Mealey's Emerging Insurance Disputes

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Mealey's Emerging Insurance Disputes MEALEY’S 1 Emerging Insurance Disputes Email Phishing Scams And Computer Fraud Coverage: Causation Is Key by Karen Cestari and Bryce Friedman Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP New York, NY A commentary article reprinted from the March 19, 2020 issue of Mealey’s Emerging Insurance Disputes 1 MEALEY’S Emerging Insurance Disputes Vol. 25, #6 March 19, 2020 Commentary Email Phishing Scams And Computer Fraud Coverage: Causation Is Key By Karen Cestari and Bryce Friedman [Editor’s Note: Bryce Friedman is a Partner at Simpson email domain names are nearly identical to those of the Thacher & Bartlett LLP and is based in the Firm’s New legitimate parties. By the time the scam is discovered, York office. He advises clients in complex disputes, trials and the fraudulently-induced wire transfers have been effec- arbitrations, and devotes a significant part of his practice tuated and the devastating financial losses are often to representing members of the insurance and reinsurance unrecoverable. As such, victims of such phishing scams industries in litigated matters. Karen Cestari is an Attorney routinely seek insurance coverage for unrecovered losses. at Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP and is based in the Firm’s New York office. She focuses on insurance and rein- In the past few years, a body of case law that addresses surance law. Any commentary or opinions do not reflect the scope of insurance coverage for such incidents has the opinions of Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP or Lex- begun to develop. More specifically, several federal dis- isNexis1, Mealey Publicationsä.Copyright# 2020 by trict and appellate courts have addressed the parameters Simpson Thacher & Bartlett LLP. Responses are welcome.] of coverage for phishing schemes under a Computer Fraud provision. This emerging area of insurance law Cybercrime is big business, and showing no signs of suggests that the determinative issue in many such cyber slowing down. Companies, both large and small, are coverage disputes is the causal connection (or lack falling victim to cyberattacks that frequently result in thereof) between the use of a computer and the ensuing significant expense. According to one source, cyber- financial loss. More specifically, courts have focused related crimes accounted for approximately $2 trillion on whether and under what circumstances a fraudu- in loss last year, and are likely to reach the $6 trillion lently-induced wire transfer or other monetary loss is mark by 2021.1 Email phishing scams, in particular, deemed to have resulted ‘‘directly’’ from computer use. have become an increasingly common means for hack- As discussed more fully below, when the factual record ers to fraudulently obtain funds from unsuspecting establishes that one or more intervening steps have companies. In many such schemes, the target company occurred between the initial computer contact and receives an email from an entity purporting to be from the subsequent loss of funds, courts are likely to deny a legitimate source, such as a trusted customer or long- coverage based on the absence of direct causation. Con- standing vendor. The email, which in actuality is sent versely, where the connection between the original from a fraudulent hacker, typically informs the target phishing email (or other cyber intrusion) and the con- company that banking or routing information has sequent transfer of funds is deemed direct and unin- changed and provides new instructions for upcoming terrupted, the causation requirement inherent in most payments. In some scenarios, the email appears to be Computer Fraud provisions is deemed satisfied. from a company executive, and directs an employee to follow forthcoming payment instructions relating Computer Fraud Provisions to a purported company transaction. Hackers have While specific Computer Fraud provisions vary by pol- become increasingly sophisticated, such that imposters’ icy, most provisions include language requiring direct 1 1 Vol. 25, #6 March 19, 2020 MEALEY’S Emerging Insurance Disputes causation between the use of a computer and the mone- The Computer Fraud provision provided coverage for tary loss. One common iteration provides coverage ‘‘direct loss of Money, Securities or Property ...result- for the ‘‘loss of ... money ... resulting directly from ing from Computer Fraud.’’ Computer Fraud, in turn, the use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer was defined as the ‘‘unlawful taking or the fraudulently of that property from inside the premises or banking induced transfer of Money, Securities or Property result- premises ...[t]o a person ...outside those premises.’’ ing from a Computer Violation.’’ According to the pol- Other Computer Fraud provisions cover ‘‘loss resulting icy, Computer Violation means ‘‘the fraudulent: (a) entry directly from a fraudulent instruction directing a finan- of Data ...[and] (b) change to Data elements ....’’ As cial institution to ...transfer, pay or deliver money or a preliminary matter, the Second Circuit ruled that securities.’’ In some policies, the relevant clause requires there was a Computer Violation because the attack a ‘‘direct loss of, or direct loss from damage to, Money, constituted both a ‘‘fraudulent entry of data into Med- Securities and Other Property directly caused by Com- idata’s computer system,’’ as well as a ‘‘change to data’’ puter Fraud,’’ with ‘‘Computer Fraud’’ defined as ‘‘[t]he based on the spoofing code that altered the appearance 2 use of any computer to fraudulently cause a transfer’’ of of the email domains. Turning to the causation issue, money or other property to a third party. Minor varia- the Second Circuit ruled Medidata sustained a ‘‘direct tions aside, the common thread in these and other loss’’ as a result of the spoofing incident, rejecting the Computer Fraud provisions is the requisite ‘‘direct’’ insurer’s assertion that the intervening actions by the link between computer use and financial loss. As dis- Medidata employee in effectuating the wire transfer cussed below, courts’ interpretations of the term were sufficient to ‘‘sever the causal relationship between ‘‘direct’’ under varied circumstances have led to differing the spoofing attack and the losses incurred.’’ conclusions as to the availability of coverage for email The same month that the Second Circuit decided phishing schemes. Medidata, the Sixth Circuit similarly ruled that claims arising out of wire transfers instigated by fraudulent Cases Finding Coverage emails were covered by a Computer Fraud provision. In Medidata Solutions Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co.,729F. In American Tooling Center, Inc. v. Travelers Casualty App’x 117 (2d Cir. 2018), an often-cited decision in and Surety Co. of America, 895 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. this context, the Second Circuit ruled that claims aris- 2018), the scheme was initiated by an email purport- ing out of a fraudulent wire transfer were covered by edly sent by a one of American Tooling’s vendors. In a Computer Fraud provision in the relevant policy. A actuality, the email was sent by an imposter using an Medidata employee received an email purportedly email address with a similar domain. The email sent from the company’s president advising her to instructed American Tooling to send invoice payments follow instructions from an attorney regarding a poten- to a new bank account. In response, American Tooling tial corporate acquisition. That same day, a man who wired approximately $800,000 to the account without identified himself as an attorney called the employee verifying the new instructions with the vendor. When and requested a wire transfer. The employee sought the fraud came to light, American Tooling sought cov- confirmation to make the transfer from Medidata’s erage under the Computer Fraud provision, which cov- executives. Thereafter, a group email was sent purport- ered ‘‘direct loss of, or direct loss from damage to, edly from Medidata’s president confirming that the Money, Securities and Other Property directly caused wire transfer should be made. After the wire transfer by Computer Fraud.’’ Computer Fraud was defined as was made, it was discovered that the emails were ‘‘[t]he use of any computer to fraudulently cause a sent by imposters. Medidata sought coverage under transfer’’ of money or other property to a third party. a Computer Fraud provision, among others. A New York district court ruled that coverage was available A Michigan federal district court ruled that the insurer under the Computer Fraud and Funds Transfer owed no coverage because American Tooling’s loss was Fraud provisions. Medidata Sols., Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., not directly caused by the use of a computer. The court 268 F. Supp. 3d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). In a summary cited the intervening steps that occurred internally at order, the Second Circuit affirmed, ruling that the American Tooling between receipt of the fraudulent underlying claims were encompassed by the Computer email and the eventual transfer of funds. See Am. Tool- Fraud provision. ing Ctr., Inc. v. Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am., 2017 2 1 MEALEY’S Emerging Insurance Disputes Vol. 25, #6 March 19, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 120473, 2017 WL 3263356 (E.D. between the initial email and payment. The court Mich. Aug. 1, 2017). The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling also dismissed the argument that coverage was unavail- that American Tooling suffered a ‘‘direct loss’’ of funds able because Norfolk was attempting to pay a legit- when it transferred the money to the imposter. The imate invoice, rather than a fraudulent bill. The court court explained that the loss was directly caused by stated: ‘‘the insurance provision does not require a frau- computer fraud because the fraudulent email induced dulent payment by computer; rather it requires a com- a series of internal actions that directly caused the trans- puter’s use to fraudulently cause a transfer of money.’’ fer of money. In addition, the Sixth Circuit ruled that the imposter’s conduct constituted ‘‘computer fraud’’ Employing similar reasoning, the Eleventh Circuit because the fraudulent emails and resulting wire trans- reached the same conclusion in Principle Solutions fer were implemented through the use of a computer.
