39

CHAPTER IV.

HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED FOR SIEGE.*

The isolated position of Kimberley, and the probability that in isolation and °f the event of war with the Boer Republics it would be attacked, '3^ had been a source of anxiety to the military authorities at Cape causes anxiety

Town for several years. Major E. A. Altham, Royal Scots, jjafat E. A. was sent to Kimberlev in i8q6 by Lieut.-General Sir W. Aitham's J J J report on situ- Goodenough (then G.O.C. in South Africa), and in August of ationthen. " that year wrote : The Government of the South African Republic haveAngloBoerWar.coma strong feeling against the De Beers Mining Company, and against Mr. , who owes his wealth to that company. The Free State, on the discovery of the diamond mines, claimed Kimberley as within its borders, and received comparatively but a small sum for the relinquishment of that claim. Kimberley is by far the most important place on the line of communications with Mafeking and, through Mafeking, to the north. Even if it should be thought impracticable to maintain that line of communication, the strategic value of

Kimberley as a point from which it can be re-opened later in the campaign is very considerable ; but, in addition to these considera- tions, which may have a direct strategic bearing on the conduct of the campaign, there are others connected with Kimberley which would have an indirect but far-reaching effect. Except perhaps Cape Town, Kimberley is the richest prize which the enemy could capture, and lies at a tempting distance from his grasp. Its loss and any damage which might ensue to the mines

* See maps Nos. 2S, 29. 4o THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

would not only be a heavy blow to the Cape Colony, but would also be most injurious to Imperial prestige throughout South Africa, and, while disheartening the loyalists, would greatly influence the waverers to take active part against us." Kimberley The only troops in Kimberley at that time were two local local troops in 1896. Volunteer corps, the Diamond Fields Horse, with a strength of 367 men, including an troop armed with four old 7-pr. M.L. guns, and the Kimberley , about 400 strong. In order to protect the town and the mines, it was essential to hold a circuit of ten miles. Major Altham proposed to increase the local Volunteer forces, to re-arm and form into a separate battery the artillery troops of the Diamond Fields Horse, and to furnish the white miners with rifles and train them to shoot " on the lines of a burgher force, or in clubs." He suggested that a defence scheme, which had already been discussed at Kim- berley, should be submitted to General Goodenough. But out of the very small garrison of British troops then in South Africa General Goodenough had none available to garrison Kimberley, nor had he any control over the Volunteer corps in Cape Colony, which were administered by Colonial Staff officers acting under theAngloBoerWar.comdirect orders of the Colonial Government. He therefore at passed on Major Altham's report to Sir J. Gordon Sprigg, that time Prime Minister of the Colony, and to the members of a Commission which, at the request of the Cape Ministry, had been assembled by the Governor (Lord Rosmead) to enquire into the organisation and efficiency of the Colonial forces. With the exception of the suggestion that the white miners should be armed and trained, the recommendations of the report were

approved by the Commissioners ; but, owing to political difficulties, no action was taken, and for similar reasons the preparation of a defence scheme by the local authorities in Kimberley was stopped. Lt.-G.l. But the clouds continued to gather in South Africa, and two Trotter suit in June, 1898 years later, in June, 1898, Sir W. Goodenough, at the request by Sir W. officer Lieut.-Colonel Goodenough of Sir Gordon Sprigg, sent another — J. K. to prepare Trotter, R.A.— to Kimberley with confidential instructions to scheme of defence. draw up a definite scheme of defence. HOW K1MBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 41

