Psychiatry, Psychology and Law

ISSN: 1321-8719 (Print) 1934-1687 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tppl20

Man Haron Monis and the Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack

Russ Scott & Rodger Shanahan

To cite this article: Russ Scott & Rodger Shanahan (2018): and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, DOI: 10.1080/13218719.2018.1479941 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2018.1479941

Published online: 05 Sep 2018.

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Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tppl20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2018 Vol. 0, No. 0, 1–63, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2018.1479941

Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack

Russ Scotta and Rodger Shanahanb aForensic Psychiatrist, The Park – Centre for Mental Health, Wacol, , ; bResearch Fellow, Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia

On 15 December 2014, nearly 20 years after he arrived in Australia from , Man Haron Monis took 18 people hostage in the Lindt Caf'e in Sydney and announced that Australia was ‘under attack by the Islamic State’. After a 16-hour siege, during which negotiators had no direct communication with him, Monis shot dead one of his hostages, precipitating the police ‘emergency action’ which broke the siege. Although Monis had been a prolific user of the Internet and , the subsequent Coroner’s inquest found that Monis made little sophisticated preparation for the siege and did not announce his intention nor did he leave any clear terrorist-inspired message or martyrdom video. Other than demanding a debate with the Prime Minister on radio and have the Islamic State flag delivered to the caf'e, Monis made no specific terrorist demands. At the time of the siege, Monis was also on bail, charged with multiple sex offences against women, alleged to have been committed whilst he held himself out as a ‘spiritual healer’. Monis was also charged with being an accessory to the murder of his former partner and had recently failed to obtain custody of his two Australian born children. His professed status as a Shi’a Muslim cleric was fraudulent, and forensic examination of his use of the Internet and social media found no evidence that Monis ever had any contact with Islamic State or any other terrorist organisation and that on the day before the siege, he had only 12 followers on Twitter. The evidence does not support the conclusion that Monis suddenly ‘radicalised’ and committed an act of . Instead, the evidence shows that Monis was a malignant narcissist whose behaviour can better be formulated as lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence. KEY WORDS: Man Haron Monis; Sydney Lindt Caf'e siege; terrorist; Coroner; Islamic State.

Introduction the decisions of government agencies in respect Within 24 hours of the end of the Lindt Caf'e of Monis. On 22 February 2015, the findings of siege in , Sydney, Man Haron the Review were published.1 Monis was variously labelled ‘deranged’,a Despite Monis’ long history of provocative ‘lone-wolf extremist’ or a radicalised domestic and attention-seeking behaviour and false claims, terrorist. On 17 December 2014, the the Review found no evidence that the Department of the Prime Minister and Security and Intelligence Organisation Premier of announced the (ASIO), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or terms of reference for a Joint the New South Wales Police Force had been Commonwealth–New South Wales Review of complacent about Monis and that security

Correspondence: Dr Russ Scott, Forensic Psychiatrist, The Park - Centre for Mental Health, Wacol, Brisbane, Australia. Email: [email protected]

© 2018 The Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 2 R. Scott and R. Shanahan and law enforcement agencies assessed new downwards’,Monis’ personal considerations information as it became available and in accord- were separate from his ‘increasing religious ance with extant policies and procedures. The extremism’ which the Coroner found was a Review found that right up to the siege, and not- ‘more significant motivator for his actions’.5 withstanding their familiarity with Monis, ASIO As well as reviewing the findings of both and law enforcement agencies never found any the Joint Commonwealth–New South Wales information to indicate Monis had formed the Review and the NSW Coroner’s inquest, this intent to commit a terrorist act. While his lan- paper considers the proceedings in the murder guage and sentiments were offensive, they were trial of Monis’ partner, Anastasia Droudis, and not exceptional, either in terms of his previous considerable open source material. The paper conduct or other material which was readily compares closely the actions of Monis with available on social media and elsewhere. The those of recognised Islamist terroristists. The Review found that when Monis was assessed authors question the assumptions made by the by ASIO in early December 2014, on the basis Coroner and refute the conclusion that Monis of the information available at the time, he was a self-radicalised domestic terrorist. fell well outside the threshold to be included in the highest priority counter-terrorism Chronology investigations. – On 14 January 2015, the New South 1964 1995 Wales Coroner’s Court announced the terms On 19 May 1964, Monis was born of reference for an inquest, and on 29 January Mohammed Manteghi in the Iranian city of 2015, the inquest began hearing evidence. Borujerd, south west of Tehran. After complet- Controversially, on 5 June 2015, the Coroner ing secondary school, he was admitted to decided that the inquest would consider the Imam Sadegh University in Tehran. In May circumstances of Monis being on bail at the 1984, Monis married Zahara Mobasheri, time of the siege, despite facing charges relat- whose father was general secretary and deputy ing to the murder of his ex-wife and numerous to the founder of Imam Sadegh University. In sex offences. On 17 August 2016, after 123 1986, Monis and his wife had the first of two witnesses testified over 109 days, the inquest daughters and lived in a large, luxurious apart- ’ finished hearing evidence. ment close to the university of Monis father- On 24 May 2017, the NSW Coroner’s in-law. In December 1990, Monis graduated Findings and Recommendations were pub- with a Masters degree in Islamic Culture and lished.2 The Coroner concluded that between political science. The inquest heard evidence August 2008 and November 2014, threat which suggested that after university, Monis assessments conducted by ASIO were attended a divinity college called the Abdol ‘adequate and appropriate’3 and that the man- Azim College of Hadith Sciences and in agement of the National Security Hotline March 1994 was awarded hujatolislam which ‘ reports on Monis’ page referred to is an honorific title meaning authority on ’ ASIO between 9–12 December 2014 were Islam . In 1995, Monis published a collection also ‘adequate and appropriate’.4 of Persian poems entitled Daroon and Boroon ‘ ’ ’ Emphasising that Monis did not have a ( Inside and Outside ). In 1995, Monis second mental illness, the Coroner concluded that by daughter was born. the time of the siege, Monis had become radi- calised and that whilst he had many charges 1996 pending against him which were likely to In April 1996, Monis became the manager of attract a long prison sentence and that he may the travel agency Rahelenoor Tours and have felt that his life was ‘spiralling Travel which assisted families emigrating Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 3 from Iran. On 1 October 1996, from Iran, number of claims including that as well as Monis applied for a one-month short-stay being a Shi’a cleric, he had been engaged in Business visa to Australia. On his visa gathering intelligence for foreign governments application, Monis falsely described himself as through his high-level political and religious a ‘legal consultant’ to an Iranian engineering contacts in Iran. Monis implausibly claimed company and stated that the purpose of his that having also worked for the Iranian visit was to meet with representatives of BHP Ministry of Intelligence and Security, he had Billiton. On 10 October 1996, ASIO assessed witnessed torture and had knowledge of highly the application and issued a non-prejudicial sensitive information about the involvement of assessment, and the Immigration Department Iran in the bombing of the Khobar Towers granted the Business visa. building in Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996, On 26 October 1996, without telling his whichkilled19UnitedStatessoldiers.8 Even wife or employer, Monis flew out of Tehran. though Monis professed to be a Shi’acleric, On 28 October 1996, after transiting through he also perversely claimed that he had been Kuala Lumpur in , Monis arrived at victimised for his association with the minority Sydney International Airport. Monis’ former Ahmadi sect, a persecuted stream of Sunni wife later reported that she married Monis Islam.9 Monis insisted that if he returned to shortly after leaving school and that Monis for- Iran, he would be summarily executed. He fur- bade her continuing her education at university ther claimed that he was afraid that if the 6 and was very secretive about his work. She Iranian Government found out he was in described Monis as a ‘cruel’ and violent hus- Australia, he would be targeted for band and added that he was not a devout assassination. Muslim. She also debunked Monis’ later On 30 April 1997, Amnesty International claims that she and her two daughters had wrote to the Immigration Department support- been detained by the Government of Iran. The ing the credibility of Monis’ claims and inquest heard evidence which suggested that emphasised that it was reasonable to expect before he left Iran, Monis defrauded clients of that he would face arrest as a prisoner of con- a total sum equivalent to A$550,000. On 4 science and may be tortured or executed if he November 1996, although ASIO received was forced to return to Iran. Later, in 2010, potentially adverse information about Monis, when he again approached Amnesty none of the intelligence related to any terrorist International as ‘Sheikh Haron’ complaining threat. On 18 November 1996, less than three about threats he received from the public after weeks after arriving in Australia, Monis he was charged for writing offensive letters to applied for a Protection visa. the families of fallen soldiers, Monis’ request for assistance was declined. Subsequently, 1997 Amnesty International acknowledged that in Although he never had a gun licence in 1997 it had been misled by Monis.10 Australia, from 1997 to 2000, Monis held a In July 1997, Monis began receiving sup- security guard licence, which permitted him to port via the Asylum Seeker Income Support carry a pistol whilst he was working and, in scheme. On 16 September 1997, Monis April 1997, Monis had basic training in han- attended the Sydney offices of the dling a side-arm and was later briefly Immigration Department and participated in a employed as a security officer at a shopping prolonged interview which was conducted centre in the western Sydney suburb of largelyinFarsi.TheCoronernotedthatthe Greenfield Park. transcript of the interview showed that Monis In April 1997, in support of his application performed poorly during the interview, his for a Protection visa, Monis submitted a answers to searching questions lacked 4 R. Scott and R. Shanahan coherence and when pressed to clarify his Protection visa, ASIO advised the claims, Monis changed parts of his account.11 Immigration Department that it did not assess Subsequently, the Immigration Department Monis to be a direct or indirect risk to national reviewed Monis’ application and discussed security, and ASIO ceased its investigation. with ASIO a perceived lack of credibility of On 23 August 2000, Monis was living in Perth Monis’ claims. when he was granted a Protection visa. The Review later found that ‘very few or no checks ’ 1998 were made to ascertain the legitimacy of Monis’ Protection visa application.13 On 18 May 1998, Monis contacted the ASIO On 20 October 2000, Monis wrote the first public line, claiming to have information rele- of many letters to public figures and the vant to the upcoming Sydney Olympic Games. United Nations. He also began writing to dig- ASIO interviewed Monis on two separate nitaries and newspapers around the world. occasions and assessed that he had no informa- Even though he had originally told the tion relevant to national security. Immigration Department that he feared that if On 18 June 1998, the Immigration the Iranian Government discovered that he Department determined that Australia owed was in Australia, he might be targeted for protection to Monis under the 1951 Convention assassination, on 23 November 2000, in his Relating to the Status of Refugees. Monis’ case first public protest, Monis chained himself to a wasformallyreferredtoASIOforasecurity pole outside Parliament House in Perth and assessment, and on 24 August 1998 the staged a hunger strike asserting that he was Immigration Department received a certificate protesting against the Iranian Government for from the AFP which confirmed that Monis had not allowing him to see his children in Iran. no criminal record in Australia. On 23 November 1998, Monis participated in an ASIO-conducted security assess- 2001 ment interview. On 20 January 2001, having moved to Sydney, Monis began a protest outside the 1999 New South Wales Parliament again, with the purported intention of convincing the Iranian On 16 July 1999, Monis applied to the Government to allow him to see his children Department of Fair Trading to incorporate an in Iran. By 31 January 2001, Monis’ protests association he called Daftar-e- had attracted the attention of the media, and he Manteghi Boroujerdi. Monis listed the pur- was interviewed on the ABC program poses of the association was ‘to promote the ‘Religion Report’.Monis,whoatthattime spiritual matters and teaching and education was using the name Manteghi Boroujerdi, was and engage in humanitarian, religion and introduced as follows: charity’ by the publication of books and news- ‘ papers and establishing schools and similar People in Sydney walking past the State activities’. The Coroner found no evidence Parliament buildings on Macquarie Street that the association ever undertook any of in recent weeks might have noticed a tall these activities.12 Muslim cleric who has taken up residence in a tent on the footpath outside. He is Ayatollah Manteghi Boroujerdi, a liberal 2000 cleric who fled Iran four years ago after In early 2000, Monis moved from Sydney to being very critical of the Iranian regime. Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s wife and two Perth, where he gained employment as a car- daughters are now under house arrest in pet salesman. On 25 July 2000, after initially Iran, and he’s hoping the Howard recommending against the issue of a government will put pressure on the Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 5

regime there to let his family join him Monis advertised his business in local eth- 14 here in Australia. nic newspapers, and subsequent investigations by police showed that Monis had at least 500 During the interview, Monis claimed that clients over the business years from 2002 to he had been: 2007. It was later alleged that Monis preyed on vulnerable women who were told that their [I]nvolved with the Ministry of ‘ ’ Intelligence and Security … more than treatment entailed them undressing and four years I have not seen my family, and allowing Monis to paint them with water and the Iranian regime doesn’t let them come massage their breasts and genitals. His conduct out. In fact I can say they are hostage; as a extended from indecent touching under the hostage the Iranian regime wants to make guise of massage to full penetration. When his me silent, because I have some secret victims objected, Monis overcame their resist- information about government, and about their terrorist operations in the war. I sent ance by intimidation including threats that he a letter to the Secretary-General of the would impose ‘curses’ or other harm if the United Nations and somebody on behalf women did not submit to his predations. of Mr Kofi Anan sent the answer, and Monis also took photos and videos of some of they want to do something. the sessions, and it was this cache of incrimi- nating files that later enabled police to estab- Later, during a rambling interview, Monis lish a strike force to prosecute Monis for professed his love for the West: multiple offences. Ultimately, by October If we explain about the meaning of the word 2014, Monis was charged with 43 counts of ‘Islamic’ as a religious society, if we say aggravated indecent and sexual assault, Islamic society is a religious society, and a allegedly committed between 2002 and 2010 society which has a relation with God, and against six victims. wants to be honest, we can say Australia, In April 2001, Canberra Canada, England, USA, so many western alerted the Immigration Department that countries, they are religious societies. INTERPOL Tehran had advised that Monis was wanted by Iranian authorities. Whenever I walk in the street, whenever I INTERPOL Tehran requested advice on the go out in Australia, I feel I am in a real possible provisional arrest and extradition of religious society. I don’t want to say it is Monis for ‘fraud-related’ offences allegedly ’ perfect, we don t have a perfect society on committed in Iran. Although the Immigration the earth, but when we compare, if we compare Australia with Iran and other Department made repeated requests between countries in the Middle East, we can say it May and December 2001 to INTERPOL is heaven. Tehran to provide relevant documentation of the alleged charges, since no extradition agree- Between 13 February and 13 August 2001, ment existed, it was not possible to arrest Monis received Newstart payments. On 23 July Monis with a view to extradition. No arrest 2001, less than a year after he was granted a warrant or summary of specific charges Protection visa, Monis registered the first of a against Monis was ever received. In the number of businesses. The business activity of absence of the requested information, Monis’‘Spiritual Power’ was listed as ‘spiritual INTERPOL Canberra closed Monis’ file. consulting’ and ‘spiritual healing for society’. In 1988, during the resistance to the Soviet Monis operated his business from premises in invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi national the suburb of Wentworthville and claimed to be founded the militant Sunni an expert in clairvoyance, astrology, numer- Islamist organisation al-Qaeda.15 In 1996 and ology, and ‘black magic’. 1998, because of the United States’ support of 6 R. Scott and R. Shanahan the ‘Zionists who occupy Al Quds’ application. Between September 2003 and (Jerusalem) and because United States troops July 2007, Monis travelled overseas on 21 sep- were stationed on the sacred land of Saudi arate occasions. His destinations included Fiji, Arabia, bin Laden issued a call to target New Zealand and Canada, and he travelled 10 America (which he called the ‘head of the times to Thailand. snake’). Bin Laden also claimed that, since the The Coroner documented Monis’ history United States was engaged in a war against of exploitation of a number of women with Muslims, ‘jihad’ wasrequiredinthedefence whom he had relationships, including some of Islam.17 On the morning of 11 September concurrently.20 In August 2002, after respond- 2001, airliners hijacked by al-Qaeda operatives ing to an advertisement about his spiritual crashed into the World Trade Center complex healing, Noleen Hayson Pal, a 20-year-old inNewYorkCityandthePentagonin Fijian Indian woman, began a relationship Arlington County, Virginia, claiming nearly with 39-year-old Monis, who later moved into 3000 victims.18 her parents’ home in Sydney. Monis lied about On 12 September 2001, Monis called the his age and told Pal and her family that his ASIO public line and volunteered information mother was Egyptian and his father was Greek that Iran, whose Government is a Shi’atheoc- and that he was a non-practising Muslim. In racy and whose population is overwhelmingly August 2003, Monis and Pal had a ceremonial Shi’a, funded the attacks on the United States. wedding, even though Monis was still married In late September 2001, October 2001 and to his wife in Iran.21 In 2004, Monis’ first son January 2002, ASIO again interviewed Monis was born. In January 2008, Monis’ second son and assessed his claims as not credible. During was born. Monis never supported Pal or his one interview, Monis asked whether he might twosonsandrefusedtohavehisnameontheir receive a reward from the United States birth certificates. Pal’s parents built a granny Government for his assistance. flat in the backyard of the home for Pal and Following the September 2001 attacks, the children. During a subsequent domestic President Bush demanded that the Taliban, violence hearing, Pal describing Monis’ con- which controlled much of Afghanistan, hand trolling behaviour, his insistence that she not over bin Laden and expel al-Qaeda. On 7 leave the flat and that she surrender her mobile October 2001, the United States launched phone, and his paranoia and secretiveness. Pal ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ and invaded reported that she never knew Monis’ real age Afghanistan, initially with the support of and that most nights they slept apart. Canada and the , and later by a coalition of over 40 countries. In November 2003 2001, Australia first sent a troop contingent to In February 2003, during his address to the Afghanistan.19 In August 2003, the first troops United Nations, as well as warning of dangers from NATO arrived and later took over the of ‘weapons of mass destruction’ in Iraq, leadership of the coalition forces in United States Secretary of State Colin Powell Afghanistan. referred to links between the regime of Saddam Hussein and the Jordanian-born Iraqi- 2002 based Sunni extremist Abu Masab al- On 16 September 2002, Monis changed his Zarqawi22 and al-Qaeda leader Osama bin name to Michael Hayson Mavros and, on 11 Laden. On 20 March 2003, ‘Operation Iraqi October 2002, he applied for Australian citi- Freedom’ was launched, and United States zenship. On 18 June 2003, ASIO interviewed and coalition forces invaded Iraq. On 7 August Monis after he called the public line to com- 2003, a huge destroyed the plain about the delay in the processing of his Jordanian embassy in Bagdad, killing at least Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 7

