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Domar Source: the Journal of Economic History, Vol Economic History Association The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis Author(s): Evsey D. Domar Source: The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 30, No. 1, The Tasks of Economic History (Mar., 1970), pp. 18-32 Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Economic History Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2116721 Accessed: 18-09-2015 10:24 UTC Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/ info/about/policies/terms.jsp JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. Cambridge University Press and Economic History Association are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Journal of Economic History. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.199.207.113 on Fri, 18 Sep 2015 10:24:51 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions The Causes of Slaveryor Serfdom: A Hypothesis I THE purposeof thispaper is to present,or morecorrectly, to revive,a hypothesisregarding the causes of agriculturalserf- dom or slavery (used here interchangeably).The hypothesiswas suggestedby Kliuchevsky'sdescription of the Russian experience in the sixteenthand seventeenthcenturies, but it aims at a wider applicability.' Accordingto Kliuchevsky,from about the second half of the fif- teenthcentury Russia was engaged in long hard wars against her westernand southernneighbors. The wars requiredlarge forcesthat the statefound impossible to supportfrom tax revenuealone. Hence the governmentbegan to assign lands (pomestia) to the servitors, who were expected to use peasant labor (directlyand/or via pay- mentsin kind and/ormoney) for theirmaintenance and weapons. In exchange,the servitorgave the peasants a loan and permitted them,free men as yet,to workall or part of his land on theirown. The systemworked rather badly, however,because of shortageof labor. Severe competitionamong landownersdeveloped, the ser- vitorsbeing bested by lay and clerical magnates. Things became particularlydifficult for the servitorsafter the middle of the six- teenthcentury when the centralareas of the state became depop- ulated because of peasant migrationinto the newlyconquered areas in the east and southeast.Under the pressureof the servingclass For many helpfulcomments on an earlierdraft, I am gratefulto the following persons: AbrahamBecker, Oleg Hoeffding,Clayton La Force, Edward Mitchell, WilliamParker, George Rosen, Matthew Edel, PeterTemin, Helen Turinand Charles Wolf, Jr. Alexander Gerschenkron'searlier suggestionswere also very helpful. Thanksare also due Ann Peet forher excellentresearch assistance. I am also gratefulto the RAND Corporationfor its supportof an earlierversion of this study (20 October 1966), and to the National Science Foundationfor its assistance(Grant No. NSF-GS-2627) in revisingand extendingthe firstdraft. Neither these two organizations,nor the personslisted above, are responsiblefor the views expressedhere. 1 V. Kliuchevsky,Kurs russkofistorii (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoesotsial'no-eko. nomicheskoeizdatel'stvo, 1937). The originalwork was publishedin 1906. All my referencesapply to the 1937 edition.An English translationby C. J. Hogarth,A Historyof Russia,was publishedin New York by Russell and Russellin 1960. For specificreferences, see Part II. is This content downloaded from 129.199.207.113 on Fri, 18 Sep 2015 10:24:51 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Causes of Slavery 19 and forcertain other reasons, the governmentgradually restricted the freedomof peasants,already hopelessly in debt to theirland- lords,to move.They became enserfed by themiddle of the seven- teenthcentury, though the processitself continued for many dec- ades to come. Thisis a veryrough summary of Kliuchevsky's story which hardly does himjustice but whichwill servemy purposesuntil Part II. Like manya historian,he assembledand describedthe relevant facts(and in beautifulRussian at that) and stoppedjust shortof an analyticalexplanation. The economistwould recastKliuchevsky's account as follows: The servitorstried to live offrents (in one formor another)to be collectedfrom their estates. But the estatescould not yielda sig- nificantamount of rentfor the simplereason that land in Russia was not sufficientlyscarce relativeto labor,and ironically,was made even less scarceby Russianconquests. The scarcefactor of productionwas not land but labor.Hence it was the ownership of peasantsand not of land thatcould yield an incometo the ser- vitorsor to anynon-working landowning class. A simpleeconomic model may sharpenthe argument(if any sharpeningis needed) and