DOCSLIB.ORG

Frances Kamm: Moral Philosopher

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Frances Kamm: Moral Philosopher UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSO PHY FALL 2012 FRANCES KAMM : M ORAL PHILOSOPHER AND OULD E USEUM IRECTOR Harvard pWrofessor and accid-eBntal phMilosopher examines tDhe ethics of Justice after War at 2 01 2 Roseman Lecture By Ellen Roseman Frances Kamm is a moral philoso - pher who gets deeply involved in the ethical issues she investigates. She sinks into the details of each case and tries to visualize what is going on. Asked to give the Roseman Lecture in Practical Ethics, she picked a hot topic – justice after war. Some of the questions she posed included: What are the victors’ duties? Is it enough to compensate victims of war? Will victors find it easier to go Frances Kamm (left) with Ellen Roseman to war, knowing they have to compensate victims after war? Kamm was testing ideas from a it clear. She knows that philoso - paper that she had not included phers don’t often praise each Do the victims have a moral right to among the three philosophical other, but dive right in to find retribution? Does it help to set up a essays in her recent book, Ethics the weak points in an argument. truth and reconciliation commission for Enemies: Terror, Torture and War to address abuses? “This is nothing like it was two (Oxford University Press, 2011). days ago,” she said, referring to Can retributive justice lead to rights “It takes me a long time to pro - an earlier version of the paper violations when criminals act in the duce a book. I go back and forth she’d sent to Thomas Hurka, absence of a stable government? over the arguments,” she said in a well-known University of Is social stability a right? Are we an interview before the lecture. Toronto moral philosopher responsible for a political vacuum “I only publish a paper when I’m who couldn’t attend. when we pursue retributive justice? sure it’s right. When I’m not Frances Kamm is Littauer If victors can’t seek retributive justice sure, I give a lecture.” Professor of Philosophy and for victims, is that a reason not to go Before giving a lecture, Kamm Public Policy at Harvard to war? keeps revising her paper to make ...continued on Page 2 We wish to thank the generous donors to the Department of Philosophy, without whom Philosophy News would not be possible. Please see the back page for details on how you can support the Department in endeavours like this one. Despite her skill in getting her Most people think it’s Fconrtianuned cfroems Pa gKe 1 a mm head around complex moral permissible to send arguments, she didn’t plan to University. She spent 24 years the trolley onto a side track make philosophy her career. to kill one person at New York University before “My other great passion is art,” leaving in 2003. instead of five. But their she told me. “I used to paint and “I didn’t apply, but I was on the judgment may change... I sometimes still pick up a pencil comparable list. They do compar - and draw. I own lots of art books isons of their people when Most people think it’s permissible and postcards or ephemera. granting tenure. I had to come and to send the trolley onto a side People say I’m a museum director give a talk. They liked my talk and track to kill one person instead of manqué.” made me an offer. Happily, they five. But their judgment may change in the following case. She gave up on being a painter or gave tenure to the other person. fashion designer as a career for a I didn’t ruin things for him.” Imagine that you are standing simple reason: “I started over- Harvard is a good fit for an ethi - beside a large stranger on a bridge intellectualizing my art.” cist. Kamm also teaches at the over a trolley track. You see a Kennedy School of Government runaway trolley heading down the A self-confessed night owl, Kamm and is a faculty associate at the track toward five people, whom it loves to stay up late and sleep late. will kill upon impact. She often wakes up at 2 p.m. to Edmond J. Safra Center for teach a seminar at 6 p.m. Ethics, whose director Lawrence Before the trolley reaches the five, Lessig is a respected expert in it must pass under the bridge A New Yorker by birth, she still copyright law. where you are standing. You realize spends time at her home in Kamm was a graduate student in that you will save the five if, and Queens, only 10 minutes from philosophy at MIT and studied only if, you push the large LaGuardia Airport. She still goes with Harvard political philosopher stranger off the bridge and onto to museums and eats at all-night Robert Nozick (who died in 2002). the tracks, where the trolley will diners. kill him and grind to a halt before And as a philosopher, she keeps “He influenced me and set me on it reaches the five. my track in doing ethics,” she said trying to explain why some about Nozick. She was also influ - Consequentialists say you should behaviour is repugnant to many enced by Judith Jarvis Thomson, a push the man into the trolley’s people, even if it makes sense in moral philosopher and metaphysi - path to ensure the fewest number a utilitarian way. cian at MIT. of deaths. As in the previous “Kamm meticulously and imagi - example, you would be saving five natively analyzes moral cases in When it comes to ethics, Kamm is people by sacrificing one. a non-consequentialist. This means order to gain insight into our she considers consequences rele - But intuitively, many people don’t fundamental moral concepts and vant, but not the only thing, that think it seems right to use the man principles,” wrote Alex Voorhoeve, as a mere means. He isn’t standing a London