17 people. A week later, a bomb exploded out- to national security. On 16 September 2004, side the headquarters of the newly installed his citizenship application was approved and, United Nations Assistance Mission in Bagdad, on 20 October 2004, Monis was granted killing 22 people and, soon after, a massive Australian citizenship which was conferred blast killed the Shi’a leader, Ayatollah Baqer during a private ceremony that Monis al-Hakim and 83 worshippers outside the requested for ‘security reasons’. Shi’a Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf in south- ern Iraq. 2005 In January 2005, the Australian Customs Service 2004 received correspondence from a lawyer repre- In February 2004, bombings during the senting Monis, who complained about his treat- Ashura festival slaughtered 185 Shi’a cele- ment by Customs Officers when he arrived at brants in Karbala and Baghdad and, two weeks Sydney International Airport. On 17 February later, 102 Iraqi police recruits died in two car- 2005, Monis called the ASIO public line to ask bombings. Al-Zarqawi later claimed responsi- if it was legal for him, as an Australian citizen, bility for all these attacks, and he became to meet officials of foreign governments. known as ‘the sheikh of the slaughterers’.23 On 7 July 2005, four Islamist extremists After the coalition forces toppled Sunni Iraqi separately detonated three bombs in quick suc- leader Saddam Hussein within a month of the cession aboard London Underground trains invasion, the occupying coalition forces found and later on a double-decker bus in Tavistock a natural ally in the Shi’a population which Square. On 15 July 2005, Monis called the had been brutally repressed and disenfran- ASIO public line claiming to have information chised by Saddam’s regime. At the same time, relating to suicide attacks. On the same day, the ‘deBaathification’ and disbanding of ASIO met with Monis, who claimed he had Saddam’s armed forces alienated tens of thou- contacts with Sunni al-Qaeda and similar sands of young Sunni Muslim men with mili- groups and offered to assist ASIO. tary training.24 In May 2004, the videotaped Subsequently, ASIO assessed the information beheading of kidnapped United States commu- provided by Monis as not credible. Between nications contractor Nicholas Berg was the 22–26 July 2005, Monis also contacted the first of a number of atrocities attributed to al- United Kingdom High Commission, claiming Zarqawi personally25 as Iraq slowly declined that he was a Muslim cleric and that he had into wholesale sectarian warfare with an information about the London bombings. unprecedented campaign of indiscriminate Throughout 2005, Monis travelled to bombings and shootings. Although he shared Bahrain, Canada, New Zealand, Singapore, al-Qaeda’s goal of killing Americans, al- Thailand and Fiji. Complaining that he had Zarqawi believed that the subjugation of been searched at Sydney airport on his return Shi’as should actually be the jihadists’ high- from overseas, Monis also later claimed that est priority.26 the was ‘harassing’ In July 2004, Monis’ legal representatives Muslim clerics. During the inquest, a solicitor contacted the Immigration Department to com- who had previously acted for Monis testified plain about the delay in the processing of his that Monis had claimed he was being ‘set up’ application for citizenship and advised that by ASIO and ‘picked on’ by Australian Monis believed that he was being discrimi- Customs officials about his frequent trips nated against because he was a Muslim. On 1 abroad. The solicitor told the inquest that he September 2004, ASIO formally advised the did not know why Monis travelled so often. Immigration Department that Monis was Monis once flew to New Zealand and back in assessed as not being a direct or indirect risk one day to ‘bamboozle Customs, to make 8 R. Scott and R. Shanahan people believe that he was doing something’.27 2006 Monis claimed that after the conviction of On 21 November 2006, Monis changed his Australian Schapelle Corby for drug smug- name to Man Haron Monis and, a week later, glinginIndonesia,AustralianCustomsoffi- he was issued a new passport. In February cials ‘targeted Muslim clerics’ and also 2007, Monis contacted the ASIO open public wanted ‘revenge’ for the relatively light sen- line and requested a meeting during which he tence given to radical cleric Abu Bakar Bashir, advised that he wanted to become a ‘teacher’ leader of a splinter cell of the Jemaah in the Islamic community and that he had Islamiyah, for his role in inciting the bomb- changed his name to be more readily identifi- ings in the tourist district of Kuta in Bali on 12 able as a Muslim and that he intended to help October 2002 which killed 202 people, includ- lead Muslim youth away from extremism. ing88Australians. Monis advised that he planned to moderate his In 2005, after Monis reported symptoms ‘pro-western views’ in order to connect with of depression, general practitioner Dr Julie young Muslims. He offered to become a Kusama referred him to psychiatrist Dr Daniel source for ASIO and provided a three-page Murray. In his evidence to the Coroner’s ‘plan’ outlining the offer. Citing concern about inquest, Dr Murray reported that when he first his motivation and his unusual behaviour and attended, Monis presented as a quite legitim- that he had provided no information of secur- ate and credible incognito Islamic cleric, who ity relevance, ASIO internally re-confirmed was dressed in a suit and tie and was polite that contact with Monis should not be pursued. and well spoken, with good conversational English. Dr Murray reported that he devel- 2007 oped a rapport with Monis, who spoke about On 30 June 2007, a 4-wheel drive loaded with his losses, including the family he left in Iran. propane canisters was driven into the glass Whilst Monis did not disclose any specific doors of the Glasgow Airport terminal and set traumatic life events, Dr Murray assumed that ablaze. Both of the occupants were appre- because of his refugee status, Monis had expe- hended at the scene, and police later identified rienced trauma in Iran. Dr Murray told the a British-born Muslim doctor of Iraqi descent inquest that Monis did not disclose any con- and an Indian-born engineering student. A sui- cerns about being under surveillance. Dr cide note indicated that the two had intended Murray did not elicit any features of psychosis to die in the attack. On 4 July 2007, as he was and made a provisional diagnosis of a para- preparing to leave Australia, Indian-born noid personality disorder. Dr Murray told the Muslim Dr Muhamed Haneef, who was a inquest that he diagnosed post-traumatic stress second cousin of two of the terror suspects, disorder and a stress- related depressive dis- was arrested at Brisbane Airport, on suspicion order and prescribed the anti-depressant of terror-related activities. Dr Haneef’sensu- Lovan (fluoxetine) and the hypnotic ing detention without charge became the lon- Stilnox (zolpidem). gest in recent Australian history, which caused During the inquest, Dr Murray agreed great controversy in both Australia with counsel assisting the Coroner that and India.29 Monis may have been ‘diagnosis shopping’. On 5 July 2007, using the name Sheikh The Coroner noted that it was likely that Haron, Monis wrote his first letter of com- the consultations with Dr Murray were plaint to Channel 7 about comments made by designed to substantiate Monis’ claim that an academic on the ‘Sunrise’ program related he had suffered harm from being victimised to the arrest of Dr Haneef and seven ‘Muslim by the Australian Customs Service with doctors’ in the United Kingdom30.Atthe which he was in dispute.28 same time, Monis also made his first Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 9 complaint to the Australian Communications family of Australian trade official Craig and Media Authority (ACMA), which Senger, who was killed in the bombing of the launched an inquiry to determine whether the Marriott Hotel in on 17 July 2009. In Channel 7 program ‘discriminated against his letters, Monis referred to one of the Muslims’. For years after the Haneef affair, deceased soldiers as the ‘sonofadirtypig’ Monis confected outrage and repeatedly made and ‘dirty animal’.33 Monis called the soldiers reference to the ‘Sunrise’ program and handed ‘murderers’ and urged the soldiers’ families to out flyers critical of Channel 7. Monis later petition the government to withdraw maintained a website on which he posted Australian troops from Afghanistan. All of the statement: the letters were signed ‘Sheikh Haron’,and Until 4th July 2007 I was in a deep sleep. copies of many of the letters were sent to pub- Sunrise woke me up! God can awaken a per- lic figures including the Prime Minister, the sonbymanydifferentmeansevenbyaterror- Minister for Defence, the Federal ist broadcast from the program Sunrise on AttorneyGeneral and the Commissioner of Channel Seven from the Australian TV! I the AFP. thank God and I won’t give up until the On 28 December 2007, Monis threatened Australian government condemns that broad- legal action against The Australian newspaper cast which was instructing terrorism.31 over an article published earlier in that month. On 30 August 2007, Monis registered the Through Monis’ lawyer, who insisted that he domain name ‘sheikh.haron.com’ with a acted for a ‘senior cleric’, Monis complained -based register and a United States- that the newspaper misrepresented him as a 34 based Internet provider. He also created the ‘mysterious imam’. website ‘www.sheikhharon.com’ and began posting inflammatory and provocative state- 2008 ments, including media releases and copies of Between February 2008 and September 2010, his letters and responses. Monis also took out Monis was alleged to have committed further front-page advertisements with the Australian sexual assault offences whilst presenting him- Muslim newspaper Crescent Times,directing self as a spiritual healer. readers to his ‘Sheikh Haron’ website. The In February 2008, the office of the New Coroner also noted that Monis later set up South Wales Premier referred a facsimile mes- YouTube accounts under the names sage from Monis to the AFP in relation to his ‘Peaceactivist’ and ‘Sheikh Haron’ as well as previous warnings of potential terrorist-related 32 a Facebook page. From late 2007, using the attacks in Australia and his grievances with name Sheikh Haron, Monis also began send- theAFP,whichhedescribedas‘corrupt’.In ing the first of approximately 60 letters, fac- January and March 2008, Monis wrote to the simile messages and media releases to a range Queen of England and to the Pope. On 20 of recipients including the Prime Minister, the March 2008, the AFP emphasised that Monis Federal Opposition Leader, the Federal exhibited obsessive preoccupations and fixated Attorney-General and the AFP Commissioner. interest in high-office holders and dignitaries On 27 November and 12 December 2007, andidentifiedhimasa‘person of interest’ in and on 22 March 2008, Monis sent letters to relation to the forthcoming visit to Australia the family of Private Luke Worsley, who died by Pope Benedict XVI. in Afghanistan on 23 November 2007. On 4, 6 On 28 April 2008, Monis purported to and 7 May 2008, Monis sent letters to the fam- write a ‘fatwa’ on his website and described ily of Lance Corporal Jason Marks, who died United Kingdom and Australian heads of state in Afghanistan earlier during the same month. as ‘war criminals’. Although the fatwa was On 27 July 2009, Monis sent letters to the phrased as a general requirement for Muslims 10 R. Scott and R. Shanahan to respond to war crimes and not a specific ‘Muslim doctors’.On16Juneand23July threat to individuals, given his continuing 2008, Monis held further protests outside the inflammatory public statements, ASIO again studios of Channel 7 in Martin Place, oppo- commenced an investigation. In April 2008, site the Lindt Caf'e, complaining about the officers of the AFP met with Monis and ‘Muslim doctors’ program which had been advised him that if he continued to send offen- broadcast in July 2007. Monis also made sive and harassing letters, he risked being another complaint to the ACMA. After a chargedwithoffences.Monisrepliedthathe three-month investigation, the ACMA dis- was within his rights to correspond with missed the complaint. whomever he wanted, and he subsequently The security manager of Channel 7 later sent several more letters. told the inquest that in 2008, he called police on In May 2008, Monis posted on his website several occasions and advised the network’s a video entitled ‘suicide fatwa’,inwhichhis television hosts not to venture outside the new partner since 2006, Anastasia Droudis, Martin Place studio to film segments of the appeared wearing a black niqab, so that her ‘Sunrise’ program.35 Monis was often observed eyes only were visible and discussed in the area handing out flyers headlined ‘War ‘legitimate suicide attacks’. Droudis came on Islam’. On one occasion in 2008 when the from a Greek Orthodox family and had been a television hosts were signing autographs, hairdresser. She changed her name from Monis ran up the Martin Place and shouted Anastasia to Amirah (Arabic for ‘princess’) abuse at the ‘Sunrise’ host David Koch.36 and, in July 2008, converted to Islam. Between July–August 2008, Monis wrote Between April 2008 and December 2009, a series of letters to the then Qantas chief Droudisappearedin11videosscriptedby executive officer, claiming recent mechanical Monis in which she appeared wearing a black faults on airliners were the result of terrorist niqab. In the videos, Droudis praised Osama sabotage. Monis’ letter was later sent to the bin Laden, delivered a fatwa against National Security hotline which referred the Presentelect for ‘apostasy’ matter to ASIO, the AFP and all state and ter- (abandoning his Muslim faith for Christianity), ritory police forces. On 21 August 2008, expressed her approval of , the ASIO concluded a review and noted ‘no infor- ‘9/11’ 2001 terrorist attacks in the United mation to suggest [Monis] had been engaged, States and the October , or [is] likely to engage, in politically motivated calleduponpeopletojointhearmyofIslam violence’ and assessed that Monis ‘has not and warned the Prime Minister that been in regular contact with individuals of Australians would be attacked and killed by security concern and his main contacts are Muslims. The material posted on the Sheikh unlikely to be of security interest’.37 Haron website referred to Droudis as In late September 2008, Monis issued a ‘Sister Amirah’. statement on his website in support of the On 21 May 2008, Monis wrote to the then mujahidin in Pakistan, in which he said that he Federal Opposition Leader, claiming that hoped ‘one day I will be able to Jihad in the recently reported explosions and fires in shop- higher levels as you do’. ping centres were the result of terrorist activ- On 3 September 2008, Mr Monis changed ities. On 6 June 2008, Monis sent a fax to the the name of one of his companies from Israeli Embassy entitled ‘Media Release: Sheik ‘Australian United Muslim Clerics’ to Haron’s Fatwa about suicide bombing coming’. ‘Hezbollah Australia’. Hezbollah (‘Party of In June 2008, Monis conducted a protest at Allah’) was also the name of the Shi’aIslamist Parliament House in Canberra, criticising the militant group and political party based in earlier Channel 7 ‘Sunrise’ program on Lebanon. No connection has ever been Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 11 established between Monis and the Islamist In 2008, Australia had begun withdrawing group Hezbollah. On 6 November 2008, its troops from Iraq. In April 2008, United ‘Hezbollah Australia’ sent a letter to the then Kingdom forces left Basra, signifying the end Commonwealth Attorney General and copies to of combat operations. the then Prime Minister, the Opposition Leader, 2009 Foreign Minister and ASIO, stating that the group was now registered in Australia and On 31 July 2009, Australia concluded its mili- hoped to begin activity as an Islamic tary commitment in Iraq, leaving only person- organisation. nel in non-combat roles. On 9 November 2008, four of the Islamist On 12 March 2009, the United States radicals convicted of the Bali bombings were Secret Service contacted the AFP after Monis executed. On the same day, Monis sent a letter sent the United States broadcaster NBC a ‘ ’ to the families of the Bali bombers describing DVD which purported to include a fatwa them as ‘martyrs’. Monis claimed that the against President Obama. The Secret Service actions of the Australian Government made was advised that Monis was not considered a the country ‘unsafe’ and he ‘promised’ credible threat to the president. In 2009, Monis Muslims would attack Australia and that registered a warehouse off Canterbury Road in Australians would be killed. He sent a media Campsie with the Office of Fair Trading as a ‘ release to various outlets, the Saudi Embassy prayer hall which he called Darul Ifta ( The ’ in Australia, the Australian Embassy in Jakarta House of Mufti ).On1July2009,Monisgave and Buckingham Palace. a lecture in Farsi to an audience at the Nabi ’ On Christmas Day 2008, Monis used the Akram Islamic Centre, a Shi a centre in opportunity of a family gathering to propose to Granville in western Sydney in which he said: Anastasia Droudis. Within a month of their ‘Your intelligence service is not working. engagement, they announced that they had There’s criminal activity in your country’.39 married in a private ceremony at a mosque in Queensland. During the inquest, Channel 7 investiga- On 18 November 2008, a DVD featuring tive journalist David Richardson testified that Droudis warning of threats to Australians was after a 2009 television story about Monis send- sent to the Queen. The AFP briefed the ing letters to the families of fallen Australian Commonwealth Director of Public soldiers,Channel7decidedtolookmore Prosecutions but no offences were identified. closely at Monis. Mr Richardson told the On 5 December 2008, an analysis by ASIO of inquest that over six months, an investigation the results of the investigation of Monis found of various companies and addresses associated that there was no information to indicate that with Monis failed to find any confirmation Monis or any of his known associates in from the Iranian community that Monis was a Australia and overseas were of security con- real sheikh or that he belonged to any particu- cern, Monis was not involved in any politically lar mosque or recognised Islamic organisa- motivated violence or promotion of communal tion.40 Indeed, it appeared that leading Muslim violence and the ‘www.sheikhharon.com’ web- figures held site did not pose any significant security threat. Monis in contempt. In August 2009, the The report concluded: ‘While [Monis] endeav- expos'e was aired on the ‘Today Tonight’ pro- ours to use language that is ambiguous and gram, in which Monis was described as a ‘fake open to interpretation, he makes sure not to sheikh’. Monis complained to Channel 7 and cross lines and tries to ensure he can protect to the ACMA, claiming that the program had himself from allegations of inciting ‘insulted’ Muslims and had invaded his priv- terrorism’.38 acy and ‘caused danger to his life’.41 The 12 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

ACMA found that although one aspect of holding small Australian flags. He stayed there Monis’ complaint was justified, the statement the entire day in front of the media holding the was not significantly inaccurate and that small flags in one hand and a sign above his Channel 7 and the ‘Today Tonight’ program head calling for Australian troops to be were not required to take any further action. It brought home from Iraq and Afghanistan. has been speculated that Monis’ many com- During the inquest, Monis’ solicitor Chris plaints against Channel 7 which he published Murphy reported that, outside court after the on his website indicate a vendetta and that the case was heard, Monis ignored his instructions Lindt Caf'e was chosen as the site of his final not to talk to the media and later chained him- protest because it was located opposite the stu- self to the building. Mr Murphy was reported dioofChannel7inSydney. to have said: ‘He didn’tstrikemeasveryintel- On 16 October 2009, Monis reported to ligent. He was entirely self-absorbed with his the New South Wales Police Force and the performance, my recollection is he held a pen AFP that his residence had been attacked in an in the air and said “this is my sword”’.44 Mr attempt to kill him but his attackers were Murphywasalsoreportedtohaveclaimed unable to locate him. The AFP invited Monis that Monis was considered to be a ‘pest’ by to attend an interview, but he did not accept. some lawyers and that he and other lawyers On 17 October 2009, Monis sent the New laterdeclinedtoactforhim.On3November South Wales Police Force a media release rais- 2009, after his bail was continued, Monis ing the possibility of a terrorist attack again chained himself outside the court. in Australia. On 11 November 2009 (Remembrance On 20 October 2009, the AFP executed a Day), Monis addressed assembled journal- search warrant at Monis’ home in Croydon ists outside the court and strongly criticised Park home in Sydney’s inner-west and subse- Australia’s military presence in Afghanistan. quently charged him with seven counts of Referring to a comment reportedly made offences related to the use of a postal service by the Prime Minister that he could not to menace, harass or cause offence. The offen- ‘stomach’ the allegations, Monis was ces related to the letters Monis wrote between reported to have said: ‘IaskMrKevin November 2007 and August 2009. Monis was Rudd, did your stomach turn when you released on bail with reporting conditions. read the news about killing innocent On 22 October 2009, at the request of the Afghan civilians?’45 Monis then produced a NSW Joint Counter Terrorism Team, the second Australian flag and a length of Internet service provider removed Monis’ chain which he draped around himself. ‘sheikhharon’ website. On 3 December 2009, Monis later faxed the Prime Minister, less than two months later, Monis’ website claiming that the Victorian bushfires were was back online with a service provider in ‘God’s punishment because the Australian Hong Kong.42 Monis continued to post items Government did not oppose the execution of on the website up to the day before the siege. the Bali bombers’. He also claimed that the On 23 October 2009, Prime Minister Australian Government was ‘hacking’ the was reported to have said that the Google website to give Muslims a ‘bad name’. prosecution of Monis could lead to major citi- On 25 and 27 November 2009, Monis zenship law changes. The Prime Minister was staged further protests outside the Downing quoted to have said that the contents of Monis’ Centre including holding up a sign which read: letters would make ‘stomachs turn’.43 On 2 ‘Australians don’t want war’.On3December November 2009, after the first day of his bail 2009, Monis was photographed in front of hearing at the Downing Centre, Monis chained Christmas decorations at an antiIsrael demon- himself to a railing outside the court house stration in Martin Place. Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 13

2010 made for him to attend two days later for an On 8 January 2010, Monis began receiving outpatient appointment with community men- Austudy benefits, having enrolled to complete tal health psychiatrist Dr Kristen Barrett. a Bachelor of Criminology and Criminal On 10 May 2010, when he was first inter- Justice degree through Open Universities viewed by Dr Barrett, Monis said that he had accredited by the Griffith University in been forced to close his spiritual business, was Queensland. In January 2010, Monis posted a $20,000 in debt and had to change his name video on YouTube claiming that he had sent a for ‘security reasons’. Monis told Dr letter to the United Kingdom Prime Minister Barrett that he was being constantly related to the death of British soldiers in watched by ASIO and the police and that Afghanistan. On 19 January 2010 and again some people could read his mind. Dr Barrett on 2 February 2010, after he attended court made a provisional diagnosis of ‘chronic hearings, Monis protested in front of the media schizophrenia’ and prescribed a low dose of on the steps of the Downing Centre. risperidone, an anti-psychotic medication. Dr The Coroner noted that in the last decade Barrett said Monis agreed to take the medica- of his life, Monis attended a number of doc- tion and appeared to improve as she saw him tors, psychologists and psychiatrists, presented at regular follow-up appointments. at public hospitals on at least two occasions, Four months later, when Monis reported attended a community mental health service symptoms of anxiety, Dr Barrett also pre- and was assessed on two occasions in custody scribed the anti-anxiety medication sertraline. by Justice Health and Forensic Mental Health Over the course of six months, Monis reported services.46 It was notable that Monis consulted that he had decided to reduce the amount of different health care providers without disclos- medication and then stop the medication ing his history of earlier presentations, and he altogether. Dr Barrett reported to the inquest often gave differing accounts of complaints that over seven consultations, she never had and symptoms. On 17 April 2010, after he was any concerns that Monis had developed any reported to have collapsed in a shopping centre violent ideation. The inquest heard no evidence car park in Ashfield, an inner-western suburb confirming that the medications prescribed by of Sydney, and complained of weakness and Dr Barrett were ever dispensed to Monis. dizziness, Monis was taken by ambulance to Whilst he was attending Dr Barrett in 2010 Canterbury Hospital for an assessment. and 2011, Monis did not disclose that he also Monis told a non-medical mental health clin- attended Dr Murray on two occasions. Dr ician that for the past five years, he experi- Barrett and Dr Murray both told the inquest enced pain all over his body when he was theyweresurprisedtolearnMonishadbeen stressed and that he was often unable to use seeing another psychiatrist. During the inquest, his arms and legs. The clinician described Dr Murray agreed that a patient telling differ- Monis as ‘quite guarded and reluctant to dis- ent stories to two different psychiatrists sug- close too much information’. Monis reported gested ‘manipulation’ and that Monis was that he believed people were watching him possibly ‘diagnosis-shopping’. Dr Murray and that he was discriminated against at air- recalled the dramatic transformation when ports. He reported that he did not use his Monis attended five years after the first con- Medicare card because he was worried that sultationin2005,bywhichtimehehad people who had access to his medical records changed his name and, instead of a suit, he would see that he had been prescribed medica- wore the flowing robes and cloth headpiece of tion and would assume he had a mental illness. an Islamic cleric. During the inquest, Dr After Monis would not provide a phone num- Murray expressed his surprise that Monis had ber or a street address, an appointment was been seeing another psychiatrist who had 14 R. Scott and R. Shanahan reached a starkly different diagnos- when Monis approached Amnesty tic conclusion. International, his request for assistance was In 2010, in the context of being declined.47 An Amnesty International official charged with the postal offences, Monis who met Monis in 2010 described his also had two consultations with psycholo- ‘delusional selfimportance’ including his out- gist Kasim Abaie, who grew up in Iran rage that the Queen did not personally respond and spoke several languages, including toaletterhewroteher:‘Itwasverymuchlike Farsi. The psychologist told the inquest that he was standing on a soapbox [and] painting Monis described anxiety and depression. himself as a noble victim’.48 The psychologist described Monis as ‘controlling’ andwouldonlyspeaktohim 2011 in English. Monis told the psychologist that On 8 April 2011, the High Court refused an he was stressed living alone but that it was application by Monis to have his constitutional ‘ ’ dangerous for him to visit his two daugh- challenge removed to the High Court.49 ters in Iran. Although Monis attended the French CJ, Gummow and Crennan JJ held that psychologist wearing the robes of a an order for removal of Monis’ matter to the ‘ ’ sheikh , his demeanour and angry com- High Court would interrupt the processes of plaints were unlike what the psychologist the lower courts and deny the High Court the was familiar with from his previous interac- benefit of the reasons of the lower courts on tions with Muslim clerics. The psychologist constitutional issues. The High Court also held told the inquest that Monis said he needed that Monis’ application raised no constitutional a report to exclude any mental illness. issues that required an urgent decision of the However, from the two brief consultations, High Court. the psychologist formed the impression that On 11 April 2011, Monis applied to quash Monis exhibited ‘delusional thinking’,that the indictments relating to the postal charges, he believed he was being followed by arguing that the case against him was ASIO and the police and that people could ‘political’ and that it infringed the implied read his mind. After providing the report ‘constitutional freedom’ of public communica- for Monis’ general practitioner, the psych- tion. On 18 April 2011, the New South Wales ologist had no further contact with Monis. DistrictCourtdismissedthemotiontohave On 11 May 2010, Monis was charged with the indictments quashed,50 and, on 6 a further six postal services offences. In July December 2011, an appeal from the decision 2010, Monis pleaded not guilty to the postal of the District Court was dismissed by the offences. On 15 November 2010, Monis filed New South Wales Court of civil proceedings in the New South Wales Criminal Appeal.51 Supreme Court seeking a declaration that the It was reported that on 3 July 2011, Monis provision under which he was charged was attended a conference hosted by Hizbut Tahrir ‘invalid’ under the constitution. (Arabic for ‘Party of Liberation’).52 Hizbut On 23 November 2010, in the context Tahrir is an international, non-violent of the royal visit to Australia as part of the panIslamic political organization, founded by Commonwealth Heads of Government Sunni Muslim scholars in Jerusalem in 1953, meeting, the AFP identified Monis as a person whichaimstore-establishtheIslamic of interest given his apparent fixation on ‘Khilafah’ (caliphate) which would enforce Australian high-office holders and assessed Shariah law. Despite being banned in that Monis may attempt to embarrass the Germany, Russia, China, Egypt, and Australian Government and was likely to most Arab countries, Hizb ut-Tahrir is not come to the attention of the police. In 2010, banned in many western countries, including Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 15 the United Kingdom and Australia. Monis did On 27 May 2012, Monis, who was by that not address the conference. time living with Droudis and her family, began On 18 June 2011, Noleen Pal separated subleasing a flat in an apartment building in from Monis. Within days of the separation, the western Sydney suburb of Werrington Monis reported that his eldest son had been which became the address at which his two indecently assaulted by Pal’sfather.Police children were dropped off and collected after whoinvestigateddeterminedthattheallega- the Sunday access visits. Transcripts of the tions against the maternal grandfather were domestic violence hearing in the false and had been made by Monis with the Campbelltown Local Court during May 2012 intention of securing custody of the children. documented Pal’s claims of Monis’ controlling On 22 July 2011, two days after a late- behaviour, his insistence that she not leave the night confrontation with Monis in the carpark home, that she surrender her mobile phone and of a fast-food restaurant in Green Valley in pull the blinds at all times. Pal also claimed western Sydney, Pal reported to police that in that in 2010 they separated after Monis had the context of disputes over access to his chil- attacked her and had also beaten the elder of dren, Monis had threatened her. She reported their two sons. However, the magistrate found that Monis became abusive and said: ‘If I can’t that Pal’s evidence seemed ‘somewhat see the kids more than I am now, you’re going evasive’, and on 30 May 2012, the charge to pay, even if I have to shoot you’. against Monis was dismissed. On 27 July 2011, after he was questioned Although New South Wales police made an at St Marys Police Station, Monis was charged application for a final apprehended domestic vio- with stalking or intimidating intending to lence order, the court declined to make the order. cause fear of physical or mental harm. A pro- In July 2012, Monis’ application to renew his visional order was made by the police, and an security licence was refused on the grounds that apprehended domestic violence order was he was not a ‘fit and proper person’. made by the court, and Monis was granted On 9 June 2012, Monis attended protests bail. On 9 August 2011, Monis commenced organisedbyHizbut-Tahriroutsidethe custody proceedings against Pal. The effect of Iranian, Saudi and Turkish embassies demon- the court proceedings was that Monis was strating against those countries which sup- deprived of seeing his two sons from July ported the regime of Syrian President Bashar 2011 until after interim orders for supervised Hafez al-Assad, whose army and mostly access were made in the Federal Magistrates Alawite shabiha militia received direct support Court on 27 October 2011. from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards and On 21 October 2011, President Obama Lebanese Shi’a Hezbollah. announced that United States troops would On 5 July 2012, Monis wrote to the presid- leaveIraqbytheendoftheyear.On18 ing Federal Magistrate to advise that he December 2011, the last United States combat wanted to withdraw his proceedings against troops withdrew from Iraq. Pal. On 27 July 2012, Monis failed to appear at the listed hearing, and on 24 August 2012, 2012 final orders were made granting full custody In January 2012, Pal told a Sydney of the children to Pal. Monis was given access Magistrates Court that she was concerned for only on every second Sunday between 10 am her safety and she believed that Monis held a and 4 pm. Monis later posted a website entry: gun licence. New South Wales Police later Man Haron Monis … has continuously confirmed that the Firearms Registry did not been under attack and false accusation by have any record of Monis ever holding a gun the Australian government and media licence in the state. since he started his political letter 16 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

