Vol 04 Issue 2

Atom A "i • JOURNAL Summer 1990 Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise Editor Col Keith W. Geiger Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst. Art Director and Illustrator The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Summer 1990, Vol. IV, No. 2 AFRP 5 0 - 2 Editorial 2 Requirements Planning Lt Gen Thomas R. Ferguson. Jr., USAF Terrence J. Hertz 4 NATO Air Operations after Arms Control Lt Edward H. Feege. Jr., USN 20 War Gaming: Thinking for the Future Lt Col David B. Lee, USAF 40 Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat: The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend Insurgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Thunder C2C Diego M. Wendt. USAFA 52 The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations: implications for US Maritime Strategy Dr Donald D. Chipman 66 Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 76 Notams Notices of Interest 94 Contributors 95 Currently, a popular analogy for the EDITORIAL business of the Air Force is that of the pro fessional football team. We expect our players to concentrate on being experts— that’s why they are “hired.” There are other parallels between the leadership structures of both organizations. These Scoping the Game comparisons have some validity, but con sider the differences. A pro team recruits barrage of news, editorials, and com its people from among the best it can get, mentaries in the press has made us including those from other teams. Society, Aaware of the dramatic changes occurring in though, takes a dim view of military pro Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. fessionals who act as free agents and hire Pundits predict that these changes will on with the highest bidder. The Air Force have a varying impact, depending on one’s must grow its own first-string players, as point of view, on the global strategies and well as trainers, coaches, and general man military force structure of the United agers. Given the professional requirement States. Valid arguments abound over doc for its junior, middle, and senior manage trines. threats, strategies, the most effective ment to have actually played the game, it weapons systems, and the resultant force is unlikely that the Air Force will rely on structure. This is interesting grist for the external hires to guide the development professional and bureaucratic mills, but it and employment of its combat capability. will likely be some time before decision The military person who understands makers resolve these matters. At this these requirements hardly needs to be told point, we can assume that these changes that players of all sorts form the pool from and economic realities almost certainly which the Air Force will draw even its will cause reductions in the US military junior management personnel. In contrast, force structure and that fewer of us will be only a highly optimistic linebacker or around to argue about and man the result quarterback would expect a 20-year foot ing forces. This does make things a bit ball career “on the line.” more personal; at the least, we can gener Noting that there may well be fewer of ate some immediate interest in the ques us in the future and that the myriad func tion of just who these “fewer” might be. tions necessary to a modern military force Recently, an article in these pages re will not decrease in variety, we may not be minded us that success is a societally de able to lock ourselves into single-specialty fined accomplishment. It cautioned that tracks. It seems reasonable to presume that societies, oddly enough, tend to assess the most professionally educated and people and their potential in a social functionally versatile of our people will context—nothing really revelatory. After also be our most valuable. Does this mean all. this lesson is nothing more than a that real warriors face a bleak future? Ab broader application of what is fondly solutely not! Warrior is a state of mind, not known as situational awareness. Perhaps a specialty. It requires a drive to prevail, we should bear in mind that success, in an awareness of situation, an intellectual and of itself, has little meaning outside its flexibility, and an appreciation of the societal context. Being promoted is neither broader purposes and tenets of the military important nor the mark of success; rather, profession. Those who are able to carry accomplishing something by being pro that state of mind into whatever assign moted is what counts. Thus, military pro ments may present themselves are likely to fessionals must remember that, after all, be the military professionals on whom we their careers have a social purpose and rely to take us into the twenty-first aspect. century. KWG 2 ricochets Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- SOS spent a considerable amount of time on spondence should be addressed to the Editor. TDY to Thailand and the Republic of Korea Airpower Journal. YVafker Hall. Bldg 1400. (ROK) working with their respective special op Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the erations forces (SOF). While their land and right to edit the material for overall length. naval SOF are among the most capable in the world, effective air employment of them by the host nation is severely hampered for the MISIDENTIFIED TARGET reasons cited in Major Newton's article. The 1st SOS lacked the requisite language skills, assets, Some sharp-eyed readers of Col William R. and—most importantly—the operational direc Carter’s "Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge" tive to adequately train its Thai air force and in our Winter 1989 issue noted that we ROK air force counterparts in air employment misidentified a destroyed German tank as a of SOF. Thus, totally effective air employment Mark IV when, i n f act, it was a Mark V. We can of their land and naval SOF pivots largely upon only hope that all our close air support pilots a high degree of US Air Force SOF integration are equally well versed in the identifica (even direct intervention) during a crisis. tion of modern enemy armor! Thanks for the With the recent political events in Eastern correction. Europe reducing the threat of large-scale con ventional war, USAF’s low-intensity conflict capability will become an even more important KUDOS FOR PME cornerstone of our nation’s war-fighting strat egy. As such, it would behoove USAF’s senior Lt Col Richard L. Davis’s article on "The Case leadership to take serious note of the issues and for Officer Professional Military Education” proposals presented by Major Newton. (Winter 1989) was outstanding. It showed much thought and research on the topic. The Lt Col Thomas J. Doherty, USAF, Retired value of its insights is immeasurable to the pro Fart Walton Beach. Florida fessional Air Force. My compliments to Colonel Davis on a fine article. SrA George G. DiMichele A FINAL SHOT AT CLAUSEWITZ Clemens. Michigan I see that my letter in the Summer 1989 Airpower Journal in response to Capt Kenneth L. Davison’s article ("Clausewitz and the In COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT direct Approach: Misreading the Master," Win ON TARGET ter 1988) has elicited two “ricochets” in the Vly compliments to Maj Richard D. Newton for Winter 1989 issue. One is by Captain Davison lis insightful article entitled "A US Air Force and the other bv Lt Col Phillip Meilinger, who Role in Counterinsurgency Support" in your claims I have substituted J. F. C. Fuller, the 'all 1989 issue. His article is, perhaps, one of British military analyst, for Clausewitz as a he most important recently published in the master and an icon. But in my letter I merely Yirpower Journal. pointed out that Fuller had made some sharp My operational experience 11985-89) as oper- observations about Clausewitz’s shortcomings itions officer and commander of the 1st Special as an interpreter of Napoleon. I never intended Operations Squadron (SOS) completely sup to replace Clausewitz with Fuller as an object ports his assertion that today's Air Force “lacks of veneration. he ability to train and educate our allies to joseph Forbes employ (counterinsurgency weapons|.’’ The 1st Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 3 REQUIREMENTS PLANNING Lt Gen Thomas R. Fer gu so n , Jr ., USAF Ter r en c e J. Her t z REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 5 a tive.”3 Further, he notes that “the require ments process centers on actions by the Chairman of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] in conferring on, evaluating, advising on, and recommending operational requirements.”4 Kent described the macrolevel view of requirements. A microlevel, or weapon- system. view of requirements also exists. To paraphrase a comment by Gen Larry D. Welch, Air Force chief of staff, “We tend to use the word requirement too loosely.

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