Atom A "i • JOURNAL Summer 1990 Secretary of the Air Force Dr Donald B. Rice

Air Force Chief of Staff Gen Larry D. Welch

Commander, Air University Lt Gen Charles G. Boyd

Commander, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education Col Sidney J. Wise

Editor Col Keith W. Geiger

Associate Editor Maj Michael A. Kirtland

Professional Staff Hugh Richardson, Contributing Editor Marvin W. Bassett. Contributing Editor Dorothy M. McCluskie, Production Manager Steven C. Garst. Art Director and Illustrator

The Airpower Journal, published quarterly, is the professional journal of the United States Air Force. It is designed to serve as an open forum for presenting and stimulating innovative think­ ing on military doctrine, strategy, tactics, force structure, readiness, and other national defense matters. The views and opinions expressed or implied in the Journal are those of the authors and should not be construed as carrying the offi­ cial sanction of the Department of Defense, the Air Force, Air University, or other agencies or departments of the US government. Articles in this edition may be reproduced in whole or in part without permission. If reproduced, the Airpower Journal requests a courtesy line. JOURNAL Summer 1990, Vol. IV, No. 2 AFRP 5 0 - 2

Editorial 2

Requirements Planning Lt Gen Thomas R. Ferguson. Jr., USAF Terrence J. Hertz 4

NATO Air Operations after Arms Control Lt Edward H. Feege. Jr., USN 20

War Gaming: Thinking for the Future Lt Col David B. Lee, USAF 40

Using a Sledgehammer to Kill a Gnat: The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend Insurgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Thunder C2C Diego M. Wendt. USAFA 52

The Transformation of Soviet Maritime Air Operations: implications for US Maritime Strategy Dr Donald D. Chipman 66

Ricochets Letters 3 Net Assessment Reviews of Current Literature 76 Notams Notices of Interest 94 Contributors 95 Currently, a popular analogy for the EDITORIAL business of the Air Force is that of the pro­ fessional football team. We expect our players to concentrate on being experts— that’s why they are “hired.” There are other parallels between the leadership structures of both organizations. These Scoping the Game comparisons have some validity, but con­ sider the differences. A pro team recruits barrage of news, editorials, and com­ its people from among the best it can get, mentaries in the press has made us including those from other teams. Society, Aaware of the dramatic changes occurring in though, takes a dim view of military pro­ Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. fessionals who act as free agents and hire Pundits predict that these changes will on with the highest bidder. The Air Force have a varying impact, depending on one’s must grow its own first-string players, as point of view, on the global strategies and well as trainers, coaches, and general man­ military force structure of the United agers. Given the professional requirement States. Valid arguments abound over doc­ for its junior, middle, and senior manage­ trines. threats, strategies, the most effective ment to have actually played the game, it weapons systems, and the resultant force is unlikely that the Air Force will rely on structure. This is interesting grist for the external hires to guide the development professional and bureaucratic mills, but it and employment of its combat capability. will likely be some time before decision The military person who understands makers resolve these matters. At this these requirements hardly needs to be told point, we can assume that these changes that players of all sorts form the pool from and economic realities almost certainly which the Air Force will draw even its will cause reductions in the US military junior management personnel. In contrast, force structure and that fewer of us will be only a highly optimistic linebacker or around to argue about and man the result­ quarterback would expect a 20-year foot­ ing forces. This does make things a bit ball career “on the line.” more personal; at the least, we can gener­ Noting that there may well be fewer of ate some immediate interest in the ques­ us in the future and that the myriad func­ tion of just who these “fewer” might be. tions necessary to a modern military force Recently, an article in these pages re­ will not decrease in variety, we may not be minded us that success is a societally de­ able to lock ourselves into single-specialty fined accomplishment. It cautioned that tracks. It seems reasonable to presume that societies, oddly enough, tend to assess the most professionally educated and people and their potential in a social functionally versatile of our people will context—nothing really revelatory. After also be our most valuable. Does this mean all. this lesson is nothing more than a that real warriors face a bleak future? Ab­ broader application of what is fondly solutely not! Warrior is a state of mind, not known as situational awareness. Perhaps a specialty. It requires a drive to prevail, we should bear in mind that success, in an awareness of situation, an intellectual and of itself, has little meaning outside its flexibility, and an appreciation of the societal context. Being promoted is neither broader purposes and tenets of the military important nor the mark of success; rather, profession. Those who are able to carry accomplishing something by being pro­ that state of mind into whatever assign­ moted is what counts. Thus, military pro­ ments may present themselves are likely to fessionals must remember that, after all, be the military professionals on whom we their careers have a social purpose and rely to take us into the twenty-first aspect. century. KWG

2 ricochets

Letters to the editor are encouraged. All corre- SOS spent a considerable amount of time on spondence should be addressed to the Editor. TDY to Thailand and the Republic of Korea Airpower Journal. YVafker Hall. Bldg 1400. (ROK) working with their respective special op­ Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the erations forces (SOF). While their land and right to edit the material for overall length. naval SOF are among the most capable in the world, effective air employment of them by the host nation is severely hampered for the MISIDENTIFIED TARGET reasons cited in Major Newton's article. The 1st SOS lacked the requisite language skills, assets, Some sharp-eyed readers of Col William R. and—most importantly—the operational direc­ Carter’s "Air Power in the Battle of the Bulge" tive to adequately train its Thai air force and in our Winter 1989 issue noted that we ROK air force counterparts in air employment misidentified a destroyed German tank as a of SOF. Thus, totally effective air employment Mark IV when, i n f act, it was a Mark V. We can of their land and naval SOF pivots largely upon only hope that all our close air support pilots a high degree of US Air Force SOF integration are equally well versed in the identifica­ (even direct intervention) during a crisis. tion of modern enemy armor! Thanks for the With the recent political events in Eastern correction. Europe reducing the threat of large-scale con­ ventional war, USAF’s low-intensity conflict capability will become an even more important KUDOS FOR PME cornerstone of our nation’s war-fighting strat­ egy. As such, it would behoove USAF’s senior Lt Col Richard L. Davis’s article on "The Case leadership to take serious note of the issues and for Officer Professional Military Education” proposals presented by Major Newton. (Winter 1989) was outstanding. It showed much thought and research on the topic. The Lt Col Thomas J. Doherty, USAF, Retired value of its insights is immeasurable to the pro­ Fart Walton Beach. Florida fessional Air Force. My compliments to Colonel Davis on a fine article. SrA George G. DiMichele A FINAL SHOT AT CLAUSEWITZ Clemens. Michigan I see that my letter in the Summer 1989 Airpower Journal in response to Capt Kenneth L. Davison’s article ("Clausewitz and the In ­ COUNTERINSURGENCY SUPPORT direct Approach: Misreading the Master," Win­ ON TARGET ter 1988) has elicited two “ricochets” in the Vly compliments to Maj Richard D. Newton for Winter 1989 issue. One is by Captain Davison lis insightful article entitled "A US Air Force and the other bv Lt Col Phillip Meilinger, who Role in Counterinsurgency Support" in your claims I have substituted J. F. C. Fuller, the 'all 1989 issue. His article is, perhaps, one of British military analyst, for Clausewitz as a he most important recently published in the master and an icon. But in my letter I merely Yirpower Journal. pointed out that Fuller had made some sharp My operational experience 11985-89) as oper- observations about Clausewitz’s shortcomings itions officer and commander of the 1st Special as an interpreter of Napoleon. I never intended Operations Squadron (SOS) completely sup­ to replace Clausewitz with Fuller as an object ports his assertion that today's Air Force “lacks of veneration. he ability to train and educate our allies to joseph Forbes employ (counterinsurgency weapons|.’’ The 1st Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

3 REQUIREMENTS PLANNING

Lt Gen Thomas R. Fer gu so n , Jr ., USAF Ter r en c e J. Her t z REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 5 a tive.”3 Further, he notes that “the require­ ments process centers on actions by the Chairman of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] in conferring on, evaluating, advising on, and recommending operational requirements.”4 Kent described the macrolevel view of requirements. A microlevel, or weapon- system. view of requirements also exists. To paraphrase a comment by Gen Larry D. Welch, Air Force chief of staff, “We tend to use the word requirement too loosely. We start with a need—the unconstrained requirement—and then begin a refinement process seeking trade-offs—looking for the optimum solution—taking cost, schedule, he current approach to identifying and performance into account. The first military requirements has the ap­ time Requirement (with a capital RJ pearance of a pot simmering on the should be used is after the trade-off pro­ back burner: it works well with ex­ cess is complete. That’s not earlier than perienced chefs—those who know the recfull-scale­ development.”5 ipe—but the chefs (the decision makers) The definition of requirement depends change often. As the decision makerson where one is in the requirements plan­ Tchange, so changes the perception of the ning process. Requirements planning be­ requirement, the threat, and other factors gins with an examination of the opera­ as well, resulting in frequent modifications tional need. It continues as weapon-system in funding, schedule, and requirements. alternatives are evaluated according to The latter changes, in turn, lead to addi­ how well they allow us to fulfill opera­ tional problems associated with increased tional requirements. Finally, requirements oversight. James A. Winnefeld notes that planning makes trades in performance (in­ although the “acquisition process carries cluding reliability and maintainability), the burdens of earlier ... failures [one area cost, and schedule to determine the op­ in which| the acquisition process and its timum system specification. The result of practitioners have themselves to blame [is) this process is a system requirement. the specification of requirements.”1 The fluctuation of requirements at both Prior to any discussion of requirements the operational and system levels is among planning, one must decide upon a defini­ the recurring themes of several studies that tion of the term. Unfortunately, require­ identified problems with defense acquisi­ ments has many meanings in the field of tion. The report by the President’s Blue defense acquisition. Col Alexander P. Ribbon Commission on Defense Manage­ Shine notes a problem of semantics in the ment, also called the Packard commission, Department of Defense (DOD) bureaucra- outlines fundamental problems associated tese: “ Requirement [italics added] can with establishing requirements: (1) setting mean anything from ‘something we are requirements at the national level, (2) esti­ quite confident we really have to have in mating costs and schedules, (3) resolving order to ensure battlefield success' to changes in program (system) requirements, something we sure would like to have if and (4) increasing the incentives to reduce no one would fuss too much about it.'"2 program costs.6 In his approach to defense According to Glenn A. Kent, the only legit­ planning, called “strategies to tasks," Kent imate use of the word is to “say that we correctly points out that a systematic ap­ have a requirement to increase our capa­ proach to a focused national strategy is the bility to achieve some operational objec­ first step.7 Correcting the fundamental 6 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

problems does require a focused national discipline, we improve the data that backs strategy, but those of us in requirements up the rationale for each milestone and we planning can remove some of the diffi­ reduce the—at times—irrational behavior culties by working the requirements pro­ of the acquisition decision process. cess more systematically. Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), The purpose of this article is to explore one of the Air Force acquisition com­ the requirements process—the current mands, is a major participant in require­ practice and problems associated with it— ments planning. Its role requires focusing and present a proposal for improvement. on high-priority needs and missions, and This proposal is based on the recommen­ anticipating the need for major system- dations of Secretary of Defense Richard B. acquisition programs. Thus, AFSC must Cheney in his response to National Secu­ have an understanding of the problems rity Review 11 in 1989.8 Because its foun­ and deficiencies which affect the capabil­ dation is sound, we suggest only modest ities of the major commands. Of course, re­ changes to the current process. Our most quirements planning involves other en­ significant change is philosophical, insofar tities than AFSC: the Air Staff, industry, as we add an element that is currently and requirements planners from other ma­ lacking, for the most part. That is disci­ jor commands also contribute. Hence, dis­ pline— knowing where one is in the acqui­ cipline demands that all participants know sition cycle and working the appropriate their roles and know how they interact pieces in turn. This requires making the with other participants. The emergence of correct decision at the correct milestone a need begins a constant, continual di­ and sticking by that decision. By adding alogue among these participants, which

WEAPON REQUIREMENT SYSTEM

TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY OPPORTUNITIES IDEAS

PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH:

OPERATIONAL DISCIPLINED REQUIREMENT NEED STUDY/ANALYSIS

Figure 1. What Comes First.. . Solution or Problem? REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 7

will carry through the life of each acquisi­ 9 tion program. The dialogue begins by es­ tablishing the best possible understanding of what Air Force commanders are most concerned about. It continues with pin­ pointing the problem and bringing to­ gether the technologist, planner, and user to jointly examine ways of solving the problem.

Evolution of a Requirement Requirements originate from many sources but usually derive from a defi­ ciency. We document or convince our­ selves of a deficiency in different ways. It can take the form of (1) a validated threat or capability, (2) an operational inade­ approach is the classic milestone path for quacy in existing equipment, (3) a high acquisitions. consumption of resources (i.e.. poor cost- effectiveness), or (4) an opportunity to ex­ ploit new technology or an enemy weak­ The Acquisition ness. The identification of the deficiency may come from the user by way of com­ Process Today manders’ studies or war-game exercises, The responsibilities of the acquisition rom mission area analyses and threat as­ commands are outlined in DOD Directive sessments. or from an assessment of (DODD) 5000.1, Major and Non-Major De­ an older system’s inability to meet its fense Acquisition Programs, and DOD mission. Instruction (DODI) 5000.2. Defense Acqui­ The requirements process may take one sition Program ProceduresA These docu­ jf two approaches to meet a user’s need: a ments are "first and second, respectively, solution-oriented approach or a problem- in order of precedence for providing pol­ ariented approach (fig. 1). The solution- icies and procedures and managing major ariented approach is one in which a tech­ defense acquisition programs.’’10 nological opportunity exists. That is, a lab­ A major acquisition program requires a oratory or industry sponsor presents the program decision package and a mission user with a technology that significantly need statement if it is to compete for fund­ ncreases capability. The user then identi- ing (the former is required if the program ies a requirement based on this tech­ is to be funded by the Air Force budget).11 nological opportunity. In this approach, The program decision package is an Air aften called "technology push,’’ the solu- Force decision document that describes ion is well understood. the program or an independent portion of The converse of technology push is "re- it—together with proposed alternatives— luirements pull." the problem-oriented in terms of necessary resources.12 The mis­ ipproach. It arises from any source when a sion need statement is required when a leficiency or problem is known but the so- major defense acquisition program is ex­ ution is unclear. Identification of the defi- pected to exceed dollar thresholds estab­ iency entails an analysis that fully ex- lished in DODD 5000.1: $200 million in alores the deficiency, identifies potential total expenditures for research, develop­ olutions. and assesses technologies that ment. testing, and evaluation or $1 billion equire maturation. The problem-oriented in eventual total expenditures for procure- 8 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

MILESTONES: 0 I II III |V V

MISSION CONCEPT CONCEPT FULL FULL-RATE AREA EXPLORATION DEMONSTRATION SCALE PRODUCTION ANALYSIS DEFINITION VALIDATION DEVELOPMENT DEPLOYMENT

Figure 2. Major System Acquisition Milestones and Phases. ment (both figures are based, on constant technology demonstrations are often per­ dollars for fiscal year 1980).13 Mission area formed to determine if proposed alterna­ analysis conducted by the various DOD tives are really feasible. components provides a basis for this three- Of the documents to be prepared during page document that identifies the mission concept exploration/definition to support and threat; known alternatives to be the next milestone, the most significant are considered during concept exploration/ the system concept paper and the cost and definition; affordability and sufficiency of operational effectiveness analysis (COEA) funding over the Five Year Defense Pro­ report. The system concept paper summa­ gram (FYDP); and acquisition strategy. rizes the results of the concept The program decision package and mis­ exploration/definition phase; describes the sion need statement form the basis for a DOD component’s acquisition strategy, in­ program decision/mission need decision, cluding identification of the best concepts which is milestone 0.14 The major system- to be carried into the concept acquisition milestones and phases (fig. 2) demonstration/validation phase and rea­ are outlined in DODD 5000.1.15 The mile­ sons for eliminating alternative concepts; stone 0 decision determines mission need and establishes broad goals and thresholds and approves program initiation and au­ for program cost, schedule, and opera­ thority to budget for a new major program. tional effectiveness and suitability, to be Considerations include affordability and reviewed at the next milestone.16 The life-cycle costs, modification to an existing COEA report assesses the operational US or allied system to provide needed ca­ effectiveness and suitability of proposed pability, and assessment of operational concepts in the context of the specific utility. tasks addressed in the DOD component’s Normally, a concept exploration/ mission area analysis. Alternative ap­ definition phase follows this approval. proaches and some indication of the cost- The information required to make the next effectiveness of the recommended ap­ milestone decision includes (1) program- proach are specifically required.17 alternative trade-offs; (2) performance, Milestone I, the concept demonstration/ cost, and schedule trade-offs, which in­ validation decision, establishes broad clude evaluating the need for a new devel­ goals and thresholds for program cost, opment program versus buying or adapting schedule, and operational effectiveness existing US or allied military or commer­ and suitability. This phaso emphasizes the cial systems; (3) appropriateness of the ac­ principles of acquisition streamlining and quisition strategy; (4) prototyping of the design-to-cost, especially affordability in system or selected system components; terms of program cost and risk versus (5) affordability and life-cycle costs; added military value. Thus, the program (6) potential common-use solutions; and manager should retain maximum flex­ (7) cooperative development opportuni­ ibility to develop innovative and cost- ties. During this phase, experiments and effective solutions. Although prototyping REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 9

may be the next step, plans are being tion executive, the program executive of­ formed for transition from development to ficer, and the program manager that briefly production, realistic industry surge, man­ summarizes the program’s functional spec­ power and training, and logistics. By the ifications, cost, schedule, and operational end of concept demonstration/validation. effectiveness and suitability requirements, the weapon-system program baseline is es­ as well as other factors critical to the pro­ tablished in preparation for the most sig­ gram’s success.20 nificant milestone—the decision to pro­ Milestone II is the first decision point ceed with full-scale development (mile­ where specific cost, schedule, and opera­ stone II). Beyond milestone II, the work is tional effectiveness and suitability objec­ system specific. Science and technology tives are established. It represents the end efforts contribute little to the full-scale de­ of the requirements planning phase of the velopment phase and begin to focus on acquisition process and the point at which preplanned product improvements for fu­ the system requirements are finalized. A ture upgrades during production. milestone II approval means that the full- Reporting at milestone II includes up­ scale development phase can proceed. dating the COEA and preparing the deci­ Limited initial production of selected com­ sion coordinating paper, the acquisition ponents and quantities should also be ap­ strategy report, and the program baseline proved to verify production capability and document. The decision coordinating pa­ to provide test resources needed to con­ per summarizes the results of the concept duct interoperability, live-fire, or opera­ demonstration/validation phase; identifies tional testing. program alternatives: and establishes ex­ The remaining milestones include the plicit goals and thresholds for program decision to proceed to full production and cost, schedule, and operational effective­ deployment (milestone III); a review one to ness and suitability.18 The acquisition two years after initial deployment that as­ strategy report describes the major sesses the logistics community’s ability to defense-acquisition program strategy that support the system (milestone IV); and the provides for the availability of competi­ major upgrade or system replacement deci­ tive. alternative sources from the begin­ sion (milestone V). Milestone V is the last ning of full-scale development through the major milestone in a system’s life. Nor­ end of production.19 The program baseline mally occurring five to 10 years after ini­ is a formal agreement between the defense tial deployment, it reviews the system’s acquisition executive, the service acquisi­ current state of operational effectiveness, suitability, and readiness, which deter­ mines whether major upgrades are neces­ sary or whether deficiencies warrant re­ placement. If the system should be replaced, this decision point initiates a mission area analysis, which leads to a milestone 0 decision. Hence, the mile­ stones are cyclic, and milestone V initiates the requirements process for most new systems.

Problems with Current Practice If the process just described is sound, then why all the criticism of requirements 10 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

planning? There are at least two inter­ Expectation for Detailed Information related explanations: (1) the process just Cost is emphasized in the two documents described is not followed and (2) a signifi­ that are required to make the milestone 0 cant. practical conflict exists between the decision: the mission need statement, requirements process and the budget pro­ which—besides describing alternative cess. The latter, which includes the Plan­ concepts—also identifies funding implica­ ning, Programming, and Budgeting System tions and an acquisition strategy; and the (PPBS) of the DOD and the annual con­ program decision package, which identi­ gressional approval, is the dominant force. fies resource information to be used in de­ The conflict between requirements and ciding among competing programs. But budgeting creates three major, highly inter­ cost analysis at this milestone is a critical twined problem areas: a failure to make mistake. The exigency of the budget shifts critical decisions at early milestones; an the focus of milestone 0 from operational expectation for detailed information not need to programmatic considerations, consistent with the milestone; and a lack creating the demand for a significant of funding for the mission area analysis amount of detailed information not yet phase through the concept development available—at least from systematic plan­ phase (i.e., resources to perform the work ning and studies. Emphasis quickly shifts between milestone V and milestone I). to projecting costs for some single solu­ tion, while a more practical examination Critical Decisions at of need and justification becomes Early Milestones secondary. Kent noted certain problems with DODD 5000.1 and DODI 5000.2. Specifically, he felt that the milestone definitions were Lack of Funding through the vague and that no milestone provided Concept Development Phase clear criteria for making the critical deci­ Prior to milestone I, the only available sion to start a new weapon system.1:1 Cur­ funding is reserved for research, develop­ rently, the general—and incorrect—per­ ment, and acquisition of a system. Without ception of milestone 0 is that the military dedicated resources, one can perform only is beginning a multibillion-dollar program. very limited analysis of mission area needs As a result, the budget process demands and can generate few viable alternatives. program-specific answers before commit­ This is a critical flaw in the acquisition ting to planning resources. This is a classic milestone concept. catch-22. The focus is not on the opera­ Mission area analysis has been curtailed tional problem, as it should be. but on a for many years. Neither the Air Staff major acquisition. Consequently, imma­ nor the major operational commands ture programmatic information (i.e., cost (MA)COM) are conducting this work, and and schedule) flows into the decision mak­ AFSC is not equipped to substitute for the ing because planning resources prior to user at this point in the evolution of the re­ milestone 0 are inadequate. In point of quirement. Too often, the statements of op­ fact, milestone 0 was not intended to be erational need (SON) that are validated the critical acquisition decision point, but lack the broader context of the need within a statement that a problem exists and that the mission area. Further, they seldom a deficiency requires limited funding to have the supporting data to satisfy the de­ explore potential solutions. The PPBS and mands that are best illustrated by the the annual congressional approval corrupt COEA. In fact, the concept of first estab­ the entire concept of incremental mile­ lishing a requirement, or military need, stone planning because they require the and then evolving alternatives seldom oc­ military to budget for a “ program” at curs. The deferred questions about the milestone 0. basis for the operational requirement must REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 11 be answered, and, eventually, they are. Requirements Unfortunately, the answers often arrive at later milestones, sometimes as late as Planning Model milestone II. The following proposed model, based on Might rigorous mission area analysis Secretary Cheney’s report, ensures that re­ jeopardize system acquisition programs in sources are used in the best possible way full-scale development or in the early to support the operational requirement. phases of procurement? It might. The mis­ Work is accomplished step-by-step—as sion area analysis could show that the ca­ needed—to support each milestone and is pability being developed is insufficient to focused on the milestones’ major objec­ meet the operational requirement or is tives. Our model’s goal is to give require­ simply unnecessary. Yet, it is worth the ments planning a more disciplined ap­ risk. Only through mission area analysis proach that expedites acquisition through will the planner, technologist, and user m i l e s t o n e 111. T h e m o d e l a l s o i n c l u d e s a form a common understanding of the oper­ closer relationship between science and ational need. technology, requirements planning, and weapon-system acquisition. Application of this model will provide early identifica­ tion of technologies that require matura­ tion, will improve science and technology Like some weapon systems. Ole V-22 Osprey, now in forecasting, and will shorten the time to development, may fall victim to the discord that often arises transfer technology. An improvement in between the budget process and requirements planning. Better coordination early in the planning program between the quality of trade-offs made early in the users, designers, and the acquisition community could help decision process is its prime objective. the military in its development and procurement of new Three things should be kept in mind as systems. one examines this proposal. First, the 12 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

forms trade-offs. The requirements for a major new system are continually refined until the process reaches milestone II’s de­ cision to proceed with full-scale develop­ ment. At this point, one has weighed the alternatives and established a system base­ line, and the Air Force, DOD, and Con­ gress are ready to commit major resources. The following account describes how the phases should occur.

Mission Area Analysis Scenario-driven mission area analysis may be performed by the Air Staff, several MAJCOMs, a joint command, or a single MAJCOM. This phase attempts to under­ model addresses major acquisitions—the stand capabilities and deficiencies (prob­ high-cost, closely scrutinized programs. lem oriented) as assessed against mission One can use variations of this model for objectives and existing assets. Objectives smaller acquisitions. Second, the model is play a significant part in determining the not a radical departure from today’s mile­ performance capability of the major com­ stone process but suggests minor modifica­ mand's systems. The national- and theater- tions in order to bring it more discipline. level objectives depend on several pieces And third, forcing every acquisition to fit of information (fig. 3), especially concepts the standard model may not be necessary. of operation—with the supporting doc­ Secretary Cheney recommended modify­ trine—and environment. A single concept ing the acquisition milestones. In our of operation may involve several missions model, milestone 0 is the approval to per­ and strategies. Since it is highly unlikely form concept direction studies to “evalu­ that all missions can be performed, one ate potential alternative approaches to should identify the most critical ones. The meeting validated, priority needs.’’22 environment includes scenarios in which At milestone I (concept approval) the we will employ the system (a drawn-out requirements/cost trade-offs and initial af­ war: a short engagement; wars in Europe. fordability assessments are reviewed. Re­ Southwest Asia, or Central America) as views at milestone II (full-scale engineer­ well as threats the system will likely ing development) and milestone III encounter. (production) ensure that more exacting re­ Assets include our systems, manpower, quirements are met. A new milestone IV, training, and organizational structure. The which replaces current milestones IV and determination of deficiency is based on V, addresses the need for major system up­ the systems that we have on the ramp to­ grades or modifications to systems still in day, since those included in the Five Year production.23 Defense Program may change because of Requirements planning provides the political pressure or unforeseen threats. link between milestone IV of the older pro­ (Mission area analysis must also analyze gram and milestone II of our “follow-on” the effects of delays or the cancellation of program.24 The phases include mission FYDP programs.) Assessing the ability of area analysis, SON prioritization, concept assets to meet objectives provides insight direction studies, and demonstration/ into the capabilities and deficiencies for validation. During these phases, one iden­ the mission area. tifies needs, assesses alternatives, and per­ Deficiencies are documented in state- REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 13 ments of operational need, which—under ing mission area analysis from concept di­ our model—differ from the SONs currently rection studies distinguishes the roles of in use. Our SON is a pure statement of the user and the implementing command need, emphasizing the results of mission (AFSC). With the need well understood, area analysis. It is a user document— the user still leading the process, and the without programmatic (acquisition) data— implementing command fully participat­ which outlines the mission and basis of ing, the concept direction study can de­ the need, and assesses capabilities. It does velop a menu of solutions. The quality of not define potential solutions. This con­ the programmatic data developed, and trasts today’s practice of submitting a SON likely to be available, need only be good with a proposed (foregone?) solution. Our enough to select from the menu of compet­ SON states only the need because its sin­ ing alternatives—the milestone I objective. gular purpose is to document the results of Thus, the cost, schedule, and performance mission area analyses. data developed in concept direction is not This is an important first step to improv­ “budget quality." Programmatic data of a ing the planning process because separat­ quality sufficient to establish a contract be-

SCENARIOS ENVIRONMENTS THREATS CAPABILITIES c> AND DEFICIENCIES TRAINING ORGANIZATION MATERIAL 0

Figure 3. Mission Area Analysis. 14 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

tween DOD and Congress does not emerge This milestone 0 decision differs from until milestone II. current practice in that a system-specific program decision package is not required, SON Prioritization since the decision has not been made to develop a major new system—only to ex­ The results of mission area analyses are plore alternatives for the highest-priority si ts of command (MAJCOM) SONs. During Air Force needs. A program decision pack­ mission area analysis, AFSC acts as an ob­ age may be needed to budget resources for server or consultant and provides informa- Air Force-sponsored concept direction ion. if needed. But now that the needs are studies for acquisitions that are less than defined, an Air Force perspective must be major and do not require DAB approval. established. The lead must come from These studies are manpower intensive, so Headquarters USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff cost projections should be fairly accurate. ior Plans and Operations (Headquarters Once DOD and the Air Force define the 11SAF/XO). Air Force prioritization is nec- budget for the associated concept direction ssary to compete effectively for the lim­ work, this identifies the number of studies ited resources DOD will make available for that can be performed. If more needs re­ concept direction studies. It assures that quire examination. Headquarters USAF/ m Air Force-wide priority has been pro- XO urges an increase in the budget. ided to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) for review and incorpora- tion with the other services’ needs. It is la­ ter provided to the Defense Acquisition Concept Direction Studies Board (DAB) for annual requirements re­ Insight into this phase of the requirements view and prioritization. process has already been provided. Stud-

MRP ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT JROC Review TECHNOLOGY for Validity CONCEPT EXPAND MISSION ASSESSMENT Annual DAB Review OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT ( PERFORMANCE PARAMETERS THREAT) BASELINE DESIGN \ OPERATIONAL / REOUIREMEN1S CONCEPTS

