Alternative Media and the .Public Sphere in Zil11babvve

Nkosi Martin N dlela

countries or communication spaces offered by .T...... he advent ofdemocratic transitions in Africa « in the early 1990s saw some countries the Internet. experiencing a boom in media pluralism, Some theorists have argued that there can be an introduction of multi-channel broadcasting no meaningful definition of the term alternative systems, independent media, and even experi­ media (Abel, 1997). is used here mentation with community media. However, to denote any media which fall outside the formal there are many exceptions to this trend, and corporate , and for media to be Zimbabwe is one of those unfortunate cases considered "alternative," they must embody the where there has been a dramatic reversal to the Gramscian notion of the counterhegemonic. democratization process. Since 2000, the coun­ Alternative media can be expressed in different try has been engulfed in a multifaceted sociopo­ forms, both printed and electronic, creative writ­ litical crisis. Since the existing media are ing, art, music, and video. Alternative media can strongly influenced by the ruling party elites, also be expressed in terms of perspectives that they are heavily tilted toward the mainstream hardly appear in dominant media. Access to alter­ voices and official interpretations of the events native media is open to ordinary actors. In recent unfolding in the country. The relentlessly criti­ years, the term alternative media has taken on a cal civil society, opposition parties, and other new dimension as a result of dynamism in the prodemocracy movements, not happy with the information and communication technologies. suppression of their voices and the restricted In this chapter, alternative media are analyzed access to the public sphere, are increasingly in terms of their contribution to the political turning to the alternative communicative public sphere in Zimbabwe. The public sphere is Spaces. They have emerged as active contribu­ defined by Keane (1995) as an extensive physical tors of news and information disseminated via and symbolic space for the formation of public alternative media-be it "illegal" radio stations opinion and is composed of a society's commu­ 1l1'oadcasting into Zimbabwe from foreign nication structure. In a situation where a society's

87 88 PART 11 III CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE communication structures are heavily tilted interests. Individuals and institutions vying for toward mainstream discourses, oppositional power also contend to influence the media in forces and reformists often resort to alternative terms of representation, access, and participa­ media, hence creating an alternative public tion. Political entities compete for media space sphere. As Woo-Young (2005) has argued, an and strategically mobilize forms of communica­ alternative public sphere is a space in which tive power. The media in a democracy constitute counterdiscourse is produced and consumed by prime areas for contending interests, values, and counterpublics, who had their expression or viewpoints-in pursuits of public recognition, voices suppressed by the existing social order. legitimacy, and strategic aims. As McNair (2000) Since the alternative media are not controlled by argues, any study of democracy in contemporary government, they arguably revitalize the political conditions is a study of how the media report public sphere by giving access to oppositional and interpret political events and issues (p. x). and social movements that could not easily While modern politics in Western countries access the formal public sphere. has been largely mediated through the main­ stream media and more recently through the Internet, in the sub-Saharan countries, the situa­ The Media and tion is different. Many critics would dispute the Democratization existence in Africa of a Habermasian public sphere-that communicative space in which The wave of democratization that swept across private people come together as a public. sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early Nonetheless, African media are central to politi­ 1990s is one of the consequences of globaliza­ cal processes in Africa even though they are not tion. The end ofthe Cold War marked the begin­ as widespread as in Western countries. The ning of a new global political order and open media in Africa provide mediating mechanisms demands for democracy-fundamental human for political representation, despite their being rights, multipartism, and greater representation. limited to urban areas. In countries still in demo­ The confluence ofinternal and external pressures cratic transition, given greater political freedom led to unprecedented political transformations in and a responsive public, the role of the media is Africa, and these have been described by crucial in educating the people about the differ­ Huntington (1991) as a "third wave of democra­ ent political parties and candidates available for tisation." The basic tenets ofthis liberal dispensa­ choice (Randall, 1999). tion emphasize an introduction of extensive The role ofthe media has to be assessed in rela­ competition among individuals and organized tion to freedom of expression, that is, the ability groups (especially political parties) for political for citizens to participate in political discussions power. The media have been identified as crucial and safely express their political convictions by elements in the process of building, consolidat­ voting for a party of their choice without fear of ing, and