Southeast Asia, Africa, Australia, the USA, Western Europe, and Latin America.

8 “Against the colorful elusiveness of the stage, the hypnosis of the loud waltz and the eye-binding face of the costume, who detected the brutality and the real face of the game was the heroic guardians of the last outpost. This detection provided us with the regathering of our hope world and the understanding of ourselves...And now, in endless hope and joy, we see this resurrection of century of waiting that we take as sunrise, as a proof to the existence and future of the last outpost; we salute once again our soldiers who rescued us at the point where our hopes had been exhausted” (Gülen , 1980).

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relationship between the state and Gülen Movement (2009:344). However, after the memorandum of the army on 28 February 1997 about the protection of secularism, so-called “post-modern coup”, which resulted in the collapse of Necmettin Erbakan’s government, in 1999, Fettullah Gülen was charged with being the leader of an organization that aimed to destroy the Turkish state. The primary evidence was a video leaked to the press in which Gülen instructed his followers to “move in the arteries of the system, without anyone noticing your existence, until you reach all the power centers ...”9.Around the time the clip aired on Turkish TV stations, Gülen had flown to the USA for health reasons and he has been living in a remote residence in the state of Pennsylvania ever since. In 2006 he was acquitted of all charges against him.

In conclusion, the political struggles in Turkey can hardly be separated from the social and political processes of Turkish migrant population in Germany. It was through the transnational connections of Turkish immigrants in Europe that religiously oriented social and political movements could be free from the suppressive state control in Turkey , organize, accumulate capital and develop , establish global ties, and most importantly reformulate its discourse from a global perspective to include the notions of human rights, democracy etc. In return, the political struggles in Turkey and the rise of political Islam also shaped the Turkish immigrants’ lives in Europe and the way issues on migration and integration folded out in the last 15 years. This perspective is important when the integration discourse of Turkish language media in Germany is being analysed.

9 The full text is widely published online and video is available for viewing with English translation at YouTube: http://youtu.be/8DDq7o0FYXc

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2.3.2. Hürriyet and Media Wars

Hürriyet

Aydin Dogan’s purchase of the back then center-left newspaper Milliyet in 1979 marked the beginning of the change in media ownership in Turkey from “journalist families” to big corporations. With the help of neo-liberal economic policies ,during 1980s and 1990s, Dogan Inc. maintained a steady growth in horizontal, cross and vertical dimensions by buying seven other newspapers, such as Hürriyet in 1994 , producing 48 weekly and monthly magazines and operating news agencies, publishing centers ( also in Germany) radio stations and eight TV stations .Thus , Dogan Inc. became as the largest media group in Turkey, which also operates within various sectors ranging from finance and agriculture to energy

Hürriyet belongs to Dogan Inc. and is positioned as a center-right, ‘mainstream’ newspaper, which in the context of Turkey often also means nationalistic , especially in relation to the Kurdish issue (Özyürek 2006:197; Demir&Zeydanlioglu 2010:19; Bayindir 2007:156). In their studies on Hürriyet’s reportings about Kurds in Turkey and in Northern Iraq during the 1990s and 2000s ,Demir&Zeydanlioglu and Bayindir show that Hürriyet strictly followed the official state discourse on the issue ; in the periods that the Turkish state softened its approach , Hürriyet published several news series on problems of the region and interviews with the Kurdish people and the Kurdish politicians in the region, while in the periods when the armed conflict intensified and the State got harsher, especially in the second half of 1990s, Hürriyet stopped these kinds of reports and “reproduced state’s discourse of ‘first [end of] terror then reform’ by disregarding human rights violations in the region as topics of news reports” (Bayindir 2007:156). Hürriyet also followed the AKP government’s “Kurdish Opening” project in 2009, yet not without a degree of hesitation. However when the “Opening” project failed and violence intensified , Hürriyet did not closely follow the nationalistic turn of the Government and has

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often published opinion pieces criticizing the AKP’s pressure on Kurdish political movement and the KCK10 arrests.

In their study Demir&Zeydanlioglu concluded that Iraqi Kurds were overwhelmingly portrayed negatively in the reporting of Hürriyet, as in the news pieces they analysed the newspaper deployed an orientalist mode of binary representation in which Iraqi Kurds were considered as backward and enemy ‘others’(2010:19). Demir and Zeydanlioglu does not see the Hürriyet's deployment of orientalist discourses as separate from the modernization project of Turkey: “... the construction and representation of the dangerous, barbaric, tribal Kurd, contributes to the identity construction of the modern ‘European Turk’ “, thus , such an identity construction defines both the borders of ‘Europeanness’ and ‘Turkishness’ (ibid). Thus, their study suggests a positioning of Hürriyet within the modernist, Westernization ideology in Turkey.

The logo of the newspaper includes a Turkish flag, a portrait of Atatürk and the slogan “Turkey belongs to Turks”. According to the marketing leaflet of the newspaper, “democracy and laicism are core values of Hürriyet” (13-10-2011).11

Hürriyet is printed in six cities in Turkey and in Frankfurt, Germany. The European edition of Hürriyet is printed in Germany and it defines itself as “an important component of the European media landscape” which “appears seven days a week and reaches the Turkish community all over Europe with news from home and the region they live and work in”, thus,”...caters to the needs of the Turkish first, second and the younger third generation in Germany and other parts of Europe” .11

10 An alleged umbrella organization from which both armed (PKK) and political (BDP) wings are controlled with the aim of establishing a Kurdish State in the Southeast part of Turkey. At the beginning of October 2011 the numbers of detentions since April 2009 was given as 3,895 by BDP spokesman Bestas (06.10.2011).Most of them were members and politicians active in the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), including 13 mayors from the same party. Trade unionists, publishers, human rights defenders and academicians have also been among the detainees. The government declared the number of detainees as 485 (08.10.2011).

11 For the English language leaflet see http://www.hurriyet.de/documents/pdf/MD_2011_english_nr41.pdf , retrieved 13-10-2011

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Regarding the Turkey’s position and the Turkish migrants in Europe, Hürriyet claims that “the Turkish culture has been an integral component of the European culture for centuries and Hürriyet supports the full membership of Turkey in the EU. It therefore supports for the rights of the Turkish community in Europe and encourages their integration”.11

Media Wars

The appeal of AKP to big corporations and liberal intellectuals rested primarily on its pro-European stance. When AKP became government in 2002, TÜSiAD, the organization of big corporations based in Istanbul, which Dogan Inc. is a member , voicing the viewpoints of the big business and in quest of political and economical stability, did not withhold its sympathy and embraced AKP, yet not without suspicion (Kaya&Cakmur 2010: 531). The reason of the acceptance was that the party seemed to be only political actor with considerable popular support that can bring single-party rule, thus the economic stability, while being capable of complying with the “Copenhagen Criteria” and carrying forward integration to the EU (ibid).

The “flag-ship” of Turkish mainstream media, Hürriyet , seeing the formation of the AKP “as an antidote to the Islamists” and shrinking political center, often emphasized the fact that the new party described itself as “conservative-democrat” rather than as “Muslim Democrat” (ibid). Although AKP favored the development of a conservative capital of “Anatolian Tigers”, it had also to make concessions to big capital in general, especially to the members of TÜSiAD, thus the indirect consent of the mainstream media has paid off, and “AKP turned out to be the most successful privatizer of public companies” and Dogan Inc. was one of the main beneficiaries of these privatizations (ibid).

However over time the relations between the AKP and TÜSiAD turned sour due and the first confrontation came when in 2008, which was the year that the political tension increased because of a case of closure against the AKP by the Constitutional Court. Aydin Dogan alleged that the AKP government attempted to block a number

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of his company’s expansion projects, namely construction of an oil refinery on the Mediterranean coast and an addition to the Hilton hotel in Istanbul. The former project, Dogan alleged, was refused to him as Erdogan told him that the permission had been awarded to “our Calik” meaning the Calik Holding, a firm which was known to have connections to Gülen Movement’s schools ,Gülen-controlled media in Turkmenistan and to have economic relations with interest-free ‘Bank Asya’ of Gülen movement , in addition to the detail that the firm’s expanding media branch was led by Erdogan’s son-in-law (Hendrik 2011:43 ;Kaya&Cakmur 2010: 532). Dogan Group’s media outlets immediately began voicing criticisms against the government and in the course of events Dogan’s newspapers covered a court case in Germany that dissolved Light House (Deniz Feneri),an Islamic charity foundation, for the illegal transfer of funds to Turkey and reported its alleged connections with names close to the AKP (Hendrik 2011:43).The German court ruled against the ‘Light House Foundation’ and found the organization’s administrators guilty of funneling charity revenue to various corporate, media and political recipients back in Turkey (ibid).

Opposing comments of Tayyip Erdogan and Aydin Dogan quickly elevated to harsh threats of revealing each other’s dirty secrets and soon Erdogan publicly called for a boycot of Dogan Inc. publications with the accusation of biased reporting. Soon the tax authorities heavily fined the Dogan Inc., which was beyond the corporation’s market value, amounting to $ 3.7 billion, and prison sentences were demanded for Aydin Dogan and the editor-in-chief of Hürriyet, Ertugrul Özkök for alleged tax frauds (Kaya&Cakmur 2010:532). One of the accusations of tax fraud was about the sale of %25 of Dogan Inc. to the largest publishing company of Europe, the German Axel Springer, which is the publisher of German newspapers Bild and Die Welt and which is often criticised for obvious bias of its publications towards Israel. This case by itself illustrates the complexity of the transnational linkages.

Two newspapers, Calik Group’s Sabah and Gülen affiliated Zaman, were especially very critical of the fraud allegations about Light House Foundation and the Dogan Inc. media’s claim that there is political pressure on press in Turkey and the support

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Dogan Inc. received from international journalist associations (Hendrik 2011:44). For example, Bülent Keles commented as follows in the English language Today’s Zaman :

Had it adopted an impartial look of Turkey, it [the World Association of Newspapers] could have seen that what really threatens freedom of the press in Turkey are the military, the judiciary and influential groups that cooperate with them. I am sure [the Association] would then realize that the Dogan group’s newspapers and TV channels would lend unconditional support to all anti- democratic military interventions... ( 2009)

In the years following this event the relationship between Dogan Inc. and AKP seemed to have improved. The tax fraud case against Aydin Dogan and Hürriyet’s editor-in-chief Ertugrul Özkök has resulted partly in favour of Dogan Inc., Aydin Dogan stepped down from chairmanship of Dogan Inc., Ertugrul Özkök stepped down from his editor-in-chief position, Zaman is being distributed by YAYSAT which is the distribution company of Dogan Inc., the chief political consultant to Erdogan started to write opinion columns in the liberal-left Radikal newspaper of Dogan Inc. and in general the level of criticism in Dogan Inc. publications against the government have decreased.

However , Hendrik (2011) suggests that this “media war” illustrates that the debate in Turkey is not a simple contest between “Islam” and “secularism” as both “sides” in Turkey’s media war claim that the threat posed by the other is a threat to the continuation of Turkish democracy and they effectively use the same signifying codes (democracy, free speech, liberalism) and the same methods (specifically framed stories, over-reporting, under-reporting) to achieve the same goal: manufacturing public consent ; the effect is a deeply divided Turkish political public and a deeply confused international audience (44).

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3. THEORY AND METHODOLOGY

This study takes Michel Foucault’s approach on power-knowledge relationship as its general theoretical starting point. The ideas of Foucault on the relationship of power, knowledge and discourse make it possible to analyse and to understand the ways discourse on integration shapes in the Turkish language media in Germany. To be able to successfully position the research theoretically, first I will go into the historical and philosophical origins of the discourse analysis in general, and ideas of Michel Foucault in particular. Then I will discuss Foucault’s conceptual framework on discourse, institutional apparatus and power-knowledge, their relations with the concepts of ideology and resistance.

Discourse analysis as a general methodological approach is employed in the study. To start with, on the most elementary sense, discourse analysis can be defined as the close study of language in use (Taylor 2001). It rests on the assumption that language occupies primary role in understanding society. However to be able to discuss this better, and so to be able to position this study better, I will need to investigate how language came to be accepted as focus of analysis to explain social phenomena. And for this it is necessary to go back to the fundamental debates and review the key ontological and epistemological positions.

3.1. Theoretical Background

3.1.1. Language and Reality: Modernism, Structuralism and Post- Structuralism

Modernism

Central to the Enlightenment and Modernism lays the ‘reason’. Enlightenment ideology sees the world as constituted by natural laws. The objective and rational knowledge of the world can be discovered by reasoning and the humankind has the

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intellectual capacity to do that. The view on how the physical world exists and operates by the rational laws of nature is directly translated to the study of humankind and the society. Since the rational knowledge of the world is there to be discovered by intellectual reasoning, as opposed to traditional and irrational worldview which existed in the past, the objective knowledge is seen as cumulative. With the ideas of enlightenment philosophers, humankind is seen as moving beyond its primitive, egoist core and creating a social contract as the base of its society, which is to be the constituting base of the State. Thus the State represents the idea of progression that is established by the humankind who rationally created the state to provide better life and happiness for the collective society. In that way, the progressive modern social world is the product of rational human thought, rational human is the subject. This view replaced the divine subject, God; outside humankind by the divine subject of human which was capable of reasoning. It is by reasoning only that we can reach the objective truth that is the reality out there. The realist ontological position is at the center of modernism.