Recommended publications
  • Identity Theft Literature Review
    The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S. Department of Justice and prepared the following final report: Document Title: Identity Theft Literature Review Author(s): Graeme R. Newman, Megan M. McNally Document No.: 210459 Date Received: July 2005 Award Number: 2005-TO-008 This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice. To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally- funded grant final report available electronically in addition to traditional paper copies. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. IDENTITY THEFT LITERATURE REVIEW Prepared for presentation and discussion at the National Institute of Justice Focus Group Meeting to develop a research agenda to identify the most effective avenues of research that will impact on prevention, harm reduction and enforcement January 27-28, 2005 Graeme R. Newman School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany Megan M. McNally School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University, Newark This project was supported by Contract #2005-TO-008 awarded by the National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • Are the Current Computer Crime Laws Sufficient Or Should the Writing of Virus Code Be Prohibited?
    Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal Volume 18 Volume XVIII Number 3 Volume XVIII Book 3 Article 8 2008 Are the Current Computer Crime Laws Sufficient or Should the Writing of Virus Code Be Prohibited? Robert J. Kroczynski Fordham University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons Recommended Citation Robert J. Kroczynski, Are the Current Computer Crime Laws Sufficient or Should theriting W of Virus Code Be Prohibited?, 18 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 817 (2008). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss3/8 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Are the Current Computer Crime Laws Sufficient or Should theriting W of Virus Code Be Prohibited? Cover Page Footnote Alexander Southwell, Shari Sckolnick This note is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol18/iss3/8 KROCZYNSKI_022508_FINAL 2/25/2008 7:20:52 PM Are the Current Computer Crime Laws Sufficient or Should the Writing of Virus Code Be Prohibited? Robert J. Kroczynski* INTRODUCTION .............................................................................818 I. BACKGROUND OF CYBERCRIME AND VIRUSES........................820 A. DEFINITION OF VIRUSES AND TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS ....822 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Computer Crime and Computer Fraud
    Computer Crime and Computer Fraud University of Maryland Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice Fall, 2004 Report to the Montgomery County Criminal Justice Coordinating Commission By Michael Kunz & Patrick Wilson This report was prepared in part as fulfillment of requirements in CCJS 604 and CCJS 605 for the Professional Masters Degree in the Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice. We express thanks to Dr. Charles Wellford, Dr. Doris MacKenzie, and Jean McGloin for assistance with this report. 2 Executive Summary The past several decades have brought a vast increase in the availability of electronic resources. With this increased availability has come a new form of criminal activity that takes advantage of electronic resources, namely computer crime and computer fraud. Currently, these new forms of crime are burgeoning and pose a new and lasting challenge to law enforcement agencies at all levels in how to prevent, investigate, and prosecute these crimes. Law enforcement agencies from the local to the federal level are beginning to institute specific units devoted to handling computer-related offenses, but there does not currently exist a uniform method to define and address computer crime and computer fraud. With this case study, we intend to analyze what the current level of understanding is regarding computer crime and computer fraud, as well as what is being done by law enforcement agencies to deal with these offenses. Using this information, we provided specific recommendations regarding computer-related offenses in the future including: • Uniform definition • Organizational requirements and procedures • Tools necessary to successful operation of computer crime units 3 Introduction Throughout the past several decades there have been numerous advances in electronic resources.