USD/A (DAB) Concept Approval Selects (Milestone I) Alternative

Figure 4. Concept Direction Studies. REQUIREMENTS PLANNING 15

ies are performed that define a set of alter­ natives which meet the need defined in an SON. The objective of the concept direc­ tion studies is to provide the answers needed at milestone I: why a particular al­ ternative was selected or others discarded. This is the type of information that the Air Council. Office of the Secretary of Defense (especially the Directorate for Program Analysis and Evaluation), and Congress will demand. Four to six studies per year, each lasting six to nine months, could probably be handled by the joint efforts of Air Force Studies and Analysis, AFSC, and the sponsoring MAJCOM. The concept direction studies team is comprised of planners, technologists, and users. It could include industry participa­ tion. Cross-representation ensures that the team understands the deficiency and con­ siders the possible applications of new The alternative selected at milestone I is technology. The purpose of the studies is defined in terms of operational benefit. to define the best option to meet the opera­ newf technology, and support factors (re­ tional need. Consequently, the studies de­ liability and maintainability) that yield fine system alternatives; make overlays of insight to life-cycle costs. Alternative con­ operational benefit, cost, and schedule; cepts arise from the user. Air Force plan­ and perform trade-offs. ners, industry or study houses, and Air Two subphases of concept direction are Force laboratories. These concepts include necessary: preparation of a mission re­ modifications to existing systems, new quirements package and development of versions of current systems, or new—even alternatives (fig. 4). Prepared by the user, radical—approaches. Within the frame­ the mission requirements package is based work of the mission requirements package, on the mission area analysis and provides the options are then evaluated by using the study framework from the operations predefined measures of merit. The effec­ viewpoint. Although concept direction tiveness of the concept is judged by its studies should be user led (i.e., the user ability to meet the objectives described in provides the study director), AFSC plays a the mission requirements package—that is, significant role by providing the man­ by its ability to satisfy the need. In this power to perform the analyses and moni­ way, all concepts are tested against one an­ tor contractual studies. The user assists in other. Cost—both life-cycle costs and re­ the understanding of the mission require­ search and development costs—is a mea­ ments and the operational environment. sure of merit, but only relative cost is valid Hence, the mission requirements package to this evaluation. Ideally, the cost of each defines the deficiency, the concept of op­ alternative is based on the same cost- erations. and the objectives that the new analysis tool. The results of the analyses system is to meet; it also addresses mis­ are then compared to show the sensitivity sion criticality. Typically, the concept of to changes in operational effectiveness. operations includes more than a single For each alternative, the assumptions and mission. Therefore, the mission require­ the consequences of changes in these as­ ments package needs to define the relative sumptions must be described. Further, ac­ criticality of each mission—an important quisition strategy, though not an overrid­ factor in selecting the best alternative. ing factor, should be considered. 16 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

The results of the concept direction cision to begin full-scale development study are documented in the cost and op­ (milestone II) and expend major resources. erational effectiveness analysis. Because of As a reminder, every acquisition does not uncertainties (e.g., technology-maturation need to follow this model. If the need is risks, changes in threat, and economic well understood and the preferred system conditions), performance and cost esti­ alternative defined, it may be possible to mates reflected in this COEA should be compress all these actions into one used only for the purpose of selecting the milestone decision. alternative(s) to continue beyond mile­ stone I. Summary Demonstration/Validation The theory behind the milestone plan­ Several risks and technological uncertain­ ning process, introduced in the early ties are defined during the concept direc­ 1960s, remains sound. Unfortunately, the tion studies and outlined in the COEA. theory is not put into practice, and the The demonstration/validation phase elimi­ conflict between requirements planning nates or reduces these risks and demon­ and budgeting has caused milestone plan­ strates how military capability is thus en­ ning to erode. The proposal presented here hanced. The results of the demonstrations yields three advantages. First, the potential allow one to establish estimates of afforda­ solutions are better understood, in that the bility, or cost versus added military value. SON results in a formal examination of so­ Additionally, this phase examines issues lutions without the imposition of the involving manpower, training, and logis­ budget process. Second, the best solution tics in detail. is likely to be among the potential solu­ During demonstration/validation, one fi­ tions. And third, technology is not an af­ nalizes the system requirements and terthought in the proposed model. By hav­ thereby establishes a baseline. The COEA ing the technologists involved and by is then updated to reflect the chosen alter­ performing concept direction studies be­ native. (This is a refinement of the mile­ fore a ‘real” program is established, one stone I step and not a revisit of the full al­ has time to work the technological issues ternatives matrix.) Moreover, specific data before settling on a solution. The concept on cost, schedule, and operational effec­ direction studies will also provide better tiveness becomes more reliable. Adequate input to the investment strategy for sci­ information is now available to make a de­ ence and technology, thus strengthening that program. Further, our proposal pro­ duces better predictability in technology availability, reduces technological risk, and improves technology transfer. Last, ex­ periments play a critical role in this model. In fact, the length of time between milestone 0 and I is dependent on whether experiments to validate alternatives are needed. The need-to-requirements process (fig. 5) involves understanding the problem of defining a solution. One achieves disci­ pline in the need-to-requirements process, not by taking the need as a firm require­ ment but by continually assessing the sys­ tem against its critical mission, clarifying HEQUIHEMENTS PLANNING 17

MISSION- SUSTAINED CAPABLE CRUISE RATE LEVEL ACCELERATION DASH SPEED NEED (Wish List)

O FOR MISSION CRITICALITY:

WHAT COST? REQUIREMENT WHAT SCHEDULE? WHAT TECHNICAL RISK?

Figure 5. From Need to Requirement. and alleviating the risks, and prioritizing both problem and solution. Winnefeld de­ the parameters of performance. Respon­ scribes it well: sibility resides in both the user and acqui­ In the process of acquisition, system perfor­ sition communities. On the one hand, mance requirements acquire a life of their users must understand that not all their awn. It is too widely perceived that to back needs can be met and must see that their off requirements is a sign of failure—rather priorities fall within the overall context of than of choice to attain a better mix of ca­ the mission area. On the other hand, the pabilities within the resource envelope. Re­ responsibility of the acquisition com­ quirements should be tuned on the same principle that resource allocation is tuned munity is not to argue the value of one re­ (though hopefully not as often). At some quirement over another but to show what point the strategy and threat must be re­ can be done (and when) and offer alterna­ visited to see if the new systems develop­ tives. Thus, the requirements process is ment compromises fit with them as well as give-and-take—a continuous scrubbing of with the resources available.25

Notes 1. fames A Winnefeld, Killing the Messenger: The Place of 4. Ibid.. 49. Systems Acquisition in the National Security Planning and 5. Gen Larry D. Welch. Air Force chief of staff, discussion Management Systems. Rand Report P-7417 (Santa Monica. with coauthor (General Ferguson), April 1989. Calif.. Rand Corporation. May I988|, 32. 33. 6. David Packard, "Micromanagement: The Fundamental 2. Col Alexander P Shine. "Theater Airlift 2010." Problem with the Acquisition System." address to the Ac­ Airpower Journal. Winter 1988. 9. quisition Leadership '88 Conference. Defense Systems Man­ 3. Glenn A Kent. "A Framework for Defense Planning." agement College. Fort Belvoir, Va.. 14 July 1988. Rand Report R-3721-AF'OSD. lanuary 1989 (draft). 48 7. Glenn A. Kent, Concepts of Operations: A More Coher- 18 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

ent Framework for Defense Planning. Rand Report N-2026- 15. DODD 5000.1. 3-4. See also DODI 5000.2. 2-4. AF (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Corporation. August 1983), 16. Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 23. Acquisition. SAF7AQ Action Officer's Handbook. March 8. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney, Defense Man­ 1988. 10.24. agement: Report to the President (Washington, D.C.: Depart­ 17. Ibid., 10.26. ment of Defense, July 1989). 18. Ibid.. 10.24. 9. DOD Directive 5000.1. Major and Non-Major Defense 19. Ibid.. 10.25. Acquisition Programs, 1 September 1987; DOD Instruction 20. DODI 5000.2. 8. Note that each milestone has a "base­ 5000.2. Defense Acquisition Program Procedures. 1 Septem­ line" document. The mission need statement serves as the ber 1987. The discussion in this section is based on the re­ program baseline at milestone 0 for the concept exploration quirements process as it existed prior to the publication of definition phase. Annex B of the system concept paper be­ Secretary Cheney's recommendations in his response to Na­ comes the program baseline at milestone I for the concept tional Security Review 11. demonstration/validation phase. The acquisition program 10. DODD 5000.1. 1. baseline is established at milestone II and carries through 11. AFR 57-1. Operational Needs. Requirements, and Con­ subsequent milestones. cepts. 7 October 1988. 21. Kent. "A Framework." 26. 12. US Air Force, Directorate of Programs, The Planning, 22. Cheney. 18. Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)—A Program­ 23. Ibid., 19. mer's Primer (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 24. Follow-on is not meant to imply that the new system lanuary 1987). does the same job as the old system. The follow-on system 13. DODI 5000.2, 6-7: DODD 5000.1. 2. does what the old system does not: provides the capability 14. For the uninitiated, milestones are a recurring set of to perform the current mission in the current threat phase points in a cyclical process. They are points at which environment. one decides whether to continue or stop an acquisition. 25. Winnefeld. 34. SPRING 1990 IRA C. EAKER AWARD WINNER

Dr Richard P. Hallion for his article Battlefield Air Support: A Retrospective Assessment

Congratulations to Dr Hallion on his selection If you would like to compete for the Ira C. as the Ira C. Eaker Award winner for the best Eaker Award, submit an article of feature eligible article from the Spring 1990 issue of length to the Airpower Journal, Walker Hall. the Airpower Journal. Dr Hallion receives a Maxwell AFB. AL 36112-5532. The award is $500 cash award for his contribution to the Air for the best eligible article in each issue and is Force’s professional dialogue. The award hon- open to all US military personnel below the ors Gen Ira C. Eaker and is made possible rank of colonel or equivalent and all US gov- through the support of the Arthur G. B. Metcalf ernment civilian employees below GS-15 or Foundation of Winchester, Massachusetts. equivalent.

19 NATO AIR OPERATIONS AFTER ARMS CONTROL

Lt Edward H. Feege, Jr ., USN

n July 1989 NATO officially acceded to Soviet and Warsaw Pact demands that combat aircraft be included in the Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) Iarms control talks. For the first time, NATO's air forces, which embody a sig­ nificant part of the alliance’s overall fire­ power. are open to potential cuts. While no clear outcome is discernible yet, chances are that NATO’s and the Warsaw Pact’s force structure will be reduced in the 1990s in the aftermath of an arms con­ trol agreement driven by both a changing political climate and the search for bud­ getary savings. The traditional roles assigned to NATO aircraft revolve around two major efforts: the maintenance of air superiority and the defense of NATO airspace, and support for land (and sea) operations. How cuts might affect the ability of NATO's air forces to carry out these traditional conventional missions is still uncertain. Nevertheless, the inevitability of force cuts makes it pru­ dent to consider these cuts now, since the

20 21 22 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

end result may well be significant changes air defense of the USSR. NATO, for its in the way NATO air forces are organized part, still refuses to accept the WTO defi­ and employed. nitions, arguing that a defensive aircraft To determine what air capabilities will can be quickly reconfigured for an offen­ be available to NATO commanders after sive role. NATO commanders rejected as arms control, we must examine future too glib the Soviet characterization of most force structures, threats, and operations— NATO aircraft as “offensive” while ex­ all of which will be shaped in turn by the empting 1,600 to 1,800 aircraft of their political and military imperatives of an own, particularly when the Soviets them­ evolving alliance and by a rapidly chang­ selves credit the V PVO with a secondary ing strategic picture. The most obvious theater defensive role.2 A further argument first step, then, is to review the proposals has been that an aircraft’s character is pri­ forwarded in CFE talks, for this is the only marily determined by the strategic context existing, rigid framework for reductions. in which it is used. The maintenance of air Follow-on agreements may be quickly con­ superiority would be critical to the success cluded, particularly if the trends toward of any Soviet action against NATO. Thus, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact as a ostensibly defensive aircraft would play an military alliance continue at their present integral role in an offensive action. V PVO pace. The qualitative and quantitative out­ aircraft would certainly be pitted directly lines of such an accord, however, are against NATO tactical aircraft in northern likely to be driven by social and political Norway, and perhaps over Turkey, if hos­ events that are as yet unclear. Conse­ tilities were to break out. For the Soviets, quently, the current CFE proposals become this option becomes even more feasible as the best means for NATO military person­ their purely interceptor aircraft (Su-15s, nel to predict how their future forces will Tu-28s) are replaced by aircraft such as the look, at least for the next 12 months. Su-27 that are capable of vigorous air com­ bat maneuvering. Finally, Su-27s and other fighters are integrated into the air ar­ mies of the Supreme High Command for Current Arms Control strike escort duties, making it difficult to Proposals and Problems distinguish between fighters involved in air defense and those with more offensive The proposed numbers shown in table 1 taskings.3 raised some immediate points of conten­ Another dispute has arisen over NATO’s tion. Most obvious among these was the insistence that trainer aircraft be included Soviet refusal to include aircraft with “de­ in each of the alliance’s overall totals. New fensive missions." in the category of "com­ Soviet and other Warsaw Pact pilots do bat aircraft" on the grounds that ‘‘they not possess the knowledge and proficiency have no ground attack capability and are of their Western counterparts when they not part of the surprise attack potential."1 report to their first operational command. There being no equivalent of the Western operational conversion units, the Warsaw Questions of Definition Pact air forces rely on nominally unarmed, Initially, the Warsaw Treaty Organization two-seat trainer versions of squadron air­ (WTO) definition was to extend to all craft to bring their fledgling pilots up to frontal aviation (FA) and national air de­ speed. These training programs would be fense (e.g., V PVO) aircraft in the Atlantic- severely curtailed if NATO proposals were to-the-Urals (ATTU) area. Subsequent pro­ accepted. Conversely, the NATO position posals narrowed this to V PVO aircraft (ex­ was at least partially based on its own use cluding the FA’s fighter assets), since the of trainers in ground attack and air-to-air Soviets continued to argue that these air­ roles (aircraft such as the Royal Air Force's craft are intended solely for the strategic Hawk).4 Soviet offers of mutual on-site in- NATO AIR OPERATIONS 23 spections of airfields might provide NATO in their totals, although these bombers with the means to ensure that Warsaw Pact make up a significant percentage of the trainers perform that mission alone.5 Smolensk air army. Since this force is ded­ A third question concerns the treatment icated primarily to strategic nuclear mis­ of aircraft tasked with maritime missions sions (it also possesses Tu-95 Bear H and (either land- or carrier-based) and ostensi­ Tu-160 Blackjack bombers with interconti­ bly strategic missions. The Soviets do not nental range), NATO could find it difficult include their Tu-26 Backfire bombers to push for their inclusion, particularly if

TABLE 1 PROPOSED CFE AIRCRAFT CEILINGS

NATO Warsaw Pact

Atlantic-to-the-Urals (ATTU) Sublimits:

Combat aircraft 5,700 4,700* Combat helicopters 1,900 1,700

Sufficiency Rule:**

Combat aircraft 3,420 1,200 Combat helicopters 1,140 1,350

Stationing Rule:***

Combat aircraft none 350 Combat helicopters none 600

Notes: 'Original proposal was for 1,500 combat aircraft. "Stipulates that no one country within an alliance may retain aircraft in excess of a set percentage of overall alliance limits. "'Prohibits any nation from maintaining an ill-defined “disproportionate” number of offensive weapons in forces stationed outside of its national territory. Sources: Adapted from Phillip A. Karber, The Implications of the Gorbachev Reductions for Conventional Arms Control," presentation to the North Atlantic Assembly, 29 May 1989 (McLean, Va.: BDM Corporation, 1989), 39; Air Vice-Marshal R. A. Mason, "Airpower in Conventional Arms Control," Survival 11 (September-October 1989): 398; AAS MILAVNEWS (Supplement to the International Air Forces and Military Aircraft Industry Newsletter) 28, no. 334 (August 1989): 18; Michael R. Gordon, “Soviets Ease Stand on Aircraft Cuts in Europe," New York Times, 21 September 1989, 16. 24 AIRPOIVER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 it wants to keep French aircraft with stra­ greater significance in a post-CFE environ­ tegic and prestrategic missions (the Mirage ment, when mobility a ' striking power IV-P and the Mirage 2000N) from being will be increasingly ir jrtant for the re­ counted against its own totals. The Soviets maining ground fore c. Even before an also contend that their Tu-26s and other agreement, both the NATO and Soviet ar­ aircraft belonging to Soviet naval aviation mies are placing greater emphasis on air­ (SNA) should not be included in Warsaw mobile units.9 Pact totals since they would not be used These are the issues requiring resolution against land targets (only in a defensive before an agreement involving aircraft can role against offensive Western naval be reached. Each holds the potential to al­ forces). This contention runs counter to low one bloc to gain a meaningful advan­ earlier Soviet writings of joint operations tage over the other in the air and thus can­ by FA and SNA aircraft against NATO not be ignored. Yet another such issue forces and airfields.6 concerns the geographic distribution of re­ Such an exemption could allow uncon­ quired cuts. strained production of Tu-26 Backfires and other capable standoff platforms, as long Problems of Geography as they were based with the Smolensk air In its proposal, NATO placed specific con­ army or at SNA fields and practiced pri­ straints only on aircraft actually in the marily naval missions. In return. NATO ATTU region. NATO rejected the notion would keep aircraft such as Buccaneers that sublimits could be placed on aircraft and Tornadoes from being included in its based on their location within this area de­ totals. While these are highly useful, spite the fact that it had accepted this for highly capable aircraft (and do retain a nu- other weapons (see fig. 1). The reasoning clear capability), it is uncertain whether behind this refusal relied on the idea that they possess the same mission capability aircraft are inherently flexible and easily as the SNA Backfire force (which is mainly redeployed. In this view, only theaterwide structured for the less demanding standoff reductions would, with any certainty, re­ missions).7 duce the capability of aircraft to quickly Carrier-based aircraft present a similar redeploy forward and engage in subse­ problem. Soviet totals include them, while quent surprise attacks. Additionally, NATO negotiators contend that they are subregional restrictions would hamper not land based and hence not subject to NATO’s own ability to distribute its air as­ CFE constraints. Their view is that aircraft sets throughout Europe.10 carriers and their air wings have global As shown in figure 1, the Warsaw Pact roles rather than being strictly apportioned proposals do include regional sublimits on to NATO missions. They also see these air- aircraft. As they currently stand, limita­ raft as being in the same category as air tions seem to constrain NATO options reinforcements based in the continental more than those of the Warsaw Pact. Un­ United States (CONUS), particularly in the der this plan, Soviet air defense problems Northern and Southern regions.8 caused by NATO tactical aircraft on its Last among the specific points of con­ northern and southern borders essentially tention is the concern over the definition would disappear since, by Soviet reason­ of com bat helicopters. Again, the difficulty ing, air defense forces would remain intact of determining the difference between of­ while NATO's aircraft would be tightly fensive and defensive aircraft tended to controlled. The situation could become so hinder agreement since almost any heli­ benign from the Soviet point of view that copter can be fitted with guns or rockets. the Soviet Union could redeploy some as­ Hence, attempts by the Soviets to keep sets to face its last coherent NATO threat their heavier transport helicopters out of in the Central Region, at least while NATO consideration were vigorously opposed by chose to honor any in-place regional NATO. This issue would take on an even sublimits. NATO AIR OPERATIONS 25

The Soviets do not wish to count aircraft tasked with pable aircraft in some countries’ invento­ maritime missions, even if they are land-based aircraft. ries (including some capable of long-range Aircraft such as this Backfire bomber, with standoff missile capability, would then become even greater lethal threats in nuclear delivery). Subsequent plans postu­ a post-CFE environment. lated heavier reductions in NATO’s oldest and less capable aircraft and air forces. The concept of “cascading” was intro­ duced to implement this reduction. Under It is unclear, then, why NATO would ac­ its terms, “nations would get rid of some cept these constraints, or a stationing rule of what they consider their less capable for aircraft. The end result of this would be aircraft and give or sell them to another a net loss in the alliance’s ability to rein­ country that has even less capable force its units in a time of crisis without aircraft.”’1 abrogating a valued treaty. In effect, NATO Under this scheme, NATO’s hypotheti­ would be putting itself in a political quan­ cal 15-percent reductions would be borne, dary that would be difficult to resolve if for the most part, by nations in the South­ the threat of hostilities ever loomed. ern Region, which currently maintain the oldest inventories. Their air forces would NATO's Problem— What to Cut? make more than their share of the cuts, in some cases eliminating whole classes of One tally of the fixed-wing aircraft in­ aircraft, to ensure that the alliance meets it cluded in each side’s current proposals is overall goals. A tentative US proposal shown in table 2. Clearly, the major prob­ would make these same deep cuts (but go lems are the definitional problems men­ above and beyond the required 15-percent tioned above. But even if these are suc­ cuts) and build back up to allowable levels cessfully negotiated away, problems by transferring F-16s to the affected coun­ would still remain for NATO. Chief among tries. This would increase commonality these would be deciding which aircraft to and interoperability among national cut when an agreement is reached. forces, would serve as an impetus to Initial proposals for a 15-percent across- greater standardization of logistics and the-board cut by all NATO nations to meet training, and would facilitate any potential even their own proposals would have US reinforcement effort.12 Such a proposal, meant cuts in some of the newest, most ca­ however, would not be well received by 26 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

WTO-PROPOSED REGIONAL SUBZONES

CENTER NORTH mmm SOUTH REAR WTO-PROPOSED CEILINGS

NORTH CENTER SOUTH REAR

HELICOPTERS 30 1,250 380 80 AIRCRAFT 30 1,120 290 90

Note: NATO-proposed ceilings for helicopters and aircraft are 1,900 and 5,700, respectively, for each alliance, to be positioned anywhere within the Atlantic-to-the-Urals region.

Source: Phillip A. Karber, The Implications of the Gorbachev Reductions for Conventional Arms Control, presentation to the North Atlantic Assembly, 29 May 1989 (rev. 18 August 1989), (McLean, Va.: BDM Corporation, 1989), 33.

Figure 1. Comparison of NATO- and WTO-Proposed Regional Subzones. NATO AIR OPERATIONS 27

the European aerospace industry or by The promise of non-Communist govern­ European governments. Additionally, the ments springing up throughout the non- generic “cascading” concept would still Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) nations por­ require a wholesale turnover in methods of tends a profound change in Europe’s stra­ training, maintenance, and weapon inven­ tegic environment and hence in NATO’s tories, as well as the ushering in of many own roles and structures. The Warsaw legal and financial problems.13 Neverthe­ Pact’s “Statute on the Combined Armed less, it appears that both alliances will put Forces and Organs Commanding Them in some version of this idea into effect if and Times of War,” under which NSWP forces when an agreement is reached. can be mobilized and placed under a So­ NATO would have a difficult task meet­ viet theater commander (without the con­ ing the requirements of their own CFE pro­ currence of their respective governments), posal; Warsaw Pact proposals would cause still appears to be in effect.17 However, it even greater problems. The dilemmas of remains to be seen how long Eastern Euro­ what to cut and how to verify the cuts can pean governments no longer dominated by probably be resolved, but only after exact­ Communist parties will remain comfort­ ing interbloc negotiations. For this reason, able with these arrangements, or even with outgoing US negotiator Stephen Ledogar reduced numbers of Soviet troops and air­ suggested that aircraft be temporarily re­ craft on their territory. Conceivably, the moved from the CFE agenda, allowing Soviets eventually may decide on their other and more tractable issues to be re­ own to withdraw most of their forces, leav­ solved.14 But whether the Soviets would ing only token forward detachments in the be willing to accept this is another matter. name of “new thinking.” It seems fairly obvious that the Soviets, Under such conditions, the need for sub­ to mitigate the threats they face, would not stantial forward-deployed NATO air forces do so. Thus, “the Warsaw Pact approach may need to be rethought and emphasis implicitly proposes a trade of armor for placed on reinforcement capability. Con­ airpower.”15 To some analysts, it would be versely, some NATO nations may choose sensible to take up this offer by cutting its to leave a fairly robust (within CFE limits) “deep interdiction” aircraft in exchange air force structure intact, relying upon it to for asymmetrical cuts in Soviet ground for­ buttress smaller, more mobile, ground mations, or for similar cuts in Soviet forces and to cover the many possible per­ “deep-strike aircraft.”16 But NATO’s offi­ mutations of conflict that may arise in a cial position is that cuts in its air forces rapidly changing Europe. will only come in tandem with cuts in Such scenarios are, for now. in the realm Warsaw Pact air forces. Thus, it is becom­ of speculation because the Soviet Union ing increasingly clear that if the Soviets still maintains its strong presence in Cen­ demand the inclusion of aircraft as the tral Europe. The unilateral cuts announced price of a CFE agreement, NATO will in by General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev in turn insist that inventories be slashed December 1988 hold some promises for across the board, not just in specific cate­ raising the strategic warning time of any gories, leading to a much smaller—and Soviet attack by 5 to 10 days. Nevertheless, theoretically a balanced—force structure. even with these reductions, “the Soviet Such an outcome could spring from an Union will retain significant military in initial CFE agreement, but the pace of major conventional offensive weaponry change in Eastern Europe might soon re­ and possess the capacity for mounting a quire that NATO look even further than large-scale offensive against NATO.”16 The this. As was mentioned earlier, the man­ CFE negotiations address this near-term date for a “CFE II” is still uncertain. situation and thus will have the greatest Nevertheless, the pressures for further ac­ immediate effect on NATO and Warsaw tion will undoubtedly be present. Pact force structure. It is in the context of 28 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 these initial cuts that NATO must deter­ tack and harassment of its main operating mine how an agreement may affect its re­ bases (MOB) and the overwhelming of quirements in different mission areas. those formations that did get airborne.20 It would also have the effect of forcing NATO to commit its “swing” (dual-role) Counterair aircraft to a defensive battle rather than to The severity of NATO’s air defense prob­ the support of the ground battle. The prac­ lems in the future will depend, to a large tical result would be a major reduction of extent, on the makeup and geographical useful NATO sorties, which would have a disposition of Soviet air forces in Europe. salutary effect on Warsaw Pact ground op­ The historical Warsaw Pact air threat to erations, and would allow FA operations NATO’s defense plans centered around in the fire support and accompaniment two major operations: the air and the anti­ roles to proceed unmolested.21 air operations.19 Intended to be carried out Despite their stated reversion to a defen­ in support of Warsaw Pact operational- sive doctrine, Soviet military-technical level goals, they were meant to disrupt writings increasingly point to the need for NATO’s defensive response to an invasion simultaneous operations throughout the and to prevent the effective application of entire depth of an enemy’s formation, in­ the alliance’s air power against Warsaw cluding deep air strikes, which they expect Pact ground operations. The first of these, to be used against their own defenses.22 It the air operation, was to be carried out pri­ appears, then, that the Soviets still see the marily by the Legnica, Vinnitsa, and parts need for offensive air operations into of the Smolensk air armies of the Supreme NATO territory in the event of war, even if High Command in conjunction with FA their own forces were to maintain defen­ and SNA units, as well as surface-to- sive positions (either as an end in them­ surface missile (SSM) units, heliborne selves or as a covering force for an even­ raiding parties, and special operations tual counteroffensive). (Spetsnaz) units. It was designed to de­ How a CFE agreement would affect this stroy or suppress NATO’s command and situation is obviously dependent on which control links, storage and delivery systems proposal is finally accepted. The latest for nuclear weapons, and NATO's air Warsaw Pact position of September 1989 bases and supporting infrastructure. If suc­ would keep air defense or V PVO virtually cessful, the air operation would have in­ unscathed, while leaving other NATO and hibited any effective NATO retaliation Warsaw Pact aircraft subject to reductions. (particularly nuclear) against Soviet These assets could, depending on the over­ ground operations. all likelihood of attack on the Soviet In practice, the air operation was to in­ homeland, become a significant augment­ volve two or three large-scale, massed ing force for the remaining FA fighters in strikes involving up to 1,200 aircraft, fol­ Eastern Europe, freeing the latter to throw lowed by a series of follow-on raids by FA their full weight into covering offensive assets and again by strategic aviation, so operations over NATO territory. The V that NATO would not be able to regenerate PVO. if left with all or most of its aircraft a viable air capability. Air army attacks and facing a reduced strategic threat (per­ were to be supported by intense jamming haps as the result of a Strategic Arms Lim­ of NATO radar and communication links, itation Talks—START—treaty), would be and air defense suppression was to be ac­ able to maintain a vigorous defense over complished by tactical air, SSMs, and ar­ Soviet lines of communication through tillery bombardment. Eastern Europe. This would almost pre­ Overlapping this operation was the anti­ clude any sustained, unreinforced inter­ air operation, which was designed to deny diction effort (either conventional or nu­ NATO air superiority by the continual at­ clear) by NATO, especially if NATO had NATO AM OPERATIONS 29

TABLE 2 NATO AND WTO AIRCRAFT IN EUROPE BEFORE AND AFTER PROPOSED CUTS

Added in NATO WTO Definition Definition

Combat Air Defense Trainer Total Baseline NATO 5,322 0 1,384 6,706 WTO 5,198 1,694 5,700 12,592

