Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

Report No. DODIG-2018-049

U.S. Department of Defense

InspectorDECEMBER 21, 2017 General

U.S. Military-Occupied Facilities Evaluation – Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

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For more information about whistleblower protection, please see the inside back cover. U.S. Military-Occupied Facilities Evaluation – Al Udeid ResultsAir Base, Qatar in Brief

December 21, 2017 Findings (cont’d) Objective On June 21, 2017, the Commander responded to these concerns and indicated that they were addressed or in the process of Our objective was to evaluate being addressed. See Appendix B for additional information U.S. military‑occupied facilities at on the notice of concern and the Commander’s response. Al Udeid Air Base to verify compliance Recommendations with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding indoor air quality, electrical systems, fire protection systems, We recommend that the Commander, 379th Air and active and inactive fuel systems. Findings Expeditionary Wing: • Conduct a root cause analysis and implement a corrective action plan for all deficiencies identified We found that indoor air quality, electrical in this report. Ensure that facility operations and systems, fire protection systems, and maintenance comply with the Unified Facilities Criteria inactive fuel systems were not being and the National Fire Protection Association standards. maintained in accordance with DoD health Determine the causes of the moisture intrusion into and safety policies and standards. However, occupied facilities. Include an assessment of the fuel we found that the active fuel systems at system pipelines in accordance with the American Al Udeid Air Base were generally maintained Petroleum Institute (API 570) piping inspection code. in accordance with DoD health and safety • Conduct a root cause analysis and implement a policies and standards. corrective action plan to ensure that all construction projects are reviewed for compliance with applicable We identified a total of 253 deficiencies fire protection and fuel systems codes and standards that could affect the health, safety, and before they are accepted by the Government well-being of DoD personnel: 13 related to as complete. indoor air quality, 105 related to electrical Management Comments systems, 49 related to fire protection systems, and 86 related to inactive fuel and Our Response systems. The deficiencies identified during our evaluation resulted from acceptance of new construction that did not comply The Commander, 379th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW), agreed with DoD health and safety policies and with our findings and recommendations, and has taken action standards, moisture intrusion into facilities, to mitigate and reduce the risks to Government personnel and and inadequate facility maintenance. property. The Commander stated that he had taken steps to identify root causes and correct deficiencies identified in the We considered five of the electrical report. Specifically, he stated that the 379th Expeditionary deficiencies we identified to be critical Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES) had conducted inspections of deficiencies requiring immediate all facilities for the types of electrical deficiencies identified in corrective action and issued a notice the report and had implemented corrective actions, including of concern on June 7, 2017, to the replacing electrical panels, adding protective barriers around Commander, 379th Air Expeditionary Wing.

DODIG-2018-049 (Project No. D2017-D000PT-0103.000) │ U.S. Military-Occupied Facilities Evaluation – Al Udeid ResultsAir Base, Qatar in Brief

Management Comments (cont’d)

transformers, and purchasing electrical diagnostic Additionally, the Commander did not address the equipment to identify problems. The Commander recommendation to determine the cause of the water further stated that the base operations support intrusion and the poor air quality in the facilities and contractor had updated the status of fire suppression correct the related deficiencies. The Commander stated systems for all facilities and was correcting all that there is no active roof inspection program, but deficiencies. Where timely correction of fire deficiencies he did not confirm that roof infiltration is the only was not possible, the Commander stated that 379 ECES contributor to indoor air quality problems. Therefore, was mitigating the risk. In addition, the Commander these two recommendations are unresolved. We request stated that the command had added the services of a that the Commander, 379 AEW, provide additional fire protection engineer to the base operations support comments on these recommendations within 30 days of contract for the design and execution of construction the issuance of this report. The additional comments projects. Finally, the Commander stated that a contract should address all specific causes of the moisture was awarded to correct the fuel system deficiencies and intrusion and air quality problems in facilities and to bring the system into full compliance with the Unified corrective action plans. In addition, the Commander’s Facilities Criteria by May 2018. comments should address the specific actions planned to ensure that fuel system construction projects are Therefore, four of the six recommendations are resolved reviewed for compliance with applicable fuel systems but remain open. We will close these recommendations standards before the Government accepts them once we verify that the stated corrective actions have as complete. been implemented. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page. Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, did not address the recommendation to ensure that all construction projects are reviewed for compliance with applicable fuel systems standards before the Government accepts the systems as complete.