Glyn Williams explains the role of nation state in modernism. He, through the example of the ideas of Condorcet on political systems and social progress, unfolds a relationship with the modernist notions of reason, progress, the Nation, the State and the theory of social evolution. For him, in modernism, reason is rooted in the very nature of the State:

… As a consequence of this harnessing of reason by the State, humanity , living in accordance with the law proclaimed by the State, … , with legal rationality being the basis of the market economy in the construction of modern society. Superimposed upon the theory of evolution involving inevitable progress was the claim that the most recent form held to be the closest to perfection, which was the end phase of evolutionary progress. Other forms were treated as the antithesis of this perfection...The domination which derived from the equation of the State and the reason was exercised liberally, even though in an authoritarian way, addressing the freedom of the subject, but in a context where each submits to the interest of all...The whole was equated with the State itself, an abstract notion which was there to serve the interest of all ....The idea of progress was linked

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with the spirit of a people (Volkgeist) by Herder, a pupil of Leibniz. Thus reason and nation were linked much in the same way as was implied in the Durkheimian notion of national culture (Williams, 1999: 19).

Hence, modern nation state formation has the reason in its core, which Williams thinks disproves the usual tendency to create a distinction between the German inclination to see the nation as a community of destiny and the French way of seeing it as community of freedom and national sovereignty (Williams, 1999: 20).

The view of modernism on language is similar to the view on rationally constructed societal organization of state and the idea of progression. It is no coincidence that the modern state is extremely concerned about the language. At the practical level, it would not be wrong to say that modernism penetrated into the political realm through a form of language control. In France, Glyn Williams argues, instead of just extending the political right to various language groups living in state territory, one of the first productions of the Revolution was an elementary textbook to be used by all children living in France, to make sure that every citizen understood French, which was seen as the language of reason and democracy (Williams, 1999:22). Enlightenment view on the difference of humans from animals is the capacity of humans to reason and their ability to reason. Not every human use reason but all humans use language. Thus modernism separates language and mind, which brings along the idea that different languages might enable human mind to use the capacity to reason in different ways. With this logic, French Enlightenment philosopher Condorcet could place those humans who had a language that allows them to use their reason above those who did not in the drive for progress (Williams, 1999: 22).

In the modernist view, the knowledge is real, and it is out there. It already exists, waiting to be discovered, through rational reasoning, experiment and observation, as the objective truth. Language is only a reflection or expression of the objective truth, thus social knowledge exist prior to and independent from language.

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Structuralism and Post-Structuralism

This view was challenged by Ferdinand de Saussure in his work Course in General Linguistics (1916), a compilation of the Saussure’s lectures at the University of Geneva between the years 1906 and 1911, which is generally regarded as the starting point of Structuralism. Saussure challenged the idea that language is only a reflection or expression of the objective reality. He claimed that if the orthodox linguistic theories, which argued that meanings came from things which were ‘represented in words or meanings derived from universal ideas which were ‘expressed’ in words and given specific form by each speaker, were true, “words would have exact equivalents in meaning from one language to the next”(Saussure 1916, trans. 1974:116 in Macdonnel, 1986:9). However this was not true, the meanings vary from one language to another.

Saussure developed a theory of sign and signifier, where the term signified refers to the mental representation of the meaning, and the signifier, the psychological imprint of the sound (Williams 1999: 35). This separation brings profound changes with it, as it sees sign consisting of two parts, signifier and signified, none of which is directly related to the objective reality. The word ‘car’ is connected to the concept of car, not the physical object of car in real world which corresponds to that concept.

The ideas of Saussure influenced many thinkers, like Levi-Strauss and Lacan, and had revolutionary effect upon the general perspectives that meaning of a word resides external to the language and the human subject is the conscious source of the meaning.

Though leading post-structuralist like Althusser and Foucault did not try to directly integrate the work of Sassure into their perspective, post-structural thought shared the core idea that language exists prior to reality. The division between structuralism and post-structuralism is perhaps lying on the difference of orientation towards language and the subject (Henry 1990 in Willams 1999: 63). William suggests that while structuralism broke the idea that human subject is the source of meaning by presenting language as arbitrary and autonomous, it still retained the idea of human

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nature as a specific object and remained entrenched in the Enlightenment philosophy (1999: 63).

Post-structuralism questioned the way in which structuralism had assumed that although meaning was not guaranteed by an external world, it was nevertheless held in place by the consent of a speech community. As Gee (1993) puts it, ‘ a sign system operates not because it is inherently natural or valid, nor because it is universal, but simply because some people have engaged in the past and continue to engage in the present in a particular set of social practices that incorporate that sign system. The sign system is a social and historical tool in terms of which groups of people carry out their desires and claim and contest power. It is not a disinterested reflection of a historical and a social reality’ ( Pennycook 2002: 21).

Through the works of structuralist and post-structuralist thinkers, drawing on the ideas of Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Heidegger , Freud and others, the modernist assumption that social reality exist prior to and independent from language has been shaken in a great degree. Moreover, mostly through so called post-structuralist turn came the view to think of language as something that constructs reality. Thus rather than rational human subject guaranteeing meaning, our subjectivities are produced by it; we are not so much authors of the words as authored by them (Pennycook 2002:20).

It is surely beyond the scope of this study to make a detailed survey of post- structural thought and post-structural critique of modernism. However, it has seemed necessary to remember the basic discussions, to be able to provide the study a substantial basis and perspective.

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3.1.2. The Power of Words: Discourse, Power, Knowledge, Ideology and Resistance

Discourse

Foucault took the concept of discourse away from being purely a linguistic concept to entail a broader meaning which includes both language and practice. By discourse Foucault would mean “the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualizable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements” (1972:8), which defines and produces the objects of our knowledge, governs the ways that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and limits and restricts other ways of talking (Hall 2001:73).

According to Foucault discourse is productive in a specific historical context. It produces forms of knowledge, objects, subjects and practices of knowledge, which differed radically in different periods (Hall 2001:75). For example ‘madness’ is not a universal objective fact that has same meaning or definition in different times and cultures, but discursive construction which only has a meaning within a specific historical context and discursive formation, which was “constituted by all that was said ,in all the statements that named it, divided it up, described it, explained it, traced its development, indicated its various correlations, judged it, and possibly gave it speech by articulating , in its name, discourses that were to be taken as its own” (Foucault 1972:32). Thus only after a certain definition of ‘mental illness’ is produced, ‘madman’, as an appropriate subject, emerges. ‘Migration’ and ‘immigrant’ can also be thought in a similar way. Through the ‘knowledge of immigration /integration’, the subject of ‘immigrant’ is constituted , through all the statements that named him, described him, explained him, traced his development and categorized him (Foucault 1982).

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Power and Knowledge

In his analysis of power, Foucault rejects the classical notion of power as ‘capacity to act’. For him power is dispersed, decentralized and diffused throughout society: it may run through the prison or the mental asylum, or through different discourses such as psychiatry or sexuality (Newman 2005:51). Power constitutes the subject, and applies to the everyday life of individual, by categorizing him, marking him by his own individuality, attaching him his own identity, imposing a law of truth on him which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him (Foucault 1982:210 in Newman 2005:52).

Thus for Foucault, ‘power is everywhere...because it comes from everywhere’ (Foucault 1978:93).

Foucault focused on the relationship between power and knowledge. He argued that not only knowledge is always a form of power, but power is also implicate in the question of whether and in what circumstances knowledge is to be applied. He identified how power is put into operation within institutional apparatuses and its technologies (dispositif) (Hall 2001:76).

Foucault’s concept of apparatus includes diverse elements, such as;

… discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, morality, philanthropy, etc. … The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain co-ordinates of knowledge (Foucault 1980:194 in Hall 2001:76).

According to Agamben, Foucauldian concept of apparatus can be anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, or discourses of living beings (Agamben 2009:14). Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, confession, factories, disciplines, judicial measures, and so forth,…, but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, cigarettes, navigation, computers,

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cellular telephones and even the language itself can be considered as apparatus (ibid).

According to Foucault, there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault 1979:27).

Knowledge, as social sciences, and power relations constitute each other by shaping the social world into a form that is knowable and also governable, each being interdependent. Thus, according to Foucault, power can only be exercised over something that techniques of knowledge and procedures of discourse were capable of investing in (Simons 2006:190).

For Foucault, modern power disguises itself by presenting the truths of the human sciences as advances in objective knowledge about human beings. He denies that such progress occurs, arguing instead that certain forms of knowledge are replaced by others as discursive arrangements and power/knowledge regimes shift (Simons 2006:189).

Ideology

To see power as ‘subjectifying’ is a radical break from the conviction central to the politics of emancipation that there is a human essence whose interests are restricted by power. It is rather the opposite, the ‘human essence’ is constructed by power (Newman 2005:52).This is exactly the point where post-structuralist view of Foucault separates from the concept of ideology. Foucault is reluctant to use the concept of ideology on the ground that ideology in Marxism refers to a false consciousness which prevents the subject to see where his real interest is. As he explains in an interview:

The notion of ideology appears to me to be difficult to make use of, for three reasons. The first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else that is supposed to count as truth … The second drawback is that the

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concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in secondary positions relative to something that functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, and so on (Foucault 2001:118).

However, another view of ideology is possible where it does not stand for an illusion or a distortion of the truth. According to this view, rather than distorting the objective truth ideology operates through that truth. What it conceals is not the essential interests of the subject, but rather a particular position of power from which it is articulated (Newman 2005:64). Thus ideology does not conceal a ‘true objective reality’, what it conceals and covers is this non-existence, this lack of true reality.

In Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis theory, a fantasy is constituted around what Lacan calls ‘object petit a’, which is the illusion of having a true reality, a fullness (Newman 2005:64). The identity of the subject emerges in suspension between the lack of truth/reality, the symbolic reality - constituted by structures of representations - and the fantasy of fullness or having a real constitution. The ideology sustains the fantasy, and through this it conceals the lack of reality, the lack of real constitution of the subject.

One concrete example of this is given by Žižek: Nazi ideology operated at the figure of the Jew to be able to constitute a consistent identity.

‘The Jew’ is just the embodiment of a certain blockage - of the impossibility which prevents society from achieving its full identity as a closed, homogeneous totality … Society is not prevented from achieving its full identity because of the Jews: it is prevented by its own antagonistic nature, by its own immanent blockage, and it ‘projects’ this internal negativity onto the figure of the ‘Jew’ (Žižek 1989:127).

Thus the figure of ‘the Jew’ was used by the Nazi ideology to sustain the fantasy of a lost state of fullness. “Symbolization makes us believe that what was impossible was prohibited and thus can also be recaptured” (Stavrakakis 1999:52).The subject, the Nazi, is created around the lack of essence, the symbolic representations of Nazism (language, art, uniform, swastika, etc.), and the fantasy of harmonious, pure

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German race which is sustained by the Nazi ideology, for example by creating the figure the ‘the Jew’.

Resistance

If power is everywhere and it constitutes the subject wholly, as Foucault suggests, then how is resistance to power possible? Even though Foucault does not see resistance to power as impossible and he thought that resistance is possible when power pushes to its limits (1978:95). It is rather problematic how subject, who was constructed by power/knowledge, can resist to power in a way that such resistance, without verifying the power even more, results in the disappearance of its subjectification by the power.

Inspired by Lacan, we can say that, unlike Foucault’s claim that the subject is fully constituted by power, the subject cannot be fully constituted by power, and it is around this constitutional failure, this non-complete constitution or this void that the subject comes to emerge. The subject emerges in its not having been fully constituted by power, and this ‘failed construction’ is a reflection of the failed order of power. A complete construction of the subject is the impossibility.

Moreover, as Newman suggests, the very structure that determines the subject is itself indeterminate. Thus this leaves room for certain freedom or radical indeterminacy in the identity of the subject which makes resistance to power possible (Newman 2005:59).

In this study, I am committed to a notion of power which is incomplete in itself, and which, through the operations of ideology, discourse and knowledge, indeterminately and incompletely constitutes and controls the subject. This incompleteness, in the end, opens up the possibility of resistance.

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3.2. Methodology

3.2.1. Discourse Analysis

Discourse analysis is described by Taylor et al. as a set of methods and theories for investigating language in use and language in contexts which usually involves interpretation as the main analytic activity (2001:1).Discourse analysis is employed by various disciplines, through different traditions and approaches, and each approach certainly does not come with specific templates on how to conduct a research mostly due to its multidisciplinary character (Jörgensen& Philips 2000:9).

One common approach is conversation analysis where the researcher focuses on the language itself and tries to discover how it varies. Another common approach is socio-linguistics and corpus analysis where the analyst is more interested in the use of the language than the language itself.