The town of Kimberley lies between its two principal diamond Description of t and mines, the " Kimberley " and the " De Beers." The original °^" ^gh r settlement, the smaller township of Beaconsfield, is a thousand hood, yards south-east of the present town. A mile and a half further to the south-east the little Boer village of Wesselton stands upon the lake known as Du Toit's Pan (see map No. 29). There are two other diamond mines, " Du Toit's Pan " and " Bultfon- tein," between Wesselton and Beaconsfield. The Premier mine projects into the plain a mile due east of Du Toit's Pan. North- east of Kimberley the monotony of the veld is broken by plan- tations of eucalyptus trees surrounding the village of Kenilworth, a suburb erected some years before by Mr. Rhodes for the use of the white employes of the mines. To the south-west of Kim- berley lies the main reservoir, which in normal times draws its supply of water by pipes from the Vaal at Riverton, nearly eighteen miles away (see map No. 28). The terrain encircling the two towns, Kimberley and Beaconsfield (both of which for the purposes of this narrative are included under the title of Kimberley), is on the whole favourable to defence. To the east- ward a plain, unbrokenAngloBoerWar.comsave by the heaps of debris from the mines, stretches to a dark range of low kopjes on the Free State side of the frontier line. To the north the ground slopes gradually towards the valley of the Vaal river, the fall being crossed, some six miles out, by the wooded ridge of Dronfield. To the west of the town, separated from it by a shallow valley, rises Carter's Ridge, a wave of ground from which, at a range of four thousand yards, artillery fire could be brought to bear on the town itself. Southward the country rises and falls in almost imperceptible undulations until the commanding position of Wimbledon is reached, some six miles distant. The heaps of debris much aided the defence. Built up by the accumulations of the tailings of the mines, they formed a series of large mounds some sixty to seventy feet high, skirting the town on the north, east and south. In front of these mounds a network of barbed wire fences effectually obstructed all approach except by the roads, while the electric searchlights, installed by the De Beers company to illuminate the fields of " blue " soil 42 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

which were exposed to disintegrate in the open air, were avail- able for military use. A few, however, of the debris heaps, such as those of the Premier mine to the south-east, and those of the Kamfer's Dam mines three miles to the north-west, were of doubtful advantage to the defence, as their occupation would cause undue extension, while, if not held, they would be dangerous. Mr. Schreiner Colonel Trotter's scheme for the defence of this area was having Sir succeeded sent by Sir W. Goodenough to the War Office , but as Gordon Sir Gordon Sprigg had ceased to be Premier, no local action was taken. Sprigg, no help from The Volunteers gradually dwindled in numbers till the Kim- Cape Town is berley Rifles were reduced to two companies and the Diamond forthcoming. Utter decay of Fields Horse almost ceased to exist. At an inspection of the local forces in field it still with the four 1899. battery early in 1899 was armed only obsolete 7-pr. R.M.L., there were no horses for the guns, and only twenty-two officers and men appeared on parade. The breakdown of the Bloemfontein Conference in June, 1899, awoke the citizens of Kimberley to a sense of their danger. The Prime Minister of the Colony was asked to supply protection, or, at least, arms to enable the town to defend itself. Both these petitionsAngloBoerWar.comwere rejected, the Civil Commissioner being instructed to reply that " there is no reason whatever for apprehending that

Kimberley is, or in any contemplated event will be, in danger

of attack, and Mr. Schreiner is of opinion that your fears are groundless and your anticipations without foundation." War Office The optimistic feeling of the Cape Ministry was not shared orders return to Kimberley by the Military Staff at the War Office, whose anxiety about of U.-C0I. the safety of Kimberley was increased by their knowledge that Trotter, July, 1899. part of the Boer plan of campaign was directed against the town, which was to be attacked as soon as war began. It was clear that out of the garrison of South Africa, which in August, 1899, was less than 10,000 men,* an adequate force of regular troops could not be allotted to so distant a post as Kimberley, and that the burden of its defence must fall principally upon its inhabitants. Orders were therefore telegraphed on 4th July to Sir W. Butler, in then command at the Cape, to send Lieut. -Colonel J. K. Trotter again to Kimberley to make confidential enquiries as to

* Volume I., page 1. -

HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 43 the organisation of the defences. Lieut. D. S. Maclnnes, R.E., Eagerness of was selected to assist him in his mission. The situation was a inhabitants to assist Trotter delicate one, as the General Officer Commanding the Imperial* is hampered troops still lacked authority over the local Volunteers, and the by Mr.

