CHAPTER I

THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN EARLY BUDDHISM

If we glimpse at the history of Indian philosophy, we see that almost all schools of Indian philosophy have made an attempt to solve the problems that come to human life. Gautama Buddha, the founder of Buddhism is not an exception to this. While solving the problem of suffering, Gautama Buddha has pointed out that tr$nd or uncontrolled unlimited desire of man which is caused by ignorance is the basic cause of suffering. In this context he has further pointed out that one can make oneself free from suffering by removing trsnd through valid knowledge. Thus Gautama Buddha has discussed the problems of suffering and its removal with reference to ignorance and valid knowledge respectively. Hence it could be said that the Buddhist philosophy is originated in the discussion of the problem of suffering and its root in consciousness. In Pali literature it is said that the suffering is a problem of consciousness, because it is said that, only that, which is conscious can suffer. Due to the ignorance consciousness has suffering. The appearance of ignorance is the origin of suffering and evil. When being is misguided by ignorance, all his activities, views, and thoughts become useless and immoral. Because ignorance misled his mind and its activities. The Buddha expounded what happen when being is misguided by ignorance as follows:

"Bhikkhus, ignorance is the forerunner in the entry upon unwholesome states, with shamelessness and fearlessness of wrongdoing following along. For an unwise person immersed in ignorance, wrong view springs up. For one of wrong view, wrong intention springs up. For one of the wrong intention, wrong speech springs up. For one of wrong speech, wrong action springs up. For one of wrong action, wrong livelihood springs up. For one of wrong

13 livelihood, wrong effort springs up. For one of wrong effort, wrong mindfulness springs up. For one of wrong mindfulness, wrong concentration springs up."' In Buddhism, ignorance is defined as the belief on permanent, independent self and its object. Once man has this discrimination into a self and things, man has suffering. Man also has craving and aversion, because of that he desires those things that please the self and has averse to those things that are not conducive to the self

The belief on duality of the self (or subject) and dharmas (or object) is the fundamental cause of suffering, as the Buddha observed,

"He regards feeling as self... perception as self... volitional formations as self ... consciousness as self, or self as possessing consciousness, or consciousness as in self, or self as in consciousness. That consciousness of his changes and alters. With the change and alteration of consciousness, his consciousness becomes preoccupied with the change of consciousness. Agitation and a constellation of mental states bom of preoccupation with the change of consciousness remain obsessing his mind. Because his mind is obsessed, he is fi-ightened,distressed , and anxious, and through clinging he becomes agitated."^

This is, of course, a vicious circle: we inadvertently increase the conditions that lead to suffering, anxiety, and distress in craving for what is "happy, good, healthy and safe," and in imagining a self that enjoys them. For as long as there is a craving for and attachment to self, the Buddha declared, there will be further distress, in response to which there will be further actions that lead to further distress, and so on. It is, in short, our misguided desires for some truly lasting, satisfactory existence within this conditioned world, along with the actions taken to secure it, that keeps us c;ontinuously bound to the

'SNVl. ^ SN III 16-17.

14 repetitive cognitive and behavioral patterns called ''samsdra.'" The Buddhists suggest the way to come out from this vicious cycle by understanding their underlying causes - the interactive dynamics between ignorance and grasping, the actions they instigate, and the results these lead to - and gradually reversing their deleterious results. And this is the fundamental aim of the formula of Dependent origination.

In this context it is necessary to discuss two terms of vijndna, namely; vijndna as consciousness and vijndna as cognitive awareness with reference to the dependent origination by focusing in particular on the multiple relationships between these forms of vinndna and the volitional formations, the sankhdras.

1. Vinnana as Consciousness

Vinndna has significant role to play in Buddhism; vijndna, in Buddhism, has a technical sense; it does not refer to cognition or understanding, it is a sort of principle of conscious life which is different from the body. It is also the power or faculty of discrimination, which is faithfully retained in its original sense.

For the purpose of this study, we will limit our inquiry to the first two of these five categories given by Edgerton, namely (1) vijndna as practical, empirical knowledge, and (2) vijndna as perceiving and discriminating faculty of the mind.^ An extensive treatment in the Sutra is given to both these meanings.

The word consciousness itself is explained in Pali and Sanskrit-English Dictionary'* to mean "the act of distinguishing or discerning, knowledge.

' BHSD. p. 485-486. •• Monier-William.; Sanskrit English Dictionary, p. 941, 961; T. W. Rhys-Davids and W. Stede, Pali English Dictionary, London PTS, 1979, p. 287, 611; This is one word whose root or basic form remains recognizable in virtually all Indo-Eurpean language: Sanskrit: jnana, Greek: gnosis, Latin: gnosco, gnoscere, gnovi, English: know, etc. the Sanskrit Jn - becomes kn - in English, as in German it became kennen. In other language groups such as Semitic (Hebrew; da'ath) or Chinese (chih), no similarities with the Indo-European root are found.

15 understanding, cognitive av/areness, consciousness, or thought-faculty" (from the root jnd = "to know," "to perceive," and the separative verbal prefix vi = "apart," "asunder," "away," "without;" originally dvi = "in two parts," this prefix is used to express division, distinction, distribution, arrangement, order, opposition, or deliberation). As such, vi-jndna is associated with various cognitive functions related to perceiving, as well as sorting out the sensory data, or input. Although 'discernment' may be a more literal translation, 'cognitive awareness'^ comes closer to denoting its sense as an awareness of a specific object within a specific sense-field, while 'consciousness' highlights the aspect of vijndna as a subsisting sentience which persists from one life to the next.

Suzuki explains the consciousness in a broader sense. He explains "it is not mere cognition or understanding, it is a sort of principle of conscious life as distinguished from the body, and it is also the power or faculty of discrimination."^

Vihndna is closely associated with the continuity and perpetuation of cyclic existence in a variety of ways. First it is one of the four maintenances: The nutriment edible food, gross or subtle; second, contact; third, mental volition; fourth, consciousness.^ These four kinds of nutriment have craving as their source, craving as their origin; they are bom and produced from craving. Thus, driven by craving, the nutriment of consciousness becomes one of the preconditions for rebirth itself: If there is delight, if there is craving^ for the ... nutriment vifindna. Craving in fact is central to the Buddhist thought and it is enshrined in the second Noble Truth, the cause of suffering:

' SN III 87: Vijdnati kho bhikkhave tasma viniidnam ti vuccati; Kosa I 16, p. 11: f^?TR wfdtci^iliii:; Asl., p. 42: "is aware variously". * Suzuki., Studies in the Lahkdvatdra sUtra, p. 176. SN II 13, 101: "The viiinana maintenance (vinndndhdro) is a condition of renewed existence of rebirth in the future" (vififiariaharo ayatirp punabhavabhinibbattiya paccayo). ' Lust (rdga), delight (nandi), and craving (tai^hd) as synonyms for greed {lobha). Consciousness becomes established there and comes to growth (patitthitarn tattha viflfianarn virujharn): having impelled a kamma, it "becomes established and comes to growth" through its ability to drag along a rebirth.

16 And what is the origin of suffering? Is it craving? Which brings renewal of being, is accompanied by delight and lust, and delights in this and that; that is, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for being, and craving for non-being. This is called the origin of suffering.^

It means, it is an action that is motivated by desire and craving- that entail psycho-ontological consequences, that is, continued rebirth.

Craving leads to rebirth in the series of dependent origination in two ways. In the standard fonnula, sense-impressions and feeling give rise to craving (tanhd), which in turn conditions the arising of appropriation (updddna); these last two are afflictive influences which instigate karmic activities, thereby indirectly conditioning the arising of samsdric consciousness. In other contexts, however, craving directly conditions the growth of consciousness, leading directly to further rebirth. Samukta Nikaya^*^ states that when there is a pleasure in or a craving, for any or all of the four kinds of maintenances (dhdra) of those who are already bom or who desire to come to be (sambhavesinam), then consciousness becomes established and comes to growth. Whatever consciousness that becomes established and comes to growth, there is a descent of name and form. Where there is a descent of name-and-form, there is the growth of volitional formations.'' Where there is the growth of volitional formations, there is the production of future renewed existence.'^

' MN I 48-49. '" SN 11 66. " Atthi tattha sankharanarp vuddhi: this is said with reference to the volitional formations that are the cause of a future round of existence for one abiding in the present round of results. The variation here on the usual sequence is very interesting. When "the growth of volitional formations" is placed between name-and-form and future existence, this implies that the expression corresponds to three critical terms of the standard formula - craving, clinging, and {kamma-) existence - with atatini punabbhavabhinibbatti signifying the process of entering the new existence. '^ SN II 101: Kabalirpkare ... phasse ... manosailcetanaya ... viflilane ce ... ahare atthi rago atthi nandT atthi tanha patiRhitarp tattha vii^ilanaiTi viru|harp. Yattha patifthitairi vififianam virujham atthi tattha namarupassa avakkanti. Note the discrepancy with DN II 63, cited above, where it is viiinaria, rather than name-and-form, that descends into the mother's womb.

17 Vimdna is thus a precondition not only for the development of a new sentient body (mind-and form) in this life but also for "the growth of volitional formations" (sankhdra). The nutriment consciousness is a condition for the production of fiiture renewed existence. Where there is the production of future renewed existence, there is future birth, aging, and death, I say that is accompanied by sorrow, 1 "^ anguish, and despair. After birth, vimdna and other accompaniments of life, the "life factor" (dyu) and heat (usmd), continue uninterruptedly throughout that lifetime until, upon their departure, one passes away.'"* Thereafter, in dependence upon these same conditions, "consciousness being established and growing, there comes to be renewed existence in the future."'^

While the processes of vimdna grow and increase, thereby sustaining samsdric life, they can also be calmed, pacified, and brought to an end, marking the end of the cycle of birth and death. Indeed, the destruction of vimdna (along with other four aggregates) is virtually equated with liberation in one passage: "Through its fading away and cessation of vinndna, iire

" SN II 13, 101: The nutriment consciousness: rebirth-consciousness (patisandhicitta). The production of future renewed existence (ayatirp punabbhavabhinibbatti): the name-aiid form arisen along with that same consciousness. At AN I 223-224 it is said that: ''kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture, for consciousness ... to become established in a low (middling, superior) realm; thus there is production of future renewed existence (kammaqi khettam vifinanain brjarn tanha sineho ... hmaya (majjhimaya, panitaya) dhatuya cififlariaip patthitaiji; evarp ayatirp punabbhavabhinibbatti hoti)." This implies that it is the stream of consciousness coming the preceding existence that functions as the nutriment consciousness by generating, at the moment of conception, the initial rebirth-consciousness, which in turn brings forth (or "nourishes") the concomitant name-and-form. '* SN III 143, MN I 296: when this body is bereft of three states - vitality, heat, and consciousness - it is then discarded and forsaken, left lying senseless like a log; Sarpyuktlgama (^PRj-a-,|l), T. 2, No. 99, p. 150b9-10; Madhyamagama (c^R-^ll), T. 1, No. 26, p. 789a4-5: ifnJ^H » —^M ° -%W.' H#iE» JiilHffi^a-^E - MMi^f^ ' t\WMt\ AKB. 11.45 a-b, p. 73: 3ng?^W5?11g?R ^ g5W H^rtnfr/