campaign from 2007. … His children had any links to any person or organisation have been taken away from him by the involved in the conflict. … Australian government he is not On 10 April 2013, Monis took out home allowed to visit or even call them. contents insurance, including water damage cover, on the third-floor flat he leased in During 2012, Monis began associating with Werrington. On 13 April 2013, Monis con- the Rebels Outlaw Motorcycle Gang (OMCG). tacted friends from Iran with whom he had no He attempted to become a full member of the communication for some years and made club and began attending Friday evening social arrangements for a family outing during the gatherings at the Mt Druitt clubhouse. In following weekend. September 2012, a female friend took out a During the outing with his two sons on 21 loan for nearly $25,000 to enable Monis to pur- April 2013, using his mobile phone, Monis chase a Harley Davidson motorcycle. created 14 separate video clips, many of which filmed clocks or Monis recording himself at a 2013 place distant from his Werrington unit. Upon During the subsequent trial of Monis’ partner leaving the Penrith public swimming pool, Droudis, the court heard evidence that in early Monis’ children got into his friend’s vehicle. 2013, on two occasions, Monis approached At 3:56 pm, Monis recorded a 27-second video members of the Rebels bikies club soliciting clip which showed his sons seated in the rear assistance in having his ex-wife killed.53 On of his friend’s vehicle and Monis entering the ’ 13 January 2013, during a child access visit, driver s seat of his Jeep Cherokee in which he Monis drove to his ex-wife’s residence, was travelling on his own. ’ accompanied by two bikies on their motor- At approximately 4 pm, Monis ex-wife cycles. Monis’ ex-wife’s mother was so con- Noleen Pal arrived at the flat to collect her two cerned that she contacted the police to report sonswhowerethenagedsevenandfour.She how intimidated she felt. During Droudis’ sub- activated the intercom, and the security door sequent trial, Johnson J held: ‘I accept the was opened to allow her entry to the ground floor stairwell. It was later alleged at her trial unchallenged evidence that Monis solicited that Droudis, dressed in a black niqab, waited members of the Rebels OMCG in early 2013 in the stairwell and stabbed Pal 18 times, then to kill [Noleen Pal]. The evidence is that these doused her in petrol and set her alight. At the requests were not taken seriously and were same time as his ex-wife was being murdered, rejected summarily’.54 Monis staged a minor motor vehicle accident On 27 February 2013, after a two-day in which he drove into the rear of a parked hearing in October 2012 on an application on vehicle 240 metres away from the Penrith the question of constitutional validity of the Police Station. A subsequent investigation by postal offences, the Full Court of the High 55 the Metropolitan Crash Investigation Unit Court arrived at a split judgement. As a con- found that the movements of the Jeep driven sequence, the earlier decision of the New by Monis were ‘highly consistent with the South Wales Court of Appeal that the provi- intentional actions of a cognisant driver’56 and sion was valid was affirmed. concluded that the crash was the result of a On 18 April 2013, Monis was reported to ‘driver commanded divergence’.57 have attended a rally protesting against the At the crash scene, although Monis com- Syrian regime of al-Assad. The AFP reviewed plained of chest pains, he asked his friends to Monis as part of the project identifying people attend the nearby police station to report the who may be involved with or connected with accident. After Monis had been taken to the the conflict in Syria and Iraq and concluded Nepean Hospital, police arrived and filmed an that there was nothing to suggest that Monis interview in which Monis appeared to be Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 17 shocked when he was advised that his ex-wife community service, a two-year good behav- had been murdered. Monis complained of iour bond and a $1000 surety. chest pain and a ‘racing heart’ and terminated In the week after the Abbott government the interview with police. During Droudis’ was elected on 7 September 2013, Monis subsequent trial, Johnson J held ‘I am satisfied wrote to the Prime Minister inviting him to that Monis’ intentional collision with a parked participate in a live debate in which Monis vehicle fortifies a conclusion that his actions said he would ‘prove that Australia and that day involved an elaborate charade to Australians will be attacked’ as a result of the prove that he was not at Werrington that after- participation of Australia in the war in 58 noon, and particularly after 4.00pm’. Afghanistan. However, Australia had begun On 22 April 2013, upon application by withdrawing its troops from Afghanistan much Pal’s parents, a Family Law Recovery Order earlier, in October 2008, and the efforts of the was issued by the Federal Circuit Court with Australian Reconstruction Task Force were respecttothetwochildren,andon23April concentrated on ‘capacity building and 2013, the Order was served upon Monis who mentoring’ of the Afghan National Army.60 was advised that the children were to be By August 2009, combat operations by returned to their maternal grandparents. Australian troops in Afghanistan had ended. On 29 May 2013, Monis and Droudis On 28 October 2013, during a surprise visit to attended the Police Station and the Australian base in Tarin Kot, Uruzgan made a complaint that Pal’s father had threat- province, Prime Minister Abbott announced ened to kill Monis and also maintained the ear- the withdrawal of all Australian troops from lier allegation that Monis’ former father-in-law Afghanistan.61 BythetimeoftheLindtCaf'e had sexually abused one of Monis’ children. siege in December 2014, there were no On 20 August 2013, a clinical psychologist Australian combat troops in Iraq, and the small with the NSW Police Forensic Services Group Australian contingent in Afghanistan were Behavioural Science Team was given access involved only in training of the Afghan to police records and correspondence to com- National Army. plete a psychological assessment of Monis. On 1 November 2013, less than a week Although she qualified her opinion by empha- after the Prime Minister’s announcement in sising that she had not actually interviewed Afghanistan, Monis again wrote to Mr Abbott Monis, in her evidence to the inquest, the arguing that Australia’spolicyinAfghanistan psychologist opined that Monis was grandiose, had ‘a significant role in jeopardising security arrogant, lacking in empathy and preoccupied and peace in the world especially in Australia’ with his own self-importance and that these and challenged the Prime Minister to a debate features were consistent with narcissistic per- about the war in Afghanistan. Two weeks sonality disorder (NPD). In her report which later, on 15 November 2013, police arrested was tendered at the inquest, the psychologist Monis and Droudis. Droudis was charged with added that individuals with NPD often have a murder and Monis was charged with inciting, fragile sense of self-esteem, which makes them procuring, aiding and counselling Droudis to respond badly to criticism.59 murder his ex-wife and assisting and harbour- On 5 August 2013, Monis pleaded guilty ing Droudis after the murder. to postal services offences and was convicted Whilst in custody, Monis asked two differ- on 12 counts. On 6 September 2013, after ent fellow remandees on different occasions describing the offences as ‘deplorable’ and for their assistance in making connections with noting that the maximum sentence for such criminal elements who could assist in murder- offences was two years imprisonment, the sen- ing his ex-wife’sfather.62 Monis suggested to tencing judge sentenced Monis to 300 hours of these prisoners that payment for the killing 18 R. Scott and R. Shanahan could come from items of value stolen from Director of Public Prosecutions, the the premises of the proposed victim. Coroner held that ‘had the Inquest not During the subsequent trial, Droudis’ examined this issue, there would have been defence counsel did not contest the Crown no independent public examination of the case that Monis organised the murder. On 3 response of prosecuting authorities to November 2016, the trial judge, who heard the Monis’ application for grant of bail – mat- case without a jury, held that the overwhelm- ters of considerable concern’.66 In his find- ing evidence was that Monis had planned the ings, the Coroner referred to the transcript murder and had gone to ‘incredible lengths’ to of bail proceedings on 12 December 2013 establish an alibi on the afternoon of the mur- and noted: der. Referring to Monis’ report to police of  the solicitor employed by the NSW thefts of his property and his false insurance claims arising from smoke and water damage Director of Public Prosecutions failed to his flat, Johnson J found: ‘strong support for to advise the magistrate that Monis had a conclusion that Monis planned the murder been on bail for the Commonwealth [and devised] a false theft scenario in the pro- postal offences at the time of the alleged cess. It provides support, as well, for a conclu- murder sion that Monis did not hire a killer to whom  the solicitor erroneously advised the he had paid or owed money for the killing’.63 magistrate that Monis did not have to On 15 November 2013, following his show ‘exceptional circumstances’ arrest, Monis did not apply for bail. On 12 before Monis could be granted bail December 2013, when he appeared before when the relevant section of the Bail a magistrate in the Penrith Local Court, Act in fact imposed such an onus Monis claimed that the Iranian Secret  the fact that Monis had an alibi was Police and ASIO were trying to frame him irrelevant (the Crown did not allege for the murder of his ex-wife.64 The pros- that Monis was present at the scene of ecutor told the court that Monis went to the alleged murder) ‘extreme and elaborate lengths’ to create an  Monislackedtiestothecommunity alibi and that Monis deliberately filmed a (Monis’ children were in the care of clock while asking somebody for the time their grandparents, he had no other fam- at a Penrith public swimming pool before ily members in Australia, his passport the murder and faked a car crash outside hadbeenreturnedtohimandhehad Penrith Police station so that he would be communicated with an Iranian woman takentoNepeanHospital. about meeting her in Malaysia) During the inquest, the NSW Director  Monis posed a flight risk of Public Prosecutions was granted leave to appear before the inquest and questioned The magistrate held that the Crown’scase whether an examination of Monis’ history was ‘weak’ and that both Monis and Droudis of bail applications was within the scope of had advised the court they had alibis, and the inquest.65 The Commonwealth supported Monis was granted conditional bail.67 No the submissions made by the Director of application was made to the New South Wales Public Prosecution. The NSW Director of Supreme Court to review the bail decision, Public Prosecutions also claimed ‘legal pro- and on 17 December 2013, Monis was fessional privilege’ over communications released from custody. between legal officers and police officers During an interview with the ABC, lawyer involved in Monis’ prosecution. On 5 June Emanuell Conditsis, who represented Monis 2015, in dismissing the application by the after he was remanded into custody in Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 19

November 2013, said Monis had described a criminal record in Iran, he was wanted for very unpleasant experience whilst he was in ‘defrauding Iranian citizens’ but the arrest custody.68 Mr Conditsis reported that on one warrant had lapsed. occasion when he visited, Monis broke down On 14 April 2014, Monis was arrested and and cried ‘likeababy’ because of how he was charged with sexual intercourse without con- being treated in Silverwater prison. During a sent and two counts of indecent assault relating subsequent interview with BBC Radio 4, Mr to incidents alleged in 2002 and was denied Conditis further embellished Monis’ account: bail. During the bail application, ‘What he said happened is that he was placed Monis requested that the Kogarah Local into a cell which had a concrete bed, they Court investigate his allegation that the New removed the mattress, there was excrement South Wales Police Force and ASIO were thrown around the walls and the floor – not by involved in the murder of his former partner. inmates, according to him, but by prison Monis also compared the accusations of sexual guards. He was then forced to stand in and assault against him to the allegations made about the excrement and every time he tried to against Julian Assange, founder of the whistle- sit down over a period of 24 hours he would blowing website ‘Wikileaks’.On16April 69 be bashed’. Mr Conditsis later said that the 2014, Monis was refused bail. Lindt Caf'e siege was not the work of an On 26 May 2014, the magistrate found organised terrorist group: ‘This was a oneoff that Monis did not pose an ‘unacceptable risk’ random individual. It was not a concerted ter- to the safety of any individuals or the commu- rorism event or act. It was a damaged-goods nity or of interfering with witnesses. The individual who did something outrageous’. magistrate highlighted that Monis had limited criminal history and no history of violence and 2014 had not committed any serious offences whilst On 22 January 2014, in an application to vary on bail. Perversely, the magistrate also high- his bail conditions, Monis appeared at lighted Monis’‘strong community ties’. Parramatta Local Court. After informing the Notwithstanding the submissions made by the magistrate that he was representing himself, Director of Public Prosecutions, the magistrate Monis began referring to documents that he granted bail, and Monis was released with claimed showed ASIO ‘conspired’ to have daily reporting conditions. On 18 July 2014 him imprisoned. The magistrate told Monis and again on 31 July 2014, Monis’ bail was that she had no power to order the release of continued without objection by the Director of 71 documents held by ASIO and advised Monis Public Prosecutions. to desist because the submissions he was mak- On the two occasions when he was ing would ‘harm’ his defence. Following the remanded into custody, Monis was subject to adjournment, Monis staged a protest outside the standard reception screening assessments the court and wore chains and held a sign: ‘I by the Justice Health and Forensic Mental have been tortured in prison for my political Health Services. On the first screening assess- letters’.Moniswasquotedbythemediaas ment in November 2013 after he was charged saying: ‘This is not a criminal case. This is a with offences relating to the murder of his political case’.70 exwife, Monis was cleared as being fit for the In February 2014, during the course of correctional centre community. On the second criminal investigations into Monis, New South assessment which occurred in April 2014 after Wales Police sought through INTERPOL he was charged with the sexual assault offen- CanberraacopyofMonis’ criminal history. ces, Monis was again cleared as having no On 31 March 2014, INTERPOL Tehran mental health issues and was found to be fit advised that, whilst Monis did not have a for normal mainstream cell placement. During 20 R. Scott and R. Shanahan both assessments, Monis did not disclose any quantities of arms and munitions,75 fewer than history of mental health issues. In January and 1000 Islamic State fighters captured Mosul, February 2014, after he was released on bail, the second largest city in Iraq, and summarily Monis attended three different general practi- executed and dismembered the Imam of the tioners complaining of depression and insom- Grand Mosque.76 Less than a week later, 12 nia. The Coroner observed that whilst each local Imams were also executed in front of the general practitioner made referrals to psychia- Al Israa Mosque. On 4 July 2014, al-Baghdadi trists, there was no evidence that Monis ever ascended the prayer niche in the Grand followed up with any these referrals.72 Mosque and declared himself ‘caliph’77 (reli- On 27 June 2014, Monis attended a lecture gious and political leader of the Muslim at the Lakemba headquarters of Hizb utTahrir. community).78 Although he was photographed sitting in the In August 2014, after Islamic State had front row of the audience, Monis did not seized the Kurdish city of Sinjar and commit- address the audience. It was reported that in ted genocide against the minority Yazidi popu- July 2014, Monis was photographed in conver- lation, United States President Obama ordered sation with Hizb ut-Tahrir spokesperson airstrikes to assist the Iraqi Government forces Ismail al-Wahwah in front of the Egyptian and the Kurdish Peshmerga. As reprisals, consulate in Surry Hills during a protest Islamic State released videos of the beheading against the military crackdown on the Muslim of captured American journalists James Foley Brotherhood in Egypt. However, as the andStevenSotloff. Coroner noted, Hizb ut-Tahrir was not a pro- On 13 September 2014, Australia’s terror- scribed terrorist organisation in Australia and ist alert level was raised to ‘high’, meaning the actually denies the legitimacy of Islamic risk of an attack was ‘likely’, but not State.73 Conversely, Islamic State considers ‘imminent’. Prime Minister Abbott said that Hizb ut-Tahrir an obstacle to its aspirations whilst the government had ‘no specific and strongly opposes it. No account of intelligence’ of a plot to mount a terrorist the nature of any conversations Monis may attack, security agencies had recommended have had with al-Wahwah or anybody else the increased threat level because of the num- associated with Hizb ut-Tahrir has ever ber of Australians ‘fighting with and been reported. supporting’ terrorist groups in the Following the death of his predecessor Middle East.79 Abu Omar al-Baghdadi, on 16 May 2010, On 18 September 2014, nearly 500 New Ibrahim Awad Ibrahim al-Badri, who had South Wales police and 300 AFP officers taken the name Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (‘The mobilisedforpre-dawnraidson15homesin One from Baghdad’) claimed leadership of the 12 western Sydney suburbs in ‘Operation Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. After the Appleby’ which was reported to have foiled a withdrawal of United States troops from Iraq plot to ‘commit violent acts’ in Australia. in 2011, Prime Minister al-Maliki closely Although it was luridly reported that the identified with the Shi’a population which fur- extremistsplannedtomakeavideoof ther alienated the Sunnis, many of whom ‘beheading’,80 it was later alleged only that a gravitated towards Islamic State.74 After its police phone intercept had overheard initial military successes in Syria, the forces of Mohammad Ali Baryalei, a former Kings Islamic State swept into northern Iraq and Cross bouncer who had gone to fight in Syria eventually gained control over an area larger in 2013, urging 22-year-old Omarjan Azari to than Great Britain with more than six million recruit ‘boys with heart’ to commit terrorist inhabitants. On 12 June 2014, after 30,000 attacks, adding that ‘BritishandFrenchback- well-armed Iraqi forces fled, leaving massive packers should be targeted’.81 Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 21

On 19 September 2014, during a commu- aggravated sexual assault and 14 counts of nity rally in the Sydney suburb of Lakemba aggravated indecent assault in relation to six organised by Hizb ut-Tahrir to protest against women. The charges were initiated by serving the overnight arrests of those suspected of hav- a court attendance notice rather than by arrest- ing links to Islamic State, Monis was photo- ing Monis. The Coroner was later critical of graphed wearing a white robe and an this decision which increased the likelihood Islamic headband. that Monis’ bail would continue.82 The On 22 September 2014, a lengthy video Coroner noted that in no instance was an appli- address and a written English translation attrib- cation made to review or revisit the grants of uted to Islamic State spokesperson Abu bail made in favour of Monis: ‘there were defi- Muhammad al-Adnani were released which ciencies in the way prosecutions dealt with the called for ‘muwahhidın in Europe, America, question of bail for the sex charges, including Australia, and Canada’ andacrosstheworldto not even opposing bail when the most numer- defend the Islamic State against the ‘dozens of ous and serious of those charges came before nations … gathered against it’: the court’.83 The Coroner concluded:

If you can kill a disbelieving American or As charges against him accumulated, a European – especially the spiteful and reassessment of the risk Monis posed was filthy French – or an Australian, or a warranted. Instead, with the prosecution’s Canadian, or any other disbeliever from consent, his bail on the initial murder and the disbelievers waging war, including the sex charges was extended, and the fresh citizens of the countries that entered into a sex charges were looked at in isolation.84 coalition against the Islamic State, then rely upon Allah, and kill him in any manner or way however it may be. In examining whether the outcome would have been different if Monis’ bail applications Do not ask for anyone’s advice and do not had been handled differently, the Coroner seek anyone’s verdict. Kill the disbeliever highlighted that the inquest ‘necessarily whether he is civilian or military, for they focussed on mistakes and missed oppor- have the same ruling. Both of them are tunities’ and concluded: ‘at times ODPP disbelievers. [Office of the NSW Director of Public On 9 October 2014, the Canberra office Prosecutions] lawyers did not approach ’ of the Federal Attorney-General received Monis bail application in the most effective a letter from Monis under the name way, and that investigating officers made ‘Sheikh Haron’: some mistakes that affected the question of bail and then missed opportunities to cor- 85 IwouldliketosendalettertoCaliph rect them’. Ibrahim, the leader of the Islamic State, in Between 2010 and 2014, Monis received which (sic) making some comments and eight separate grants of legal aid funding. asking some questions. Please advise me In October 2014, the Family Court granted whether the communication is legal ’ or illegal. full custody of Monis twochildrentotheir maternal grandparents. It is unlikely to be coincidental that at that On 17 November 2014, Monis posted a time, police investigations were continuing brief statement in Arabic on his website: into further allegations by a number of women who had attended Monis’‘Spiritual Healing’ I pledge my allegiance to God, his Messenger, and the Caliphate of the business. The following day, on 10 October Muslims. Peace be upon the Commander 2014, Monis was charged with 37 additional of the faithful and the Caliph of the sex offences, including 22 counts of Muslims, the Imam/preacher of our time. 22 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

In the month before the siege, Monis agencies and Monis in the years leading established a Twitter account and posted 157 up to the siege. The response of the AFP Tweets, several of which contained links to and the NSW [Police Force] was proportionate to what they knew or should videos including confronting images of the have known about Monis at the time.88 bodies of children lying in ruined buildings. In the first week of December 2014, Monis On 12 December 2014, Monis appeared in posted a photo of dead children on his the High Court sitting in Sydney in relation to ‘ Facebook page which was captioned evidence his appeal from the decision of the NSW for terrorism in America and its allies includ- CourtofCriminalAppealrelatingtothe ’ ing Australia, the result of their airstrikes . convictions for the postal offences. Monis’ Monis also made an obscure post on his web- application to remove the appeal to the High site which has been interpreted to suggest that Court was given only cursory consideration. In ’ ‘ he had converted from Shi a to : I a terse dismissal, the High Court held that it ’ used to be a Rafidi, but not anymore .The was not desirable to make any further com- ‘ ’ Arabic word Rafidi can be translated as ments on any preclusionary principles in rela- ‘ ’ ‘ ’ rejectionist or heretic and is sometimes tion to Monis’ case.89 It can be speculated that used by Sunni Muslims as a derogatory term having exhausted his options for appealing his for Shi’ite Muslims. postal offences and being charged with offen- On 6 December 2014, Monis posted on ces related to the murder of his ex-wife and Twitter: ‘Islam is the religion of peace, thats multiple sex offences, Monis may have had why Muslims fight against the terrorism of the very real concern that his bail may be America and its allies’. On 8 December 2014, revoked at any time. Monis posted: ‘This is team Islam against Two days later, on 14 December 2014, the Australian oppression and terrorism’.On9 day before the siege, Monis made his final December 2014, Monis posted ‘Shame on those post on his website with the same photograph racist and terrorist Australians who support the of the dead children he had used earlier: governments of America and its allies’. Between 9 and 12 December 2014, the Islam is the religion of peace, that’s why National Security Hotline received 18 calls Muslims fight against the oppression and and emails related to Monis drawing attention terrorism of USA and its allies including to his Facebook page. All of these calls and UK and Australia. If we stay silent emails were referred to ASIO and the AFP, towards criminals we cannot have a and some were also forwarded to the New peaceful society. The more you fight with crime, the more peaceful you are. Islam South Wales Police Force. The Coroner found wants peace on the Earth, that’s why that whilst Monis’ Facebook page contained Muslims want to stop terrorism of confronting and provocative content,86 they America and its allies. When you speak did not indicate a capability, desire or intent out against crime you have taken one step 90 by Monis to undertake an act of ‘politically towards peace. motivated action or violence by Monis’.The ’ Coroner made further specific reference to 10 On 14 December 2014, Monis behaviour and 11 December 2014 and found nothing on appeared unremarkable. During the afternoon, Monis’ Facebook page that ‘indicated an he reported to Campsie Police Station as increased level of threat or imminent plans for required by his bail conditions. He withdrew politically motivated action or violence’.87 the balance of $850 from his bank account and The Coroner concluded: purchased the $70 backpack which he wore during the siege. Since he was found to have There was frequent interaction between only $120 in his wallet after the siege, it has various law enforcement and security been speculated that he also purchased the Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 23 unregistered 1950s-era Manufrance LaSalle composed hurriedly. Monis then addressed the 12-gauge pump-action shotgun, possibly from hostages (8 staff and 10 customers), saying an acquaintance he made during his associ- words to the effect of: ation with the Rebels OMCG. The shotgun held three cartridges in the magazine and one Everything’s going to be all right. You are in the breach; the butt and barrel had been all safe. The manager is talking to the police crudely sawn off. The inquest did not establish so do not panic, everything is going to be all right. There is a bomb here. … There are what Monis did on the night before the siege other bombs as well. One is at Circular or with whom, if anyone, he met or how he Quay and another one at Town Hall.92 got to the Sydney central business district on the morning of 15 December 2014. Monis told the hostages he had a bomb in his backpack, which he did not take off during The Lindt Caf'e Siege the siege. He ordered the hostages to produce From 8:26 am on 15 December 2014, Monis’ their mobile phones which he later ordered movements were captured by eight separate them to use to send text and Facebook mes- cameras in Martin Place. At 8:33 am, he sages to their families and the media. Monis entered the Lindt Caf'e. Sometime before 9 did not collect all the mobile phones, which am,heorderedteaandwenttothetoilet. enabled some of the hostages to send Shortlybefore9:40am,heaskedtospeak Facebook and text messages surreptitiously with the manager and, soon after, he pulled during the siege. Monis first demanded an out a sawn-off shotgun and ordered the doors audience on ABC radio with the Prime to the caf'e locked. At 9:41 am, Monis told the Minister. Later, Monis demanded that the flag caf'e manager Tori Johnson to call the 000 of Islamic State be brought to the caf'e. emergency number using Monis’ phone and At approximately 11:30 pm, a police offi- read from handwritten instructions which cer who had been involved in the investigation Monis brought to the caf'e. The instructions into the murder of Monis’ ex-wife was watch- were recovered intact after the siege: ing the live television coverage of the siege when he thought he recognised Monis and Australia is under attack by Islamic State. notified senior police. It was not until approxi- There are 3 bombs in three different mately 2:30 pm that NSW Police commanders locations Martin Place, Circular Q and confirmed Monis’ identity.93 George Street. I want to contact other brothers and ask them not to explode the At 12:25 pm, a hostage rang a radio station other two bombs but I can’t contact them and at 12:28 pm, the same hostage rang 000 to because they don’t carry mobile phones pass on a demand from Monis for police to with them. They have radio with them, I can move back from the caf'e. After Monis ordered say throug [sic] Radio ABC. The plan is to a female hostage to hold up a handwritten request Tony Abbot to call them or me, and ‘ to have a debate while it is broadcast live on message ( Leave or he will kill us all. Please ABC national Radio. So that’swhythey go’), police retreated from their forward posi- have radio, and the best way to contact them tions.94 At 12:56 pm, a hostage rang 000 and is by my voice message to announce that conveyed Monis’ demand that all vehicles they should not explode the bombs. They parked near any window of the Lindt Caf'e be listen to me anything I tell them. The device placed inside the Radios is another way of removed. It was not until 5 pm that all the exploding the bombs [sic].91 vehicles including an Armaguard truck was driven out of Phillip Street.95 The handwritten instructions were In a special lunchtime edition, The Daily scrawled across two pages in a crude, non-cur- Telegraph featured the front-page headline: sive style which appeared to have been ‘Death Cult CBD Attack: IS takes 18 hostages 24 R. Scott and R. Shanahan in city cafe siege’.96 At 12:57 pm, referring to lights off or he will kill a hostage’ before the what he described as a ‘disturbing incident’, call was abruptly terminated.99 during a press conference after a meeting of At 9:40 pm, Monis’ partner, Anastasia the national security committee in Canberra, Droudis, was detained by police. Although the Prime Minister Abbott said ‘there were some necessary authorisations for a search of Monis’ indications that the incident could be politic- bail address at Wiley Park had been granted ally motivated’.97 under the Terrorism Police Powers Act 2002 At approximately 3:37 pm, two hostages (NSW), police hesitated to commence the escaped through the front entrance of the caf'e search of the property until 11:22 pm.100 The andathirdescapedthroughthesidefireexit. search found no extremist literature or anything At 4:58 pm, two female hostages escaped to confirm that Monis had a bomb, and police through the building foyer entrance of the found no evidence that Monis was connected caf'e. Even after five hostages had escaped, with or had been communicating with any ter- although he was angry and increasingly agi- rorist organisation or that he had left any terror- tated and intermittently threatening towards ist-related message.101 his hostages, Monis did nothing. During phone calls at 12:35, 12:45 and At 6:30 pm, during an ABC radio inter- 12:53 am on 16 December 2014, hostages view, when asked whether police had been in again relayed Monis’ earlier demand that the contact with the gunman, the New South lights in Martin Place be turned off. At 1:12 Wales Deputy Police Commissioner (Special am, a hostage called the police negotiators Operations) answered: pleading for the lights to be turned off, saying that she would be ‘shot in 15 minutes’ if that ’ We ve been in contact throughout the day did not occur.102 The street lights were never in various forms and it’s an important part of our negotiation that we do not talk turned off. about some of the tactics or information At 1 am, the police embargo on publically that is being passed. But this is a very, naming Monis as the ‘gunman’ was lifted. At very well tested system of negotiation that 1:43 am, Tori Johnson texted his partner: we use, it is world class and it might take ‘[Monis] increasingly agitated’.103 During the a little bit of time but the safety of those people inside is what is paramount.98 early evening, police utilised a covert listening device in the caf'e which picked up Monis say- In fact, police negotiators never had any ing that he would kill any escaping hostages. direct communication with Monis. From the At 2:03 am, 16 hours into the siege, six hos- first call police negotiators made to the caf'e, tages fled through the foyer exit, the door of they sought to speak directly to the hostage- which had remained unlocked since the previ- taker. On some occasions, whilst speaking ous hostage had escaped. As the hostages with hostages, negotiators explicitly asked to rushed through the doorway, Monis fired a speak to the hostage-taker. Monis always shot which shattered the glass high above the refused these requests. At 4:25 pm, after Martin Place foyer doors. Monis did not Monis’ identity had been established, a police appear to have aimed at any of the fleeing hos- negotiator asked to speak with ‘Sheikh tages and he did not pursue the hostages or Haron’, and the call was abruptly terminated. take a second shot. At 2:11 am Monis fired After the fifth hostage escaped, other than another shot towards the kitchen high into the again relaying Monis’ demand for the Islamic wall and was heard on the police listening State flag, the hostages had no contact with device reloading his shotgun. At that time, the police negotiators until 8:38 pm, when one of twelfth hostage escaped through the front the hostages called the police negotiator and door, leaving only 6 of the original 18 hostages relayed Monis’ new demand: ‘turn the street inside the caf'e. Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 25