Cape Government continued to maintain that there was no u^mTngness cause for any special preparation. In these circumstances it to act. was thought desirable to keep two staff officers permanently in Kimberley to watch events, and, confidentially, to concert measures for defence with the leading inhabitants. Lieut. Colonel Trotter, who had recently been appointed Chief Staff Officer of the South African command, could not be spared for any length of time from Headquarters at Cape Town, and, after reporting on the condition of Kimberley, he returned to the coast, being replaced by Bt. -Major H. S. Turner, The Black Major Turner

Watch, an officer who had for some years been in special employ- Trotter! and ment in Southern Rhodesia, and was well known to, and popular with Lt. Mac- with, South African colonists. Major Turner immediately placed out ; n detail himself in touch with the principal inhabitants of the town, and °n pap" with their assistance was able to carry out valuable work. Pre- Trotter's liminary arrangements were made for the organisation of addi- AngloBoerWar.com jefg",^ °f tional local forces, and much information was obtained as to town - the Boers' preparations for war, while Lieut. Maclnnes worked for ra i s ing out in detail Colonel Trotter's scheme of fortification. Towards additional local troops. the end of July, Captain W. A. J. O'Meara, R.E., one of the ten Special Service officers sent out at that time from England for Intelligence duty, joined Major Turner, then acting as Staff Officer to Commissioner M. B. Robinson of the Cape Police, who, with the local rank of lieut. -colon el, had been appointed by the Cape Government to the command of the colonial forces, including the police detachments, around Kimberley. Early in September, Sir Alfred Milner persuaded his Ministers to send two thousand Lee-Metford rifles and a small quantity Sir Alfred

of ammunition to Kimberley, and to detail detachments of Cape obtains some rifles and am - Police to guard the more important points to the north and . r r munition tor south of the town. He further suggested that a senior officer of Kimberley. the regular forces should be sent to report confidentially on the situation. Lieut. -Colonel R. G. Kekewich, Loyal North Lan- .

44 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

At Sir cashirc regiment, was selected by Lieut-General Sir F. Forestier- September received personal instance, Walker for this duty, and on nth Lt.-Coi.' instructions from Sir A. Milner to enquire carefully into the and o£ appointed t" arrangements planned for the protection of Kimberley

11 i cations to Mafeking on the north and to Orange SeT'iV' the commun River station on the south. If in Colonel Kekewich's opinion these arrangements offered reasonable security against immediate danger, the High Commissioner wished no further action to be

if Kekewich became aware of any serious risk, taken ; but Colonel either to Kimberley or to the communications with Cape Town,

he was to report it at once. Colonel Kekewich was not informed that there was reason to believe that an attack on Kimberley formed part of the Boer plan of campaign. On political grounds he was told to keep his mission as secret as possible. Vryburg meet- Bt.-Colonel R. S. S. Baden-Powell* was already at Mafeking had defence^sipt' inspecting the regiment which Lieut .-Colonel C. O. Hore nth, 1899. j ust raised, and a consultation as to the defence of the Cape frontier from Mafeking to Orange River took place at Vryburg on the nth September between him, Brevet-Major Turner, Goold-Adams, the Resident CaptainAngloBoerWar.comO'Meara, and Major H. J. Commissioner of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. On Colonel Kekewich Kekewich's arrival at Kimberley on September 13th Turner e at explained to him the general situation. Sq'>t. i3th, and O'Meara once '899- It was startling in its simplicity. The movements of the Boers showed that mobilisation had begun across the frontier, and that Kimberley was seriously threatened. There were no regular troops in the place, which was not fortified in any way, Condition and for work upon its defences had not yet begun. The local Volun- f teers were much below their authorised strength so weak, *ocTuoops. ; indeed, were they that when called out for active service on October 4th they mustered only 540 strong. They were armed with Lee-Metford rifles, and, thanks to the exertions of Major W. H. F. Taylor, R.A., at that time commanding the artillery of the Cape Colonial forces, the four 7-pr. R.M.L. guns of the Dia- mond Fields Horse had just been replaced by better weapons, six 2.5-in. R.M.L. To protect the three hundred miles of railway

* See Volume I., pages 39, 42, 51. . —

HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 45 between Mafeking and the Orange river there were only the Volunteers at Kimberley, some half-dozen small posts of Cape Police, and a single company of sixty-one Volunteers at Vryburg.