A third broad approach, which is also employed in this study, is when researcher look for patterns in much larger social context to identify patterns in language and related practices and to show how these constitute aspects of society. Such an analysis draw attention to the social nature and historical origins of the world ‘out there’ which is generally taken for granted, and involves the power and resistance, contests and struggles (Taylor 2001:9). Among the sub-approaches, such as Critical Discourse Analysis or French Discourse Analysis, a common assumption is the all- enveloping nature of discourse as a fluid, shifting medium in which meaning is created and contested and where the language user is not a free agent but as one who is heavily constrained in her or his choice of language and action (ibid).

The discourse analysis studies which are conducted within this third approach are qualitative in nature. Resulting from the underlying social constructivist epistemological assumptions, the knowledge obtained by this kind of research is partial, situated and relative (for example to the discourse analyst’s world view and value system) (Taylor 2001:12).

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Taylor points out several critical issues about the discourse analysis and the epistemological tradition that most discourse analysts belong (ibid). Discourse analysis is criticized, often from positivist epistemological positions, for being short of representation, as the researcher cannot claim to offer ‘objective’ knowledge; and for being short of legitimation, as there are no well-established procedures for evaluating the knowledge obtained (ibid). Another common criticism, stemming from the interpretative character of discourse analysis, is that the identity of the researcher is influencing the results of the study, firstly throughout the selection of topic or the collection of data and secondly throughout the analysis and interpretation (ibid). These issues, which are mostly related to having different epistemological assumptions, are not rejected by discourse analysts, yet for the quality of the study Taylor suggests that the researchers should be “self-aware” of his or her not being outside of the social processes and constantly employ ‘reflexivity’ (2001:17,18).

As a qualitative method, nature of discourse analysis is relatively open-ended and iterative , in which the researcher looks for patterns in the data but is not sure what these will look like (Taylor 2001:38). As possible patterns emerge, the researcher employs some kind of sorting and categorizing, which has been conventionally called ‘coding’ (Taylor 2001:39). However the principle difference between discourse analyses and other data analyses is not this initial process of ‘coding’ but the use of theoretically informed analytical concepts; the discourse analyst searches for patterns in language in use, building on or referring back to the assumptions she or he is making about the nature of language, society and the interrelationships between them (ibid). The final presentation of the analysis is not a record of the process but a summary of selected findings, which are presented for a reader so the most interesting or complete patterns can be seen (ibid).

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Media Discourse Analysis

Media in general and news reports in particular constitute a specific type of discursive activity. As a very important element of mass communication, news reports can be seen among what Foucault describes as apparatus, always being inscribed in a play of power, but also always being linked to certain co-ordinates of knowledge (Foucault 1980:194 in Hall 2001:76). News are not only a very important element of discursive formation and communication, it is also an important component of the process of shaping the world into a specific form by the interplay of power and knowledge.

Then, how can we think of a more detailed account of the operations of power/knowledge? And how would these discursive operations be reflected on the realm of news reporting (and also news reading)?

In his study on news analysis, Van Dijk, presents a cognitive framework to understand the discourse structures in news reports. He suggests that a sentence in a news reports should be ‘coherent’ to be able to be understood by the readers/listeners, and he describes this aspect of discourse as ‘local/sequential coherence’. According to a simplified rule of coherence, sentence A is coherent with sentence B, if A refers to a situation or an event that is a possible (probable, necessary) condition of the situation or event referred to by B. For example the sentence “We went to beach yesterday. We did a lot of swimming” is a coherent one as we have the knowledge that beach enables you to swim. Thus coherence depends on our knowledge about the world and what is possible in the world (Van Dijk 1988:12).

It is necessary to note that knowledge here does not only correspond to only scientific knowledge. This knowledge can be the knowledge of mental illnesses, or knowledge of a supermarket, knowledge of beach or knowledge of immigrant integration. In any of them, the specific knowledge has to be there and a sentence can only be coherent, thus meaningful within that knowledge.

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Similarly, in Archeology of Knowledge Foucault argues that statement is the basic component of a discourse and statements are meaningful in their relational character, thus for a statement to exist it must be related to a whole adjacent field. One cannot say a sentence or transform it into a statement, unless a collateral space is brought into operation (1972:80, 99).

If we look more into the detailed of how the knowledge is organized, we can think that knowledge of the world is efficiently organized in special clusters, so called scripts (Schank&Abelson 1977 in Van Dijk 1988:13). People may have scripts about shopping in the supermarket, having a birthday party, a week of holiday on Ibiza, voting in an election, migrating to another country, or immigrants being integrated (ibid).News reporting heavily relies on these socially shared knowledge scripts, since both the journalist employ them when producing the report and the reader use them to be able to comprehend and make sense of the news report.

When a journalist writes a news report about an honor killing of an immigrant young woman, he constructs a model of the event by using the knowledge script he has in his mind. Thus social abstract knowledge scripts form the general representations used to interpret concrete incoming information, and each event or situation is represented in terms of a subjective model (Johnson - Laird 1983 in Van Dijk 1988:22). This model is organized around categories such as time, location, participants, action etc.

Berger and Luckman claims that it is not so much the real world that people act upon or speak about but rather their inter-subjective models of interpreted events and situations of the world (Berger&Luckman 1967 in Van Dijk 1988:22).

Eventually, a piece of news report is produced by a journalist based on his models and knowledge scripts and is read by the reader based on the reader’s models and scripts. Moreover, both the journalist and the reader have specific models of each other and also models of ‘news reporting’. In the end, the representation and reproduction of news events by journalists is not a direct or passive operation but

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rather a socially and ideologically controlled, joint set of constructions (Van Dijk 1988:29).

An important point in the analysis of media discourse is to identify patterns and thus try to put a frame around the discourse. In this study I am inspired by the media discourse analysis method suggested by Böke et al. ,who are considered a part of so- called Düsseldorf school of German discourse analysis, Diskurslinguistik (Spitzmüller&Warnke 2011:77).They suggest three levels of analysis for media discourse : word analysis, metaphor analysis and argument analysis (Böke et al. 2000:18-28 in Bauder 2008:102).While word and metaphor analysis attempt to unveil the political and cultural meanings embodied by particular words and terms, argument analysis, on the other hand examines particular ‘models of argumentation’ (Argumentationsmuster) and identifies ‘schemes of thought’ (Denkweisen) embedded in the examined text (Böke et al. 2000: 245 in ibid) . According to Böke et al. these thought schemes relate to a body of ‘collective knowledge’ (kollektives Wissen) shared among groups and communities (2000: 25 in Bauder 2008:110). Linguisticly these literary schemes, themes or motifs are called ‘topos’ (Bauder 2008:110).

Bauder, drawing upon the 16 common themes (or topoi) that Wengeler (2000) identified as framing the immigration discourse in 1970s in Germany, identifies 4 dominant topoi in his study on media discourses on new immigration law of Germany: economic, danger, cultural and humanitarian, where each topos is represented by reoccurring statements (Bauder 2008:111).

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3.2.2. Research Design

For the purpose of this study, I followed a similar path with Bauder. After reading and re-reading the texts, and coding them with keywords, I identified six common themes of argumentation, which frame the integration discourse of Turkish language media in Germany: - Meaning of Integration - The Role of Religion - Language - Media Representation - Political Participation - Culture

It is not a straight forward task to assign topoi to text , both because many texts are coded with multiple themes of argumentation and because the two sources I examined possess very different ideological and political background ,each laying on one side of a strong political fault line in Turkey. Thus their discourses on immigration and integration can hardly be seen as being independent from the political and ideological conflicts taking place in Turkey.

After identifying dominant models of argumentation about integration in newspaper texts, I compare and contrast them to the dominant integration discourse in Germany, to be able to determine in what degree and through which points Turkish language media in Germany performs resistance or acceptance in discursive form against the dominant integration discourse.

For this, I locate and define a dominant discourse on integration in Germany, based on the previous studies performed on this specific topic. It was necessary to do this before the analysis of the material as it is presumably around or against the dominant discourse in Germany that the discourse in Turkish language media shaped. The comparison of the discourses of the two newspapers and their respective positions to the dominant integration discourse in Germany was done under the analysis of the identified models of argumentation, where necessary, instead of a separate chapter.

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The material to be collected and analysed for the purpose of this study consists of texts (opinion columns, news reports, interviews etc.) that were published in the European /Germany editions of the two major Turkish newspapers, Hürriyet and Zaman, discussing the issue of immigrant integration one way or another.

Even though a detailed background about the Turkish language media in Germany, and about Hürriyet and Zaman in particular, is given in the background part of the study, it is necessary to note why these two newspapers have been chosen particularly as suitable for the purpose of this study. There are currently 5 Turkish newspapers publishing European edition directed at the Turkish immigrants living in different European countries, or ‘EuroTurks’ as they are often referred. Among those Zaman and Hürriyet are the two ones which have the highest sales: 29.000 and 35.000 respectively12. On the other hand, these two newspapers, which are partly prepared and printed in Germany, are distributed to many other European countries, as their total European weekly sales amount to 67.000 and 78.000 respectively. However, more importantly than the sales, these two newspapers are parts of two separate media group13 14, each group controlling more than one TV stations with Turkish content, broadcasting solely to Europe, and even more ,these media groups belong to two different political and ideological camps in Turkey15. Thus, these two newspapers are very influential and their different, mostly opposing political and ideological standpoints made them useful candidates for the comparing purpose of the study.

12 Official sales numbers retrieved on 13.11.2011, from IVW (Informationsgemeinschaft zur Feststellung der Verbreitung von Werbeträgern e.V.), German body providing information for determining the distribution of advertising media.

13 Zaman,Samanyolu TV,Samanyolu TV Euro,StvNews are unofficially controlled by Gülen Movement.For a detailed account of Fettullah Gulen and his movement :Ebaugh(2010); Ergene(2008); Yavuz&Esposito (2003)

14 Hurriyet, EuroD TV, EuroStar TV, DSmart, CNNTurk are officially controlled by Dogan Inc. (Holding) which is one of the biggest corporations in Turkey, though its power has diminished since Tayyip Erdogan became the Prime Minister in 2002.

15 For an overview of media wars between Dogan Holding and Gulen Movement in Turkey see : Hendrik,Joshua(2011),Media Wars and Gulen Factor in New Turkey,Middle East Report ,p. 40-46

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The time frame covered by the analysis ranges from 01.01.2011 and 25.12.2011. Both newspapers have electronic archives and relevant texts can be searched online. Unfortunately at the time the study was conducted, online archives of both newspapers did not function properly when a search was done for earlier dates. Both for this reason and also for the time considerations a time frame of one year was chosen.

The online archive of the two newspapers were searched using the Turkish keywords of “entegrasyon”(integration),”uyum” (adaptation/adjustment/harmony- Turkish word which is used for integration) and”göcmen” (immigrant). Besides this keyword search, a manual search for related text was also done for random 10 dates of every month, considering the possibility of related texts not involving any of the keywords or the possibility of a malfunctioning of the search engines.

The relevant texts were then coded and framed to be able to identify common models of argumentation. Excerpts from the texts are used through the analysis to represent the identified models of argumentation. All the texts which were originally in Turkish were translated by me. This study will be concerned with a limited range of empirical data, both in terms of time and variety. The study will limit itself with the analysis of the empirical data from two sources which are published in the year 2011. The empirical data choice is limited to characterize only the two most important political and ideological streams in Turkish media.

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4. MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION

During the twentieth century, a number of migrant receiver countries, such as the UK, Canada, and Australia, traversed the migration policy path from assimilationism, through forms of integrationism, to multiculturalism (McPherson 2010:550; Ager and Strang 2008: 174). However multiculturalism have been called into question following the attacks of 11 September 2001 and certain domestic events causing social unrest ,and the state of fear generated in the Western countries by these events has started heated debate about multiculturalism , especially related to the immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries (McPherson 2010:550; Ager and Strang 2008:174). Multiculturalism is often accused of fostering ethnic enclaves and cultural separatism which are represented as preventing social cohesion, thus the steering away from multicultiralism towards integrationism reflects a view that social cohesion is best achieved through greater levels of conformance by newcomers (Jakubowicz 2008; Ager and Strang 2008; Castles et al. 2002 in McPherson 2010: 550).

Integrationism is commonly represented as the middle road of migration policy (Vermeulen&Pennix 2000:3).It sits between the extremes of multiculturalism, which has been widely criticised for creating social problems and has recently been declared by leading politicians as a failed attempt16, and assimilationism, which attracts public distaste for its association with the eugenics policies of Nazi Germany (Markus et al. 2009: 39; McPherson 2010:550). To achieve the goal of social cohesion integration discourses are often concerned with the spheres of spacial distribution (such as preventing enclaves), language proficiency, cultural similarity (as referring to “core values”), religion (as preventing extremism), etc.

Concerns about integrationism’s roots in assimilationism are rejected through reference to integrationism’s more progressive character: its capacity to embrace

16 "And of course, the approach [to build] a multicultural [society] and to live side-by-side and to enjoy each other... has failed, utterly failed." (The German Chancellor Angela Merkel,16-10-2010)

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‘two-way’ approaches in contrast to the assimilation as the one-sided adaptation immigrants to the host society (Ager and Strang 2008:177 in McPherson 2010:547).