nurturing a democratic society. reprisals. Ideally, the media should provide com­ Democratization thus envisages an expansion of municative spaces where people can openly par­ communicative democratic spaces. ticipate in discussion and debates. The metaphor A study of democratization processes is of space defines the social, political, and physical inevitable a study of access to communicative configurations in which positions ofpower, dom­ spaces. The media's role in the democratization ination, and marginality are negotiated and repro­ process resolves around their relation to wider duced (Barnett, 2003). However, in authoritarian structures and systems of power contestation. societies, or during periods of conflict, there is an The linkage invites a reconsideration of the rela­ inclination by the powerful sectors toward con­ tive power of media in relation to organized trolling the communicative spaces. Therefore, Chapter 7 III Alternative Media and the Public Sphere in Zimbabwe 89

a Gramscian perspective, the media have to political crisis unfolding in the country. The cri­ interr'reted as instruments for disseminating sis affected the communicative spaces in several reinforcing the hegemonic perspective. ways. Firstly, the increasingly authoritarian gov­ ernment responded to domestic and interna­ tional pressure by protecting its own information ontested spaces and, secondly, by also attempting to influ­ ommunicative Spaces ence the media impact outside its own borders. The response can also be interpreted in light of The political landscape in Zimbabwe has, since government's efforts to reinforce sovereignty in independence in 1980, been dominated by one the face ofwhat has been defined as unwarranted political party, ZANU-PF, led by President interference in the national affairs by the former obert Mugabe. Through the years, the party has colonial power, the United Kingdom, the xtended its hegemony into the economic, social, European Union, and the United States. Control Vd cultural spheres, including the , of media space within the national boundaries here the government controls the only broad­ can be seen as competition to dominate national $ting institution and the nominally public- consciousness and reinforce patriotism. Wned Zimbabwe Newspapers Group. However, Faced by multifaceted problems, the govern­ ward the end of the 1990s, there has been a ment fundamentally shifted the communication rowing discontent over limited political partici­ spaces. It did so by emasculating the mainstream ation, human rights violations, the declining national media, attempting to influence public Fonomy, and limited communication platforms. opinion in its own favor by directing the state­ his discontent against the ruling party saw the owned newspaper oligopoly to serve out govern­ rmation of a new opposition party, the ment ; by regulating the reception of ()vement for Democratic Change (MDC), international media in the country; and by ~cked by important groups in the civil society restricting external communication channels. d supported by Western countries. Another The government also developed media policies velopment was the formation of an indepen­ that undermine the growth of the media and nt daily newspaper, The Daily News, to give their possible extension to new areas, creating an ice to oppositional discourses. The Daily News environment of insecurity that scares away local ade an enormous contribution by opening up investors, and put up stringent conditions that olitical communication spaces in the country effectively discourage foreign investment and !ld provided access to alternative interpretations limit access to the media. funfolding events. Within a short space oftime, Control ofthe media extends through owner­ $. readership became the largest in the country, ship structure and by means oflegal and extrale­ 11s challenging the ruling party's hegemony in gal measures. The ownership structure of the enational political public sphere. media gives the government dual control over The controversial land reforms in which the the country's largest print media and only broad­ overnment violently confiscated white-owned casting institution. In the broadcasting media, mercial farms in the late 1990s, the disputed the government has, since 1980, kept the broad­ rliamentary elections in 2000, and the presi­ casting sector firmly under control with a strin­ ntial elections in 2002 are all events that gent monopoly situation, notwithstanding ri,ited a multifaceted crisis and have been cen­ pressures for liberalization in the 1990s. Even .ers ofcontestation in the communicative spaces. though broadcasting reforms saw the enactment .e deepening conflict in Zimbabwe dichoto­ of a new broadcasting law that theoretically pro­ 'zed the political public sphere, with contend­ moted a three-tier broadcasting system, in prac­ adopting polarized views on the tice a status quo of monopoly prevailed. In the 90 PART 11 III CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE print media sector, the government through a The government policies and actions public trust has, since independence, controlled a also sought to suppress the development of large stake in the print media, controlling the munity media. Attempts have also been made main daily and weekly newspapers, with only a the government to delink the rural areas from few independent weeklies working on the fringes, urban areas through the use of "coerced" targeting mainly the urban elite. The dual control tionalleaders who have monitoring powers over of the print and broadcasting