3?Tlfg;55RT^ ?>^ Wr *IBM^dH # //; APTMCSL [PSJU^Sift^l^], T. 29, No. 1558, p.26a. m'^'SlMW.^ ^J##Bvf^}##fl|'(h$P?Kl^mi; For the Blessed One said, "When life, warmth and consciousness leave the body, the body lies abandoned, like wood, lacking feeling". '' SN II 65: Tasmirp pafthite viflflane virQjhe ayatirp punabbhavabhinibbatti hoti; DN 11 68; SN III 54 also describes the persistence ofvinnana from life to life; vinndna passes over into another body in SN 122 and SNIII124,andPED.,p.618. liberated by non-clinging (anupadd), they are well liberated."'^ The Noble Eightfold Path is the way leading to the cessation of consciousness; that is right view ... right concentration. As a result of such practice, vihndna is no longer increased by clinging; on the contrary, a monk "Who is without clinging attains Nibbdna.'"^^ Thus, "when that consciousness is unestablished, not coming to growth, non-generative (anabhisahkhdra), it is liberated.'^ A Buddha or Arhat therefore differs from a worldly being, for whom vinndna is still continually established in samsdra, in that their vinndna no longer has a support in cyclic existence {appatitthita-vinndna) unstablished consciousness here to mean a consciousness without the prospect of a future rebirth through the propulsive power of ignorance, craving, and the volitional formations. The Arahant is said to expire with consciousness "unstablished." Thus, with the passing away of the Arahant consciousness too ceases and no longer exists.^' After realizing nirvdna at the end of the process of karmically driven rebirth, vinndna, the stream of wordly consciousness which persists throughout one's countless lifetimes, also comes to an end, or is at least radically transformed. The cessation of vinndna is here closely identified with the destruction and cessation of the volitional formations which, we shall see, are necessary for the continued perpetuation of cyclic existence.^^

'* SN III 61: Viftfianassa nibbida viraga nirodha anupada vimutta te suvimutta. ''SNIII61. " MN II 265: Anupadano ... bhikkhu parinibbayati. " SN III 53: Tad apatitthitarp vififianam avirulhani anabhisankharafica vimuttam; Dutt, N., Early Monstic Buddhism, p. 285, Dutt comments on this sutta: "The sense of apatiffhita-vinnanam is given elsewhere in the Sarpyutta Nikaya, where it is explained as consciousness which arises only when attachment {rdga) to material elements of the body (rupa), and the other four constituents is removed. It is unconstituted, devoid of growth and independent of any cause and condition and hence free. IJeing free it is steady; being steady it is happy; being happy it is without any fear of change for the worse; being fearless it attains pann(6ia«a." ^° This is a common epithet of the Buddha or An Arhat. DN III 105; SN I 122; SN 11 66, 103; SN III 54. ^' SN II 83. ^^ As is oflen the case with the study of the early Pali texts, this statement needs some qualification. There are other passages that suggest that vinndna continues in some form beyond samsdric existence. Suttta-Nipata 734-735 describes both the cessation and calming of vinndna in the same breath: ^'M vinndna is destroyed, there will be no origin of suffering; through the calming oi vinndna the monk become free from craving and completely free"; MN 1 329 reads: "The consciousness that makes no showing, and in becoming about to dlsbecome, not claiming being with respect to all."

19 This consciousness {vinndna) also refers to cognitive awareness insofar as it arises in conjunction with specific objects. Whereas the ''samsdric" aspect oi vinndna is usually discussed in terms of what has resulted from past action (i.e. sahkhdra), "cognitive awareness" is also directly involved with the processes that generate new karma, and it is this karma that, in turn, causes ''sanisdric vinndna''' to continue being established in cyclic existence, thereby completing the vicious circle constituting the formula of dependent origination.

In this context vinndna is better rendered "cognitive awareness", since it is an awareness that arises in conjunction with specific cognitive objects. That is, a specific form of cognitive awareness arises when an appropriate object enters into its respective sense-sphere, impinging on its respective, unimpaired sense-organ (indriya) and there is sufficient attention thereto.'^'' Sense-object and sense-organ are thus correlatively defined: a visual object, by defmition, is that which impinges upon the eye. These cognitive modalities are, however, distinguished and classified by their object: "Cognitive awareness is reckoned by the particular condition dependent upon on the eye and forms, it is reckoned as eye - cognitive awareness ..." and so on.^"* Cognitive awareness for human beings is analyzed in terms of six specific modalities - visual, audio, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, and mental-cognitive awareness - based upon the five senses and mind. All of these arise in dependence upon the concomitance of their respective organs with their corresponding objects. However, in the causal syntax of dependent origination, cognitive awareness does not cognize anything - it is simply an awareness that arises when required conditions come together. Cognitive awareness is thus not an act of cognition; it simply is cognitive awareness

" This formula more elaborate is found for example, in MN 1 190: When internally the eye is intact and external forms come into its range and there is the corresponding [conscious] engagement, then there is the manifestation of the corresponding section of consciousness. " MN I 259.

20 itself?^ Thus cognitive awareness (vinndna) does not act; it does not in and of itself accrue karma. Only intentional activities generate karma. Thus, even though intentional activities are almost inevitably instigated by the affective accompaniments of cognitive awareness - vinndna itself is not the cause of karma; it is conceptualized altogether separately. It is apparent, moreover, that cognitive awareness arises depending, on the one hand, on specific objects within a particular cognitive domain, as well as, on the other hand, on volitional formation {sahkhdra) such as the sense faculties that result from previous karmic activities. And these are the very patterns described in the formula of Dependent origination.

2. The Characteristic of Consciousness

Consciousness is said to possess the characteristic of being 'luminous' ipabhassara) which reads: ''This mind, O monk, is luminous though contaminated by adventitious defilements; that mind, O monk, is luminous those it is cleansed of adventitious defilements.'' However, these statements

^' AKB. 1.42, p. 31: 3^^ 4^1:11^1*1 S^: / 1%ft^qran?f Tira^ / xT^ ^[^ -^c^qif^T xjhqij^

Manas, etc., and in union with the ego-soul—this is what is taught by the best of speakers. The Mind is primarily pure, but the Manas, etc., are other than that; varieties of karma are accumulated by them, and thus there are defilements giving rise to dualism). Other longer, and hence later, recessions of the prajfiaparamita elaborate the luminous mind (prabhasvara citta) concept. The result is the idea that mind is devoid of the contamination of the defilement in its enlightened state. ^ariputra said, 'what is it that the luminous mind consists of? Subhuti replied, 'the luminously of the mind O Sariputra is such that it is neither associated with passions nor non-associated with it. It is neither associated with hate, delusion, the irruption, the obstruction, the residue, the hindrances and the false verses nor non-associated with them'. (Pailcavimsatisahasrika, Dutt, N. (ed.), 1934, p. 121-122: ¥%flra:PT

21 taken independently of other statements and concepts in the early discourses have led to much confusion, some holding that 'luminosity' implies 'natural purity' iprakrtipra-bhdsvardf^ and others implying a 'neutral' nature.'^* In the first place, the epistemological standpoint of the Buddha, which recognizes the 'inconceivability of the beginning' (anamatagga) of things, certainly prevented him from subscribing to a notion of natural or original purity. Secondly, the negative statement that consciousness, as it occurs in the individual, lacks luminosity is to be found elsewhere.^^ Here consciousness is compared to gold-ore (Jdtarupa, lit. 'The form in which it has come to be') which is to be purified by a process of washing and smelting before being converted to pure gold (suvama). Similarly, consciousness, when it arises in the individual, is not completely pure, but contains within it the defiling elements (kilesas), just as g old comes to be in the form of gold-ore. When the Buddha maintained that consciousness is luminous, thereby he merely implyed the possibility of it being purified. If this purification does not take place, it will continue to be defiled by adventitious elements. Then total reconditioning of the mind {visankkhdragatam cittam) will not be a reality. Luminosity is best understood in terms of the capacity of consciousness to depict whatever is presented to it together with its own contribution to what is presented, like a crystal that reflects various shades of light, the objectively given as well as its own mixture of what is objectively given.

" Lanka. X.753-754, p. 156: n^;%^in<(T // 28 Rahula, Walpola., Zen and the Taming of the Bull: Towards the definit ion of Buddhist Thought, p. 52. ^'SNII 178. '° AN I 253.

22 Three other characteristics of consciousness are enumerated in the early discourses. They are the characteristics of being (a) signless {anidassanain), (b) boundless (anantam) and (e) all luminous {sabbato pabham).

However, we find that vinndna displays the characteristics of all conditioned phenomena: namely the truths of imperaianence and selflessness. For example, The Dyad Sutta emphasizes that in dependence on the eye and forms there arises eye-consciousness. The eye is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise; forms are impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise ...Eye-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of eye-consciousness is also impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. When, bhikkhus, eye- consciousness has arisen in dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent... Mind-consciousness is impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. The cause and condition for the arising of mind- consciousness is also impermanent, changing, becoming otherwise. When, bhikkhus, mind-consciousness has arisen in dependence on a condition that is impermanent, how could it be permanent? ^^ And the Alagaddupama Sutta stresses as that vinndna itself is impermanent.''^ And it is mentioned elsewhere that those who believe that vinndna has a destiny of its own, distinct from the other four khandhas, are misled as to its true nature.^"* Therefore, it is clear that, neither vinndna nor any of the other aggregates can be considered as permanent or as occupying the place of an everlasting self

Thus, Buddhism denies the existence of a substantial and everlasting soul (dtman) but unlike materialistic traditions, Buddhism never negates the existence of consciousness. From a Buddhist point of view, consciousness is

^' DN I 223. " SN IV 67-69. MN I 138; also SN IV 67-68: Tarp kirp manflatha bhikkhave. Vinnanam niccam va aniccarp va ti? Aniccai^ bhante. SN III 53: Yo bhikkhave evaqi vadeyya: aham aflfiatra rupa anfiatra vedanaya aflfiatra safifiaya afifiatra sankkharehi viflflanassa agatirp va gacirp va cutim va upapattim va vuddhirn va virulhim va vepullarp va paftflapessami ti n'etaip thanam vijjati.

23 differentiated from the soul^^ in that the former is an ever-changing, momentary, and impermanent element. Mind is the only ultimate reality, every individual mind is constantly changing and being remodeled under the influence of causal law, because, it is a definite product created out of nothing by the interaction of the indriyas and visayas. Consciousness, however, is considered to continue like a stream of thought, or human consciousness (vimdna-sota) or a stream of becoming {bhava-sota), and is thought to be somehow transmitted fi-om one life to the next, thus enabling karmic causality over lifetimes. This continuity of consciousness represents, in a sense, the personal identity. Consciousness also keeps the body alive and distinguishes animate beings firom inanimate elements. Therefore, consciousness is one of the key factors of Buddhism.

This concept of ever-changing vinndna, of "non-entity," seems also to be in complete accord with William James' understanding of consciousness:

"To deny plumply that "consciousness" exists seems so absurd on the face of it - for undeniably "thought" do exist - that I fear some readers would follow me no further. Let me then immediately explain that I mean only to deny that the word stands for an entity, but to insist most emphatically that it does stand for a function.

Thus, the analysis of the human personality {ndma-rupa) into five aggregates is intended to show the absence of a psychic self (dtman). Therefore, to elucidate the meaning of vinndna we should, as James recommends, approach it as an abstract function, an intangible mental operation, just as we have approached all the other mental aggregates.

'' Citta defined as the awareness of an object, since there is no agent like a soul. '*DN III 105; the stream of consciousness coupled with volitional information (safikhdra) provided a more realistic explanation of the notion of human progress or development. '^ SN I 15; for the Buddha, who rejected such a metaphysical self, volitional information (sankhara) and consciousness (vinndna) constituting the stream of becoming (bhava-sota) provided a better means of explaining human progress or designation. •'* James, William, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 4.