For example, the term ‘integration’ is defined by the EU as “a dynamic two-way process of mutual accommodation by all immigrants and residents of the European Union” (Common Basic Principles, Council of the European Union: 2004).

However the arguments that these terms get blurred in public discourse are often part of the conflicting debates (Muhe 2010:7). When specific standards of integration are being introduced by policy makers or scholars, certain cultural assumptions are often made with references to “the core values”17. For example, Lesthaeghe speaks of ‘core modern values’, such as individuality, secularization, and rationality and he assumes that these values represent the culture of the western host society and that those ethnic groups who accept more of them are better integrated (Lesthaeghe 2000:40;Yükleyen&Yurdakul 2011:66).However McPherson criticizes this by reminding that there is no similar imperative on the members of the host society to adhere to these “core” values, and thus the statement imposes a special and more restrictive model of social belonging for the migrants (2010:554).

Yükleyen and Yurdakul argues that in what is represented as the most “successful integration”, immigrant communities resemble the upper and middle classes of the migrant receiving society; whereas in “unsuccessful integration”, at the other end of the continuum, immigrant communities associate themselves with the lower classes, creating their own residential areas and institutions, strongly maintaining their own traditions and religious practices and working against the ‘common good’ of the society (Yükleyen&Yurdakul 2011:66).

17 One recent example of this very common practice is the speech of British Prime Minister :“Under the doctrine of state multiculturalism we had encouraged different cultures to live separate lives apart from each other and apart from mainstream.We had even tolerated these segregated communities behaving in ways that run completely counter to our values.” ( British Prime Minister David Cameron, 05-02-2011)

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Despite the definitional emphasis on the difference of integrationalism and assimilationalism, considering the public discourses and policy applications of integrationalism in various countries ,some scholars claim that the core concern of integrationalism is to achieve the point where immigrants become similar to the receiving country and adapt its “core” norms and values, and in that sense integration discourses are only superficially different from assimilation discourses ( Ehrkamp 2006:1673). Drawing on Foucault’s work (1970;1980), Ehrkamp claims that both integration and assimilation discourses may serve as practices of exclusion which sanction certain behaviors but not others, and she gives the example of ‘othering’ of transnational ties/practices of migrants by mainstream migration discourses (ibid).

Even though integrationalism’s roots in assimilationalism are rejected through reference to integrationalism’s capacity to embrace ‘two-way’ approaches, McPherson argues that this capacity is problematic as it “speaks of questions of strategy, rather than ideology”, since the ultimate goal of integration is the adaptation of local norms and values by the outsiders, thus the “facilitation of conformance”, even when it is about mutual understanding and cultural exchange (McPherson 2010:551).

The problem that McPherson urges us to pay attention here is that conformance- based migration discourses problematize outsiders against the dominant social and cultural structure and construct them as the problem to be fixed (McPherson 2010:552).

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5. DOMINANT DISCOURSE IN GERMANY

Even though the discourses on newcomers in Germany are varied and it is not possible to define a clear-cut discourse, in this section, drawing on the previous studies, I try to present a dominant discourse in Germany. To do this, firstly a historical overview is presented, which is then followed by a discussion of the key arguments of the dominant discourse in Germany, as they are identified by various scholars.

Germany has existed as a nation-state since 1871, when the military federation Norddeutscher Bund (Northern German Federation) became the core of the Deutsches Reich after other independent states (Bayern, Württemberg, Baden, Hessen) had joined the federation under a common Kaiser (Muhe 2010:9). The monarchy ended in 1918/19 with the end of World War I and the then proclaimed German Republic (Deutsche Reich) adopted a new constitution, which is also known as the Weimar Constitution (Weimarer Verfassung) (ibid). According to Muhe, what is perceived as an important factor of the downfall of the Weimarer Republik until today is that its too liberal nature reflected in the proportionate representation system created instability and in general it had been too open for all political powers – even the enemies of the republic and its constitution – which eventually led to the Hitler coming into power (ibid).

Bauder argues that discourse on immigrants in Germany has deep historical roots in the Romantic movement of the late eighteenth century, and a persistent attitude which defines German national identity in ethnic terms and excludes non-German immigrants from the imagined national community, can be seen throughout the imperial Wilhelmine era, the Weimar Republic, the Third Reich and the Federal Republic of Germany (Brubake 1992 in Bauder 2008:96). For example the German citizenship law has until 1999 been dominated by ius sanguinis (right of blood), that holds ethnic descent as the major factor for national belonging. According to Ruf, a specifically ethnic understanding of the nation has been an important factor of

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German development of national identity since the very beginning of the nation- building process as it has supported border-drawing and exclusionary processes, that culminated in extreme degradation of ‘non-ethnic Germans ’(Muhe 2010:8).

However throughout the history of German nation states, there has occasionally been need for foreign labour force, and given the ethnically defined, exclusionary national identity formation, the emphasis has been on the economic utility of non- German workers , which is a view prevailed during the 1960s, 1970s and the early 1980s. Two terms were typically used to refer to these migrants: ‘guest-workers’ (Gastarbeiter), reflecting the economic utility of the migrants; and ‘foreigners’ (Ausländer), expressing their non belonging (Bauder 2008:97). Starting from the beginning of the 1980s, however, this economic viewpoint declined in significance and the term ‘Ausländer’ was started to be used more frequently (Bauder 2008:97).

"Multiculturalism," the seeking of equal rights and recognition for ethnic, racial, religious, or sexually defined groups, is one of the most pervasive and controversial intellectual and political movements in contemporary Western democracies (Joppke 1996:449). According to Joppke, while with its insistence on equality and emancipation, multiculturalism is clearly a movement of the Left, in its defence of particularistic, mostly ascriptively defined group identities, multiculturalism also deviates from the universalist project of the Left (ibid). This double character of multiculturalism, Joppke thinks, also makes it possible to define multiculturalism both as modern and anti-modern (ibid).

In the political context of the 1990s, a shift towards multiculturalism occurred in German immigration discourse and the long-standing paradigm that Germany is a non immigrant country began to shake (Bauder 2008:98). Joppke analyses multiculturalism as an attempt to break the "us" versus "them" code in which Germans have traditionally defined themselves, as the “Volkisch conception of nation as a community of descent, which one cannot become a member of unless one already is one, is anachronistic in the multiethnic immigrant societies of today”

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(1996:468).In that sense, he sees multiculturalism in Germany as “first and foremost a debate among Germans about the meaning of Germanness” (1996:473).

Yet this shift towards multiculturalism was not without growing criticisms as Hell argues that, alongside this discourse shift, the view that Germany should remain a culturally homogeneous society, and that immigration threatens social cohesion and German identity, also existed in public discourse during the late 1990s (2005:77- 115).

Multiculturalism have been called into question following the 11 September 2001 event and a heated debate started about multiculturalism in Germany as well, especially related to the Muslim immigrants, and as a result , the religious identity of Turkish immigrants came to the front (McPherson 2010:550). For example while the idea for a new immigration law grew out of the changes in public discourse on immigration during the 1990s, the final outcome of the law was a product of the political debate and shifting public discourse away from multiculturalism that occurred between 2001 and 2004 (Bauder 2008:100).

Thränhardt criticizes multiculturalism of 1990s and argues that during the 1990s the discussions about multiculturalism reached it “zenith” with the intellectual supporters of multiculturalism (2002:358). He claims that the intellectual supporters of multiculturalism conceived the multikulti society “as a romantic destruction of the nation state”, which is something they thought was out-dated , “particularly in Germany with its holocaust past”, and they constructed cultures in a homogenizing way thus they bound the immigrants to their inherited culture (ibid).What he sees as a negative outcome of this cultural homogenization is the “logical outcome that the indigenous "culture" would also be conceived as homogeneous”, which left no room for inclusion (ibid).

With the changes in migration discourses in the beginning of 2000s and a new immigration law, the politics officially declared Germany as a country of immigration and, at the same time, pointed out the necessity to urgently design integration policies. During the 2000s, Germany has witnessed increasing levels of

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problematization of immigrants, especially Turkish migrants as the largest Muslim group and a growing integrationist discourse which is based on this problematization and which is also posited as the medicine for the problems.

In the studies of Muhe (2010),Münch (2009) , Erhkamp (2006) , Bauder (2008) and Mueller (2007) , some common themes of the dominant discourse in Germany comes affront : culture-Leitkultur, religion/Islam and parallel societies.

‘Integration’ has become the key political term within a wide variety of issues, and , as it is widely used in German political rhetoric, is regarded as an attempt by the majority to ‘integrate’ minorities into the already existing society and the ‘culture,’ which is also labeled as ‘Leitkultur’ (the leading culture) (Muhe 2010:5). The cultural topos occupies an important position in the dominant integration discourse in Germany.

The concept of Leitkultur was first introduced in 1998 by the German-Arab sociologist Bassam Tibi, to advocate a cultural pluralism based on some values of consensus. However what Thränhardt criticized as the negative outcome of cultural homogenization has occurred and the concept was quickly adapted by the critics of multiculturalism as the homogeneous culture of the majority. The public debate on Leitkultur, in a tone that demanded rules for adaptation of immigrants to values and ways of life of the majority, was started by Friedrich Merz, who was the chairman of the Christian Democrat parliamentary group in the Bundestag in 2000, and who perceived a “liberal, German leading culture” as an alternative to multiculturalism (Merz 2000; Muhe 2010:5). Freidrich Merz claimed in the turn of millennium that “It is imperative that they [foreigners] learn German and accept our conventions, customs, and habits'' (Merz 2000) and as Erhkamp argues, Merz's statement was indicative of contemporary political and public debates across Germany's political spectrum about immigration and citizenship that have made the integration of immigrants central themes (Ehrkamp 2006:1673). As Mueller explains, the Leitkultur, covering knowledge of the principal components of German culture, “ranging from Mozart to Schiller, though not necessarily Marx, was supposed to

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guide the integration of immigrant workers”, yet conservative politicians have never suggested German lower class to adopt the German Leitkultur (Mueller 2005:425,430).

The debate of Leitkultur, which has started in the beginning of 2000, was again heated up in the end of 2000s, especially with the influential book of German Social Democrat politician Thilo Sarrazin, “Deutschland schafft sich ab” ("Germany Abolishes Itself") 18 , which was sold over 1.5 million copies and Angela Merkel’s comment on the failure of multiculturalism.

The cultural topos of dominant integration discourse does not only demand the immigrants to follow a core culture, it also assigns a “culture” to the immigrants, which is characterized by its counter-Leitkultur position. Muhe argues that phenomenon which are supposedly specific to Muslims, such as forced marriages, anti-Semitism, fanatism or homophobia, are more or less continuously circulated within the German public sphere (Muhe 2010:5). Mueller claims that there is almost a media obsession with the Turkish family, depicted negatively with its supposedly ‘‘traditional,’’ ‘‘repressive,’’ and ‘‘collectivistic’’ character which cannot be reconciled with the individualism associated with the fragmented German nuclear family (2005:424). White even claims that “Germans have constructed integration in opposition to what they perceive to be ‘traditional' Turkish behavior’’ (White 1997: 759).

Another topos that is employed by dominant integration discourse in Germany is religion. Especially after 9/11 the debate on ‘immigrant integration’ to become a debate on ‘Muslim integration’, and this shift to Muslim integration has prioritised the religious identity of immigrants as an obstacle to integration

18 The book claims that Germany's immigrant Muslim population is reluctant to integrate. Sarrazin calculates that the population of Muslim immigrants may overwhelm the German population within a couple of generations, and that their intelligence is lower as well. The book was criticised and supported by many. One of the supporters, Matthias Matussek, wrote in Der Spiegel that Sarrazin’s “findings on the failed integration of Turkish and Arab immigrants are beyond any doubt”( Matussek ,2010 ).

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(Yükleyen&Yurdakul 2011:68). Specifically, it is widely argued that the Muslim faith cannot be reconciled with Western traditions and the values of German society, that Islam is an obstacle for the process of integration and that any public support for Muslim institutions would foster separatist tendencies and possibly fundamentalism (Yükleyen&Yurdakul 2011:68 ; Mueller 2005:422). For example ,these arguments are at the center of the debate on the demands of official recognition of Islam , similar to Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism , for which the state collect taxes and sponsors religious education ( Mueller 2005:422).

Another common topos in the dominant integration discourse in Germany is the argument of parallel societies. Integration discourse in public and political debates exhibit a distinct spatiality, as members of various parties in the German Bundestag associated a lack of integration with the existence of immigrant neighborhoods (Ehrkamp 2006:1680).