│ DODIG-2018-049 (Project No. D2017-D000PT-0103.000) Recommendations Table Recommendations Recommendations Recommendations Management Unresolved Resolved Closed A.1, B.1.a, B.1.b, Commander, U.S. Air Forces Central C.1.b and D.1 None and C.1.a Please provide Management Comments by January 14, 2018. Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

• Unresolved – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

• Resolved – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

• Closed – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

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DODIG-2018-049 (Project No. D2017-D000PT-0103.000) │

INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 21, 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: U.S. Military-Occupied Facilities Evaluation – Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar (Report No. DODIG-2018-049) We are providing this report for review and comment. We found that the active fuel systems at Al Udeid Air Base were generally maintained in accordance with DoD health and safety policies and standards. However, we found that indoor air quality, electrical systems, fire protection systems, and inactive fuel systems were not being maintained in accordance with DoD health and safety policies and standards. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation.” We considered comments from the Commander, 379th Air Expeditionary Wing (379 AEW), when preparing the final report. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly. Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, partially addressed the recommendations. Therefore, we request additional comments on Recommendations C.1.b and D.1 by January 14, 2018. Please send a PDF file containing your comments to [email protected]. Copies of your comments must have the actual signature of the authorizing official for your organization. We cannot accept the /Signed/ symbol in place of the actual signature. If you arrange to send classified comments electronically, you must send them over the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff.

Randolph R. Stone Deputy Inspector General Policy and Oversight

DODIG-2018-049│ Distribution:

UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPTROLLER), DEPUTY CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ENERGY, INSTALLATIONS, AND ENVIRONMENT); ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY, AND OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH DIRECTORATE DIRECTOR, COST ASSESSMENT AND PROGRAM EVALUATION DOD PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT OFFICER/DEPUTY CHIEF MANAGEMENT OFFICER UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE AIR FORCE SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE INSPECTOR GENERAL COMMANDER, UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND DEFENSE LOGISTICS EXTERNAL AUDIT LIAISON COMMANDER, 379TH AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING INSPECTOR GENERAL, 379TH AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING

│ DODIG-2018-049 Contents Introduction

...... Objective 1 ...... FindingsBackground 1

...... Finding A. AUAB Electrical System Deficiencies 4 ...... Conclusion 7 ...... Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response 8 ...... Finding B. AUAB Fire Protection Deficiencies 9 ...... Maintenance Deficiencies 9 ...... Construction Deficiencies 10 ...... Conclusion 12 ...... Finding C. AUAB Inactive Fuel System Deficiencies 14 ...... Conclusion 16 ...... Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 17 ...... Finding D. AUAB Indoor Air Quality Deficiencies 18 ...... Conclusion 19 ...... AppendixesRecommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response 19

...... Appendix A. Scope and Methodology 21 ...... Use of Computer-Processed Data 21 ...... Use of Technical Assistance 21 ...... Prior Coverage 21 ...... Appendix B. Notice of Concern 24 ...... ManagementAppendix C. Evaluation Comments Standards and Criteria 29

...... AcronymsCommander, 379 and AEW Abbreviations 31 ...... 34

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DODIG-2018-049│

Introduction

Introduction Objective

Our objective was to evaluate U.S. military‑occupied facilities at Al Udeid Air Base (AUAB) to verify compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards regarding indoor air quality, electrical systems, fire protection systems, and active and inactive fuel systems. This project was conducted in support of overseas contingency operations, Operations INHERENT RESOLVE and FREEDOM’S SENTINEL, and was completed in accordance with our oversight responsibilities, described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. See BackgroundAppendix A for information about the scope, methodology, and prior coverage.