24 3. Function of Consciousness In Buddhism consciousness and body, mind and matter, represented merely functions. Consciousness iyifindna) stood for its function is aware of an object (yijdndtiti vinndnam)?^ Similarly, form (rupa), which represents the manner in which we get to know what is called "matter" (mahdbhuta), represents nothing more than the function of resisting {rupatiti rupam). However, scholars hold that function of vinndna merely consists of apprehending the bare phenomenal world, "the immediately known thing which on the mental side is in opposition with the entire brain process." Stcherbatsky's interpretation is typical:

Consciousness represents pure consciousness or pure sensation, without any content. Its content is placed in the objective part which contains the definite sensation (sparsa), feeling (vedand), ideas (samjna), volition {cetand). 42

He continues:

... vijndna and its synonymous, cittd, manah, represent pure sensation, the same as the kalpandpodha pratyaksa of Dignaga, and samjna corresponds to definite ideas. Every construction (kalpand), eveiy abstraction (udgrahana), every definite (parichinna) representation, such as blue and yellow, long and short, male and female, friend and enemy, happy and miserable - this is all brought under the head of ideas (samjna) as distinguished from vijndna = pure sensation.'*^

'' SN III 87: Vijanati kho bhikkhave tasma vififianaip ti vuccati. *° SN III 87. ^' Jams, William., Principles of Psychology, p. 142. *^ Stcherbatsky.Th., The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 15; Consciousness, it is stated, never arises alone, since it is pure consciousnes;; or pure sensation, without any content. It is always supported or "introduced" by two elements: a cogn tive faculty (manas) and a corres|X)nding objective element. These are the supporters or the "doors" (dvdra) ::'or consciousness to appear. Eye-c;onsciousness (cak^ur-vijiidna) arises in correlation (pratityd) with the sense: of vision (cakfur-indriya) and some colour {rupam ca). In the case of the sixth cognitive (manas), consciousness itself, i.e., its preceding moment, acts as a faculty for apprehending non-sensuous objects. "^ Stcherbatsky.Th., The Central Conception of Buddhism, p. 19.

25 Stcherbatsky's theory receives support from scholars such as E.R. Sarathchandra, who advocates that when the term vinndna was "applied to the psychology of perception, it meant not full cognition, but bare sensation, a sort of anoetic sensation that occurs before the object is completely apprehended."'*'' Jayatilleke also agrees, quoting the Vibhangatthakatha to the effect that visual consciousness means mere visual perception.

The theory that correlates vinndna with bare sensations devoid of any content seems to be inconsistent with certain passages of the Pali canon, since the Majjhima Nikaya indicates that the function of vinndna is to "cognize" or "aware"'*^ what is pleasant, painful and neither painful nor pleasant."*^

In above discussion of contact above, it is pointed out that for a stimulus to be perceived, the presence of three elements is required. There must be a sense-object iyisaya), a sense-organ {indriya) and attention or consciousness {vinndna). Only when these three elements come together can a stimulus be perceived. This implies, however, that vinndna itself is present before the stimulus has appeared, and that the former is independent of the later. Vinndna as pure consciousness or mere attention does not necessarily need to be conscious of or attentive to something in order to exist. So, it seems that the "act of attention" is precisely the function of vinndna.

Having bounded this very important warning that consciousness is merely a function and not an entity by itself or an entity belonging to a substantial agent, a warning similar to one that was given centuries later by

An William James, Buddha resorted to the use of nominal forms such as vinndna, citta and mano in his discourses are considered synonym. In the

** Sarathchandra, E.R., Buddhist Theor}> of Perception, p. 4. "' Jayatilleke, K.N., The Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, p. 436. ''* The Pali phrase defining consciousness uses only the verb, vijanati, and this could as well be understood to mean "One cognizes, one cognizes." *' MN 1 292; MN III 242: Kifi ca vijanati: suichan ti pi vijanati, dukkhan ti pi vijanati, adukkhamasukhan ti pi vijanati. ''* James, William., Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 3.

26 Theravada Tipitaka as well as in the Pali Commentaries, these three terms - citta, mano (S. manas), vijndna - are considered as synonym denoting the same thing/^ The Sarvastivada also takes them as synonym as they ivre described in Abhidharmakosa. It states that citta, mano and vijndna designate the same thought.^'' Since any one of these three terms - citta, manas, vijndna - represents some aspect, even though not all aspects, of the fifth aggregate vijndna-skandha, or the third link of dependent origination vinndna, they may roughly be considered as synonymous.

It is extremely important to realize that the different contexts in which these terms are to used indicate that they have both a general and specific sense.

In a general sense vinndna, citta and mano refer to conscious life; all denote function of mentation and, therefore are considered synonym.^'

•" SN II 94: Cittaip iti pi mano iti viftnanam iti pi; DN 121: Yam ... idairi vuccati cittan ti va mano ti va vlftfiarian ti va. Vsm. 452: Viflfianarp cittam, mano ti attiiato ekam. These are ail names for tiie mind base (manayatana); see also in the Vibhaiiga, p. 403, to the question katamani satta cittani "what are the seven minds?" the answer is: cakkhuvififianarn, sota-ghana-jivha-kayaviflfianarri, manodhatu, manovififianadhatu. So citta, mano and vififlana are synonymous. DhammasaiiganT also (p. 209) to the question katame dhamma citta? Gives the same answer as the above in Vibhafiga. Visuddhimagga, p. 383 says: viftnanam cittatn manoti atthato ekatp. ^ AKB. II 34a, p. 61-62 states that: "l^ra" IT^OT Q^nA*l«f- f^lnlcilQ f^IW / ^R^ ^ TR: /

'M T# R^nftc4cbM:/; APTMCSL [HSSsi^M], T. 29, No. 1558, p.21-3: MB - ^MWi^'b '

^^PfX^fft^h^S^M^^'M - -"SSSi^ffnlaS— ° (The mind is termed citta because it accumulates (cinoti), it is mannas because it knows (manute); and it is termed vijndna because it distinguishes its objects (dlambanant vijndnati). Hence these three names express different meanings, but they designate the same object; in this same way. Even the Lankavatarasutra, which is purely a Mahayana text, calls them synonyms although their separate functions are mentioned elsewhere in the same sutra (Laiika. X.400, p. 316: ft?il^H i^^Hlfi ^rrar T^ 5^:; and Lanka. X.461, p. 323:1^1%? 8^ CRI^ IRT ipqft" t ^T^ / Hr^HT i^riRlM^" Ig^t:

W Rj-^fti If); Vasubandhu, too, in his Vitpsatikavijflaptimatratasiddhi considers them as synonyms. (Vijflaptimatratasiddhi 1: fw M^ ^TR iq^iitui^ W^:ll). And Mahayana paficaskandhaprakarana also mentions them as synonyms. (Paflca 112-113: ^WTl%TWTOti%jIRtnf^// (TCWYL ['^^'EMM], T. 31, No. 1612,p.849c27:^E>0'^^'DSo ) ' SN II 94: Cittarp iti pi mano iti vinfiatjam iti pi; DN I 21: Yarp ... idam vuccati cittan ti va mano ti va vififiaijan ti va. Vsm. 452: Vififlanatp cittam, mano ti atthato ekarn. These are all names for the mind base

27 In a specific or limited sense they have been defined and differentiated. The term citta has so many meanings according to Dhammasahgani all of which are explained in the Atthasalinl, that the other schools of Buddhist thought who had an Abhidharma, singled out a certain function of mind and so avoided the tautology. Since the various terms for what we call mind is extremely relevant for a proper understanding of complex psychic phenomena, they may be given here together with the explanation by the Atthasalinl. It is called citta, for following reasons firstly; of the varieties of attitudes; manas, secondly of its measuring (i.e., taking stock of, interpreting) the sensed objects; manasa, though identical with manas, thirdly the functional aspect is stressed hrdaya (heart), fourthly of inwardness; pandara (transparency), fifthly in every experience there partakes something of the indeterminate and ineffable luminous continuum, in and through, and out of which all experiences come to pass, and which in its purity and lucidity apart from the sensed and introspected differentiations. It is more emotionally, moving and spiritually satisfying the sensed or introspected data, which only veil and limit the brightness and boundlessness of 'mind'. It is called mano mandyatana in the sense of birth-place, inasmuch as such factors like phassa and the like originate in it; in the sense of a meeting-place, inasmuch as the data of the outer objects, visible, audible, olfactory, gustatory, and tangible, assemble here as objects of the manas; and in the sense of cause inasmuch as it is the necessary antecedent for the co-existence of such functional patterns as phassa and the like. It is called vinndna, because it of discriminating nature, and vinndna-kkhandha with respect to the complexity of psychic processes among which the consciousness is a specific aspect, and above all to point out

(mandyatana); also see Hamilton Sue, Identity and Experience: The Constitution of the Human Being According to Early Buddhism, Chapter 5. '^ DhammasanganT 6 (£/7«mera//'o« of the Ultimate Realities), p. 36: What at that time is thought? That which at that time is thought, cognition, knowing, mind (lit., heart), purity, mind as the sphere of mind, faculty of mind, consciousness, aggregate of consciousness, mind-consciousness-element appropriate to those mental concomitants - this at that time is thought. " Asi. Ill 274-276.

28 the fact that though general psychological natures (sabhdva) are operating in every individual, yet they cannot be said to have an individual nature of their own {nissatta dhdtu), because there are too many factors which condition and influence the nature of mind. Let us see what is conisciousness?

3.1. Consciousness (P. vinhana, S. vijhdna)

The main focus of the Buddhist analysis of reality is experience and consciousness is the principal element in experience, as it constitutes the knowing or awareness of an object.

Consciousness is defined in Sarnyutta Nikaya: Because it recognizes, it is called consciousness.^"* Consciousness may define as the relation between drammanika (subject) and drammana (object).^^ This relation is spoken of in the language of the 'Patthana'^^ as drammana-paccaya which means the relation of presentation. In this relation the object presented is iQim^d paccaya en (the relating thing) and the subject, paccayuppanna (the related thing). Thus, these two terms are relative, one implying the other - that is to say, the subject cannot exist without the object, and vice verse. Vifindna means 'discrimination' in the sense of cutting up a whole into parts and selecting them. It is termed vijndna because it distinguishc;s its objects {dlambanam vijndndti) and to the extent that it grasps the support through the organ and its subject (dsritabhutd), it is vijndnaP Thus when the word consciousness is used, it appears to refer mainly to the cognitive fiinction directed to its object. This shows that, from the Buddhist point of view, vifindna has been used in two different meanings; it is the impression relative to each object or

^* SN III 87. " Abhs. p. 2. ^* Patlhana is the title given to the Seventh Boole of the Abhidhamma Pifaka, which treats of the related modes of existence. It is, therefore, essentially the Buddhist Philosophy of Relations, covering more ground than the Association Philosophy, which deals with the association of ideas only. '' Paccaya is lit. Pafi =back to, and aya=go\ng. Paccaya uppanna is lit. uprisen-as related, or - in relation. '* Lanka. X.461, p. I37:f^?nT l^railw %I^: ^RF f^i^/T.16. p.576.2: m^'b^W ftS^it5^S!l. '* AKB. 11.34a, p. 61: J^^JlMlrflR 1^^/.... 3Tlf^nT^ I^,HHfIlrilM> /

29 Prativijnaptf'^ and relative to consciousness, the point of support or cognition of object.^' And this function is connected with the senses so that, strictly speaking, vinndna corresponds to our 'sensing'. Therefore, vinndna signifies the particularizing awareness through a sense faculty, as in the standard sixfold sense vimdnas (eye-consciousness, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind- consciousness). Eye-consciousness ^^ arises accomplishing the function of seeing in the eye door and having the eye-sensitivity as its physical basis. And likewise ear, nose, tongue, body-consciousness and mind-consciousness arise respectively.