The idea of immigrant neighborhoods as opposite to integration and to social peace, find spatially concentrated living environments to be obstacles to immigrant adaptation. Hence, integration discourses promote particular notions of space and define desirable versus non-desirable A common media representation of “parallel configurations of space (ibid). society” (Der Spiegel,10/18/2010)

One example of this is an article published in Der Spiegel on the neighborhood of Neuköln, which is shown as an example of the so-called parallel societies. A short excerpt from the article demonstrates the argument of parallel societies, as well as arguments on religion and culture from the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany:

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The name of the [hairdressers] salon is German -- Goldene Finger (Golden Fingers) -- but the services it offers are listed in the window in Arabic and Turkish ... Diagonally across the street, Ris A, a restaurant specializing in grilled meats, advertises its poultry as "halal".... In an open kitchen in the corner, 72 chickens are being roasted over coals on a large rotating grate. Mehmet Özçelik's bakery, which sells sweet baklava; a Turkish Airlines travel agency; the supermarket run by Nazik Balabanoglu and her husband Ergin. For some, Sonnenallee is a colorful, quirky shopping street. Others refer to it derisively as the Gaza Strip...Neukölln, like a specimen under a microscope, is proof positive of something that is slowly dawning on the rest of the country: Islam, this mysterious religion, both fascinating and alarming, has gained a foothold in Germany...The area is the epitome of a troubled neighborhood. One in two residents are unemployed. The number of robberies and assaults has more than tripled since 1990... Muslim immigrants' traditional values are reinforced by media outlets controlled by their countries of origin. More than 40 Turkish-language stations are now available in Germany...(Pötzl, Der Spiegel ,04/16/2008)

In sum, drawing on the previous studies, common themes of a dominant, integrationist discourse on newcomers are demonstrated in this section. The integration discourse has established its dominance in a way that today it is ‘common sense’ to talk about an unaccomplished or even a failed process , which is identified as ‘integration’, of the supposedly homogeneously separate social group , which is defined as ‘immigrants’ (Miera 2007:4).

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6. ANALYSIS

Through the analysis of 97 news and opinion articles in the newspapers Zaman (55 texts) and Hürriyet (42 texts), I have identified six re-occurring categories of argumentation (topoi) which are employed in constructing a discourse on integration: Meaning of Integration, The Place of Religion, Language, Media Representation, Political Participation, and Culture. The first five of these topoi are common in both newspapers, even though the argumentations within these common themes, the points of references often differ from each other in the two newspapers. The last topos, culture, is not common in both newspapers. Cultural values, especially family values is a common topos in Zaman in relation to integration but it is not in Hürriyet. This does not mean there is no text about family in Hürriyet; however it means that those texts are not in relation to immigration and integration.

6.1. Meaning of ‘Integration’

Even though the word “integration” is already absorbed by Turkish language as “entegrasyon”, and the word is actively used in different areas such as technology, E.U. politics or business, in relation to ‘immigrant integration’, mostly another word is used: ‘uyum’. Both Zaman and Hürriyet prefers to use this concept in the texts related to ‘immigrant integration’. While the Turkish word “entegrasyon” is a direct adaptation of the word “integration”, the word “uyum”, which has meanings such as “harmony, accordance, congruity”, is preferred when the topic is related to migration.

The scholarly debate which is illustrated in section four about the concept of ‘integration’ is reflected in the two newspapers, Zaman and Hürriyet. Zaman employs a view similar to McPhersson’s and Ehrkamp’s claims that the concept of ‘integration’ is only superficially different from ‘assimilation’ and that both concepts are exclusionary (McPhersson 2010:551; Ehrkamp 2006:1673). Whereas in Hürriyet, arguments supporting the view that integrationism is a two-way approach in contrast to the assimilationism, which requires one-sided adaptation of immigrants to the host society, are reoccurring (Ager&Strang 2008:177).

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Among the analysed articles from Zaman, there were numerous opinion pieces dedicated to criticize the concept of ‘integration’, to equate ‘integration’ with ‘assimilation’ and to reject both. For example in one article Zaman columnist Ismail Kul defines Turks in Germany as “the victims of uyum policies” (13.06.2011), and in another opinion article called “Excluding by Concepts”, columnist Muhammed Mertek proposes the concept of “participation” to be employed instead of ‘uyum’:

There are many concepts used in Germany, discussions are done around them, but we do not so much calculate their area of effect outside their meanings. However, the concepts which are marketed with deep calculations and which are even institutionalized are not innocent as their meanings at all....For example why and for whom the concept of integration (uyum) is used? For the immigrant Turks who have been living in Germany for half a century. Then what is the message that it gives to German people:”There are foreigners/Muslims who at some year came to Germany as labour force. The culture they have, apart from not belonging to us, should develop more. These people have a responsibility of integrating us and to our values.”... As a result the group who has to fit [uymasi gereken] into German values is made ‘the other’ in a way... Yet, would it not be a more realistic approach if ‘participation’ (Partizipation) [katilimcilik] is emphasized instead of ‘uyum’? Because, while the concept of ‘uyum’ is found repulsive, there is acceptance in ‘participation’. German politics, instead of “I accept you as a human being with your own values. How and in what degree can you contribute to my society?” ,prefers an imposing style as “adapt to me, adopt my values”. (Mertek, Zaman, 28.01.2011)

Foucault claims that there is no power relation without the correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations (Foucault 1979:27). Following this, we can claim that the construction of the knowledge of ‘integration’ is a reflection of the power relations in Germany. Zaman’s discourse rejects the concept of ‘integration’, and

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attempts to construct its own knowledge by proposing a new concept of ‘participation’, thus attempts to negotiate the power configurations. Through the discursive strategy of equating ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’, and rejecting both, Zaman is resisting the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany.

When ‘integration (uyum)’ and ‘assimilation’ are coupled, it becomes easier to criticize and to dismantle. In one opinion article, the concept ‘integration’ is not used even a single time; instead ‘assimilation’ is used all through the text. Assimilation is accepted as a ‘natural wish’ of human groups for the others to be like them; however forceful assimilation is rejected:

The fact that Turks will not assimilate does not only stem from the difference of religion. At least these two factors also take part in it: 1.Today the migrations are not like 19th century. When somebody goes, he does not go forever....Even if he goes he keeps connected with the origin. Technical developments provided this. 2. The society, to which [migrants] assimilate in, should not want it. Even if it wants, it should not let the other side sense it. Hence, at the point that [the host] reveals [the intention] it will not happen. Because assimilation is about the most core values of the human being...At the moment that the intention [for assimilation] is sensed, he shows reaction, he takes defensive position. This does not mean that a human does not change...But this happens slowly, in time. Most importantly: this change happens as long as he does not feel a threat to his own being...The attempt to change the other person … even creates problems in relations of marriages: the idea that “first I marry him/her , then I pull him/her on the track” , usually does not work. (Kul, Zaman, 18.09.2011)

On the other hand, the concept of ‘uyum’, paradoxically, is also employed in Zaman’s discourse, though in a functionalist way. For example it is often argued that learning mother tongue first makes it easier for the child to learn German, and thus contribute to ‘uyum’, or that religion courses on Islam are the key to ‘uyum’, or that with a possible dual-citizenship right more Turks would acquire German citizenship and this would work positively towards ‘uyum’, or that not being accepted by majority is an obstacle for ‘uyum’ (Zaman, 28.02.2011; 03.06.2011). In one article it is made clear that what is being challenged is the concept of integration (uyum) as

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produced by the dominant discourse unilaterally, and if the content of the concept was possible to negotiate, which is demanded, and then it could also be employed by immigrants.

It would accelerate the ‘uyum’ in positive way to support that immigrants preserve their own values and be open all kinds of good cultural richness. In a realist view, the self-confidence of immigrants and thus a healthy ‘uyum’, can be achieved by developing their own values. Also, to say, “learning good Turkish and establishing schools with Turkish as the language of education would be obstacle to ‘uyum’ policies” is the mentality of dogmatization...For example Greece and Italy is applying this for long time with agreements. It is proven that this contributed to the education level and the integration of Greek immigrants. What should be discussed is the unilateral understanding of the concept of ‘uyum’ and it not being shaped by mutual discussions...” (Yilmaz Bulut, Zaman, 03.03.2011)

Articles which are openly challenging the concept of ‘integration’ produced by dominant discourse was absent in Hürriyet. However the conceptual separation of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ and the claim of ‘integrationalism’ being a two-way approach, suggests an implicit rejection of assimilationist approaches. One article which was reporting the comments of the State Minister of Germany on the meaning of ‘integration’ is illustrative:

The State Minister of German government who is responsible for migration and ‘uyum’, Maria Böhmer said “a successful integration is not synonym with assimilation. German government also never claimed this”... Böhmer said they always underline that no one has to give up his own cultural roots... (Hürriyet, 01.03.2011)

As this excerpt illustrates, Hürriyet shows an effort to emphasize a separation of the concepts of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’.

What is widely seen in Hürriyet is the notion of ‘Exemplary Turks’ for achieving successful ‘uyum’ (integration). Famous Turks in Germany such as actors, singers, politicians and of course football players are presented as achievers of successful ‘integration’. For example, a report from Berlin is given with the headline “Here is

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an Example of Uyum (Iste Uyum Örnegi)”, which is about a girls basketball team called "Kreuzberg Kaengurus”, that is established as a part of an integration project of an NGO (Hürriyet, 09.04.2011).Another article is an interview with Bahar Kizil, a pop music singer, in which she urges the people discussing about integration not to ignore persons like herself. “Those who say Turks cannot integrate should not ignore us...There are many people with Turkish background who are successful with their talent and intelligence...” she told the Hürriyet reporter (10.01.2011).

In another news article in Hürriyet, an article that has been written by Mesut Özdil, who is a football player of German national team, is summarized. It is reported that, Özdil presents himself as a mixture of cultures, by giving the example as “my discipline is typical German, my calmness is typical Turkish”, and concludes that his apparent hybridity is a result of him “not having any ‘uyum’ problems ever” (Hürriyet, 22.09.2011).

As the example illustrates, by presenting famous Turks as ‘integration example’, Hürriyet is taking the other migrant individuals as the target for action, a not yet achieved destination. By the construction of an ‘acceptable Turk’ model, which as a result brings out a model of ‘not yet acceptable Turk’, “the immigrant” is subjectified and problematized in the discourse of Hürriyet, similar to dominant integrationist discourse. This problematization carries the danger of exclusionary perspectives with a selective and more restricted model of belonging for the ‘not yet acceptable’ immigrants (McPhersson 2010:554).

6.2. The Role of Religion

The role of Religion is a common and re-occurring theme in the analysed text in both newspapers, yet the share of Zaman in the texts with religion topos was considerably higher than of Hürriyet19. However what is more important than the number of the texts is the difference in argumentation in the two newspapers.

19 Out of 19 texts with religion topos 13 of them were from Zaman.

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In the texts published by Zaman, ‘Islamophobia’ and the possible ways to deal with it has a heavy weight. ‘Islamophobia’ is seen as a harmful phenomenon for the interests of Turkish community. It is seen as a part of general exclusion and discrimination by the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany.

In one article, a recent research on the representation of Muslims in the German school books is reported with the head line “The othering of the Muslims starts in school books” (Zaman, 16.09.2011). It is reported in the article that the research found out that the Muslims are represented as homogeneous, religious , pre-modern and collective ‘Other’ (ibid).What is often suggested as a way to overcome the claimed ‘othering’ is establishing personal relations to present the ‘real’ Islam, to establish a positive image of Muslims and to ”win the hearts” of ordinary Germans. For this especially the Ramadan month is seen as an opportunity of exhibition, during which Germans can be invited to fast-breaking dinners (iftar). During August, which was the month for Ramadan for 2011, numerous reports on fast- breaking dinner meetings were published in Zaman. This performative action was quickly picked up by German politicians as an easy way to show their pro- immigrant stance. In one of the articles it is reported that Social Democratic Party Federal parliamentary Bernd Scheelen was very happy with the iftar-dinner and said “For years we’ve been living together but we still do not know each other...We should come together more often” (Zaman, 08.08.2011). In another article , a speech of the religious affairs attaché of the Turkish Consulate in a mosque in Cologne is reported , in which the attaché recited some verses of the Qur’an about helping one’s neighbor and advised to establish personal relations with German neighbors, invite them over for visits and support them in times of sickness or death (Zaman ,01.08.2011).

The argument that religion should have a lower profile to be able to tackle the problems of integration is seen repeatedly in the news reports that Hürriyet has published. In one article with the headline “Do not discuss over religion”, Hürriyet reports that the German President Christian Wulff warned the politicians and civil society leaders that “We should not only talk over religion. Instead we should more

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be employed with people” and he reminded that the integration of immigrants is important, regardless of their religion (Hürriyet, 01.04.2011). This speech of the German president Wulff was not published by Zaman. Hürriyet’s effort to bring this report front and its desire for religion to play a smaller role is in line with its general ideological position and publishing policy. In that sense, Hürriyet seems to have a parallel view with the dominant integrationist discourse on Islam, by seeing Islam as an obstacle for integration and committing to the idea that if Turkish migrants were less religious and more secular they would be accepted easier by German society and German State.

