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Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack

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Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack Psychiatry, Psychology and Law ISSN: 1321-8719 (Print) 1934-1687 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tppl20 Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack Russ Scott & Rodger Shanahan To cite this article: Russ Scott & Rodger Shanahan (2018): Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack, Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, DOI: 10.1080/13218719.2018.1479941 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2018.1479941 Published online: 05 Sep 2018. Submit your article to this journal Article views: 67 View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=tppl20 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law, 2018 Vol. 0, No. 0, 1–63, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13218719.2018.1479941 Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege – Not a Terrorist Attack Russ Scotta and Rodger Shanahanb aForensic Psychiatrist, The Park – Centre for Mental Health, Wacol, Brisbane, Australia; bResearch Fellow, Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia On 15 December 2014, nearly 20 years after he arrived in Australia from Iran, Man Haron Monis took 18 people hostage in the Lindt Caf'e in Sydney and announced that Australia was ‘under attack by the Islamic State’. After a 16-hour siege, during which negotiators had no direct communication with him, Monis shot dead one of his hostages, precipitating the police ‘emergency action’ which broke the siege. Although Monis had been a prolific user of the Internet and social media, the subsequent Coroner’s inquest found that Monis made little sophisticated preparation for the siege and did not announce his intention nor did he leave any clear terrorist-inspired message or martyrdom video. Other than demanding a debate with the Prime Minister on radio and have the Islamic State flag delivered to the caf'e, Monis made no specific terrorist demands. At the time of the siege, Monis was also on bail, charged with multiple sex offences against women, alleged to have been committed whilst he held himself out as a ‘spiritual healer’. Monis was also charged with being an accessory to the murder of his former partner and had recently failed to obtain custody of his two Australian born children. His professed status as a Shi’a Muslim cleric was fraudulent, and forensic examination of his use of the Internet and social media found no evidence that Monis ever had any contact with Islamic State or any other terrorist organisation and that on the day before the siege, he had only 12 followers on Twitter. The evidence does not support the conclusion that Monis suddenly ‘radicalised’ and committed an act of terrorism. Instead, the evidence shows that Monis was a malignant narcissist whose behaviour can better be formulated as lone-actor grievance-fuelled violence. KEY WORDS: Man Haron Monis; Sydney Lindt Caf'e siege; terrorist; Coroner; Islamic State. Introduction the decisions of government agencies in respect Within 24 hours of the end of the Lindt Caf'e of Monis. On 22 February 2015, the findings of siege in Martin Place, Sydney, Man Haron the Review were published.1 Monis was variously labelled ‘deranged’,a Despite Monis’ long history of provocative ‘lone-wolf extremist’ or a radicalised domestic and attention-seeking behaviour and false claims, terrorist. On 17 December 2014, the the Review found no evidence that the Department of the Prime Minister and the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation Premier of New South Wales announced the (ASIO), the Australian Federal Police (AFP) or terms of reference for a Joint the New South Wales Police Force had been Commonwealth–New South Wales Review of complacent about Monis and that security Correspondence: Dr Russ Scott, Forensic Psychiatrist, The Park - Centre for Mental Health, Wacol, Brisbane, Australia. Email: [email protected] © 2018 The Australian and New Zealand Association of Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 2 R. Scott and R. Shanahan and law enforcement agencies assessed new downwards’,Monis’ personal considerations information as it became available and in accord- were separate from his ‘increasing religious ance with extant policies and procedures. The extremism’ which the Coroner found was a Review found that right up to the siege, and not- ‘more significant motivator for his actions’.5 withstanding their familiarity with Monis, ASIO As well as reviewing the findings of both and law enforcement agencies never found any the Joint Commonwealth–New South Wales information to indicate Monis had formed the Review and the NSW Coroner’s inquest, this intent to commit a terrorist act. While his lan- paper considers the proceedings in the murder guage and sentiments were offensive, they were trial of Monis’ partner, Anastasia Droudis, and not exceptional, either in terms of his previous considerable open source