    [Show full text]
  • Cybercrime: an Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws
    Order Code 97-1025 CRS Report for Congress Received through the CRS Web Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws Updated June 28, 2005 Charles Doyle Senior Specialist American Law Division Alyssa Bartlett Weir Law Clerk American Law Division Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws Summary The federal computer fraud and abuse statute, 18 U.S.C. 1030, protects federal computers, bank computers, and computers used in interstate and foreign commerce. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills crack and gaps in the protection afforded by other federal criminal laws. This is a brief sketch of section 1030 and some of its federal statutory companions. In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw: ! computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3); ! computer trespassing (e.g., hackers) resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or commercial information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); ! damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., a worm, computer virus, Trojan horse, time bomb, a denial of service attack, and other forms of cyber attack, cyber crime, or cyber terrorism), 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(5); ! committing fraud an integral part of which involves unauthorized access to a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in interstate or foreign commerce, 18 U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • Credit Card Fraud: a New Perspective on Tackling an Intransigent Problem
    Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law Volume 16 Issue 4 Article 2 2011 Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective On Tackling An Intransigent Problem Lydia Segal Benjamin Ngugi Jafar Mana Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons Recommended Citation Lydia Segal, Benjamin Ngugi, and Jafar Mana, Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective On Tackling An Intransigent Problem, 16 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 743 (2011). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl/vol16/iss4/2 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Credit Card Fraud: A New Perspective On Tackling An Intransigent Problem Cover Page Footnote Lydia Segal is an Associate Professor of Business Law and Ethics at Suffolk University’s Sawyer Business School. With degrees from Harvard Law School and Oxford, her specialty is organizational stewardship and integrity. Her latest book is Battling Corruption in America’s Public Schools (Harvard University Press). ** Dr. Benjamin Ngugi, is an Associate Professor in the Information Systems and Operations Management Department at Suffolk University’s Sawyer Business School. He received his Ph.D. in Information Systems from New Jersey Institute of Technology and his bachelors degree in Electrical and Electronics Engineering from University of Nairobi, Kenya. He conducts his research in the areas of identity fraud, biometrics, security compliance, e-Health security and technology adoption.
    [Show full text]
  • Cybercrime: an Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws
    Cybercrime: An Overview of the Federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Statute and Related Federal Criminal Laws Charles Doyle Senior Specialist in American Public Law October 15, 2014 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov 97-1025 Cybercrime: An Overview of 18 U.S.C. 1030 and Related Federal Criminal Laws Summary The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. 1030, outlaws conduct that victimizes computer systems. It is a cyber security law. It protects federal computers, bank computers, and computers connected to the Internet. It shields them from trespassing, threats, damage, espionage, and from being corruptly used as instruments of fraud. It is not a comprehensive provision, but instead it fills cracks and gaps in the protection afforded by other federal criminal laws. This is a brief sketch of CFAA and some of its federal statutory companions, including the amendments found in the Identity Theft Enforcement and Restitution Act, P.L. 110-326, 122 Stat. 3560 (2008). In their present form, the seven paragraphs of subsection 1030(a) outlaw • computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) in a government computer, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(3); • computer trespassing (e.g., hacking) resulting in exposure to certain governmental, credit, financial, or computer-housed information, 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(2); • damaging a government computer, a bank computer, or a computer used in, or affecting, interstate or foreign commerce (e.g., a worm, computer virus, Trojan horse, time bomb, a denial of service attack, and other forms of cyber attack, cyber crime, or cyber terrorism), 18 U.S.C.