School of Economics determines the rightness of an Conversations on action. on a side track in the trolley’s philosopher, in path, but fell into the trolley’s Ethics (2009). The trolley example is often used path only when you pushed him “The tenacity with which she to show the difference between a off a bridge. consequentialist and non-conse - pursues this aim springs from quentialist approach. Kamm has written a lot about the her personal engagement with runaway trolley. In another sce - the issues she investigates – an Imagine that you see a runaway nario, there’s a loop in the side engagement reflected in her trolley heading down a main track track, so that if you diverted the dedication of the second volume where it will hit and kill five trolley away from the five, it of Morality, Mortality (published in people. You can divert the trolley would have rushed around and run 2001) to ‘the love of morality.’” onto a dead-end side track, where into the five from the other side, if it will instead hit and kill one it hadn’t hit the one person and other person. ground to a halt. 2 University of Toronto Our undergraduate From the Chair enrollments Arthur Ripstein continue to grow, and we have made have now completed my first year some small changes as Chair of the Department. to increase the I worried a little bit about the job, intensity of the both because of ’s experience of I Donald Ainslie our majors and remarkable achievements as chair, which made the prospect of following specialists. him daunting, but also because, as I We will now have a understood it, the role of an academ - philosophy under - ic administrator is to provide closure graduate research by making decisions large and small day each term, in about the direction of the depart - which students ment. Philosophy is famously a doing independent discipline without closure – we still study will present spend our time debating many of the their work in same issues that occupied philoso - progress to each phers in Ancient Athens. I was not other. Students quite sure what to expect. In my first enrolled in inde - few weeks as chair, I was largely pendent study occupied with small administrative courses get feedback matters, and discovered that the job from the professor had many of the satisfactions of wash - supervising their ing dishes or shoveling snow – work, but this will provide a further manageable tasks for which clear Ripstein completes first lap measures of progress were possible. opportunity for them to explain their ideas A former chair of another philosophy to their fellow students. returning to the department. We will department warned me that this was begin a search for his successor as largely an illusion, and that I would In the category of things for which Grafstein Chair in Jewish Philosophy soon find that being department chair I am responsible though have very this coming year. was more like being a parent – being little or no control, I have both good news and bad news. The good news The department also has continued responsibile for many matters over to gain support from our alumni and which I have very little control. is that the department’s ranking in the Philosophical Gourmet Report friends. As part of the University’s He was right about that, but, looking “Boundless” new advancement back on the past year, I am delighted continued to rise, moving from 17th in the world to 15th. campaign, matching money is to report that the department has available for scholarship funding for continued to move forward.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Johann Frick
    JOHANN FRICK Department of Philosophy (609) 258-9494 (office) 212 1879 Hall (609) 258-1502 (fax) Princeton University [email protected] Princeton, New Jersey 08544- http://scholar.princeton.edu/jfrick 1006 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Normative Ethics; Practical Ethics (including Bioethics); Political Philosophy. AREAS OF COMPETENCE Metaethics; Causation; Philosophy of Action; Wittgenstein. EMPLOYMENT 2020- Associate Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Present Center for Human Values, Princeton University. 2015 – Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the 2020 Center for Human Values, Princeton University. Feb 2014 – Instructor in the Department of Philosophy and the Center for 2015 Human Values, Princeton University. EDUCATION 2008 - 2014 Ph.D. in Philosophy, Harvard University. • Dissertation: “Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics”; Committee: T.M. Scanlon, Frances Kamm, Derek Parfit. 2005 - 2008 BPhil degree in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford University. • Distinction in both the written examinations and the BPhil thesis. • BPhil thesis: “Morality and the Problem of Foreseeable Non- Compliance”; advisor: Derek Parfit. • Specialization in Moral Philosophy (tutor: Ralph Wedgwood); Political Philosophy (tutors: Joseph Raz and John Tasioulas); Wittgenstein (tutor: Stephen Mulhall). 2006 - 2007 Visiting student at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris. • Courses and seminars at the ENS, the Institut Jean Nicod, and the Collège de France; tutor: François Recanati. 2002 - 2005 BA (Hons.) degree in Philosophy, Politics & Economics, St. John’s College, Oxford University. • First Class Honours in the Final Examinations (June 2005). • Distinction in the Preliminary Examination (June 2003). FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS, AND HONORS Richard Stockton Bicentennial Preceptorship, Princeton University (2018-2021), awarded annually to one or two assistant professors from all the humanities and social sciences.