The DoD Office of Inspector General (OIG) regards the health and safety of DoD personnel as a priority and has previously performed similar evaluations of U.S military-occupied facilities in Southwest Asia, Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and the United States. This evaluation was conducted onsite at AUAB, Qatar, which is on the east coast of the Arabian Peninsula surrounded by the Persian Gulf and Figureattached 1. Regionalby land toMap Saudi Arabia (see Figure 1).

Source: Master Plan Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, prepared by CH2M May 2015.

DODIG-2018-049│ Introduction

AUAB, Qatar

AUAB is a staging and operational base for the 379th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW). According to the base master plan, the 379 AEW protects U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization interests throughout U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) and Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, with its primary focus on Southwest Asia. The 379 AEW is the largest, most diverse expeditionary wing in the Air Force. The wing and its associate units operate more than 90 aircraft, making the base a large hub for humanitarian airlift activity, while providing mission-essential combat power, aeromedical evacuation, airlift, air Evaluationrefueling, and intelligenceProcess and gathering Criteria for multiple theaters of operations.

We evaluated indoor air quality, electrical systems, fire protection systems, and fuel systems in U.S. military occupied facilities at AUAB to verify compliance with DoD health and safety policies and standards. All DoD health and safety policies applied at AUAB are mandated by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), and Air Force standards. Where contracted

support is employed, these policies 1and standards are required by the base operations support (BOS) contract. The 379th Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron (ECES) personnel performed the operation, maintenance, and repair of electrical systems inside these facilities. However, the operation, maintenance, and repair of fire protection systems and large air handling units (AHU) were performed through contracted services. The criteria used for the evaluation of the fire protection systems and the AHU’s that support indoor air quality

were contained2 in the BOS contract under FA8051-15-D-0008, “Engineering Support.” The inactive fuel systems, which is a fuel system that is not in use, was a military construction project and is therefore required to comply with the UFC. See Appendix C for the DoD health and safety policies and standards used in this evaluation.

We evaluated 71 buildings. The buildings included offices, dining facilities, living quarters, bathhouses, warehouses, an indoor pool, a vehicle maintenance shop, a clinic, and a dog kennel. We also evaluated 74 support facilities, which included fuel storage, fuel distribution, hazardous waste storage, and an outdoor pool.

1 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) Subpart 246.2, “Contract Quality Requirements,” requires contracts for the construction, installation, repair, maintenance, or operation of facilities acquired for use by DoD personnel, including facilities existing in host nation, to require contractor compliance with unified facilities criteria (UFC) 1-200‑01, “general building requirements,” to minimize safety and health risks. 2 Contract number FA8051-15-D-0008 Air Force Installation Contracting Agency 772 Enterprise Sourcing Squadron/PkD.

│ DODIG-2018-049. Introduction

Notice of Concern

On June 7, 2017, we issued a notice of concern (NOC) documenting critical electrical deficiencies identified during this evaluation that required immediate corrective action. Specifically, the NOC identified electrical panels intended for indoor use that were being used outside. The panels had open vents that can allow dust and water to enter and contact exposed wires, increasing the risk of shock and electrocution. We also found two 11,000-volt transformers that were not protected from vehicle traffic. The transformers could be knocked off their platform by a vehicle, exposing feeder cables, and putting personnel at grave risk of shock or electrocution. We also identified four European metric panels with poorly fitted American circuit breakers. The incompatible breakers in the panels were not adequately secured, causing the panels to overheat. Overheated circuit breakers greatly increase the risk of explosion, fire, and injury. Additionally, on a food service counter at a dining facility, we found exposed wires spliced together outside a protective junction box that could send an electric current through the metal serving counter and shock workers and patrons. At the outdoor swimming pool, we identified inadequate bonding and inadequate ground fault circuit interrupt (GFCI) protection. A person could be electrocuted if a pool pump motor that is not bonded has a voltage surge and the circuit breaker does not trip because is it not GFCI protected. All of these critical electrical deficiencies present a significant and immediate risk of electrocution or fire.