After NATO- NATO 5,322 0 378 5,700 Source: proposed cuts WTO 4,304 1,396 0 5,700 Institute for Defense and Dis- armament studies, reprinted After WTO- NATO 4,700 0 1,384 6,084 in Aviation Week/Space Tech- proposed cuts WTO 4,700 1,694 5,700 12,094 nology, 30 October 1989, 36.

greatly reduced its numbers of long-range still leave a significant offensive potential. penetrators or was withholding them for Even the initial Soviet-proposed suffi­ later use. ciency limits of 1,200 aircraft (excluding V Even if final agreement approximated PVO) would have provided the Warsaw the limits put forward by NATO, it is still Pact with enough offensive potential to not clear that the Soviets would not be un­ conduct a vigorous campaign. If they in­ able to carry out an effective airfield sup­ stead opted to maintain a smaller, more pression campaign. Within the limits of balanced force or one oriented more to­ 3.420 combat aircraft allowed under the ward air defense, their options could be NATO proposal, the Soviets could still as­ more limited. Still it is highly unlikely semble a potent, mixed force of fighters, that a postagreement Soviet air force heavy bombers armed with a mix of stand­ would lose its capability to conduct at off and free-fall weapons, and fighter- least a selective air and antiair operation. oombers for tactical missions.23 This force Soviet writings already reflect the belief :ould be arrayed against a reduced NATO that precision-guided munitions reduce arget set. particularly if NATO decided to the need for large numbers of strike air­ onsolidate its forces to a smaller number craft. Instead, the premium is on escort >f MOBs or had less short-range nuclear fighters, electronic countermeasures (ECM) lelivery systems in the wake of arms con- aircraft, and defense suppression aircraft, rol or budget cuts. It could also face less all of which would be devoted to getting lense ground-based air defenses. the smaller number of strikers through to Theoretically, the Soviets could throw their targets (much in the same manner as he same numbers of aircraft into an air their Western counterparts).24 It would not tperation after a CFE agreement as they be surprising, then, to see them cut some vould have before, since NATO's proposal less capable attack aircraft (such as Su-17s) vould allow them to retain the estimated while retaining most of their medium- .200 aircraft needed to carry it out. As range attack aircraft (Su-24s) and those uggested by figure 2, the 15-percent cuts useful in overcoming air defenses. ii the inventories of both alliances would Hence, a CFE agreement, if properly 30 AIRPOWER IOURNAL SUMMER 1990

crafted, should lead to roughly acceptable slashed their average flight hours below force ratios, but it would be unwise to con­ the 15-hour/month NATO standard, while clude that it would prevent Soviet coun­ others are experiencing pilot shortages terair operations. The advantage will still (Norw'ay, the Netherlands, and again be with the side that struck preemptively Denmark). and could maintain a high sortie rate dur­ All of this is placed in the context of ex­ ing crucial periods of the ground war. panding airspace and training restrictions In the area of defensive counterair over Western Europe. By contrast, the So­ (DCA), and with smaller forces, factors viet aviators are averaging 12-13 hours of such as pilot skill and training would take monthly flight time, and the quality of on greater significance, which has tradi­ their training has undergone a marked im­ tionally been strongly in NATO’s favor. provement.25 While probably not yet as so- However, a side effect of reduced tensions in Europe has been, and will probably con­ tinue to be, a drop in resources committed to defense and a corresponding drop in For its part, NATO does not believe carrier-based aircraft flight hours. Several nations (including should he counted in CFE totals since the carrier taskforce Belgium and Denmark) have already has a worldwide mission and is not dedicated to NATO. NATO AIR OPERATIONS 31

phisticated as that of NATO air forces, EC-130H Compass Call, etc.), which would Warsaw Pact aircrew training may even­ be shared by both the Second Allied Tacti­ tually decrease the flight skill superiority cal Air Force (2ATAF) and 4ATAF, are re­ that NATO has enjoyed in the past. Thus, quired for penetration of Warsaw Pact air if NATO nations feel that a residual air ca­ defenses—both for OCA and interdiction pability is necessary at all, they must ade­ missions. It would be important for United quately maintain their level of training if States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) and this force is to have any use whatsoever. NATO to preserve the countable aircraft in Successful arms control may also mean this category (F-4G/F-16 Fighting Falcon less aircraft to cover the same amount of and EF-111) from cuts, since a more lim­ airspace, at least until reinforcements are ited pool of actual attack aircraft would be wrell under way. There would also be less unacceptably vulnerable to fast attrition threat aircraft to worry about, but these without them. would have the advantage of penetrating A smaller force would need to be ex­ NATO’s airspace at the time and place of tremely combat efficient in its OCA cam­ their own choosing. This would make paign, as in other operations. Here again, battle management systems such as the E-3 the training required to make use of dif­ airborne warning and control system ferent aircraft from nations making up (AWACS) even more important, so that as­ force packages would be crucial as long as sets can be concentrated to cover the right these formations are considered the best threat axes at the right times and not re­ means to penetrate hostile airspace. Yet, spond to feints. Defensive sorties cannot noise restrictions in the Federal Republic be wasted, and “blue-on-blue” engage­ of Germany (FRG) and training cutbacks ments can be afforded even less. Thus, the will probably continue to hinder the abil­ need for a clear air picture continues to ity of NATO’s air forces to practice large suggest that a common NATO identifica­ force operations (especially at low level).26 tion, friend or foe (IFF) system and the If less aircraft are available for this mis­ AWACS would still be a requirement for sion, timing and weaponeering will also post-CFE air forces. become even more important. Former cam­ A dearth of usable aircraft may call into paign options may be precluded, with a question NATO's ability to conduct a com­ few well-timed pindowns of selected prehensive offensive counterair (OCA) Warsaw Pact fields the best that can be campaign. Once again, if the Soviets are expected. able to keep V PVO aircraft unconstrained Munitions would be needed to have a and be able to operate forward, the longer-lasting effect, since less revisits outcome of such a campaign could be would be possible than before. Also, doubtful. standoff weapons (such as NATO’s modu­ In the aftermath of the Intermediate- lar standoff weapon—a program that is ange Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, rapidly withering) would be extremely NATO’s most capable OCA aircraft also helpful in keeping attrition to a mini­ jecame, once again, NATO's prime assets mum.27 If no such weapon becomes avail­ or long-range nuclear delivery, which im- able and OCA assets are reduced signifi­ )lies that many of them could be held cantly, the mission itself may become iack from conventional operations. If unviable. hese aircraft numbers were drawn down Many of NATO’s counterair require­ o meet CFE quotas, even fewer would be ments could be obviated, however, if So­ vailable for counterair missions (once air- viet forces were to reduce the number of raft on nuclear alert were subtracted). airfields in Eastern Europe from which Likewise, a limited number of the spe- they operate (see fig. 3). This could come ialized support package assets (such as about either through a deliberate unilateral F-lll Ravens, F-4G Wild Weasels. Soviet decision (which is unlikely for 32 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

now) or as a component of a conventional NATO will probably continue its efforts to arms control agreement. The Soviet air acquire a robust airfield attack capability. forces operate from over 1,000 MOBs in the ATTU region, plus myriads of more austere fields to which their aircraft could Support of the Land Battle be dispersed. NATO, on the other hand, NATO’s air forces contribute to the ground has approximately 600 airfields, 130 of war by providing offensive air support which have the hardened aircraft shelters (OAS)—consisting of close air support and facilities necessary for proper wartime (CAS) and battlefield air interdiction survivability.28 It has been suggested that, (BAI)—and air interdiction (AI), and re­ should the Soviets decide to keep signifi­ connaissance. They also provide airlift and cant numbers of aircraft forward deployed, special operations support, which will not NATO could counter with CFE proposals be dealt with here.32 CAS/BAI respon­ to reduce the number of Warsaw Pact sibilities grew from the need to support MOBs to match those of NATO, especially NATO ground forces in contact or immi­ those nearer the inter-German border.29 nent contact with Warsaw Pact forces, The agreement would have to require the while deeper interdiction was designed to Soviets to withdraw not only their aircraft disrupt the Warsaw Pact follow-on forces, but also all elements of their tactical logis­ logistics nets, and command and control tics system, which would be critical to the networks.33 readiness of FA units.30 These arrange­ Future requirements for OAS and AI ments would also need to be verified will, as will the counterair mission, be af­ through on-site inspection. fected by reductions in Soviet ground and In reply, the Soviets would almost cer­ air units. Between the possibilities of a re- tainly redouble their efforts to reduce assertion of Soviet control over their Western offensive aircraft while maintain­ NSWP allies (and the subsequent revitali­ ing that their exclusion of V PVO aircraft zation of their military capabilities) or a from official count is even more justified complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from since they would be dismantling some of Eastern Europe lies a broad range of con­ their forward air defenses. But this argu­ tingencies. The most likely of these, result­ ment only becomes more convincing the ing from a CFE agreement, would result in farther east the Soviets withdraw their air smaller, less heavy forces facing each other infrastructure and the more NATO’s OCA in Central Europe. Offensive Soviet ac­ problems are eased. tions, then, would require partial or full Nevertheless, as long as Soviet aircraft mobilization, actions that would alarm are based in Eastern Europe, it is prudent both NATO and NSWP governments alike. to retain .some offensive capability against (And it is uncertain that the latter would Soviet airfields.31 Still, deep penetration of even comply with a Soviet mobilization any sort may lead to more aircraft attrition order.) Events seem to suggest that the So­ than NATO is ready to accept. Conse­ viets would have to mobilize their own quently, if Soviet aircraft in the groups of forces, either enforcing the compliance of forces are thinned out and moved away their erstwhile allies or at least ensuring from the interbloc boundaries, the OCA their noninterference, and only then mission may become less urgent and thus would they be able to undertake forward receive less priority when scarce resources operations-—a tall order to say the least. are allotted by NATO air commanders. If, Nevertheless, the Soviets may still retain on the other hand, the Soviets retain po­ some options less taxing than an all-out tent striking forces (such as Su-24s) in the push to the North Sea. Recent writings bv FA and their air armies and strong support Soviets seem to suggest that they no longer forces on fields in the German Democratic see a well-defined line between offense Republic (GDR) and Czechoslovakia, then and defense in modern warfare. Instead, as NATO AIR OPERATIONS 33 stated earlier, defensive operations can Nevertheless, any Soviet operation also include aggressive strikes into the en­ should, in present circumstances, give emy’s depth either as an end in themselves NATO forces time to react; a CFE agree­ or as a prelude to counteroffensive opera­ ment should improve this even more. If tions.34 One of their options is to seize a this remains the case, the opening battles politically or militarily significant piece of of any future war may well be meeting en­ territory, dig their forces in, and then al­ gagements between covering forces that low a NATO counterattack to “break its are attempting to gain an initial advantage teeth” trying to eliminate the salient (as Is­ while, in their strategic rears, both alli­ rael attempted to do in the 1973 Yom Kip- ances scramble to mobilize and reinforce pur War). their positions. This may affect the way re-

______NATO Air to Air Warsaw Pact

Dedicated Air Defense

Primary Air Defense

Total Air Defense Air to Ground

Dedicated Ground Attack

Primary Ground Attack

Strike

Bomber

Total Ground Attack

Reconnaissance

Teconnaissance/EW

Total ------

Source: Phillip A. Karber, Implications of the Gorbachev Reductions for Conventional Arms Control, presentation to the North Atlantic Assembly, 29 May 1989 (rev. 18 August 1989) (McLean, Va.: BDM Corporation,

igure 2. NATO-Warsaw Pact Inventory Comparisons. ;i4 A/RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 duced NATO air forces can influence the Consequently, the best solution seemed ground war. to be the acquisition of multirole aircraft (such as the A-16) that could, when needed, perform this mission in coopera­ Close Air Support tion with helicopters and ground-based In the 1980s thinking about the CAS mis­ weapons.36 Thus, it was natural for NATO sion underwent a change.35 The perennial to include aircraft suited for little other problems of target acquisition and surviv­ than CAS (A-lOs, Alpha jets, G.91s) in its ing the constantly improving Soviet bat­ list of aircraft slated for cuts or cascading. tlefield air defenses (fig. 4) seemed to sug­ Instead, some air forces, at least in the gest that dedicating aircraft solely to the Central Region, are concentrating on BAI, CAS mission was not the best use of lim­ where target arrays (columns) are more ited fixed-wing assets. There would be concentrated, making them easier to ac­ times on the battlefield when CAS would quire and attack. The combined fixed-wing be needed (e.g., during times of maximum and helicopter team concept, effective as it battlefield fluidity, such as a breakthrough may be, could be disrupted if both plat­ situation). forms are subjected to deep CFE cuts, leav-

Source: Anthony H. Cordesman, NATO's Central Region Forces (London: Jane's Publishing Co.. Ltd. 1988), 2"

Figure 3. NATO and Warsaw Pact Air Bases in the Forward Area of die Centra] Region. NATO AIR OPERATIONS 35

ing ground commanders with insufficient As was the case with OCA missions, the support when they actually do need it. density of Soviet air defenses would re­ The demand for CAS could be quite strong quire the use of packaged forces for day­ after CFE cuts, as aircraft tasked with the light operations, with its attendant mission are used as an operational reserve, problems. Soviet Iookdown/shootdown covering gaps between noncontiguous and airborne early warning (AEW) capabil­ units.37 ities are also improving, reducing the low- altitude sanctuary NATO’s air forces had Air Interdiction previously enjoyed. Since any future Soviet action in Europe Nevertheless, these are not new prob­ would require reinforcement from the lems. They only highlight the need to care­ western military districts of the USSR, fully husband NATO’s reduced inventory effective air interdiction could pay hand­ in the event of hostilities, since attrition some dividends. What remains to be deter­ could quickly wear this force down to the mined, however, is how such an effort point where its effect on the ground war should be conducted by less assets. would be insignificant. To avoid this con­ To be effective, AI activities should be dition, tactics that produce the greatest in sync with events on the ground. To that disruption for the least amount of sorties end, current NATO practice, in the Central must continue to be emphasized. Some ex­ Army Group. Central Europe (CENTAG), at amples of this would be the widespread least, is described as follows: use of sensor-fuzed mines for BAI mis­ Almost all AI target selection is done at army sions and standoff weapons across the group headquarters, and almost all BAI target board, and an emphasis on night opera­ selection is done at the corps. But COMCEN- tions. The bottom line is that some sort of TAG prioritizes BAI targets across corps/army sanctuary must be found wherever possi­ group boundaries.38 ble, allowing NATO aircraft to go over, un­ der, or around threat weapons’ envelopes. With the introduction of the multiple These are not new ideas by any means, launch rocket system (MLRS) and the and in most cases only involve a continua­ Army tactical missile system (ATACMS), tion of current practices. Even with a re­ ground units are increasingly able to cover duced number of aircraft, NATO forces many targets deep within the corps sectors should still be able to conduct an effective that previously could only be reached by interdiction campaign. Success, in the aircraft. If less assets are available in the end, would be measured by how well such future, the division of labor currently operations impeded Soviet forces as they being established between army and air tried to come into contact with NATO force staffs can allow proper concentration forces at the forward edge of the battle area of AI assets on prearranged areas and tar­ (FEBA). gets. with only minimal overlap with ground systems.39 The reduced post-CFE force would face Reconnaissance a surface-to-air threat little diminished The first indications NATO would have over the present one. The Soviets, in an that any agreement was being violated jffort to combat NATO’s follow-on forces would be through a variety of sensors, not attack (FOFA) concept (of which BAI and the least of which would be NATO’s own AI are integral parts), have stated their in­ reconnaissance (recce) systems such as the dention to augment existing air defenses, as TR-1 or eventually the E-8. As events un­ well as relying on ECM to blind NATO re- folded, these would be joined by tactical :onnaissance systems such as the joint recce assets such as RF-4 Phantoms and surveillance and target attack radar system Tornadoes. Together with other systems, JSTARS) that would be vital for targeting these aircraft form the surveillance net both ground- and air-delivered strikes.40 NATO would need to transition from a 36 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

Source: David C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army (London: Jane’s Publishing Co. Ltd., 1988), 308.

Figure 4. Soviet Army Mobile SAM/AAA Coverage.

peacetime footing back to a mobilized con­ unable to participate in a conventional bat dition; if hostilities broke out, they would tie, especially long-range assets such as form a crucial targeting system. This F-llls and Tornadoes. As shown in table would be the case with or without a CFE 3, however, there are several other types ol agreement. No matter what the course of aircraft able to carry out this mission, bu< arms control, reconnaissance assets will it is increasingly uncertain that the\ probably remain relatively untouched.41 would be used in this role, since their weapons would be released over the terri­ tory of NSWP countries, who would prob­ ably not be willing participants in a Dual-Capable Aircraft Soviet-initiated war. Consequently, less of these shorter-range aircraft would be As CFE cuts come into effect, another needed as nuclear withholds. This, in protected category would be nuclear- turn, could mean that while their flex­ capable aircraft. As long as NATO main­ ibility is increased, their usefulness to tains an in-theater nuclear deterrent, and NATO commanders as a deterrent could since any follow-on to the Lance surface- be diminished. For the near term, how­ to-surface missile is delayed, NATO’s tac­ ever, all of NATO’s nuclear-capable air­ tical aircraft will be tasked with a nuclear- craft form an important component of its delivery mission. As stated earlier, it is overall deterrent and of flexible response. likely that some of these aircraft would be The pace of change in Europe could still NATO AIR OPERATIONS 37

cause this to change in the not-too-distant Conclusions future. A CFE agreement along the lines of NATO's position would leave NATO air Reinforcement Issues forces with the wherewithal to perform all If the Soviets were to abrogate a CFE agree­ traditional missions; the Soviet proposal, ment by attempting to reinforce their re­ with its exemptions for important Soviet sidual forces in Eastern Europe, then (the­ aircraft, would not. But even an agreement oretically) NATO reinforcement should that would be to NATO’s liking would still begin to flow from the CONUS after the not mean that air and ground threats were appropriate political decisions. This eliminated; on the contrary, they could re­ would serve as both a deterrent and as a main viable, if not likely. It also means means to bolster the reduced order of bat­ that priorities would have to be imposed tle in the ATTU region in almost every on its force structure and missions. At first mission area. glance, post-CFE air forces may not appear In practice, however, the process may to look or operate that much differently not work so smoothly. Politically, it would than they do now, but there will be several be questionable whether all NATO govern­ shifts in emphasis. ments would believe intelligence indicat­ As always, one of the first priorities will ing a Soviet reinforcement effort into be to retain aircraft that can perform the Eastern Europe and accede to NATO’s own nuclear strike mission, at least as long as reinforcements until the situation was crit­ the alliance decides that such weapons are ical. It would be very difficult for NATO necessary to deter war in Europe. Next, the countries to accept with unanimity the reconnaissance mission and the associated idea that an era of reduced tensions might aircraft, needed to ensure compliance with suddenly be coming to an end. any treaty and to alert NATO military and If this agreement were reached, CONUS- political authorities of any abnormalities based wings would be among the most that might precede hostilities, would re­ quick reacting of all rearward-based mili­ ceive priority. tary assets, but problems would still re­ The first threat that NATO would proba­ main. Redeploying squadrons would be bly face in the event of a war would be air competing for tanker and airlift support, attacks on its air bases and other targets in and if the number of usable fields were re­ its rear areas. As shown, Soviet residual duced in the aftermath of CFE, they could forces would still be capable of carrying find insufficient ramp space, hardened air­ out these missions under all current pro­ craft shelters, and maintenance facilities.42 posals. They, too, would have to prioritize The end result could be major bottlenecks the activities of their reduced forces, but in the reinforcement effort unless prob­ they would still be able, at least the­ lems were addressed beforehand. oretically, to conduct an air and antiair op­ Eventually, the Soviets could face the eration suitable to cover their ground oper­ similar problem of recalcitrant allies un­ ations. The contributions of NSWP air willing to facilitate a redeployment for­ forces is questionable, but they could still ward of Soviet ground and air forces. As of be used to assert airspace sovereignty in now, however, they still face a much both directions. easier logistical problem and could easily For this reason, DCA capabilities, em­ reinsert aircraft into fields under their con­ bodied in aircraft such as the F-15 Eagle trol, especially if this were done slowly by and the Tornado F-2, would receive a small flights of aircraft. For this reason, the greater priority among wartime missions. Soviet calls for intrusive verification are As a result, the air-to-air picture after CFE probably crucial to the success of a CFE could look very similar to what it was be­ verification regime. fore an agreement. 38 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

An unreinforced attack by a smaller So­ the west and east of the interbloc borders. viet force remaining after an agreement Consequently, the air forces with which would probably not present an unmanage­ NATO enters the twenty-first century may, able threat if NATO’s residual forces re­ in the final analysis, be capable of provid­ acted in time. A moderately reduced force ing little more than a ragged air defense. of CAS/BAI aircraft would be sufficient to Nevertheless, the possibility of a major support the initial ground war provided turnabout in Europe’s strategic environ­ they had immediate support from spe­ ment (perhaps from major upheavals in cialized suppression aircraft. As more So­ the USSR) cannot be discounted. With this viet ground formations are committed, and in mind, most nations will probably retain as their battlefield air defenses become at least a small, flexible force for use in the denser and interconnected, NATO can ex­ skies over an uncertain Europe. pect greater attrition in this group of air­ craft, which will require timely replace­ ment. OCA requirements will probably develop slowly, as Soviet aircraft reenter their Eastern Europe fields and begin oper­ Notes ations. Arrayed against these offensive 1. Soviet CFE negotiator Oleg Grinevsky quoted in John D. Morrocco. "Vienna Talks Trigger NATO Air Force Review." missions, Soviet integrated air defenses Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 October 1989. 36. will remain formidable, at least as long as 2. Morrocco. "Vienna Talks." 36: Michael Gordon. "U.S. Soviet ground formations remain in Cen­ Weighs Limiting Arms Agenda." New York Times. 7 Novem­ ber 1989. 15: lohn W. R. Lepingwell. "Soviet Air Defense and tral Europe. Improved SAM systems the Stealth Challenge." International Security 14. no. 2 (Fall (SA-10/-11/-12, 2S6, etc.), aircraft with 1989): 76-77. 3. R. A. Mason, "Airpower in Conventional Arms Control." good maneuverability and lookdown/ Survival 31 (September/October 1989): 405: Oliver Debouzy. shootdown capabilities, and supporting C2 “The Balance of Air Forces in Europe—The Devil Is in the systems will all remain in place in mean­ Details." NATO’s Sixteen Nations 34. no. 6 (June 1989): 52; ingful numbers after an agreement. Only Gen )ohn Galvin. "A Strategy for the Future." Royal United the NSWP contribution might be in the process of significant change. Thus, after CFE, the ability of NATO to project offen­ TABLE 3 sive air power against Warsaw Pact forces NATO NUCLEAR-CAPABLE and installations may actually be some­ TACTICAL AIRCRAFT* what degraded after the initial stages of any future conflict, provided it does not Combat Radius (nm) begin an appropriate reinforcement effort A ircraft (optimum profile) or does not have the proper infrastructure to support such an undertaking. F-111D/E/F 945 Most likely scenarios, then, involve a F-4D/E 454 peaceful yet evolving Europe so that deter­ F-16C 502 rence, verification, and initial air defense CF-18 400 will most probably dominate the force Mirage IIIE 518 structure of NATO air forces, followed by Mirage 2000N 373 aircraft actually needed to prosecute a de­ Jaguar A 459 veloping, mobile ground war. Tornado IDS 750 Whatever the outcome, NATO’s military forces will develop first and foremost ac­ cording to the dictates of political events *Land-Based Only. in Europe and budgetary circumstances. Source: International Institute for Strategic With war in Europe appearing most un­ Studies, The Military Balance 1989-1990 likely in the near term, defense budgets (London: IISS, 1989), 217-20. will undoubtedly continue to fall, both to NATO AIN OPERATIONS 39

Sen-ices Jnslilule (RUSI) loumal 134. no. 4 (Autumn 1989): counting or have them readily available to convert to a com­ 17. bat role. 4. Mason. 409. 24. "Soviet Air Force Studies New Bombing Tactics," 5. Part of a comprehensive verification proposal offered in fane's Defence Weekly. 26 August 1989. 354: "Air Force October 1989. Studies Changing Tactics." lane's Defence Weekly. 10 June 6 There are approximately 115 Tu-26 Backfires assigned to 1989. 1168. the Smolensk air armv. The International Institute for Strate­ 25. Debouzy. 55. The importance of realistic, sustained gic Studies. The Military Balance. 1989-1990 (London: IISS. training to NATO’s overall air capabilities is stressed in Gen 1989). 41. 229. SNA contributions to the land battle were dis­ William Kirk's "Air Superiority in the Central Region,” cussed in a 1982 article by Polish colonel A. Musial, ana­ NATO's Sixteen Nations 34. no. 3 (1989): 21. lyzed in Phillip A. Peterson and Mai lohn R. Clark s "Soviet 26. A good description of the complexities of these opera­ Air and Antiair Operations." Air University Review 17. no. 3 tions can be found in Maj Bob George and Maj Lonnie Good- (March-April 1985): 36-54. son. "Planning. Leading, and Executing a Large Force Pack­ 7. Mason. 408-9; Debouzy. 50. age: The Gorilla Lives.” USAF Fighter Weapons Review, 8. See Gen Sir Geoffrey Howe. "Alliance Defense of the Summer 1985. 5-8. Northern Flank." NATO's Sixteen Nations 133. no. 12 (De­ 27. Current runway-busting munitions include the French- cember 1988): 13-18. US Durandal (which lacks any type of antirepair mine) and 9. Mason. 411. For a description of increasing airmobilitv. the British JP-233 and German MW-1 submunition dis­ see Klaus Naumann's "The Restructured Bundeswehr." pensers (respectively). All require the overflight of a heavily NATO's Sixteen Nations 34. no. 10 (October 1989): 34; and defended target, as would the US Air Force's troubled direct Harold S. Orenstein. "Warsaw Pact Views on Trends in airfield attack combined munition (DAACM). Benjamin F. Ground Force Tactics." International Defense Review 22. no. Schemmer. "Stronger Warsaw Pact Runways Cause USAF to 9 (1989): 1149. 'Cancel' Airfield Denial Weapon." Armed Forces (ournal In­ 10. Soviet defense intellectuals writing in the USSR Acad­ ternational. August 1989. 22. emy of Science’s Disarmament and Security 1987 Yearbook 28. Debouzy. 52. basically agreed with NATO's position on the question of re­ 29. Mason. 410. gional sublimits. Phillip A. Karber. “The Military Impact of 30. See Richard A. Ward. "Readiness, Soviet Style," Air the Gorbachev Reductions." Armed Forces Journal Interna­ Force. March 1989, 50-55, for a description of the Soviet lo­ tional. January 1989. 63. gistics system. 11. Morrocco. "Vienna Talks." 36. 31. Also expressed by General Kirk. 19. 12. (ohn D. Morrocco. "NATO Weighs Air Force 32. David C. Isby and Charles Kamps. Jr.. Armies of Modernization in Light of Conventional Arms Cuts.” Avia­ NATO's Central Front (London: Jane's Publishing Company tion Week Sr Space Technology. 24 July 1989. 29-30. Limited, 1985), 35. 13. Morrocco. "Vienna Talks." 36. Affected aircraft would 33. James P. Kahan. “Air Support in CENTAG Deep Opera­ be Alpha jets (West Germany). F-104s (Italy. Turkey). F-lOOs tions." Military Review 69. no. 8 (August 1989): 65, 68-69. (Turkey). G.91s (Italy. Portugal). RF-84s (Greece). Mirage F-ls 34. Orenstein. 1152: Mary C. Fitzgerald. "The New Quality (Greece). A-7s (Portugal). NF-5s (the Netherlands). The US of Soviet Defense," International Defense Review 22. no. 10 contribution could be all or part of its 108-strong A-10 force (1989): 1305-6. in Europe. Morrocco. "NATO Weighs Air Force Moderniza­ 35. See Lt Col Price T. Bingham. "Dedicated Fixed-Wing tion." 30. Close Air Support—A Bad Idea," Armed Forces Journal In­ 14. Quoted in Gordon. 15. ternational. September 1987, 58-62. See also Air Vice- 15 Klaus Wittman. "Challenges of Conventional Arms Marshal John Walker, "The Conundrum of Air-Land War­ Control." Adefphi Papers, no. 239 (London: IISS. 1989), 53. fare." RUSI /ournal 133, no. 3 (Summer 1988): 19-20. 16 See comments by |ohn D. Steinbrunner for the first ar­ 36. See lohn A. Warden. The A ir Campaign (Washington. gument and Barry Blechman for the second in "Breaking D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's. 1989). 97. for a discussion of CAS. with Convention: The New European Force Talks." Arms 37. Warden. 96. Control Today 19, no. 3 (April 1989): 3-9. 38. Kahan. 72-73. 17. For a discussion of this "statute." see John Yurechko. 39. Current German arrangements include army respon­ "Soviet Reinforcem ent and M obilization Issues" in NATO- sibility out to 75 kilometers with the air force taking respon­ Warsaw Pact Mobilization, ed. leffrey Simon (Washington. sibility for targets beyond that range. Deconfliction of US Air D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1988), 57-97. Force and US Army systems has been under way, with the 18. Warning times and quote in Phillip A. Karber. “The Im­ Air Force expected to cover most deep targets. See John D. plications of the Gorbachev Reductions for Conventional Morrocco, "West Germany Eyes Larger Air Force Role in Arms Control." presentation to the North Atlantic Assembly. Ground Support." Aviation Week Sr Space Technology. 30 29 May 1989 (rev. 18 August 1989), 16-17. October 1989. 39; Glenn W. Goodman. “New Airborne Sen­ 19. The description of these operations is drawn primarily sors Look Deep, Allow Army/LtSAF to Strike Deep," Armed from Phillip A. Peterson and Maj |ohn R. Clarke. "Soviet Air Forces Journal International. January 1989. 86. and Antiair Operations," Air University Review 17. no. 34 40. Peter Adams, "Soviets Plan Electronic Air Defense (March-April 1985): 36-54. Counter to FOFA." Defense News. 16 October 1989, 38. quot­ 20 "Changing Tactics in Air Power.” fane's Defence ing Frunze Academy commandant General Colonel Vladimir Weekly, 16 April 1988, 754 Kontchits. 21. Robert Hall. "T h e Ground/Air Interface." lane’s Soviet 41. John D. Morrocco. "Importance of USAF Moderniza­ Intelligence Review. July 1989. 326-27. tions to Grow Following Force Reductions.” Aviation Week 22. V. G. Reznichenko. quoted in Harold S. Orenstein's & S p a c e Technology, 30 October 1989. 37. "Warsaw Pact Views on Trends in Ground Forces Tactics." 42. As is the case at the collocated operating bases now. International Defense Review 9 (1989): 1149. Anthony H. Cordesman. NATO's Central Region Forces 23. They would also need to have trainers exempted from (London: Jane’s Publishing Company Limited. 1988), 246. .-I’ Sir WAR GAMING HNIG O H FUTURE THE FOR THINKING L t C ol D avid

b . L ee SA , U WAH GAMING 41

What can be done during peacetime to train and educate our current and future leaders for wartime air campaigning? War games can help. This article reviews con­ cepts of war gaming and its historical developments. It also considers the advan­ tages of war gaming, as well as its limita­ tions and pitfalls.