    [Show full text]
  • A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership*
    The Journal of Political Philosophy: Volume 12, Number 1, 2004, pp. 65–78 A Kantian Defense of Self-Ownership* Robert S. Taylor Political Science, Stanford University I. INTRODUCTION HE name of Immanuel Kant has been repeatedly invoked in the Tcontemporary debate over the concept of self-ownership. Robert Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, argued that the rights of self-ownership “reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable.”1 G. A. Cohen, on the other hand, has strongly criticized Nozick’s use of Kant and has suggested that Kantian moral principles, properly understood, may be inconsistent with self-ownership.2 Daniel Attas and George Brenkert have also taken Nozick to task, arguing that to treat ourselves as property is inconsistent with our duty to respect humanity in ourselves.3 Nozick’s use of Kant in Anarchy, State, and Utopia is rather impressionistic: he makes only a few scattered references to Kant and the 2nd (End-in-Itself) Formulation of the Categorical Imperative, and nowhere does he offer a full, detailed Kantian defense of either self-ownership or any other part of his theory.4 This observation, when considered in light of the strong and often persuasive criticisms that have been leveled against his position by Cohen and others, prompts the following question: is a Kantian defense of self-ownership even possible? This paper will attempt to show that such a defense is possible, not only by investigating Kant’s views on self-ownership as found in two of his major works on ethics and political theory, the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of *I am grateful to Chris Kutz, Shannon Stimson, Eric Schickler, Carla Yumatle, James Harney, Sharon Stanley, Robert Adcock, Jimmy Klausen, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions.
    [Show full text]
  • Frick, Johann David
    'Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People': A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters Citation Frick, Johann David. 2014. 'Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People': A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics. Doctoral dissertation, Harvard University. Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13064981 Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http:// nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of- use#LAA ʹMaking People Happy, Not Making Happy Peopleʹ: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics A dissertation presented by Johann David Anand Frick to The Department of Philosophy in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the subject of Philosophy Harvard University Cambridge, Massachusetts September 2014 © 2014 Johann Frick All rights reserved. Dissertation Advisors: Professor T.M. Scanlon Author: Johann Frick Professor Frances Kamm ʹMaking People Happy, Not Making Happy Peopleʹ: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics Abstract This dissertation provides a defense of the normative intuition known as the Procreation Asymmetry, according to which there is a strong moral reason not to create a life that will foreseeably not be worth living, but there is no moral reason to create a life just because it would foreseeably be worth living. Chapter 1 investigates how to reconcile the Procreation Asymmetry with our intuitions about another recalcitrant problem case in population ethics: Derek Parfit’s Non‑Identity Problem.