At 2:13 am, Monis ordered Tori Johnson political or tactical advantage, usually to 111 to kneel on the floor with his hands on his influence an audience. head.104 The police listening devices captured Monis saying ‘you’ll be right, everyone … Distinguished professor of psychiatry and you’ll be fine’ immediately before he shot Mr political psychology, Jerrold Post, has pro- Johnson from behind before pumping the shot- posed a more succinct definition: gun to reload. The shooting was witnessed by … apolicesniper,whoreported‘hostage Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence against non-combatants or down’.105 The Night Forward Commander ‘ ’ property in order to gain a political, immediately ordered the Emergency Action , ideological, or religious goal through fear and police armed with M4A1 carbines and intimidation.112 deployed 11 ‘flashbang’ stun grenades as they stormed the caf'e.106 Monis fired two shots at In an edition of Inside Terrorism,Bruce police as they entered the caf'e, but neither Hoffman, who gave expert evidence during struck any of the officers or hostages. Monis the inquest, highlighted that the critical distinc- was later found to have 21 assorted shotgun tion between terrorism and other acts of vio- cartridges in his pockets. One of the hostages, lence is the ‘purpose’ of the terrorist act.113 Katrina Dawson, was fatally wounded after Hoffman emphasised that terrorism is vio- she was struck by fragments of bullets fired by lence, or the threat of violence, which is 107 police. The Coroner noted that Monis’ ‘ineluctably political in aims and motives’, ‘ backpack contained a stereo speaker with designed to have ‘far-reaching psychological some wires emerging in the usual way from repercussions beyond the immediate victims ’ 108 the back . or targets’ perpetrated by ‘individuals or a small collection of individuals influenced, Discussion motivated, or inspired by the ideological aims or example of some existent terrorist move- Definition of ‘Terrorism’ ment’. The terrorist seeks to affect change Whilst there is no universally accepted defin- through the intimidation of a wider ‘target ‘ ’ 109 ition of terrorism , the passage adopted by audience’ of ‘non-combatants’.114 the European Union offers a useful foundation: There is no consensus as to whether ‘motive’ should be included in any definition Intentional acts that are committed with ‘ ’ 115 the aim of seriously intimidating a of terrorist act . Terrorists can be broadly population, or unduly compelling a divided between the categories of religious or Government or international organization political groups. Terrorists engage in asym- to perform or abstain from performing any metric warfare unrestrained by laws and inter- act, or seriously destabilizing or national conventions. The intention of the destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social terrorist may be to provoke a disproportionate structures of a country or an international reaction or repression from a government organization.110 which may trigger a process of escalation.116 The terrorists’ ultimate aim may be far beyond Stressing the importance of ‘fear’ and what can reasonably be achieved. Referring to ‘ ’ intimidation , Poland has offered a more emo- ‘absolute terrorists’ as those whose attacks are tive definition of terrorism: ‘non-instrumental’, Zartman has emphasised that the self-contained act of the ‘absolute Terrorism is the premeditated, deliberate, ’ systematic murder, mayhem, and terrorist is completed when it has occurred threatening of the innocent to create fear and is not a means to obtain some further and intimidation in order to gain a goal.117 As well as the restoration of the 26 R. Scott and R. Shanahan caliphate and the removal of all western forces system; a telecommunications system; from Muslim lands, the aims of Islamic State a financial system; a system used for include the destruction of the state of Israel. It the delivery of essential government is these unrealistic demands which make services; a system used for, or by, an impossible any negotiation with Islamic State essential public utility; or a system 118 terrorists. used for, or by, a transport system).119 By s 100.1(3), an action that is ‘advocacy, Definition of ‘Terrorism’ in the Criminal protest, dissent or industrial action’ falls out- Code Act 1995 (Cth) side the definition of a terrorist act. ‘ ’ Prior to the 9/11 attacks in the United States, In Lodhi v The Queen,120 the New South Australia had no national counter-terrorism Wales Court of Criminal Appeal emphasised legislation. Since 2001, the Federal Parliament that the intentions in relation to ‘advancement’ has enacted over 40 new counterterrorist stat- and ‘coercion’ attach to the terrorist act itself utes. In July 2002, the Security Legislation and not to the state of mind of the accused as Amendment (Terrorism) Act 2002 (Cth) the accused was engaged in the conduct which amended the Criminal Code (Cth) to include a constitutes the offence. Spigelman CJ emphas- ‘ ’ definition of a terrorist act . ised (at [90]) that the references to ‘intention’ ‘ ’ In most criminal offences, motive is con- in the definition of ‘terrorist act’ were not fault ‘ ’ sidered distinct from the element of intention elements of the offence, but rather they identi- and may, at most, be only circumstantially fied the character of the action or threat of relevant to intention. However, motive is a key action that fell within the definition of feature of the statutory definition of a ‘terrorist ‘terrorist act’ and the prosecution was not act’. Section 100.1 of the Criminal Code (Cth) required to particularise the person who had defines ‘a terrorist act’ to be an action (or the relevant ‘intention’ because the identity of threat of action) done or made with two spe- that person may not be known.121 As at cific intentions: February 2015, 45 men, almost all of whom 1. the intention of advancing a political, identified as Muslim, had been charged under religious or ideological cause, and Australia’s terrorism laws for preparatory con- 2. the intention of coercing, or influencing duct, and 26 had been convicted.122 by intimidation, the government of the Commonwealth or a State, Territory or Typology of Domestic Terrorists foreign country or intimidating the pub- Domestic terrorist attacks can be usefully div- lic or a section of the public ided into one of three functional categories– By s 100.1 (2), to constitute a terrorist act, directed, enabled or inspired. The co-ordinated theactionmustalsodoone(ormore)of attacks across Paris in November 2015 (the the following: deadliest terrorist attacks on European soil since the March 2004 Madrid bombings which  cause serious physical harm to a per- killed 192 people), were clearly an ‘Islamic son other than the offender State-directed attack’. The plot was conceived  cause serious damage to property in the ‘caliphate’ and carried out by well-  cause death or endanger another’s life armed operatives, some of whom had trained  create a serious risk to the health or in Syria.123 In an ‘enabled terrorist attack’,the safety of the public attacker or attackers have direct, usually online  seriously interfere with, disrupt or des- communicationwithaknownterroristorgan- troy an electronic system (including, isation which may include planning or logis- but not limited to, an information tical support and may even include the supply Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 27 of weapons or bomb components.124 For  perception of grievance; for example, example, in April 2017, Lebanese-Australian conflicted identities, injustice, oppres- Khaled Khayat started communicating with an sion, or social exclusion, which can Islamic State operative in Syria and arranged make an individual receptive to for high-end military-grade explosives to be extremist ideas 125 sent by air cargo from Turkey to Sydney.  adoption of an extremist narrative or Khayat subsequently also received instructions ideology that speaks to the grievance on how to construct a bomb concealed in a kit-  and provides a compelling rationale chen meat mincer which he planned to put in ’ for what needs to be done; and his brother s check-in luggage on an Etihad  social and group dynamics – radical- flight out of Sydney to Abu Dhabi on 15 July isation often occurs in a dense, small 2017. In the ‘inspired terrorist attack’, network of friends, and extremist ideas although the attacker, who is sometimes inexactly dubbed a ‘self-starter’, may not have are more likely to resonate if articu- lated by a credible or charis- direct contact with a terrorist organisation, by 128 accessing the propaganda material, statements matic leader. or directions of the organisation, the attacker is Further research into Islamist radicalisation inspired to action in support of the aims of that has elaborated other significant factors includ- terrorist organisation. ing ‘enabling environments and support However, closer forensic examination of structures’129 and communication and indoc- what may appear to be an ‘inspired attack’ trination over the Internet and social media.130 may also reveal that the violent act was actu- In a study of 12 individuals convicted of ally motivated solely by some personal issue terrorist-related offences in Australia, Porter and that the narrative that the attacker has cre- and Kebbell examined a number of features ated, or that has been created for them, are including the ideas and attitudes that legiti- post hoc formulations. mised violence against westerners.131 An obli- gation to engage in ‘jihad’ (holy war) to Islamist Radicalisation defxend their faith ‘against infidels’ or ‘ ’ The term ‘radicalisation’ refers to the process martyrdom (dying for jihad which brought by which beliefs and motivations change to great reward, including the forgiving of all sin 132 ‘an extremist viewpoint in which an individual and entry into paradise) were identified, as or group is willing to countenance or engage was the theme of ‘retaliation’ against political in violence in pursuit of their goals’.126 There and military policies of the West including is no accepted profile for the radicalised Australia’s troop commitments to the coalition domestic Islamist terrorist.127 Innesetalhave forces in Afghanistan and Iraq. Porter and proposed a situational model of Islamist radic- Kebbell also speculated that some individuals alisation in which various circumstances con- may also be looking for purpose, acceptance verge to create a ‘radicalization window’ in or justification for their criminal lifestyle which an individual may identify with the including attitudes that support the use of vio- ummah (an imagined global Muslim commu- lence or beliefs of superiority over the kuffar 133 nity) in the context of a discourse of global or ‘non-believers’. injustice against Muslims which is further fer- mented by jihadist propaganda on the Internet Australian Islamic State-Connected or social media. Terrorist Plots The inquest heard expert opinion which The majority of convicted Australian jihadists cited research by Neumann, who has identified have been aged between 18 and 35 at the time common themes in radicalisation trajectories: of their arrest, and the youngest was aged 28 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

20.134 Monis was aged 50 at the time of the the attention of security and law enforcement Lindt Caf'e siege. Whilst there are several agencies and, on 31 July 2014, ASIO agents Australians still awaiting trial for Islamic visited him in the family home and advised State-connected terrorist plots, there is a small him not to associate with extremists. Haider cohort in which details of the attackers and was one of more than 40 Australian citizens their planning are known. whose passports were cancelled due to con- The terrorist plotters intercepted by cerns that they would leave Australia to join Operation Pendennis in 2005 belonged to a Islamic State. The Victorian Coroner heard selfcontained group which sought guidance that, shortly before his death, Haider accessed from Algerian-born self-proclaimed Sunni ‘ 135 websites containing radicalised Islamic cleric , while the ter- ideology’ whichshowedshootingexecutions rorists who plotted an attack on the and beheadings and contained recruitment Holsworthy army base in 2009 had links with propaganda. Haider also accessed material on Somalian al-Shabaab insurgents and had his mobile phone including graphic instruc- sought a ‘fatwa’ (religious edict) from a tions from Islamic State on how to kill and Somalian cleric.136 maim. A week before the attack, Haider had been seen by police at a Dandenong shopping Abdul Numan Haider plaza waving a black flag. When questioned, On 23 September 2014, the day after Islamic Haider told police that whilst he was ‘not State spokesperson al-Adnani called for going to blow up the shopping centre today’, muwahhidın in Europe, America, Australia he was angry about the recent ‘Operation and Canada, 18-year-old Abdul Numan Haider Appleby’ raids across Sydney. was shot dead by two counter-terrorism offi- cers outside a Melbourne suburban police sta- tion. Having agreed to meet the officers to Omar al-Kutobi and Muhammad Kiad discuss his passport being cancelled the previ- In 2009, Iraqi-born Omar al-Kutobi arrived in ous day, Haider pulled a knife and stabbed Australia on a fake passport and was granted both officers before he was shot dead. The asylum. In 2012, Muhammad Kiad arrived in black flag on which was written the words of Australia on a temporary Spouse visa, having the (‘There is no God but Allah and married an Australian citizen in Kuwait. In Mohammed is the messenger of God’)was July 2013, he was granted a permanent Spouse foundinHaider’s clothing. Haider and his visa. Al-Kutobi and Kiad later lived together family came to Australia as refugees from in Fairfield and initially did not come to the Afghanistan.137 Haider had been a good stu- dent who played sport and was popular with attention of police or security agencies. After his peers. His family were devout Muslims, making contact with a person whom they and he regularly worshipped at his local mos- believed to be an Islamic State recruiter, al- que in Hallam. In 2014, Haider began attend- Kutobi and Kiad initially indicated an intent to ing lectures at the fundamentalist Al-Furqan travel to Syria to fight with Islamic State Centre in Springvale which was known for its before turning their attention to planning a pet- strict interpretation of the Koran. Unlike at the rol bomb attack on a Shi’ite prayer centre in Hallam Mosque, the lectures at the Al-Furqan western Sydney. They used multiple commu- Centre were politicalised and focused on the nication devices and addresses, swore alle- conflict in the Middle East and the fate of giance to Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi, created an Muslims. Prominent Islamic State recruit Neil Islamic State flag and made a martyrdom Prakash became associated with the Al-Furqan video before they were arrested in Centre.138 In June 2014, Haider first attracted February 2015.139 Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 29