History of To be prepared for war is one of the War Gaming most effectual means of preserving peace. The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines —George Washington a war game as “a simulation, by whatever means, of a military operation involving ar is chaotic, full of un­ two or more opposing forces, using rules, knowns, and governed by data, and procedures designed to depict an chance. It can be mastered actual or assumed real life situation.”1 The only through practice, and the war game has been around almost from the Wbest practice is combat experience.time combatTo­ began. The oldest and best- day’s airmen, however, lack the campaign known war game is chess. Although its experience of their predecessors. Indeed, origin is unknown, most people agree that World War II and Korean warriors are all chess developed from the Indian game but extinct, and even the ranks of combat- “Chaturanga,” which used a standard map experienced officers from the Vietnam era and pieces representing the arms of the are thinning. day (e.g., elephants, infantry, cavalry, etc.). Tactically, our Air Force pilots and sup­ It was played by four people according to port personnel are second to none. Train­ fixed rules.2 ing almost constantly, they have honed In 1664 Christopher Weikhmann of Ulm, specialty skills to a fine edge. Yet, can the Germany, developed a warlike game called same be said of officers involved in direct­ the ‘‘King’s Game.” It had 30 pieces per ing the application of air power? Air side and 14 distinct moves. About 120 power is a theater asset, distinguished by years later, Helwig, master of pages to the speed, range, and flexibility. But theater­ Duke of Brunswick, devised a game whose wide exercises are costly, both in terms of playing pieces represented entire military time and resources. Because field and units (e.g., infantry, cavalry, heavy and command-post exercises are threatened by light artillery, etc.) rather than individual proposed cuts in the defense budget, the soldiers.3 The playing board consisted of prospects for training officers in the art of 1,666 squares, each colored to represent a employing air forces are not good. Further, particular type of terrain. The most notable host nations are apprehensive about the of the chess-like games of the eighteenth United States conducting air activities century was “ Neue Kriegsspiel,” de­ over their territory, especially in light of veloped by Georg Vinturinus. It featured a the rash of aircraft accidents in Western game board of 3,600 squares depicting the Europe over the last few years. Addi­ terrain between France and Belgium, troop tionally, environmentalists concerned lists containing 1,800 units of various about tbe effect of military exercises on the arms, and a 60-page rule book includ­ environment constantly urge a curtailment ing new rules for reinforcements and of large-scale maneuvers. logistics.4 42 AJRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

The next round of improvements was continues in war games today. Finally, the made in 1811 by von Reisswitz, a Prussian younger von Reisswitz’s game used an um­ military official. In his game, the chess­ pire to settle disputes and determine casu­ board was eliminated in favor of terrain alties. Communication delays, limited in­ modeled with sand. Troops, now repre­ telligence, and rates of maneuver as well sented by colored blocks of wood, were no as the above innovations were covered in a longer confined to chessboard squares but rule book entitled Instructions for the Rep­ were permitted to move freely about, resentation of Tactical Maneuvers under based on their capabilities.5 Von the Guise of a War Game.7 The younger Reisswitz's game was further developed by von Reisswitz’s efforts caused the then his son, a lieutenant in the artillery of chief of staff of the German army, Karl von the Prussian Guards. The younger von Muffling, to exclaim, “It’s not a game at Reisswitz replaced the sand table with a all, it’s training for war. I shall recommend large-scale map. In addition, he revised the it enthusiastically to the whole army!” rules of the game to more closely resemble And he did.8 combat of the times6 and invented the red As rules became more complicated and and blue color coding for sides, which battlefield experience more common, a

Pearl Harbor. 7 December 1941. The USS Arizona, shown here on fire, became perhaps the most famous victim of war gaming. Prior to hostilities, the Japanese perfected shallow- water torpedo attacks during war games that were designed to simulate an assault on Pearl Harbor. WAR GAMING 43

group of Prussian Kriegsspiel officers began to agitate for •‘reforms.” In 1874 Klement W. von Meckel and Col Julius von Verdy du Vernois argued that umpires should not render decisions based on rules but on tactical experience. They further ar­ gued that the randomness of games should be eliminated because game results should reinforce proven tactics.9 In von Verdy’s book War Game, published in 1877, he proposed to eliminate the written rules and govern opponents by tactical rules which would become obvious during the Japan appears to have adopted war gam­ course of the game.10 These reformists pro­ ing during the same time as the Europeans, duced a basic dichotomy in war games although no definite date can be estab­ still present today: rigid games whose out­ lished. Works from von Meckel were trans­ comes were based on rules versus free lated into Japanese and used throughout games whose outcomes were based on um­ the Japanese army and the Japanese war pire expertise. college.15 The victory that Japan enjoyed Germany continued to use war games as over Russia in 1904 was attributed, in part, a resource for training military officers on t o w a r g a m e s . 17 T h e J a p a n e s e “ g a m e d ” t h e how to think about warfare. They were es­ Midway campaign as well as the raid on pecially important tools in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor—the latter in the presence of World War I, when ceilings on both man­ the actual carrier task force commander. power and spending were placed on the Vice Adm Chuichi Nagumo.15 German army.11 Germany went so far as to US experience in war gaming began late require each regimental officer to devote in the nineteenth century. Maj W. R. Liver­ one evening a week to war gaming. Game more of the Army Corps of Engineers is play continued well into World War II credited with producing the first major US and was used to think through many military war game. His game, called campaigns. “American Kriegsspiel,” was based on the Other countries began to try out war works of German war gamers von Meckel games in the late 1800s. The British started and von Verdy.19 Published in 1879, Liver­ informal gaming that used German rules in more’s version allowed tactical, grand tac­ 1872 and, acting on a directive issued by tical, strategic, fortress, and naval play20 he Duke of Cambridge, formally adopted on a map with 10-foot contours and drawn war games in 1883.12 Each military district on a scale of 12 inches to the mile.21 Liver­ n England had its own war games. These more modified German war-gaming games used some large-scale campaign as a methods by giving each side incomplete oackdrop, with part of the action occurring information on the opponent’s position n the players’ own military districts. From and deployment.22 However, play followed here, individual garrisons confronted mil­ a rigid format since combat-seasoned itary problems of attack and defense.13 umpires—required for free games—were Games were also used to illustrate military virtually nonexistent in the United States. listory and geography.14 Unfortunately, Livermore hoped that his game and inno­ he British adopted the most rigid of the vations would simplify and speed up play, •var-game rules for training, and when the but by 1898 he had to conclude that the Boers did not abide by them during the time required to master the rules offset any second Boer War (1900-1902), the British timesaving features in the game itself.23 dropped the whole concept of war gaming US Army gaming activities continued •or s o m e 5 0 y e a r s . 15 through World War II, based on the 1908 44 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 work of Capt Farrand Sayre, entitled Map der the auspices of the Air Staff; (1) the Maneuvers and Tactical Rides.24 Sayre in­ Warrior Preparation Center, created in troduced one-sided games, whereby the 1982 and located at Einsiedlerhof Air Sta­ umpires played opposing forces; plastic tion, Federal Republic of Germany, and map overlays; and grease pencils for mark­ (2) the 4441st Tactical Training Group ing unit information and movement.25 (commonly known as Blue Flag) located at Naval war games were introduced to the Ilurlburt Field, Florida. United States in 1887 by Lt William Commercial computer war games were McCarty Little (USN), who lectured on the developed in the early 1980s, one of the concept of chart maneuvers at the Naval first of which was “Tanktics.” published War College.26 This variation on war in 1981. This game simulated a tactical gaming became a regular part of the Naval tank battle, with a human pitted against War College curriculum in 189427 and had the computer. While the computer re­ two levels of play: strategic and tactical.28 solved hidden movement and combat, the In the strategic game, forces were deployed human player entered direction, move­ to detect the enemy fleet, relying heavily ment, and firing orders for friendly tanks. on patrols and naval screens. In the tacti­ Since computer graphics were not very cal game, fleets maneuvered to obtain the good, the human player visualized best position to destroy the enemy. Over friendly and enemy forces with a hexago­ 300 naval war games were played at the nal map board and cardboard chits. Since Naval War College between 1919 and then, these games have vastly improved, 1941.29 both graphically and substantively, as the The US Air Force’s war-gaming experi­ power of the personal computer has in­ ence began in the 1950s and, until the late creased. Game scenarios range from antiq­ seventies, was limited to the professional uity to World War III and beyond. military schools of Air University.30 Dur­ ing the seventies. Air Force war gaming was divided between Air University, Advantages of War Games United States Air Forces in Europe, Tacti­ cal Air Command, and US Readiness Com­ The first and foremost advantage of war mand. But in 1984 the Headquarters US games is that they make people think Air Force Wargaming Review Group was about war. Players can test their skills in established to ensure a cohesive Air Force the art of making decisions that affect approach in satisfying operational war­ thousands of people, despite the paucity of gaming systems requirements.31 As a result information (Clauswitz’s famous “fog of of the group’s findings that year, the Direc­ war”).32 One example of such thinking is torate of Operations for the Air Force Dep­ the evolving strategy of the US Navy dur­ uty Chief of Staff, Plans and Operations ing the interwar years: the concepts of air­ was made the executive agent for Air craft carrier-based fleet engagements and Force war-gaming policy, requirements, “ island hopping” were developed from concepts of operation, and budgets. The war games played at the Naval War Col­ same year saw the creation of the Air lege.33 Adm Chester W. Nimitz acknowl­ Force Wargaming Center at Maxwell AFB, edged the usefulness of war games in a let­ Alabama, whose mission is to plan and ter to that institution: “The war with Japan conduct war games in support of USAF has been [enacted] in the game room here educational and operational requirements. by so many people and in so many dif­ Additionally, the center was chartered as ferent ways that nothing that happened the Air Force war-gaming clearinghouse during the war was a surprise—absolutely and the technical focal point on war gam­ nothing except the kamikaze tactics to­ ing for the Air Force. Two other war­ wards the end of the war; we had not visu­ gaming organizations were also placed un­ alized those.”34 Furthermore. Germany’s WAFI GAMING 45

ployments.38 Further, war games allow commanders to run a campaign plan re­ peatedly without actually expending re­ sources and causing unit fatigue.39 For ex­ ample, the American crossing of the Roer River in World War 11 was gamed many times without subjecting troops to hostile fire. When the actual operation took place, virtually nothing came as a surprise.40 Fourth, hours of boredom sprinkled with moments of terror are a reality of the battlefield, and critical decisions are often made during the moments of terror. But time can be compressed or expanded dur­ ing war games to focus on campaign issues and discuss available options. The hours of boredom can be disposed of in a tick of the clock. Fifth, any location in the world can be the setting for a war game. Since battles are fought over maps rather than actual territory, they do not affect treaties, inter­ national relationships, peacetime safety restrictions, or the environment.41

4dm Chester W. Nimitz was a solid supporter of war games, Limitations of clayed throughout the interwar period at the Naval War Col- lege. He believed that they made a significant contribution to War Games he US naval effort in the Pacific. War games, despite their many virtues, are not a low-cost, universal solution. Be­ cause of their limitations, they supple­ tactical expertise on the battlefield during ment, but do not replace, other training World War II was attributed to the use of techniques. war games in the education and training of First, war games do not match reality. its officers.35 Most of the functions of war, ranging from Second, war games can be used to inves- the movement of ground troops to the igate new ideas without risking the lives positions of reconnaissance satellites, can of soldiers, sailors, and airmen. For exam­ be approximated to some degree, but the ple, the use of light aircraft carriers and model can never predict exactly what battleships in coordinated landings was would occur in a real conflict. Further­ yarned at the Naval War College some 15 more, many important aspects of battle, years before the actual landings,36 and such as human relations and mechanical he Japanese—in their gaming of Pearl failures, cannot be satisfactorily quantified Harbor—developed tactics for delivering a or simulated in a game.42 iorpedo attack in shallow harbor waters.37 Second, war games do not convey the Third, war games can provide a less ex­ threat of death that is prevalent on the bat­ pensive alternative to command-post and tlefield. And losing or inappropriate play iield exercises, which have casts of thou­ does not call down the severe penalties sands and are used to check command and (dismissal, court-martial, execution, etc.) control procedures and unit em­ that accompany failure. Since physical 46 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 threats are not real, players may not react players). The process also includes admin­ the same way in a game as they would in istrative aspects, such as message-traffic real life; that is, they may be more compla­ handling, audio-v eo projection, and cent or more aggressive than in actual supply functions. Further, if the war combat.43 Other people may play the game game uses computer support, computer to reach the "school solution" or to ap­ specialists must program and operate the pease the game sponsor. The German army equipment. made sure that an officer’s promotion was In short, war games are the shadow of never based solely on the results of a war war and must be taken neither too se­ game, using the latter as only one of many riously nor too lightly. Taken too se­ indicators of performance.44 riously, war games can be considered pre­ Third, war games are not as inexpensive dictive, a conclusion which history has as they may appear. A good military game shown to be false. Taken too lightly, they often takes a year or more to develop. For cannot serve the purpose for which they instance, specialists must research the were made—training for war. topic, develop a plan of attack, construct necessary gaming materials, prepare brief­ ings for participants, and write after-action Pitfalls of War Games reports. Others must design, play, and um­ pire the game (the number of umpires War games help people learn how to often equals or exceeds the number of think, but if players misuse or misunder-

One major tactic that war games did not envision was the use of kamikaze attacks on the US fleet. Below, a Japanese dive- bomber. hit by defensive fire, attacks the USS Essex. WAR GAMING 47

stand them, they can be counterproduc­ the warring generals. Unfortunately, they tive. Regardless of their level of experi­ were more than willing to continue fight­ ence, players can succumb to certain ing “the old-fashioned way” to the tune of pitfalls. several million casualties. Correctness counts after the war, and what is right or wrong can be proven only in the crucible This Isn't Correct of combat. Future wars will inevitably be Insisting that something about the game fought differently from their antecedents, isn’t right—probably the most common and the side flexible enough to accommo­ pitfall—reveals more about players than date change will probably win. about the game itself. The complaint is es­ pecially prevalent when players are not This DoesIDoesn’t Prove My Point doing well or actually have been defeated. At that point, they typically declare the Another pitfall occurs when a war game war game to be in error and lose enthusi­ produces an answer that the sponsor did asm for continuing. This pitfall stems from or did not want. Using a war game to their inability to deal with the environ­ prove one’s contention is a travesty of how ment portrayed in the game. Although un­ the game should be used. War games are derstandable, this attitude is dangerous. designed to raise issues, not settle them. Indeed, aspects of World War I did not Furthermore, rejecting the outcome of a meet the preconceived notions of some of game because the result does not fit one’s

Below, the escort carrier USS Saint Lo is hit by a kamikaze. War games are valuable, but they do not provide all the answers. 48 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

same capability as the Germans and were equally willing to use it. Thus, the rapid appearance of the French at the front came as a great surprise, upset the entire Ger­ man plan, and resulted in a deadlock.47 Another example is the previously men­ tioned comment of Admiral Nimitz. Al­ though a multitude of possibilities had been war-gamed at the Naval War College, the admiral had to concede that Japan’s use of the kamikaze came as a surprise.48 preconceptions invites failure on the bat­ tlefield. The classic example of this pitfall Implications for the is the Japanese gaming of the Battle of Air Force Midway.45 During the game, an umpire de­ termined that two Japanese aircraft carriers Can war games be of use to the Air were sunk after a surprise attack by Ameri­ Force? Yes! Airmen can benefit from them can aircraft. The chief umpire, Adm throughout their careers. For example, Matome Ugaki, fresh on the heels of the games can enhance novice airmen’s study victories at Pearl Harbor, refused to believe of military subjects. One Air Force Reserve such a “bizarre” result and overturned the Officer Training Corps instructor at the lower umpire’s ruling. One of the carriers University of Pittsburgh uses war games to was immediately resurrected, and the illustrate the Korean War, and his students other returned later to support attacks on show marked improvements in learning New Caledonia and the Fiji Islands.46 This both the geography and the history of that overturning of the results based on precon­ conflict. In Air University’s Squadron Of­ ceptions disenchanted many of the junior ficer School, students participate in games officers at the game. Moreover, it provided that cover operations of the tactical air a false sense of security to the senior control center and systems analysis. Air officers—a feeling that eventually contrib­ Command and Staff College students ap­ uted to the Japanese defeat at Midway a ply their classroom lessons about aerial few weeks later. warfare, ground combat operations, and strategic nuclear theory by playing war games. The Air War College uses games The Results Will Show Who to further student understanding of cam­ Is Going to Win paign planning and air power em­ Viewing the results of a war game as an in­ ployment. The Air University Center for fallible indicator of success constitutes the Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Educa­ final pitfall. War games, as already noted, tion (AUCADRE) employs war games in its are not war and cannot duplicate the Joint Flag Officer Warfighting Course to chance and often unrelated events of real­ educate senior officers in issues pertaining ity. Thus, they should not be considered to unified commanders. Students in predictors. One example is the Germans’ AUCADRE’s Combined Air Warfare Schleiffen Plan, probably the most gamed Course are exposed to general operating plan of its time. Troop movements were concepts in the central European theater painstakingly calculated, train schedules through the use of a war-game exercise. scrupulously kept, and rates of supply and And the Warrior Preparation Center uses ammunition carefully determined. Unfor­ war games to train in-place battle staffs for tunately, the game did not take into ac­ North Atlantic Treaty Organization count the fact that the French had the (NATO), while Blue Flag trains battle WAR GAMING 49

staffs for theaters such as Korea and South­ base security. Results that show promise west Asia. can then be verified through field tests and Is this enough? No! War games must be exercises. taken beyond the schoolhouses at Air Uni­ If war games are to be implemented suc­ versity and into the field. Just as one can­ cessfully, Air Force leaders must make a not become a chess master in a single personal commitment to their use and suc­ game, one cannot uncover all the intri­ cess. Commanders must insist that the cacies of aerial warfare in a single war right people—and not their surrogates— game. In the absence of real combat experi­ exercise their thinking in the area of war ence, war gaming should be used to season fighting. Failure to do so can result only in current and future leaders. Indeed, war confusion and eventual defeat. In addition games can be used creatively to examine to having the right people participate in or discover issues in any Air Force job or games, commanders must ensure that the area, such as air base operability and air proper personnel and resources are used to

The Japanese heavy cruiser Mikuma. destroyed at Midway. During the Japanese war game of the Battle of Midway, an admiral refused to accept a ruling favorable to the Americans and ordered the game umpires to change their decision. Using war games to prove a point is a dangerous (and potentially lethal) misuse o f these exercises. 50 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 design, develop, and produce them. This Summary is not to suggest that war games should rely on large computer systems and glitzy The thoughtful application of air power graphics. The use of high technology must is just as important as new hardware on depend on the objectives of the war game, the ramp. Therefore, in light of the its audience, and available resources. dwindling number of combat-experienced Is the Air Force falling into any of the veterans, declining defense budgets, and pitfalls of war gaming? Sometimes. Players increasing environmental concerns, the may succumb to the “this isn’t correct” Air Force must carefully consider the role pitfall, especially if things do not go ac­ of war games in the evolution of air strat­ cording to plan or if they are embarrassed egy and doctrine. Just as the advantages of because of their bad decisions. Since no war games are great, so is the potential for one wants to look bad in front of subordi­ their abuse. The greatest danger lies in at­ nates or superiors, the war game, control­ tempts to use them to prove points or to lers, and umpires make excellent scape­ predict the future. History shows that peo­ goats. The “this does/doesn’t prove my ple who have tried to use war games for point” and “the results will show who is these purposes have lost far more than a going to win” pitfalls have not yet affected game. However, by paying strict attention the Air Force, although it is only now con­ to the purpose of war games and by crit­ sidering using war games on a wide scale. ically examining the issues and concepts In time, the Air Force will become more they provide, the Air Force can use them, susceptible to these two pitfalls, especially as W. McCarty Little said, “to provide when advocates seek support for their pet the right thing, rightly applied, and in programs or missions. time.”49

Notes 1. Joint Chiefs of Staff ()CS) Publication 1. Department of 19. Wilson, 14. Defense Dictionary of M ilitary and Associated Terms (Wash­ 20. Francis J. McHugh. Fundamentals of War Gaming, 3d ington. D.C.: Government Printing Office. 1 June 1987), 393. ed. (Newport. R.I.: Naval War College, 1966), 2-21. 2. Col Paul S. Deems. "War Gaming and Exercises," Air 21. Wilson, 14. University Quarterly Review 9. no. 1 (Winter 1956-1957): 99; 22. Matute. 55. ). K. Hjalmarson. "The Development of War Games." Cana- 23. Wilson, 15. dian Army /ournal 15, no. 1 (Winter 1961); 5. 24. Ibid., 17. 3. Andrew Wilson, The Bomb and the Computer (New 25. Ibid. York: Delacorte Press. 1968), 3. 26. Anthony S. Nicolosi, "The Spirit of McCarty Little." 4. Theodore E. Sterne. "War Games: What They Are and US Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1984. 74. How They Evolved," Army 16, no. 3 (March 1966): 44. 27. McHugh, 2—44. 5. Wilson, 4. 28. W. McCarty Little, "The Strategic Naval War Game or 6. Ibid., 5. Chart Maneuver." US Naval Institute Proceedings. December 7. Deems. 162. 1912. 1213. 8. Wilson. 6. 29. Michael Vlahos, “Wargaming, the Enforcer of Strategic 9. Ibid.. 8. Realism: 1919-1942." Naval War College Review 39. no. 2 10. Edgardo B. Matute, "Birth and Evolution of War (March-April 1986): 17. Games." Military Review 50. no. 7 (July 1970): 53. 30. Deems, 111. 11. Hjalmarson. 8. 31. Report of the HQ USAF Wargaming Review Group. Jan­ 12. Farrand Sayre. Map Maneuvers and Tactical Rides, 5th uary 1985. 17. ed. (Springfield, M ass.: Press of Springfield Printing and 32. Defense Science Board. Report of the Defense Science Binding Co.. 1911), 5. Board Task Force on Computer Applications to Training and 13. Ibid., 21. Wargaming (Washington. D.C.: Government Printing Office, 14. Ibid. May 1988). 6. 15. M. R. (. Hope Thompson, "The Military War Game," 33. Vlahos, 19. /ournal of the Royal United Service Institution 107, 34. Wilson, 39. (February-November 1962): 50. 35. "War Games," Military Review 41, no. 6 (June 1961): 16. Sayre, 25. 68. 17. Ibid. 36. Vlahos, 15. 18. Thomas B. Allen, War Games (New York: McGraw-Hill 37. Wilson, 41. Book Company, 1987), 74. 38. Report of the Defense Science Board. 5. •1» t USING A SLEDGEHAMMER TO KILL A GNAT The Air Force’s Failure to Comprehend Insurgent Doctrine during Operation Rolling Thunder

You ask: How then can we cope with the enemy’s enormous war machine? There is the example of the monkey coping with the Princess of the Iron Fan. Though the Princess was a very formidable monster, the monkey, by changing himself into a tiny insect, found his way into her entrails and quelled her. —Mao Tse-tung

C2C Dieg o M Wen d t , USAFA

he Vietnam War is still, to this day, by Lt Gen Joseph Moore, 2d Air Division a great source of irritation in the en­ commander in 1969, not long after trails of US military strategists. Nu­ the abandonment of Operation Rolling merous studies have focused upon Thunder. Moore contended that the Air Tpolitical, military, and societal concerns inForce “was not effective in knocking out attempting to unravel the mystery that the will to fight ... of the North Viet­ made the Princess of the Iron Fan an alias namese, because we weren’t allowed to hit for Uncle Sam. The enigma of a war won those targets that would have done that.”2 by an enemy that lost every battle of sig­ Whether his contention is true or not is nificance is a concept seemingly un­ immaterial. His statement may have a cer­ fathomable to the dictates of reason. tain degree of validity, but one must re­ Many works have laid the blame for the member that war is a means of achieving a US defeat on political restrictions imposed political end. To deny this basic truth is to upon the military, specifically the US Air deny any purpose for the existence of the Force.1 This contention is still held by military other than gratuitous violence. In many of the Air Force high command who war. the political and the military are inex­ served during the conflict. An assertion tricably intertwined. Faulting one without that embodies this attitude was stated acknowledging the other indicates that the military does not understand its subordi­ nate role as a means to a goal. As long as there are wars, there will be political restrictions upon military actions and targets. Limited war was not a new concept in the years just before the United States’ for­ mal entrance into the Vietnam War. The United States was only a decade beyond its involvement in the Korean War. Lim­ ited war had also reared its head in Malaya, Algeria, and Indochina just a few years before. Neither were restraints upon air power a new concept. In Malaya (1948-60) the Royal Air Force (RAF) was not allowed to strike rubber or timber holdings so as to avoid disrupting the Malayan economy.3 One of the first applications of political constraints on air power occurred at Chankufeng. China, in 1938 during the Sino-Japanese War.4 At Chankufeng, a small town on the border with the USSR, 54 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

the Soviets had struck at Japanese forces ership the idea that our staying power is with air power in order to retake Japanese- greater than theirs.9 held Soviet garrisons. Capt Kusaka Through both strategic and tactical inter­ Ryunosuke, operations chief on the Jap­ diction,10 Rolling Thunder’s specific objec­ anese naval general staff, advocated the tives would be achieved (the Air Force— withholding of air power to avoid enlarg­ along with the Johnson administration— ing the affair to include a war with the recognized, however, that total interdic­ USSR.5 His advice was taken, and the Jap­ tion would be impossible).11 AFM 1-7, anese were able to avoid a serious con­ Theater Air Forces in Counter Air, Inter- frontation with the Soviets, allowing them­ diction, and Close Air Support, the Air selves time to build up their navy for the Force’s tactical doctrine manual in 1965, approaching world war. saw the goal of interdiction as destroying All of the aforementioned conflicts fall or neutralizing “the enemy military poten­ under Bernard Brodie’s definition of lim­ tial before it can be brought to bear effec­ ited war, which he formulated for the tively against our own forces and to re­ Rand Corporation in 1958. Brodie, one of strict the mobility of hostile forces by the most influential cold war theorists at disrupting enemy lines of communica­ the time, stated that “while limited war in tion.”12 AFM 1-7 identified four means to the past meant limited effort ... for the achieve this goal: isolating the battlefield, present and the future it must mean re­ destroying supplies, delaying enemy straint ... and a deliberate resort to use less forces, and harassing the enemy.13 efficient measures.’’6 Perhaps the Air Accordingly, the JCS advanced a target Force’s difficulties in understanding the list that it felt would best be suited to necessity of restraint in Vietnam stemmed achieve the military objective, while recog­ from its vague definition of limited war in nizing the necessity for restraint. The “94- 1960. defining it as “armed conflict short target list” advanced by the JCS clearly in­ of general war in which the overt engage­ dicated “that the JCS desired to wage a ment of US military force is directed.”7 classic strategic bombing campaign and a In 1965, however, the Air Force did complementary interdiction campaign show some understanding of Brodie’s defi­ against North Vietnam.”14 The JCS plan nition of limited war; during Operation called first for the destruction of air­ Rolling Thunder, whether deliberate or fields—attacks on petroleum, oil and lubri­ not, the Air Force displayed a particular cants (POL) were given next priority fol­ knack for using “less efficient measures.” lowed by the “progressive destruction of Initiated in early 1965, Rolling Thunder the enemy’s industrial web”15—reverting was a strategic/interdiction campaign de­ to the Douhetan concept of “destroying the signed to convince the North Vietnamese birds while still in the nest.” that they could not win.8 This objective However, the spectre of the Chinese in­ was to be achieved through graduated and tervention in Korea still hung over Presi­ increasingly intense bombing strikes upon dent Lyndon Johnson’s head, and the JCS military and logistics targets in North Viet­ plan was rejected for fear of escalating the nam. Stated specifically in a message from Vietnamese conflict into a war that would the commander in chief of the Pacific Air include the Chinese and the Soviets. Thus, Forces (CINCPACAF) to the Joint Chiefs of only a small portion of the JCS target list Staff (JCS) in 1965, Rolling Thunder’s mili­ was initially approved for bombing. Addi­ tary objective was to tionally, the administration involved itself in the strategic and tactical aspects of the reduce the movement of personnel and sup- war, establishing stringent rules of engage­ plies to support the VC [Vietcong and at the ment—to the chagrin of the Air Force. Af­ same time] develop and drive home to the ter a short time, some of the reins were DRV [Democratic Republic of Vietnam] lead- loosened following Air Force complaints USING A SLEDGEHAMMER TO KILL A GNAT 55