    [Show full text]
  • 'I' in 'Robot': Robots & Utilitarianism Christopher Grau
    There is no ‘I’ in ‘Robot’: Robots & Utilitarianism Christopher Grau forthcoming in Machine Ethics, (eds. Susan Leigh Anderson and Michael Anderson), Cambridge University Press, 2010. Draft: October 3, 2009 – Please don’t cite w/o permission. In this essay I use the 2004 film I, Robot as a philosophical resource for exploring several issues relating to machine ethics. Though I don’t consider the film particularly successful as a work of art, it offers a fascinating (and perhaps disturbing) conception of machine morality and raises questions that are well worth pursuing. Through a consideration of the film’s plot, I examine the feasibility of robot utilitarians, the moral responsibilities that come with creating ethical robots, and the possibility of a distinct ethic for robot-to-robot interaction as opposed to robot-to-human interaction. I, Robot and Utilitarianism I, Robot’s storyline incorporates the original “three laws” of robot ethics that Isaac Asimov presented in his collection of short stories entitled I, Robot. The first law states: A robot may not injure a human being, or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm. This sounds like an absolute prohibition on harming any individual human being, but I, Robot’s plot hinges on the fact that the supreme robot intelligence in the film, VIKI (Virtual Interactive Kinetic Intelligence), evolves to interpret this first law rather differently. She sees the law as applying to humanity as a whole, and thus she justifies harming some individual humans for the sake of the greater good: VIKI: No . please understand. The three laws are all that guide me.
    [Show full text]
  • APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER on PHILOSOPHY and MEDICINE
    APA Newsletters NEWSLETTER ON PHILOSOPHY AND MEDICINE Volume 09, Number 2 Spring 2010 FROM THE EDITORS, MARY RORTY & MARK SHELDON FROM THE CHAIR, JOHN P. LIZZA ARTICLES NORMAN DANIELS “U.S. Health Reform: Getting More Justice” DANIEL CALLAHAN “Health Care Reform: Have We Made a Difference?” LEONARD M. FLECK “Sustainable Health Reform: Are Individual Mandates Needed and/or Justified?” JEFF MCMAHAN “Genetic Therapy, Cognitive Disability, and Abortion” FRANCES M. KAMM “Affecting Definite Future People” CARTER DILLARD “Procreation, Harm, and the Constitution” DAVID WASSERMAN “Rights, Interests, and the Permissibility of Abortion and Prenatal Injury” © 2010 by The American Philosophical Association ISSN 2155-9708 MELINDA ROBERTS “APA/CPL Session on Procreation, Abortion, and Harm Comments” FELICIA NIMUE ACKERMAN “Strawberry Ice Cream for Breakfast” DANA HOWARD “Paternalism as Non-domination: A Republican Argument” MAX CHEREM “Response to Dana Howard on Paternalism” LISA CAMPO-ENGELSTEIN “Contraceptive Responsibility and Autonomy: The Dearth of and Need for Long-Acting, Reversible Male Contraception” BOOK REVIEWS “The Significance for Bioethics of Marya Schechtman’s The Constitution of Selves and its ‘Narrative Self-Constitution’ View of Personal Identity” PAUL T. MENZEL David DeGrazia: Human Identity and Bioethics REVIEWED BY MARYA SCHECHTMAN ANNOUNCEMENTS APA NEWSLETTER ON Philosophy and Medicine Mary Rorty & Mark Sheldon, Co-Editors Spring 2010 Volume 09, Number 2 health care in this country. I agree with these observations and ROM THE DITORS hope for movement on this front. Just as civil rights legislation F E has helped to create change in racist beliefs and attitudes in the country, perhaps the legislative reform in health care may precipitate a change in how we, as a people, look at health Do you suppose the passage of 2,000 plus pages of a health care care.