In addition to these, it may be said that apart from rupa or matter, all the four other skandhas (vedand, samjfid samskdra and vijndnd) work internally through the mind.

Another aspect of the function of Consciousness may be regarded as the cause, the origin and the condition of name-and-form as mentioned above - but it is not an entity: it includes six groups: eye - consciousness exists when there exists the contact between eyes and forms, ear - consciousness exists when there exists the contact between ears and sounds, ..., and mind - consciousness exists when there exists the contact between mind and mental objects. If the contact does not exist, consciousness cannot be present and

*° Ibid, 1.16a, p. 11: i5?IM' w(did|?lii

*' Ibid, 1.44, P. 34: TRirWTewr / *^ Eye-consciousness has the characteristic of being supported by the eye and cognizing visible data. Its function is to have only visible data as its object. It is manifested as occupation with visible data. Its proximate cause is the departure of the functional mind-element that has visible data as its object. The eye does not see a visible object because it has no mind or consciousness. The consciousness does not see because it has no eyes. But when there is the impingement of door and object he sees by means of the consciousness that has eye-sensitivity as its physical basis. In other words, if the eye were to see the visible object, then (organs) belonging to other kinds of consciousness would see too; but that is not so. Why? Because the eye has no thought (acetatta). And then, were consciousness itself to see a visible object, it would see it even behind a wall because of being independent of sense-resistance (appafighabhavato); but that is not so either because there is no seeing in all kinds of consciousness. And herein, it is consciousness dependent on the eye that sees, not just any kind. And that does not arise with respect to what is enclosed by walls, etc., where light is excluded. But where there is no exclusion of light, as in the case of crystal or a mass of cloud, there it does arise even with respect to what is enclosed by them. So it is as a basis of consciousness that the eye sees.

30 cannot operate. So, consciousness is but the existence of a group of conditions which must not be regarded as the "I", the "mine" or the "myself"

Similarly, vijndna may be cognized through manovijndna and may develop more complexities when combined with vedand (feelings), samjnd (perception) and samskdra (volitional formation).

3.2. Mano (S. Manas)*^

Manas is minding, that is, discerns. It is mannas because it knows (manute), because it is a support, it is manas.^^ But the authors of the commentary say: like measuring by the ndU or balancing by a great weight, mind knows the object. It exercises government (over associated state) by the characteristic of measuring; hence it is a controlling faculty, giving the compound 'mind-faculty.'^^ Sanskrit English Dictionary defined that on the etymology of the word manas is mind, intellectual, perception etc., derived from Sanskrit root man "to think, believe, imagine, suppose, and conjecture." ^^ So the function of the manas as 'measuring' or 'taking stock', it is obvious that the immediately sensed colours, sounds, fragrances, flavours, are not the mere effects of the action of material substances upon the otherwise absolutely blank mental substances which by means of some mysterious faculty then project out of themselves what we call our conscious world. Sense perception is essentially a process of symbolic formation.^^ A mano-

*^ The Sanskrit term manas (Pali mano) always implies somewhat of an intellectual process. On the etymology of the word manas is mind, intellectual, perception etc., derived from Sanskrit root man "to think, believe, imagine, suppose, conjecture," manas is related to the Latin mens, "mind, reason, intellect", and ultimately to the English "mind, mentate," and "to mean" (PED 515, 520; SED., p. 783). It may be stated that both the manas and the manovifindna (dhdtu) this differentiation is met with only in the works of the Pali tradition, while the Yogacaras use only one term, viz., manas to denote subliminal processes leading up to an actual awareness. " AKB. 11.34, p. 61-62: ^ # ^H: / rl^SW^ iR: /; Laiika X.400, p. 316: wm T^ 5?: /; T.16. p.574.3.

" Asl. 123. ^ SED. P. 783. " See Langer, Susanne K., Philosophy in a New Key, p. 73.

31 vimdna has been listed as having the mams for its basic. Thus, Mano is said to represent the rational faculty of man, Mano serves as the third door of action (along with body and speech) and as the sixth internal sense base (along with the five physical sense bases); as the mind base it coordinates the data of the other five senses and also cognizes mental phenomenal (dhammaf^, its own special class of objects. As Kalupahana elucidates this point:

In fact, its [mano's] flinction is to assist in bringing back the impression produced by the other sense faculties and, as such, constitutes a form of "reflection." Mano, therefore, has "concept" (dhamma) as its objects, and these are generally considered substitutes for percepts. ... While mano is performing this special function, consciousness (vinndna) constitutes to flow uninterrupted like a stream fed by all the faculties including manoJ^

The Brahmin Unnabha Sutta of the Samyutta Nikaya explains the

71 function of mano. According to this text, each of the first five sense-organs has a different domain (visaya) and field (gocara), none of which are interchangeable. In other words, the eye cannot perceive smell. Yet mano is common to them all in the sense that it is able to interact with all the other sense-organs. The text does not imply that mano perceives smells, visual forms, etc., but only that it can perceive the concept (dhamma) that was derived fi"om the percept apprehended by one of the first five sense-organs. It

^ AKB. 1.17, p. 11: 3Trn?Rr«I^rafeg:^ n^l^^uRy: / APTMCSL [M^B^iM^^ml T. 29, No. 1558, p. 4b: W>f\MM,M^^l^iR ° Mf^itHi'SlMWM ' (Consequently, with a view to attributing a point of support to this consciousness, one calls manas or inanodhatu). *'Dhp. v.l: Manopubbangama dhamma manosepa manomaya, manasa ce padu^hena bhasati va karoti va, tato naip dukkhamanveti cakkarn'va vahato padaip. ™ Kalupahana, David J., The Principles of Buddhist Psychology, p. 30. " The same conversation is recorded is recorded at MN I 295. Though the five faculties are usually identified with the physical sense organs, here they seem to correspond to the five kinds of sense consciousnesses, for the physical sense faculties cannot properly be said to experience (paccanubholi) an objective domain (visaya) or resort (gocara). Their function is only to serve as the media through which consciousness cognizes objects. SN V 218: Paflcimani brahmana indriyani nanavisayani nanagocarani na anfiamannassa gocaravisayarn paccanubhonti. Katamani paflca? Cakkhundriyarn. Pe ... kayindriyaip. imesarn kho brahmana paflcannam indriyanaip nanavisayanaip nanagocaranarn na aflfiamaflfiassa gocaravisayarn paccanubhontanam manopajisaraoarri mano ca nesaip gocaravisayarp paccanubhotTti.

32 shows that mano is endowed with a special function distinct from that of all the other sense-organs: mano has the ability to survey the fields (gocara) of the other senses. The term "field" does not refer to the sense-object itself, but to the actual contact betsveen the sense-object, the sense-organ and the respective vinndna, which implies that mano is not the "original and transcendental condition" of all experience. It is merely one of the conditions and, according to the Buddha, a condition that give rise to the belief in a permanent and eternal self and is also the cause of a great deal of suffering for the human beings. The sense-object as much is merely a potential object of perception, and, as long as it has not been apprehended by the senses and the consciousness, it can not become an object of mano. Once contact has taken place, a percept arises. This percept may be visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory or tactile. In its turn, the percept becomes a potential object of mano, potential in the sense that not all percepts come in contact with both mano and a vinndna. However, when it does come in contact with these two other faculties, the percept itself is technically termed dhammdyatana for it becomes the direct object of mano.

As Buddhagho§a states that "immediately after the activity of visual perception or other sense perceptions has ceased, the manas which discriminates the visual object from other objects begins to function; its function is receiving the visual percept or the other percepts; its actual manifestation is suchness; and the moment from whence it starts its action, is the moment or situation when the activity of visual perception or of the other sense perceptions has ceased."^^

" Vism. 455; see also Asl. Ill 578.

33 3.3. Citta The Pali word citta is derived from the verbal root citi or Sanskrit cit, to cognize, to know7'* Citta signifies thought or mind^^ as the centre of personal experience, as the subject of thought, volition, and emotion.

The grammarian's definition of the term citta (mind) is arammanam cintetrti cittam (thought = thinking of an object). Here the word cinteti (to think) is used in its most comprehensive sense of vijdndti (to know). Mind is, then, ordinarily defined as that which is conscious of an object. This is called the kattu-sddhana definition, or definition by which an agency is attributed to the thing denoted by the term. It is no doubt the most convenient mode of defining terms.''' According to commentary, citta is so called from thinking (cit) of an object, or because it is variegated {citta, citra)?^

The mind is termed citta because it accumulates (cinoti). And citta's function as the selecting principle of good and evil, and is ethically wholesome, or unwholesome.'^ It may be pure or impure.*^ Let us single out some sentences for illustration: 'with a mind that is open and undeveloped, he develops the mind imbued with luminosity';^^ 'with his own mind released, without acquisitions.^^ 'A desire of his heart he shall exclude from this.'^^

'" SED. p. 395. " T. W. Rhys-Davids and W. Stede.; PED., p. 266: Citta is derived from verb root cit, 'to thinic' citta is also characterized by the "process-product'' bivaience found in oilier Buddhist term. Citta is the centre and focus of man's emotional nature as well as that intellectual element which inheres in and accompanies its manifestations: In this wise citta denotes both the agent and that which is enacted; Guenther H. V., From Reductionism to Creativity, p. 1: makes similar observations. It should be note here that citta (verb: cit) and cetas (verb: cet) are almost identical in meaning and application. In promiscuous application there is no cogent evidence of a clear separation of their respective fields of meaning; a few instances indicate the role of cetas as seat of citta, where most of them show no distinction. As ceto is preferred in ceto-khila and ceto-vimutti (but vimutta-citta), whereas is restricted to combination with upakkilesa, etc. " Abhs., p. 2. " Asl. p. 49; Abhidhammatthasaiigaho with AbhidhammatthavibhavanTtika, p. 30. ''AKB. 11.34 p. 61-62: i^^fra^ 1^ / f%^ Vpil?p^«rf^^

'" AKB. 11.9, p. 42: TiraafTti^RreraTn^ / *' SN V 263; DN III 223; AN IV 86: Vivafna cetsa sappabhasam cittam bhaveti. '^ SN I 194: cetasa cittam samannesati vippamuttarn. " SN IV 195: Cetaso tato cittaiii nivaraye.

34 'The world is led around by mind; by mind it's dragged here and there. Mind is the one thing that has, all under its control'.*"* Or 'O Bhikkhu, the world is led by mind, by mind it is drawn along. When mind has arisen, it goes under its sway."^^ Buddhagho§a the later commentator of Pali literature establishes four meanings for citta: (1) it is citta that thinks of its objects, is aware variously. Or, inasmuch as (2) this word 'citta' is common to all states or classes of citta, that which is known as worldly, moral, immoral, or the great inoperative, (3) it is termed 'citta,'' because it arranges itself in a series (cinoti, or, its own series or continuity) by way of apperception in a process of thought. And (4) the resultant is also termed 'citta' because it is accumulated (cito) by kamma and the corruptions.^^

All these four classes are termed 'citta' because they are variegated (citra) according to circumstance. The meaning of citta is also understood from its capacity of producing a variety or diversity of effects.