media has ensured their communities and have powers to that access to the mainstream media is mainly noncompliant residents. Residents supporting given to the dominant discourses, while alterna­ other political parties, other than the tive discourses are subdued. party, have been denied access to basic m2lterlals Legal measures have been used to close down such as food aid, fertilizers, and farming equip" at least five independent newspapers, including ment. I It is also illegal to say something that the country's main independent daily newspaper undermines the authority of the president. A The Daily News. The laws have been roundly con­ number of people have been hauled into demned by the international community. The for uttering "subversive" comments on the presi­ legislative environment that gives the authorities dent. People in small communities are therefore unlimited powers to license newspapers and to not free to express their political opinions. Fear subsequently close them has been used to curtail of repercussions undoubtedly undermines freedom of expression in the country, so that "word-of-mouth" communication, one of the only the dominant voices are heard in the official most important channels of communication in media. On the pretext of protecting individual rural areas. dignity, privacy, reputation, national security, Developments in grassroots communication and public order, laws that have been promul­ have also been hampered by the repressive con­ gated cumulatively limit access to the political texts within which the media in the whole country public sphere and limit the voices that can be operate and the cumulative self- that heard, by limiting the channels that can be used. prevails in the country. Not only has the govern­ Extralegal activities, such as arrests and ment dominated the media landscape, it has also harassment by security forces, have also been tried to control and manipulate indigenous com­ applied to instill fear, compliance, and self­ munication systems such as music, theater, and censorship among journalists. Consequently, a religious performances. Artists, especially musi­ number ofjournalists have since left the country. cians considered too critical of the government, It has also been alleged that the Central have had their music banned on the airwaves, and Intelligence Organisation (CIO) has taken over some have been forced into self-censorship or some independent newspapers. The newspapers exile. These include Thomas Mapfumo, who is in question include the Zimbabwe Mirror currently living in exile in the United States. Newspapers Group, which publishes the Daily Theater groups such as Amakhosi Theatre MirrOl; the Daily Mirror on Saturday, and the Productions and Rooftop Productions have had Sunday Mirror. The chief executive officer of the their plays banned due to their critical political group was ousted through a boardroom coup. content. Police have banned the performance of Another independent weekly newspaper, the three satirical plays from Amakhosi-The Good Financial Gazette, has also been linked to the CIO President, Everyday Soldiel; and Overthrown­ takeover. The owner of two other independent citing political incorrectness. They have also weeldies, The Zimbabwe Independent and The banned Rooftop's play Super Patriots and Morons. Zimbabwe Standard, has repeatedly been This shows the government's determination to harassed by the authorities, who at one point control both the written and the oral public questioned his citizenship status. sphere. There are other artists who have dedicated Chapter 7 II1II Alternative Media and the Public Sphere in Zimbabwe 91

works toward challenging the status quo. As especially the word of mouth, oral literature, the­ eradical musician, Sam Farai Momo has vowed ater, festivals, and metaphysical forms in their at "the government is manipulating the arts and endeavor to air their views-not without risks, lture for propaganda to brainwash the nation, though, as already pointed out above. Ild we are coming in to challenge that and liber­ le our people's mental perceptions of reality" Alternative Radio Stations Shumba, 2007). Some artists have even formed a 'otest arts movement to challenge the govern­ Radio is the most-used medium in Zimbabwe, as ent's restrictions on artistic expressions (see, access to other media, such as newspapers, is lim­ ., www.voicesfromzimbabwe.com). ited by factors such as illiteracy, costs, and distri­ The cumulative effects ofthe legal and extrale­ bution and access patterns. Radio can thus be almeasures of control have turned the media described as the most powerful and strategic l1to both crucial settings and tools for power mass medium in the country, and this explains truggles. Freedom ofexpression is curtailed with why the government has been reluctant to liber­ punity, and communicative spaces have shrunk alize the radio sector. People in the villages have aresult ofthe government's concerted policy of access only to government-owned radio stations. tting down all avenues of access to the politi- This gives the incumbent ruling party unlimited Lpublic sphere. Alternative discourses are access to the majority of the population, hence a enced, marginalized, and isolated. competitive advantage over other political par­ ties also seeking rural votes. Disgruntled by the lack of access to main­ Iternative Media as stream radio, prodemocracy movements have pmmunicative Spaces turned to alternative radio stations, mostly with the support of Western governments would be expected in any environment where advocating