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Cooperation and Integration Among Australia's National Security Security Community Integration in Australia Cooperation and Integration among Australia’s National Security Community Aaron Phillip Waddell Introduction siege at Martin Place in Sydney on 15 December 2014—amidst many The Australian National Security warning signs that the gunman, Man Community (NSC) encompasses Haron Monis, had previously been Australia’s intelligence, diplomatic, identified by law enforcement and “...the Australian gov- defence, law enforcement, infra- intelligence agencies as a potential ernment implemented structure development, and border domestic threat—proved the difficul- several institutional protection agencies. These agencies ty implicit in such coordination and play a vital role in keeping Australian integration. transformations to society secure and free from attack ensure effective coordi- or the threat of attack1—often in the Historically, Australian national nation and integration background—in an effort to maintain security organisations were structured the Australian lifestyle.2 around the four pillars of diploma- within the National Se- cy, defence, domestic security, and curity Community.” Australia’s 21st century national intelligence. As circumstances have security challenges were once fairly changed, the Australian government predictable but are now broader, more implemented several institutional dynamic, and more complex.3 Con- transformations to ensure effective sequently, Australia has to exercise a coordination and integration within comprehensive whole-of-government the NSC. and -society approach to national security in a period of extreme fiscal The end of the Cold War heralded constraint that requires agencies to changes in the general nature of intel- conduct business in a more pru- ligence work and refocused intelli- dent and smarter manner than ever gence organisations’ roles, but more before.4 Thus, the Australian NSC aggressive changes commenced after has now generally interconnected the September 11th attacks on Amer- across government, non-government, ica, refocusing efforts on the grow- and private industry in pursuit of a ing terrorism threat. The election of well-rounded, fully-enabled Austra- the Labor Government in 2008 saw lian security platform. regional security concerns gain fur- ther momentum with Kevin Rudd’s Subsequently, it has been argued seeking a more exacting approach to that coordination and integration with Australian security. These changes in agencies and businesses that have approach can be grouped into three distinct cultures, embedded preju- domains: centralising decisionmaking dices, and highly compartmentalised authority, increasing policy coordina- business practices is not easy.5 The tion, and increasing funding.6 All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations. © Aaron Phillip Waddell. Studies in Intelligence Vol 59, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2015) 25 Security Community Integration in Australia The Australian security concept now encompasses both internal and external threats, with a very strong focus on terrorism. The success of such changes in the current environment of fiscal constraint depends heavily on the development and implementation of consistent and connected approaches, with effective legislation, that com- plement existing individual agency arrangements.7 This article focuses on the coordi- nation and cohesion of the Australian National Security Community with an aim of reviewing whether the roles, responsibilities, and cultures of each agency were sufficiently artic- ulated as overarching improvements to the community were implement- ed. The article commences with an overview of the NSC structure and the whole-of-government approach within the present environment. It then seeks to analyse decision cen- tralisation, policy coordination, and funding in the NSC before highlight- ing achievements as well as remain- ing challenges in the quest for a seamless and interconnected national security structure. Finally, the article will offer some suggestions to better connect the NSC. Cabinet (a position formally known include the asymmetric threat posed as the PM&C Associate Secretary) by non-state and rogue state actors and by the release in 2008 of The such as al-Qa‘ida and ISIS and issues Australia’s National Se- First National Security Statement, such as international crime networks, curity Community Australia’s then-newly articulat- climate change, health pandemics, ed national security policy, which and natural disasters.8 The Australian In 2008, the Rudd government described for the first time “the scope security concept now encompasses adopted a new national security of national security; [Australia’s] both internal and external threats, concept designed to move toward national security interests, principles with a very strong focus on terrorism. a whole-of-government approach, and priorities; and . the govern- Additionally, complicating factors which would replace the longstand- ment’s vision for a reformed national such as regional economic power and ing Department of Defence-centric security structure.” The Australian influence shifts and advancements system. This shift was marked by perception of threat has also sig- in communications and technology the creation of the role of national nificantly changed from traditional, have opened up new pathways for security advisor within the Depart- conventional state-based threats to transnational crimes, making Austra- ment of the Prime Minister and 26 Studies in Intelligence Vol 59, No. 3 (Extracts, September 2015) Security Community Integration in Australia . the distinguishing feature of the whole-of-government lia’s national security environment approach is the incorporation of a much broader policy increasingly fluid and fraught with agenda whilst maximising existing resources. a complex and dynamic mix of con- tinuing and emerging challenges and 9,10,11,12 and the Department of Infrastructure multiple agencies and, as such, whilst opportunities. This new range and Transport (DIT) operate in all 13 our broad national security interests of international risks and pressures areas.15 remain unchanged, the institutional means that one agency or single tier framework of the NSC is evolving to of government acting unilaterally Although interconnected at manage the complexity of threats.17 cannot address all the issues: creating the strategic level, individual NIC a whole-of-government approach was agencies are also expected to perform This whole-of-government therefore vital.13,14 specific roles to minimise duplica- approach has forced NIC agencies tion and operational costs; therefore, to take new steps to create effective Facing a host of new security within the larger NIC, all six Austra- policy and intelligence outcomes and challenges, both external and “home- lian Intelligence Community (AIC) encompassed a much wider range grown,” Australia’s implementa- agencies—i.e., Australian Secret In- of traditional and non-traditional tion of a coherent national security telligence Service (ASIS), Australian security concerns. Concurrent with framework was designed to establish Security Intelligence Organization the implementation of a more con- a comprehensive approach to respond (ASIO), Australian Geospatial-Intel- nected government effort, Australia to those challenges. The NSC was re- ligence Organisation (AGO), Aus- has seen an increase in public sector structured to ensure collaboration and tralian Signals Directorate (ASD), involvement in security policy, which interoperability among the agencies Office of National Assessments has complicated the broad national responsible for national and domestic (ONA), and the Defence Intelligence security agenda, making a holistic ap- security. The diagram below details Organisation (DIO) perform a specif- proach to management more convo- the organisations that comprise the ic intelligence function and conduct luted and complex.18 Such complex- present Australian NSC and the intelligence assessments.16 ity is evidenced by the large number national security concerns they are of policy reviews and commissions resourced to address. Mindfulness of NIC and AIC of inquiry into various aspects of agencies’ capabilities at the highest As illustrated by the diagram on national security written or convened levels of government leadership level since 2008. the facing page, the distinguishing is important in order to avoid dupli- feature of the whole-of-government cation of roles and to ensure effective approach is the incorporation of a cooperation across the broader NSC. much broader policy agenda whilst Additionally, there must be consider- An Analysis of Decision Cen- maximising existing resources. In ation of agencies’ cultures to ensure tralisation, Policy Coordina- this schema, individual National flexibility and adaptability in the tion, and Funding in the Na- Intelligence Community (NIC) agen- whole-of-government and -society tional Security Community cies perform overlapping and com- capability approach. plementary functions; for instance, The National Security Community the Australian Security Intelligence The networked and multifaceted since 2008 has strengthened its coor- Organisation (ASIO) operates in threat environment has challenged dination and integration using deci- eight of the 13 national security ar- government departments such that sion centralisation,
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