Many airmen contend that if the right targets had been hit early in the war. the North Vietnamese would have quickly agreed to come to the Paris peace talks (above. Henry Kissinger confers with Le Due Tho in Paris). But that logic fails to take account of how the war had progressed and what the enemy's objectives were. that the administration was keeping the target list reflected an inability to identify military from effectively performing its the enemy’s real vulnerabilities; the major­ task. Nevertheless, the Air Force grudg­ ity of the targets on the initial list were ingly felt that it could still accomplish its eventually hit over the three and one-half mission and generally supported the cam­ years leading to Rolling Thunder’s in­ paign.16 Even so, the residual pain from auspicious culmination, with little impact the administration’s rejection of the 94- upon the outcome of the conflict.18 Regard­ target list manifested itself among the mili­ ing General Moore’s complaint, both the tary after the abandonment of Rolling steel mill and cement plants were de­ Thunder in October 1968. The inability to stroyed during Rolling Thunder with no hit the enemy’s “industrial web” early on significant effect upon the enemy.19 With was a point of contention for the Air respect to the POL storage areas, the Viet- Force. As stated by General Moore in 1969, cong and North Vietnamese Army regulars "We had several military targets of some in South Vietnam did not have much use importance [on the list), such as a steel for oil. As was stated by Gen Alejandro mill up near Hanoi ... a couple of other big Bayo, the man responsible for training cement plants [and] several POL storage Fidel Castro’s insurgent troops, “Feet and areas.”17 In the most basic sense, the 94- legs are the engine of the guerrilla.”20 56 AJRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

What, then, was the Air Force role in the ments could be fatal to the United failure of Rolling Thunder? Certainly, the States.”23 The Air Force developed a tun­ political hierarchy was partially respon­ nel vision view of warfare, contending that sible, but as was stated earlier, the military the next war would be general, and one in must adapt to and work within the politi­ which nuclear weapons would play a deci­ cal restraints imposed upon it in warfare. sive factor. Several developments after the Korean Despite signing the report, Gen Otto P. War hindered the application of a sound Weyland, who commanded the FEAF from Air Force air power doctrine during Roll­ 1951-55, soon altered his opinion when ing Thunder. Disregarding the political as­ subsequently serving as commander of pects and focusing solely upon Air Force Tactical Air Command (TAC). When asked doctrinal inputs between the Korean and in 1954 what he had learned from the Vietnamese conflicts, several develop­ Korean conflict and the prospects of future ments portended the ineffectual applica­ warfare, Weyland stated, “ We have tion of air power during Rolling Thunder. Basically, the Air Force high command’s failure to comprehend the past lessons of The United States attempted to conduct a classic strategic bombing campaign to defeat North Vietnam. Even the limited war, counterinsurgent operations, bombing o f targets such as this oil storage facility outside and guerrilla warfare led to the establish­ Hanoi had no significant effect on the war in the South. ment of an unrealistic objective and the re­ Instead of accepting the war on its own terms and fighting luctance to change tactics during Rolling accordingly, the United States tried to turn the conflict into Thunder—in addition to the reluctance to something it was not. properly prepare for the contingency of people’s war.21 The Korean War was a special case, and air power can learn little from there about its fu- ture role in the United States foreign policy in the East. Thomas K. Finletter Secretary of the Air Force, 1950-53 Ignorance at the strategic level was nur­ tured by a “tunnel vision” view of warfare, especially after the Korean War. The United States had mixed emotions about its outcome, experiencing a distaste for “victory” in which the enemy was not totally defeated. The anti-limited war sentiment was espoused in a “No more Koreas!" rally cry from the government, the American people, and the military.22 This feeling was present throughout most of the Air Force high command; the gen­ eral consensus was that there were no lessons to be learned from Korea. In addi­ tion to Finletter’s assessment, adding more fuel to the fire was the conclusion of the Far East Air Forces (FEAF) report pub­ lished at the end of the war. The report stated that “any attempt to build an air force from the model of Korean require­ USING A SLEDGEHAMMER TU KILL A GNAT 57

learned that a problem isn’t necessarily The British and the French did not be­ stopped by the signing of a truce, or by a lieve in the infallibility of Mao’s teachings. temporary political adjudication. ”24 When The British success in quelling a Commu­ serving as commander of TAC in 1956, nist insurgency in Malaya was a testament Weylaud fell in line with the conclusion to the Royal Air Force’s ability to adapt to reached by a Rand study published in the and work within political restrictions and same year regarding future warfare.25 the significant problems inherent to COIN Weyland said, “I feel rather strongly that warfare. The French effort in Algeria, de­ the most likely conflict in the immediate spite a political loss, was generally viewed future will be the peripheral type. In this as a very effective application of air power event it will be primarily a tactical air against a determined enemy.28 On the war.”26 other hand, the problems posed by the Weyland's prophetic claims were not Vietminh in Indochina were a significant the first to be ignored and would not be factor in the French defeat of 1954. These the last. At a time when the Air Force was same problems would appear again when sending military aid and advisors to South the Air Force became actively involved Vietnam to help the South Vietnamese (beyond the advisory role) in Vietnam sev­ counter the threat posed by Ho Chi Minh- eral years later. backed Communist insurgents, Brig Gen The situations in Malaya and Algeria Jamie Gough, director of operations at paralleled the Vietnam War in many ways. Headquarters USAF, discussed how the The Malayan emergency was strictly a RAF applied counterinsurgent (COIN) doc­ ground war, fought primarily in dense trine to the Malayan emergency in an arti­ jungle terrain, with the RAF having to deal cle for Airman magazine. A British army with difficult weather conditions but en­ commander advised General Gough that joying the advantage of air superiority.29 should the US involve itself in COIN war­ The Algerian uprising shared the afore­ fare, ‘‘it should be ready for a long, drawn mentioned similarities with one excep­ out affair.”27 tion—the Moslem insurgents operated in The lessons of current combat in COIN terrain covering the spectrum from dense warfare abounded. The British had re­ cities to open desert. Different from Viet­ cently successfully completed a COIN ac­ nam was the fact that the insurgents never tion that had lasted from 1948 to 1960. Ad­ reached the conventional phase; the insur­ ditionally, the French effectively used air gent action was restricted to the first and power in the Algerian campaign (1954— second phases of people’s war30 where 61). The French success in Algeria was ap­ guerrilla action was limited to intimida­ parently the result of hard-learned lessons tion, terror, and persuasion of the popu­ from their failure in Indochina (1945-54). lace to support the Communist party.31 The advent of people’s war posed per­ The British in Malaya and the French in plexing problems to those forces trying to Algeria viewed COIN warfare as primarily defeat insurgents. Combat against guerrilla a matter of ‘‘identification, isolation, and forces had recently taken place in Malaya, annihilation of the enemy.”32 Conse­ Algeria, and Indochina, affording the Air quently, air strikes were relegated to sec­ Force the opportunity to learn relevant ondary status while air power’s primary lessons at no cost. Ironically, the lessons, importance was in the roles of aerial re­ if any. that the Air Force did learn resulted supply, reconnaissance, and close air sup­ in the ineffective application of air power port.33 Aerial resupply was the most im­ during Rolling Thunder. portant role for the RAF because it allowed The army must become one with the people the foot soldier freedom of movement so that they see it as their own army. Such an without being tied down to a logistical army will be invincible. base. For the French, reconnaissance was —Mao Tse-tung the first priority of air power; reconnais­ 58 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

sance allowed the French to “ detect the nam). Both of these men would lead guer­ enemy and keep him under surveillance rilla armies against US forces in South until the effective force could be applied Vietnam a decade after their victory over against him.”34 Close air support (CAS) the French. was employed when the army alone could The war actually followed Mao’s three not handle the matter.35 phases of classic people’s war. Imme­ The effectiveness of the British and diately after World War II, signs of unrest French CAS efforts sheds light upon the among the population appeared, directed organizational structure employed. Each towards the French leadership in Viet­ had a very simplified organizational sys­ n a m . 38 H o C h i M i n h ’ s p o o r l y e q u i p p e d tem (a joint operations center) which al­ guerrilla forces struck in earnest on 19 De­ lowed on-the-scene prioritization of re­ cember 1946, as the Vietminh launched at­ source allocation, strike authorization, and tacks on French-held garrisons. These at­ the issuance of skeleton operation orders.36 tacks did relatively little damage but From the Malayan and Algerian cam­ attracted the attention of the French, who paigns, the Air Force could have learned sent in 100,000 troops determined to crush the following lessons: expect a long con­ the Vietminh insurgency.39 frontation, understand the importance of The Vietminh remained within Mao’s joint-service action, employ a simplified first two phases, gaining recruits and pro­ command structure, and realize that air curing weapons until 1949, the turning power, although not decisive, still plays an point for the Vietminh. The success of integral role. Mao's insurgency in China offered the The effectiveness of French air power in Vietminh an ally who provided a great the Algerian campaign was more than deal of Soviet and Chinese weaponry in likely heightened by the lessons learned addition to a sanctuary for supplies and from the French-Indochina War. The forces. This development portended the French air force was able to adapt quickly evolution of the Vietminh to a truly con­ to the needs dictated by combat. Addi- ventional force. In 1950 the Vietminh ionally, the French in general understood moved into the third phase of operations, guerrilla tactics, consequently applying destroying French outposts along the Chi­ the most effective force to counter the sit­ nese border, allowing the increase of sup­ uation.37 In essence, the French COIN doc­ plies to Giap’s army. In 1951 the Vietminh trine was dynamic in nature, allowing the engaged French forces, overwhelming FTench air force to act effectively, though their garrisons but sustaining enormous not decisively. losses. Ho’s forces withdrew to phase-two Certainly, the French experience in operations until 1952.40 In that year the Indochina, more so than in Algeria or the Vietminh returned to conventional opera­ British in Malaya, had the most sim­ tions, establishing a solid presence in Viet­ ilarities to what the Air Force would see a nam north of the 17th parallel (what was decade later in the same region. In the en­ later the line between North and South emy being fought, the type of war being Vietnam).41 In early 1954 the Vietminh at­ waged, the area of battle, and methods em­ tacked the French garrison at Dien Bien ployed, the war in Indochina was a verita­ Phu. overrunning the French position on 7 ble crystal ball—if only the Air Force had May and securing a French surrender.42 looked. French air force officers believed in The enemy was the Vietminh, an insur­ 1954 that the loss occurred as the result of gent force led by the leader of the Demo­ the misuse of air power. The main com­ cratic Republic of Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh. plaint was that air power was tied too The military genius under Ho’s leadership much to the army when a better applica­ was Gen Vo Nguyen Giap, the subsequent tion would have been to use it in an air in­ military leader of the DRV (North Viet­ terdiction role. When the French did begin USING A SLEDGEHAMMER TO KILL A GNAT 59

interdiction operations in 1952, they of communication] system and are making lo- claimed to have reduced Chinese aid from gistics operations difficult and costly, the 1,500 to 250 tons per month. The Viet- ability of the NVN [North Vietnamese) to minh reacted by moving at night and em­ support activities in Laos and SVN [South ploying varied routes, effectively counter­ Vietnam] with men and material has not been significantly affected.47 ing the French interdiction effort.43 The French air force encountered a sig­ The Air Force continued its support of nificant problem in the application of Rolling Thunder because it still believed it close air support; the enemy was often dif­ could achieve the objective of persuading ficult to locate, except in battle. When not the North Vietnamese that they could not engaged, the Vietminh were dug in and win. All that had to be done was to in­ “artful when it came to dispersal, camou­ crease the effectiveness of its interdiction flage and concealment.”44 The Vietminh operations. How did the Air Force intend would also mingle with the populace, to do this? The same report cited that an making it difficult to distinguish them enemy battalion had a consumption rate of from the civilians. Finally, the Vietminh 34 tons per day. This was calculated from would often begin attacks at night to limit the North Vietnamese current engagement the capability of air power. If a battle rate of once every 30 days (the report lasted into the daylight hours, the Viet­ failed to mention the Vietcong engagement minh avoided air attack by “clinging” to rate). The report then cited that the enemy the enemy, thus neutralizing French air requirement would be increased to 138 power for fear that friendly forces might be tons per day if he were forced to engage hit.45 once every seven days.48 The fact that the The countermeasures, strategies, and Air Force was still pursuing the notion tactics employed by the Vietminh would that the North Vietnamese could be con­ again be seen in Vietnam in 1965-68. It vinced that US “staying power was greater appeared as if air power had no role in than theirs,” and that the Air Force felt it COIN operations; interdiction was ineffec­ could do this by forcing the enemy to en­ tive, CAS was difficult, and airlift was in­ gage on a massive scale, displays one efficient. The British applied air power thing: a great deal of ignorance regarding effectively in Malaya under somewhat the basics of insurgent doctrine. similar conditions. What was the problem? If the enemy attacks, I disappear: if he de- A Rand study completed for the Air Force fends, I harass; and if he retreats I attack. in 1961 concluded that the French loss was not due to tying air power to the army —Mao Tse-tung as the French air force officers felt; rather, The above quote is insurgent warfare in a the French loss was the result of their de­ nutshell. The insurgent has no set time­ termination to “ adhere to their accus­ table; the insurgent cannot be forced to at­ tomed methods of warfare even when they tack; if the enemy attacks, the guerrilla we r e n o l o n g e r p a y i n g o f f . ” 46 ( A l o n g w i t h will be very hard to find. the countermeasures, strategies, and tac­ Ironically, Mao’s teachings, along with tics of the Vietminh, the reluctance to Giap’s and various works about insurgen­ change would also make an unfortunate cies and how they have been countered in reappearance in 1965-68.) the past (Malaya, Indochina, Japan, the In a previously classified US document Philippines, the Arab revolt, the Germans analyzing the effectiveness of Air Force in­ in World War II), appeared in the USAF terdiction from the beginning of Rolling Counter-Insurgency Orientation Course Thunder to May 1966, the following as­ book. The aforementioned was only a sessment was made: small portion of the course book, which Although the strikes have achieved some re- was required reading at the Air Command duction in the capabilities of the LOC (lines and Staff College in 1962. 60 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

Throughout the course book, the theme strikes are hurting him and impeding the of the protractedness of guerrilla warfare flow of supplies to the South__ I am con­ was emphasized. The very man the Air vinced that the mounting pressure of such Force was trying to “outlast” had this to “strategic persuasion" will ultimately prove a major factor in making the Communists ame­ say about guerrilla warfare: nable to negotiations.31 This strategy must be the strategy of long- term war__ If from the outset, the conditions Had Air Force planners read their les­ are favorable to the people ... the revolution- sons regarding guerrilla warfare, they ary war can end victoriously in a short time. might have found that making the guerrilla But the war of liberation of the Vietnamese “amenable to negotiations” is a rather in­ people started in quite different conditions: significant, if not irrelevant, goal. One ol we had to deal with a much stronger en- the tactics of the guerrilla is to negotiate emy__ In a word, it was impossible for us to only in order to further “protect” the war. defeat the enemy swiftly.49 The guerrilla has no interest in compro­ General Giap was talking about the mise. According to Mao, negotiation “is French-Indochina War: he could just as undertaken for the dual purpose of gaining well have been talking about the war to time to buttress a position (military, politi­ follow in 1964. cal, social, economic) and to wear down, But when Giap spoke, the US Air Force frustrate, and harass the opponent.”52 did not listen. The Air Force felt that it All the information necessary to under­ could handle any situation that arose be­ stand guerrilla warfare was available to the cause it was technologically superior. Air Force years before the American en­ However, the Air Force ignored an impor­ trance into the Vietnam War. Why did the tant fact when assessing its COIN ca­ Air Force not do its homework?53 Why did pabilities: guerrillas are able to choose the Air Force not feel the need to establish when and where they want to fight, thus some sort of doctrine applicable to coun­ keeping tight reins over the initiative. The terinsurgent warfare? insurgent compels the enemy to fight a re­ In the most basic sense, the Air Force actionary war: if the conditions do not suit failed to prepare for COIN warfare because the guerrillas, they merely revert to the it thought it could handle any contin­ second or even the first phase of people’s gency. The general feeling was summed up war. The US Air Force did not have a best by a previously classified Air Force grasp of this concept. At the Vietnam Sym­ file in 1958: posium in May 1967, Maj Gen Gilbert L. Meyers, deputy commander of Seventh Air It has been postulated that if we prepare ade quately for total war, then we can handle lim Force from July 1965 to August 1966, con­ ited wars in stride with the forces so created cluded,.“The fact that the North Viet­ Opponents to this idea raise objections that namese ... have not mounted a sustained Total war forces cannot efficiently perform offensive in over a year, substantiates the limited war tasks, i.e., the idea of using a effectiveness of our interdiction efforts.”50 sledgehammer to kill a gnat.54 Gen John P. McConnell, chief of staff, of­ fered this assessment to the audience at Though stated in 1958. there is evidenc the Air Force Association convention in that the sledgehammer mentality was sti March 1967: present just prior to Vietnam. In a 196 special study done for the Air Force title< [The enemy| can still harass and ambush and Basic Problems in Counter-Guerrilla Ai snipe: but he no longer has any chance of winning: he knows it and our men know it. Operations, the author states, “It seem Our bombing of selected targets in North unlikely that nuclear weapons will fin* Vietnam is contributing an important share usefulness in the early, bandit-like stage o in that end. The enemy’s hue and cry about guerrilla operations— They may be ver such bombing is compelling proof that our useful when warfare begins to enter th USING A SLEDGEHAMMER TO KILL A GNAT 61

third, more conventional, stage.”55 A state­ target during the interdiction efforts of ment made in 1963 by then Lt Gen Gabriel Rolling Thunder) were to be attacked only P. Disosway, a little over a year before be­ after the pilot was able to detect whether it coming commander of TAC. reflected the was a decoy. According to the manual, same line of thinking. In reference to guer­ trucks are sometimes camouflaged by rilla warfare, which he deemed a threat of making them look inoperable: the pilot can "the greatest magnitude," Disosway said, determine if the truck is a decoy by noting "One sortie and one low-yield nuclear that “the condition of the windshield and bomb would do the same job on a specific the tires usually indicate the condition of tactical objective as 8,000 sorties with 25 the target.”58 million pounds of napalm.”56 The optimist Of course, that was predicated upon the might note that he was at least not talking fighter-bomber being able to find and hit about a sledgehammer—a ball peen ham­ the target. The average number of trucks mer maybe, but not a sledgehammer. It damaged or destroyed per 100 sorties over was this type of ignorance regarding the the first year of Rolling Thunder was basics of limited warfare and why ‘‘less rather small (3.7).59 Perhaps this number efficient measures” must be used that was was so small because the pilots heeded the severely detrimental to the preparation of advice of AFM 51-44 regarding camou­ the Air Force for COIN warfare. flage detection: Detection of vehicles in heavily wooded Without preparedness superiority is not real areas ... is extremely difficult because of the superiority and there can be no initiative dense foliage__ The pilot must fly low and either. Having grasped this point, a force slow enough to look under and through the which is inferior but prepared can often de- trees to detect the enemy__ Any unusual feat a superior enemy. mound of freshly cut foliage should be inves- —Mao Tse-tung tigated and, if necessary, fired into.60 J’he US Air Force was poorly prepared for These recommendations, no matter how he problems posed by people’s war. The impractical, did at least show that the Air unnel vision previously alluded to signifi- Force knew' that the enemy w'ould be diffi­ antly hindered the development of an ap- cult to locate during COIN warfare. Nev­ dicable tactical doctrine. This reluctance ertheless, judging from the low number of o take the threat of insurgent warfare se- trucks damaged or destroyed, the Air iously was evident in Air Force tactical Force did a lot of weed killing. nanuals. The 1964 version of AFM 1-1, The primary emphasis on nuclear Jnited States Air Force Basic Doctrine, weapons delivery by TAC after the Korean he basic Air Force doctrinal manual, de- War was a significant factor contributing oted only turn of 13 pages to conventional to the Air Force’s low truck-kill total in ir operations. The rest of the manual dis- Vietnam. In order to keep Tactical Air ussed air operations in the context of gen- Command a viable force in the face of a ral war, with the emphasis upon the em- shrinking budget. General Weyland (com­ doyment of nuclear weapons.57 mander of TAC) began training pilots for a AFM 51-44, Fighter and Fighter-Bomber nuclear role in the mid-1950s.61 Weyland, Employment in Tactical Air Operations, whose prophetic cries regarding future vas the operational manual in use at the warfare were ignored, displayed his in­ ommencement of Rolling Thunder. Pub- ability to comprehend the need for re­ ished in 1953 at the end of the Korean straint in limited war in a statement in Var, the manual provides startling insight which he reminisced about Korea: nto how much effort the Air Force felt I vividly remember during the Korean War vas necessary in preparing its fighter pi- the tremendous number of high-explosive ots for conventional operations. Station- bombs our B-29s rained on the bridge over ry trucks (trucks in general were a prime the Han River__ One low-yield atomic 62 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 weapon delivered by a tactical tighter ... November 1968. The North Vietnamese would have destroyed that bridge.62 agreed to negotiate with the United States By the time Operation Rolling Thunder in Paris but in no way indicated that they began rolling, pilots had loosened to a 750- were prepared to stop fighting in the South foot circular error probable (CEP)—the ra­ or that they had been forced to come to the dius from the aim point that half of the conference on US terms.65 What was the bombs dropped will fall within. This num­ Air Force role in the failure of Rolling ber is sufficient for the impact of a tactical Thunder? nuclear weapon but is far from adequate At the root of the Air Force failure in for conventional weaponry. It took several Rolling Thunder was a basic misconcep­ years for the CEP to be lowered to a man­ tion about limited insurgent warfare de­ ageable 365 feet.63 spite the evidence of teachings at the Air The general lack of preparedness for Command and Staff College and the les­ what Vietnam would hold in store for the sons available to the Air Force through Air Force was best summed up by a study Malaya, Algeria, and Indochina. Ignorance titled Tactical Warfare and the Limited regarding the needs and motives of insur­ War Dilemma. Done for the Air Force in gents allowed the Air Force to support a 1961, the report came to the conclusion highly questionable objective that was that never achieved. The Air Force’s own igno­ rance regarding people’s war resulted in a TAC is without a reasonable sense of mis- reluctance to change tactics that were es­ sion, present resources, or an adequate de- sentially ineffective. This reluctance to velopment program; SAC [Strategic Air Com- change was nurtured in the years before mand] is clearly inappropriate for this role Vietnam and hindered the Air Force’s abil­ and should not be diverted from its main de- ities to recognize the potential threat terrent mission in any case; MATS (Military posed by people’s war. Consequently, the Air Transport Command, now Military Airlift Air Force lacked the foresight necessary to Command] is equipped and deployed for peacetime logistics and “pipe-line” opera- prepare for such a contingency. tions and only now is beginning to think se- This last consequence is a bit of a sur­ riously about developing a believable ca- prise considering how intimate the Air pability to support tactical operations.64 Force is with the teachings of Italian air marshal Giulio Douhet. It was he who But then, who was going to argue with a said, “ Victory smiles upon those who princess carrying a sledgehammer? anticipate the changes in the character After three and one-half years of bomb­ of war, not upon those who wait to ing North Vietnam, Operation Rolling adapt themselves after the changes Thunder came to an inconclusive end on 1 occur.”66

Notes 1. An interesting work is W. Hays Parks's “ Rolling Moore (U), interview no. 241, 22 November 1969. 67. (CON­ Thunder and the Law of War.” Air L/niversity Review, FIDENTIAL) Information extracted is unclassified. lanuary-February 1982. 2-23. Parks contends that the loss 3. Robert L. Hardie. Airpower in Counterinsurgency War- was a result of political ignorance regarding an unwritten fare. Professional Study no. 3373 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air “law of war." See also Col Dennis M. Drew's Rolling War College. 1967). 29. Thunder 1965: Anatomy of a Failure, AU-ARI-CP-86-3 (Max­ 4. Alvin D. Coox, “Restraints on Air Power in Limited War well AFB. Ala.: Air University Press, October 1986). Drew Japan vs. USSR at Chankufeng. 1938." Aerospace Historian provides intriguing insight into the political/military inter­ 17 (December 1970): 118. face problems prior to and during Rolling Thunder, establish­ 5. Ibid.. 118-19. ing that its failure was in part due to the distrust bred be­ 6. Bernard Brodie. The Meaning of Limited War. Rand Re­ tween the Johnson administration and the JCS (34—49). port RM-2224 (Santa Monica. Calif.: Rand Corporation. 2. Maj Samuel E. Riddlebarger and Lt Col Valentino Cas- 1958), 1. tellina. USAF Oral History Interview of Lt Gen Joseph H. 7. Instruction Circular no. 61-10, Unit X: Limited War USING A SLEDGEHAMMER TO KILL A GNAT 63

(Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. 1961). quently employed in South Vietnam—generally attempted to 1. follow three phases. The first phase is characterized by ter­ 8- Drew. 11. rorist strikes of an isolated nature against the enemy while 9. Message. 120314Z. commander in chief Pacific, to JCS. the insurgents try to win the population over to their side. May 1965. The second phase is characterized by increasing direct action 10 For our purposes, strategic interdiction will be defined against the enemy (ambushes, attacks on poorly defended as "having payoffs that are only indirectly and in the long outposts, sabotage, etc.): its primary purpose is to procure term related to [friendly] ground force success.” (the point of arms and other essential materiel while continuing to enlist manufacture): while tactical interdiction "has payoffs di­ recruits. The last phase is the "decisive phase" where the rectly and immediately related to the success of friendly guerrilla force "completes its transformation into an ground forces" (points of dissemination up to the battlefield). orthodox establishment capable of engaging the enemy in Edmund Dews. A Note on Tactical vs. Strategic Air Inter­ conventional battle." Mao Tse-tung. On Guerrilla Warfare, diction, Rand Report RM-6239-PR ISanta Monica. Calif.: trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger Publishers. Rand Corporation, April 1970). 1-3. 1961) . 21-23. 11. Message, 120314Z. 31. Hardie. 30. 12. AFM 1—7. Theater Air Forces in Counter Air. Interdic­ 32. Ibid.. 44. tion. and Close A ir Support. 1954. 2. 33. Gough. 6. 13. According to AFM 1-7. isolation serves to "(1) compel 34. Hardie, 25. the enemy to consume his forward supplies. (2) prevent rein­ 35. Special operations also played a role as air power was forcements from being moved into the area. (3) prevent the used to drop leaflets and transmit recorded messages to help withdrawal of forces. (4) prevent the shifting of forces within undermine the persuasive efforts of the Communists. Hardie. the area. (5) impose an untenable position on hostile forces." 25. Destruction of supplies serves to reduce the level of re­ 36. Hardie. 25. Granted, this sort of freedom was not avail­ sources readily available and "delay or deny critically able to the Air Force for strikes within North Vietnam, but needed resources for combat use." Delay gains time for there were no such restrictions upon air power (in the tacti­ friendly maneuvering and buildup while preventing the en­ cal interdiction role) in South Vietnam. The command struc­ emy from acting at his desired rate. The objective of harass­ ture employed throughout Vietnam was extremely complex. ment is "to cause the enemy general inconvenience, i.e.. North Vietnam and Laos were divided into seven route pack­ force the enemy to take extra measures to safeguard his re­ ages (RP) for the purpose of air operations. Each RP came un­ sources." AFM 1-7. 13—14. der the authority of a different command, requiring separate 14. Drew. 30. inputs for target validation and strike authority. The various 15.Ibid. RPs came under the authority of the commander of US Mili­ 16. Message. 120314Z. tary Assistance Command. Vietnam (COMUSMACV). the 17. Interview of Lt Gen /oseph H. Moore. 13. JCS. commander in chief of Pacific Air Forces (CINCPACAF), 18. Although some might argue that air strikes are less and the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet effective when carried out over a long period of time—rather (C1NCPACFLT). PACAF-Corona Harvest. The USAF in than early, intense, and short—the Air Force still emphasized Southeast Asia. 1970-1973: Lessons Learned and Recom­ the "vital" and decisive nature of these targets throughout mendations: A Compendium. 16 June 1975. Rolling Thunder until their destruction. 37. Guerrilla Warfare and Airpower in Algeria, 16-17. 19. Interview of Lt Gen /oseph H. Moore. 13. 38. All of Vietnam (both North and South) had been a 20 Quoted in USAF Counter-Insurgency Orientation French colony before World War II but eventually fell under Course (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. Japanese authority during the war. The political vacuum cre­ 1962), N-l-31. ated by the absence of Japanese authority at the end of the 21. Throughout this article, people's war. guerrilla warfare, war allowed the Vietminh to establish themselves as the de and insurgent warfare will be used interchangeably. facto government of North Vietnam before the French could 22. Drew. 27. reoccupy the territory. The French recognized the DRV gov­ 23. Robert F. Futrell. The United States Air Force in Korea. ernment as a free state within the French Union but would 1950-1953. rev. ed. (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force not grant it full independence. Bernard B. Fall. Street without History. 1983). 693. Joy: Insurgency in Indochina. 1946-63, 3d rev. ed. (Har­ 24. Otto P. Weyland. "Can Air Power Win in Little Wars?" risburg, Pa.: Stackpole Co.. 1963), 24-28. U.S. News & World Report, 23 July 1954. 57. 39. Phillip B. Davidson, Vietnam at War: The History. 25. N. C. Peterson. Comments on Warfare in the Next Ten 1946-1975 (Novato. Calif: Presidio Press. 1988), 42—47. to Twenty Years. Rand Report P-889 (Santa Monica. Calii.: 40. Fall, 29-57. Rand Corporation. 1956). 41. Davidson. 137-52. 26. Quoted in M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, Air Power 42. Davidson provides an in-depth and exciting account of in the Nuclear Age. 2d ed. (Urbana. 111.: University of Illinois the battle at Dien Bien Phu. describing its origins, the strat­ Press. 1985), 44—45. egies used, and the tactics employed (193-269). 27. Jamie Gough. "Airpower and Counter-Insurgency." 43. George K. Tanham. "Communist Revolutionary War­ Airman 6 (August 1962): 5. fare." in USAF Counter-Insurgency Orientation Course, vol. 28. The French were militarily effective in the Algerian up­ 1 (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff College. rising because they were able to isolate the Moslem insur­ 1962) , L-36. gents from the rest of the population by the end of the con­ 44. Ibid., L-37. flict. in great part due to air power. However, the campaign 45. Ibid. was a political loss for the French because France could no 46. Ibid., L-38. longer economically maintain the ownership of its colony. 47. Headquarters USAF. Analysis of Effectiveness of Inter­ Cuerriila Warfare and Airpower in Algeria. 1954-1960 (Max­ diction in SEA. Second Progress Report, May 1966, 33. well AFB. Ala.: US Aerospace Studies Institute. 1965). iv-vii. 48. Ibid.. 3. 29. Hardie. 23-25. 49. Vo Nguyen Giap. People's War. People's Army: The 30. People's war—as defined by Mao and practiced by Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for Underdeveloped Coun­ Communists in China. Malaya. Indochina. Cuba, and subse­ tries (New York: Praeger Publishers. 1962). 46. 64 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