Sevdet Besim their death. He also accessed a video entitled ‘ Sevdet Besim was born in Dandenong in The Crisis of ISIS & Black Flag: A Prophetic ’ January 1997. Although his Albanian- Prediction . On 14 April 2015, the home ’ Australian parents identified as Hanafi screen on Besim s mobile phone featured the Muslims, the family were not strict adherents Islamic State flag, and on 17 April 2015, to their faith. Besim completed an martyrdom message on In year 10 at high school, Besim began his mobilephone which set out his reasons for attending the Al-Furqan Centre where he his planned attack and his expectation that he befriended and Abdul Numan would die in the course of the attack and Haider. Besin met with Haider only hours instructions to his family on how he wished to 141 before Haider was shot by counter-terrorism be buried. officers on 23 September 2014. After Haider’s In the early hours of the morning of 18 death, Besim decided to go to the Middle East April 2015, members of the Special and fight for Islamic State. When his passport Operations Group arrested Besim at his fam- ’ application was refused, as had occurred with ily s home in Hallam. Police searches found a Haider, Basim turned his attention to plotting a Rambo knife with a 40-centimetre blade under ’ domestic terrorist attack. Subsequent police the driver s seat of his vehicle and a locking analysis of Besim’s mobile phone revealed tactical knife in the glovebox. In the bedroom, that, on 28 January 2015, he created an elec- police found a Taser disguised as a black tronic memorandum which amounted to a bay- iPhone, a large black flag containing the sha- ’ah (pledge) of allegiance to Abu Bakr al- hada in white Arabic writing, 10 Islamic text- Baghdadi and began downloading digital edi- books and various Islamic documents. tions of the Islamic State magazine Dabiq.In Analysis of various electronic items revealed February 2015, Besim began using the an extensive Internet search history of extrem- ist material and numerous images, audio files, encrypted messaging app Telegram to commu- 142 nicate with another terrorist, ‘S’,intheUnited videos and pdf documents. Kingdom. In March 2015, ‘S’ sent Besim a message referring to a terrorist attack at the Farhad Jabar National Museum in Tunis, Tunisia in which Farhad Khalil Mohammad Jabar was born in 22 people were killed. Besim later began mak- Iran of Iraqi-Kurdish descent in January 2000. ing Internet searches on the He was described by his year 10 classmates at commemorations to be held in Melbourne Arthur Phillip High School in Sydney as a which included references to the Dawn quiet, often upset-looking solitary youth who Service, the Shrine of Remembrance and was occasionally bullied. He accessed social Camp Gallipoli. During his subsequent sen- media via his Arabic name, Abu Zaid. On 2 tencing, evidence was presented that showed October 2015, he was aged only 15 when he Besim planned to kill a police officer on attendedtheParramattaMosqueashehad ANZACDaybydeliberatelyrunninghim done frequently. He changed into black robes down in his vehicle and then beheading him before walking to the nearby police headquar- ‘to make sure the dogs remember this as well ters where he shot dead civilian police admin- as [their] fallen heroes’.140 On 11 April 2015, istrator Curtis Cheng. A bloodied suicide note Besim made the first of a series of social was found on Jabar’s body which featured media posts in which he referred to targeting standard jihadist phrases.143 Jabar’ssister the AFP and Victorian police. On 13 April Shadi, who drafted the suicide note, left 2015, Besim made a further social media post Australia the day before the attack and was quoting the Koran about those who had been reported to have been killed in a United States killed in the cause of Allah and rejoicing in airstrike in Syria in the following year along 30 R. Scott and R. Shanahan with her Sudaneseborn Islamic State jihad- ‘shirk and transgression’. The magazine fea- ist husband. tured a full-page colour photograph of Monis All these Islamic State-connected terrorist and quotations attributed to him. plots in Australia shared similarities in their After inaccurately describing Islamic State preparation, methods and targets, and all dem- as having ‘claimed’ Monis’ siege, the Coroner onstrated a clear Islamic State-inspired terror- qualified that observation by adding ‘this ist intent. Haider and Jabar attacked outside a claim is of questionable significance because it police station, Besim planned to behead a occurred after the siege’.148 The Coroner police officer during ANZAC Day commemo- referred favourably to the evidence of Bruce rations whilst al-Kutobi and Kiad planned to Hoffman who opined that ‘Islamic State does fire-bomb a Shi’a prayer hall. not arbitrarily claim the acts of anyone assert- ing jihadi objectives, but reserves its avowed Terrorist Acts Claimed by Islamic State affiliations for those who have some degree of connection to [Islamic State]’.149 This asser- During the uprising against the Assad regime, tion by Hoffman is quite erroneous. It is well the plethora of anti-government groups made recognised that Islamic State needs no connec- it difficult to determine enduring group loyal- tion with perpetrators of violence to claim an ties. Islamic State grew out of the old alQaeda attack in its name.150 Surpassing al-Qaeda,151 in Iraq (AQI)/Islamic State in Iraq (ISI) that Islamic State has become adept in its use of established a secret branch in Syria, operating the Internet, social media platforms and viral as Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN). A move by the marketing152 for both recruitment and propa- Islamic State leader Abu Bakr alBaghdadi to ganda, including its strategy of portraying rename his group Islamic State in Iraq and itself as an organisation with a global reach.153 ash-Sham (ISIS) and reveal the link to JAN By opportunistically claiming responsibility ledtoanirrevocablesplitbetweenal- post hoc for lone-actor attacks outside of the Baghdadi and the al-Qaeda leadership which Middle East war zones, Islamic State hopes to subsequently saw JAN and ISIS take up arms maintain its relevance as it continues to be against the other.144 But less than a fortnight degraded.154 Typically, Islamic State first after the Lindt Caf'e siege, despite Monis claims the ‘attack’ on the Amaq news agency declaring through one of his hostages that via social media and then posts video,155 audio, Australia was ‘under attack by Islamic State’, text messages, tweets156 or screenshots from al-Qaeda was the first terrorist organisation to the perpetrators pledging an oath of ‘allegiance’ acknowledge Monis’ attack. On 28 December or loyalty (bay’ah) to al-Baghdadi, the ‘caliph’. 2014, the al-Qaeda magazine Inspire145 Subsequently, the perpetrators are extolled in referred to Monis: the Islamic State online magazines – originally 157 After years of peaceful protest in in Dabiq which was first published in four Australia, a … Muslim takes dozens of languages through the Al-Hayat Media Centre hostages in a cafe for 16 hours.146 in July 2014, or after September 2016, the more polished Rumiyah158 – using stock format On 30 December 2014, the sixth edition of phrases like ‘soldiers of Islam’ responding to Dabiq, the Islamic State online propaganda the call to target the ‘crusaders’ or ‘citizens of magazine, also lauded Monis’ actions in join- the coalition countries’.159 In November 2014, ing the ‘mujahidin’ in their ‘war against the Islamic State released a short film featuring crusader coalition’.147 Although Islamic State Mohammed ‘Jihadi John’ Emwazi and the did not assert any connection with him, Monis infamous mass decapitation of 22 captured was acclaimed for having ‘brought terror to Syrian Army soldiers. The highly professional theentirenation’ anderasedhishistoryof production was likely to have taken up to six Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 31 hours of filming and editing and was estimated leaving the pack to hunt alone.165 Jenkins has to have cost US$200,000 to produce.160 argued that the term ‘ terrorist’ is a In July 2016, Islamic State distributed a ‘romanticising term’ that suggests a ‘cunning video which appeared to show the Eiffel and deadly perpetrator when this is not often Tower on fire and claimed responsibility for the case’.166 the attack.161 However, French police There is a burgeoning literature on lone- promptly released a statement confirming that actor terrorists.167 The anomic lone actor the dramatic image actually depicted a Bastille negotiates a different radicalisation. As Spaaji Day firework display. has suggested, unlike in the small conspirator- In June 2017, Jessie Carlos was a 42-year- ial terrorist group or cell, the lone actor often old married father of three and former govern- becomes radicalised within their own attain- ment Filipino finance employee who had lost able means, including violent online sermons his job owing more than US$80,000. After his and an idiosyncratic reverence for some identi- family had arranged for him to be banned fied terrorist movement or leader, and adopts from casinos because of his gambling addic- tactics and methods without any direct outside tion, he entered a casino hotel near the airport command or direction.168 in Manilla and fired shots and set fire to gam- The lone-actor terrorists may have a range bling tables before stuffing casino chips worth of personal grievances and may adopt or seek more than US$2 million into his backpack. validation or legitimisation by identifying with Most of his 23 victims died of suffocation a recognised terrorist organisation or terrorist from smoke. Amaq announced that ‘Islamic agenda even though the individual may have State fighters carried out’ the attack and a later no direct or indirect communication or even statement boasted about the number of any real affinity with any terrorist organisation ‘ ’ 169 Christians killed or wounded before the gun- or agenda. 162 man ‘took his life’. Pantucci has emphasised that whilst Within a week of the then deadliest mass they may appear to act alone and without shooting in United States history in October any external instigation or support, most 2017,inwhichnearly60peoplewerekilledin socalled ‘lone actors’ demonstrate some Las Vegas, Amaq claimed that 64-year-old degree of contact with operational extrem- real estate millionaire and high-stakes gambler ists.170 ‘[T] hey may appear to be troubled ‘ Stephen Paddock was a soldier of the Islamic individuals who seek solace in the extremist ’ ‘ State and had carried out the operation in ideology – an ideology that while for the ’ 163 response to targeting coalition countries . most part remains self-taught, also appears Jihadoscope, which monitors jihadi cyber to be reinforced through online contact activity, confirmed that Amaq also claimed with extremists’.171 A study of 112 cases ‘ that the Attacker of Las Vegas converted [to of individuals indicted for Islamic State- ’ Islam] several months before .TheFBIand related terrorist offences in the United ’ Paddock s family have debunked any sugges- States between March 2014 and August tion that he had converted or had any connec- 164 2016 found that more than 80% watched tion with any Islamist extremist group. Islamic State propaganda videos including lectures by terrorist leaders or execu- The ‘Lone Actor’ Terrorist tion videos.172 In nature, wolves are social animals that usu- Highlighting the ease with which an indi- ally hunt in mated pairs or packs. In wolf vidual may access extremist dogma on the packs, the dominant alpha male and female Internet or social media and even technical may victimise the submissive omega wolf, the information or online manuals for bomb- mak- lowest in the pack hierarchy, who may end up ing, Sageman has observed: ‘The internet has 32 R. Scott and R. Shanahan dramatically transformed the structure and terrorists’ found that in 70% of instances, the dynamic of the evolving threat of … terrorists broadcast their intent before initiating terrorism’.173 Brachman has coined the term the attack.181 Hamm and Spaaij concluded that ‘jihobbyists’ to disparage those individuals ‘on balance, broadcasting intent is a trademark who relate anonymously with others online in of lone wolf terrorists and, as an observable support of real-world extremists.174 phenomenon, it can help (at least) give insight into lone wolf terrorism’.182 The ‘Lone Actor’ Terrorist –‘Leakage’ and Broadcasting Intent The Case of Man Haron Monis – Not a An early study of foiled terrorist attacks in Radicalised Terrorist America suggested that more than 80% were Whilst noting that Monis’ radicalisation was initially discovered by law enforcement agen- ‘atypical, in that radicalisation is most com- cies or the general public.175 A subsequent monly a social process and it is rare for a per- 183 study found that, on average, terrorist incidents son to become radicalised alone’, the are preceded by at least two activities that Coroner was satisfied that by the time of the 184 authorities register.176 Hamm found that even siege, Monis had become radicalised. The skilled terrorists leave clues as to their violent Coroner concluded that by adopting ‘extreme intentions, either through poor ‘tradecraft’177 violence’ to influence government action and/ or to deliberately attract notoriety.178 or public opinion concerning Australia’s Operational security refers to the behav- involvement in the Middle East, that ‘clearly iours by which a lone-actor terrorist minimises brings his crimes within the accepted defin- ’ 185 the likelihood of detection whilst planning or ition of terrorism . preparing an attack. ‘Leakage’ refers to behav- However, all of the major assumptions iours by which a ‘would-be’ lone actor inten- made by the Coroner can be questioned. tionally or unintentionally divulges their Fundamental to whether his actions constituted ’ motivation, capability or resolve to commit a an act of terrorism is the question of Monis terrorist attack.179 The most surprising finding intent. It is clear from his past history that of a recent study of the attack-planning and Monis was entirely self-serving in the way he preparation of 55 lone-actor terrorists was the contrived to present himself in different con- infrequency with which lone actors took oper- texts. His original visa application was fraudu- ational security.180 The study found: lent, and he later fabricated his claim for asylum to obtain a Protection visa. At the  86% communicated their radical or same time as he was very publically protesting extremist convictions to others includ- and proselytising as a self-styled Shi’acleric, ing family members, friends, col- Monis was operating as a ‘spiritual consultant’ leagues or strangers online which was a sham for his perversions as he  58% indicated to others that they were victimised vulnerable women. Throughout his involved in suspicious and potentially life, Monis was a compulsive liar. When he violent activities arranged the murder of his ex- wife, he devel-  one-third communicated a desire to oped an elaborate alibi for himself and contin- commit an as-yet unspecified attack ued to adopt the mantra of a principled anti-  49% came in contact with the author- government protester. On this background, it ’ ities during the planning and prepar- is difficult to accept as genuine Monis protes- tations against western foreign policy and the ation phase182 oppression of Muslims. A study of 69 ‘post-9/11’ cases which sat- The inquest heard expert opinion evidence isfied the strict criteria for ‘lone-wolf on fundamentalist Muslim extremism and Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 33 more particularly the most extreme form of and protester to which he could revert in the radical Salafi Islam of Islamic State which is event that his past indiscretions caught up with marked by its rectitude and intolerance. It is him and he was remanded into custody. similarly difficult to reconcile Monis’ narcis- sistic personality traits with him embracing a Man Haron Monis – Not a Devout radical Islamist ideology which required his Muslim, no Connection with the worshipful subordination. Islamic Community As soon as he arrived in Australia, Monis In 1997, when he first arrived in Australia, actively pursued publicity and notoriety despite professing to be a Shi’a cleric, Monis including contriving knowledge of sensitive also claimed that he was victimised in Iran for intelligence. He was a prolific user of the his association with the minority Ahmadi sect, Internet and social media, and he made inflam- a persecuted stream of Sunni Islam. Less than matory statements and sent offensive letters. a year after he was granted a Protection visa, But it is clear that his repeated and often errat- Monis began operating as a self-styled ically confected information linked to current ‘spiritual consultant’ practising clairvoyance, affairs and world events was designed to astrology, numerology and ‘black magic’ attract not only police and security agencies which are activities entirely antithetical to his but, more importantly, the attention of the professed Muslim faith. media. Having staged sham protests and writ- There is no evidence that Monis demon- ten offensive letters, Monis could portray him- strated any genuine religious zeal or commit- ‘ ’ self firstly as a liberal cleric refugee and later ment. During the inquest, no witness testified ‘ ’ an anti-war protester who was being har- to observing Monis in solemn prayer or devo- assed and discriminated against by the govern- tion. There was a short video that purported to ment and authorities. During his appeals show Monis and others receiving their white against the postal offences, Monis claimed that turbans during a religious ceremony in a he was ‘persecuted’ by the Australian hawza (a centre for scholarly learning in Iran). Government and invoked spurious ‘freedom There are several levels of qualification that of speech’ arguments. Monis’ protests can be can be attained by those studying Shi’a. clearly characterised as pretence. Whilst his Whilst Monis may have achieved the level of florid protests and pronouncements would hojjat al-Islam, there is no indication that he have been likely to have alienated the genuine was ever actually granted an ijaza (certificate pacifist or committed anti-war demonstrator, of scholarly achievement) issued by any Monis’ posturing was calculated to attract the teacher at any hawza. attention of the media which he could manipu- Monis had no substantive links to the late later in his favour. Islamic community. Indeed, during an inter- Arguably, Monis’ greatest fears were that view on ABC, the founder of the Islamic he would be extradited back to Iran to stand Friendship Association of Australia said that trial for the fraud offences or that he would be Monis was considered ‘damaged goods’ and charged with sex offences against women who had been rejected by the Sydney Muslim com- had attended his ‘Spiritual Healing’ business. munity.186 During an interview with the BBC, Later, he would also have been preoccupied the Director of the Forum on Australian with the prospect of having his bail revoked Islamic Relations described Monis as after he was charged with aiding and abetting ‘isolated’ from the Muslim community in the murder of his ex-wife. In this context, Australia. On 28 December 2007, the Monis’ attention-seeking can be reframed as Australian Federation of Islamic Councils disingenuous attempts to create the highly (AFIC) urged ‘Sheikh Haron’ to identify him- publicised persona of the victimised activist self and stop exploiting freedom of speech to 34 R. Scott and R. Shanahan attack mainstream Australia under the banner Hizb-ut-Tahrirwasalsolikelytobenothing of Islam.187 AFIC president Ikebal Patel said more than cynical opportunism. It has never Muslim leaders feared that ‘Sheikh Haron’, been shown that Monis had any standing whose website provided no insight into his within Hizb-ut-Tahrir. identity or religious qualifications, would Whilst Monis had a long history of atten- encourage others to adopt the persona of an tion-seeking behaviours related to a number of Islamic spiritual leader to ferment controversy. causes, he demonstrated no deep attachment or Mr Patel said senior Muslim spiritual leaders commitment to any of these, and it is errone- from around Australia, including executives of ous to conclude that any apparent connection the Australian National Imams Council, had with any group indicated any strongly held been unable to confirm the identity of belief in that group’sidealsorobjectives.191 ‘Sheikh Haron’. After Channel 7 highlighted his pretentions On 28 January 2008, after Monis attracted as risible and his criticism of Australia’sfor- attention by sending offensive letters to the eign policy and military involvement in Iraq families of fallen Australian soldiers, the presi- and Afghanistan as specious, Monis’ vitriol dent of the Supreme Islamic Shi’a Council of escalated as he vainly sought attention and Australia, Sheikh Kamal Mousselmani, told credibility. The Australian that Monis, who at that time ‘ referred to himself as Ayatollah Manteghi Man Haron Monis – The Website Boroujerdi’, was not a genuine Shi’a spiritual An examination of Monis’ prominent website leader (‘You take one look and think, he is an is also particularly revealing. The statements idiot’).188 Sheikh Mousselmani was reported and proclamations on his website never dem- to have canvassed the Shi’a community in onstrated a sophisticated understanding of Australia and also inquired of religious schools Islamic theology. The often rambling and in Iran (‘I’ve talked to our community and obtuse references mixed up Sunni, Shi’a, asked if they knew him, but they did not and Sufist and other Muslim terminology. even over there in Iran, they had not heard of Perversely, at one stage, an image of Osama him’). After highlighting that the content of bin Laden appeared on Monis’ website. Bin Monis’ website showed what he described as, Laden, an adherent of Wahhabism, the strict at best, ‘an amateur knowledge’ of Islam, doctrinaire form of Sunni Islam, had actually Sheikh Mousselmani characterised Monis’ proclaimed that Shi’aMuslims(ofwhich,at behaviour as ‘erratic … not like a real sheikh’ the time, Monis professed to be a cleric) were and urged the AFP to investigate Monis’ ‘heretics’ and, along with ‘America and identity.189 Israel’, were the principal ‘enemies of Islam’. His appearance in Shi’aclericalgarbatral- lies and protests and his inane and prolix pro- – nouncements could not mitigate the reality that Man Haron Monis The Request to Write Monis had no following and was held in con- to Caliph Ibrahim of Islamic State temptbyhisownShi’a community and the On 7 October 2014, the Federal broader Muslim community. Immediately after AttorneyGeneral received correspondence the siege, Dr Jamal Rifi, a senior Muslim com- from Monis in which he asked whether he munity leader in Sydney, said Monis was not a could write to ‘Caliph Ibrahim’ of Islamic sheikh: ‘He had no religious qualifications State. Referring to Monis’ letter, the Coroner whatsoever. He has never been associated with found: ‘Monis exhibited a familiar behavioural any mainstream mosque, and he is not associ- pattern of writing controversial letters to hold- ated with any of our religious leaders what- ers of high office. Again this letter in itself is soever’.190 Monis’ apparent association with not necessarily suggestive of terrorist Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 35 intentions, but it does suggest a shift in Monis’ It is impossible to overstate the importance thinking and perhaps an increasing identifica- of sectarianism in the strategic doctrine of tion with radical interpretations of Islam’.192 Islamic State. Al-Zarqawi referred to Shi’a This finding of the Coroner shows a very Muslims as ‘a sect of treachery and unsophisticated interpretation of a quite fatu- betrayal’.194 From the outset, al-Zarqawi ous gesture by Monis on the day before he believed that Islamic State attacks on the Shi’a was charged with a further 37 sex offences. populations in Iraq would not only undermine This gesture by Monis showed no shift in his the new Iraqi Government and local support thinking, only a shift in his attention to the for the coalition forces, but the provocation most recent high-profile event on which he would also highlight to Sunnis the perfidy and ’ 195 hoped to attract further attention to himself. vindictiveness of the Shi a. Even after al- Rather than clearly declaring his allegiance Zarqawi’s death in June 2006, Islamic State’s to the ‘caliph’ (the leader of the Muslim com- sectarian violence continued without restraint, ’ munity) or his support of Islamic State, Monis targeting both Shi a religious and political ’ 196 was ostensibly asking whether it was ‘legal’ leaders as well as Shi a civilian populations. for him to make some ‘comments’ and ask In May 2012, Islamic State spokesperson Abu ‘some questions’ of the leader of Islamic Muhammad al-Adnani issued a statement: ‘ ’ State.Monis,whoatthattimeprofessedtobe [y]our first enemy is the [Shi ites], and after ’ 197 aShi’a cleric, was purporting to write ‘aletter’ them the Jews and the Crusaders . Ayear later, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced: ‘So to the leader of the militant Sunni forces which rise, O lions of the Islamic State in Iraq and had been systematically destroying mosques the Levant, and cure the frustration of the and other sacred Shi’a sites and slaughtering believers and attack the hateful Rafidah minority Shi’a populations across north- [Shi’ites], the criminal Nusayris, the Party of ern Iraq. Satan [Shi’a Hezbollah] and those who come from Qum, Najaf and Tehran’.198 Man Haron Monis – Conversion from On 12 June 2014, it was reported that Shi’a to Sunni Islam? Islamic State captured and executed 1566 Less than two weeks before the Sydney siege, Shi’a Iraqi Air Force cadets in a base in Tikrit Monis self-identified as a Shi’aMuslim,the in north west Iraq.199 In the five months arch enemy of the Sunni extremist organisa- between June 2014 when it announced the tion Islamic State. The obscure reference ‘caliphate’ and December 2014, Islamic State Monis made in December 2014 to not being also committed mass atrocities on Shi’a ‘Rafidi anymore’ can be characterised as the minority civilian populations in Syria. The self-serving ploy of a fantasist who parlayed United Kingdom-based Syrian Observatory the jargon of Islamic extremist rhetoric in his for Human Rights reported that in five months, disparate denouement. Pointedly, the Coroner 1429 people were pitilessly beheaded or shot did not make a finding that Monis had actually dead in mass killings including women and converted. In his findings, the Coroner referred children in the provinces of Aleppo, Deir 200 to the evidence of an ‘academic in Islamic Ezzor, Hama, Homs, Hasakah and Raqqa. studies’ who was dubious about Monis’ pur- ported conversion from Shi’a to Sunni, given Man Haron Monis – No Pledge of Loyalty that Sunni Islamic State was well documented to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as having committed repeated atrocities An oath of bay’ah (loyalty) is a regular feature against Shi’a Muslims in Iraq and Syria.193 In of Islamic State terrorists.201 The bay’ah is a this regard, the inquest was very poorly served pledge of loyalty to an individual, not to an by this opinion evidence. organisation and may be recorded in a number 36 R. Scott and R. Shanahan of ways.202 In June 2012, 29-year-old Omar in which Amri had pledged allegiance to ‘Abu Mateen,whowasborninNewYorkto Bakr al-Baghdadi’.208 Afghan parents, was employed as a security The wording of the brief pledge which guard when he phoned 911 dispatchers and Monispostedonhiswebsiteon17November pledged fealty to ‘Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi … 2014 reveals more about his sense of self- on behalf of the Islamic State’ before attacking importance and narcissism than any loyalty to a gay nightclub in Orlando, Florida and shoot- the ‘caliph’. The Coroner incorrectly found ingdead49people.203 Fellow jihadists used that Monis pledged ‘allegiance to the [Islamic “ ” 209 the Telegram app to promptly disseminate pic- State] Caliph four weeks before the siege. tures of Mateen praising him as a martyr and In fact, Monis pledged allegiance only to ‘ ’ ‘soldier of the Caliphate’. A trend soon devel- God, his messenger (presumably the prophet ‘ oped on Telegram in which attacks were Muhammad) and the Caliphate of the ’ referred to under the hashtag ‘dar al-kuffar’ Muslims , which suggests that Monis saw himself so self-importantly that he was not (home of disbelievers) as opposed to ‘dar al- beholden to any mortal leader. Monis never Islam’ (home of followers of Islam).204 Less referred to al-Baghdadi by name when he that a fortnight after Tunisian-born Mohamed offered the generic salutation: ‘Peacebeupon Lahouaiej-Bouhlel drove a truck through the Commander of the faithful and the Caliph crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, the of the Muslims, the imam/preacher of our killers of an 85-year-old French priest in time’. The wording of Monis’ pledge fell well Normandy recorded a video in which they short of implying any sense of a subordinate ‘ pledged their loyalty to Abu Bakr al- relationship. Baghdadi al-Husseini al-Qurayshi’ before the background of a handmade paper Islamic State Man Haron Monis – No Leakage, no flag.205 In the week of the December 2015 Broadcast of Intent, no Terrorist Message in San Bernardino, California, Syed Rizwan Farook and Tashfeen Malik, Nothing has ever been demonstrated to sub- who were both of Pakistani descent, left a stantiate that Monis was even inspired by Facebook post in which they pledged alle- Islamic State. Contemporary Islamist terrorists in Australia who have self-affiliated with giance to ‘Khalifah Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi al- Islamic State have typically shown a propen- Quraishi’.206 In June 2016 during Ramadan, sity to download online video or audio 25-year-old Frenchman Larossi Abballa material or social media content, including stabbed to death a French police officer and anasheed (Arabic poetry sung without music). his partner in their home in Magnanville, east For their networking and clandestine com- of Paris. Three weeks earlier, Abballa had munications, jihadists commonly use ‘ ’ pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi encrypted apps, like Telegram, WhatsApp or on Facebook, saying he would answer the call Zellow.210 However, Monis posted all his ‘ to kill the infidels, at their homes with their messages and correspondence on his publicly ’ families . Before police stormed the house and accessible website, presumably so that he killed him, Abballa made a video, which was could attract the widest lay audience. the first live feed of an Islamist terrorist attack Narcissistically, Monis created videos that 207 posted on Facebook. Amaq news agency cobbled together excerpts of news reports of also later released the video. In December his activities and protests and his turgid mono- 2016, four days after Tunisian-born Anis Amri logues and correspondence to public figures. drove a truck into the Breitscheidplatz There was no record of Monis ever having Christmas market in Berlin, killing 12 people downloaded or viewed on his computer or andinjuring56others,Amaq released a video mobile phone any videos or speeches from Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 37 radical Salafist clerics (as did convicted camera) to capture images or film to upload to Australian terrorists Tamim Khaja, Ali al-Talebi, Facebook in real-time.212 Even during the siege, Omar Succarieh, Omar al-Kutobi and Monis did not record any video or deliver any Mohammad Kiad) or any of the vast material message on either his or any of the hostages’ produced by Islamic State or other extremists mobile phones which could have been used as organisations. propaganda by Islamic State. Both the Joint Commonwealth–New South Wales Review and the New South Man Haron Monis – Not Wales Coroner found that right up to the siege, Mentally Disordered as ASIO and law enforcement agencies contin- There is actually very limited research into the ued to monitor his website and Facebook possible associations between terrorism and page, Monis gave no indication that he had mental illness. Whilst substance use disorders, formed an intent to commit a terrorist act. depression, post-traumatic stress disorder and Although he had become a proficient and pro- personality disorders, particularly narcissistic lific user of the Internet and social media, and anti-social personality disorder,213 are Monis did not broadcast his intent before the likely to be over-represented in studies of ter- siege, and he left no clear ‘terrorist message’. rorist offenders, most case series and studies In his evidence to the inquest, a fraud- and have significant limitations.214 Small sample cyber detective testified that he had examined sizes, unreliable collateral history from inform- Monis’ YouTube accounts and the websites ants, poorly worded or broad definitions and Monis visited and his use of social media plat- selection and hindsight biases are likely to forms and found no evidence of any online or contribute to over-diagnosing of mental illness social media ‘footprint’ or that Monis had any in ‘psychological autopsies’ of terrorists who contact with Islamic State or any extremist or are killed or take their own lives.215 Interviews terrorist organisation. and assessments of captured or would-be terro- Monis had a twitter account with the handle rists may also be prejudiced by confirmation ‘@sheikh_haron’ whichwaslinkedtoanemail bias, or the assessments may elaborate features account with the username ‘peaceactivist’.The that reflect malingering or the deterioration of cyber detective was able to use Twitter ana- the mental state of a person who has failed in lytics to determine that, before the siege, Monis his or her mission and is detained in custody had only 12 followers. His first tweet in contemplating a long prison sentence.216 November 2014 was ‘please connect to me’, Characteristics vary across different forms and his last tweet on 14 December 2014, the of terrorists – suicide bombers,217 lone-actor day before the siege, was a link to his website. shooters or members of a small terrorist cell – and the prevalence of serious mental illnesses – 218 Man Haron Monis No Martyrdom in terrorists is not clear. Mentally disordered Video, no Propaganda Message persons may have overvalued ideas and para- The ‘martyrdom video’ has become virtually noid delusional beliefs of religious or political synonymous with the preparation of Islamic content, and they may arm themselves and State extremists before launching an attack.211 makethreatsasterroristsdo.219 Mentally disor- Although Monis was prolific in his Internet post- dered persons are also vulnerable to being tar- ings and had also become quite adept at creating geted and manipulated by terrorist videos to upload on YouTube or on his website, organisations who may encourage them to com- he created no martyrdom video and left no mit a dramatic violent act that may otherwise propaganda message. An increasingly common be characterised as ‘rational’, purposeful and feature of Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks organised.220 An example is , is the use of hand-held cameras (GoPro or phone the 33-year-old Australian-born son of 38 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

Lebanese migrants, who later shocked the evidence that Monis suffered from any diagnos- world by releasing a photo of his seven-year- able categorical psychiatric disorder at the time old son holding the severed head of a Syrian of the siege.223 Dr Phillips opined that Monis soldier and was imprisoned for his role in the had for many years led ‘a secretive, self-serving Pendennis terror plot. In 2005, a psychiatrist life [in which he was] driven at all times by his who visited Goulburn prison reported that own idiosyncratic desires [and that he lacked] Sharrouf had schizophrenia and experienced any sense of understanding of the sensitivities hallucinations and was secluded in the ‘high- of others’224 and concluded that Monis had a risk management unit’ before he had treatment severe personality disorder with anti-social, nar- for his mental illness in the prison.221 cissistic and paranoid features.225 Since he arrived in Australia, Monis The Coroner concluded that Monis began attended a number of doctors, psychologists the siege ‘in a controlled, planned and quite and psychiatrists and was assessed on two occa- methodical manner marked by deliberations sions in custody by Justice Health and Forensic and choice’. The Coroner emphasised that Mental Health Services. The Coroner noted that Monis did not have a mental illness and that Monis consulted different healthcare providers he ‘fully understood that the deaths of hos- without disclosing his history of earlier presen- tages were a real possibility and that the pro- tations, and he gave differing accounts of com- spect of such an outcome was of no concern 222 plaints and symptoms. to him’.226 Monis is likely to have been guarded, During her murder trial between 22 August hypervigilant and paranoid, given all the and 5 October 2016, Droudis’ defence counsel women he had victimised and the many people did not contest the Crown case that Monis he had offended, including customs officials organised the murder of his ex-wife, the and particularly the families of the Australians mother of his two adolescent children. The trial ’ to whom he had sent vile letters. Monis judge found overwhelming evidence that actions also attracted the attention of police Monis had planned the murder. At the time of and security agencies, and he may have had the siege, Monis was also charged with a total reality-based concerns that he was intermit- of 43 sexual offences against six victims. The tently under surveillance by different agencies. Coroner later noted that, since a number of However, there is no evidence that Monis ever women, who did not know one another and developed a major mental illness even when were from different ethnic backgrounds, all he experienced the stressors of being arrested, described assaults that were remarkably simi- detained in watch houses and remanded to lar, it was likely that Monis would have been prison awaiting court hearings. convicted of multiple offences had he stood trial.227 Since the High Court had just dis- Man Haron Monis – Malignant Narcissist missed his appeal from the postal charges, it is After reviewing the evidence from all the health likely that Monis became concerned that at any care providers who had actually had contact time he may be charged with further offences with Monis, the Coroner had the benefit of the and that his bail would be revoked and he opinion of the NSW Police Forensic Services would be remanded into custody to await trial. clinical psychologist, who concluded that The Coroner highlighted that, in contrast Monis demonstrated features of narcissistic per- to his previous publicity-seeking behaviour, sonality disorder. The inquest also had an during the siege Monis sought to maintain expert report from senior forensic psychiatrist anonymity and responded negatively by tell- Dr Jonathan Phillips, who examined all of ing hostages to hang up when police negotia- Monis’ antecedents and history of contact with tors began using his name.228 The Coroner mental health services and found no convincing also pointed to Monis not mentioning or Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 39 making any demands in relation to his Berlin truck attack (12 killed).232 It has been ‘personal grievances’ during the siege.229 But estimated that since its inception, Islamic State it can be argued that being identified as a has been connected with more than 5000 ter- ‘fake sheikh’ who was charged with multiple rorist attacks worldwide.233 sex offences and was also implicated in the The quite explicit aim of any Islamic murder of his ex-wife would not have served State terrorist act is to cause fear and terror Monis’ grandiose pretensions. To be dis- by killing as many ‘unbelievers’ as possible. missed simply as a serial pest or predatory But the Lindt Caf'e siege clearly did not fol- sex offender would have detracted from low this very basic direction. Whilst Monis Monis’ self-aggrandisement and diminished had armed himself with over 20 shotgun car- the notoriety he sought. tridges, before police stormed the Lindt Caf'e, Monis fired his shotgun only three times and Why did Monis Take a List of Muslim deliberately killed only one hostage. Clearly, Prisoners to the Siege? as the siege was drawn out over nearly 17 hours, Monis’ original aim was not to ter- After the siege, a note was found in Monis’ rorise the community by killing hostages. pocket. The note had a list of contact details Very rarely have Islamic State-inspired and inmate ‘master index numbers’ of some attacks resulted in hostage or siege situa- Muslim prisoners in Long Bay Correctional tions. An exception was in January 2015, Centre whom Monis met between May–April when, having already killed a police officer 2014 whilst he was held on remand.230 As the on the previous day, Amedy Coulibaly Coroner noted, the finding of the list suggests entered a kosher supermarket in the Porte that Monis anticipated surviving the siege and de Vincennes area of Paris and shot dead becoming a notorious prisoner.231 The finding four Jewish hostages. The ensuing siege of the list of prisoners’ names further points to lasted four and a half hours before the conclusion that the overriding consider- Coulibaly deliberately ran toward massed ation for Monis was to conduct a dramatic police and was shot dead. In a video siege which would enhance his standing even released after his death, Coulibaly pledged after he was imprisoned. Rather than being allegiance to al-Baghdadi and announced disparaged as a psychopathic sex offender, the that his actions were co-ordinated with the siege would enable Monis to cast himself as a Charlie Hebdo attacks which had occurred ‘lone wolf’ jihadist who would be admired two days earlier in Paris.234 He made a and respected, at least by his fellow martyrdom video and a further video using Muslim inmates. GoPro whilst he was holding hostages and attempted to upload the images to broadcast – The Lindt Cafe' Siege Not on the Internet. On 13 June 2016, Larossi Characteristic of an Islamic State Attack Abballa, a Frenchman with previous terror- Between 2014 –2016, there were more casual- ism convictions, killed a police officer and ties (273) from extremist violence in Europe then held his wife and child in their house than in all previous years combined, as jihad- for several hours, during which time he ists launched mass-casualty attacks in which killed the wife with a knife, which he large numbers of civilians were targeted: 13 filmed and uploaded onto Facebook. He November 2015, Paris attack (130 killed); 22 told negotiators that he had pledged alle- March 2016, Brussels airport and metro station giance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and was bombings (32 killed); 28 June 2016, Istanbul following Islamic State’s instructions to airport attack (45 killed); 16 July 2016, Nice kill non-believers in their homes with their truck attack (84 killed); 24 December 2016, families.235 40 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

Sieges by followers of Islamic State have wearing at a rally (‘We are your soldiers occurred, but these have all been part of a Muhammad. … May Allah honour him and complex attack. On 7 January 2015, 12 peo- grant him peace’) and is not emblematic of the ple were killed in the attack on the Paris offi- adherents of any particular Islamic extrem- ces of the satirical newspaper Charlie ists group. Hebdo. During the Bataclan nightclub attack By contrast, before their planned attack in in Paris on 13 November 2015, nearly 100 Sydney, Kutobi and Kiad made a stencil and civilians fell victim to the well co-ordinated createdanIslamicStateflagwhichwasthe and brutally executed shootings and bomb- backdrop to their martyrdom video in which ings near the Saint-Martin canal in Paris. In theyvowedtostrike‘unbelievers’.InBesim’s both these instances, the sieges followed case, police found that the home screen of his mass killings. At no time during the brief mobile phone featured the Islamic State flag. sieges did the attackers make any demands, From the outset of the siege, Monis’ aim and there was never any negotiation over the appeared to be to draw attention to himself fate of any hostages. The sieges ended only rather than any cause. The handwritten note he when the remaining terrorists were unable to ordered caf'e manager Tori Johnson to read is escape and blew themselves up or were particularly instructive in this regard. In the killed by police.236 note, Monis referred to ‘Islamic State’ only in the first sentence and only to announce that it ‘ ’ The Lindt Cafe' Siege – Not a Well- was an attack on Australia. Monis made no Planned Attack, no Islamic State Flag, no explicit reference to any terrorist objective. Jihadist Vernacular During the siege, Monis never used any of the vernacular characteristic of Islamist jihadists The Coroner cited with approval the opinion (kuffar – infidels, murtaddin – apostates, of Hoffman that Monis’ planning for the siege tawaghıt – tyrannical rulers, sahwat – Syrians included bringing an Islamic banner and head- or Iraqis who collaborated with the United band to the siege, and that his offer to States-led coalition or ‘crusaders’–the West exchange hostages for his demands was indi- or Christians) and neither did he cite any cative of an act of terrorism.237 But Monis’ verses from the Koran and Hadith or refer to preparation was actually very rudimentary. any of the prophetic Islamist episodes from the Although the Coroner did not hear any medieval era to justify the case for expert evidence on Monis’ crudely scribbled muwahhidın or martyrdom (istishhadi). hostage demand note, and its content has never Instead, Monis demanded to ‘debate’ the been subject to any critical neuro-linguistic Prime Minister live on ABC Radio. analysis, the note appears to have been written hurriedly. In the backpack he only bought on the previous day, Monis carried a speaker box Why Target the Lindt Cafe'? with wires roughly soldered to the terminals. Martin Place, in the heart of Sydney’scentral As Monis envisaged, the media coverage high- business district, is one of the most intensively lighted the hostages being forced to hold up a monitored precincts in Australia and is occu- black flag with Ara-bic writing in the window pied by the Reserve Bank of Australia, the of the Lindt Caf'e. United States Consulate, the studios of the But the shahada is a central tenet of Islam Channel 7 television network and an entrance which, in itself, is not synonymous with to a busy railway station. The Sydney extremism or jihadists. Monis did not have the Cenotaph, the city’s most prominent monu- of the Islamic State,238 and the ment to Australia’s fallen service men and headband he wore during the siege was one women, is also located nearby. Since he was that he had previously been photographed vilified as the ‘fake sheikh’ in the 2009 Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 41 television program, Monis’ many protests Whether Monis was motivated to act by resulted in a high level of security at the public calls from the leaders of Islamic Channel 7 studio. From 8:26 am on the morn- State for followers to undertake atrocities is impossible to know. His pledge of ing of the siege, during the usual live morning allegiance to the [Islamic State] ‘Caliph’ broadcast of the ‘Sunrise’ program, exterior four weeks before the siege suggests this surveillance cameras captured Monis walking might have been the case. However, past the building. equally, he may have been on a personal ’ crusade: frustrated by being dismissed Monis choice of target and his conduct when he adopted relatively benign means were also not indicative of an Islamic State- of protesting. He may have decided to use inspired or directed attack. Unlike the offices [Islamic State] to make himself seem of Charlie Hebdo, a kosher supermarket in more dangerous; did he cloak himself in Paris or the Canadian Houses of Parliament, the [Islamic State] rhetoric so he would not be mocked or ignored but feared?239 the Lindt Caf'e had no particular social, politi- cal or religious significance. Its significance however, lay in the fact that it was located dir- Unlike other [Islamic State] terrorists, ectly opposite the studio of Channel 7, an Monis did not immediately kill those he organisation that Monis believed had maligned had taken hostage, but that is equally and disrespected him in the past. Monis’ consistent with his belief that his best chance of achieving his political ends was choice of target appears to have been moti- by prolonging the siege.240 vated by a deep personal grievance, rather Even with the benefit of expert evidence, than to advance any terrorist agenda. it remains unclear whether Monis was motivated by [Islamic State] to prosecute its bloodthirsty agenda or whether he used The Lindt Cafe' Siege – Not a Lone- that organisation’s fearsome reputation to 241 Actor Terrorist Attack bolster his impact. For an act to be properly described as a However, the reality is that the ‘lone actor’ ‘ ’ terrorist attack , it must be possible to elabor- Islamic State-inspired terrorist attacks are ‘ ate a clear intention to advance a political, almost universally characterised by a sudden ’ ‘ ’ religious or ideological cause .The cause ‘spree’ of violence, usually a concentrated cannot be abstract, equivocal or ill-defined, shooting or bombing attack or the use of a because the threatened or actual violence is motor vehicle to kill as many victims as pos- intended to advance that cause. Any violent sible in a relatively short space of time.242 Even criminal activity or indeed any violence that is after he killed Tori Johnson and waited for the simply fuelled by a grievance or motivated by police to burst into the caf'e, Monis did not turn protest or vengeance cannot be appropriately his shotgun on the remaining hostages. labelled as a ‘terrorist act’. In the ninth edition of Rumiyah published Instead of critically examining Monis’ in May 2017, Islamic State provided a justifica- many personal grievances and his prominent tion for the bombing of two major churches narcissism, the NSW Coroner defaulted to a which killed 45 Christian worshippers. Another simplistic orthodoxy that Monis had suddenly article was entitled ‘Just Terror Tactics’: converted from the Shi’a to Sunni faith and, in total social isolation, ‘self-radicalised’ before The objective of hostage-taking in the embarkingona‘lone actor’ terrorist attack. In lands of [the disbelievers] … is not to ‘ ’ hold large numbers of the kuffar hostage the chapter entitled A Terrorist Incident ,the in order to negotiate one’s demands. Coroner briefly considered an alterna- Rather, the objective is to create as much tive hypothesis: carnage and terror as one possibly can 42 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