Citta, to be sure, is not a phenomenon existing per se and detached from all psychic factors but is intimately connected with all of them and only precedes them (and also, of course, accompanies them). As we are told: "Citta does not arise singly. Just as in saying, 'the king has arrived, it is clear that he does not come alone without his attendants, but comes attended by his retinue, so this mind should be understood to haven arisen with more than fifty moral (mental) phenomena. Citta as such has come as a forerunner.*''

Therefore, mind can not be isolated form its lunctions. One, actually experiences many mental facts put together and channelised in a particular direction.

^ SN1 39: Cittena niyati loko, cittena parikassati, cittassa ekadhammassa sabbeva vasam anvaguti. AN II 177: Cittena kho bhikkhu lokoniyati cittena parikassati, cittassa uppannassa vasam gacchatlti. Vism. p. 21-22,452-454; Asl., part II, chapter 1, p. 63. " Asl. II 67.

35 Now, let us go to the meaning that the term citta suggests. On one hand, citta is sometimes used in a way that suggests a personal identity from existence to existence. The Udana says, "Without understanding the thoughts of his inner sense he runs with restless citta^^ fromexistenc e to existence." Hence citta seems to signify a surviving entity. This is one hand of the spectrum. On the other hand, citta is clearly used for thought processes. Citta is called samudaya-dhamma (something that comes to be) and vaya-dhamma (something that passed awsiy).^^ As mentioned above, one extreme is the decision that citta is surviving entity from existence to existence; the other extreme is that citta is merely a thought or an idea. It is citta that needs to be understood, trained, and liberated. Citta, when thoroughly infiised with wisdom is set quite free from the taint (dsava). The dsavas, then, are deeply seated propensities that drive one to pursue and cling to pleasure, fiirther, existence, ignorance, and pernicious views and theories. They are the propensities that, due to ignorance and wrong views, compel man to desire and to become attached. Or one becomes free from samsdra only by eliminating or 'destroying' these dsavas, namely the maleficent influences of

*' Vism., 490; SN II 95: Mind just as a monkey roaming through a forest grabs hold of one branch, lets that go and grabs another, then lets that go and grabs still another, so t(X) that which is called 'mind' and 'mentality' and 'consciousness' arises as one thing and ceases as another by day and by night. The simile of the monkey should be understood thus: the "grove objects" is like the forest grove. The mind arising in the grove of objects is like the monkey wandering in the forest grove. The mind's taking hold of an object is like the monkey grabbing hold of a branch. Just as the monkey, roaming through the forest, leaves behind one branch and grabs hold of another, so the mind, roaming through the grove of objects, arises sometimes grasping hold of a visible object, sometimes a sound, sometimes the past, sometimes the present or future, sometimes an internal object, sometimes an external object. When the monkey does not find a new branch it does not descend and sit on the ground, but sits holding to a single leafy branch. So too, when the mind is roaming through the grove of objects, it cannot be said that it arises without holding to an object; rather, it arises holding to an object of a single kind. It should be noted that neither the sutta nor the commentary interprets the monkey simile here as saying that the untrained mind is as restless as a monkey; the point., rather, is that the mind is always dependent on an object. " DN II 299: And how, monks, does a monk abide contemplating mind as mind? Here, a monk knows a lustful mind as a lustful, a mind free from lust as free from lust; a hating mind as hating, a mind free from hate as free from hate; a deluded mind as deluded mind, an undeluded mind as undeluded; a contracted mind as contracted, a distracted mind as distracted; a developed mind as developed, an undeveloped mind as undeveloped; a surpassed mind as surpassed, an unsurpassed mind as unsurpassed; a concentrated mind as concentrated, an unconcentrated mind as unconcentrated; a liberated mind as liberated, an unliberated mind as unliberated.

36 sensual pleasure, existence, views and ignorance.

Thus, the importance of citta whether it ten(is to become involved in Samsdra or whether it tends to find its fulfillment and expression in Nirvana, is the key to philosophical anthropology.

In short, the different functions of vinndna, mano and citta can be summed in the words of BhikJdiu Nanamoli as follows:

Vinndna (rendered by "consciousness") is, loosely, more or less a synonym for mano and citta; technically, it is bare cognition considered apart fi-om feeling [vedand], perception [safind] or formation [sankhdra]. Mano (rendered by "mind"), when used technically, is confined to the sixth internal base for contact. Citta (rendered by 'mind and 'consciousness' or [manner of] consciousness'), when used technically, refers to a momentary type-situation considered as vinndna in relation to the tone of its concomitant feeling, perception and formations. Possibly a better rendering would have been 'cognizance' throughout. It carries a flavor of its etymological relative cetand ('volition'). ^^

4. Relation between vinnana and the paticcasamuppada

Before going to discuss correlation between vinndna and the paticcasamuppdda and pancakhandhas, we will glimpse what is the theory of Dependent Origination.

4.1. The Theory of Dependent Origination

The theory of dependent origination seeks to understand the dynamic relationship between ignorance, the afflictions, and their ensuing actions, by analyzing the patterns through which they arise, persist, and pass away in dependence upon their supporting condition. Every existing thing is

^ DN II 81; Johanson, the \erh paribhavita, "to be infused" is used in the Abhidharmakosa and in Yogacara texts in connection with the notion of seeds (bJJa) and impressions (vasana), and will have important implications for alaya-vijndna theory. " Vism. p. 507, note35.

37 conditioned. In fact, it is but the presence of conditions originating it, so it is selfless or unsubstantial. Those who can see this truth of Dependent origination, see existing things; those who can see existing things, see the principle of Dependent Origination. And those who can see those things see Lord Buddha Himself, as He said:

''•This has been said by the Blessed One: "One who sees Dependent origination sees the dhamma; one who sees the dhamma sees Dependent origination." This formula of Dependent origination was considered indispensable for reversing their deleterious consequences. Both these unmistakably refer to the samsdric continuance (paccayd) and release therefrom (nirodhd) of worldly beings.^^ These two together are identified as the core teachings of Buddhism relating to man and his liberation.^'* The simplest expression of this arising in dependence on conditions is formulated as follows:

"When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises. When this does not exist, that does not come to be; with the cessation of this, that ceases."^^

The theory of dependent origination is usually divided into twelve links (niddna), each of which conditions the following one. This is formulated in two directions: the conditions that lead from existence of one factor to the arising of the next {anuloma)^^ and in reverse order (patiloma), the conditions that lead to their cessation. In the text called Nidana-vagga or the Saying on Cause, the Buddha presents the traditional twelve links of the chain of

MN I 190-191: Yo paticcasamuppadam passati so dhammarn passati, yo dhammam passati so paticcasamuppadarp passatlti. It also repeated in SN 3 120: Yo kho Vakkali dhammam passati so mam passati, yo marp passati so dhammarfi passati. Atthi idappaccaya jaramaraiian'ti iti pufthena sata ananda atthT'ti'ssa vacanTyam MN 1 167; SN I 136: Alayaramaya kho pana pajaya ... duddasam idarn thanarn yadidam idappaccayata paticasamuppado. MN I 262-263; MN II 32: Imasmirp sati idatp hoti, imassa upada idam uppajjati. imasmim asati idaqi na hoti, imassa nirodha idatp nirujjhati. ** Literally [combing] "in the direction of the hair."

38 dependent origination in this same fashion, first describing the conditions leading to the arising of this world of suffering, and then, in reverse order, those leading to its cessation: "And what, Bhikkhus, is dependent origination? With ignorance as condition, volitional formations [come to be]; with volitional formations as condition, consciousness; with consciousness as condition, name-and-form; with name-and-form as condition, the six sense bases; with the six sense bases as condition, contact; with contact as condition, feeling; with feeling as condition, craving; with craving as condition, clinging; with clinging as condition, existence; with existence as condition, birth; with birth as condition, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair come to be. Such is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This, bhikkhus, is called dependent origination."

But with the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance comes cessation of volitional formations; with the cessation of volitional formation, cessation of consciousness; with the cessation of consciousness, cessation of name-and-form; with the cessation of name-and-form, cessation of the six sense bases; with the cessation of the six sense bases, cessation of contact; with the cessation of contact, cessation of feeling; with the cessation of feeling, cessation of craving; with the cessation of craving, cessation of clinging; with the cessation of clinging, cessation of existence; with the cessation of existence, cessation of birth; with the cessation of birth, aging- and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair cease. Such is the cessation of this whole mass of suffering.^^

Dependent origination is usually expounded in a sequence of twelve factors (dvddasdnga) joined into a chain of eleven propositions. In the

"SNII 1-2; MN I 54.

39 Nidanasamyutta this formula is cited many times. However, it briefly describes each of the twelve members or limbs (anga) of the series:

Ignorance (P. avijjd, S. avidya) Ignorance is defined as follows: "Not knowing suffering, not knowing the origin of suffering, not knowing the cessation of suffering, not knowing the way leading to the cessation of suffering." This definition shows that ignorance, as the most basic cause of samsdric existence, is lack of knowledge of the Four Noble Truths. Although in popular accounts ignorance is often identified with the ideal of self, "I am" or "I was" or "I will be" the definitions here show that the view of self is an aspect of clinging, which is itself conditioned by craving, while the latter is in turn conditioned by ignorance.^^ And it is ignorance which is the fountain-head of wrong thoughts, activities and suffering. It is the operation of ignorance which leads to volitional formations. Consciousness ... Old-age and Death ..., and therefore each element of the above means sulTering; man or life means suffering. j ^ |^ ^g ^

Volitional formations (P. sankhara, S.samskara)

There are three kinds of volitional formations: the bodily volitional formation, the verbal volitional formation, the mental volitional formation.'^°

This teaching means all the activities of a whole man are of sankhara. The so-called 'volition' is embodying for the inner spirituality of men. Therefore, forms, sounds, odours, tastes, tactile objects and mental phenomena are make up the phenomenon world and the volitional formation (sankhara) appears as the mental phenomena of it. The world people see

" SN II 4; MN I 54. ''See AN V U6. MN I 54; SN II 4: Tayo me, bhikkhave, sankhara kayasaiikharo vaclsankharo cittasaiikharo // Ime vuccanti, bhikkhave, sankhara; '°° SN III 60: Another time, Lord Buddha taught: "There are these six classes o f volition: volition regarding forms, volition regarding sounds, volition regarding odours, volition regarding tastes, volition regarding tactile objects, volition regarding mental phenomena. These are called volitional formation."

4 0 really is the world created by the volitional formation, and is the result of what people call "Volition to live".

Consciousness (vinnana) There are these six classes of consciousness: eye-consciousness, ear- consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body- consciousness, and mind-consciousness. This is called consciousness.

Consciousness is explained that: "And why, bhikkhus, do you call it consciousness? It cognizes,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness. And what does it cognize? It cognizes sour, it cognizes bitter, it cognizes pungent, it cognizes sweet, it cognizes sharp, it cognizes mild, it cognizes salty, it cognizes bland, 'it cognizes,' bhikkhus, therefore it is called consciousness."

Consciousness means that when sense-organ interfering matter-object in combining of one's cognition-subject is able to discriminate, decide, compare between the thing and that one. Because man discriminates and compares that is the source of man's knowledge, man's attachment to the world and man's sufferings.