Kekewich at once telegraphed to Headquarters to represent Sept. 20th, e the urgent need for reinforcements, and on the 20th September ^s for°and the following troops reached him from Cape Town :

Officers. 23rd company R.G.A. (with six 2.5-in. R.M.L. guns on moun-

tain carriages) . 7th company R.E. Headquarters and 4 companies 1st Loyal North Lancashire regiment Detachment Army Service Corps Detachment Royal Army Medical Corps AngloBoerWar.com 46 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

against overwhelming odds, and only surrendered at the last extremity.* On the morning of the 28th September Captain O'Meara, who had been sent on the previous day by Kekewich on a bicycle to obtain information as to the situation at Boshof, a village in the Free State some thirty-three miles from Kim- berley, reported that he had observed throughout the previous night the concentration of a large commando there. On receipt Defence of this news the construction of the defences, which, owing to works, previously political reasons, it had been impossible to begin before the 18th, planned, arc was pushed on with the utmost energy, and by 7th October begun, 18th Sept., 1899, the town was considered to be safe from a coup de main. Work, and on Sept. however, continued throughout the siege, as it was found neces- 28th, because of threatening sary to include fresh ground to meet the varying dispositions of news, are vigorously the enemy. pressed Though about eighty recruits joined the Volunteers during forward. the first week after they were called out, their numbersf were wholly inadequate for the defence of the town, even with the regular gunners and infantry who reached Kekewich as a rein- forcement on the 20th September. The numerical weakness of theAngloBoerWar.comVolunteer corps arose from no want of spirit on the part of the inhabitants, as was proved by their conduct during the siege. It was due rather to the imperfect appreciation of the danger of the situation which was prevalent throughout the Colony, and from the reluctance of the Cape Government to make any preparations for war. It therefore became necessary to carry out the arrangements made by Major Turner for the Town Guard organisation of a Town Guard. On the 30th Sir Alfred Milner organised, Sept. 30th to gave the necessary permission, and, within a week, more than Oct. 7th, 1899. 1,100 men had been enrolled, officers appointed, and non-com- missioned officers of the regular troops detailed to give instruction in the use of the rifle and in simple drilV From these numbers

* See Volume I., page 382, note.

j When embodied- The Diamond Fields Artillery consisted only of 3 officers and 90 other ranks.

The Diamond Fields Horse ,, „ 6 ,, 142 ,,

The Kimberley regiment ,, 14 ,, 285 ,, HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 47

the force slowly grew until by the end of the siege it reached a strength of 2,750 men. The patriotism thus displayed by the inhabitants alone made it possible to occupy the wide circle of works necessary for the defence of the town. On 5th October, owing to the report of an intended attack, the " hooters " of the mines sounded an alarm at midnight, and the defences were manned for the first time.

President Kruger's ultimatum to the British Government Hostilities expired on the nth October, and next day the Boers crossed the gin h oc t ',gQg frontier and occupied the railway station at Kraaipan, from which the police detachment, with Kekewich's consent, had fallen back on Mafeking two days before. Within a few hours of their occupation of Kraaipan the Boers had destroyed the Railway