What would support this argument are the frequent articles which present the Alevi community20 in Germany as a good example of integration. In one article Hürriyet reports about a visit of a CDU politician to AABF, an Alevi organization, with the headline: “Alevis are exemplar” (15.01.2011).The CDU politician Dr. Norbert Lammert is reported to have said that:

Alevis are a community in Germany that we can show as example in the topic of integration. I wish that other Muslim communities, which have important place in society in terms of population and influence, also create a picture of integration by being open to our country and culture, loyal to our constitutional system and in peace with society in the same way. (Hürriyet, 15.01.2011)

Zaman’s approach to religion puts a spot light on Islam as a different religion than the religion of Germans. Islam is expected to come to the front, with its distinctiveness to be exhibited, to be performed, and in that way the negative attitude of German society towards Muslims is expected to be diminished, while the role that Islam plays in society is increased. This could be argued to be in parallel with multiculturalist discourse, since here Islam demands an equal position in society as Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism, to be accepted as a homogeneous, separate, officially recognized and important element of the society, which in the end comes to

20 Members of Alevi community are known to be supporters of secularism in Turkey, voting in majority to Republican People’s Party (CHP), and seeing the secular Republic as protective shield against Sunni majority.

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an expected conflict with the dominant integrationist discourse. Here, the good personal relations with Germans and positive representations through performance are not expected to bring this position to Islam. Instead ,a possible overall diminish in the negative attitudes of German public towards Islam through positive representations and good personal relations, is expected to make it easier for Islam to reach that position on state level.

On the other hand, Hürriyet argues for the opposite. The role of Islam in the Turkish community in Germany is seen as a negative aspect for integration, which seems partly parallel with the dominant integrationist discourse. According to this, in order for the social problems of immigrants to diminish and for the various pressures on Turkish migrants to disappear ,religion ,which is seen as a dividing line between Germans and Turks, should have a very low profile, and if possible this should apply to both Islam and Christianity.

According to Agamben, Foucauldian concept of apparatus (dispositif) can be anything that has in some way the capacity to capture, orient, control, or secure the behaviors, opinions, or discourses of human beings, and in that sense religion is a powerful apparatus (Agamben 2009:14). The Foucauldian apparatus is “always inscribed in a play of power” (Foucault 1980:194 in Hall 2001:76). As a powerful apparatus, religion has a central position in the complex power struggles in Turkey.

As mentioned before, Demir and Zeydanlioglu argues that Hürriyet’s discourse is not separate from the Westernization project of Turkey and the construction of the modern ‘European Turk’ identity (Demir&Zeydanlioglu 2010:19). Within the perspective of the social and political inter-connectedness of Germany and Turkey, and the modernist and secularist ideological position of Hürriyet, the more Islam plays a role and becomes a dominant identity within Turkish community in Germany, the more it appears as a dividing identity marker between Europe and Turkey.

In sum, the ideological differences of the two newspapers about the role of religion in society are reflected on their discourses.

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6.3. Language

There is a consensus between Zaman and Hürriyet on the arguments about language. There is strong agreement on the necessity of being fluent in the German language and of children learning German in the most proper way while preserving their mother tongue through the demanded Turkish language education in public schools.

On 16.03.2011, Hürriyet reported on the visit of Turkey’s Munich Consul to the President of Bavarian State Parliament with the headline, “German is a must for integration (uyum)”. The Turkish Consul is reported to state that he and his host “completely agreed on the necessity of learning good German in relation to the integration (uyum) of Turks to the German society”.

A similar visit with a similar message was reported by Zaman, yet uyum/integration was not voiced. The headline of the article is “German is a must for contributing the society”, and it is about the visit of a federal parliamentarian from the Green Party, Mehmet Kilic, who is Turkish, to a private school, where he advised the immigrant students in the school to learn very good German, because “people can only express themselves if they know the [German] language and in that way can become a person who is beneficial to society” (Zaman, 03.03.2011). Thus, German language is necessary, not as a facilitator to or a social condition for integration, but to have a place in society, to be able to express oneself and to contribute to society. The agreement on the necessity of German language is clear, albeit the reasons for the necessity differ.

There is even a stronger agreement and emphasis on the necessity of children learning the Turkish language properly before they learn German and there is a growing demand that Turkish language should be seen as a part of minority rights and thus should be treated in a similar way as other minority languages such as Danish or French, which includes effective teaching of Turkish in public schools and the permission to open schools where Turkish is the language of education similar to many schools where education is in English, French, Italian etc.

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Hürriyet columnist Celal Özcan comments on the discussion in an article and claims that:

If it was France or Britain who wanted to establish a school in Germany, the same [German] politicians would present is as the strengthening of the friendship between the two countries. However, when Turkish is concerned, there is a great fear in Germany. Germany fears, more than Turkish schools would prevent integration, that a strong Turkish lobby would emerge and desires that Turkey cuts off its ties with the Turks here... If Germany, which has over 500 German high-schools around the world, is against Turkish schools, then it should undertake the mother tongue education itself. The policy of neglecting Turkish language should be abandoned. (Hürriyet, 28.03.2011)

Following these discussions, there are also demands that if Turkish high-school is not possible, Turkish should at least be taught as the second foreign language in schools, and this demand was also supported by some German local politicians (Zaman, 16.03.2011).

The arguments claiming that learning Turkish harms German language education and the process of integration are tried to be pushed back by claiming the opposite and referring to academic studies supporting the opposite arguments.

In an article published in Zaman, former Federal Minister Prof. Dr. Rita Süssmuth’s speech in the ‘Language Festival’ in Cologne, which is organized by the Cologne Municipality, is reported:

We fought an ideological war for years. We have only recently stopped this war. In fact it would be the best if mother tongue was taught until 10-11 years old. We would not be able to learn this if there were not cognitive studies. Despite all the advantages of children who were raised bi-lingually, we did not want to convince ourselves...We identify scientifically that in the places where mother tongue education is seen valuable, German language is also learned better. On the other hand it is always talked that economy needs multilingualism. (Zaman, 28.01.2011)

In another article published in Zaman, Esin Ileri, who is a Turkish academician from Hamburg University, stated that: “The protection of the mother languages of

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students with migration background should be secured by law”. She reminded the European Council’s decision on 25.07.1977 about the protection of mother tongue of migrant children and argued that:

Every student should start schooling in his/her mother tongue. If the mother tongue of the child is not the official language of the state that he/she is living in, then this child should afterwards also learn this official language. (Zaman, 13.05.2011)

Excerpts from the two newspapers illustrate a demand for the education of Turkish language which is an important component of their discourses. As Williams explains in the example of France, language is a very important element of national identity construction (1999:22). The disagreement of Zaman and Hürriyet on the role of religion disappears when it comes to language as Turkish language is seen central to Turkish identity, which has to be protected.

6.4. Media Representation

The topic of media representations of Turks in Germany occupies an important position in the discourses of Zaman and Hürriyet. For the two newspapers, what seems to be agreed on is the importance of media representations of Turks, and that Turks are represented negatively in Western media. What is to be done, then, is to change the negative image of ‘the Turk’, and to present the ‘correct’ image. It is important that the ‘correct image of the Turk’ is quite different from the ideological positions of Zaman and Hürriyet.

Hürriyet sees the solution to the problem of negative representation in focusing on the ‘positive’ representations of Turks in Germany, which crystallizes as the above mentioned ‘exemplary modern Turks’, who are expected to be approved as ‘integrated’. Media representations which seems to show ‘the modern’ and ‘the Turk’ in the same frame and not as opposites , such as films on the problems of young Turks in Germany who want to ‘integrate’ but are prevented by the traditional

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structures of Turkish culture, are seen as useful for the construction of the desired ‘modern Turk’ identity.

In an article Hürriyet reports on a speech of the Integration Minister of Baden- Württemberg with Turkish background, Bilkay Öney, with the headline “Turkish- German films are more effective than politics” (Hürriyet, 10.09.2011). It is reported that Öney claimed to be able to break the prejudices on both sides, it is necessary to get more knowledge, and the cultural works are an important for this. She is reported to have argued that these cultural works, such as Turkish-German films can be more effective than the politics, and advised Germans to watch these films (ibid).

This need for coupling ‘the modern’ and ‘the Turk’ resulted in an extreme as in one article , Hürriyet presents the decision of Frankfurt Opera to perform Mozart’s “Abduction from the Seraglio” as a ‘goodwill gesture’ of the Opera to Turks in Germany even though it is well known that Mozart’s work is constructed around 18th century orientalist themes (Hürriyet,17.01.2011).

Mueller argues that in German media Turks are depicted with their supposedly ‘‘traditional,’’ ‘‘repressive,’’ and ‘‘collectivistic’’ characters which cannot be reconciled with the Western individualism (2005:424). Discursive construction and representations of ‘the modern Turk’ by Hürriyet is a way to break away from the homogenizing subjectification of the German media’s negative representations of the Turkish migrants. Yet, as mentioned above, Hürriyet’s representations of ‘the modern Turk’ are also contributing to the dichotomy of modern - not yet modern, and thus the problematization and the exclusion of the Turks who are seen in the later.

Zaman, on the other hand, is quite critical about the German media and the way it represents Turks and Muslims. It is argued that German media either ignores Turkish immigrants or represents them in a negative way as archaic, fanatic , backward, unwilling/unable to integrate etc. In a news report on a conference about media and integration, Zaman preferred to highlight a part of the words of one of the

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German participants as headline: “Immigrants are shown less and negatively in German media” (Zaman, 08.06.2011).

In one opinion article by columnist Ismail Kul, ZDF is heavily criticized for sending Thilo Sarrazin and a group of cameras to Kruezberg neighborhood, and preying on a possible verbal or physical attack to Sarrazin by Turkish residents:

They released Sarrazin and the cameramen behind him on the people, watching the reaction or event that emerges. Then, they will broadcast this on television as ‘scandal’. But why? Why and for what would ZDF appeal to such a thing? They claim to have wanted to enable a dialogue between Sarrazin and Turks. That can only be a lie!

(Zaman, 22.07.2011)

Zaman, instead of representation by ‘exemplar modern Turks’, supports representations at the individual level , as personal relations with Germans , as invitations to visits by Germans , as educational institutions or as good relations with German authorities. According to Andrew, ‘Temsil’(representation) is a central principle of Gülen Movement, and he argues that the schools and interfaith dialogue centers of the movement served as open and accessible sites for German officials to visit and monitor, thereby diminishing suspicion (Andrew 2011). This element is reflected in the discourse of Zaman. Moreover, the dichotomy of modern – pre- modern that Hürriyet employs is a central position in modernism in general and also in the Westernization process in Turkey since 18th century. Religion and traditional values are seen as pre-modern entities by modernist ideology and thus for Zaman such a dichotomy of modern – pre-modern is exclusionary for religious-conservative people.

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6.5. Political Participation

Participation of Turkish migrants to German society is another theme in both newspapers, mostly with the focus on political participation.

In Zaman’s discourse, in consistency with the rejection of the concept of ‘integration’ and the proposal of ‘participation’ to replace it, political participation is advocated. The form of this political participation is organizing in political parties other than the establishment parties, at the local and regional level for the beginning to be able to push for practical changes, and mobilizing ‘the Turkish man on the street’ for exercising his/her right to vote, thus it is an attempt to attain changes through the legitimate political system of Germany. While one foot of this political participation argument is to support establishing political parties which will represent Turkish immigrants’ interests and exercising the right to vote for the Turks who are German citizens, the other foot is voicing the demand for the right of dual- citizenship so that more Turkish citizens can acquire German citizenship and thus political rights.

One example of the ‘first foot’ of Zaman’s political participation topos is the promotion of the BIG Party (Bündnis für Innovation & Gerechtigkeit Partie - Alliance for Innovation and Justice), which is a party established by Turks and have been described as “Ankara’s Trojan” by the weekly Der Spiegel for allegedly having connections with or at least being ideologically close to the AKP of Tayyip Erdogan (Spiegel, 12.09.2011). In one article in Zaman, which is presented with the headline “BIG party demands the votes of immigrants in Germany”, the speech of the Vice General Secretary of the party is reported:

… Misirlioglu , pointing out that immigrants started to leave Germany , stated that the word ‘integration’, which is used in Germany to describe the adaptation of immigrants to the society, creates a sense of excludedness among immigrants...He argued that it is widely thought among immigrants that the politicians with migration background in various parties do not represent themselves... (Zaman, 20.06.2011)

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Murat Somer’s study on “religious” and “secular” Turkish press suggests similar findings (2010).According to Somer’s analysis, the idea that “liberal democracy is a means for Muslims to protect themselves through rights and freedoms” was approved in the religious press in %83 of all the times this idea was coded (Somer 2010:564).

Considering political participation, Hürriyet, on the other hand, focuses on the politicians with Turkish background in various political parties whom the Vice General Secretary of BIG Partie accuses of not representing immigrants.

Hürriyet supports the Turkish politicians who are in the established political parties, more the ones in SPD and Green Party, and has a view of political participation in which Turkish migrants do not become a separate political force but occupy positions in the big parties of the system and try to push migrant related agendas forward, while staying within the normative borders of the established parties.