material. The paper conduct or other material which was readily compares closely the actions of Monis with available on social media and elsewhere. The those of recognised Islamist terroristists. The Review found that when Monis was assessed authors question the assumptions made by the by ASIO in early December 2014, on the basis Coroner and refute the conclusion that Monis of the information available at the time, he was a self-radicalised domestic terrorist. fell well outside the threshold to be included in the highest priority counter-terrorism Chronology investigations. – On 14 January 2015, the New South 1964 1995 Wales Coroner’s Court announced the terms On 19 May 1964, Monis was born of reference for an inquest, and on 29 January Mohammed Manteghi in the Iranian city of 2015, the inquest began hearing evidence. Borujerd, south west of Tehran. After complet- Controversially, on 5 June 2015, the Coroner ing secondary school, he was admitted to decided that the inquest would consider the Imam Sadegh University in Tehran. In May circumstances of Monis being on bail at the 1984, Monis married Zahara Mobasheri, time of the siege, despite facing charges relat- whose father was general secretary and deputy ing to the murder of his ex-wife and numerous to the founder of Imam Sadegh University. In sex offences. On 17 August 2016, after 123 1986, Monis and his wife had the first of two witnesses testified over 109 days, the inquest daughters and lived in a large, luxurious apart- ’ finished hearing evidence. ment close to the university of Monis father- On 24 May 2017, the NSW Coroner’s in-law. In December 1990, Monis graduated Findings and Recommendations were pub- with a Masters degree in Islamic Culture and lished.2 The Coroner concluded that between political science. The inquest heard evidence August 2008 and November 2014, threat which suggested that after university, Monis assessments conducted by ASIO were attended a divinity college called the Abdol ‘adequate and appropriate’3 and that the man- Azim College of Hadith Sciences and in agement of the National Security Hotline March 1994 was awarded hujatolislam which ‘ reports on Monis’ Facebook page referred to is an honorific title meaning authority on ’ ASIO between 9–12 December 2014 were Islam . In 1995, Monis published a collection also ‘adequate and appropriate’.4 of Persian poems entitled Daroon and Boroon ‘ ’ ’ Emphasising that Monis did not have a ( Inside and Outside ). In 1995, Monis second mental illness, the Coroner concluded that by daughter was born. the time of the siege, Monis had become radi- calised and that whilst he had many charges 1996 pending against him which were likely to In April 1996, Monis became the manager of attract a long prison sentence and that he may the travel agency Rahelenoor Tours and have felt that his life was ‘spiralling Travel which assisted families emigrating Man Haron Monis and the Sydney Lindt Caf'e Siege 3 from Iran. On 1 October 1996, from Iran, number of claims including that as well as Monis applied for a one-month short-stay being a Shi’a cleric, he had been engaged in Business visa to Australia. On his visa gathering intelligence for foreign governments application, Monis falsely described himself as through his high-level political and religious a ‘legal consultant’ to an Iranian engineering contacts in Iran. Monis implausibly claimed company and stated that the purpose of his that having also worked for the Iranian visit was to meet with representatives of BHP Ministry of Intelligence and Security, he had Billiton. On 10 October 1996, ASIO assessed witnessed torture and had knowledge of highly the application and issued a non-prejudicial sensitive information about the involvement of assessment, and the Immigration Department Iran in the bombing of the Khobar Towers granted the Business visa. building in Saudi Arabia on 25 June 1996, On 26 October 1996, without telling his whichkilled19UnitedStatessoldiers.8 Even wife or employer, Monis flew out of Tehran. though Monis professed to be a Shi’acleric, On 28 October 1996, after transiting through he also perversely claimed that he had been Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, Monis arrived at victimised for his association with the minority Sydney International Airport. Monis’ former Ahmadi sect, a persecuted stream of Sunni wife later reported that she married Monis Islam.9 Monis insisted that if he returned to shortly after leaving school and that Monis for- Iran, he would be summarily executed. He fur- bade her continuing her education at university ther claimed that he was afraid that if the 6 and was very secretive about his work. She Iranian Government found out he was in described Monis as a ‘cruel’ and violent hus- Australia, he would be targeted for band and added that he was not a devout assassination. Muslim. She also debunked Monis’ later On 30 April 1997, Amnesty International claims that she and her two daughters had wrote to the Immigration Department support- been detained by the Government of Iran.
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