until Allah decrees his appointed time and  use images of the Islamic State Black the enemies of Allah storm his location or Standard flag succeed in killing him. This is because the  hostile kafir only understands one leave a terrorist or propaganda message language and that is the language of force,  leave a martyrdom video the language of killing, stabbing and  send messages or upload images or slitting throats, chopping off heads, flat- video during the attack tening them under trucks, and burning them alive.243 In the 472-page report of his findings, the Coroner emphasised that the inquest was ‘the In seeking to restore the ‘caliphate’,Islamic largest critical-incident investigation’ in the State adheres to the rigidly fundamentalist history of Australia.248 However, in failing to Sunni position that the only religion and law is consider systematically the chronology of sharia which is based on the precepts derived Monis’ behaviour in the weeks before the from the Qur’an and Hadith.244 For Sunni siege, the Coroner overlooked the opportunity jihadists, there can never be any accommoda- to highlight that Monis demonstrated none of tion or compromise either with Islamic minor- the features that characterise Islamic State- ities (Druze, Sufis, Kurds, Alawites, Ahmadis inspired terrorists. and Yazidis) or with the ‘hated Shi’a’, In a more nuanced and critical examin- Christians, Jews and other ‘nonbelievers’.245 ation, there is abundant evidence that rather Followers of Islamic State or those inspired by than simply being a self-radicalised domestic Islamic State have no ‘negotiating position’.246 terrorist, Monis demonstrated all the promin- Their aim is to cause terror by killing as many ent features of a malignant narcissist. He was victims as quickly as they can. They do not behaviourally arrogant, grandiose and preten- take hostages or conduct prolonged sieges.247 tious. He was callous and interpersonally They do not threaten to detonate bombs in mul- exploitative. Since Kernberg first suggested tiple sites if their demands for a live radio that the ‘malignant narcissist’ demonstrated a ‘debate’ with the leader of the government are core narcissistic personality disorder as well as not acceded to. antisocial behaviour and a deeply paranoid orientation toward life,249 the association between narcissistic personality disorder and Conclusion violence has become well recognised.250 The All Islamic State-inspired terrorists demon- proclivity of the narcissist to react to humili- strate most of the following salient features: ation of a ‘narcissistic injury’ with an intense 251  download extremist sermons, fury is well recognised. Kohut first described ‘narcissistic rage’, in which the frus- speeches, propaganda material trations of a narcissistically perceived reality  view violent extremist videos including and a vulnerable sense of self precipitate anger bombings, shootings and beheadings 252  and aggression. After the Channel 7 pro- network and communicate with other gram exposed him as a fraud and showed his jihadists by encrypted apps (e.g. criticism of Australia’s military involvement Telegram, WhatsApp, Zellow) in Iraq and Afghanistan as insincere, Monis’  develop an online or social wounded narcissism would have struggled to media ‘footprint’ cope with his increasing irrelevance.  broadcast an intent (‘leakage’) to com- Monis also satisfied the criteria of a much mit a terrorist attack more prosaic and ubiquitous profile – that of  pledge loyalty (bay’ah) to Abu Bakr an embittered middle-aged divorcee with no al-Baghdadi (the caliph of gainful employment and no social supports. Islamic State) After allegations of domestic violence and a Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 43 family law dispute in which he lost custody of 4. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 401 his children, he was finally charged with his- para 86: ‘While Monis’ public Facebook torical sex offences. More significantly, Monis page (being the subject of the reports) did contain confronting and protent, there was was also charged with aiding and abetting the nothing indicative of adesire or intent to murder of his ex-wife and could envisage con- undertake an act of [politically motivated viction and a long prison sentence. In sentenc- violence] nor suggestive of a capability or ing Monis’ partner Droudis to 44 years with a intention to commit [politically non-parole period of 33 years, Johnson J point- motivated violence]. ‘ 5. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 240 edly emphasised: Monis is dead and cannot para 87. face justice for his own large part in the mur- 6. C Miranda, ‘How Martin Place Siege derofhisformerwife’.253 Killer Man Haron Monis Went from Being When the narcissistic archetype is sub- a Dodgy Travel Agent in Iran to Becoming ’ jected to the stressors that Monis experienced a Terrorist Network (16 January 2015) 16-hour siege, the flight of the last group of 394d885356a9979c3e67f8ac37b5803a 7. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 58 hostages just after 2 am on the morning of 16 para 28. December 2014 was the tipping point for a 8. The attack was in fact masterminded by murderous and self-destructive rage.254 Saudi Shi’ite Ahmed al-Mughassil, the military commander of Saudi Hezbollah, a terrorist organisation close to Lebanon’s Ethical Standards – Declaration of Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Conflicts of Interest Guard Corps which operated training camps in Lebanon and Iran. See also J Dr Scott has declared no conflicts of interest. Teitelbaum, ‘Terrorist Challenges to Saudi Dr Shanahan has declared no conflicts Arabian Internal Security’ (2005) 9(3) of interest. Middle East Review of International Affairs 1–11; T Matthiesen, ‘Hezbollah al-Hijaz: A History of the Most Radical ’ ’ Ethical Approval Saudi Shi a Opposition Group (2010) 64(2) Middle East Journal 179–97; J This article does not contain any studies with Teitelbaum, ‘The Shiites of Saudi Arabia’ human participants or animals performed by (2010) 10 Current Trends in Islamist – any of the authors. Ideology 72 86. 9. The Ahmadi or Ahmadiyya community are followers of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad Notes (1835–1908), a charismatic leader whose 1. Martin Place Siege: Joint Commonwealth- claims of spiritual authority brought him New South Wales Review (Canberra, into conflict with most other Muslim January 2015) https://www.nsw.gov.au/ leaders. The movement originated in rural news-and-events/news/martin-place-siege- India and is best known for challenging joint-commonwealth-new-south-wales- current conceptions of Islamic orthodoxy. review accessed 24 June 2018 Despite missionary success and expansion 2. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings, ‘Inquest throughout the world, particularly in into the Deaths Arising from the Lindt Cafe western Europe, North America and parts Siege: Findings and Recommendations’ of Africa, Ahmadis have effectively been (May 2017) From Sufism to Ahmadiyya: Muslim 3. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 400 Minority Movement in South Asia (Indiana para 70. University Press, Bloomington, Indiana 44 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

2015); AM Irawan, ‘“They Are Not 19. More than 26,000 Australian soldiers Muslims”: A Critical Discourse Analysis served in Afghanistan on Operation of the Ahmadiyya Sect Issue in Indonesia’ Slipper (2001-2014), and 41 Australian (2017) 28(2) Discourse and Army soldiers died in Afghanistan. Society 162–81. Australian Army in Afghanistan, 10. T Auerbach, ‘How Amnesty International ‘Australian Army’ 2015) 22. In 1999, al-Zarqawi founded Jama at al- 11. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 60 Tawhid wal-Jihad of ‘Organisation and para 40. Monotheism’ which waged an insurgency 12. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 50 against the US occupation of Iraq. In para 50. 2004, al-Zarqawi took command of ‘Al 13. Martin Place Siege: Joint Commonwealth- Qaeda in the Land of the Two New South Wales Review (n 1)28. Rivers’ (Iraq). 14. S Crittenden, ‘New Cardinals for Rome, 23. Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi, Combating George Bush, Muslims in Australia’ ABC Terrorism Center at West Point (West Radio The Religion Report (31 January Point, NY 2005) rome-george-bush-muslims-in/3478556> 24. See C Malkasian, ‘The Role of 15. See also Y Fouda and N Fielding, Perceptions and Political Reform in Masterminds of Terror: The Truth Behind Counterinsurgency: The Case of Western the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack the Iraq, 2004–2005’ (2006) 17 Small Wars World Has Ever Seen (Arcade Publishing, and Insurgencies 367–94; D Byman, ‘An New York 2003); P Bergen, The Longest Autopsy of the Iraq Debacle: Policy War: The Enduring Conflict between Failure or Bridge too Far?’ (2008) 17(4) America and al-Qaeda (Free Press, New Security Studies 599–643. York 2011); AB Atwan, The Secret 25. L Khatib, The Islamic State’s Strategy: History of al Qaeda (University of Lasting and Expanding (Carnegie California Press, Berkeley 2008); B Endowment for International Peace, Hoffman and F Reinares (eds), The Washington, DC 2015) (Columbia University Press, New 26. Cited in W McCants, The ISIS York 2014). Apocalypse: The History, Strategy and 16. Combatting Terrorism Centre, The Osama Doomsday Vision of The Islamic State bin Laden Files: Letters and Documents (Martin’s Press, New York 2015) 10; see Discovered by SEAL Team Six during also MA Weaver, ‘The Short, Violent their Raid on bin Laden’s Compound Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’ The (Skyhorse, New York 2012) 161. Atlantic (July/August 2006) 17. Osama bin Laden, ‘Text of Fatwah ‘ abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/ ;AN 1998 Declaration of War against the ‘ ’ ’ Americans Occupying the Land of the Celso, Zarqawi s Legacy: Al Qaeda s Two Holy Places’ < http://www. ISIS “Renegade”’ (2015) 26 (2) mideastweb.org/osamabinladen1.htm> Mediterranean Quarterly 1–14. 18. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 27. B Ryan, ‘Sydney Siege Inquest: Man Upon the United States, The 9/11 Haron Monis Claimed he Was Being “Set Commission Report: Authorised Edition Up” by ASIO and “Picked On” by (Norton, New York 2004)

sydney-siege-gunman monis-claims-set-up- 36. M Safi, ‘Sydney Siege Inquest: Gunman asio/6496936> Accused TV Hosts of being “Killers and 28. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 70 Terrorists”’ (2 June 2015) para 162. Sabeel Ahmed are incorrectly described as 37. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 397 two of the Glasgow Airport terrorists. See para 34. also Haneef v Minister for Immigration 38. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 398 and Citizenship [2007] FCA 1273; M Rix, para 37. ‘The Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef: An 39. T Auerbach, ‘Taped Granville Lectures Give Australian “Terrorism Drama” with Glimpse Inside the Crazed Mind of Sydney British connections’ (2009) 2 Plymouth Terrorist Man Haron Monis’ Daily Telegraph Law Review 126–47; M Rix, ‘The Haneef (1 January 2015) Counter-terrorism Policing in Australia’ 40. Wells, ‘Man Haron Monis Branded David (2010) 20(1) Policing and Society 2138; Koch a “Killer”’ (n 34)., posed security LK Vogel and MR Kebbell, ‘Judgement concerns for Channel 7 staff.’ ABC News. and Decision-Making in the Controversial Retrieved from http://www.abc.net.au/news/ Dr Haneef Counter-terrorism Operation: A 2015-06-02/sydney-siege-gunman-posed- Simulation Approach’ (2011) 18(4) concerns-for-channel-7-staff-inquest/6514728 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 612–25. 41. J Dowling, ‘Man Haron Monis’ Litany of 30. “D Gardham and others, ‘Seven doctors Complaints Against Today Tonight’ held over al-Qaeda bomb plot’ The (6 March 2015) Cafe Siege Gunman? Man Monis’ 42. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 99 Ranting Letters about Channel 7 Breakfast para 57. Show Presenters’“Comments on 43. M Farr, ‘Kevin Rudd to Ponder Terrorism” revealed’ Daily Mail Australia Citizenship Laws as Sheik Haron Accused (27 December 2014) to-ponder-citizenship-laws-as-sheik-haron- 32. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 66 accused-of-harassing-dead-digger-families/ para 133. story-e6freuy9-1225789920643> 33. Monis v The Queen [2013] HCA 4 (27 44. J Wells, ‘Sydney Siege Inquest: Lawyer February 2013). Says Man Haron Monis Was a Pest and 34. R Kerbaj, ‘Call to Probe Mystery Shia Not Very Intelligent’ ABC News (29 May Cleric’ The Australian (28 January 2008) 2015) < http://www. abc.net.au/news/2015- cleric/story-e6frg8yx-1111115413357> 45. Australian Associated Press, 35. J Wells, ‘Sydney Siege Inquest: Man ‘Controversial Sheik in Chains Outside Haron Monis Branded David Koch a Court’ SBS News (24 February 2015) “Killer”, Posed Security Concerns for sydney-siege-gunman-posed-concerns-for- 46. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 15 channel-7-staff-inquest/6514728> para 159. 46 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

47. Auerbach, ‘How Amnesty International 63. R v Droudis (No 14) [2016] NSWSC was “Conned”’ (n 10). Daily Telegraph. 1550 at [324]. Retrieved from http://www.dailytelegraph. 64. B McClellan, ‘“Hate” Sheik Man Horan com.au/news/nsw/how-amnesty-interna Monis and Girlfriend Amirzh Droudis tional-was-conned-by-lindt-cafe-killer- Granted Bail on Murder Charges’ DailyTe- man-haron-monis/news-story/8ae57da legraph (12 December 2013) gunman-monis-claims-set-up-asio/6496936 65. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 76 49. Monis v Regina; Droudis v Regina [2011] para 17: On 15 June 2015, in an outline HCATrans 97 (8 April 2011). of submission, the Crown Solicitor, on 50. R v Monis; R v Droudis behalf of the Office of the NSW Director [2011] NSWDC39. of Public Prosecutions (ODPP), stated that 51. Monis vR;Droudis v R [2011] the questions about bail in the provisional NSWCCA 231. issues list were beyond the proper scope ‘ 52. E Orofino, Intellectual Radicals of theinquest and if the inquest sought to Challenging the State: The Case of Hizb investigate these questions, the inquest ’ ut-Tahrir in the West (2015) 10(4) would fall into jurisdictional error. – Contemporary Social Science 401 12. 66. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 76 53. R v Droudis (No 13) [2016] NSWDC para 20. In relation to the question of 1350 at [31]. ‘legal professional privilege’ over 54. R v Droudis (No 14) [2016] NSWSC communications between legal officers 1550 at [646]. and police officers, the claim was rejected 55. Monis v The Queen; Droudis v The Queen in parts and upheld in others. The [2013] HCA 4. Coroner noted ‘As a result of the claim, 56. R v Droudis (No 14) [2016] NSWSC however, the Inquest was prevented from 1550 at [278]. fully examining all relevant aspects of 57. R v Droudis (No 14) [2016] NSWSC ’ ’ 1550 at [281]. Monis bail history NSW Coroner 58. R v Droudis (No 14) [2016] NSWSC Inquest Findings (n 2) 76 para 23. 1550 at [283]. 67. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 78 59. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) para 41. 68. Whilst noting that the presiding magistrate para 172. ‘ ’ 60. Parliament of Australia, Parliamentary took an interventionalist approach and Library, ‘Australia’s Military Involvement frequently interrupted, the Coroner in Afghanistan Since 2001: A Chronology’ concluded that the solicitor employed by document containing a list of objections 61. M Brissenden, ‘ Makes First from the Homicide Squad and gave the Visit to Afghanistan as PM, Says overall impression of ‘an inadequate Australia’s Longest War is Ending’ ABC response’ to the applications for bail for News (29 October 2013) .In his speech, the Martin Place Stand-Off was Iranian Man Prime Minister reflected on Australia’s Haron Monis, Who Had Violent Criminal longest military engagement which had History’ ABC News (16 December 2014) begun in 2001 as a mission to hunt the Sunni Taliban insurgents. 70. Wells, ‘Lawyer Says Man Haron Monis 62. R v Droudis (No 14) [2016] NSWSC Was a Pest and Not Very Intelligent’ (n 1550 at [339]. 43). Retrieved from http://www.abc.net. Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 47

au/news/2015-05-29/lindt-cafe-siege-man- Who They Are, How They Fight, What They haron-monis-lawyers-give-evidence/6506312 Believe (Skyhorse Publishing, New York 71. L McNally, ‘Controversial Sheikh Haron 2016); D By man, ‘Understanding the Faces Accessory to Ex-wife’s Murder Islamic State - A Review Essay’ (2016) 40 Charge’ ABC News (22 January 2014) (4) International Security 127–65; H

92. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 142 Term for an International Legal Definition’ para 86. (2014) 61(3) Netherlands International Law 93. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 144 Review 305; G Ramsay, ‘Why Terrorism para 103. Can, but Should Not be Defined’ (2015) 94. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 390 8(2) Critical Studies on Terrorism 211–28; para 84. J Striegher, ‘Violent-Extremism: An 95. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 162 Examination of a Definitional Dilemma’ para 339. (2015) Edith Cowan University Research 96. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 162 Online 75–96 DOI 10.4225/75/ para 343. 57a945ddd3352 Coverage’ Daily Telegraph (10 July 2015) 111. Council of the European Union, Council European Union, Brussels 2002) 3; see 98. L Cox, ‘Sydney Siege: Tony Abbott also L Weinberg, A Pedahzur and S Urges Australians to “Go about Business Hirsch-Hoe-fler, ‘The Challenges of as Usual”’ Sydney Morning Herald (15 Conceptualizing Terrorism’ (2004) 16(4) December 2015) < http://www. smh. com. Terrorism and Political Violence 777–94; au/federal-politics/political-news/sydney- AP Schmid, ‘The Definition of Terrorism’ siege-tony-abbott-urges-australians-to-go- in The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism about-business-as-usual-20141215- Research (Routledge 2011); AB Krueger, 127f8t.html> ‘What Makes a Homegrown Terrorist? 99. D Mark, ‘NSW Deputy Police Human Capital and Participation in Commissioner Says Negotiation Efforts Domestic Islamic Terrorist Groups in the Continue’ ABC PM (15 December 2014) U.S.A.’ (2008) 101 Economics Letters Decision on Combating Terrorism: Two 100. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 176 Questions on the Definition of Terrorist para 522. Offences’ (2012) 3 New Journal of 101. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 264 European Criminal Law 68–82; Saul (n para 76. 110); E MacDonald and G Williams, 102. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 265 ‘Combating Terrorism: Australia’s para 87. Criminal Code Since September 11, 2001’ 103. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 186 (2007) 16(1) Griffith Law Review 27–54. para 638. 112. JM Poland, Understanding Terrorism: 104. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 307 Groups, Strategies, and Responses para 260. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ 1988) 11; see also 105. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 208 A Merari, ‘Terrorism as a Strategy of para 74. Insurgency’ in G Chaliand and A Blin 106. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 194 (eds), The History of Terrorism from para 728. Antiquity to al Qaeda (University of 107. One officer fired 17 times and a second California Press, Berkeley 2007); JA officer fired 5 times: NSW Coroner Lynn, ‘Fear and Outrage as Terrorist Inquest Findings (n 2) 197 para 772. Goals’ (2012) 42(1) Parameters 51–62. 108. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 222 113. J Post, The Mind of the Terrorist: The para 124. Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to 109. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 197 al-Qaeda (Palgrave Macmillan, New York para 772. 2007) 8. See also AP Schmid and AJ 110. L Zedner, ‘Securing Liberty in the Face of Jong-man, Political Terrorism: A New Terror: Reflections from Criminal Justice’ Guide to Actors, Authors, Concepts, Data (2005) 32 Journal of Law and Society Bases, Theories and Literature (New 507–15; B Saul, Defining Terrorism in Holland, Amsterdam 1988); A Silke (ed), International Law (OUP 2006); JR White, Terrorists, Victims and Society: Terrorism and Homeland Security Psychological Perspectives on Terrorism (Wadsworth, Belmont, California 2014); R and its Consequences (John Wiley & Grozdanova, ‘Terrorism - Too Elusive a Sons Ltd, West Sussex 2003); J Victoroff, Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 49

‘The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Criteria of an Apocalyptic Islamic Cult? Critique of Psychological Approaches’ An Evidence-Based Historical Qualitative (2005) 49(1) Journal of Conflict Meta-analysis’ (2017) 8(1) Journal of Resolution 3–42; D Wright-Neville and D Terrorism Research 18-33; E Beevor, Smith, ‘Political Rage: Terrorism and the ‘Coercive Radicalization: Charismatic Politics of Emotion’ (2009) 21(1) Global Authority and the Internal Strategies of Change, Peace and Security 85–98; J ISIS and the Lord’s Resistance Army’ Victoroff and A Kruglanski (eds), (2017) 40(6) Studies in Conflict and Psychology of Terrorism: Classic and Terrorism 496-521. Contemporary Insights (Psychology Press, 120. See also M Gani and G Urbas, ‘Alert or New York 2009). Alarmed? Recent Legislative Reforms 114. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (n 29). Directed at Terrorist Organisations and 115. In the latest edition of Inside Terrorism, Persons Supporting or Assisting Terrorist although Hoffman referred briefly to ISIS Acts’ (2004) 8(1) Newcastle Law Review ‘claiming responsibility for an attack in 23; B McSherry, ‘Terrorism Offences in Melbourne’ without naming Abdul Haider the Criminal Code: Broadening the (p 42), there is no mention of Monis or Boundaries of Australian Criminal Laws’ the Lindt Cafe siege. Hoffmann makes (2004) 27(2) University of New South only eight very brief references to ‘lone Wales Law Journal 354, 364-69; B wolf terrorists’ (pp 1, 7, 39, 42, 43, 44, McSherry, ‘The Introduction of 125, 136) and lists the December 2015 Terrorism-Related Offences in Australia: San Bernadino and June 2016 Orlando Comfort or Concern’ (2005) 12 (2) shootings and the July 2016 truck killings Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 27988; in Nice, France as attacks by ‘lone A Lynch and G Williams, What Price wolves’ (p 313). In the final chapter Security? Taking Stock of Australia’s which is entitled ‘Terrorism Today and Antiterror Laws (UNSW Press, Sydney Tomorrow II: New and Continuing 2006) 14-28; MacDonald and Williams (n Challenges’, there is no discussion of 111); G Syrota, ‘The Definition of lone-actor terrorism. “Terrorist Act” in Part 5.3 of the 116. B Golder and G Williams, ‘What is Commonwealth Criminal Code’ (2007) “Terrorism”? Problems of Legal 33(2) University of Western Australia Definition’ (2004) 27 University of New Law Review 307-50. South Wales Law Journal 270; J 121. Lodhi v Regina [2006] NSWCCA 121; Blackbourn, ‘The Evolving Definition of See also N J Broadbent, ‘Faheem Khalid Terrorism in UK Law’ (2011) 3(2) Lodhi v Regina [2007] NSWCCA 360’ Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and (2007) 14 Australian International Law Political Aggression 131–49. Journal 22737; S Sorial, ‘Guilt By 117. JM Weinstein, Inside Rebellion: The Association: The ‘Anti-Terrorism’ Case of Politics of Insurgent Violence (CUP, Regina v Lodhi [2007] ’ (2007) 32(3) Cambridge 2007) 198–259. Alternative Law Journal 160-64; G 118. IW Zartman (ed), Negotiating with Syrota, ‘Australia’s Counter - Terrorism Terrorists (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Offences: A Critical Study’ (2008) 34(1) Leiden 2006); see also M Sageman, University of Western Australia Law Understanding Terror Networks Review 103-44; A Pyne, ‘The Mood and (University of Pennsylvania Press, Temper of the Public: R v Lodhi and the Philadelphia, PA 2004); see also P Butler, Principles of Sentencing in the War on ‘Terrorism and Utilitarianism: Lessons Terror’ (2011) 23 (2) Current Issues in from, and for, Criminal Law’ (2002) 93 Criminal Justice 163-182; G Williams, A Journal of Criminal Law and decade of Australian Anti-terror Laws’ Criminology 1–22. (2011) 35 (3) Melbourne University Law 119. PR Neumann, ‘Negotiating with Review 1136-76. Terrorists’ (2007) 86(1) Foreign Affairs 122. In 1998, Pakistan-born architect Faheem 128–38; GO Faure, ‘Negotiating with Khalid Lodhi migrated to Australia and Terrorists: A Discrete form of Diplomacy’ began living in Lakumba in Sydney. In (2008) 3 The Hague Journal of October 2003, following an investigation Diplomacy 179-200; See also B Barron by ASIO and the NSW police, raids on and DL Maye, ‘Does ISIS Satisfy the Lodhi’s home and workplace discovered 50 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