50. Maj Gen Gilbert L. Meyers. "Why Not More Targets in 57. AFM 1-1. United States A ir Force Basic Doctrine, 14 the North?” Air Force 50. no. 5 (May 1967): 77. August 1964. 5-1 through 5-10. 51. Gen |ohn P. McConnell. "What the Air Force Is Learn­ 58. AFM 51-44. Fighter and Fighter-Bomber Employment ing from Vietnam," Air Force 50. no. 5 (May 1967): 45. in Tactical Air Operations. 1953. 37. 52. Mao Tse-tung, 22. 59. Headquarters USAF. Analysis of Effectiveness. 37. 53. Some may argue that both the Johnson and Nixon ad­ 60. Ibid. ministrations were also to share in the blame for not realizing 61. Gen Otto P. Weyland. "Air Power in Limited War." the true nature of the negotiation process However, civilian Ordnance 44 (July-August 1959): 41. errors in judgment regarding military affairs should be antici­ 62. Ibid.. 43. pated in time of war: it is the military advisors' job to under­ 63. George Weiss. "TAC Air: Present and Future Lessons. stand the enemy's intentions and persuade the president Problems, and Needs." Armed Forces Journal. September accordingly. 1971, 31. 54. Project no. Au-l-57-ESAWAC. "The USAF in Limited 64. Robert B. Johnson. Tactical Warfare and the Limited War," 20 March 1958. 1, Special Collections. United States War Dilemma (Santa Barbara. Calif.: General Electric Co.. Air Force Academy Library. 1961). 6. 55. John L. Phipps. Bosic Problems in Counter-Guerrilla 65. Jon M. Van Dyke. North Vietnam’s Strategy for Sur­ Air Operations (Maxwell AFB. Ala.: Air Command and Staff vival (Palo Alto. Calif.: Pacific Books, 1972), 22. College. 1962), 56. 66. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air. trans. Dino 56. Lt Gen Gabriel P. Disosway, "Tactical Air Power." Ord- Ferrari (Washington. D.C.: Office of Air Force History. 1983), nance 48 (July-August 1963): 47. 30. Basis of Issue

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65 THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET MARITIME AIR OPERATIONS

ver the years, the US Air Force than 50 sorties in 17 days. The highlight of and Navy have forged joint op­ this exercise occurred when B-52s planted erational plans to fight the So­ capsulated torpedo (CapTor) minefields viets at sea. This cooperation and then flew several Harpoon strikes beganO in 1982, when the USAF signed a against an opposing fleet. Teamwork 88 al­ Memorandum of Agreement with the lowed NATO to evaluate the allies' ability Navy. Thereafter, the USAF increased its to conduct a maritime campaign in the commitment to maritime operations by as­ Norwegian Sea and project forces ashore signing B-52s to fly mine-laying missions in northern Norway.1 and Harpoon missile strikes. In recent To ensure a nuclear second-strike ca­ years, B-52s, E-3As, and F-15s have joined pability, the Soviets have established a de­ with naval forces in several maritime fensive strategy to protect their ballistic- exercises. missile submarines stationed in the In the fall of 1988, the North Atlantic Barents Sea. Despite all the political Treaty Organization (NATO) conducted changes in Eastern Europe and the USSR, Teamwork 88, a major exercise in the Nor­ the Soviets have continued to upgrade this wegian Sea in which the USAF flew more submarine program, and defense of these

66 to integrate Su-27 Flanker and 11-76 Main­ stay aircraft into SNA.2 In addition, by the mid-1990s the Soviets will have a large deck carrier which undoubtedly will be stationed with the Northern Fleet. Ul­ timately, this carrier will be the center- piece of a new Soviet naval battle group designed to extend tactical air coverage across the Norwegian Sea and into the North Atlantic. ;ssets remains a high priority. If threat- These are the obvious signs that Soviet •ned, the Soviets' Northern Fleet, whose maritime air operations are in rapid transi­ tome port is along the Kola Peninsula tion. With Flankers, Mainstays, and a new USSR), would maneuver into the Nor- attack carrier, the Soviets will be able to vegian Sea in an attempt to deny an en- fly combat coverage across the entire Nor­ my this theater of operations. A large por- wegian Sea. Indeed, this transformation ion of the Northern Fleet’s capabilities will enhance the Soviet maritime threat vould come from Soviet air power. against allied sea-lanes and force US com­ In recent years, the transformation of the manders to reconsider tactics in the con­ Soviets' maritime air operations has duct of Harpoon missile strikes, mine­ aused changes in the nature of this naval laying missions, and air-to-air combat. To ur threat. Twenty years ago, Tu-95/142 understand this transformation and its im­ tear and Tu-16 Badger aircraft comprised plications for US maritime operations, one he primary threat over the Norwegian Sea. must examine how these SNA operations ’hen in the late 1970s. Tu-26 Backfire air- originated. raft were assigned to Soviet Naval Avia­ ion (SNA) and were soon flying missions )Ut of the Kola Peninsula and into the Nor- Soviet Naval Aviation, vegian Sea theater. This sweptwing air- raft—with its low-altitude ability, tran­ 1970-1989 sonic dash speed, and firepower—signifi- After World War II, SNA’s primary mis­ :antly enhanced SNA's strike capabilities sion was to defend the Soviet Union md complicated allied air defense plans. against US carrier attacks. Toward that Yet, the addition of the Backfire is only end, in the 1950s the Soviets transferred he first step in this transformation. Cur- Bears and Badgers from Long Range Avia­ ent signs indicate that the Soviets intend tion to SNA.3 Thus, by the 1970s Bears

67 68

primary air Backfires— half of their inventory—to in iiecl their tactics, these air- SNA.5 Unlike the Bears and Badgers, the eratt participated in various maritime ex­ Backfires came directly off the production ercises, such as Okean 1975. This exercise line into a maritime role. Able to carry two began when a Soviet naval task force, AS-4 Kitchen air-to-surface missiles, the posed as an aggressor, sailed out of the high-speed, long-range Backfire dramat­ North Atlantic and into the Norwegian ically increased both the SNA’s strike ca­ Sea. Working with reconnaissance aircraft, pabilities and the threat against NATO’s the older Bears and Badgers—the primary maritime forces.6 In 1979 the US Depart­ striking force— flew out of the Kola Penin­ ment of Defense commented on the initial sula and attacked the opposing task group. appearance of Backfires: These sorties were coordinated with There is increasing evidence that the Soviet strikes against the enemy by Soviet bomber and cruise missile force may be over- submarines.4 taking their submarine force as a threat to our In 1976 the Soviets enhanced their mar­ fleet and to our forces necessary for the re- itime air operations by assigning about 40 supply of Europe. They can concentrate air-

Soviet Naval Aviation has used the Bear bomber since the 1950s. The one shown below is capable of delivering cruise missiles. Although newer aircraft have been added to the Soviet military arsenal, the Bear is still a major reconnaissance asset and a threat to US naval taskforces. TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET MARITIME AIR OPERATIONS 69

craft, coordinate attacks with air, surface, or over a decade. These operations began submarine-launched missiles, and use new when the Kirov battle cruiser, escorted by technology to find our fleet units, jam our de- approximately 15 ships, departed the fenses and screen their approach." Barents Sea and sailed south into the Nor­ From 1976 through the 1980s. the So­ wegian Sea. At the same time, another So­ viets worked to perfect the Backfire's mar­ viet surface squadron departed the Baltic itime tactics. For instance, in September Sea and headed toward the Norwegian 1982 four Backfires approached the car­ Sea. Subsequently. Backfires deployed to riers USS Midway and Enterprise as these the Kola Peninsula and began flying simu­ ships were conducting fleet exercises near lated strikes against this force.13 the Aleutian Islands. At a distance of 120 The Soviets conducted yet another Nor­ miles from the carriers, the aircraft simu­ wegian Sea exercise on 4 April 1984. lated release of their cruise missiles. The Again, maritime strike aircraft flew several following day, four more Backfires ap­ attacks against a simulated enemy task proached the fleet in another simulated air force.14 According to John Lehman, former strike. According to one report, this was secretary of the Navy, until 1984 most So­ the first time that Backfires had flown out­ viet maritime exercises were defensive in side Eurasia.8 These simulated carrier at­ nature; however, the appearance of the tacks provided an indication of the So­ Backfires in such numbers and the pres­ viets' tactical priorities. ence of numerous Soviet ships in the Nor­ As if to confirm the Backfire’s role, late wegian Sea clearly indicated the offensive in 1982 Soviet Naval Digest published sev­ nature of these maneuvers.15 Thus, by the eral articles describing British and Argen­ mid-1980s, there were obvious signs that tine air operations during the Falklands the Backfire had developed its tactics and War. The Soviets noted that, in general, was fully integrated into the Soviets' mar­ air-launched cruise missiles were effective itime air operations. antiship weapons. With only a limited After 1984 the Soviets scaled down their supply of Exocet missiles, commented one naval maneuvers, preferring to conduct ex­ Soviet writer, the Argentines successfully ercises near their own coasts. However, hit their targets 50 percent of the time.9 they continued to perfect Backfire opera­ Another article stated that “on the whole, tions in 1985 by simulating attacks against the high effectiveness of cruise missiles in one of the Kiev-class carriers. In March of destroying surface ships has been con­ that year, the carrier Novorossiysk and an firmed.” 10 A 1984 US Navy analysis of escorting task force departed the Sea of SNA’s reaction to the Falklands War japan, sailed to the south of Okinawa, and claimed that the Soviets were quick to see then made their way east across the Pa­ the value of the air-launched missile cific. After approximately eight days, the strikes. This study concluded that since ships turned and headed northwest toward air-to-surface missiles comprised a large the Kuril Islands, simulating an enemy part of the SNA’s arsenal, Soviet praise of carrier strike against the Soviet Union. As the Exocet was not surprising.11 Thus, the the Novorossiysk approached the islands, Falklands War provided a rationale for the about 700 miles east of Japan. Bears flew Soviets to continue perfecting their mar­ reconnaissance missions near the battle itime air operations. group and helped vector some 20 Backfires In 1983 the journal Soviet Aerospace es­ to their targets. A US Navy description of timated that the Soviets were building at the Novorossiysk exercise notes that least 30 Backfires per year and that SNA the force was hit by simulated air strikes and had approximately 100 of these aircraft.12 probably by submarines firing torpedoes and Then in 1984, Backfires flew numerous cruise missiles from 1120 km east of Japan. sorties over the North Atlantic during one on 14 April. They came at it with submarines of the largest Soviet maritime exercises in and aircraft—everything they had.111 70 AIRPOVVER IOURNAL SUMMER 1990

Throughout these various exercises, the Forger—a vertical and/or short takeoff and Soviets coordinated their air attacks with landing (VSTOL) aircraft.22 Further, Rear submarine strikes. Apparently, the Soviets Adm Thomas A. Brooks, director of US intend to attack en masse, using every naval intelligence, told members of Con­ available weapons system and striking gress that the Soviets plan to launch a sec­ from all directions. But recent evidence ond attack carrier by 1993. Aircraft men­ suggests that even these tactics are chang­ tioned for service on these carriers include ing. In 1987 Norwegian air surveillance the MiG-29 Fulcrum, the Su-25 Frogfoot, spotted Flankers escorting Badgers during and the Flanker. However, Admiral Brooks simulated ship strikes in the Norwegian points out that “aircraft carrier com­ Sea.17 Although not officially assigned to patibility testing with Flanker aircraft was SNA, the Flanker has excellent capabil­ accelerated last summer, most likely to de­ ities, including a flight range of approx­ velop a credible air wing by the early imately 600 miles.18 Marc Liebman states 1990s.”23 that the Flanker could substantially en­ Consequently, the assignment of one of hance Soviet maritime air operations: these carriers to the Northern Fleet in the Su-27s may be tasked to escort Badger/ early 1990s will allow the Soviets to de­ Backfire bombers to a point where they could ploy a carrier battle group to the Nor­ launch their long-range cruise missiles at US/ wegian Sea and provide extended combat NATO ships or naval bases in Iceland or on air patrols for their fleet. With these addi­ the Shetland, Orkney, or Faroe Islands. tional assets, the Soviets will be able to NATO fighters patrolling the Greenland- project air power to the North Atlantic and Iceland-Norway Gap to protect surface ac- threaten NATO’s sea lines of communica­ tion, convoy, and carrier battle groups would tion. In a recent article in Military Tech- have to engage the Su-27 escorts before they nology, US Navy Lt Comdr Joseph Striewe could attack the bombers.19 speculated on the composition of this In addition to the Flankers, the Soviets Northern Fleet carrier battle group. Given have deployed Mainstays—airborne early the current order of battle, he thinks that it warning and control aircraft—to the Mur­ would consist of the following ships: mansk (port in northwest USSR) region.20 • One Tblisi attack carrier. A Soviet version of the USAF’s airborne • One Kiev-class carrier. warning and control system (AWACS), the • One Kirov-class battle cruiser. Mainstay can detect remote threats and • Two Kara-class crusiers. vector an interceptor such as the Flanker. • Several Udaloy/Sovremenny-class Its mission is to detect low-flying aircraft destroyers. and missiles and to help direct fighter • One Berezina-class replenishment operations.21 Apparently, Mainstays, ship.24 Flankers, and Backfires will fly in concert on coordinated strike missions. These The Tblisi and Kiev carriers would changes are indicative of the progressive provide approximately 90 aircraft of one transformation of Soviet air operations. kind or another for fleet defense. In addi­ Indeed, the likelihood of finding and fight­ tion, a Soviet carrier battle group situated ing unescorted Backfires is quickly in the Norwegian Sea would be sailing diminishing. within the operating radius of land-based Soviet maritime air operations will be Flankers, Mainstays, and Backfires. Thus, further enhanced by the deployment of the by the early 1990s Soviet battle groups Tblisi, a large deck carrier that will accom­ will no longer conduct operations outside modate about 60 aircraft. Although we are of a comprehensive air defense screen. The not certain about the numbers and types of integration of the Tblisi—along with planes, the new carrier’s inventory ap­ Flankers, Backfires, and Mainstays—into parently includes an upgraded Yak-38 Soviet Naval Aviation will transform the TheHMS Sheffield and other Royal Navy ships were destroyed during the Falklands War by Exocet antiship missiles. Thisfact did not go unnoticed by Soviet naval planners, who saw it as a validation o f their own doctrine of maritime air operations. air operations picture in the Norwegian naval policies. Second, US military com­ Sea and complicate US and USAF mar­ manders will have to rethink how B-52s, itime strategy. AWACS aircraft, F-15s, and the US strik­ ing fleet will counter the new Soviet mari­ time threat. Implications for The configuration and deployment of the aforementioned Soviet assets indicate US Maritim e Strategy that the USSR wishes to extend tactical air These improvements in Soviet maritime coverage at sea and sustain a sea-power air operations have two major implications building program developed by Adm for US maritime strategy. First, contrary to Sergei Gorshkov, father of the modern So­ current Soviet pronouncements, there ap­ viet navy. Evidently, the late naval com­ pears to be no apparent change in Soviet mander in chief’s plans for a balanced

71 72 A/RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

The Soviet Mainstay airborne wanting and control system aircraft is now used in Soviet naval exercises to control attacks against enemy aircraft and naval surface ships.

navy have not been curtailed by the cur­ vided only limited maritime air defense. rent Soviet administration. As early as the After launching more of these smaller ves­ 1960s, Gorshkov wanted a balanced, blue- sels, the Soviets decided to fulfill a water navy which included air assets. In Gorshkov dream by building two large at­ his book The Sea Power of the State, tack carriers. Gorshkov claimed that during World War Basically, then, the recent transforma­ II, the Germans never appreciated how air­ tion of Soviet maritime air operations is a craft could complement fleet operations: manifestation of Gorshkov’s plan to build “The German Command under-estimated a balanced, blue-water navy around an the role of aviation in the operations at attack carrier battle group. Even though sea.’’ Indeed, he continued, “This to no General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev has small degree was promoted by the resist­ offered to scrap older ships and has dis­ ance of Goering to the creation of naval cussed ways to disarm, the Soviets have aviation.”25 not significantly altered their shipbuilding Thus, Gorshkov set out to ensure that programs. Nor have they abandoned naval air would be included in plans for Gorshkov’s dream of launching a balanced constructing a balanced fleet. Because the navy. Indeed, one report claims that the Soviets had no aircraft carriers in the late Soviets have started building a third major 1960s, they had to use land-based aircraft attack carrier similar to the TbJisi.26 De­ for distant tactical air coverage of their spite Gorbachev’s pronouncements, the fleet. In the 1970s under Gorshkov’s direc­ deployment of Flankers, Mainstays, and tion, the Soviets built the first Kiev-class new attack carriers indicates that Soviet aircraft carrier and stationed Yak-38 naval policies have not changed and that Forgers on board. However, because building a balanced navy remains a high Forgers performed poorly, the Kiev pro­ priority. TRANSFORMATION OF SOVIET MARITIME AiH OPERATIONS 73

The changes in Soviet maritime air oper­ As mentioned earlier, in Teamwork 88, ations also have implications for US mar­ unescorted B-52s flew Harpoon strikes and itime doctrine. At present, Air Force and mine-laying missions. But if attack carriers Navy air tactics call for attacking the Back­ provide combat air coverage for Soviet fires before they can launch their missiles. fleets, B-52s will no longer be able to fly Because Backfires formerly flew without without protection. The Air Force, there­ escorts and without long-range radar fore, should consider stationing F-16s and coverage. Navy F-14s or Air Force F-15s KC-lOs at Loring AFB, Maine, and tasking planned to fly straight toward the Back­ them to fly with the B-52s. After tanking fires and attack them. However, if off a KC-10 and receiving vectors from an Flankers—vectored by Mainstays—are to Iceland-based AWACS, F-16s could ac­ escort Backfires, our old air tactics will not company B-52s on Harpoon missions and suffice. Obviously, the F-15s and F-14s provide air coverage while the bombers are will have to fight their wav through com­ planting minefields. Just as long-range bat air patrols to get to the Backfires. Thus, P-51 Mustangs accompanied B-17s over their success will depend on our ability to Germany in World War II, so could F-16s destroy or deceive the Mainstays. This in from Loring and F-15s from Iceland escort itself is sufficient justification to support B-52s on future missions against the the stealth fighter program and the deploy­ Soviets. ment of advanced tactical fighters on In most NATO maritime exercises, board US aircraft carriers. American carrier battle groups face a simu-

Backfire bombers have become a central part o f Soviet antiship operations. Always dangerous, these aircraft are an especially formidable threat now that they enjoy the protection of Soviet sea-basedfighter aircraft. 74 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

lated enemy comprised primarily of sur­ tions need to be tested under realistic face ships and land-based aircraft. Seldom, conditions. if ever, is the enemy force endowed with Although detailed tactics for opposing the fighting power of an attack carrier. Soviet carrier battle groups have yet to be And when AWACS aircraft participate, perfected, one fact remains clear: the So­ they are assigned only to the friendly viets are upgrading their maritime air op­ forces. But if the USSR is able to deploy a erations. In the 1960s they had no carriers carrier battle group and Mainstays to the and, therefore, relied on their Bears and Norwegian Sea, NATO should add these Badgers. However, the 1970s and the aspects of the Soviet threat to its maritime 1980s saw the addition of Backfires and exercises. Specifically, NATO should the construction of attack carriers. If two screen the simulated enemy carrier with new attack carriers—together with Back­ submarines, surface combatants, and air­ fires, Flankers, and Mainstays—are avail­ craft. Furthermore, Air Force E-3As should able by the mid-1990s, the Soviets will be used for Mainstays; F-14s, F-15s, or have substantially enhanced their mar­ F-18s for Flankers; F-llls for Backfires; itime capabilities. Now is the time to pre­ and A-6s for Yak-36s. In short, before the pare for this threat by adapting US mar­ Soviets actually deploy their new carrier itime tactics and weapons to effectively battle groups, allied maritime air opera­ counter the improvements in Soviet air operations.

Notes 1. Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic. Public Affairs Of­ 12. “Soviets Building 26-40 Backfires a Year.” Soviet fice, "NATO Amphibious Forces Land in Northern Norway" Aerospace. 21 March 1983. 77-78. (Norfolk. Va.: Commander in Chief Atlantic. Fleet Com­ 13. Rodney Cowton. “Pact Ships Mass in Atlantic," The pound. 19 September 1988). Times (London), 3 April 1984. 6. 2. Tonne Huitfeldt. "Soviet Tu-16 Badgers in Norwegian 14. R. van Tol. “Soviet Naval Exercises. 1983-85.” Naval Sea Exercise," lane's Defence Weekly'. 27 June 1987. 1345; Forces, no. 6 (1986): 18-35. Nick Cook. "Soviet 11-76 Pictured over Kola Peninsula." 15. William Smith. "Moscow's Muscle Flexing.” Time. 16 ibid.. 12 December 1978, 1338. April 1984. 28-30: Fay Willey. "Strategy: A Test for NATO at 3. Peter H. Rasmussen. "The Soviet Naval Air Force: De­ Sea." Newsweek. 16 April 1984. 46. velopment. Organization and Capabilities." International De­ 16. Walter Andrews. "Soviets' 9-Ship Show Impressed fense Review, no. 5 (1978): 689—95. Most." Washington Times. 18 April 1985. 4; Richard Gross. 4. Bruce W. Watson and Marguerite Walton. "Okean-75." "Soviet Naval Forces Simulate US Aircraft Carrier Attack." US Naval Institute Proceedings, (uly 1976. 93-97. fane's Defence Weekly', 27 April 1985. 701; Kensuke Ebata. 5. Rasmussen. 689-95. "Speed Is the Kev for Soviets in Pacific." ibid.. 18 Mav 1985, 6. John W. Taylor, ed.. lane’s A ll the World's Aircraft. 833. 1986-87 (London: Jane's Publishing Co.. 1987). 267-79. 17. Huitfeldt. 1345. 7. Ibid., 268.. 18. "Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker Fighter in Close-up." fane’s De­ 8. "New Soviet Bombers Fake Strike against U.S. Navy,” fence Weekly. 22 August 1987. 338-39. Washington Post. 9 November 1982, 16; "Soviet Backfires 19. Marc Liebman. "Flanker Aircraft Threatens Norwegian Simulate Attacks against U.S. Carrier,” Soviet Aerospace, 15 Sea." Armed Forces fournal International. October 1987. 52. November 1982. 70. 20. Cook. 1338. 9. B. Rodinov and Y. N. Novichkov, "Electronic Warfare in 21. Ibid. the South Atlantic," Selected Translations from Morskoi 22. Marc Liebman. "The New Soviet Carrier." Defense Sbornik. no. 1 (1983): 61-77. Electronics, March 1989. 55-60. 10. I. Uskov. "Lessons of the Anglo-Argentine Conflict and 23. "Soviets Launch Second Large Aircraft Carrier." Soviet the Role of Surface Ships in Conflict at Sea." Selected Trans­ Aerospace. 6 March 1989. 1-5. lations from Morskoi Sbornik. no. 11 (1982): 102-13. 24. Joseph Striewe, "Soviet Carrier Battle Group on the 11. Richard N. Papworth. Soviet Navy Reactions to the Horizon?" Military Technology, |une 1989, 26-31. Falkland Island Conflict. Defense Technical Information 25. Adm S. G. Gorshkov, The Sea Power of the State (An­ Center Technical Report (Alexandria. Va.: Defense Technical napolis. Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1979), 262. Information Center. 1984), 78-79. 26. Peter Howard. “Soviet Third Carrier Build Confirmed." Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 April 1989. 583. . . . BUT HOW DO I SUBSCRIBE? EASY . . . • Just write the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. • Tell him you want to subscribe to AFRP 50-2, Airpower Journal, stock number 708-007-00000-5.