Although vinnana is glossed in Samukta Nil<;aya as the six classes of consciousness or cognitive awareness, in this place in the series it is usually considered a rebirth consciousness which descends into, "take up", and thereafter animates the newly forming fetus, as described in this dialogue between Lord Buddha and Ananda:

SN II 4; SN III 61, MN 1 53: Cha ime avuso vififianakaya: cakkhuvifinanarn, sotavinflanam, ghanavififlanam, jihvaviftflanaiTi, kayaviflflanam, manoviflfianarn. "^ SN III 87; The Pali phrase defining consciousness uses only the verb, vijdndti vijdndti, and this could as well be understood to mean "One recognizes, one recognizes." MN I 292: It cognizes, it cognizes, friend; that is why 'consciousness' is said. What does it cognize? It cognizes: '[This is] pleasant'; it cognizes: '[This is] painful'; it cognizes: '[This is] neither-painful-nor-pleasant.' It cognizes, it cognizes, friend; that is why 'consciousness is said.

41 'I have said: "consciousness conditions mind-and-body." ..., Ananda, if consciousness were not to come into the mother's womb, would mind-and- body develop there?' 'No, Lord'. 'Or if consciousness, having entered the mother's womb, were to be deflected, would mind-and-body come to birth in this life?' 'No, Lord'.

Thus, consciousness is a mental quality. It is a very important factor to determine for the constitution of an individual. It is the bearer of individual life, life-force, and principle of conscious life.

Consciousness conditions name-and-form and other elements, so it is recognized as the subject of cognition, the object of cognition and the content of it. It exists in all mental, vocal and bodily activities.

Name-and-form (P. S. ndma-rupa)

Feeling, perception, volition, contact, attention: this is called name. The four great elements and the form derived from the four great elements: this is called form. Thus this name and this form are together called name-and form.'"^

Thus, Ndma-rupa refers to the psychological and physiological aspects of human experience that begin developing during the intra-uterine stage and continue throughout a single life. These represent the basic processes of the human mind and body and correspond closely to the five "aggregates of grasping" {updddna-khandha).

Six sense bases (P. saldyatana, S. sad-dyatana)

"" DN II 62-63. SN II 3-4, MN 53: Katamanca, bhikkhave, namarupam // Vedana safifia cetana phasso manasikaro // idairi vuccat'avuso namam, Cattari ca mahabhutani catunnamca mahabhutanamupadaya ruparn, idam vuccat'avuso rupaip, itldani ca namaipidani ca rupaniidarn vuccat'avuso namarupam.

42 The eye base, the ear base, the nose base, the tongue base, the body base, the mind base, these are called the six sense bases.'^'^

The term dyatana usually denotes the twelve sensory bases or domains, i.e., the six kinds of sensoiy organs along with their respective six kinds of sensory objects. The eye sees 'visibles' {rupa), the ear hear 'audibles' (sabda), etc. the twelve dyatana are regarded as the twelve bases upon which the six types of consciousness arise, viz. when the eye-organ and a 'visible' (riipa) come into contact, visual consciousness arises, and when the ear-organ and a sound make contact, auditory consciousness arises, etc. Each of these six consciousnesses is discrete and occurs separately from the others, though the sbith consciousness {mano-vinndna) to some extent appropriates and interprets the other five.'^^

Contact (P.phassa, S. sparsa)

"There are these six classes of contact: eye-contact, ear-contact, nose- contact, tongue-contact, body-contact, and mind-contact. This is called contact.'^^

Contact is simply means that the sense organs are 'in contact with' sensory objects. The circuit of intentionality is operation. Therefore, contact is only the meeting of three elements: sense organ, sense object and the consciousness regarding to the sense organ. "^^

Sensation or feeling (P. S. vedand)

'"' MN I 53; SN II 3: Kataitianca, bhikkhave, salayatanam, cakkhayatanam sotayatanam ghanayatanam jivhayatanam kayayatanam manayatanam, idaqi vuccati, bhikkhave, sajayatanam. The difficulty of accounting for this special function of mano-vijfiana both logically and epistemologically contributed to the Yogacara attempt to supplement the six vijilanas with two additional vijilanas, making eight in all. '° MN I 52; SN II 3: Katamo ca, bhikkhave, phasso // Chayime, bhikkhave,phassakaya: Cakkhusamphasso sotasamphasso ghanasamphasso jivhasamphasso kayasamphasso manosamphasso, Ayam vuccati, bhikkhave, phasso. "' MN I 111; SN IV 32: Cakkhufi c'avuso pa^icca rupe ca uppajjati cakkhuvifii\anaip tinnarp sangati phasso (The meeting of eye, form, and eye consciousness is called contact. Contact, according to dependent origination, is the principal condition of feeling.)

43 Lord Buddha taught: /'md what, bhikkhus, is feeling? There are these six classes of feeling: feeling bom of eye-contact, feeling bom of ear-contact, feeling bom of nose-contact, feeling bom of tongue-contact, feeling bom of body-contact, and feeling bom of mind-contact. This is called feeling.

Every instance of 'contact' is immediately perceived as either pleasure, pain or neutral. Pleasure feeling always produces more craving or desire (rdga) in one's mind. The painful feeling always produces anger {dosa). And neutral feeling arises from positively or negatively to reiterate pain and pleasure or delusion (moha). Feeling is, therefore, the source nurturing three root evil. It really is the maker of rebirth and suffering.

Craving (P. tartha, S. trsnd)

Lord Buddha taught: "And what, bhikkhus, is craving? There are these six classes of craving: craving for forms, craving for sounds, craving for odours, craving for tastes, craving for tactile objects, craving for mental phenomena. This is called craving.'"'

Craving or thirst is the cause of suffering. One comes into existence to live with his thirst for happiness and pleasures derived from the six classes of craving, and make man to perform an action in order to get more pleasure. But, unfortunately, everything, every pleasure changes from moment to moment, and this brings man doleful sufferings. Thus, craving is a result of ignorance. Buddhism reasserts the parity between avijjd and tanhd by arguing that reason itself is a passion, an expression of desire. This says that craving means the root cause of suffering, or suffering itself.

MN I 51; SN II 3: Katama ca, bhikkhave, vedana // Chayime, bhikkhave, vedanakaya, cakkhu- samphassaja vedana, sotasamphassaja vedana //kayasamphassaja vedana, manosamphassaja vedana, ayain vuccati, bhikkave, vedana. "" MN I 51; SN III 3: Katama ca, bhikkhave, tanha // Chayime, bhikkhave, tanhakaya // Rupatanha saddataijha gandhatanha rasatanha photthabbatanha dhammatanha, ayam vuccati, bhikkhave, tanha.

44 Clinging (P. S. Upadanaf^^

"There are these four kinds of clinging: cHnging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, clinging to rules and vows, clinging to a doctrine of self This is called clinging.''^ The truth of suffering of life forces men to grasp their desire and what he desires for as a means to look for happiness. Man then comes to consider his desire and thought to identify with and grasp onto it as his "self" This phenomenon produces the grasping of desire, opinion and soul-theory and strengthens ignorance and suffering.

Existence (P. bhava^ S. bhavd)

"There are these three kinds of existence: sense-sphere existence, form- sphere existence, formless-sphere existence. This is called existence.

Liberation from samsdra means the 'stopping' of existence {bhavd), i.e., the cessation of the 'existence' or bringing bhava to rest. As bhavdsava, the dsava of craving existencsj or lust for life, it is one of the subtle, basic underlying karmic problems that man must be overcome in order to awaken.

Birth (?. S. Jati)

The birth of the various beings into the various orders of beings, their being bom, descent [into the womb], production, the manifestation of the aggregates, the obtaining of the sense bases. This is called birth."'*

'" The AtthasalinT explains the word adana: {upa + adana) by suggesting that it means "to catch hold of strongly," and that its prefix upa merely adds an emphasis, just as in the words despair {upasaya) and denounced (upakkuffha). Dhs. 385: Upadanan ti dalhagahanarn, dal.hattho hi ettha upasaddo upayasa- upakkutthadfsu viya. ' ^ MN I 50-51; SN II 3: Katamanca, bhikkhave, upadanam, Cattarimani, bhikkhave, upadanani Kamupadanam ditthupadanam sTlabbatapadanam attavadupadanam, idaqi vuccati, bhikkhave, upadanarp. "'MN I 50; SN II 3: Katamo ca, bhikkhave, bhavo, tayo' me, bhikkhave, bhava: Kamabhavo rupabhavo ariipabhavo. Ayaip vuccati, bhikkhave, bhavo. "* MN I 50; SN II 3: Ya tesam sattanarn tamhi tamhi sattanikaye jati sanjati okkanti abhinibbatti khandhanarp patubhavo ayatananarn patilabho. Ayarp vuccati, bhikkhave, jati.

45 The appearance of man is nothing but ndma-rupa or the five aggregates of grasping. As each skandha is impermanent, suffering, and no-self, so, the appearance of five aggregates is that of the whole mass of ill.

Aging-and-death (P. SJam-marana) The Buddha taught that "And what, bhikkhus, is aging-and-death? The aging of the various beings in the various orders of beings, their growing old, brokenness of teeth, greyness of hair, wrinkling of skin, decline of vitality, degeneration of the faculties: this is called aging. The passing away of the various beings firom the various orders of beings, their perishing, breakup, disappearance, mortality, death, completion of time, the breakup of the aggregates, the laying doM'n of the carcass: this is called death. Thus this aging and this death are together called aging-and-death.''^

Thus, the entire chain of the twelve elements is the manifestation of the outer world and the inner world of a man; or rather the chain is typical for the psychological process that happening within a man.

Each of the links of the chain of dependent origination is, therefore, necessary for the emergence of the next element; yet none can definitely be perceived as a cause sufficient to engender the following link. Since this complex chain of causation is always said to give rise to suffering,"^ the deactivation of any of the twelve links is bound to break the causal process and to eliminate suffering.

4.2. Relation between Pancakhandhas and Viiinana

Through the explanation of dependent origination, we can see that vimdna holds a specific place in the theory of dependent origination

'" MN I 49; SN II 2-3: Katamanca, bhikkhave, jaramaranam. Ya tesam tesam sattanam tamhi tamhi sattanikaye jara jTrariata khandiccarp paliccarp valittaccata ayuno samhani indriyanairi paripako, ayarp vuccati jara. Yam tesam sattanam tesam tanha tanha sattanikaya cuticavanata bhedo antaradhanam maccumaranarp kalakiriya khandhanaip bhedo kalebarassa nikkhepo, idam vuccati maranam. Iti ayanca jara idanca maranaixi. Idarp vuccati, bhikkhave, jaramaranairi SN H 2: "This [the paticcasamuppada] is the origin of this whole mass of suffering." Evarp etassa kevalassa dukkhandhassa samudayo hoti.

46 (paficcasamuppada) as well as in the pancakhandas. As one of the links of the paticcasarnuppdda, vinndna is the third link of the chain, preceding volitional formation and succeeding name-and form. Vinndna is the fifth aggregate. We must keep larger picture in mind about the relationship between volitional formations (sankhdra) and consciousness (vinndna) within the series of dependent origination."^ Name-and-form as discussed in "the operation of the twelve elements of dependent origination" are the five aggregates of man (pancakkhandhas), therefore the operation of the twelve elements really is the operation of pancakkhandhds. Since the last of the aggregate is vinndna, it will again engender a new set of aggregates until one breaks the chain of samsdra. This theory is further evidenced by two major canonical passages. The first is found in the Samyuttanikaya, where Sariputta - the Buddha's disciple known as the commander-in chief of dharma (dharmasenapdti)^^^ - explains to Mahakotthita that name-and-form are conditioned by vinndna and that vimdria is also conditioned by name and form,"^ The second passage is from the Dlghanikaya where the Bodhisattva VipassT is said to have reflected on the nature of consciousness and of name- and-form. The result of his reflection is the same as that of Sariputta: vinndna conditions name and form, and vice versa.'^° This clearly shows that vinndna can either be approached as the last aggregate. 1 therefore offer evidence supporting the correlation between the pancakhandds and the links of the chain of dependent origination {paticcasarnuppdda); the establishment of such

' Samskdraprapratyayam vijnanam is crucially important to ail interpretations of the principle of dependent origination, and in any technical discussion of the formula. This consciousness laid the groundwork for the Yogacarin idea of the Slaya-vijnana. PratTtyasamudpadavyakhya of Vasubandhu, p. 21a3-4; Mahayanasarpgraha of Asaiiga, 1.33; Trims: rt^lnamarupa ti ... namariipe kho sati viflfiariarTi hoti, namarupapaccaya viiifianarn ti."