In one article, Hürriyet reports that the Integration Minister of Baden-Württemberg, Bilkay Öney21 (SPD), who has Turkish background, wrote a letter to the Foreign Minister of Germany criticizing the inflexible and harsh treatment of the Embassy of Germany in Ankara during visa application processes. She is reported to have said:

The Embassy is being too harsh especially on the visa applications of visitors who would like to join the weddings of their relatives in Germany....This way of processing visa applications disturbing and it is effecting the image of Germany negatively. (Hürriyet, 12.08.2011)

21 Bilkay Öney was at the center of heated discussions after weekly Welt am Sonntag published an article claiming that Bilkay Öney was opposed to any change in the law that forbids teachers to wear headscarf in Baden-Württemberg and she said that Turks in Germany watch 5 times more TV than Germans and that more Turks in Germany would just bring more problems (21.08.2011) (http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article13556196/Tuerken-schauen-fuenfmal-mehr-TV-als-Deutsche.html )

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What is interesting here is that Bilkay Öney is not opposed to the visa requirement22 itself. Öney, by staying within the borders of the official German position on the issue, only criticises the Embassy for ‘being too harsh’.

In an interview Hürriyet conducted with the Consul of Germany in Istanbul, Brita Wagener, interviewer asks the Consul if it is possible that the Co-chairman of the Green Party, Cem Özdemir, becomes the next prime minister of Germany and if German public is ready for it:

I think yes, because names like Özdemir is known by public...There is much to do in the topic of migration and integration but we have already come quite a distance. There is a difference in how people look at the foreign background people who are having difficulties in integration, who could not find a place in the society, and the foreign background people who are well integrated and successful. (Hürriyet, 01.07.2011)

The symbolic event of Cem Özdemir, as a German citizen and top leader of a political party; possibly becoming the prime minister of Germany, obviously interests Hürriyet, yet this possibility is in need of approval and is conditioned to the readiness of German public, although this question of readiness would never be relevant for another German citizen. Thus the “more restrictive model of social belonging for immigrants” that McPhersson argues to exist in integrationist discourse is implicitly conformed (2010:554).

6.6. Culture

While the cultural topos is a central part of Zaman’s discourse on integration, this theme is virtually absent in Hürriyet. This difference is also reflected on the sections of the newspapers: while in both newspapers the sections of News, Politics and Economics are common, these sections are followed by the sections of My Family

22 European Court of Justice in 2009(Case C-228/06) and the Administrative Court of Munich in 2011 ruled that Turkish nationals are exempt from visa requirements during travel for tourism purposes to the EU, due to article 41 of the ‘Additional Protocol to the Association Agreement’ (1973) between Turkey and the EEC.

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and Family Health in Zaman, and by Magazin (paparazzi / lifestyle) and Sports in Hürriyet. The culture topos in Zaman is composed of two parts; the first part is about the family values and the ways to protect the family values, and deal with the cultural challenges of having children in a ‘foreign’ country. The second part is about criticizing what is identified as the ‘morally decaying German culture’, and thus holding a moral superiority of Turkish migrants in relation to majority Germans.

One article about the story of two high-school student sisters, who ran away from home but came back, is published with the headline of “We regret that we ran away, Turkish girls should know how valuable their families are” (Zaman, 04.01.2011). The article tells how the girls ran away from home “with the dream of having a new life”, and how they went through ‘difficult situations’, had to stay in women protection houses which were not safe, stopped attending the school. The girls are interviewed and when they were asked why they took off their headscarves, one of them gives the reason that so the relatives do not recognize them and she explains,

We know that it was a mistake, we will put it [headscarf] again....unfortunately we also started to try alcohol and smoking by time. We went to disco. When you say ‘yes’ once, it is not easy to say ‘no’. We did all these things even though we know they were wrong. (Zaman, 04.01.2011)

The reply of the girls suggests that they possess the appropriate script for the situation, the ‘correct’ answer they should be giving to the reporter of Zaman, and as a result, through their ‘confessions’ they speak the views of a conservative discourse. Zaman’s discourse, through the discursive activity of ‘confession’, produces its subject, ‘misbehaving young who lived like a German’, who becomes the target for correcting action. The exclusionary and problematizing perspectives of dominant integrationist discourse that Zaman opposes, are reversed and employed by Zaman’s discourse.

In another article, a Turkish pedagogue advises on how Turkish parents should explain Christmas to their children (Zaman, 19.12.2011). It is advised that Christmas

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should be explained to children and experienced as a cultural event and children should never be kept away from the celebrations unless the celebrations are openly and obviously religious.

If a teather is coming to school, if a Christmas song is sung , the parents should also join this...If the child is excluded, he/she might grow an anger towards the society...Parents should also join these kind of cultural activities. If parents just say “ok , then you go” , then the child gets into a feeling of belonging towards to society and perceives himself as the society, and this time his/her ties to parents might get weak. In fact it is easier to raise children in Europe than in Turkey. Because when the child witnesses behaviors that do not fit to his/hers and his/her family’s values , the parents can easily explain that they are German, French or Dutch and the child then can make a meaning out of it by thinking “that’s how Germans how fun”...But it is not like this in Turkey. Because there everybody is Turk, everybody is Muslim. Then the child can ask “Why?”. And the answer to this is not easy... (Zaman, 19.12.2011)

The pedagogue’s view on the difference of Turkey and Europe is particularly interesting. For this view, the Europeans are already not expected to follow the ‘correct’ way, as they are not Muslim, and that can be even better as it can be used as ‘the opposite’ for the construction of a desired identity. The excerpt illustrates how the subject, ‘Muslim Turk’, is constructed in an exclusionary and homogenizing way, by referring the Turks who ‘do not behave as they should’ or who ‘behaves as the other side do’. The ideological construction and problematization of the Turks ‘who do not behave as they should’, who “prevents society from achieving its full identity as a closed, homogenous totality”, serves to sustain the fantasy of a lost state of fullness, the times when all Turks were ‘Muslim Turks’ (Žižek 1989:127). According to Stavrakakis, such constructions of ‘blocking figures’ tells people that “... what was impossible was prohibited and thus can also be recaptured” (1999:52).

The construction of a ‘blocking figure’ is coupled by the problematization and subjectification of ‘the Other’, German society. The same pedagogue continues by warning against the ‘real problem’ in Germany about family:

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The real problem in Germany is this: The parents are not creating a nice atmosphere at home with the kids. They are not caring so much about their children. When the children are growing somewhere on the side, they cannot establish a feeling of belonging to the parents. When parents are busy with their careers, the children are not feeling a unity of family. This is very dangerous. (Zaman,19.12.2011)

Another criticism of Zaman to the morally ‘decaying’ or ‘degenerated’ German culture comes on the topic of pet keeping. The columnist Ismail Kul explains that there are more dogs being sold in Germany in a year than the babies born, there is more money spent on dog and cat food than on baby food in a year and there are more veterinaries than children doctors in Germany (Zaman,14.01.2011). Then he is asking: “how will such a country survive the race for the future and solve the problems of aging society?” (ibid). Even though pet keeping habit in Germany is used in the article, the argument does not have anything to do with the pets. Germans are criticized for not giving importance to family and children, and it is reminded that it is not just a choice not to have children, it is direct way for demographical destruction of the society.

In his next article, Ismail Kul again writes about the degeneration of German culture:

The roles of men and women mixed… women became a bit masculine, men became a bit feminine. Instead of completing each other they turn to not fitting each other. If you look at this picture German society created a giant economy, abut then doing this they neglected family, neighbors and friendships. Thanks God, there are Muslims in the country that these things in majority are not seen. When the suppression of Muslim women is being discussed the situation of German women stays in shadow. While Muslim families are picked on the problems of German families are not seen … It actually is pleasing [to Germans]. It is both easier to push another person around and psychologically comforting. (Zaman, 18.01.2011)

The argument that the West is economically superior but morally inferior is a common and persistent argument of conservative discourses. This can be seen as a form of resistance to the cultural topos of dominant integration discourse in

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Germany which claims cultural superiority and demand the Turkish immigrants to follow the core cultural values of German , while assigning a ‘culture’ to them which is ‘traditional’, ‘repressive’ and ‘collectivist’ , and that is characterized by being counter-Leitkultur. Zaman’s discourse does quite the opposite: a selective package of cultural and moral values is assigned to both the German and the Turkish society. ‘The German culture’, which is characterized as ‘individualist’, ‘selfish’, ‘hypocritical’ and ‘perverted’ , in fact, seen as inferior to ‘the Turkish culture’.

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7. CONCLUSION

This study has been conducted with the aim to understand how the topic of migrant integration in Germany is approached and discussed, how a discourse or discourses on integration are formulated by the transnational Turkish language media in Germany, as well as, if and how the discourses differ from, comply with or resist the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany. A detailed exploration of the transnational socio-political context, to help the analysis and the positioning of the discourses better, is provided. The analysis of empirical material consisting of 97 articles from the European editions of the newspapers Zaman and Hürriyet has been conducted within the theoretical perspective informed by Michel Foucault and through the methodological framework of Discourse Analysis.

Below the findings of the analysis are summarized, which will also answer the research questions posited in the beginning of the study. The research questions posited were as follows:

What are the common themes of argumentation in Turkish language print media on the topic of migrant integration?

If and how do the discourses differ among Turkish language print media on the topic of migrant integration?

If and how do the discourses in Turkish language print media on migrant integration differ from the dominant discourse in Germany?

Six themes of argumentation (topoi) are identified in the newspapers Zaman and Hürriyet: Meaning of Integration, The Role of Religion, Language, Media Representation, Political Participation and Culture. While the first five of the models were common in both of the newspapers; the Cultural model was prevalent only in Zaman. The two newspapers were producing different, competing and often conflicting arguments within these models of argumentation, except on the language topos, thus constructing two different discourses.

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On the meaning of integration, Zaman’s discourse, follows a critical path and rejects the concept of integration with the argument that integration is equal to assimilation, thus, Zaman rejects the knowledge produced by the powerful and attempts to construct its own knowledge by proposing a new concept of ‘participation’. Hürriyet’s discourse, on the other hand, by not challenging the concept of integration and by presenting famous Turks as ‘integration example’’, is accepting the knowledge of ‘integration’ as defined by the dominant discourse, and thus partly reproducing the dominant discourse, and contributing to the construction of an ‘acceptable Turk’ model which as a result brings out a model of ‘unacceptable Turk’. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the discourse of Hürriyet completely overlaps the dominant German discourse; for example the conceptual separation of ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ and the claim of ‘integrationalism’ being a two-way approach, suggests an implicit rejection of assimilationist approaches. Moreover the ‘acceptable Turk’ that Hürriyet constructs submits to a modernist view coupled with Turkish national identity, and which is not necessarily acceptable by the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany.

On the topos of religion, Zaman’s approach puts a spot light on Islam, with its distinctiveness to be exhibited, to be performed, and in that way the negative attitude of German society towards Muslims is expected to be diminished, while the role that Islam plays in society is increased. The arguments of Zaman on religion resonates at similar tones with multiculturalist discourse, since here Islam demands an equal position in society as Protestantism, Catholicism and Judaism, to be accepted as an officially recognized , important element of the society. This, in the end, comes to an expected conflict with the dominant integrationist discourse. On the other hand, Hürriyet produces arguments on religion for a secularist discourse. The role of Islam in the Turkish community in Germany is seen as a negative, an argument which is similar to the argument of mainstream integration discourse. According to this, in order for the social problems of immigrants to diminish, religion, which is seen as a dividing line between Germans and Turks, should have a very low profile.

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About the language, there is strong agreement between Zaman and Hürriyet, on the necessity of being fluent in the German language and of children learning German in the most proper way while preserving their mother tongue through the demanded Turkish language education in public schools. This demand contrasts with the dominant discourse as it aims to preserve the Turkish national identity among the migrant population.

On media representation, there is a silent agreement between Zaman and Hürriyet on the argument that Turks are represented negatively by the German media, and this creates negative/hostile attitude in the German state and society towards Turks. Hürriyet sees the solution to the problem of negative representation in focusing on the positive representations of Turks in Germany, positioned in the axis of modern versus pre-modern, which in the end crystallizes as ‘exemplary modern Turks’, who are expected to be approved as ‘integrated’. For Hürriyet, even though the Turks are integrating, they are intentionally ignored by German mainstream media and dominant integration discourse. For Zaman, the negative representations in German media is institutionalized ideologically, and the way to deal with it is to expose them on one side, and on the other side, create positive representations at the grassroots level , as personal relations with Germans, or as good relations with German authorities.

More political participation is argued for by both Zaman and Hürriyet. Zaman, in consistency the proposal of ‘participation’ to replace ‘integration’, advocates organizing around political parties other than the ‘establishment parties’, and mobilizing ‘the Turkish man on the street’ to attempt to create a visible political force in Germany. Hürriyet, on the other hand, supports the Turkish politicians who are in the system parties, and has a view of political participation in which Turkish migrants do not become a separate political force but occupy positions in the big parties of the system and try to push migrant related agendas forward, while staying within the borders of the mainstream ideology.