railway at that point, and had captured an armoured train Kimberley which was conveying two 7-pr. guns with ammunition from ancl Mafeking Vryburg to Mafeking. Captain R. C. Nesbit, V.C., Mashona- land Mounted Police, and the twenty-six men he commanded, after a stout resistance were compelled to surrender to the overwhelming artillery and rifle fire which was poured upon them by the burghers.AngloBoerWar.com The movement of the commandos against the railway from Orange River to Mafeking was general. The police detachments who watched the line from Vryburg to Kimberley gradually retired southward, and as the line of investment drawn round Kimberley was at first a thin one, they all succeeded in joining Kekewich by the 22nd October, and proved a valuable reinforce- ment to his garrison. Kekewich had early realised that mobile infantry was urgently required for the defence of the large area enclosed by his works, and that the police and mounted volun- teers were numerically insufficient for this purpose. In a con- versation over the telegraph line to Cape Town a few hours K j mberiey before the wire was cut, he obtained Sir Alfred Milner's per- Light Horse mission to raise a corps of mounted irregulars, under the title i 4th, 1899. °n of the Kimberley Light Horse. **j£ On the 14th the telegraph lines north and south of Kimberley line being

' wlc cut, and a reconnaissance on the 15th in an armoured train p" were c i afm| ascertained that Boers with three guns were in possession of martial law. 48 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

the railway between Spytfontein and Magersfontein. Lieut.- Colonel Kekewich, thus effectually cut off from railway and telegraphic communication with Headquarters, immediately pro- claimed martial law and assumed supreme control of the civil population.

Difficulties of In the lives of many men occurs an opportunity for distinc- Kekewich's the orjty fa.il to grasp it. It was not so with ^^ but maj Lieut.-Colonel Kekewich. Called suddenly from the command of a battalion, where the scope of his energies was limited to the training of his men for battle, the fortune of war placed him in supreme charge of an invested town of nearly 50,000 inhabitants, defended by a garrison composed for the greater part of im- provised troops, who were inadequate in numbers to hold the great length of line imposed upon them by the nature of the The personnel ground. Only one-eighth of his command were professional consisted of Police, well disciplined command. soldiers ; the remainder Cape

and hardy men, but not highly trained for war ; the Kimberley Volunteers, whose military knowledge, like that of every other

volunteer organisation, was necessarily scanty ; the newly-raised irregularAngloBoerWar.comcorps of Kimberley Light Horse, and the Town Guard, neither of whom had received any previous training at all. It is a truism that the less instructed are the men the better their leaders should be. But including one officer of the Army Service Corps, one of the R.A.M.C, and one recently retired from the infantry, Kekewich had but twenty-two professional officers under his orders, of whom by the 28th November four had been killed or permanently incapacitated for the remainder of the siege. The others were either volunteers or civilians. A few of the volunteers had gained experience and well-deserved honours in campaigns against the Kaffirs, but the majority had but a limited knowledge of the rudiments of the art of war, and were chiefly equipped with stout hearts and a determination to do their duty. The civilians, whose patriotism brought them from the desk or the warehouse to command their fellow-citizens in the trenches, were as ignorant as their men. It was not only in professional officers that Kekewich was grievously short-handed. In every garrison, even when the ordinary routine work has HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 49 been cut down to the lowest point, the officer commanding must necessarily maintain a large correspondence, with many returns to prepare, many papers to catalogue and preserve for reference. This work is always carried out by highly-trained military clerks. But of these Kekewich had but one or two, and thus the com- mandant of Kimberley and his staff officers had to take upon their already overburthened shoulders the drudgery which should have been performed by non-commissioned officers.

Nor were these deficiencies in the personnel of the garrison His guns and

ammumtIon - counterbalanced by the excellence of the materiel at his disposal. To meet the modern artillery of the enemy he had only fourteen light field guns, twelve of which ranged up to 4,000 yards, while two could throw but half that distance. He was short of rifles. Two thousand Lee-Metfords had been sent to Kim- berley a short time before the siege began, and the De Beers Company produced from their stores about 450 more. But these were not enough to re-arm some five hundred of the Cape Police, who concentrated on Kimberley, and to equip the Kim- berley Light Horse and the Town Guard with the service weapon. The discarded Martini-HenrysAngloBoerWar.comwere served out to the Town Guard, but there were not enough even of these old rifles for the whole of its members, and the last few men enrolled were served out with the obsolete Snider rifle, in default of a better fire-arm. Ammunition, the complement of rifles, was also deficient in quantity. Including half a million of rounds brought up country by the North Lancashire, the supply sent by Sir A. Milner, and about 650,000 rounds (of which many proved defective) supplied by the De Beers, there were about 1,500,000 Lee-Metford cartridges in Kimberley when the siege began. For the Martini-Henrys there were about 60,000 rounds. Small as was this amount of rifle ammunition, it could not be kept solely for use in action, for it was necessary to train the newly- raised troops to shoot, and their instruction necessarily con- sumed a large number of cartridges. Thus to the other anxieties of Colonel Kekewich and his staff was added that of carefully husbanding ammunition—difficult even with well-trained troops, infinitely more so with a garrison largely composed of hastily