evidence of a plot to commit a terrorist strophic-how-australia-narrowly-escaped- act. In R v Lodhi [2006] NSWSC 584 two-sophisticated-bomb-plots-20170804- (Unreported, Whealy J, 14 February gxpk4f.html> 2006), Lodhi was charged with (1) 127. M Innes and others, Hearts and Minds possessing a thing (a document about how and Eyes and Ears: Reducing to make bombs) connected with a terrorist Radicalisation Risks Through act (2) collecting or making documents Reassurance-Oriented Policing (collecting maps of the electricity supply (Universities Police Science Institute, system and making aerial photos of Cardiff, Wales 2007); see also H Gordon, Australian Defence Force establishments ‘The “Suicide” Bomber: Is it a Psychiatric including the Barracks, the Phenomenon?’ (2002) 26 Psychiatric and the HMAS Bulletin 285-87; J Stern, Terror in the Penguin) connected with terrorist acts and Name of God: Why Religious Militants (3) doing an act (seeking information Kill (HarperCollins, New York 2003); A about the availability of materials that Silke, ‘Courage in Dark Places: could be used to make bombs) in Reflections on Terrorist Psychology’ preparation or planning a terrorist act. (2004) 71(1) Social Research 177-98; J 123. A Lynch, N McGarrity and G Williams, Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism Inside Australia’s Anti-terrorism Laws (Routledge, New York 2005); C and Trials (UNSW Press 2015) 96; see McCauley and S Moskalenko, also C Smith and M Nolan, ‘Post- ‘Mechanisms of Political Radicaliza-tion: sentence Continued Detention of High- Pathways Towards Terrorism’ (2008) Risk Terrorist Offenders in Australia’ 20(3) Terrorism and Political Violence (2016) 40(3) Criminal Law Journal 415-33; C McCauley and S Moskalenko, 163-179. Friction: How Radicalization Happens to 124. J Brisard, ‘The Paris Attacks and the Them and Us (OUP, New York 2011); Evolving Islamic State Threat to France’ RH Rahimullah, S Larmar and M (2015) 8 (11) Combating Terrorism Abdallah, ‘Radicalization and Terrorism: Center Sentinel 5-8; see also P Nesser, Research within the Australian Context’ Islamist Terrorism in Europe: A History (2013) 2 International Journal of (Hurst, London 2016); G van Vlierden, Criminology and Sociology 180-85; C ‘Profile: Paris Attack Ringleader McCauley and S Moskalenko, ‘Toward a Abdelhamid Abaaoud’ (2015) 8(11) Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 30- Moves an Individual from Radical 33; see also A Tausch, ‘Estimates on the Opinion to Radical Action’ (2013) 26(1) Global Threat of Islamic State Terrorism Terrorism and Political Violence 69-85; A in the Face the 2015 Paris and McGilloway, P Ghosh and KA Bhui, Copenhagen Attacks’ (2015) 19(1) Middle ‘Systematic Review of Pathways to and East Review of International Affairs 37- Processes Associated with Radicalization 58; M Abrahms, M Ward and R Kennedy, and Extremism amongst Muslims in ‘Explaining Civilian Attacks: Terrorist Western Societies’ (2015) 27 International Networks, Principal-Agent Problems and Review of Psychiatry 39-50; C McCauley Target Selection’ (2018) 12(1) and S Moskalenko, ‘Understanding Perspectives on Terrorism 23-45. Political Radicalization: The Two- 125. See also S Hughes and A Meleagrou- Pyramids Model’ (2017) 72(3) American Hitchens, ‘The Threat to the United States Psychologist 205-16; KR Sarma, ‘Risk from the Islamic State’s Virtual Assessment and the Prevention of Entrepreneurs’ (2017) 10(3) Combating Radicalization from Nonviolence into Terrorism Center Sentinel 1-8; J Mueller, Terrorism’ (2017) 72(3) American ‘The Cybercoaching Of Terrorists: Cause Psychologist 278-88. for Alarm?’ (2017) 10 (9) Combating 128. P Lentini, ‘Antipodal Terrorists? Terrorism Center Sentinel 2934. Accounting for Differences in Australian 126. R Olding and A Benny-Morrison, and “Global” Neojihadists’ in R Devetak ‘Catastrophic: How Australia Narrowly and C Hughes (eds), The Globalisation of Escaped Two “Sophisticated Bomb Political Violence: Globalisations Shadow Plots”’ Sydney Morning Herald (4 August (Routledge, Australia 2008); E Bekker, 2017)

Characteristics and the Circumstances in com Press, New York 2015); ML Stroink, which They Joined the Jihad: An ‘Processes and Preconditions Underlying Exploratory Study (Netherlands Institute Terrorism in Second-Generation of International Relations, Clingendael Immigrants’ (2007) 13(3) Peace And 2006); S Copland, Psychological Profiling Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology of Terrorists: A Case Study of the Bali 293-312; M Chulov, Australian Jihad: Bombers and The Battle against Terrorism from Within (Australian National University, Canberra and Without (MacMillan, Sydney 2006); 2005); G Dean, ‘Criminal Profiling in a J Horgan, ‘From Profiles to Pathways Terrorism Context’ in R Kocsis (ed), and Roots to Routes: Perspectives Criminal Profiling: International Theory, from Psychology on Radicalization Research, and Practice (Humana Press, into Terrorism’ (2008) 618 Annals of Totowa, NJ 2007) 169-88; M Kebbell and the American Academy of Political and L Porter, ‘An Intelligence Assessment Social Science 80-94; AS Wilner and Framework for Identifying Individuals at C Dubouloz, ‘Homegrown Terrorism Risk of Committing Acts of Violent and Transformative Learning: An ’ Extremism Against the West (2012) Interdisciplinary Approach to 25(3) Security Journal 212-28; P Lentini, Understanding Radicalization’ (2010) Neojihadism: Towards a New 22(1) Global Change, Peace and Security Understanding of Terrorism and 33-51; C Crossett and JA Spitaletta, Extremism? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham Radicalization: Relevant Psychological 2013); Rahimullah, Larmar and Abdalla and Sociological Concepts (Johns (n 127). Hopkins University, Baltimore 2010); R 129. P Neumann, Briefing Note - Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Radicalisation, CVE and Counter- Extremism: A Review of Social Science radicalisation: Core Issues and Questions Theories’ (2011) 34(4) Journal of (International Centre for the Study of Strategic Security 7-36; J Bartlett and C Radicalisation, Kings College, London 8 Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence: Towards August 2015); see also P Neumann and S Telling the Difference Between Violent Kleinmann, ‘How Rigorous is and Non-violent Radicalization’ (2012) Radicalization Research?’ (2013) 9 (4) 24(1) Terrorism and Political Violence 1- Democracy and Security 360-82; PR ‘ 21; A Richards, ‘From Terrorism to Neumann, The Trouble with “ ” “ ” Radicalisation’ (2013) 89 International Radicalization to Extremism : Affairs 873-93; P Neumann, Radicalised: Counterterrorism Imperative or Loss of Focus?’ (2015)91(2) International Affairs New Jihadists and the Threat to the West ‘ (IB Tauris and Co, London 2016); KM 371-80; A Dalgaard-Nielsen, Violent Sarma, ‘Risk Assessment and the Radicalization in Europe: What We Know ’ Prevention of Radicalization from and What We Do Not Know (2010) Nonviolence into Terrorism’ (2017) 72(3) 33(9) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism American Psychologist 278-88; AW 797-814; A Aly and J Striegher, ‘ Kruglanski and others, ‘To the Fringe and Examining the Role of Religion in Back: Violent Extremism and the Radicalization to Violent Islamist Psychology of Deviance’ (2017) Extremism’ (2012) 35(12) Studies in American Psychologist 217-30. Conflict and Terrorism 849-62; N 130. SJ Mullins, ‘Islamist Terrorism and Ferguson and E Binks, ‘Understanding Australia: An Empirical Examination of Radicalization and Engagement in the “Home-Grown” Threat’ (2011) 23(2) Terrorism through Religious Conversion Terrorism and Political Violence 254-85; Motifs’ (2015) 8(1) Journal of Strategic M Hafez and C Mullins, ‘The Security 16-26; J Klausen and others, Radicalization Puzzle: A Theoretical ‘Toward a Behavioral Model of Synthesis of Empirical Approaches To “Homegrown” Radicalization Trajectories’ Homegrown Extremism’ (2015) 38(11) (2016) 39(1) Studies in Conflict and Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 958-75; Terrorism 67-83; O Honig and A see also M Silber and A Bhatt, Reichard, ‘The Usefulness of Examining Radicalization in the West: The Terrorists’ Rhetoric for Understanding the Homegrown Threat (OccupyBawlStreet. Nature of Different Terror Groups’ (2017) 52 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

Terrorism and Political Violence 1-20 Technology, Theology, and Teleology?’ DOI 10.1080/09546553.2017.1283308 (2007) 30 Studies in Conflict and 131. JD Simon, Lone Wolf Terrorism: Under Terrorism 303-25; McGilloway, Ghosh standing the Growing Threat (Prometheus and Bhui (n 128); AS Wilner and C Books, Amherst, NY 2013); P Bergen, Dubouloz, ‘Transformative Radicalisation: United States of Jihad: Investigating Applying Learning Theory to Islamist America’s Homegrown Terrorists (Crown, Radicalization’ (2011) 34 Studies in New York 2016); C Archetti, ‘Terrorism, Conflict and Terrorism 4l8—38; N Bolt, Communication and New Media: The Violent Image: Insurgent Propaganda Explaining Radicalization in the Digital and the New Revolutionaries (Columbia Age’ (2015) 9(1) Perspectives on University Press, New York 2012); P Terrorism 49–59; P Gill and others, Lentini, Neojihadism: Toward a New ‘Terrorist Use of the Internet by the Understanding of Terrorism and Numbers: Quantifying Behaviors, Patterns Extremism? (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham and Processes’ (2017) 16(1) Criminology 2013); G Ramsay and D Holbrook, ‘The and Public Policy 99–117. Representation of Violence by Insurgent 132. LE Porter and M Kebbell, ‘Radicalization Political Actors: The “Violent” Part of in Australia: Examining Australia’s “Violent Extremism”?’ (2014) 7(1) Convicted Terrorists’ (2011) 18 Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 213-21; Political Aggression 84—96; DP see also Lentini, ‘Antipodal Terrorists?’ Eisenman and L Flavahan, ‘Canaries in (n 128); Rahimullah, Larmar and Abdalla the Coal Mine: Interpersonal Violence, (n 127). Gang Violence, and Violent Extremism 133. See also Stern (n 127); R Pape, Dying to through a Public Health Prevention Lens’ Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide (2017) 29(4) International Review of Terrorism (Random House, New York Psychiatry 341—49; S Lakhani, ‘Extreme 2005); F Ali and J Post, ‘The History and Criminals: Reconstructing Ideas of Evolution of Martyrdom in the Service of Criminality through Extremist Narratives’ Defensive Jihad: An Analysis of Suicide (2018) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Bombers in Current Conflicts’ (2008) DOI 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1450613. 75(2) Social Research 615-54; A 135. S Harris-Hogan, ‘Violent Extremism in Moghadam, The Globalization of Australia: An Overview’ (2017) 491 Martyrdom: Al Qaeda, Salafi Jihad, and Trends and Issues: Australian Institute of the Diffusion of Suicide Attacks (Johns Criminology 1—14 ; see also A Zammit, and Social Aspects of Suicide Terrorism ‘Explaining a Turning Point in Australian (OUP, New York 2010); S Cottee and K Jihadism’ (2013) 36(9) Studies in Conflict Hayward, ‘Terrorist (E)motives: The and Terrorism 739—55; A Zammit, ‘New Existential Attractions of Terrorism’ Developments in Australian Foreign Fighter (2011) 34 (12) Studies in Conflict and Activity’ (2014) 7(9) Combating Terrorism Terrorism 963–86; A Lankford, The Myth Center Sentinel 5—8; A Zammit, ‘Australian of Martyrdom: What Really Drives Foreign Fighters: Risks and Responses’ Suicide Bombers, Rampage Shooters, and Lowy Institute for International Policy, 16 Other Self-Destructive Killers (Palgrave April 2015 York 2007); O Roy, Globalized Islam: 136. B Schuurman and others, ‘Operation The Search for a New Ummah (Columbia Pendennis: A Case Study of an Australian University Press, New York Press 2007); Terrorist Plot’ (2014) 8(4) Perspectives on O Roy, Secularism Confronts Islam Terrorism 91—99. (Columbia University Press, New York 137. B Malkin, ‘Australian Police “Foil Terror 2007); O Roy, Jihad and Death: The Plot” to Storm Sydney Army Barracks’ Global Appeal of Islamic State (Hurst and The Telegraph (4 August 2009) Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 53

138. Inquest into the death of Ahmad Numan farhad-jabar-cap tured-giving-islamic-state- Haider, Coroners Court of Victoria (31 salute-before-curtis-cheng-shooting-20170501- July 2017) gov. au/resources/a2408200-0e96-47c1- 145. N Kazimi, ‘Zarqawi’s Anti-Shi’a Legacy: b6aa-ebeee1bb3622/ahmadnumanhaider_ Original or Borrowed?’ (2006) 4 Current 491714 .pdf> Trends in Islamist Ideology 53-72; B 139. J Stapelton, Terror in Australia: Workers’ Haykel, ‘Al-Qa’ida and Shiism’ in A Paradise Lost (A Sense of Place Moghadam and B Fishman (eds), Fault Publishing, Australia 2015). Lines in Global Jihad (Routledge, London 140. On 9 December 2016, both were 2011); B Fishman, ‘Revising the History sentenced 20 years imprisonment: R v al- of al-Qa’ida’s Original Meeting with Abu Kutobi and Kiad [2016] NSWSC 1760. Musab al-Zarqawi’ (2016) 9(7) 141. R v Besim [2016] VSC 537 at [1]. Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 29- ‘ 142. In the name of Allah the beneficent, the 33; C Watts, ‘Deciphering Competition Merciful, a while ago world leaders between al-Qa’ida and the Islamic State’ declared war on Islam and Muslims, (2016) 9(7) Combating Terrorism Center invading lands, dividing us into separate Sentinel 1-6; W McCants, ‘The Polarizing nations, installing puppets, killing and Effect of Islamic State Aggression on the torturing Muslims. This war had always Global Jihadist Movement’ (2016) 9(7) had a[n] impact on me, however recently Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 20- my brother Numan (may Allah accept 23; TR Hamming, ‘The al Qaeda-Islamic him) carried out his attack, this opened State Rivalry: Competition Yes, but No my eyes up to the reality of who the Competitive Escalation’ (2017) Terrorism enemy is. Since then a growing feeling and Political Violence DOI 10.1080/ within me had led me to decide to carry 09546553.2017. 1342634, 1-18. out my own. To establish my jihad in 146. Inspire was first published by al-Qaeda in Australia, to fight the oppressors, those the Arabian Peninsula in January 2010; who have implemented man made law, to see HJ Ingram, ‘An Analysis of Inspire fight to make Allah’s word known and and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and the highest, to defend Islam and put fear ’ ’ into those who are enemies to Allah and Islamic State s Propaganda War (2017) his religion Insha’Allah. At first I wanted 40(5) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism nothing else but to leave this country and 357-75. 147. J Dowling, ‘Al-Qaeda’s Brutal Warning after live in the Islamic State, however after ’ many complications with my passport I Sydney Siege Herald Sun (28 December < realised this could not be done. So I 2014) http://www.heraldsun.com.au/ started to prepare myself for my attack news/alqaedas-brutal-warning-after-sydney- against the enemies of Islam’ cited in R v siege/news-story/2ec7c640bf6d976488a3f > Besim [2016] VSC 537 at [109]. 20f1daa0f8a ‘ 143. Besim ultimately pleaded guilty to one 148. M Knott, Sydney Siege Gunman Man Haron count of doing acts in preparation for, or Monis Glorified in Islamic State Propaganda planning, a terrorist act contrary to s Magazine Dabiq’ Sydney Morning Herald 101.6 (1) of the Criminal Code (Cth) and (30 December 2014) 144. ‘Soon by the will of God … your nights 149. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 236 will turn into nightmares, your days into para 49. hell. By the will of Allah I have come 150. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 236 today to put terror into your hearts and para 49. soon the majahideen will do the same, by 151. See also AM Hoffman, ‘Voice and the will of Allah’: cited by N Ralston (1 Silence: Why Groups Take Credit for May 2017); ‘Farhad Jabar Captured Acts of Terror’ (2010) 47(5) Journal of Giving Islamic State Salute before Curtis Peace Research 615-26; M Abrahms and J Cheng Shooting’ Sydney Morning Herald Conrad, ‘The Strategic Logic of Credit

Attacks’ (2017) 26(2) Security Studies Jihad’ (2014) 38(4) Strategic Analysis 279-304. 554-65; AB Atwan, Islamic State: The 152. SC Sivek, ‘Packaging Inspiration: Al- Digital Caliphate (University of Qaeda’s Digital Magazine Inspire in the California Press, Oakland, California Self-Radicalization Process’ (2013) 7 2015); D Talbot, ‘Fighting ISIS Online’ International Journal of (2015) 118(6) Technology Review 72-77; Communication 584–606. HJ Ingram, ‘The Strategic Logic of 153. NJ O’Shaughnessy and PR Baines, Islamic State Information Operations’ ‘Selling Terror: The Symbolisation and (2015) 69(6) Australian Journal of Positioning of Jihad’ (2009) 9(2) International Affairs 729-52; J Melki and Marketing Theory 227-41; G Michael, M Jabado, ‘Mediated Public Diplomacy Lone Wolf Terror and the Rise of of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria: The Leaderless Resistance (Vanderbilt Synergistic Use of Terrorism, Social University Press, Nashville, Tennessee Media and Branding’ (2016) 4(2) Media 2012); G Weimann, New Terrorism and and Communication 92-103; B Ganor, New Media (Wilson Centre and Commons Global Alert: The Rationality of Modern Lab, Research Series, Washington, DC Islamist Terrorism and the Challenge to 2014); D Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic the Liberal Democratic World (Columbia State and the Global Jihadist Movement: University Press, New York 2015); G What Everyone Needs to Know (OUP, Weimann, Terrorism in Cyberspace: The New York 2015); C Galloway, ‘Media Next Generation (Columbia University Jihad: What PR Can Learn in Islamic Press, NY 2015); MM Kraidy, ‘Revisiting State’s Public Relations Masterclass’ Hypermedia Space in the Era of the (2016) 42 Public Relations Review 582- Islamic State’ (2017) 20(3) 90; TH Tonnessen, ‘Islamic State and Communication Review 165-71. Technology - A Literature Review’ (2017) 155. AY Zelin, ‘Picture or it Didn’t Happen: A 11(6) Perspectives on Terrorism 101-11; Snapshot of the Islamic State’s Official MC Benigni, K Joseph and KM Carley, Media Output’ (2015) 9(4) Perspectives ‘Online Extremism and the Communities on Terrorism 85-97; G Siboni, D Cohen that Sustain it: Detecting the ISIS and T Koren, ‘The Islamic State’s Supporting Community on Twitter’ (2017) Strategy in Cyberspace’ (2015) 7(1) 12(2) PLoS ONE ;MG Marcellino and others, ‘Measuring the Zekulin, ‘More than the Medium: How Popular Resonance of Daesh’s the Communication Literature Helps Propaganda’ (2016) 10(1) Journal of Explain ISIS’s Success in Recruiting Strategic Security 32-52; C Smith and Westerners’ (2018) 13 (1) Journal of others, ‘The Islamic State’s Symbolic Policing, Intelligence and Counter War: Da’esh’s Socially Mediated Terrorism 17-37. Terrorism as a Threat to Cultural 154. Y Tsfati and G Weimann, ‘www. Heritage’ (2016) 16 (2) Journal of Social terrorism.com: Terror on the Internet ’ Archaeology 164-88; A Watkins, ‘Losing (2002) 25 Studies in Conflict and Territory and Lashing Out: The 317-32; MRT Soriano, ‘The State and International Terror’ (2016) 3 Vulnerabilities of Online Terrorism’ Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 14- (2012) 35(4) Studies in Conflict and 18; M Bloom, ‘Constructing Expertise: Terrorism 263-77; G Weimann, ‘Lone Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Wolves in Cyberspace’ (2012) 3(2) Spotting” in the PIRA, Al Qaeda, and Journal of Terrorism Research DOI 10. ISIS’ (2017) 40(7) Studies in Conflict and 15664/jtr.405; C Archetti, Understanding Terrorism 603-23; Z Tziarras, ‘Islamic Terrorism in the Age of Global Media: A Caliphate: A Quasi-state, a Global Communication Approach (Palgrave Security Threat’ (2017) 12(1) Journal of Macmillan 2013); G Hussain and EM Applied Security Research 96-116; T Saltman, Jihad Trending: A Maurer, ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’s Comprehensive Analysis of Online Terrorism: A Universal Instrument of Extremism and How to Counter it Asymmetric Warfare and the New (Quilliam Foundation, London 2014); Battlefield in Europe’ (2017) 9 Defence RHeickero, ‘Cyber Terrorism: Electronic Against Terrorism Review 61-76. Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 55

156. A Salem, E Reid and H Chen, ‘Multimedia ‘the last hour will not come’ until Content Coding and Analysis: Unravelling Muslims vanquished the Romans at the Content of Jihadi Extremist Groups’ ‘Dabiq or al-Amaq’ on their way to Videos’ (2008) 31(7) Studies in Conflict conquer Constantinople (modern-day and Terrorism 605-26; E Reid, ‘A Istanbul). On 16 November 2014, Islamic Comparison of Jihadi Extremist Groups’ State distributed a 15-minute video Videos’ (2009) 11(3) Forensic Science showing British militant Mohammed Communications < https://www. fbi.gov/ Emwazi (‘Jihadi John’) standing over the about-us/lab/forensic-science- severed head of captured American aid communications/fsc/july2009/index. htm/ worker Peter Kassig: ‘Here we are, research_tech/2009_07_research01.htm>; burying the first American Crusader in JM Berger, ‘Tailored Online Interventions: Dabiq, eagerly waiting for the remainder The Islamic State’s Recruitment Strategy’ of your armies to arrive’; See also M (2015) 8(10) Combating Terrorism Center Vergani and A Bliuc, ‘The Evolution of Sentinel 19-23; A Gendron, ‘The Call to the ISIS Language: A Quantitative Jihad: Charismatic Preachers and the Analysis of the Language of the First Internet’ (2017) 40 (1) Studies in Conflict Year of Dabiq Magazine’ (2015)2 and Terrorism 44-61; A Aly, ‘Brothers, Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Societa 720. Believers, Brave Mujahideen: Focusing 159. On 31 July 2016, the town of Dabiq was Attention on the Audience of Violent lost to Syrian rebels with support from Jihadist Preachers’ (2017) 40 (1) Studies in Turkish forces. In September 2016, the Conflict and Terrorism 62-76; M Conway, new online magazine Rumiyah first ‘Determining the Role of the Internet in appeared. Rumiyah (Arabic for ‘Rome’)is Violent Extremism and Terrorism: Six a reference to the Hadith in which the Suggestions for Progressing Research’ Prophet Muhammad declares that after (2017) 40 (1) Studies in Conflict and Constantinople, the Muslim armies will Terrorism 7798; M Abrahms, N conquer Rome. Beauchamp and J Mroszczyk, ‘What 160. HJ Ingram, ‘An Analysis of Islamic Terrorist Leaders Want: A Content State’s Dabiq Magazine’ (2016) 51(3) Analysis of Terrorist Propaganda Videos’ Australian Journal of Political Science (2017) 40(11) Studies in Conflict and 458-77; CMI Novenario, ‘Differentiating Terrorism 899-916. al Qaeda and the Islamic State through 157. M Maggioni and P Magri (eds), Twitter Strategies Publicized in Jihadist and Jihad: The Communication Strategy Magazines’ (2016) 39(11) Studies in of ISIS (Italian Institute for International Conflict and Terrorism 953-67; L Political Studies, Milan 2015) ; J Klausen, ‘Tweeting the Review 7-30; J Burke, ‘The Age of Selfie Jihad: Social Media Networks of Western Jihad: How Evolving Media Technology Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq’ (2015) is Changing Terrorism’ (2016) Combating 38(1) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Terrorism Center Sentinel 16-22; R 122; A Hoffman and Y Schweitzer, Mahzam, ‘Rumiyah - Jihadist Propaganda ‘Cyber Jihad in the Service of the Islamic and Information Warfare in Cyberspace’ State (ISIS)’ (2015) 18(1) Strategic (2017) 9(3) Counter Terrorist Trends and Assessment 71-81; N Prucha, ‘IS and the Analyses 8-14; Meleagrou-Hitchens and Jihadist Information Highway - Projecting Hughes (n 125); NM Rocca, Influence and Religious Identity via ‘Mobilization and Radicalization through Telegram’ (2016) 10 (6) Perspectives on Persuasion: Manipulative Techniques in Terrorism 48-58. ISIS’ Propaganda’ (2017) 5(11) 158. Dabiq, a small town in Syria International Relations and Diplomacy approximately 10 km from the border with 660-70. Turkey, features in Islamic apocalyptic 161. Terrorism Research and Analysis prophecies as the site of an end-of-times Consortium, ‘More than Just Beheadings: confrontation between Muslims and their How the Islamic State Sells Itself’ (8 ‘Roman’ enemies. The Prophet December 2014)

com/3624976/isis-beheading-technology- 135–59; McCauley and Moskalenko (n video-trac-quilliam/%22> 127); JA Capellan,‘Lone Wolf Terrorist or 162. N Morley, ‘Isis are Claiming Deranged Shooter? A Study of Ideological Responsibility for Acts They Didn’t Active Shooter Events in the United Commit’ Metro News (17 July 2016) States, 1970-2014’ (2015) 38(6) Studies Selection in the United States’ (2014) 163. RC Paddock and F Villamor, ‘Manila 37(11) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Casino Attacker was a Gambling Addict, 959-78; R Spaaij and MS Hamm, ‘Key the Philippine Police Say’ New York Times Issues and Research Agendas in Lone (4 June 2017) H Loow and L Malkki, ‘Introduction to 164. J Moore, ‘ISIS Claims Las Vegas the Special Issue on Lone Wolf and Shooting, Says Stephen Paddock Autonomous Cell Terrorism’ (2014) 26(1) Converted to Islam’ Newsweek (10 Terrorism and Political Violence 1-12; BP February 2017) < http://www.newsweek. Alakoc, ‘Competing to Kill: Terrorist com/isis-claims-las-vegas-shooting-says- Organizations Versus Lone Wolf stephen-paddock-converted-islam-675504> Terrorists’ (2017) 29 Terrorism and 165. N Bucci, ‘Las Vegas Shooter Stephen Political Violence 509-32; K Beydoun, Paddock, Islamic State and the Mystery of ‘Lone Wolf Terrorism: Types, Stripes and Motive’ Sydney Morning Herald (6 Double Standards’ (2018) 11 October 2017) < http://www.smh.com.au/ Northwestern University Law Review world/las-vegas-shooter-stephen-paddock- 187-215; P Gill and others, ‘Terrorist islamic-state-and-the-mystery-of-motive- Decision Making in the Context of Risk, 20171006-gyvkav.html> Attack Planning, and Attack Commission’ 166. LD Mech, ‘Alpha Status, Dominance, and (2018) Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Division of Labor in Wolf Packs’ (1999) DOI 10.1080/1057610X.2018.1445501 77 Canadian Journal of Zoology 169. R Spaaij, ‘The Enigma of Lone Wolf 1196-203. Terrorism: An Assessment’ (2010) 33(9) 167. BM Jenkins, Stray Dogs and Virtual Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 854-70; Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to R Spaaij, Understanding Lone Wolf Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Terrorism: Global Patterns, Motivations Since 9/11 (RAND, Santa Monica and Prevention (Springer, New York California 2011) 21; see also JR White, 2012); Spaaij and Hamm (n 168). Terrorism: An Introduction (Wadsworth, 170. JT Alderdice, ‘Sacred Values: Belmont, California 2003) ‘The term Psychological and Anthropological glorifies their actions and should not be Perspectives on Fairness, Fundamentalism, used’ p4. and Terrorism’ (2009) 1167 Annals of the 168. S Moskalenko and C McCauley, ‘The Psy New York Academy of Sciences 158-73; chology of Lone-Wolf Terrorism’ (2011) MA Hogg, ‘SelfUncertainty, Social 24 Counselling Psychology Quarterly Identity and the Solace of Extremism’ in 115–26; P Gill, Lone-Actor Terrorists: A HA Hogg and DL Blaylock (eds), Behavioural Analysis (Routledge, New Extremism and the Psychology of York 2015); JD Simon, Lone Wolf Uncertainty (Blackwell Publishing, Terrorism: Understanding the Growing London 2012); J Gruenewald, S Chermak Threat (Prometheus Books, Amherst, NY and J Freilich, ‘Distinguishing “Loner” 2013); DM Zierhoffer, ‘Threat Attacks from other Domestic Extremist Assessment: Do Lone Terrorists Differ Violence’ (2013) 12 Criminology and from Other Lone Offenders?’ (2014) Public Policy 65-91; J Reid Meloy and J Journal of Strategic Security 48-62; OE Yakeley, ‘The Violent True Believer as a Danzell and LM Maisonet Montanez, “Lone Wolf”- Psychoanalytic Perspectives ‘Understanding the Lone Wolf Terror on Terrorism’ (2014) 32(3) Behavioral Phenomena: Assessing Current Profiles’ Sciences and the Law 347-65; JM Post, (2016) 8(2) Behavioral Sciences of ‘Terrorism and Right-Wing Extremism: Terrorism and Political Aggression The Changing Face of Terrorism and Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 57