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75 ...... — ------I net assessment

The Eagle’s Talons: The American Experience tions,” “Military Technology and Technique,” at War by Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr Don­ “Military Conduct,” and “Better State of the ald M. Snow. Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112- Peace." This is not the book for people who 5532: Air University Press, 421 pages. $16.00. want a new and detailed survey of American military history. The authors provide just Clausewitz’s conclusion that “war is a con- enough background—gleaned from reputable tinuation of political activity by other means” secondary sources—to illuminate their areas of is an often misunderstood or forgotten dictum. emphasis. In The Eagle’s Talons, Col Dennis Drew and Dr Given the book’s emphasis on interacting po­ Donald Snow, both past instructors at the Air litical and military factors, it is no surprise that War College, examine America's military his- the most interesting (some would argue, most tory in light of Clausewitz's adage. Directed at important) chapters in the book deal with those individuals concerned with national se- America's "limited” wars. While America has curity affairs (both civilian and military), the found it much more acceptable to relate "total” book attempts to describe the complex interac- wars to its myths and feelings about the use of tion between political and military factors in military force, such has not been the case with America's past in order to provide some in- “limited” conflicts. Indeed, it is no accident sights on how America might view the use of that the chapter preceding the book’s summary force in the future. addresses America's minor wars: the War of The book’s introductory chapter, "War and 1812, the Mexican War, and the Spanish- Political Purpose.” alone makes this book American War. With the discussion of these worth reading. While designed primarily to ex- smaller and more controversial conflicts still plain the authors' methodology and chapter fresh, the authors then bring home the point organization, it provides a detailed and cogent that America in the twentieth century has argument for the examination of America’s mil- fought and is facing more of these wars of lim­ itary experience as an integration of political, ited scope and consequence. military, and societal factors. In general, Amer- In their last chapter. Drew and Snow describe ica has gone to and conducted war with pre- and comment on the situation America faces as cious little foresight, allowing its use of force to she closes out the century. They conclude that be directed by very narrow public perception we face a world where many of our images of (or indignation) along with very limited the way we fight and why we fight simply will thought to the political motivations and con- not apply. Their argument is that both political sequences of its actions. Contributing to this and military leaders need to understand this haphazard understanding of the uses of mili- situation so that American military policy can tary force are myths of American military prow- adapt to this reality. ess and purity of motive. Further complicating Maj Budd A. (ones, Jr., USAF the problem is the very real conflict between an USAF Academy. Colorado antimilitary society and the institutions the so- ciety has created to protect it. The authors dis- play a keen understanding of these phenomena America’s First Black General: General Ben- and thoroughly examine them in the context of jamin O. Davis. Sr., each of America's wars. 1880-1970 by Marvin E. Following this introductory chapter, the book Fletcher. Lawrence. Kansas 66045: University is organized chronologically and devotes a Press of Kansas, 1989. 226 pages. $22.50. chapter to each of America's major wars. Each Given the title of Marvin Fletcher's book, I chapter is subdivided into sections on “Issues was predisposed to believe that the author’s ac­ and Events,” “Political Objective,” “Military count would tend to extrapolation rather than Objectives and Strategy," "Political Considera- specificity, to heroics rather than to the pedes-

76 NET ASSESSMENT 77

rian. However, the biography of Brig Gen Ben- The book's reserved style and avoidance of amin O. Davis is a very detailed recitation of unwarranted conclusions add a certain dignity :he actions and motivations of a unique indi- that is much in keeping with what General . idual, drawn from credibly annotated, con- Davis must have been like. Furthermore, the temporary sources. A picture clearly and suc- foreword by Lt Gen Benjamin O. Davis, Jr., adds cinctly emerges of an officer driven by duty to perspective and support to the biography. This family, to officership. to black members of the book should be considered a “must read" for military, and to the US Army. Aside from the anyone interested in the details and person- obvious and important historical significance of alities involved in the racial integration of the the general's 50-vear military career, the book American military. explores a pervasive and interesting theme for Capt Eric C. Anderson, USAF urrent officers to follow: the actions of a man Duluth, Minnesota operating in the classic ‘‘officer environment" li.e.. relying on personal standards to set goals and analyze results, despite the absence of use- ful feedback). Edward Lansdale: The Unquiet American by During his career, which began as an officer Cecil B. Currey. Boston 02108: Houghton in the volunteer infantry during the Spanish- Mifflin Co., 1988, 416 pages, $24.95. American War. General Davis held many posi- tions, ranging from the predictable (professor of In spite of the fact that for nearly 30 years military science and tactics at Tuskegee In- Maj Gen Edward G. Lansdale’s name has been stitute in Alabama) to the exotic (military at- synonymous with nation building and coun- tache to Liberia). Because the Army was still terinsurgency. he is relatively unknown in most oppressively segregated, the salient factor that Air Force circles. One reason is that most of his determined General Davis's assignments was career was spent as a nonrated intelligence of- he color of his skin. Command jobs remained ficer on detached duty. The other may be that rare because of the possibility of subordinating his counterinsurgency specialty has been midlevel white officers to a senior black officer. forced into the shadows by the Vietnam Throughout his career. General Davis was experience. prone to lobby for the more desirable jobs or Currey does an admirable job of dispas- those that had more potential for promotion. sionately explaining Lansdale and his career. Although this tendency is at first disconcerting, Although it is clear that the author admires his it becomes apparent that he was simply doing subject, he captures Lansdale’s strengths and his duty: “In his own mind he was first of all failings without glorifying the former or excus- an Army officer, then a black man. For the ing the latter. Unfortunately, Currey spends lit- black community, he was first of all a black." In tle time on the early years of Lansdale’s life. this sense. General Davis was maximizing his The reader must be content knowing that from value to the Army and to the black community his youth. Lansdale projected a likable mixture simultaneously. Given the institutionalized big- of artistic talent, military interest, and an innate otry of the Army bureaucracy, these instances ability to sell. These qualities led to his achiev- of apparent careerism become examples of ad- ing a reasonable level of success as an advertis- mirable initiative. ing executive before World War II. Upon his promotion to brigadier general dur- It is the recounting of Lansdale's firing from ing World War II. General Davis became in- this job which gives the initial insight into volved in the most compelling portion of his Lansdale the man. Following Pearl Harbor, he career—advising the War Department on how made the decision to activate his reserve com- to handle racial issues. Although he was the mission. His employer disagreed in principle, only black general and one of the key. firsthand and Lansdale's intolerant rebuttal resulted in observers of racially generated problems, he an immediate, though mutually regretted, nevertheless remained the consummate Army dismissal. officer, making his recommendations clearly Although physicians initially found him and unequivocally. If they were rejected, he medically unqualified for duty, he relied on simply moved on. Certainly, the seeds for post- personal contacts to gain his commission. This war integration were sown largely through the ability to overcome circumstance by capitaliz- practical, quiet approach of General Davis. ing on his network of acquaintances became 78 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

one of his trademarks. Following the war, he provides insight into his character, it necessar successfully transitioned to the Air Force in ily distorted reality in order to obscure his Cen- search of a less restrictive environment. His tral Intelligence Agency (CIA) affiliation. wartime experience led to an assignment to the Currey’s scholarly treatment of Lansdale Strategic Intelligence School at Lowry Air provides a counterpoint which leads to a Force Base, Colorado. deeper understanding and appreciation of his While there, Lansdale’s penchant for subor- subject yet retains a quality of excitement. To dinating convention to what he felt was right understand Lansdale, you should read both led to evaluations which ranged from “May- books, but it is Currey’s work that will become hem's going on in your class” to “A good man a classic. for air attache, staff, or liaison duty.” Although Lt Col T. K. Kearney, USAF his selection to attend Academic Instructor Headquarters USAF School at Craig AFB, Alabama, threatened to seal his fate, he returned to Lowry by way of Washington. D.C., after completing the course. Soviet Military Doctrine: Continuity, Formula- Once again Lansdale achieved the impossible: tion, and Dissemination by Harriet Fast Scott less than a month later, he received orders and William F. Scott. Boulder, Colorado to the Office of Policy Coordination in 80301: Westview Press, 1988, 295 pages, Washington. $45.00. This secret organization was the direct de- scendant of the Office of Strategic Services Anyone who follows Air Force Magazine (OSS). Lansdale immediately settled in and be- knows the work of Harriet Fast Scott and gan working on covert operations aimed at off- William F. Scott, the premier experts on Soviet setting Soviet third-world advances. He became military affairs. Harriet Scott, a member of the a self-taught expert on psychological opera- General Advisory Committee on Arms Control tions, seeing this field as a means to help coun- and Disarmament, and her husband William ter the Hukbalahap rebellion in the Philippines. spent four years with the US embassy in Mos- He convinced the Philippine attache to route cow—he as the US air attache. They have returning military officers through Washington, coauthored The Soviet Art of War and the clas- where he could teach them the art. During this sic The Armed Forces of the USSR (now in its period, a friend introduced him to Ramon third edition). Soviet Military Doctrine fulfills Magsaysay. a young Philippine congressman. the prediction that this couple would write the Their ensuing friendship literally changed the definitive work on Soviet military doctrine. It is course of history. the most complete treatment of the subject cur- When Lansdale returned to the Philippines, rently in print. he and Magsaysay would gain lasting fame and The title identifies the book’s three major di- much deserved credit for establishing democ- visions. The first part is “Continuity and racy in that country. This high-water mark of Change in Soviet Military Doctrine,” which Lansdale's career resulted in his being charac- traces Soviet doctrine from its formulation in terized in William J. Lederer and Eugene the 1917 revolution, through transitional Burdick’s-The Ugly American and Graham phases during the eras of Stalin, Khrushchev, Greene's The Quiet American. Although these and Brezhnev, to its present form now that the portraits brought him fame, they focused atten- USSR is a military superpower. The final chap- tion on the what and how of his activities. The ter of this section convincingly warns that the spotlight resulted in unrealistic expectations on current “restructuring” is not simply an at- the part of supporters and determined opposi- tempt to improve the living standards of the So- tion by his detractors. Years later in Vietnam, viet population at the expense of the military he became the confidant of President Ngo Dinh but a recognition by the Soviet leadership "that Diem and attempted to re-create his success in the total correlation of forces—economic, the Philippines. But too many people knew scientific-technical, moral-political, and mili- him too well, and his assignment produced no tary—must be kept in their [the Soviets) favor” lasting results. and that this correlation has been slipping General Lansdale later attempted to put his away. career into focus for the American public with The second part, “Formulation and Dis- his book In the Midst of Wars. Although it semination of Soviet Military Doctrine," deals NET ASSESSMENT 79

with the roles of both the Communist party and bibliography worthy of a doctoral dissertation, the Soviet government in the military doctrine all of which make it a top-notch reference. process. Here, through an exploration of those Lt Col Vincent J. Landry, Jr., USAF roles, the Scotts make a strong argument that Columbus, Ohio any true fundamental change in the Communist party and its administrative arm, the Soviet government, will most certainly be reflected in George C. Marshall: Soldier-Statesman of the Soviet military writings approved for dis- American Century by Mark A. Stoler. Boston semination to Soviet officers. The current doc- 02111: Twayne Publishers. 1989, 239 pages, trinal writings do not support the notion of a $24.95. fundamental Soviet move to a defensive opera- tional doctrine. Politically, the Soviet view is Mark Stoler solves the biographer’s crucial that their doctrine has always been defensive. problem—the selection of a suitable subject— The first two parts lay a strong foundation for by choosing George C. Marshall, the most hon- the book’s third and final part. “Conclusions: ored American military man since George Continuity or Change?” Washington—a man whose character and In the conclusion, the Scotts develop a most achievements should be studied and emulated logical framework for placing perestroika by all true professionals. In doing so, however, (restructuring) in perspective and help the he creates another problem: saying something reader appreciate not only whether fundamen- new about General Marshall, especially in the tal changes are taking place in the Soviet Union light of the publication just three years ago of but whether they are even possible. This sec- the fourth and final volume of the definitive tion should be mandatory reading in all US and Marshall biography by Forrest Pogue. allied war colleges, as the following paragraph Stoler acknowledges his debt to Pogue in a demonstrates: graceful tribute that begins a long (18-page) bib- liographic essay. This addendum, by the way, Before actions are based on such perceptions of So­ is frank, thoughtful, and very useful. But the viet behavior, it is more important than ever before approximately 200 pages of Stoler’s text are not that defense planners outside the Soviet orbit ex­ just a condensation of the more than 2,000 amine the total Soviet concept on military doctrine pages of the Pogue text. Rather, they paint a and its purpose__ Soviet military doctrine tran­ scends the Soviet Armed Forces. It impacts all as­ distinctive picture of a man whom Stoler ad- pects of Soviet life, whether it be the military- mires and whose times he understands. patriotic education of Soviet youth, the location of The necessary process of selection and the re- new industries, or scientific exchanges with the sultant juxtaposition of events in a shorter work noncommunist world. Soviet military doctrine can be helpful in comparing incidents that hap- provides the overall framework for preparing the pened over a long period of time. For example, country against the possibility of a future war. It is consider the famous scene in 1943 when Mar- concerned with the very essence of war. its aims shall tells Winston Churchill that (in regard to and nature, the weapons that will be used as well British demands for action against the island of as how they will be used. Rhodes) “not one American soldier is going to Regardless of when it appeared, a book of die on that goddamned beach." This is made this quality and scope would be an important much more understandable when Stoler ex- work. However, recent events (the Intermedi- plains that Marshall—only a brigadier gen- ate-range Nuclear Forces treaty and the an- eral—did the same thing with FDR in 1938. nouncement of General Secretary Gorbachev’s Furthermore, all these are echoes of an even unilateral conventional-force reductions), on- earlier episode when Major Marshall stood up going Soviet perestroika, and upcoming con- to Gen John (“Black )ack”) Pershing in October ventional arms negotiations in Vienna magnify 1917! When we read Pogue, we understand an its importance. Indeed, Soviet Military Doctrine incident more profoundly but often have diffi- is a volume that all serious Soviet scholars, de- culty relating it to an event that occurred two or fense analysts, national security policymakers, three volumes earlier. and military professionals must add to their li- When he is not creating insights by intel- brary. The book is highly informative and ex- ligent selection and juxtaposition, Stoler states tremely well documented (700 citations for 262 them directly. For example, he contends that pages of text), with excellent appendices and a what Marshall was doing in 1950 as secretary 80 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

of defense—organizing an American Army— crippled by drug addiction, alcoholism, as- was what he had done as Army chief of staff in sorted psychiatric pathologies, and just plain 1939-43. This is one of many shrewd observa- incompetence. tions that are hard to get out of one’s mind. Fur- At the top was Hermann Goering, an enigma, ther, the author makes a startling comparison a man of great contradictions, a decorated between General Marshall and George Wash- World War I fighter ace, and a drug addict. It is ington. Rather than comparing the obvious hard to imagine anyone more poorly suited for traits of character and unselfish service, Stoler the job. He consistently overestimated his ca- notes that in picking his associates in the State pabilities by a wide margin, typically promis- Department in 1947, Marshall followed the ing what he could not deliver. His command same policy as Washington did in choosing our system was fragmented and without unity. He first cabinet. often issued orders to the various commands Stoler presents the general as a more vulner- through his adjutants, completely bypassing the able personality than does Pogue. Stoler’s Mar- chief of the General Staff of the Luftwaffe. He shall is more ambitious and strident than the thrived on chaos and confusion and was skill- man we are accustomed to read about. Instead ful at encouraging his enemies to fight each of the magisterial Olympian of the later years, other rather than him. the author describes a young man who recog- Equally disastrous was the selection in 1936 nized his own abilities and worth, who grew of Ernst Udet as chief of the Luftwaffe’s Techni- sick from intense periods of overwork and cal Office, the agency responsible for aircraft strain, who worried about ever getting a chance development and procurement. Like his crony to accomplish anything, and who wrestled with Goering. Udet was totally unsuited for the job. a fierce temper. (But even when it flared, the Although the leading German ace to survive target was always something akin to unfairness, World War I, he was completely lacking in disloyalty, callousness, or ignorance.) After managerial aptitude or skill. He was addicted to reading Stoler’s account, we are better able to both drugs and alcohol and was completely un- appreciate Marshall's achievement in mastering disciplined in his work habits. He had a knack himself. He channeled his intensity into a com- for selecting subordinates as incompetent as he manding force which everyone who came into and was often unavailable for making decisions contact with him recognized. He then wielded for weeks at a time. At one point he had direct this power for the good of his country and the responsibility for 26 departments, a nearly world. hopeless task for even the best manager. This is a fine book about a great man. Read it Mitcham provides many other examples of for its strengths and insights, but don’t forget such leadership. The ultimate effect was disas- the four-volume work by Forrest Pogue. Both trous for the Luftwaffe in the late 1930s, a crit- books are appropriate for us to study, and each ical time in the evolution of aviation technol- reinforces our understanding of the other and ogy. A whole new generation of aircraft was our appreciation of George Marshall, perhaps under development, and important decisions the noblest American. had to be made. More often than not, however, Col George W. Tiller. USAF the top men of the Luftwaffe focused their ener- Maxwell AFB, Alabama gies on power struggles and internal bickering. By the start of World War II, the Technical Of- fice was out of control, and Germany was al- Men of the Luftwaffe by Samuel W. Mitcham, ready losing its edge in military aircraft Jr. Novato, California 94949: Presidio Press, technology. 1988, 356 pages, $18.95. By 1940 the Luftwaffe was placing its future hopes on four basic aircraft types—the Me-109, Did the Luftwaffe lose the war because of hu- which proved its utility through war’s end, and man failure or because of technological failure? three others that proved to be less than com- In Men of the Luftwaffe, Samuel W. Mitcham, pletely successful, if not outright failures. The Jr., comes down hard on the side of human Ju-88 twin-engine bomber, sometimes referred failure. He examines each of the Luftwaffe's key to as the "flying barn door,” never lived up to men in detail. What emerges is a fascinating expectations. Attempts to add a dive-bombing portrait of leaders who did not lead, managers capability increased the aircraft’s weight sub- who did not manage, and an organization stantially, thus reducing its range and speed. NET ASSESSMENT 81

The He-177, one of Germany's few attempts to But even a brief examination confirms that it produce a long-range bomber, was a complete has a fresh approach, while a close reading re- disaster. It, too, had to be able to dive-bomb, a veals much food for thought. requirement which doubled the aircraft's The aim of the book is to expose the reader to weight. It had a nasty tendency to explode in modern air combat missions from the cockpit flight for no apparent reason and to fall apart perspective. The authors cover seven missions during dives. It was said to be deadlier to its ranging from air superiority to antitank in as crews than to the enemy. The He-177 was many chapters, introducing each one with a abruptly withdrawn from production when its concise but informative survey of the mission's numerous technical problems proved unsolv- history. All but the chapter on the maritime able. The Me-210. which was to replace the mission conclude with a rough comparison of Me-110, represented another major disappoint- aircraft that currently perform the mission. The ment. Its extremely poor handling characteris- bulk of each chapter consists of one or two hy- tics made it a virtual death trap. Like the pothetical descriptions of combat missions oc- He-177, it was canceled before significant num- curring in contemporary, conventional-war sce- bers were built. narios. The F -lll mission, however, is a brief The failure of the Me-210 and He-177 came at reconstruction of Operation Eldorado Canyon— considerable expense. Scarce resources were the attack on Tripoli, Libya. squandered at a time when Germany could ill Fighter Missions succeeds in exposing the afford such waste. And precious time, one of reader to contemporary fighter operations in a the most valuable of all commodities during a broad sense. Each historical survey is rich in war, was spent on dead-end projects. As a re- fascinating details, many of them obscure or sult, by 1942 the Luftwaffe was operating with novel. Furthermore, the authors are not shy mostly obsolete combat aircraft designs. about giving their opinions in the discussions In addition to examining the technological is- of contemporary mission challenges: “One has sues, Mitcham does an excellent job of high- only to apply one’s mind to the problem for lighting other significant shortcomings which about three consecutive seconds to see that contributed to the Luftwaffe’s defeat: the over- such an aircraft is not merely pushing its luck emphasis on ground support operations and ne- but is sheer nonsense” (p. 89). Mission sce- glect of strategic bombing, the obsession with narios are plausible but arguably rosy in dive bombing—which ruined more than one outcome. good aircraft design—and the failure to prepare Knowledgeable readers may be distracted by for a long war, to name just a few. If there are details in the photographs that suggest a lack of any heroes in this story, they are the individual authenticity (e.g., training configurations and pilots who, by skill alone, maintained air supe- small arms with blank adapters). Aircrew mem- riority in some sectors and at least parity in bers and controllers will find the dialogues others until late in the war. It was the loss of loose and chatty. But most readers are likely to these men that ultimately proved fatal to the be confused by the book’s disjointed layout: be- Luftwaffe. cause the text is repeatedly interrupted by Mitcham’s account is well written and well photos and captions, it is sometimes difficult to worth the time. As a case study in leadership tell where the narrative resumes. Nevertheless, and management failure, it offers timeless this volume is a useful introduction for readers lessons. It is must reading for the student of interested in understanding air combat military history. missions. Maj fames C. Ruehrmund, Jr., USAFR Maj Charles M. WestenhofT, USAF Richmond. Virginia Maxwell AFB. Alabama

Fighter Missions by Bill Gunston and Lindsay Preventing World W ar III: A Realistic Grand Peacock. New York 10003: Orion Books, Strategy by David M. Abshire. New York 1989. 207 pages. $24.95. 10022: Harper & Row, 331 pages, $19.95. A glance at Fighter Missions on the bookshelf David Abshire is a West Point graduate who might lead you to believe that it is just another served as a company commander in Korea, coffee-table book about modern fighter aircraft. earned a PhD in history from Georgetown Uni- 82 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

versity. was a staff member with the US House Soviets gain more Western technology and de- of Representatives, helped found the Center for ploy newer and better weapon systems, they Strategic and International Studies in Wash- may eventually come to believe that we ington, D.C., served as chairman of the US wouldn’t dare challenge them should they de- Board for International Broadcasting, and was a cide to seize the economic, industrial, and tech- member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence nological assets of Western Europe. Abshire Advisory Board. He has also served as an assis- presents this as the most likely scenario for the tant secretary of state, US ambassador to the start of World War III. North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), His prescription is a call for an overall grand and—most recently—special counselor to Presi- strategy aimed at making the United States and dent Ronald Reagan for the Iran/Contra inquiry, NATO stronger, both militarily and economic- with full Cabinet rank. ally. Abshire believes that a coordinated overall You would expect someone of this breadth strategy should incorporate the following: polit- and depth of experience to write a book with ical strategy, public relations strategy, deter- the potential to stand as a classic on strategy rence strategy, resources strategy, technology and international affairs. This book won't dis- strategy, third-world strategy, and economic appoint you. From his explanations of how strategy. He points to NATO as an example of events and decisions shaped the world as we an almost perfect vehicle (in structure) for im- know it today to his thumbnail sketches of plementing a grand strategy. Indeed, Ambas- world leaders and major political players, sador Abshire is a most vocal advocate of the Abshire offers a unique insight into the work- NATO alliance. One of the heroes of the book is ings of our national government, the NATO al- Lord Peter Carrington, who until recently was liance, and foreign policy that only someone of NATO’s secretary general. Another is Senator his experience can provide. Sam Nunn of Georgia. These two combined to The book begins with an outstanding histor- help awaken the alliance to the need for less re- ical analysis of why wars begin. Dr Abshire, liance on the US nuclear umbrella and more former adjunct professor of history, takes us commitment by alliance members to conven- from the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe tional readiness. through World Wars I and II, through the for- A military capability (both nuclear and con- mation of NATO, up to today's world political ventional) second to none, a strong partnership situation. According to Abshire, wars begin with our allies, a strong economy, and a grand through uncertainty and miscalculation. To strategy designed to attain and sustain these avoid World War III, we must remove as much strengths will convince the Soviets that they uncertainty as possible. He argues that as the cannot win by starting a war. Thus, the miscon- Soviet Union improves its technology and its ceptions and miscalculations are removed. strategic nuclear forces, a continued NATO re- Abshire’s clarion call must be heeded. Decision liance on nuclear deterrence will eventually makers and policymakers must read this book. lead to uncertainty and miscalculation. If we It is thoughtful, incisive, and beneficial to any- continue to rely on nuclear deterrence, the So- one who wants to understand strategy and its viets will improve to the point that they believe role in our complex world. they can deter us from responding to a Warsaw Capt Albert T. Mackey. Jr., USAF Pact attack on NATO. He draws a parallel be- Edwards AFB, California tween US reliance on nuclear deterrence today and the reliance of Europe in 1914 on the Con- cert of Europe, which had prevented a general Command of the Seas by John F. Lehman. Jr. war for almost 100 years. As Abshire puts it, New York 10017: Charles Scribner’s Sons. "Just believe in that deterrent, it was felt, and 1989, 320 pages. $21.95. everything would be all right. All of these as- sumptions proved tragically wrong__ The up- No service benefited more from the Reagan heavals and depressions provoked by World presidency than the United States Navy, and War I ultimately were responsible for the rise of few people played as critical a role in its a C om m unist Soviet U nion and a Nazi Ger- growth and application as John Lehman, the many. The first steps on the road to World War secretary of the Navy for most of that period. II had been taken.” He feels that today we are The administration's determination to actively in danger of walking into the same trap. As the counter Communist incursions throughout the NET ASSESSMENT 83

third world and punish state-sponsored terror- Messianic style that finds its ultimate expres- ism hinged on the capabilities of a large, blue- sion with the author’s likening himself to Paul water Navy. This ability to responsively project on the road to Damascus. It is easy to read this force expressed itself over and over again, from book and dismiss it because of the overbearing Grenada to Libya. The rebuilding of the Navy personality of the author. Doing so, however, and the secretary’s less-than-low profile guar- would be an unfortunate mistake. All of the anteed that both the Navy and Lehman served fluff and bravado belie a serious and significant as the frequent focal points for controversy. book. Command of the Seas, subtitled Building the Take the pain, and read it. His dissertation on Six Hundred Ship Navy, presents Lehman’s naval strategy, focusing on eight principles of side of the story. maritime strategy, would be must reading even In doing so, the author addresses a mind- if Lehman had nothing else to say. Fortunately, boggling range of topics, from the Pentagon bu- there is much more. Every military officer reaucracy. the budgetary process, shipbuilding, would be generously rewarded for reading and and naval combat operations, to the life and understanding even a few of the significant is- times of Grace Kelly and other rich and famous sues Lehman raises. Your perseverance in people. A photo section that includes snap- weeding through the book to find them is well shots of the author with Tom Cruise and other worth the effort. My point is that not reading notables does not enhance the image of the Command of the Seas will hurt you more than book as serious reading. It is this broad sweep, it will John Lehman. 1 only wish that he had whereby Lehman discusses the influence of made it easier for us. Adm Hyman Rickover on nuclear reactor de- Maj Bill Nikides, USAF sign in one moment and presents an embarrass- Langley AFB, Virginia ing kiss-and-tell account of his forced retire- ment in the next, that made reading the book an uneven and often unpleasant experience. Leh- Vietnam: Strategy for a Stalemate by F. Charles man seems to be in a hurry to vindicate himself Parker IV. New York 10023: Paragon House, and his opinions. This alerted me to the fact 1989, 257 pages, $19.95. that Command of the Seas was not going to be dry, lifeless history (if there is such a thing) and Any work on Vietnam that receives en- that Lehman would have a strongly held, diver- comiums from both Richard Nixon and Eugene gent opinion on just about everything. 1 do not McCarthy is bound to be unusual, and this one imply that the relationship between Lehman lives up to that billing. Its uniqueness is not and the defense establishment was one-sided. that it is an eccentric work but a deeply provoc- Evidently, the Department of the Navy has in ative one. Parker’s argument is clear and fact devoted itself to erasing every last vestige cogently stated throughout the book. First, the of Lehman’s reform. What is clear is that John strategic conceptions—regarding the USSR, the Lehman has written a fascinating, informative, People's Republic of China, and North provocative, but frequently frustrating book. Vietnam—under which the United States en- My strong impressions were, no doubt, exacer- tered into the Vietnam War after 1963 were ab- bated by his schizophrenic writing, which al- solutely at odds with the reality of the situa- ternates between terse, elegant prose, and the tion. Second, the US had a strategy for winning style of Harold Robbins. the war, devised by Secretary of Defense Robert 1 suppose the point is that the personality of McNamara. But McNamara unilaterally aban- the author overpowers the book. I found it diffi- doned it in August 1967 because the USSR had cult to objectively evaluate his writing without begun to catch up with US strategic might. developing strong and often unfavorable im- However, he and President Lyndon Johnson pressions of the man. It is ironic that this is did this without telling the American people. largely due to a section of the book that de- To the extent that these arguments are true, scribes his earlier life as a prominent socialite, they will undoubtedly break the heart of any Cambridge man, and so forth. He, no doubt, in- reader. Basically, the strategy of the US was to cluded it to let us know what John Lehman the kill Vietcong and troops of the North Viet- man is like. I suspect that he is successful in namese army by rapidly building up men and this, but we just do not like what we see. He firepower on our side faster than the enemy comes across in a self-congratulatory, nearly could replace their casualties. This strategy was 84 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

to go in phases: (1) arrest the slide to defeat that Moscow, and Beijing) can refute or validate it. seemed ever closer in 1963—65, (2) stabilize the Parker’s passion is evident and so are his he- situation, and (3) move on to victory by 1968 roes and villains, the latter being McNamara (the year of the presidential election). Thus, and the “brandy-sipping journalists” who war’s imperatives were sacrificed to the wholly turned the victory of Tet into a defeat. The ar- unstrategic requirements of a presidential elec- guments brought by Parker will resound in the tion and to the macabre body-count literature for some time to come as they contra- phenomenon. dict much of the debate around American pol- The choice of 1968 was deliberate; it gov- icies in Vietnam (e.g., the issue of whether we erned strategy in the field through the Johnson had a viable strategy, the role of the Soviet administration. Moreover, the administration Union, etc.). refused to mobilize troops and reservists, de- In his review, Eugene McCarthy noted that he spite the urgings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take issue with several interpretive (JCS) to do so and fight a real war. Yet, the ad- points raised by the book. Undoubtedly, so will ministration constantly berated the JCS for not many others. That fact makes this much more moving faster in building up the requisite num- than just a worthwhile read. Rather, it is must ber of men and firepower called for by this reading for students of the international politics strategy. In effect, Johnson and McNamara ex- of the war in Vietnam. pected Americans to die for a war in Vietnam Dr Stephen Blank but not pay for it by reducing their standard of Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania living. Such a craven estimation of the home front undoubtedly shaped the public’s eruption against an administration which—it rightly believed—had lied to it. According to Parker, this strategy rested upon the assumption that the USSR exerted a moder- China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition ating influence on North Vietnam, while China within Evolution by Chong-Pin Lin. Lex- pushed it forward. In fact, this view completely ington. Massachusetts 02173: Lexington misread the evolving nature of the Sino-Soviet Books, 1988, 273 pages, $40.00. clash—which was moving to its apogee during 1963—69—as well as the motives of China and This book is clearly intended for serious the USSR. Moscow was delighted to see the US scholars of China’s nuclear weapons strategy. fall deeper into the mire. In fact, when the From a research perspective, it provides a me- USSR realized it was not directly threatened, it ticulous basis for further study. Perhaps as val- proffered ever-greater amounts of equipment to uable as the author’s conclusions are 132 pages Hanoi. This alone enabled North Vietnam to of appendices, a glossary, notes, and a bibli- provision its troops and air defense forces. The ography of both English and Chinese sources. Soviets did so to augment the US threat to The author, a graduate of National Taiwan China, a situation that Moscow harped upon in University, successfully defended this work as order to exert pressure on China and anti-Mao a PhD dissertation for Georgetown University. factions to rfejoin the socialist community. Mao, As one might expect of a published doctoral on the other hand, disparaged the American thesis, readability suffers, and it may not ap- threat and. if anything, began making overtures peal to the broad military audience. to the US in 1963! In addition, his efforts were In response to the hypothesis “Why doesn't compromised by the group who saw US actions China have an easily quantifiable, clearly de- as a threat and suggested more harmony with fined, nuclear weapons strategy?” the author Moscow. Thus, a major contributing factor in contends that Beijing does have a strategy, but the eruption of the Cultural Revolution in it doesn't look like one from the Western point 1965-66 was the Vietnam War and its impact of view. Rather, China's nuclear weapons strat- upon the superpower triangle. The Johnson ad- egy is an outgrowth of “Chinese strategic tradi- ministration totally misread these overtures by tion” steeped in 4,000 years of military strate- Mao and thus slipped into a disaster. gic principles. The author details several tenets, Clearly, this is a controversial book, and only even more fundamental than mass, defense, someone who has mastered the politics of all and deception espoused by Sun Zi (Sun Tzu). the protagonists here (Hanoi, Washington, To understand Chinese strategy, nuclear or oth- NET ASSESSMENT 85