for regime change in Zimbabwe. is little or no access to mainstream media, Alternative radio stations, referred to as clan­ movements and local communities turn to destine radio by Nichols and Soley (1987), are 'native communicative spaces independent defined as "unlicensed radio stations designed overnment control. As Nyamnjoh (2005) has to create political change within countries tar­ ued, geted by their transmission" (Zeller, n.d.). These stations often appear in countries experi­ However repressive a government IS and encing political crisis and where opposition however profound the spiral of silence forces have limited access to mainstream induced by standardized global media menus, few people are ever completely mystified or broadcasting media. Prodemocracy move­ wholly duped. In other words, there is always ments, aware of the strategic importance of the room-sometimes through radical or alternative medium in reaching the masses, have thus media. (p. 204) turned to alternative radio stations. The pri­ mary goal is advocating for political change The restricted communicative space in and offering alternative explanations to the cri­ babwe has generated an array of alternative sis in the country. dia and alternative public spheres. Political There are today three alternative radio sta­ .ormists are turning to the leTs (information tions relying on foreign transmission facilities dcommunication technologies), especially the and the Internet, and these are SW Radio Africa, ~rnet and radio stations hosted in foreign Voice of the People (Radio VOP), and Voice of ll.ntries for remedies, while some communities America's Studio 7. The stated objective for start­ ~riveted to indigenous communication systems, ing these radio stations is the endeavor to provide 92 PART 11 11 CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE

Zimbabweans with alternative radio channels Radio VOP has been a target of harassment by and provide news and perspectives that are silent government through raids, arrests, jamming, and in the government-owned radio programming. seizure of equipment and office files. In August These radio stations target the grassroots popula­ 2002, the offices of Radio VOP in Harare were tion in Zimbabwe, using all the three main lan­ destroyed in a bomb blasts, and the assailants guages, English, Shona, and Ndebele. have never been caught. But the motives for SW Radio Africa is based in the United bombing the offices were clear-to silence and Kingdom, and its stated objective is to be the intimidate journalists working for the station. Its voice of the voiceless, giving its audience oppor­ directors were, between December 2005 and tunities to call in and air their firsthand experi­ January 2006, arrested and charged with operat­ ences ofthe situation in Zimbabwe. It also allows ing a radio station without a license, but the case readers of its Web site opportunities to partici­ against them failed, since they operate a "com­ pate through discussion forums. SW Radio munication trust" rather than a radio station. Africa's Web site includes links to major Voice of America Studio 7 is another radio prodemocracy groups in Zimbabwe. SW Radio initiative based in foreign countries. Studio 7 is a Africa has broadcast every day via shortwave and radio news channel launched by the Voice of Web radio, and in December, 2006, it introduced America in 2003, and it is manned by exiled an SMS service where it sends news headlines to Zimbabwean journalists based in the United mobile telephone subscribers in the country. The States. It features interviews and commentary on initiative followed reports that the security social, political, and economic matters. The gov­ agents were confiscating shortwave radios from ernment has repeatedly accused the U.S. govern­ listeners in an effort to prevent people from ment of sponsoring a hostile radio station. accessing alternative radio broadcasts. Several Another ingenious alternative radio is the NGOs have also been distributing solar-powered Radio Dialogue project. Radio Dialogue is a radio receivers in remote rural areas so as to community radio program whose original aim enable people to access shortwave broadcasts was to have a community broadcasting license from alternative radio stations. The government for Bulawayo and its surrounding. As the name has, on several occasions jammed shortwave implies, it intended to create a forum for debate broadcasts from SW Radio Africa and other and information on economic, political, social, alternative broadcasters. cultural, and developmental issues. Radio Radio VOP was established in 2000 as an alter­ Dialogue has embarked on a project of diffusing native voice for Zimbabweans in the run-up to community views by other methods, which do that year's parliamentary elections and is broad­ not rely on radio transmission technology. These cast in shortwave 1 hour everyday. Its stated methods include road shows in which the com­ objectives are "to cover issues that would not munities, local artists, and musicians participate make it to the state controlled electronic media" in artistic works such as dancing, singing, talk and to give Zimbabweans an opportunity to look shows, workshops, and meetings to plan advo­ at issues critically. Programs are produced by cacy issues around democracy, the rule of law journalists based in the country and then and human rights, and discussion forums in shipped or e-mailed to the Netherlands for trans­ schools. These programs are recorded in audio mission via Radio Netherlands' relay transmis­ and video cassettes and then distributed to the sion in Madagascar. Radio VOP promotes the community. Radio Dialogue's stated aims are works of prodemocracy organizations such as that it should be available, accessible, and afford­ Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights, National able to the community it serves. It is the commu­ Constitutional Assembly, Zimbabwe Electoral nity's own means of communication and a Support Network, and many others. For this, platform for everyone to express themselves. Chapter 7 III Alternative Media and the Public Sphere in Zimbabwe 93