help to developit further.Assume that labor and land are the onlyfactors of production(no capitalor management),and that land of uniformquality and locationis ubiquitous.No diminishingreturns in the applicationof labor to land appear;both the averageand the marginalproductivities of laborare constantand equal, and if competitionamong employers raiseswages to thatlevel (as would be expected),no rentfrom land can arise,as Ricardodemonstrated some time past. In the ab- senceof specificgovernmental action to the contrary(see below), the countrywill consistof family-sizefarms because hiredlabor, in anyform, will be eitherunavailable or unprofitable:the wage of a hiredman or theincome of a tenantwill have to be at leastequal to whathe can makeon his ownfarm; if he receivesthat much, no surplus(rent) willbe leftfor his employer.A non-workingclass of servitorsor otherscould be supportedby the governmentout of taxeslevied (directlyor indirectly)on the peasants,but it could not supportitself from land rents. As a steptoward reality, let us relaxthe assumption of theubiq- uityof uniformland, and let capital (clearingcosts, food, seeds, livestock,structures and implements)and managementbe included This content downloaded from 129.199.207.113 on Fri, 18 Sep 2015 10:24:51 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 20 Evsey D. Domar amongthe factorsof production.Owners of capital,of superior skilland ofbetter-than-average land will now be able to pay a hired manhis due (or to use a tenant)and stillobtain a surplus.But so longas agriculturalskills can be easilyacquired, the amount of cap- ital forstarting a farmis small,and the per capita incomeis rel- ativelyhigh (because of theample supply of land), a good worker shouldbe able to saveor borrowand starton hisown in time.Most of the farmswill stillbe moreor less family-size,with an estate usinghired labor (or tenants)here and therein areasof unusually good (in fertilityand/or in location)land, or specializingin activ- itiesrequiring higher-than-average capital intensity, or skillfulman- agement.But untilland becomesrather scarce, and/or the amount ofcapital required to starta farmrelatively large, it is unlikelythat a largeclass of landowners, such as requiredby theMuscovite gov- ernment,could be supportedby economicforces alone. The Amer- ican Northin the Colonialperiod and in the nineteenthcentury wouldbe a good exampleof an agriculturalstructure of thistype. So farthe institutionalstructure has been shapedby economic forcesalone without direct interference by the government.2Sup- pose now thatthe governmentdecides to create,or at least to fa- cilitatethe creationof, a non-workingclass of agriculturalowners. As a firststep, it givesthe membersof thisclass the sole rightof ownershipof land. The peasantswill now have to workfor the landowners,but so longas theworkers are freeto move,competi- tionamong the employerswill drivethe wage up to the value of the marginalproduct of labor,and since the latteris stillfairly close to the value of the averageproduct (because of the abun- danceof land) littlesurplus will remain. The Russiansituation prior to thepeasants' enserfment corresponds to thiscase. The nextand finalstep to be takenby the governmentstill pur- suingits objectiveis the abolitionof the peasants'right to move. Withlabor tied to land or to the owner,competition among em- ployersceases. Now the employercan derivea rent,not fromhis land,but fromhis peasantsby appropriatingall or mostof their incomeabove some subsistence level.3 That Russian serfs could stay alive,and evento multiply,while working for themselves half-time 2 I mean by the "government"any organizationcapable of maintainingsome measureof law and orderand particularlyof usingnon-economic compulsion. It can be a king,an assemblyof landowners,a magnate,etc. 3 He may be restrainedby customand by the fearthat his serfscan run away-a commonoccurence in Russia. This content downloaded from 129.199.207.113 on Fri, 18 Sep 2015 10:24:51 UTC All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Causes of Slavery 21 and less suggeststhat the productivityof theirlabor (with poor technique,little capital, but abundantland) musthave been quite high. To recapitulate,the strongversion of thishypothesis (without capital,management, etc.) assertsthat of thethree elements of an agriculturalstructure relevant here-free land, freepeasants, and non-workinglandowners-any two elements but never all threecan existsimultaneously. The combinationto be foundin realitywill depend on the behaviorof politicalfactors-governmental mea- sures-treatedhere as an exogenousvariable. The presenceof thisexogenous political
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