ervvise, one must be aware of integrated multi- versality and short-lived particularity." then plicity and dualism, which include simul- this book is for you. However, this reviewer be- taneous application of binary opposites. For lieves that a conclusion summarizing the ambi- example, surprise and consistency or indirect guity of Chinese strategy could be a little less and direct strategies are seemingly applied at ambiguous. Some excellent points in this book odds with each other. need to be coaxed into a more digestible form. Consider also the traditional Chinese princi- The distinguished professional military educa- ple of indirection, which involves the integra- tion faculty should consider challenging their tion of negativism and minimalism. Negative best and brightest students to use this book as a motivation is the opposite of a pep talk (e.g., reference or an excerpted source for their com- burning your own troop-carrying boats after parative nuclear strategy curriculum. It will your assault forces debark, thereby forcing serve the force well. them to fight a surrounding superior force). Lt Col Dion W. Johnson, USAF Minimalism is the principle of the inferior Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii being victorious over the superior. For the sake of simplicity, think of the skill employed by commanders as they tactically concentrate a NATO Strategy and Nuclear Defense by Carl H. smaller force to defeat a numerically superior Amme. Westport, Connecticut 06881: Green- force. At the strategic level, consider minimal- wood Press, 1988, 189 pages, $37.95. ism as an aversion for escalating a conflict beyond the means required to accomplish the Carl Amme presents a tightly reasoned argu- end, which roughly equates to the Western con- ment for the use of nuclear weapons in a doc- ception of deterrence. The People's Liberation trine of flexible response for the defensive strat- Army and the Chinese Red Army continued to egy of the North Atlantic Alliance. He focuses apply such traditional principles into the twen- his discussion on the political and strategic tieth century, forming the basis of a nuclear problems facing the US and Western European strategy'. nations. Currently, deterrence in Europe is cre- Not only does China have a nuclear strategy ated by a combination of conventional forces but also the author contends that it began in an and tactical nuclear weapons, a posture more effort to regain national self-esteem at least 10 credible than the deterrence created by the US years prior to China’s first detonation of a nu- strategic triad, which is remote from the Central clear weapon. The strategy is uniquely Chinese, European battlefield. Furthermore. US doctrine with no implicit Western comparison. It does not dictate the use of strategic nuclear evolved in the "logic of deterrence by denial” weapons on the tactical battlefield. But US doc- but does not go as far as the Western connota- trine is not the only force at work. Each of the tion of war fighting, which implies a much principal nations has its own strategic con- larger “quantitative dimension." Additionally, cepts. which are often at odds with each other. “Beijing will continue to minimize, through the NATO’s flexible response—conventional art of ambiguity, the perceived scope of its stra- forces to thwart a border crossing and tactical tegic and grand-strategic goals that are directly nuclear weapons to stop the attack if the con- or indirectly supported by its nuclear weap- ventional forces fail—has different meanings to onry.” China’s nuclear weapons strategy is “ul- France and the United Kingdom (which have timately a counterstrategy, targeting the nuclear independent nuclear forces) and to West Ger- weapons at the mind of the enemy’s strategy- many (which seems destined to serve as the maker.” host nation for any future war in Europe). West In short, what you see is not necessarily what Germany’s policy of Ostpolitik with East Ger- you get. For hundreds of centuries, the Chinese many and the USSR has strained its relations have often done the unexpected. No matter with the US. The situation was exacerbated by how the West plays the China card, Beijing President Jimmy Carter’s decision not to deploy isn’t going to allow a clear peek at the strategic the enhanced-radiation weapon (neutron bomb) cards it holds. needed by West Germany to destroy Soviet ar- If you’re really up on Chinese strategy or can mor columns without destroying the nearby, easily sort through a concluding sentence closely spaced German villages. Continuing ad- which states that “principles can be formulated vocacy efforts by ex-Secretary of Defense Robei I appropriately to avoid nondiscriminatory uni- McNamara to decouple NATO's nuclear deter- 86 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

rence from Soviet conventional aggression via a forces attack and appropriate use of low-level policy of “no first use” created more anti-US nuclear weapons. Only in later stages of combat controversy. should larger, air-delivered systems be used. He Charles de Gaulle withdrew French forces laments the fact that current doctrine does not from NATO in 1966, choosing to reserve for make this distinction clear enough and that France the advantage of having and using an in- doctrine on paper and doctrine in the field are dependent nuclear force free from the decision- two entirely different matters. making structure of NATO. The force de frappe Amme concludes that NATO’s nuclear doc- continues to deter Soviet aggression, but doc- trine should be one of constraint but with a trine for its use continues to muddle NATO nu- lower threshold for battlefield nuclear clear war planning by its very presence. The weapons. This would necessarily be coupled other European nuclear force is that of the with a force structure clearly defensive in na- United Kingdom, whose close cooperation with ture and thus be less provocative. In the current the rest of NATO and whose commitment to climate of openness, this seems to invite deterrence remain a hallmark of flexible restraint and dialogue, but in other times it may response. well invite lax attitudes within the alliance and Across the intra-German border lie the forces aggressive attitudes without. of the Soviet Union. Despite a declaratory pol- While no longer particularly current in light icy of no first use of nuclear weapons, the of the recent INF treaty, this book presents a USSR built up its nuclear arsenal markedly in well-reasoned approach to flexible response the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1980s. nuclear doc- and arms control. Portions of it serve as excel- trine seems focused on mobility, concealment, lent roundups of current US-USSR treaties, his- and survival through hardening. The deploy- torical confrontations between the two, the doc- ment in Eastern Europe of several regiments of trine of flexible response and its history, and SS-20 strategic missiles by the early 1980s, the the battlefield doctrines of NATO and the invasion of Afghanistan, and the continuing USSR. It even provides a concise definition of support for Marxist regimes worldwide led to the term doctrine: “codified sense held in com- efforts by the US to deploy new Pershing II and mon." Overall, NATO Strategy and Nuclear De- ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. So- fense is a well-done analysis of one of the most viet conventional forces loom ominously as pressing yet poorly understood aspects of na- well. The USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies pos- tional strategy. sess a considerable advantage over NATO con- Lt Col James H. Smith, USAF ventional forces, most notably in tactical air M axw ell AFB, Alabama forces, troops, armor, artillery, and chemical weapons. Thus, a NATO strategy to hold it all at bay is paramount. Although this book was written before the re- Rethinking Nuclear Strategy by Stephen J. cent Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Cimbala. W ilmington, Delaware 19805: treaty was executed, many of Amme’s argu- Scholarly Resources, 1988, 278 pages. $40.00. ments persist as valid. He feels that the US and NATO are able to take action to stabilize the al- In these days when the Strategic Defense Ini- liance and keep the nuclear threshold clear tiative (SDI) and conventional capability seem without any agreements with the Soviets. The to monopolize the printed page, it is good to point is that in order to keep the use of nuclear see a book that examines nuclear strategy. But weapons at the tactical level, the allies must in examining this topic, we must also consider comprehend the nature of nuclear warfare and its basis—deterrence—lest we forget that all na- its consequences fully so that discrimination tional policy originates there. Nuclear deter- and control prevail. rence must be our first concern although many To do so requires a clear understanding of people seem to have forgotten that point. NATO and Soviet aims and doctrines coupled Cimbala's book examines our nuclear strategy with an appreciation for the consequences of from the time the US had a nuclear monopoly various kinds of nuclear weapons. Amme feels up through the present era of SDI. One must that NATO can survive a sudden Soviet attack keep in mind that, despite all the changes in and survive second-echelon operational ma- nuclear strategy, the idea of deterrence re- neuver groups with its doctrine of follow-on mained dominant. However, we have gone be- NET ASSESSMENT 87

yond this idea and have dabbled with a nuclear cessful attempt to rescue hostages in Iran—and strategy that allows us to fight and win should the truck bombing of the US Marine compound deterrence fail. In fact, how to fight and win in Beirut. Lebanon). sometimes appears to overshadow deterrence: Major Bolger thoroughly examines the seven thus, some authorities place great emphasis on operations, devoting a chapter to each one, and conventional capabilities at the expense of nu- includes comprehensive and largely insightful clear force. postmortems. Further, each chapter contains a Cimbala explores five alternative strategies: detailed order of battle, an assessment of issues general nuclear response, nuclear diplomacy, and stakes, and a summary of the times and counterforce, defense, and extended nuclear critical events. The chapter on Operation Eagle war. Discussed in detail and clearly explained, Claw, which Bolger considers “probably the all of these options are related to the basic de- most daunting [rescue] ever attempted,” even terrent functions of denial, retaliation, and con- boasts a fictional account of what might have trol. Considering these strategic possibilities is happened had the mission not failed at Desert a sobering experience, but one must keep in One. Though speculative, it does heighten the mind that the discussion is theoretical rather drama. than historical. Americans at War makes a strong case for This is a thought-provoking book and good readiness, good intelligence, and a variety of reading for people interested in nuclear strat- conventional—and unconventional—ground, egy. There is much to be learned and studied air. and sea capabilities. Bolger is an un- here, for, despite the current easing of tensions abashed, gung ho champion of the American between the US and the Soviet Union, we soldier, sailor, airman, and marine. He prefers should not ignore nuclear strategy. that politicians decide a course of action then get out of the way. And he prefers that critics John T. Bohn Offutt AFB. Nebraska be longer on experience and qualifications than most of the academic and media faultfinders who so quickly and extravagantly pass highly questionable judgments. Bolger is a better historian than political ana- lyst. He can scarcely disguise his contempt for President Jimmy Carter, and his complaints and conclusions concerning Carter are too superfi- Americans at War, 1975-1986: An Era of Vio- cial and smug to be taken earnestly. He also lent Peace by Daniel Bolger. Novato, Califor- summarily dismisses former Secretary of De- nia 94949: Presidio Press. 1988, 466 pages, fense Robert McNamara for “typically mis- $24.95. begotten” programs, leaving the reader to con- In Americans at War. US Army major and clude that the nation’s most controversial West Point history professor Daniel Bolger defense secretary accomplished little (which, if charts the seven major US military “expedi- true, could hardly make him so controversial). tions” since America’s darkest hour—the fall of Unfortunately, Americans at War is wordy Saigon and the inglorious abandonment of Viet- and amateurish in style. Certainly, its vignettes nam and the Vietnamese. Thus, the book is are frequently fascinating: the signal for the about military responses to episodes as varied American pullout from Saigon was Bing as piracy (of the SS Mayaguez). hostages and Crosby’s "I’m Dreaming of a White Christmas' ; humiliation (in Iran), terrorism (the Lebanon the F -lll that destroyed a Khmer Rouge patrol truck bombing), and the strange mix of lunacy, boat during the Mayaguez incident did so with- Marxism-Leninism, martial law, and murder out even one direct hit but with the concussion which led to intervention in Grenada. Amer- from eight 2,000-pound bombs: and a certain ica’s largest military operation since Vietnam. US Marine Corps major named Oliver North ap- The 11-year toll was 337 Americans killed and pears throughout. But its cliches, jargon, and 400 wounded in five successes (the Mayaguez, euphemisms read like a manuscript in first air operations over the Gulf of Sidra, Grenada, draft: “high-altitude platform,” “punished the interception of the Achille Lauro hijackers, and Khmers,” “choppers," “bottom line," “blew the bombing of Tripoli, Libya) and two failures away,” “guts and the US flag,” “brewed up," (Operation Eagle Claw—the tragically unsuc- and "armed to the teeth.” These expressions 88 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

simply do not ring true, sounding more like caused by compartmentalization was the Reyk- macho night at the club. javik (Iceland) summit in 1986 where President Still, Bolger’s work provides considerable in- Ronald Reagan proposed what eventually be- formation and analysis about a wide array of came the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces military operations since the Vietnam War. (INF) treaty. That proposal conflicted with cur- Well structured and easy to read, Americans at rent North Atlantic Treaty Organization War is a sobering reminder that peace may well (NATO) strategy and was not reviewed by sen- have a violent side. It also reminds us that even ior defense planners or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. the world’s foremost military power has limits. Also lost is strategic thinking. The entire na- But its best reminder is that even though high tional security system is “astrategic” because technology can work wonders, the human fac- our government does not have a “grand strat- tor remains the ultimate determinant of victory egy.” as defined by B. H. Liddell Hart. or defeat. Solving national security problems starts Lt Col Wayne A. Silkett, USA with rethinking and strengthening the NSC. Carlisle Barracks. Pennsylvania Strategic planning should be its primary role, along with having the responsibility of oversee- ing the operational development of national strategies. The NSC must be involved in all ma- jor national security communications so that it can integrate military strategy and strategic in- The Presidency and the Management of Na- telligence with the diplomatic aspects of na- tional Security by Carnes Lord. New York tional strategy. 10022: Free Press, 1988. 207 pages, $22.50. The assistant to the president for national se- Our national security system suffers from bu- curity affairs (national security advisor) must reaucratic infighting, too much channelization, be an expert in strategic thinking and have a and a lack of strategic thinking by both our mil- strong academic base. Unfortunately, people itary and civilian leadership. Carnes Lord, a po- with these qualifications are usually found out- litical scientist and former National Security side the government. Lord claims that govern- Council (NSC) staffer during the Reagan admin- ment executives, like military personnel, do not istration, believes that national security disas- have the necessary academic background for ters such as the Iran/Contra scandal are inevita- their jobs. ble due to systemic flaws within the executive Lord is appropriately critical of the military branch. He makes three proposals: rethink how officer corps for being ignorant of the political the president tasks the NSC, define a broader side of national security policy. He says that role for the national security advisor, and offer our professional military schools have failed in solid advice to the military on how it can im- this area and that teaching national security prove our national security system. policy should be the war colleges’ primary task. His criticisms of State Department bureau- The author brought out a good point concern- crats could, also be made of the Air Force’s of- ing why the vice president is usually a non- ficer corps. Self-preservation is their highest player in national security. If a matter is impor- priority, which leads to micromanagement and tant enough that it needs consideration by the resistance to change. Furthermore, overspecial- executive branch, then more than likely it is so ization tends to eradicate the generalists who, important that it demands attention from the ironically, are the type of people who are president. needed at the top. Finally, short-duty tours Although this text contains important mate- eliminate the cohesiveness or consistency rial as well as timely recommendations, it need needed by subordinate personnel. not be a priority on the Air Force officer’s read- The national security process is channelized ing list. What we should learn from the book is because we have not realized that foreign af- that we need to know more about the political fairs, defense, and intelligence are interrelated. side of national security and that other govern- This compartmentalization is the “political- ment agencies are bogged down by bureaucratic military fault line,’’ but the problem can be infighting, as is the military. solved if we develop a “single framework of Capt Thomas L. Driehorst, USAF analysis." A recent national security failure Nellis AFB. Nevada NET ASSESSMENT 89

1914 by Lyn Macdonald. New York 10022: the swimmers were Germans trying an amphib- Atheneum. 1988. 426 pages. $24.95. ious invasion without a ship! Lyn Macdonald's 1914 is a compelling blend A small British army, “disciplined by hard of humor, action, and suspense that provides training on the frontiers of an Empire." faced the reader with an insight into “the war to end the German juggernaut in the opening days of all wars.” It describes fully the turmoil that World War I. This small band of professionals rocked the empire as Great Britain mobilized fought skillfully against overwhelming odds, and shows in stark detail that wars, especially often outnumbered 10 to one. However, the World War 1, are fought with grit, not grand- dawn of 1915 saw the end of Britain's Old standing. The book is superbly written and Army, decimated by a 90-percent casualty rate. would enthrall anyone with an interest in the Macdonald's 1914. similar to her much ac- First World War. Finally, Macdonald’s theme claimed Somme, is must reading for everyone still applies to armed forces throughout the in the US military. The parallels between Brit- world: die men of the Old Guard did not fight ain’s Old Army and the American armed forces because it was their job but because it was their of today are uncanny. Although history may duty. not repeat itself, it is a good forecaster for the future. Thus, 1914 provides us with valuable 2d Lt Paul |. Putnam, USAF insights into the behavior of small, well- USAF Academy, Colorado trained. professional armies. The book begins with the withdrawal of troops that were garrisoned around the world to protect the holdings of the British Empire. Bursting the Bocage: American Combined These veteran soldiers were placed under a sin- Arms Operations in France, 6 June-31 July gle command and sent across the English Chan- 1944 by Capt Michael D. Doubler. Fort Leav- nel to help their French allies defeat the invad- enworth, Kansas 66027: Combat Studies In- ing Germans. The Old Guard, as they were stitute, 1988, 75 pages. called, was the only fighting force that the em- pire could muster in so short a time. It was the This is a concise, detailed history of the US backbone of the untried, newly constituted Army’s fighting through the hedgerow country British Expeditionary Force and fought battles of France from D day through the end of July in Belgium at Mons and Ypres and in France at 1944. Touching on air power only briefly. Cap- Le Cateau, the Marne, and the Aisne during the tain Doubler prefers to concentrate on the first year of the war. small-unit tactics of combined arms operations The author uses eyewitness accounts, letters, that conquered the hedgerow country, field by diaries, and official papers and reports to create field. The author begins by describing the 1944 a historically accurate picture of the first year organizational doctrine of the infantry divisions of World War I. Hers is not a drum-and-bugle and the independent, general headquarters tank type of book. Rather, it describes the fierce bat- battalions that provided armor support to the tles that took place during that first year of the infantry. He then explains the combat experi- Great War, capturing the atmosphere of blood, ences and subsequently developed strategies sweat, and tears mixed up with deadly clouds which led planners to prepare for D day with- of poison gas. But Macdonald does not ignore out giving thought to the tough fighting ahead the other aspects of the war. such as the intense in the hedgerows (even though this area had brotherhood that develops among comrades un- been studied prior to the invasion). This bloody der fire. fighting against the German troops is vividly Macdonald uses personal accounts to bring to described, as are the ingenious field improvisa- life—through narrative and dialogue—the day- tions of equipment and tactics that eventually to-day, life-and-death struggles of war. One of proved quite successful. Illustrations depict the stories that makes the book come alive de- both the Germans’ strategy in their use of ter- scribes a group of British soldiers bathing in a rain and firepower and the Americans’ tactics cove near the sea. A small detachment of rather for countering this strategy. The slug-it-out elderly French soldiers saw the naked men fighting of units such as the 29th and 83d In- swimming toward their sea-watch position and fantry Divisions and the 3d Armored Division, started firing—the aged French guards thought though less glamorous than Gen George S. Pat- 90 A1RPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990 ton's Third Army, typified the tough combat in covered by current doctrine. He credits success the bocage: in the bocage to the inventiveness of the of- ficers and enlisted men on the line. One such The attacking element consisted of an infantry squad, an engineer team, and a tank section. The man was Sgt Curtis D. Culin of the 102d Cav- attack opened when the lead Sherman, positioned alry Reconnaissance Regiment, the inventor of along a hedgerow with the infantry and the engi­ the now-famous Culin hedgerow' device. Unfor- neers. opened fire with its main gun against the tunately, Captain Doubler fails to note that Ser- German heavy machine-gun positions in the cor­ geant Culin was awarded the Legion of Merit ners of the opposite hedgerow. Simultaneously, the for the invention. Granted, this is a small omis- infantry fired from their positions with their own sion, but the award recognized the ability of the small arms. In addition, supporting mortars lobbed frontline fighting man to resolve problems at rounds on the first defensive position, while artil­ the lowest level—a capability that all leaders lery shelled German defensive positions in depth, (p. 47) should keep in mind. Apart from such minor flaws, this book is a w'ell-researched, incisive The author makes several observations about account of the Allied victory in the bocage. the campaign, one being the US Army’s ability SMSgt William D. Buhrman, USAF to adapt quickly to a combat environment not George AFB. Californio I Can Write Better Than That! OK. then do it! Airpower Journal is always looking for good ar­ ticles written by our readers. If you've got something to say. send it to us. We’ll be happy to consider it for publication. The Airpower Journal focuses on the operational level of war, that broad area between grand strategy and tactics. We are in­ terested in articles that will stimulate thought on how warfare is conducted. This includes not only the actual conduct of war at the operational level, but also the impact of leadership, training, and support functions on operations. We need two typed, double-spaced draft copies of your work. We encourage you to supply graphics and photos to support your article, but don’t let the lack of those keep you from writ­ ing! We are looking for articles from 2,500 to 5,000 words in length—about 15 to 25 pages. As the professional journal of the Air Force, we strive to ex­ pand the horizons and professional knowledge of Air Force per­ sonnel. To do this, we seek and encourage challenging articles. We look forward to your submissions. Send them to the Editor, Airpower Journal. Walker Hall. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532.

Writing for the Airpower Journal Over the years and throughout the var- even if that means writing that the US Air ius units to which the editors of Airpower Force could be doing it better. We can't ournal have been assigned, we have known guarantee you that someone won’t oppose nany people who debated whether or not to your views, but it is not Air Force policy to •vrite an a r t i c l e for t he Ai r F o r c e ’s pr of es - penalize its people for writing in a publica­ ional journal. Most decided not to do so for tion. So go ahead, share your thoughts with i variety of reasons. your fellow airmen. I’ll get hammered! This was the most iften-heard reason. People perceived that “They” don’t publish “regular people” speaking out was something Air Force like me. just try us! With the Journal focus­ members shouldn’t do and that those who ing on the operational level of war, we hope did suffered for it. They felt that if they to see more and more articles coming from wrote, even for an approved Air Force pub­ the people who know what they’re talking lication, their commanders, their major about—people like YOU. The officer corps, command, or the Air Force as a whole enlisted personnel, and the Air Force civil­ would take actions to show disapproval. As ians are the hands-on experts. You are the you may have read in our premier issue people who deal with war and the prepara­ (Summer 1987), Gen Larry D. Welch, Air tion for war. You are the people who have Force Chief of Staff, addressed this issue in the ideas we need to hear. We can’t guaran­ a most positive light. The Air Force recog­ tee we’ll print what you write, but we’ll nizes the need for its members to speak up help you in every way we can to achieve and write about the profession of warfare, that goal.

91 92 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SUMMER 1990

They only want to hear about ops. Not so. using multisyllable words where they’re We interpret the term “operational level of not needed, but don’t shy away from send­ war” very broadly. It is how we fight. And ing your readers to the dictionary when nec­ that depends on how we train, how we op­ essary. Remember that your readers are erate our logistics systems, how we manage probably not as expert on the subject of your and lead our people— in short, all the day- article as you. Write to your audience. Or­ to-day functions that create a capability to ganize your thoughts in a logical way and effectively apply combat power. stick to the subject. Cite sources and data Convinced? We hope so. If you are, the where appropriate (endnotes are in addi­ next step is to write an article that has a tion to the 15 to 25 pages). Papers contain­ good chance of being published. First, write ing unsupported assertions are not the type on a topic you are familiar with, either be­ that get published. cause you have worked in that area or be­ Finally, if possible, send photos, maps, cause you have a special interest in the area. and other appropriate illustrations that sup­ Don’t try to guess what topic the Airpower port your article. If you don’t have them, Journal “needs” an article on. We don’t don’t let that deter you from writing. You work that way. Likewise, don’t stop just be­ may have supporting illustrations that are cause you saw an article on your subject in more appropriate than those available to the a recent issue. We review each article on its editors, but if not. press ahead. own merit, and yours may offer a new Once you've written your article, send it perspective. to the Editor, Airpower Journal, Walker Second, don’t try to solve the problems of Hall. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We’ll the world in one article. W’e look for articles assess it for publication. If we like it but of between 2,500 to 5,000 words (approxi­ think it needs some rewriting, we’ll work mately 15 to 25 typewritten double-spaced with you to make a stronger article. If we de­ pages). So concentrate on a specific area. A cide not to publish it, we’ll let you know topic such as “Defending Against the Sovi­ why rather than simply sending you a short ets" is too broad. “Effective Use of Air Base “thanks-but-no-thanks” letter. We will as­ Ground Defense Teams” is more sist you as best we can to make for the best appropriate. professional journal possible. That’s what Next, be straightforward in your writing. we're here for, but it’s your journal. Now get Don’t try to make it look more impressive by out there and write. CAN’T WAIT TO ORDER THE AIRPOWER JOURNAL??? Now You Can Phone Your Order In and Charge It!!! By calling (202) 783*3238. you can order a subscription to the Airpower Journal ISSN: 0897-0823. stock number 708-007-00000-5, and charge your subscription to your MasterCard or Visa card. Subscriptions are $9.50 annually ($11.90 for international mail). If you prefer, you can mall your order to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402. Payment by check, money order, or credit card Is acceptable. If you pay by credit card, be sure to Include your card number and type (MasterCard or Visa), expiration date, and your signature for authorization. notams

Notices of upcoming conferences, seminars, and other professional events of a noncommer- cial nature should be sent to the Editor. Airpower Journal. Walker Hall. Bldg 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. We reserve the right to edit material for length and editorial content.

Air University Review Index nated the T-lA, the Jayhawk will be a twin- engine modification of the Beech 400A The Air University Press is in the process of com­ mercial business jet. It will be used to train stu- publishing a complete index of the Air Univer- dents in the advanced portion of the tanker/ sity Review (1947-1987). This reference work transport track of specialized undergraduate will contain an author index, a title index, and pilot training (SUPT). With seating in the flight- a cross-referenced subject index. Any Air Force deck area for the instructor and two students, or other government organization, college or the new trainer will introduce trainees to the university library, or similar organization with skills needed to function as flight-deck crew a need for this index can be placed on distribu- members. This will be Air Training Command's tion. Requests for distribution and other in- first new trainer since the 1960s. Plans call for quiries should be addressed to Maj M. A. production of 211 aircraft by 1997. Kirtland, AUCADRE/RI, Walker Hall, Bldg 1400, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-5532. Major Historical Research Center Grants Kirtland can also be contacted at AUTOVON 875-6629 o r (205) 293-6629. The United States Air Force Historical Research Center (USAFHRC) has announced the avail­ ability of research grants to encourage scholars USAFA Military History Symposium to study the history of air power through the The US Air Force Academy's Department of use of the center’s US Air Force historical doc­ History will host the Fourteenth Military His­ ument collection, located at Maxwell AFB, Ala­ tory Symposium at the academy from 17-19 bama. Grants up to $2,500 are available for October 1990. This year's topic is “Vietnam, qualified applicants who will visit the center 1964-1973: An American Dilemma." Sessions for research during fiscal year 1991. Applicants will be conducted on Vietnam War scholarship, must have a graduate degree in history or re­ the war during the Johnson and Nixon eras, and lated fields, or equivalent scholarly accom­ Vietnamese perspectives of the war. The sym­ plishments. Their specialty should be in aero­ posium also features the Harmon Memorial nautics. astronautics, or other military-related Lecture. For more information, contact Capt areas. A wide variety of military-related topics Scott Elder, Department of History, US Air may be covered in the proposed research. Pref­ Force Academy CO 80840-5701 or call AUTO­ erence will be given to those proposals that VON 259-3232 or (719) 472-3232. involve the use of primary sources held at the center. Applicants may request an application from the commander, USAF Historical Re­ New Tanker/Transport Trainer search Center. Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6678. The Air Force has named its newest tanker/ The deadline for submission of applications is transport training aircraft the Jayhawk. Desig­ 31 October 1990.

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Donald D. C hipm an (BA. C alifornia State U niversity. Chico; MS and PhD. Florida State University) is the educational advisor to the commandant. Squadron Officer School. M axwell AFB. Alabama, and a retired com m ander in the US Naval Re- serve. Dr Chipman is coauthor of two books on the philosophy of education and has published articles in several academic and m ilitary journals, inciuding Air Uni- versity Review. BOARD OF ADVISERS Col Kenneth |, Alnwick. USAF. Retired. Kupos Asstn:iales LI Col Donald R. Baucom, USAF. Retired Brig Gen James L. Cole, Jr.. USAF. Assistant Deputy Chief of Stuff for Operations. Military Airlift Command Col Raymond A. Hamilton, Jr., USAF. Retired Maj Gen I. B. Holley. Jr., USAFR, Retired, Duke University Ik Richard H. Kohn, Chief. Office of Air Force History

The Airpower Journal (ISSN 0897-0823). Air Force Recurring Publication 50-2, is published quarterly. Subscriptions are available I'rom the Superin- tendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Annual rates are $9.50 domestic and $11.90 outside the United States. The GPO stock number is 708-007-00000-5. The Journal welcomes unsolicited manuscripts. Address them to Editor, Air- power Journal, Walker Hall, Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-5532. Submit double-spaced, typed manuscripts in duplicate. Journal telephone listings are AUTOVON 875-5322 and commercial (205) 293-5322. Features for the Fall Combat Rescue Doctrinal Origins of “Aerospace”