The Commander, 379 AEW, responded to our NOC on June 21, 2017, with a plan to correct the safety deficiencies. See Appendix B for a copy of the NOC and the Air Force’s response.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Finding A AUAB Electrical System Deficiencies

We identified 105 deficiencies related to electrical systems. These deficiencies could have been mitigated if the 379 ECES electricians had properly maintained electrical systems as required by applicable National Fire Protection Agency (NFPA) codes and standards. As a result, these deficiencies pose an increased risk of fire, injury, and loss of life or property. Figure 2. Electrical Deficiencies by Category

Source: Deficiency log created by DoD OIG evaluation team.

The standard that applies to electrical deficiencies is the NFPA 70, “National Electrical Code.” We documented 105 electrical systems deficiencies at AUAB (see Figure 2). The deficiencies were related to wiring, equipment, GFCI, accessibility to equipment, and grounding and bonding. All of these deficiencies pose a risk of fire, injury, and loss of life or property. Examples of these deficiencies include the following:

We found four circuit breaker panels in building 3947. Two of the panels showed signs of overheating, likely due to incompatible circuit breakers. The NFPA 70, article 110.12, requires panels to have adequate strength to allow safe operation and to prevent overheating. Overheated circuit breakers greatly increase the risk of explosion, fire, and personnel injury.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

We identified deficient electrical cable splices, panels, and junction boxes. The panels and junction boxes were missing covers resulting in personnel being exposed to the risk of electrocution. Deficient splices, open junction boxes, and open panels were a systemic problem and an indication of the lack of compliance with electrical safety standards. Figure 3 shows one example of a noncompliant splice made outside the control box on a heated serving table in the Manhattan dining facility. The NFPA 70, article 354.56, requires splices to be made inside junction boxes or other enclosures to prevent injury from electrocution.

Figure 3. Nonconforming splice (Deficiency No. AUAB-EL-170526-005)

We found electrical panels installed outdoors that were not designed for outdoor conditions. Figure 4 shows a 240-volt, 100-amp live panel behind building 10014. The NFPA 70, article 312.2, requires energized equipment mounted in wet locations to be weatherproof, that is, sealed to prevent water intrusion. The panels we found did not have proper seals around the doors, which allowed water and dust to infiltrate the panels. If the enclosure is energized, there is a risk of shock or electrocution.

Figure 4. Indoor electrical panels used outdoors (Deficiency No. AUAB-EL-170526-001)

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Behind building 1101, two 11,000-volt transformers were not adequately protected because they were accessible to unauthorized personnel and were insufficiently protected from potential physical damage by vehicular traffic. Specifically, the transformers could be hit by a vehicle, resulting in exposure of the 11,000-volt feeder cables, which would lead to shock or electrocution. The NFPA 70, article 110.27, requires electrical equipment to be protected from physical damage, and article 110.31 requires these transformers to be enclosed to prevent access by unauthorized personnel.

We found eight occurrences of inadequate clearances around electrical equipment. Proper clearance around, and in front of, energized panels and equipment is required to allow for safe and quick access, especially during an emergency.

Additionally, adequate clearance enables escape in the3 event of an arc flash while performing maintenance on the electrical equipment. In all three dining facilities, we found electrical equipment that did not comply with NFPA 70, article 110.26, which requires adequate access and working space around electrical equipment. For example, a food cart was in front of disconnect switches in the Independence dining facility. Another instance of this deficiency was a stove installed in front of electrical panels in the Blatchford Preston Complex (BPC) dining facility. In addition, storage racks were placed in front of electrical panels in the Manhattan dining facility. Figure 5 shows a room in building 6671 with chairs blocking the required electrical panel safe access space.

Figure 5. Chairs in panel access area (Deficiency No. AUAB-EL-170526-010)

3 Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) defines an arc-flash as a phenomenon when electric current leaves its intended path and travels through the air from one conductor to another or to the ground. The results are often violent, and when a human is in close proximity to the arc flash, serious injury and even death can occur.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

We noted that eight of the buildings we visited did not have adequate GFCI protection. We tested the only GFCI receptacle we found in the Manhattan dining facility, and it failed to operate properly. Additionally, GFCI protection was not installed at the Coalition Compound (CC) outdoor pool. The NFPA 70, article 210.8, requires GFCI protection of electrical systems in wet areas like kitchens and pools to prevent the risk of shock or electrocution.