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

While the cultural topos is a central part of Zaman’s discourse on integration. The culture topos is composed of two parts; the first part is about the family values and deal with the cultural challenges coming from the German majority. The second part is about exposing and criticizing the ‘morally decaying German culture’, and thus holding a moral superiority of Turkish migrants in relation to majority Germans. This is a form of resistance to the cultural topos of dominant integration discourse in Germany which claims cultural superiority and demand the Turkish immigrants to follow the core cultural values of German society , while assigning a ‘culture’ to them which is ‘traditional’, ‘repressive’ and ‘collectivist’ , and that is characterised by being counter-Leitkultur. Zaman’s discourse is quite the opposite: ‘The German culture’, which is characterized as ‘individualist’, ‘selfish’, ‘hypocritical’ and ‘perverted’, seen as inferior to ‘the Turkish culture’. Zaman’s discourse works towards the construction of a ‘Muslim Turk’ cultural identity, and for this the problematization of German culture goes parallel to the construction of the figure of ‘the deviant Turk’, who blocks the society from reaching its lost state of fullness.

In conclusion, there are conflicting and overlapping discourses manifested in the Turkish language print media in Germany, which are in varying degrees resisting to and in compliance with the dominant integrationist discourse in Germany. The resistance and compliance occurs in a complex, transnational way, in the reflection of the political and ideological fault lines in Turkey. A modernist, secular and nationalist discourse on integration appears in Hürriyet which does not openly reject the knowledge of ‘integration’ produced the dominant integrationist discourse. Yet this does not suggest a total compliance with the dominant discourse as Hürriyet resists assimilationism and a loss of Turkish national identity. The discourse in Zaman, on the other hand is rejecting the knowledge of integration and resisting the subjectification by the dominant discourse in Germany. This resistance and challenge is fed by the overarching ideological confrontation of political Islam with the enlightenment modernism and the construction of a religious identity through the othering of the West and the problematization of the Turks who does not submit to that religious identity.

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

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Newspaper Articles

"`Sen diğer Türklere benzemiyorsun` ayrımcılığı".Baycöl,Hüseyin. (2011, 05 02). Zaman Avrupa.

"‘Türkiye’nin gündemi kadar yaşadığımız ülkeyle de ilgilenmeliyiz’".Yaka,Adem. (2011, 01 02). Zaman Avrupa .

"Aleviler örnek". (2011, 01 15). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Alman eğitim sisteminde firsat eşitliği ve çok kültürlülük".Sak,Ali. (2011, 10 17). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Almanca bilmek hayatı kolaylaştırır".Gecit,Eyüp. (2011, 02 09). Zaman Avrupa .

"Almanca kitap okuma ve bir çağrı". Mertek,Muhammet. (2011, 01 25). Zaman Avrupa .

"'Almanya' filmi mecliste gösterilecek".Mercimek,Ali. (2011, 03 17). Hürriyet Avrupa .

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

"Almanya’da İslam düşmanlığının tarihi kökleri ve aktörleri" .Mertek,Muhammed. (2011, 05 11). Zaman Avrupa .

"Almanya’daki Türklere ne demeliyiz?".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 01 04). Zaman Avrupa .

"Almanya’nın geleceği: Deukisch ya da Türkmanca nesil".Sak,Ali. (2011, 12 12). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Almanyalı Türkler asimile olmadan eşit haklara sahip olmalı".Hamarat,Atilla. (2011, 04 07). Zaman Avrupa.

"Ana dil zenginlik olarak görülmeli".Parlayan,Cengiz. (2011, 10 31). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Anadiller yasa ile güvence altına alınmalı". (2011, 05 13). Zaman Avrupa .

"Anne babalar, çocuklarına Noel’i kültürel bir etkinlik olarak sunmalı".Akdeniz,Hilal. (2011, 01 02). Zaman Avrupa .

"Avrupa’daki ırkçılık ve İslam düşmanlığı Brüksel’de masaya yatırıldı ". (2011, 07 11). Zaman Avrupa .

"Bakan Demir: Türk girişimcilerin açtığı okul uyuma katkı sağlıyor".Aydin,Bayram. (2011, 01 20). Zaman Avrupa .

"Bakan Öney'den vize eleştirisi". (2011, 07 12). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Başbakan Erdoğan Almanya’daki bütünleşme anlayışına katkı sunuyor mu?".Bulut,Yilmaz. (2011, 03 03). Zaman Avrupa .

"Benim Almanyam".Külahci,Ahmet. (2011, 02 15). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"BIG Partisi Almanya’daki göçmenlerin oylarına talip".Kurt,Kemal. (2011, 06 20). Zaman Avrupa .

"'Bild sağcı popülist parti rolü oynuyor'".Aydin,Bayram. (2011, 02 28). Zaman Avrupa.

"Birbirimizi daha iyi tanıyabilmemiz için daha sık bir araya gelmeliyiz".Yilmaz,Mehmet. (2011, 08 08). Zaman Avrupa .

"Bizi görmezden gelmeyin".Zeyrek,Mesut. (2011, 01 10). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Böhmer: Eğitimli Türklerin Almanya’yı terk etmeleri engellenmeli".Yaman,Oktay. (2011, 01 20). Zaman Avrupa.

"Böhmer: Entegrasyon, asimilasyon ile eş anlamlı değildir". (2011, 04 01). Hürriyet Avrupa .

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

"Cem Özdemir Başbakan olabilir". (2011, 07 01). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Çocuklar önce anne ve babalarının dilini öğrenmeli". (2011, 04 07). Hürriyet Avrupa . "Deutsche Welle Avcı yaklaşımı".Bag,Süleyman. (2011, 02 15). Zaman Avrupa .

"Din dersine DİTİB talip“. (2011, 01 11). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Din ön plana çıkarılmamalı". (2011, 02 11). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Din üzerinden tartışmayın". (2011, 04 01). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Diyanet İşleri Başkanı: İslam korkusunu kişisel ilişkilerle gideririz". Ziver,Ermis. (2011, 06 30). Zaman Avrupa .

"Eğitime yatırım geleceğe yatırımdır". (2011, 01 16). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Eğitimin iyisi kapıları açar".Dogan,Kemal. (2011, 10 07). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"En büyük ayrımcılık çifte vatandaşlık ve yerel seçim konusunda".Ermis,Ziver. (2011, 01 02). Zaman Avrupa .

"EuroTürk çok girişimci ama eğitim de gerekli".Celikbudak,Halit. (2011, 05 14). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Ford'a Türk emeği inkar edimelez". (2011, 03 17). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Frankfurt Operası'ndan 50. yıl jest". (2011, 01 17). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Friedrich açık tartışma istedi". (2011, 08 08). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Göç ve sinema".Celikbudak,Halit. (2011, 11 06). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Göçmen çocuklar çokdillilik konusunda daha avantajlı".Kilicarslan,Ramis. (2011, 08 29). Zaman Avrupa .

"Göçmen girişimciler Almanya için önemli". (2011, 02 15). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Göçmene dil şartı dayatması saçma".Ekici,Ihsan. (2011, 11 16). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Göçmenler Alman medyasında çok az ve genellikle olumsuz gösteriliyor".

Aydin,Bayram. (2011, 06 08). Zaman Avrupa .

"Göçün 50. yılında uyum konuşuldu". (2011, 01 30). Hürriyet .

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

"Havaalanlarında dine ve etnik kökene göre kontrol insan haklarına aykırı".Yilmaz,Mehmet. (2011, 01 02). Zaman Avrupa .

"Hayvani Gelişim Endeksi".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 01 14). Zaman Avrupa .

"İki dilli eğitim çözüm mü?".Önel,Mehmet. (2011, 06 03). Zaman Avrupa .

"INA: Bu ülkede problem değil, çözüme katkı sağlamak istiyoruz".Aydin,Hikmet. (2011, 08 29). Zaman Avrupa .

"Internet yüzünden ailemi dağıtıp, sığınma evine gittim". (2011, 01 07). Zaman Avrupa .

"Internet yüzünden ailemi dağıtıp, sığınma evine gittim".Mertek,Muhammet. (2011, 01 07). Zaman Avrupa .

"İslam fobisini yenmeliyiz".Olgac,Sedat. (2011, 04 09). Hurriyet Avrupa .

"İslam ve uyumda sadece laf üreten Yeşiller mi, CDU mu?".Zirve,Ermis. (2011, 02 25). Zaman Avrupa .

"İslamofobinin büyümesinde siyasetçiler ve medya büyük rol oynuyor".Demir,Azamat. (2011, 04 07). Zaman Avrupa .

"İşte Almanlaşan Türk hamamı". (2011, 11 06). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"İşte uyum örneği". (2011, 04 09). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"İsviçre’ye göç eden Almanların uyum sorunundan çıkarılacak dersler".Bag,Süleyman. (2011, 06 28). Zaman Avrupa .

"Kaçtığımız için çok pişmanız, Türk kızları ailelerinin değerini bilsin".Cevik,Ismail. (2011, 01 04). Zaman Avrupa .

"Kavramlarla Dışlamak".Mertek,Muhammet. (2011, 01 28). Zaman Avrupa .

"Kaybolan sadece yemek kültürü mü?".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 01 18). Zaman Avrupa .

"Manavlık devri geçti Türkler çok büyüdü". (2011, 09 09). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Multikulti ölmedi, Almanya’nın gerçeği".Kilicarslan,Ramiz. (2011, 01 17). Zaman Avrupa . "Müslümanları ötekileştirme ders kitaplarıyla başlıyor".Damir,Azamat. (2011, 09 16). Zaman Avrupa . "Okul sistemi karaya oturunca…".Mertek,Muhammet. (2011, 07 25). Zaman Avrupa .

"Okullarda eşcinsellik dersi geliyor ".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 07 21). Zaman Avrupa .

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

"Olaf Scholz: Yabancılar kendi kültürlerini terketmek zorunda değil". (2011, 04 28). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Öney ‘Anti Dışlama Merkezi’ kuracak".Riza,Ali. (2011, 06 03). Zaman Avrupa .

"Öney: Yahudi düşmanlığına karşı uyardı". (2011, 05 20). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Ötekileştirme ve yok sayma aile içi iletişimi öldürür".Gülnahar,Nevzat. (2011, 03 14). Zaman Avrupa .

"Özkan: Uyumun başarılı olması dil, eğitim ve katılıma bağlı". Kilicarslan,Ramiz . (2011, 05 06). Zaman Avrupa .

"Profiling’e evet !".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 01 02). Zaman Avrupa .

"Sakinliğim tipik Türk". (2011, 09 22). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Son Türk Almanya’dan ne zaman gider? ".Ermis,Zirve. (2011, 08 01). Zaman Avrupa.

"Son Türk Almanya’dan ne zaman gider? ".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 07 25). Zaman Avrupa .

"SPD Genel Başkanı Gabriel: Yönetimde bir göçmenin olmaması utanç verici". (2011, 05 28). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Stern dergisi, Nuri Şahin'e geniş şekilde yer verdi". (2011, 04 28). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Topluma faydalı olmak için Almanca şart".Cakmak,Yasin. (2011, 03 03). Zaman Avrupa .

"Türk-Alman filmleri siyasetten daha etkili". (2011, 09 10). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Türkçe en azından ikinci yabancı dil olarak okutulmalı".Kansu,Muhammet. (2011, 03 16). Zaman Avrupa .

"Türkler hiç de uyumsuz değil".Özcan Celal. (2011, 02 01). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Uyum çokkültürlülüğü kabullenmekle olur". Riza,Ali. (2011, 03 25). Zaman Avrupa .

"Uyum için Almanca şart". (2011, 03 16). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Uyum için İslam din dersleri önemli". Riza,Ali. (2011, 03 25). Zaman Avrupa .

"Uyum katılımla olur".Karaca,Mumin. (2011, 01 30). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Uyum önlemlerle değil, eşit sosyal pay alma ile olur" .Ermis,Ziver. (2011, 05 06). Zaman Avrupa .

Can Soysal – Malmö University 2011

"Uyum sözleşmesi uygulamaya giriyor". (2011, 03 31). Hürriyet Avrupa .

"Yarısı dolu bardak".Celikbudak,Halit. (2011, 07 17). Hurriyet Avrupa .

"Zafer Şenocak veya ‘Alman olmak’ kitabı".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 06 13). Zaman Avrupa .

"ZDF ve gazeteciliğin itibarı ".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 07 22). Zaman Avrupa .

"Zorla evliliğe 5 yıl cezaya onay". (2011, 03 18). Hürriyet Avrupa .

“Türklerin asimilesi mümkün değil".Kul,Ismail. (2011, 09 18). Zaman Avrupa .

“Uyumda dil her şey değil” .Kul,Ismail. (2011, 02 28). Zaman Avrupa .

"Almanya Batı’nın bir parçası mı? ".Bag,Süleyman. (2011, 04 04). Zaman Avrupa .

"Süssmuth: Çok dillilik sadece göçmenler için değil, herkes için kazanç". Ermis,Ziver. (2011, 01 28). Zaman Avrupa .