    [Show full text]
  • A REEVALUATION of the COMPUTER FRAUD and ABUSE ACT by Reid Skibelt
    CYBERCRIMES & MISDEMEANORS: A REEVALUATION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT By Reid Skibelt ABSTRACT This Article contends that the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act is an overly punitive and largely ineffective approach to combating computer crime based on two fundamental critiques. The 1986 version of the CFAA contemplated a core distinction between harmless trespass and more substantial intrusions. Over time, this distinction has become ob- scured and is resulting in over-criminalization of offenders. Furthermore, the increased penalties for computer crime created by the USA PA- TRIOT Act, and the Cyber Security Enhancement Act, are unjust in ap- plication and ineffectual in deterring prospective computer criminals. TABLE OF CONTENTS I. IN TRO DUCTION ....................................................................................................... 9 10 II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMPUTER FRAUD AND ABUSE ACT ............................... 912 III. W HAT EXACTLY IS A "HACKER"? ..................................... .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 917 IV. COPYING OF FILES AND THE TROPHY PROBLEM ..................................................... 922 V. M ENS REA AND THE $5,000 THRESHOLD ................................................................ 926 A. The Problem of "Resecuring" Costs .............................................................. 928 B. The Problem of Calculating Intangible Harms .............................................. 932 VI. THE USAPA AND THE PUNITIVE APPROACH TO CYBERCRIME ..............................
    [Show full text]
  • Prosecuting Computer Virus Authors: the Eedn for an Adequate and Immediate International Solution Kelly Cesare University of the Pacific, Mcgeorge School of Law
    Global Business & Development Law Journal Volume 14 Issue 1 Symposium: Biotechnology and International Article 10 Law 1-1-2001 Prosecuting Computer Virus Authors: The eedN for an Adequate and Immediate International Solution Kelly Cesare University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Kelly Cesare, Prosecuting Computer Virus Authors: The Need for an Adequate and Immediate International Solution, 14 Transnat'l Law. 135 (2001). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.pacific.edu/globe/vol14/iss1/10 This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals and Law Reviews at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Global Business & Development Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Comments Prosecuting Computer Virus Authors: The Need for an Adequate and Immediate International Solution Kelly Cesare * TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................... 136 II. THE CRIME OF THE COMPUTER VIRUS ............................. 138 A. The New Crime: The Computer Virus ......................... 139 1. What is a Computer Virus? .............................. 139 2. The Role of the Computer Virus in CriminalLaw ............ 141 3. Illustrative Examples of Recent Virus Outbreaks ............. 143 a. M elissa .......................................... 143 b. Chernobyl .......................................
    [Show full text]
  • Reducing Payment-Card Fraud
    Walden University ScholarWorks Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection 2020 Reducing Payment-Card Fraud Chares R. Ross Walden University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations Part of the Computer Sciences Commons, and the Quantitative, Qualitative, Comparative, and Historical Methodologies Commons This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Walden University College of Management and Technology This is to certify that the doctoral study by Charles Ross has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects, and that any and all revisions required by the review committee have been made. Review Committee Dr. Diane Dusick, Committee Chairperson, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty Dr. Lisa Pearo, Committee Member, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty Dr. Alexandre Lazo, University Reviewer, Doctor of Business Administration Faculty Chief Academic Officer and Provost Sue Subocz, Ph.D. Walden University 2020 Abstract Reducing Payment-Card Fraud By Charles Ross M.S. University of Phoenix, 2010 M.B.A, DeVry University, 2004 BS, DeVry University, 1993 Doctoral Study Submitted in Partial Fulfillment Of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Business Administration Walden University June 2020 Abstract Critical public data in the United States are vulnerable to theft, creating severe financial and legal implications for payment-card acceptors. When security analysts and managers who work for payment card processing organizations implement strategies to reduce or eliminate payment-card fraud, they protect their organizations, consumers, and the local and national economy.