47 a relationship will clarify tlie meaningfulness of the traditional nomenclaUire of the pancakhandds. The Buddha taught that we can best understand the continuity of sentient existence in terms of the cause-and-effect relationships in the concept of karma and exemplified in the recurrent patterns of dependent origination. In other words, ignorance conditions the volitional formations, the volitional formations condition consciousness, and so on. That is to say, the workings of karma and its consequences as depicted in the series of dependent origination is the Buddhist theory of continuity, the continuity of the dependent relations between the volitional formations, the arising of cognitive awareness, and so forth. Consciousness expressed in two typical formulations for the arising of vinndna:

Dependent on the volitional formations (sankhdra) vinndna arises.'^'

Dependent on the eye and forms, eye-consciousness arises.'^^

We can discern a deeper and unexpected relationship between these two "aspects" of vinndna: they virtually condition each other. On the one hand, '"''sarnsdric''' vinndna constitutes one of the preconditions for any "cognitive" vinndna to occur in the first place, since sentience beings are necessarily concomitant with all animate life that is only living beings have cognitive awareness and on the other hand, vinndna as cognitive awareness is at the center of the various processes within which volitional formations arise. We have established a correlation between the third link of the Paticcasamuppdda and the fifth aggregate (vinndna-khandha). Now we come to see vinndna as Rebirth and Death Consciousness.

SN II 2. The vijmna that is dependent on the samskdras also can be understood in two different senses, the rebirth consciousness (pratisatndhivijfidna) and the six ordinary forms of consciousness {^advijmnakdya), respectively. '^^SNII73.

48 5. Viiinana as Rebirth and Death Consciousness We have to note that the explanation of the vimdna is often hmited to the first consciousness that enters the mother's womb which would be a rebirth-consciousness occurs in the early texts'^^ and in the formulations of Dependent origination.'^'' In later literature, however, we find that the vimdna 125 is associated not only with the nineteen types of rebirth-consciousnesses, but also with the other types of consciousness that may arise from this "original" consciousness. This consciousness laid the groundwork for the Yogacarin idea of the dlaya-vijnana. This consciousness is often interpreted as being either a rebirth- consciousness {patisandhivinndna) or a death-consciousness {cuticitta) - more literally, a "departing" consciousness. '^^ The death-consciousness constitutes the last consciousness of one's life, where the rebirth- consciousness consists of the very first consciousness of a being. It is the factor that triggers the stream of consciousness which characterizes one's

DN II 62-63, as we observed above, held that vijnana descends and coagulates in the mother's womb enabling ndma-rupa to develop. But the question in now raised as to as exactly which type of vijnana this is. Early Theravadin doctrine agrees with most schools that it is mano-vijndna (Vibhanga, 414: manovinnana- dhatu is the only vimdna at the time of rebirth (upapatti). See also Vism. XlV.l 11-114. '" AKB. III.28, p. 140: 1g?R g«TOl/ qf^g^n^OT # and DN II 63 also refers to ndmarupa could not solidify into a fetus if vijnana did not descend into the mother's womb and understands it to imply that vijnana in the pratityasamutpada formula refers to pratisamdhivijndna and hence can only be manovijnana (Iq?iH Tira' H-ilIq?iHHR

49 existence and is wholly conditioned by previous sahkhdra and karma from previous lives. As bhikkhu Narada explains: Dependent on past volitional formations arises relinking or rebirth-consciousness in a subsequent birth. It is also called because it links the past with the present, and is the initial consciousness one experiences at the moment of conception. This idea of rebirth-consciousness may be misleading; it is not a permanent entity transferred from one body to another. As the Buddha explained: "this body does not belong to you, nor anyone else. It should be regarded as the result of former action that has been constructed and intended, and is now to be experience. As Venerabhj Nagasena explains to King Milinda, that which transmigrates from one life to another is neither the same nor another.'^* In the Visudhimagga, Buddhaghosa explains tliis "transmigration" of consciousness as follows:

But it should be understood that it [the vinndna] has neither come here from the previous becoming nor has it become manifest without kamma, the formation, the pushing, the objective field, etc., as a cause. And here, let the illustration of this consciousness be such things as an echo, a light, a seal, a seal impression, a looking-glass image, for the fact of its not coming here from the previous becoming and for the fact that it arises owing to causes that are included in past becoming. For just as an echo, a light, a seal, a seal impression, and a shadow, have respectively sound, etc., as their cause and come into being without going elsewhere, so also this consciousness.'•'^

The cuticitta and patisandhivinndna respectively stand for the death- consciousness and the rebirth-consciousness. However, their meaning is not limited to these two particular types of consciousness, for vinndna in general is also subject to the three characteristics of existence. At every moment, each

'^'Abhs.p.257. "" SN II 64. ''' Miln. p. 40: Na ca so na ca aflno. "^ Vism. p. 639.

50 consciousness arises and passes away, continually yielding its place to a new one. Thus every consciousness must have the quality of both rebirth and death-consciousnesses, in the sense that it arose from the previous consciousness, and death-consciousness, in the sense that rebirth- consciousnesses that has arisen must also die. The quality of this letter vinndna (which becomes a death-consciousness at the moment of death) will engender a new rebirth-consciousness. Birth, death and rebirth do not occur only at the beginning and the end of life. From a microcosmic point of view, the cycle repeats itself at each and every moment'^"* and each time a new consciousness is engendered. Thus, with rebirth and life-continuum, this stream of consciousness turns around.

The man disciplining themselves long, understand the impermanence of life, and completely cutting off the fetters of attachment, he may attains peace.

6. Manifestation of Kusala and Akusala and their relation with Consciousness

The Buddhist emphasis on the moral nature of mind, may imply that, sciences are ordinarily free of moral obligation as modem thoughts would maintain. But all sciences have got a practical aspect in as much as they effect human good. The Buddhists evidently understood psychology in relation to its applied moral aspect. Moral development is distinguished by a conscious mind as different from unconscious effort for doing good. It is based on the freedom of choice between kusala (good) and akusala (evil). Mind or

'^^ The death of a person is merely "the temporary end of a temporary phenomenon." By death is meant the extinction of psychic life (JIvitindriya), heat {usma=tejodhatu), and consciousness {vimana). Death is not the complete annihilation of a being. Death in one place means the birth in another place, just as, in conventional terms, the rising of the sun in one place means the setting of the sun in another place. '''' Abhs. p. 228: from the moment immediately following the cessation of the rebirth-linking (consciousness), that same type of consciousness apprehending that same object flows on uninterruptedly like the stream of a river, and it does so until the arising of the death consciousness, so long as there is no occurrence of a cognitive process. Being an essential factor of existence (or life), this consciousness is called the life- continuum. At the end of life, having become the death consciousness on the occasion of passing away, it then ceases. Thereafter, the rebirth-linking consciousness and the others continue to occur, revolving in due sequence like the wheel of a cart.

51 consciousness, according to Buddhists, may be understood to be moral because of its practical role in such a spiritual context. In each moment there arises consciousness through contact with an object. Each conscious moment is accompanied by a variety of mental factors, each of which carries an activating force that determines the quality of the arisen consciousness. The concern here is with tA\'o (kusala and akusala) of the three groups of mental factors; those which increase the condition of wrong knowing and those which work towards a reduction of the wrong knowing and its eventual destruction.

It might be useful to look for a moment at the meaning of the terms kusala and akusala categories of consciousness.

Kusala (S. Kusasa) can be differently rendered as skilful, good, right, wholesome, healthy, and meritorious.'^^ Atthasalini'^* gives the etymological meaning oikusala as follows:

Kusalas are so called in that they cause contemptible things to tremble,'^^ to shake, to be disturbed, destroyed. Or, kusa are those (vices) which lie in a person under contemptible conditions. '^^ And kusala's '^^ are so called because they lop off, cut off what are known as immoralities {akusala's). Or, knowledge is called kusa ''*'' because of the reduction or eradication of contemptible things, and kusala^'^^ is so called because things should be taken, grasped, set in motion by that kusa. Or just as the kusa grass cuts a part of the hand with both edges, so also certain things cut off the corrupt part in two

"' SED. p. 297. "*AsI.I39. '•" Ku, 'bad,' + VM/, to tremble, to shaite, to be disturbed, destroyed evil '^' From ku, 'bad', + ^sl, to lie. '^' From kusa, so derived + V/iJ, to cut. '*" From ku, 'bad', + ^so, to reduce. '*" From kusa, so defined, + V/a, to take.

52 portions, either what has risen, or what has not risen. Therefore kusala 's are so called because they cut off the corruptions like the kusa grass. The word kusala means 'of good health' {drogya), 'faultless' (anavajja), 'skilful' (nipuna), 'productive of happy sentient results' {sukha vipdka), etc.'^^ Kusala is wholesome in the sense of being free fi-om physical and mental sickness through passions.

Kusala is faultless in the sense of being free from the fault of passions, the evil of passions, and the heat of passions.

Kusala is productive of happy sentient results, the cause that has built up kusala states, and (visual cognition springs into existence) because it has been performed and accumulated by a kamma which is kusala.

Judging from the various meanings attached to the term, kusala may be interpreted as wholesome, or faultless, or productive of happy results. Kusala denotes moral qualities, which should be cultivated. Its cultivation may lead to welfare, happiness as a worldly level, as well as bliss (nibbdna) as higher level.

Akusala opposes qualities from kusala such as unskillfiil, evil, unwholesome, bad''*'* and so on; it is generally refen-ed to as immoral qualities, which tends toward perpetuation of suffering. Immoral just as the opposite to friendship is enmity, or the opposite to greed, etc., is disinterestedness, etc., so 'immoral' is opposed to moral.'''^

Thus, wholesome and unwholesome consciousness as good and bad, moral and immoral consciousness, wholesome consciousness (kusala-citta) is consciousness accompanied by one or another of the three wholesome roots -

142 SeeAbhs. p. 20-21. "' Asl. 1 38. '** SED. p. 2. "" Asl. I 39.

53 non-greed (alobhd), non-liatred {amoha) and non-delusion (adosa). Such consciousness is mentally healthy, morally faultless, and productive of happy results. Unwholesome consciousness (akusala-citta) is consciousness accompanied by the unwholesome roots - greed (lobha), hatred (moha) and delusion (dosa). Such consciousness is called unwholesome because it is mentally unhealthy, morally fault, and productive of painful results.

Let's take a closer look at the unwholesome consciousness; since it is in these that the majority of the grosser kinds of suffering must be produced.

The first kind of attachment-consciousness arises together with mental factors such as dullness, lack of fear of consequences of the act, distraction, and attachment. Although many contributory and associated factors arise in this one type of consciousness, it is known as an attachment consciousness because the mental factor of attachment is the main cause of the unwholesome act.