vol. 11. 4 ;

5° THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

raised levies. For the guns there were only 2,600 rounds, or

less than 200 rounds for each piece of artillery ; but this deficiency was partially made good during the siege. When the attitude of the Boers showed that an attack upon Kimberley was certain,

Invaluable the directors of the De Beers Company placed all the resources help of the of their great mining industry at the service of Colonel Kekewich. De Beers Company, They supplied labour for building the redoubts, horses and and of for Mr. Labram. mules for the guns, for the Kimberley Light Horse, and the six Maxims which the company possessed. Many of the works required for observatories and electric search-lights were designed and built by their officials. In November Mr. G. Labram, their chief engineer, whose remarkable knowledge, resource and versatility proved of the greatest service to the garrison, began to cast shells for the 7-pr. guns, and to make powder for them by blending blasting and rifle powder. Early in December he conceived the idea of building a gun heavier

than any yet brought into action against the town ; and on the 19th January a 4.1-in. B.L. gun, throwing a 28-Ib. at an effective range of 8,000 yards, was fired for the first time. This Labram's improvised gun, named " Long Cecil " in honour of Mr. Rhodes, " Long Cecil." wasAngloBoerWar.comvery successful, and was fired 255 times during the remainder of the siege, the end of which Mr. Labram did not live to see, as he was killed by a shell on 9th February.

Nature of the The community for which the British commandant became population of Kimberley. responsible was of an exceptional character, due to the mining industry which had created it, and upon which its very existence depended. The dominant factor was the De Beers Company with its great staff of officials, and its workmen, who included a large number of natives collected from various parts of South Africa. Professional men, merchants, and native servants made up the remainder of the inhabitants. The municipal affairs of Kimberley were presided over by a mayor. When the

town was first invested, Mr. R. H. Henderson held office ; he was afterwards succeeded by Mr. H. A. Oliver. Both these gentlemen rendered valuable services to the military authorities but from a civil point of view the real power, material and moral, was vested in the De Beers Company, and (although two other ;

HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 51 directors of that company were present) it may be said to have been concentrated in the hands of Mr. Cecil Rhodes. Mr. Rhodes, with characteristic courage, had hurried up from Cape Town and thrown himself into Kimberley on October nth, determined to share the fate of the community over whose fortunes he had so long presided. Though in South African politics his influence had declined, in Kimberley his position was unchallenged and supreme. The population regarded him, not without reason, as the greatest empire-maker the sub-conti-

nent had yet seen ; a large proportion of the irregular troops were employed in the mines of which he was the moving spirit their future advancement in civil life greatly depended on his good will. Thus both from the political and financial aspect he was virtually the dictator of Kimberley, and his presence in the town during the siege necessarily became a potent factor in the situation.

The number of people within the lines of investment was at Number of the '"habitants, first not accurately known, but from a census taken during the siege it appears to have been about 48,000, of whom 18,000 were whites, while theAngloBoerWar.comremainder were drawn from races of varying colour and origin. This total included 12,000 women and 10,000 children. Attempts were made from time to time during the siege to reduce these numbers by despatching batches of

natives by night through the Boer lines to their homes ; but in most cases the enemy frustrated these efforts, and as the Boers were short of labour for their farms, the expediency of repeating the attempts was open to doubt.