The alternative radio stations are clearly The popularity of these Web sites IS eVI­ an endeavor to democratize the political pub­ denced through the ratings they get. In 2005, lic sphere in Zimbabwe, and they provide New Zimbabwe.com was rated by the U.S.­ alternative discursive spaces for marginalized based Alexa Web Search as the most popular voices. Web site in Zimbabwe, scoring higher than the country's largest daily newspaper, The Herald. Johwa (2007) has noted that "with draconian The Internet and media laws continuing to throttle the life of New Media Spaces publishing and broadcasting in Zimbabwe, The repressive media environment in Zimbabwe these online agencies have become an increas­ has ignited the rapid growth ofpolitical news Web ingly important source of alternative informa­ sites hosted in foreign domains, mainly South tion for many Zimbabweans who can access Africa, the United States, and the United Kingdom. them." The popularity of the news sites is also The aim of these news sites is to provide access to due to the fact that a quarter of Zimbabwe's those who otherwise would not have such access in 12 million people live in foreign countries, where the Zimbabwean media. These include access to the Internet is better than in Zimbabwe. groups, "dissidents:' trade unions, and opposition The news sites are linked and sometimes parties. The Web sites are driven by a focused financed by various social movements and political agenda aimed at democratic reforms NGOs, have other priorities than making money, in Zimbabwe. Today, there are more than 12 and are sympathetic to certain factions in Zimbabwe-focused news sites. 2 Almost all the news Zimbabwe's fragmented politics. Sometimes sites describe and perceive themselves as alternative there is animosity between news sites. spaces of communication and information for The government's reaction to these online Zimbabweans. Their intention is thus to expand publications has been milder than its reaction to the shrinking communicative space. other publications. This might be due to the fact For example, New Zimbabwe.corn describes that these news sites target groups other than the itself as "a vehicle for mass participation" moti­ ruling party's grassroots supporters, that they are vated by a belief that "every Zimbabwean and hosted outside the reach ofits draconian national every African with a voice deserves to be heard­ media laws, and that most ofthe articles are pub­ including those who have forfeited the freedoms lished under pseudonyms. The regime is, how­ ofthe majority" (www.newzimbabwe.com/pages/ ever, eager to control the news sites, which it usl.html). The Web site claims to be driven by claims are sponsored by foreign interests bent freedom of expression, hence its being open to on effecting regime change in the country. those suppressing freedom of expression in Journalists and individuals have also been Zimbabwe. Another news site, ZWNews.com, is warned against contributing stories to foreign­

Zimbabwe, and they offer linkages to fragmented effectiveness of alternative media as communica­ and dispersed dissenting voices. tive spaces in Zimbabwe. First, the alternative media movement is created mostly by self-exiled journalists, refugees, expatri­ An Alternative Public Sphere ates, academics, students, and experts based out­ side Zimbabwe, mostly in South Africa, the United The Gramscian notion of counterhegemony is Kingdom, and the United States. This group effec­ discernable in these alternative media. The tively uses news sites to catch up with the latest absence of an accessible public sphere, as a space news from home and seeks to influence political where the people can come together and partici­ discourse. The ruling elites perceive this group as pate in inclusive political discussions, gave rise to comprising potential supporters of the opposition an alternative realm of political debate. With the movement. Therefore, despite their capacity to mainstream media controlled and dominated by generate political discussion, the government has government, the alternative media constitute made sure that little of these discussions reach the alternative communicative spaces independent grass roots in Zimbabwe by, for example, jamming of the cohesive apparatus of the state and are the radio frequencies, confiscating radio receivers, thus positioned to challenge the dominant criminalizing comments critical ofthe president­ sociopolitical order. The alternative media offer primarily to dissuade rumor mongering and word platforms for political advocacy to democracy of mouth. In that way, there is a disjuncture activists and the transnationally integrated between a highly engaged political movement prodemocracy social movements. based abroad and a less-informed majority resid­ The democratic potential of alternative media ing within the country. The state machinery has is, however, not without shortcomings. Alter­ drastically disempowered the diaspora through native media are so often hailed