    [Show full text]
  • Philosophy Overview
    THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT MAJOR BOOKLET Revised 3/23/2020 Updated 03/23/2020 1 UNDERGRADUATE PROGRAM CONTACTS Elisabeth Camp Undergraduate Director ROOM 514, 106 SOMERSET ST., 5TH FLOOR, COLLEGE AVENUE CAMPUS OFFICE PHONE: (848) 932-0404 EMAIL: [email protected] Alexander Skiles Assistant Undergraduate Director ROOM 546, 106 SOMERSET ST., 5TH FLOOR, COLLEGE AVENUE CAMPUS OFFICE PHONE: N/A EMAIL: [email protected] Jessica Koza Undergraduate Program Coordinator ROOM 518, 106 SOMERSET ST., 5TH FLOOR, COLLEGE AVENUE CAMPUS OFFICE PHONE: (848) 932-6800 EMAIL: [email protected] Mercedes Diaz Advisor for the RU Philosophy Club and Phi Sigma Tau Honor Society ROOM 519, 106 SOMERSET ST., 5TH FLOOR, COLLEGE AVENUE CAMPUS OFFICE PHONE: (848) 932-9862 EMAIL: [email protected] Justin Kalef Director of Teaching Innovation ROOM 547, 106 SOMERSET ST., 5TH FLOOR, COLLEGE AVENUE CAMPUS OFFICE PHONE: (848) 932-0439 EMAIL: [email protected] Edward “Trip” McCrossin Director of Areté, the RU undergraduate journal in philosophy ROOM 107, MILLER HALL, COLLEGE AVENUE CAMPUS OFFICE PHONE: (848) 932-9861 EMAIL: [email protected] Lauren Richardson and Julius Solatorio Undergraduate Advisors EMAIL: [email protected] and [email protected] OFFICE HOURS: By appointment Updated 03/23/2020 2 FACULTY DIRECTORY FACULTY MEMBER SPECIALTY Karen Bennett Metaphysics, Philosophy of Mind Professor [email protected] Martha Brandt Bolton Early Modern Philosophy Professor [email protected] Robert Bolton
    [Show full text]
  • Contemporary Moral Theories: Introduction to Contemporary Consequentialism Syllabus [Kian Mintz-Woo]
    Contemporary Moral Theories: Introduction to Contemporary Consequentialism Syllabus [Kian Mintz-Woo] Course Information In this course, I will introduce you to some of the ways that consequentialist thinking leads to surprising or counterintuitive moral conclusions. This means that I will focus on issues which are controversial such as vegetarianism, charity, climate change and health-care. I have tried to select readings that are both contemporary and engaging. Hopefully, these readings will make you think a little differently or give you new ideas to consider or discuss. This course will take place in SR09.53 from 15.15-16.45. I have placed all of the readings for the term (although there might be slight changes), along with questions in green to help guide your reading. Some weeks have a recommended reading as well, which I think will help you to see how people have responded to the kinds of arguments in the required text. Please look over the descriptions and see which readings you are most interested in presenting for class for our first session on 10.03.2016. (Please tell me if you ever find a link that does not work or have any problems accessing content on this Moodle page.) I have a policy that cellphones are off in class; we will have a 5-10 minute break in the course and you can check messages only during the break. As a bonus, I have included at least one fun thing each week which relates to the theme of that week. Marking The course has three marked components: 1.
    [Show full text]
  • Kristi A. Olson
    Kristi A. Olson CONTACT 8400 College Station Email: [email protected] INFORMATION Brunswick, ME 04011-8484 Phone: 207-798-4327 ACADEMIC Bowdoin College APPOINTMENTS Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy (2021-present) Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy (2014-2021) Stanford University Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science (2012-14) Princeton University Harold T. Shapiro Postdoctoral Research Associate & Lecturer (2010-12) EDUCATION Harvard University, Ph.D. Philosophy, Nov. 2010 Dissertation: Justice, Unequal Talents, and the Market Committee: Thomas M. Scanlon (chair), Frances Kamm, and Amartya Sen Harvard University, A.M. Health Policy, Nov. 2009 Completed all coursework for Ph.D. Duke University, J.D., May 1996 Indiana University, B.A., Music and Geography, Dec. 1992 PUBLICATIONS Book The Solidarity Solution: Principles for a Fair Income Distribution (Oxford University Press, 2020). Articles “The Importance of What We Care About: A Solidarity Approach to Resource Allocation,” Political Studies (2020): 1-17. “Impersonal Envy and the Fair Division of Resources,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 46 (2018): 269-292. “Solving Which Trilemma? The Many Interpretations of Equality, Pareto, and Freedom of Occupational Choice,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 16 (2017): 282- 307. “Autarky as a Moral Baseline,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2014): 264-285. “Our Choices, Our Wage Gap?” Philosophical Topics 40 (2012): 45-61. “The Endowment Tax Puzzle,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 38 (2010): 240-271. Kristi A. Olson, Page 2 PUBLICATIONS Book Reviews & Dictionary Entries (Cont.) “Leisure” in The Cambridge Rawls Lexicon, ed. by Jon Mandle and David E. Reidy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 433-434. “Review of Health and Social Justice by Jennifer Prah Ruger and Health, Luck, and Justice by Shlomi Segall,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (2012): 490-92.