    [Show full text]
  • Interpreting Access and Authorization in Computer Misuse Statutes
    ARTICLES CYBERCRIME'S SCOPE: INTERPRETING "ACCESS" AND "AUTHORIZATION" IN COMPUTER MISUSE STATUTES ORIN S. KERR* The federal government, all fifty states, and dozens of foreign countries have enacted computer crime statutes that prohibit "unauthorizedaccess" to computers. No one knows what it means to "access" a computer, however, or when access becomes "unauthorized." The few courts that have construed these terms have offered widely varying interpretations. Several recent decisions suggest that any breach of contract renders an access unauthorized, broadly criminalizing contract law on the Internet. In this Article, Professor Orin Kerr explains the origins of unauthorized access statutes, and examines why the early beliefs that such statutes articulated a clear standard have proven remarkably naive. He then shows how and why the courts have construed these statutes in an overly broad manner that threatens to criminalize a surprising range of innocuous conduct involving com- puters. Finally, Professor Kerr offers a normative proposal for interpreting "access" and "authorization." Courts should reject a contract-based theory of authorization,and should limit the scope of unauthorized access statutes to circum- vention of code-based restrictions on computer privileges. This proposed interpre- tation best mediates between securing privacy and protecting the liberty interests of Internet users. It also mirrors criminal law's traditional treatment of consent defenses, and avoids possible constitutional difficulties that may arise under the broader constructions that courts have recently favored. INTRODUCTION Justice Holmes once noted that when a legislature enacts a new crime, "it is reasonable that a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed.
    [Show full text]
  • Computer Fraud and Security
    CHAPTERCHAPTER 55 COMPUTERCOMPUTER FRAUDFRAUD ANDAND SECURITYSECURITY www.azizd.com OverviewOverview •• InformationInformation systemssystems areare becomingbecoming increasinglyincreasingly moremore complexcomplex andand societysociety isis becomingbecoming increasinglyincreasingly moremore dependentdependent onon thesethese systems.systems. –– CompaniesCompanies alsoalso faceface aa growinggrowing riskrisk ofof thesethese systemssystems beingbeing compromised.compromised. –– RecentRecent surveyssurveys indicateindicate 67%67% ofof companiescompanies sufferedsuffered aa securitysecurity breachbreach inin thethe lastlast yearyear withwith almostalmost 60%60% reportingreporting financialfinancial losses.losses. www.azizd.com OverviewOverview TheThe informationinformation securitysecurity systemsystem isis thethe subsystemsubsystem ofof thethe organizationorganization thatthat controlscontrols thethe specialspecial risksrisks associatedassociated withwith computercomputer--basedbased informationinformation systems.systems. TheThe informationinformation securitysecurity systemsystem hashas thethe basicbasic elementselements ofof anyany informationinformation system,system, suchsuch asas hardware,hardware, databases,databases, procedures,procedures, andand reports.reports. www.azizd.com OverviewOverview •• CompaniesCompanies faceface fourfour typestypes ofof threatsthreats toto theirtheir informationinformation systems:systems: 11-- NaturalNatural andand politicalpolitical disastersdisasters • Include: – Fire or excessive heat – Floods –
    [Show full text]
  • The Computer Fraud & Abuse
    Science and Technology Law Review Volume 16 | Number 3 Article 5 2013 The omputC er Fraud & Abuse Act: Failing to Evolve with the Digital Age W. Cagney McCormick Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech Recommended Citation W. Cagney McCormick, The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act: Failing to Evolve with the Digital Age, 16 SMU Sci. & Tech. L. Rev. 481 (2013) https://scholar.smu.edu/scitech/vol16/iss3/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Science and Technology Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. The Computer Fraud & Abuse Act: Failing to Evolve with the Digital Age W. Cagney McCormick* I. INTRODUCTION The Internet's evolving nature makes it difficult for the United States to develop and implement electronic criminal and civil laws that protect Ameri- cans, while continuing to follow constitutional fundamentals. Computer fraud and cyber attacks are carried out every day against citizens and corpo- rations while the federal government continues to fight cybercrime with an inadequate, outdated federal statute. The statute, known as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), imposes civil and criminal liability on cybercriminals who undertake Internet attacks on corporations and the gov- ernment.' However, the use of one statute to prosecute both civil and crimi- nal cybercrimes distorts its applicability in case law. The CFAA's outdated language and idea of electronic communications needs to be updated regu- larly with a proactive mindset instead of the reactive mindset Congress has been using for decades.
    [Show full text]