6.1. Lobha-citta

Lobha-cittas ^'^^ belongs to the group of akusalacittas. '"^^ Attachment, greed, craving, clinging; all these words express the meaning of lobha, and lobha always has dukkha as its end result.

'** The Pali word lobha includes all varieties of greed ranging from intense passion or cupidity to subtle liking and attachment. '*^ Abhs. 1.4-6, p. 2; Abhidhamatthasangaha, p. 25, verses 4-6, Akusalacittani: Lobhamulacittani: Tattha katamam kamavacaraqi? Somanassasahagatarn ditthigatasampayuttaip asankharikamekani, sasaiikhatikamekarp; Somanassasahagatarn ditthigatavippayuttarp asankharikamekam, sasankhatikamekani; upekkhasahagatani ditthigatasampayuttarp asankharikamekam, sasankhatikamekarri; upekkhasahagataiTi dl{thlgatavippayuttaip asaiikharikamekarn, sasaiikhatikamekarn ti imani attha pi lobhasahagatacittani nama. Dosamulacittanl: Domanassasahagataqi papghasampayutarn asaiikharikamekarp; sasankharikamekam ti imani dve pi patTghasampayuttacittani nama. Mohamulacittani: Upekkhasahagatarn vicikicchasampayuttamekam, upekkhasahagataip uddhaccasampayuttamekaiji ti imani dve pi momuhacittani nama. Unwholesome consciousness: in analyzing unwholesome consciousness, the Abhidhamma first classified it by way of its most prominent root {mula, hetu), whether greed, hatred, or delusion. Greed and hatred, according to the Abhiddhamma, are mutually exclusive: they cannot coexist within the same citta. Thus those states of consciousness in which greed is the principle root are termed ^'cittas rooted in greed," of which eight are enumerated. Those states in which hatred in the principle root are term ''cittas rooted in hatred," of which two are enumerated. The third unwholesome root, delusion, is present in every state of unwholesome consciousness. Thus, in those cittas rooted in greed and in those rooted in hatred, delusion is

54 Consciousness rooted in attachment is divided into eight types on the basic of three principles of dichotomization. One is the concomitant feeling (vedana), whether a feeling of joy or equanimity; the second is the presence or absence of wrong view; the third is the considerations of these three distinctions, eight types of consciousness are obtained.

Lobha arises in daily life in many degrees. Imagine that you own a beautiful vase, for example. The sight of this treasured possession tottering on the mantelpiece may cause the unprompted arising of very strong attachment - the body may even react v^ith the characteristic grasping nature of lobha. To be aware of lobha in such a gross form presents no difficulty after the event. The problem is to see this attachment as something apart from the object of consciousness. If and when the object comes to its end in the form for which the attachment arose, lobha may yet persist. There is still a clinging to the object but in reality the object is vanished and there is just a clinging, which is to say, a clinging to emptiness. This is dukkha. Dukkha arises not merely because of lobha but also as a result of not understanding the true nature of the object as riipa (matter) which arises and passes away moment after moment. Had the vase not broken then, it would eventually have returned to dust by some means or another. The misunderstanding lies in taking as permanent what is impermanent.

This lobha is the kind that attaches to form or 'material shape'. Another kind of lobha is the one that attaches to view. Seeing the body as self is a view based on lobha. For instance, if one persists in ego-personality belief, then it will be hard to develop generosity or goodwill to any great degree because of the excessive importance placed on self which is a characteristic of this view. also found as an underlying root. Nevertheless, there are types of consciousness in which delusion arises without the accompaniment of greed or hatred. These ciltas - two in number - are called consciousness involving sheer delusion or 'citias rooted in delusion.

55 Lobha, unconnected with view, may arise with pleasant or unpleasant feeling. The arising of lobha cittas accompanied by pleasant feeling, it will lead to dukkha arising from the attachment to impermanent objects in an impermanent world.

Also man has no clear knowledge of the states of consciousness that become less and less fetttjred as they get higher and so any progress in eradicating just a small amount of lobha will bring a greater freedom and well-being to his live. This is so simply because there is an improvement, leading to a state that was previously unknown to him. Lobha may be weakened by contemplating the three marks of existence. An understanding or gradual acceptance of anicca, dukkha and anatta'''^ will allow progress to be made. It is when progress has been made and man looks back that he may realize impermanent (anicca), dissatisfaction (dukkha) and non-self (anattdf'^'^ are present in his live.

The Buddha said "Bhikkhus, if a bhikkhu has abandoned lust for the form element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off There is no support for the establishing of consciousness. If he has abandoned lust for the feeling element ... for the perception element... for the volitional formations element ... for the consciousness element, with the abandoning of lust the basis is cut off Likewise as regards feeling, perception, volitional formation. There is no support for the establishing of consciousness.

When that consciousness is unestablished, not coming growth, non- generative, it is liberated. By being liberated, it is steady; by being steady, it is content; by being content, he is not agitated. Being unagitated, he personally attains Nibbana. He understands: "destroyed is rebirth, the holy life

'** SN V 106 and SN V 121-24: Yad aniccam tarn dukkham, yam dukkham tad anatta (whatever is impermanent is suffering; whatever is suffering is anatta) "" SN III 23.

56 has been lived, what had to be done has been done, there is no more for this state of being."*^° Lust for form, feeling, perception, volitional formations and consciousness is a mental activity which belongs to the volitional formations (sankhdm) of Dependent origination or volitional formations aggregates of the five aggregates. Owing to this lust, consciousness arises, develops and matures. This lust for the five aggregates exists because of the existence of the satisfaction of the five aggregates. This satisfaction exists owing to the fact that one attaches to the selfhess of things which is called ignorance (avijjd). If the attachment to things (or ignorance) ceases to exist, the satisfaction of things cannot exist and one's lust for the satisfaction of things also ceases to exist. If one's lust for things ceases to exist, the cause of sufferings - which are grasping, becoming, birth, and old-age - carmot appear; then one comes to extinguish all troubles and attain happiness of one's free mind. This also means the cessation of consciousness.

The same applies for the remaining two unwholesome consciousnesses, the 'aversion consciousnesses' and the 'delusion consciousnesses'.

Dve§a-citta, the state of aversion consciousness will arise together with many mental factors such as jealousy, envy, guilt, distraction, aversion, and so on; but aversion is the main causative agent in this type of consciousness, hence it can be called 'aversion consciousness' or 'consciousness rooted in hatred.'

'^^ SN III 53-54: Yo bhikkhave evam vadeyya. Aham annatrarupa annatra vedanaya annatra sannaya annatra sankharehi viftflanassa agatim va gatim va cutim va upapattim va vuddhim va virulhim va vepullam va pannapessamTti netam thanam vijjati. Rupadhatuya ce, bhikkhave, bhikkhuno rago pahTno hoti, ragassa pahana vocchijjataram - manam patittha viflftaiiassa na hoti. Vedanaya dhatuya ce, bhikkhave. Sannadhatuya ce bhikkhave. Sahkhara... Viflftaria... Tad apatitthitam viflflanam aviraham anabhisaiikharanca vimuttam, vimuttatta thitam thitatta santusitaip santusitatta na paritassati, aparitassam paccattanneva parinibbayati. KhTna jati vusitam brahmacariyam katarp karanTyam naparam itthattayati pajanatTti.

57 Moha-citta, the 'delusion consciousnesses' or 'consciousness rooted in delusion', this last class of unwholesome consciousness comprises those cittas in which the other two unwholesome roots - greed and hatred - are absent. Usually delusion leads to the arising of greed or hatred as well. But though delusion is always present as a root in cittas accompanied by greed and hatred, its fiinction there is subordinate. In these last tv/o types of unwholesome consciousness, however, delusion alone is present as an unwholesome root, and thus they are classified as consciousness rooted in delusion. Because the function is especially evident in these two types of consciousness, they are also described as consciousness involving sheer delusion (momuhacitta). There are two types of consciousness in which delusion is especially prominent: one is associated with doubt (P. vicikicchd, S. vicikitsa), the other with restlessness (uddhacca).

Thus it can be say that in all unwholesome mind or consciousness, there are three main causative factors, attachment, aversion and delusion and they are mentioned in the Ahguttara Nikaya as follows: "greed, hatred and illusion, not paying proper attention, a wrongly directed mind (consciousness) is the cause of doing bad action of committing a bad action."'"

Thus, attachment, hatred and delusion are the derivative forms of fundamental ignorance which man tends to identify with grasp onto him as his self and the mistaken notion of the "I", the "Mine" or the "My self."

It is to note that all unwholesome consciousnesses have the root of delusion, and in fact the delusion consciousnesses only have this single root. Attachment consciousnesses arise with roots of both attachment and delusion, and aversion consciousnesses arise with the roots of aversion and delusion, thus these consciousnesses can be called 'two-rooted'.

Abhs. p. 37-38. Momuhacitta: the Pali word momuha being an intensification of moha, delusion. '" AN V 86.

58 We were originally looking at the states of consciousness which produce effects. Besides the unwholesome consciousnesses, there are three kinds of wholesome consciousnesses which produce effects. Non-attachment (alobha), non-hatred (adosa), and non-delusion (amoha) are Icnown as wholesome roots, and they always co-exist in all wholesome consciousness.

6.2. Kusala citta Alobha-citta is non-altachment to things; it does not want anything at all because its nature is non-greed. Because non-attachment, he will see things nothing called the "I", the "Mine", or the "My Self exists.

Adosa-citta, literally, the negation of anger, ill-will, malice, hate (dosa), so the absence of ill-will become a wholesome root, a main obstacle in the approach to understanding has been removed and thereby an atmosphere of compassion (karund) has been created. And thus, non-hatred (adosd) is synonymous with loving-kindness. "To get rid of hatred, cultivate amity."'^"^

Amoha-citta means knowledge, wisdom. This metal factor enables one to dispel the darkness of ignorance and delusion which conceals the truth, with the elimination of ignorance, knowledge comes into being, as much as light arises with the disappearance of darkness.'^"*

In short, if the mind or consciousness is deluded man will soon become entangled in the world of the passions, hating this, wanting that and strengthening his conditioning by each repeated act of craving or aversion. The roots of attachment, aversion and delusion will be developed and become completely automatic, dominating his live. Conversely, if man tries to perform acts of generosity and loving-kindness he may gradually reach the stage where the giving and goodwill is spontaneous, and man may truly be said to have the two wholesome roots. A man needs the third wholesome root.

'" AN 111 446. "" MN 1 22; AN II 196; SN IV 49.

59 wisdom, before he can enter the states of higher consciousness, or have the possibility of achieving that end of all root-making, nibbdna; so he should make efforts to cultivate insight so that, he can get happy in this life, or in the next life. Thus, the ethical implication of a mind or consciousness presupposes a continuity ol' those mind-units in the background. Every being or individual is described as being capable of consciously modifying his own being; therefore, a common man iprthagjana) may become Arya (wise liberated individual) by properly disciplining himself.

An analytical view on Pali literature, by focusing on the references to vijndna, reveals that, the 'vinndna' i.e. consciousness, can be explained by linguistic point view. Accordingly consciousness is elaborated the main principle of human being which governs his life, including worldly life.

Having given the vital importance to Citta Vinndna in human life later on the Buddhist philosophers and interpreters of the Buddha's preaching of the citta, developed different schools of vinndna. The Yogacara Buddhists of Mahayana Buddhism have explained the vinndna principle which is a core of Buddha's preaching. This is what we are going to discuss about in the next chapter.

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