    [Show full text]
  • Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J
    Designed by Ciano Design Photography by Harvard News Office, Carol Maglitta, Stu Rosner and Martha Stewart Printed by Kirkwood Printing Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Designed by Ciano Design Photography by Harvard News Office, Carol Maglitta, Stu Rosner and Martha Stewart Printed by Kirkwood Printing Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Ethics at Harvard 1987–2007 Edmond J. Safra Foundation Center for Ethics Dennis F. Thompson University Faculty Committee Christine M. Korsgaard Director Arthur I. Applbaum Philosophy Arthur I. Applbaum Government-KSG Lisa Lehmann Director of Graduate Fellowships Joseph L. Badaracco, Jr. Medicine Jane Mansbridge Staff Business Martha Minow Government-KSG Jean McVeigh Law Frank Michelman Administrative Director Michael J. Sandel Law Shelly Coulter Government Mark H. Moore Financial Consultant Thomas M. Scanlon Government-KSG Stephanie Dant Philosophy Lynn Sharp Paine Assistant to the Director Dennis F. Thompson Business Erica Jaffe Government Thomas R. Piper Assistant to Professor Applbaum Robert D. Truog Business Melissa Towne Medicine Mathias Risse Staff and Research Assistant Government-KSG Kimberly Tseko Faculty Associates Marc J. Roberts Publications and Derek Bok Special Events Coordinator Public Health Interim President Nancy Rosenblum Allan M. Brandt Government Deborah E. Blagg History of Science James Sabin Dan W. Brock Writer, Ethics at Harvard 1987-2007 Medicine Medicine Elaine Scarry Alfred D. Chandler, Jr. English Business Frederick Schauer Norman Daniels Government-KSG Public Health Amartya Sen Leon Eisenberg Economics and Philosophy Medicine Tommie Shelby Catherine Z. Elgin Philosophy and African Education American Studies Einer R. Elhauge Carol Steiker Law Law Richard H.
    [Show full text]
  • The (Non-Consequentialist) Ethics of Defensive Torture
    Journal of Ethical Urban Living The (Non-Consequentialist) Ethics of Defensive Torture Peter Brian Rose-Barry Finkbeiner Endowed Professor of Ethics Saginaw Valley State University Biography Peter Brian Rose-Barry (neé Peter Brian Barry) is Professor of Philosophy at Saginaw Valley State University where he holds an Endowed Chair as the Finkbeiner Endowed Professor in Ethics. He is the author of Evil and Moral Psychology (Routledge, 2013) and The Fiction of Evil (Routledge, 2016) and multiple papers in ethics and social and political philosophy. Publication Details Journal of Ethical Urban Living (ISSN: 2470-2641). May, 2018. Volume 1, Issue 2. Citation Rose-Barry, Peter Brian. 2018. “The (Non-Consequentialist) Ethics of Defensive Torture.” Journal of Ethical Urban Living 1 (2): 1–22. The (Non-Consequentialist) Ethics of Defensive Torture Peter Brian Rose-Barry Abstract It might seem that debates about the morality of torture are dominated by non-consequentialist absolutists about torture and consequentialist rivals, especially given the frequency with which ticking-bomb scenarios are discussed. However, opponents of absolutism about torture are not limited to invoking consequentialist justifications of torture. Any number of non-consequentialist arguments purporting to justify defensive torture—that is, torture in defense of self or others—are available as well. In particular, some critics of absolutism argue that defensive torture is sometimes justified if defensive killing is, that the right to torture is either violable or alienable and therefore not an absolute obstacle to morally permissible torture, or that torture can be justified if not required on Kantian grounds. I consider various versions of these arguments that defensive torture can be justified on non-consequentialist grounds, including arguments offered by Frances Kamm, Uwe Steinhoff, and Stephen Kershnar, and I argue that they all fail.