The Kimberley defences (map No. 29), as the scheme was Nature of the finally worked out by Lieut. Maclnnes and approved by Colonel ce ^£s Kekewich, consisted of a series of redoubts with open gorges, which completely encircled the whole town and included the Kimberley and De Beers mines. A part of the front of this enceinte was protected by barbed wire and abattis, and efforts were made to restrict egress or ingress to points on certain roads at which movable barriers had been erected. A series of advanced works to the south-east guarded Beaconsfield. Kenil-

worth formed a salient projecting northward ; the Premier mine

vol. 11. 4* —

52 THE WAR IN SOUTH AFRICA.

was held as a detached post. An isolated redoubt on the southern road near Van Druyten's Farm, and another to the westward of the town covering Otto's Kopje mine, completed the defences. The main enceinte had a perimeter of about ten miles, but by the Kenilworth and Beaconsfield salients, this (exclusive of the Premier mine and other outworks) was increased to fourteen miles. The length of this line of defence was even more disproportionate to the garrison available to hold it than was that of Ladysmith to its garrison, but the value of the property at stake and the nature of the ground made it necessary to take the risks. The permanent distribution of

the guns was as follows :

guns at the reservoir, 2 guns near the pulsator, !2 south of Kenilworth Dam ; they were moved later in the siege to Otto's kopje. 2 guns at the Premier mine. 2 uns in No 2 redoubt S ' Cape Police . . . . / AngloBoerWar.com\ north of Kimberley mine. .6 guns as a reserve in the Public Gardens, and em-

Diamond Fields Artillery . . / ployed with the mobile force as needed, usually a section at a time.

To each redoubt was assigned a permanent garrison of fifty men. The Town Guard were at first only required, as a whole, to be at their posts during the night, and seventy-five per cent, were set free during the day to follow their ordinary vocations.

But, later, as the Boers closed in, it was thought necessary to keep more men on duty, and even during the daytime leave of absence was sparingly granted to these citizen soldiers. A conning tower and telephonic communications enabled the commandant to exercise at all times direct control over his entire force, and to watch the movements of the Boers from the various gun-positions with which they had encircled the town. HOW KIMBERLEY WAS PREPARED. 53

In all sieges food and water are of the first importance. It Supply of r and was obvious that the water supply from the Vaal river would J^

be cut off as soon as the investment of Kimberley began ; but on his arrival in September Lieut. -Colonel Kekewich had ascer- tained that there were springs of pure water at the bottom of the Premier mine, and it was partly for the sake of these that he included this mine within the area of his defences. A plan for utilising these springs was then discussed with the De Beers officials. Mr. Rhodes, on his arrival, undertook to pump 300,000 gallons into the waterworks reservoir—a supply which, carefully husbanded under the regulations of the martial law enforced by Colonel Kekewich, sufficed for the military and civilian popu- lation of the city. The reservoir and filter-bed were very strongly fortified, and held by a permanent garrison of two hundred men with two guns. Shortly before the declaration of war, supplies had been collected at Vryburg and Modder River stations and brought into Kimberley, while consignments of foodstuffs for stations along the railway to the north were detained in Kim- berley, and, at the outbreak of hostilities, taken over by the military authorities.AngloBoerWar.comA rough estimate of the stock of food in the town was made then, and carefully checked in the middle of October. It was found that the amount would suffice for the time of investment then expected. A proclamation was issued fixing the price of meat at a slightly higher figure than the normal rate, and limiting the price of all other supplies to that which ruled before the communications were cut. The quantity to be sold to each individual was regulated from time to time by proclamation. Subject to these limitations sales were left at first in the hands of the ordinary tradesmen. Sub- sequently, to enable the military authorities to exercise a stricter control, a supply committee, composed of the chief inhabitants, was appointed with Captain H. V. Gorle, A.S.C., as chairman. The stocks of local dealers were bought up, and six depots formed in different parts of the town for distribution to civilians in accordance with the approved scale of issue.