as having the disenfranchisement. potential to enhance democracy and citizenship Second, the prevailing economic situation (Bolton, 2006). They provide platforms for the shapes the spread of the Internet in the country. marginalized groups who do not see their inter­ The International Telecommunication Union fig­ ests and concerns reflected in the mainstream ures of 2005 show that the Internet penetration media. New communication technologies, espe­ rate is 6.7%. While a significant number of cially the Internet, have created opportunities for Zimbabweans can access the Internet from the establishment of a counterpublic sphere, Internet cafes, prices are beyond the reach ntITl"lnV revitalizing citizen-based democracy on the basis This implies that the Internet public sphere is of access, participation, and pluralism. The exclusionary and elitist public sphere. The promise potential of the Internet arises in its capability to ofthe Internet as a domain for an alternative pub­ host new spaces for distribution of content and lic sphere fostering debate and discussion. Characteristics of interactivity and exchange is lost when conversations are limited to anonymity enable many to be heard without fear the few who can afford the costs. This lack ofaccess of victimization or reprisals. to alternative media hampers the advocacy work However, the optimism generated by the and mobilization by social movements whose tar­ upsurge of new political communicative spaces get group is the majority within the country. ought not to ignore other factors militating Third, the alternative media with against this view. Bolton (2006) argues that while agendas often tend to be elitist. Studies of the the Internet does provide a space for more par­ activists' newspaper SchNews have shown that ticipation, the social distribution of cultural cap­ while at first glance the paper appears to pri:vil1ege ital or know-how discriminates against full "ordinary" voices, closer examination reveals participation online. There are a number of "counter-elite" (Bolton, 2006). While no sys1tematic social, political, and cultural factors that limit the study has been carried out on Zimbabwe-focused Chapter 7 l1li Alternative Media and the Public Sphere in Zimbabwe 95 news sites, the journalistic sourcing practices used Barnett, C. (2003). Culture alld democracy: Media, space in the sites reveal hegemonic tendencies. These alld representatioll. Edinburgh, UK: Edinburgh sourcing practices determine which news actors University Press. are included and excluded. This practice can even­ Bolton, T. (2006). News on the net: A critical analysis tually work to silence the very voices that the alter­ of the potential of online alternative journalism to challenge the dominance of mainstream news native public sphere claims to amplify. The media. Journal of Media Arts alld Culture, 3(1). pluralism expected from these alternative media Retrieved April 3, 2009, from www.scan.net.au/ can also be reduced by the presence of active par­ scan/journallprint.php?Ud=34&journaUd=71 ticipants who tend to dominate the discourses. Huntington, S. P. (1991). The third wave: Democ­ Nevertheless, it can be argued that alternative ratisatioll ill the late twelltieth celltury. Norman: media such as online news sites, radio stations, University of Oklahoma Press. and other communication media are promoting Johwa, W. (2007, January 23). Media-Zimbabwe: From communicative democracy by recovering the turning pages to downloading them. IPS Illter Press spaces for political participation. The alternative Service News Agellcy, Retrieved February 6, 2007, media are aiding social movements in their relent­ from http://ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=36273 less pursuit of democratic change in Zimbabwe. Keane, J. (1995). Structural transformation ofthe pub­ lic sphere. Commullicatioll Review, 1(1), 1-22. McNair, B. (2000). Journalism alld democracy: All eval­ uatioll of the political public sphere. London: Routledge. Nichols, J., & Soley, L. (1987). Clalldestille radio broadcast­ 1. See TIle Politics ofFood Assistallce ill Zimbabwe on illg: A study ofrel'olutiollat)' alld coullterrel'olutiollat)' t4e Human Rights Watch Web site: wvvw.hrw.orglback­ electrollic commullication New York: Praeger. grounder/africa/zimbabwe/2004/5.htm Nyamnjoh, F. (2005). Africa's media: Democracy alld the politics ofbelollgillg. London: Zed Books. 2. www.newzimbabwe.com.wwvv.zimdaily.com. Randall, V. (1999). The media and democratisation in Ww\v.zwnews.com, www.zimonline.co.za. www the Third World. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), .thezimbabwean.co.uk, www.zimbabwesituation.com. 624-646. www.thezimbabwetimes.com,www.zimobserver.com, Shumba, T. (2007, November 22). Youllg Zimbabwe rebel \vww.zimbabwepost.com, www.changezimbabwe.com. artists take 011 Mugabe. Retrieved November 29, www.zimbabwejournalists.com.ww.studi07news.com 2007, from the ZimOnline Web site: www.zimonline (accessible at http://www.voanews.com/english/africa/ .co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=2358 zimbabwe/), www.swradioafrica.com, and www.vopradio Woo-Young, C. (2005). The Internet, alternative pub­ .cO.zw lic sphere and political dynamism: Korea's non­ gaek (polemist) websites. The Pacific Review, 18(3),393-415. Zeller, G. (n.d.). The Ace "clalldestille profile": Clalldestille radio statiolls. The Association of Clandestine Abel, R. (1997). An alternative press. Why? Publishillg Radio Enthusiasts. Retrieved November 4, 2007, Research Quarterly, 12(4),78-84. from www.frn.net/ace/clandpro.htm