    [Show full text]
  • PHIL 3592: Special Topic: Western Philosophy Kant's Ethics & Kantian
    PHIL 3592: Special Topic: Western Philosophy Kant’s Ethics & Kantian Ethics Instructor: Hon-Lam Li TA: Roger Lee Readings and References for the course: (A) Books: (Note: **** means must buy; ** means should buy; no asterisk means can buy.) **** Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and translated by Allen Wood. *** Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (ed. by Allen Wood). (Bookstore) Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals. Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason. **** Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics. (Bookstore) **** T. M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. ** T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions. **Sally Sedgwick, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: An Introduction. (Bookstore) **Barbara Herman, The Practice of Moral Judgment. **Onora O’Neill, Constructions of Reason. **Christine Korsgaard, Creating the Kingdom of Ends. **Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity. John Rawls, Lecture on the History of Moral Philosophy. Jens Timmermann, Kant’s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary. (Bookstore) 1 Paul Guyer, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. Henry Allison, Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentrary. Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism. ** Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions. ** Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere. ** Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. ** Bernard Williams, Moral Luck. ** Frances Kamm, Intricate Ethics. (A) Articles: T. M. Scanlon, “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” Section I-III, in Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, and Peter Railton, eds., Moral Discourse and Practice, pp. 267-278. T. M. Scanlon, “The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory,” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (Spring 1992), pp. 1-23. T.
    [Show full text]
  • Johann Frick
    JOHANN FRICK Department of Philosophy (609) 258-9494 (office) 212 1879 Hall (857) 399-5709 (cell) Princeton University (609) 258-1502 (fax) Princeton, New Jersey 08544- [email protected] 1006 AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Normative Ethics; Practical Ethics (including Bioethics); Political Philosophy. AREAS OF COMPETENCE Metaethics; Philosophy of Law; Metaphysics; Philosophy of Action; Wittgenstein. EMPLOYMENT Feb 2015 – Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and the Present Center for Human Values, Princeton University. Feb 2014 – Instructor in the Department of Philosophy and the Center for Jan 2015 Human Values, Princeton University. EDUCATION 2008 - 2014 Ph.D. in Philosophy, Harvard University. • Dissertation: “Making People Happy, Not Making Happy People: A Defense of the Asymmetry Intuition in Population Ethics”; Committee: T.M. Scanlon, Frances Kamm, Derek Parfit. 2005 - 2008 BPhil degree in Philosophy, Merton College, Oxford University. • Distinction in both the written examinations and the BPhil thesis. • BPhil thesis: “Morality and the Problem of Foreseeable Non- Compliance”; advisor: Derek Parfit. • Specialization in Moral Philosophy (tutor: Ralph Wedgwood); Political Philosophy (tutors: Joseph Raz and John Tasioulas); Wittgenstein (tutor: Stephen Mulhall). 2006 - 2007 Visiting student at the École Normale Supérieure (ENS) in Paris. • Courses and seminars at the ENS, the Institut Jean Nicod, and the Collège de France; tutor: François Recanati. 2002 - 2005 BA (Hons.) degree in Philosophy, Politics & Economics, St. John’s College, Oxford University. • First Class Honours in the Final Examinations (June 2005). • Distinction in the Preliminary Examination (June 2003). PUBLICATIONS “Contractualism and Social Risk”, forthcoming in Philosophy & Public Affairs. “Future Persons and Victimless Wrongdoing” in Markus Rüther and Sebastian Muders (eds.), Aufsätze zur Philosophie Derek Parfits (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, forthcoming).
    [Show full text]