Political Violence in the 21st Century: Terrorism 880-94; A Seidl and others, The Virtual Community of Hatred’ (2015) ‘Optimal Control of a Terror Queue’ (2016) 65 International Journal of Group 248(1) European Journal of Operational Psychotherapy 242-71; B Moreng, ‘ISIS Research 246-56; J Hartley and A Cherney, Virtual Puppeteers: How They Recruit ‘Forming Partnerships to Tackle Terrorism and Train Lone Wolves’ Foreign Affairs and Violent Extremism: Insights and (21 September 2016) ; J De Roy van Mullins, ‘Counter-: Zuijdewijn and B Edwin, ‘Analysing Practitioner Perspectives’ (2016) 11 (1) Personal Characteristics of Lone-Actor Journal of Policing, Intelli gence and Counter Terrorists: Research Findings and Terrorism 93-111; S Harris-Hogan, K Recommendations’ (2016) 10(2) Barrelle and A Zammit, ‘What is Countering Perspectives on Terrorism 42–49; C Ellis, Violent Extremism? Exploring CVE Policy ‘With a Little Help from My Friends: An and Practice in Australia’ (2016) 8 (1) Exploration of the Tactical Use of Single- Behavioral Sciences of Terrorism and Actor Terrorism by the Islamic State’ Political Aggression 6-24; K Buggy, Under (2016) 10(6) Perspectives on Terrorism the Radar: How might Australia Enhance its 41-47; P Joosse, ‘Leaderless Resistance Policies to Prevent ‘lone wolf’ and ‘fixated and the Loneliness of Lone Wolves: person’ Violent Attacks? (Centre for Defence Exploring the Rhetorical Dynamics of and Strategic Studies Commonwealth of Lone Actor Violence’ (2017) 29(1) Australia March 2016) http://www.defence. Terrorism and Political Violence 52-78. gov.au/ADC/Publica tions/IndoPac/Buggy_ 171. R Pantucci, A Typology of Lone Wolves: IPSP_Final.pdf. Preliminary Analysis of Lone Islamist 177. BL Smith, KR Damphousse and P Terrorists (International Centre for the Roberts, Pre-incident Indicators of Study of Radicalisation and Political Terrorist Incidents: The Identification of Violence, London 2011). Behavioral, Geographic and Temporal 172. Pantucci (n 171) 20. Patterns of Preparatory Conduct 173. R Pape and others, ‘The American Face (Arkansas University Fayetteville, of ISIS: Analysis of ISIS-Related Terrorism Research Centre Fulbright Terrorism in the US March 2014-August College 2006) Threats among Islamist Militants in Britain and 174. M Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Spain’ (2010) 33(10) Studies in Conflict Networks in the Twenty-First Century and Terror 911-32. (University of Pennsylvania Press, 179. MS Hamm, Terrorism as Crime:from Philadelphia 2008) 109; see also A Oklahoma City to al-Qaeda and Beyond Stenersen, ‘The Internet: A Virtual (New York University Press, New York, Training Camp?’ (2008) 20(2) Terrorism NY/London, UK 2007). and Political Violence 215-33; M 180. JR Meloy and ME O’Toole, ‘The Concept Sageman, ‘The Stagnation in Terrorism of Leakage in Threat Assessment’ (2011) Research’ (2014) 26 Terrorism and 29(4) Behavioral Sciences and the Law Political Violence 565-80. 513-27; JR Meloy, A Guldimann and D 175. J Brachman, Global Jihadism: Theory and James, ‘The Role of Warning Behaviors Practise (Routledge, New York 2008). in Threat Assessment: An Exploration and 176. K Strom and others, Building on Clues: Suggested Typology’ (2012) 30 Examining Successes and Failures in Behavioral Sciences and the Law 256-79; Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009 B Schuurman and Q Eijkman, ‘Indicators (Institute for Homeland Security Solutions, of terrorist intent and capability: Tools for Durham, NC 2010) ;see also EH Kaplan, ‘Estimating the 181. B Schuurman and others, ‘Lone Actor Duration of Jihadi Terror Plots in the United Terrorist Attack Planning and Preparation: States’ (2012) 35 Studies in Conflict and A Data-Driven Analysis’ (2017) Journal 58 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

of Forensic Sciences callman-haron-monis-a-terrorist-it-only- 182. See also B Bennet, ‘The Terrorist’s helpsisis; W Aly, ‘Sydney Gunman Man Preparation for an Attack’ in Haron Monis a Real Sheikh Only to Understanding, Assessing, and Himself’ Sydney Morning Herald (17 Responding to Terrorism: Protecting December 2014) https://www.smh.com.au/ Critical Infrastructure and Personnel (2nd opinion/sydneygunman-man-haron-monis- edn, 2017) 128h9x.html; B Kampmark, ‘Releasing 183. MS Hamm and R Spaaij, The Age of the “Terror Genie”: Man Haron Monis Lone Wolf Terrorism (Columbia and the “Sydney Siege”’ (2017) 37 (4) University Press, New York 2017) 153. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 184. Hamm and Spaaij (n 183) 155; See also E 496-510. Orehek and others, ‘Fully Committed: 194. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 235 Suicide Bombers Motivation and the para 26. Quest for Personal Significance’ (2009) 195. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 235 30 (3) Political Psychology 331-57. para 30. 185. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 239 196. J Warrick, Black Flags: The Rise of ISIS para 82. (Doubleday, New York 2015) 127. 186. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 239 197. The provocation would ‘show the Sunnis para 83. their [Shi’ites] rabies and bare the teeth of 187. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 17 their hidden rancor’ quoted in M Weiss para 71, 240 para 88. and H Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of 188. A Heber, ‘There Will be an Investigation Terror (Regan Arts, 2015) 29; In a letter Into How “Damaged Goods” Gunman, to al-Qaeda leaders in 2004, al-Zarqawi Man Haron Monis, Remained on the wrote: ‘If we succeed in dragging them Streets’ BBC World News (16 December [Shi’a] into the arena of sectarian war, it 2014) < http://www.bbc.com/news/world-aus will become possible to awaken the tralia-30484419> inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent 189. R Kerbaj, ‘Sheik “Faked” to Stir up Ill- danger and annihilating death at the hands Feeling’ Week-end Australian (28 of these Sabeans [descendants of the December 2007) the US Department of State Dabiq, issue 13, 41-42; See also Dangerous’ Sydney Morning Herald (16 ‘The Rafidah: From Ibn Saba’ to the December 2014) until no Rafidahi walks on the face of the 191. R Kohn, ‘Radical Muslim Cleric Goes earth’. Cited in R Manne, The Mind of the Unchecked’ ABC News (16 December Islamic State (Redback, Schwartz 2014)

Baghdad)’ (2012) 37 (1) Alternatives: Syria in 5 Months’ (31 December 2014) Global, Local, Political 30-51; G Abdo, ; the New Sectarianism: The Arab See also NG Bowie, ‘Terrorism Events Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi’a- Data: An Inventory of Databases and Data Sunni Divide Brookings Institute Sets, 1968-2017’ (2017) 11(4) Washington DC (April 2013) https:// Perspectives on Terrorism 50-72. www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/ 203. D Milton, ‘Pledging Bay’a: A Benefit or 2016/06/sunni-shia-abdo.pdf. Burden to the Islamic State?’ (2015) 8(3) 198. J Turner, ‘Strategic Differences: Al Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel 4-7. Qaeda’s Split with the Islamic State of 204. J Wagemakers, ‘The Concept of Bay’ain Iraq and al-Sham’ (2015) 26(2) Small the Islamic State Ideology’ (2015) 9(4) Wars and Insurgencies 208-25; The Perspectives in Terrorism 98-106. February 2006 bombing in the Iraqi city 205. S Ackerman, ‘Omar Mateen Described of Samarra of the al-Askari Mosque, one Himself as “Islamic Soldier” in 911 Calls of the holiest sites in Shi’a Islam, was to Police’ The Guardian (21 June 2016) followed by retaliatory violence which left ;Subsequently, ’ to Iraqi Rioting New York Times (25 Dabiq (issue 15, 43) announced ‘On the 7th < February 2006) http://www.nytimes. of Ramadan our brother Omar Mateen, one com/2006/02/25/world/middleeast/muslim- of the soldiers of the caliphate in America clerics-call-for-an-end-to-iraqi-rioting. > carried out an attack on a nightclub for html ; In September 2017, Islamic State sodomites in the city of Orlando, Florida. gunmen and suicide bombers killed more He succeeded in massacring the filthy than 80 people in Nasiriyah, south of Crusaders, killing more than 100 of them Baghdad. Most of the victims were before he was killed’. See also S Scott, pilgrims traveling north to the Shi’a ‘The Enduring Influence of Anwar al- shrines in Karbala and Najaf. In Awlaki in the Age of the Islamic State’ November 2017, the bodies of thousands (2016) 9(7) Combating Terrorism Centre of civilians executed by Islamic State were found in mass graves in Syria and Sentinel 1-8. ‘ 206. Prucha (n 157). Iraq: L Hinnant, Survivors Give ‘ “ Evidence as Mass Graves Discovered in 207. A Sims, ISIS Posts Video Showing Two ’ Normandy Attackers Pledging Allegiance” Syria and Iraq BBC News (31 August < 2016) < http://www.bbc.com/news/av/world- The Independent (27 July 2016) https:// 37235823/survivors-give-evidence-as-mass- www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ graves-discovered-in-syria-and-iraq> isis-posts-video-showing-two-normandy- > 199. Abu Muhammed al-Adnani, ‘I Exhort attackers-pledging-allegiance-a7158961.html ‘ You to One Thing Only’ Al-Furqan 208. See L Vidino and S Hughes, San Media Foundation (May 2012) a Confession in Real Time on Facebook 200. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, ‘Remaining in Live’ Washington Post (14 June 2016) Iraq and the Levant’ Al-Furqan Media ; see also R 201. J Muir, ‘Iraq Crisis: Islamic State Gunaratna, ‘Global Terrorism Mid-year Accused of Ethnic Cleansing’ BBC News Review’ (2016) 8(/) Counter Terrorist (2 September 2014) < http://www.bbc. Trends and Analyses 3-8. com/news/world-middle-east-29026491> 210. Mahzam (n 160). 202. Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, 211. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 239 ‘ISIS Executes Nearly 1,500 People in para 85. 60 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

212. A Fisher, ‘Swarmcast: How Jihadist Net 10(5) Perspectives on Terrorism 51-67; O works Maintain a Persistent Online Roy, Jihad and Death: The Global Presence’ (2015) 9(3) Perspectives on Appeal of the Islamic State (Hurst, Terrorism 3-20; Hoffman and Schweitzer London 2017); R Basra and PR Neumann, (n 157); M Weiss and H Hassan, ISIS: ‘Crime as Jihad: Developments in the Inside the Army of Terror (Phaidon Press, Crime-Terror Nexus in Europe’ (2017) London 2016); Prucha (n 157); Ingram, 10(9) Combating Terrorism Center ‘An Analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq Sentinel 1-5; V Ljujic, JW van Prooijen Magazine’ (n 160); B Colas, ‘What does and F Weerman, ‘Beyond the Crime- Dabiq Do? ISIS Hermeneutics and Terror Nexus: Socio-economic Status, Organizational Fractures within Dabiq Violent Crimes and Terrorism’ (2017) Magazine’ (2016) 40(3) Studies in 3(3) Journal of Criminological Research, Conflict and Terrorism 173-90; L Policy and Practice 158-72. Bertram, ‘Terrorism, the Internet and the 216. RR Corrado, ‘A Critique of the Mental Social Media Advantage: Exploring How Disorder Perspective of Political Terrorist Organizations Exploit Aspects of Terrorism’ (1981) 4 International Journal the Internet Social Media and How these of Law and Psychiatry 293-309; A Silke, Same Platforms Could be Used to ‘Cheshire-Cat Logic: The Recurring Counter-Violent Extremism’ (2016) 7 Theme of Terrorist Abnormality in Journal for Deradicalization 225-52; NF Psychological Research’ (1998) 4 Johnson and others, ‘New Online Ecology Psychology, Crime and Law 51; A Silke, of Adversarial Aggregates: ISIS and ‘The Devil You Know: Continuing Beyond’ (2016) 352 Science 1459-63; A Problems with Research on Terrorism’ Shehabat, T Mitew and Y Alzoubi, (2001) 13 Terrorism and Political ‘Encrypted Jihad: Investigating the Role Violence 1-14; D Weatherston and J of Telegram App in Lone Wolf Attacks in Moran, ‘Terrorism and Mental Illness: Is the West ’ (2017) 10(3) Journal of there a Relationship?’(2003) 47(6) Strategic Security 27-53; Meleagrou- International Journal of Offender Therapy Hitchens and Hughes (n 125); R Pelzer, and Comparative Criminology 698-713; L ‘Policing of Terrorism Using Data from Miller, ‘The Terrorist Mind: I. A Social Media’ (2018) European Journal Psychological and Political Analysis’ for Security Research 1-17 Offender Therapy and Comparative 213. MM Hafez, ‘The Alchemy of Martyrdom: Criminology 121-38; FJ Stoddard and Jihadi Salafism and Debates over Suicide others, ‘Psychiatry and Terrorism’ (2011) Bombings in the Muslim World’ (2010) 199 Journal of Nervous and Mental 38 Asian Journal of Social Science 364- Disease 537-43; SJ Baele, ‘Are Terrorists 78; M M Hafez, ‘Martyrdom Mythology “Insane”? A Critical Analysis of Mental in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Health Categories in Lone Terrorists’ Terrorism in Videos and Biographies’ in J Trials’ (2014) 7 (2) Critical Studies on Horgan and K Braddock, eds., Terrorism: Terrorism 257-76; P Gill and others, A Reader (Routledge, New York 2012); ‘Indicators of Lone Actor Violent Events: SP Perry and JM Long, ‘Why Would The Problems of Low Base Rates and Anyone Sell Paradise?’: The Islamic State Long Observational Periods’ (2016) 3(4) in Iraq and the Making of a Martyr’ Journal of Threat Assessment 165-73; SL (2016) Southern Communication Journal, Desmarais and others, ‘The State of DOI: 10.1080/1041794X.2015.1083047. Scientific Knowledge Regarding Factors 214. Burke (n 160). Associated with Terrorism’ (2017) 4(4) 215. RM Pearlstein, The Mind of the Political Journal of Threat Assessment ISO- 209; P Terrorist (Scholarly Resources, Gill and E Corner, ‘There and Back Wilmington 1991); WHR Martens, ‘The Again: The Study of Mental Disorder and Terrorist with Antisocial Personality Terrorist Involvement’ (2017) 72 (3) Disorder’ (2004) 4(1) Journal of Forensic American Psychologist 231-41. Psychology Practice 45-56; see also M 217. L Lankford, ‘A Psychological Autopsy of Gallagher, ‘“Criminalised” Islamic State 9/11 Ringleader Mohamed Atta’ (2012) Veterans - A Future Major Threat in 27(2) Journal of Police and Criminal Organised Crime Development?’ (2016) Psychology 150-59; A Lankford, ‘A Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 61

Psychological Reexamination of Mental Nexus between Terrorist Involvement and Health Problems among the 9/11 Mental Health in the Age of the Islamic Terrorists’ (2017) Studies in Conflict and State?’ (2017) 10(1) Combating Terrorism Terrorism others (n 129). 218. A Howell, ‘Victims or Madmen? The 221. K Bhui, A James and S Wessely, ‘Mental Diagnostic Competition Over “Terrorist” Illness and Terrorism’ (2016) British Detainees at Guantanamo Bay’ (2007) 1 Medical Journal 354 i4869 doi International Political Sociology 29-47; 10.1136/bmj.i4869 See also J Horgan, The Psychology of 222. R Borum, ‘Informing Lone-Offender Terrorism (2nd edn, Routlege, Oxon, Investigations’ (2013) 12 Criminology & England 2014). Public Policy 103-12; P Gill, J Horgan 219. E Salib, ‘Suicide Terrorism’ (2003) 1S2 and P Deckert, ‘Bombing Alone: Tracing British Journal of Psychiatry 475-76; I the Motivations and Antecedent Behaviors Orbach, ‘Terror Suicide’ (2004) S of Lone Actor Terrorists’ (2014) 59(2) Archives of Suicide Research 115-30; D Journal of Forensic Sciences 425-35; E Lester, B Yang and M Lindsay, ‘Suicide Corner and P Gill, ‘A False Dichotomy? Bombers: Are Psychological Profiles Mental Illness and Lone-Actor Terrorism’ Possible?’ (2004) 27 Studies in Conflict (2015) 39(1) Law and Human Behavior and Terrorism 2S3-95; D Lester, ‘Suicidal 23-34. Protests: SelfImmolation, Hunger Strikes, 223. R Olding, ‘Khaled Sharrouf Mental or Suicide Bombing’ (2014) 37(4) Health Problems Left Untreated in Prison’ Behavioral and Brain Sciences 372 doi Sydney Morning Herald (14 August 2014) 10.1017/S0140525X13003439; see also E Threatening Behavior 35-49; LA 224. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 69 O’Rourke, ‘What’s Special about Female para 159. Suicide Terrorism?’ (2009) 18(4) Security 225. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 71 Studies 6S1; JM Post and others, ‘The para 175, 218 para 72. Psychology of Suicide Terrorism’ (2009) 226. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 71 72(1) Psychiatry 13-31; A Lankford, ‘Do para 179. Suicide Terrorists Exhibit Clinically 227. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 71 Suicidal Risk Factors? A Review of Initial para 178. Evidence and Call for Future Research’ 228. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 72 (2010) 15(5) Aggression and Violent para 185. Behavior 1359- 7S9. J Victoroff, JR 229. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 66 Adelman and M Matthews, ‘Psychological para 123. Factors Associated with Support for 230. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 236 Suicide Bombing in the Muslim Diaspora’ para 46. (2012) 33 Political Psychology 791-809. 231. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 237 220. K Bhui, N Warfa and E Jones, ‘Is Violent para 56. Radicalisation Associated with Poverty, 232. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 129 Migration, Poor Self-Reported Health and para 37. Common Mental Disorders?’ (2014) PLoS 233. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 239 ONE 9(3) e90718. doi10.1371/journal. para 86. pone.0090718; E Corner, P Gill and O 234. P Nesser, A Stenersen and E Oftedal, Mason, ‘Mental Health Disorders and the ‘Jihadi Terrorism in Europe: The IS- Terrorist: A Research Note Probing Effect’ (2016) 10(6) Perspectives on Selection Effects and Disorder Terrorism 3-24. Prevalence’ (2016) 39(6) Studies in 235. E Miller, ‘Patterns of Islamic State- Conflict and Terrorism 560-68; S Knight, Related Terrorism, 2002-2015’ National K Woodward and GLJ Lancaster, ‘Violent Consortium for the Study of Terrorism Versus Nonviolent Actors: An Empirical and Responses to Terrorism (START) Study of Different Types of Extremism’ August 2016 62 R. Scott and R. Shanahan

236. G Woo, ‘Understanding the Principles of Threat from Terrorism: A Critique of the Terrorism Risk Modelling from Charlie ‘Clash of Civilisations’ in the New World Hebdo Attack in Paris’ (2015) 7(1) Order (Hart Publishing Ltd 2005); J Defence Against Terrorism Review 31-44. Esposito, ‘Terrorism and the Rise of 237. See also Abrahms, Ward and Kennedy Political Islam’ in Louise Richardson (ed), (n 124). The Roots of Terrorism (Routledge 2006); 238. E Miller, ‘Mass-Fatality, Coordinated M Khadduri, War and Peace in the Law Attacks Worldwide, and Terrorism in of Islam (Lawbook Exchange 2006); P France’ National Consortium for the Ahmed, ‘Terror in the Name of Islam - Study of Terrorism and Responses to Unholy War, Not Jihad’ (2008) 39(3) Terrorism (START) November 2015 Case Western Reserve Journal of ; Ed Bakker and L van der of Terror’ (2009) 4 Yale J Intl Aff 59; M Heide, ‘Mumbai- Style Attacks in Paris’ The Muthuswamy, ‘Shari’a as a Platform for International Centre for Counter-Terrorism - Espousing Violence and as a Cause for The Hague (ICCT) November 2015 Waging Armed Jihad’ (2014) 7 Albany ‘Dabiq: IS’s Apocalyptic 21st Century 239. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 236 Jihadist Manifesto’ (2014) 2 Journal of para 41. Political Sciences & Public Affairs 1-4; 240. M Bahari and M Hassan, ‘The Black Flag AN Celso, ‘The “Caliphate” in the Digital Myth: An Analysis from Hadith Studies’ Age: The Islamic State’s Challenge to the (2014) 21(4) Middle East Policy 69-83. Global Liberal Order’ (2015) 10 241. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 238 International Journal of Interdisciplinary para 85. Global Studies 1-26. 242. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 238 247. I Taymiyya, The Religious and Moral para 86. Doctrine ofJihad (Maktabah al Ansaar, 243. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 238 Birmingham, England 2001); M Bonner, para 88. Jihad in Islamic History: Doctrines and 244. PJ Phillips, ‘The Lone Wolf Terrorist: Practice (Princeton University Press, Sprees of Violence’ (2012) 18(3) Peace Princeton, New Jersey 2008); J Stern and Economics, Peace Science and Public JM Berger, ISIS: Inside the Army of Policy 111; M Pitcavage, ‘Cerberus Terror (HarperCollins, New York 2015); Unleashed: The Three Faces of the Lone C Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: Wolf Terrorist’ (2015)59(13) American The Ideology of the Islamic State Behavioral Scientist 1655-80; BJ Phillips, (Brookings Institution, Washington, ‘Deadlier in the U.S.? On Lone Wolves, DC 2015). Terrorist Groups and Attack Lethality’ 248. R Shanahan, ‘Sectarian Violence: The (2017) 29(3) Terrorism and Political Threat to Australia’ (Crawford School of Violence 533-49. Public Policy, National Security College, 245. AY Zelon, Rumiyah (9th edition) New Australian National University. release of The Islamic State’s magazine Occasional Paper 7 July 2014) Death’ (2010) 155(2) Royal United 246. A Silverman, ‘Just War, Jihad and Services Institute Journal 60-68; A Terrorism: A Comparison of Western and Dolnik, ‘From Sydney to Paris: The Islamic Norms for the Use of Political Return of the Terrorist Barricade Hostage Violence’ (2002) 44 Journal of Church Incidents?’ (2015) 8(1) Combating and State; see also N Cox and H Terrorism Center Sentinel 5-8. O’Farrell, ‘Terrorism, Shari’a and the 250. NSW Coroner Inquest Findings (n 2) 425 Isolating of Islam’ (2016) 90 (4) para 26: over 1200 witness statements, Australian Law Journal 255-74; See also 200 hours of media footage, canvassing D Cook, Understanding Jihad (U Cal 14,690 individuals including through Press 2005); J Rehman, Islamic State ‘doorknocking’, 1000 hours of CCTV Practices, International Law and the footage, 172 phone calls to ‘triple zero’, Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 63

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