Also, at the CC outdoor pool and the BPC indoor pool, we found insufficient bonding of electrical equipment. The CC outdoor pool had three water pumps that were not bonded together. The NFPA 70, article 680.26, requires these pumps to be bonded together using solid copper conductors inside a rigid metal corrosion-resistant conduit.4 Bonding the pool pumps would prevent a voltage gradient in the pool area.

At five locations, we found air conditioning equipment that was missing the required electrical disconnects. Disconnects are required to ensure that maintenance workers can keep the equipment de-energized while performing maintenance. The NFPA 70, article 440.14, requires disconnecting means to be visible or readily accessible for air-conditioning equipment. If the equipment becomes energized, a worker performing maintenance could be shocked or electrocuted.

According to the lead contracting officer representative for the BOS contract, the

379 ECES5 is responsible for maintaining the electrical systems inside the facilities at AUAB. However, a contractor is responsible for the maintenance of the electrical Conclusiongrid and power supply outside the facilities.

The 379 ECES electricians did not maintain and repair electrical systems at AUAB in accordance with applicable NFPA standards, potentially affecting the health and safety of DoD personnel. Further, the lack of maintenance and repair of the electrical systems has resulted in pervasive issues that increase the risk of personnel being electrocuted.

4 OSHA defines a voltage gradient as a difference in electric potential. 5 Contract number FA8051-15-D-0008 Air Force Installation Contracting Agency 772 Enterprise Sourcing Squadron/PkD.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response Recommendation A.1 We recommend that the Commander, 379 AEW, conduct a root cause analysis and implement a corrective action plan for all electrical deficiencies identified in this report. Ensure that all current and future facility operations and maintenance comply with the National Fire Protection Association standards. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the analysis and plan within 30 days of the issuance of this report.

Commander, 379 AEW, Comments

The Commander, 379 AEW, agreed with the recommendation and stated that steps have been taken to identify root causes and correct the deficiencies identified in the report. The Commander further stated that the 379 ECES conducted a 100-percent check of electrical panels, disconnect switches, and transformers. He also stated that projects were being designed and funded to correct deficiencies. The Commander also stated that a contract had been awarded to replace the incorrect enclosures in building 3947 with new enclosures and that electrical diagnostic equipment had been ordered to help identify electrical problems. Finally, the Commander stated that special emphasis was being placed on enforcement of clearance requirements around electrical equipment, electrical panels, and in mechanical rooms by adding it to the mandatory facility manager training plan. Our Response

Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, addressed all specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the corrections have been implemented. No further comments are required.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

Finding B AUAB Fire Protection Deficiencies

We identified 49 deficiencies related to fire protection systems. The deficiencies were related to a lack of maintenance or improper construction. These deficiencies Figurepose an 6. increasedFire Protection risk ofDeficiencies fire, injury, by andCategory loss of life or property.

Source: Deficiency log created by DoD OIG evaluation team.

The standards that apply to the fire protection deficiencies are the NFPA and the UFC. We documented 49 fire protection deficiencies at AUAB (see Figure 6). Of the 49 fire protection deficiencies, 33 were related to the construction or modification of facilities and 16 were related to the maintenance of the facilities. The deficiencies included fire suppression, fire prevention, means of egress, and fire alarm systems. These deficiencies pose an increased risk of fire, injury, and Maintenanceloss of life or property. Deficiencies

At the Independence dining facility, we found that one of the kitchen hood fire suppression systems had discharged, and it had not been refilled. The NFPA 96, “Standard for Ventilation Control and Fire Protection of Commercial Cooking Operations,” article 10.1.2, requires fire extinguishing equipment in the hood of cooking equipment that produces grease-laden vapors that might cause a fire. The code further stipulates that cooking equipment should be tagged

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

and taken out of service while its fire-extinguishing system is nonoperational or impaired. Grease from the cooking equipment could ignite and cause injury, damage, or loss of life or property.

Figure 7. Storage of combustible material in mechanical room (Deficiency No. AUAB-FP-170526-007)

We found combustible materials stored in electrical and mechanical rooms in seven of the buildings we evaluated. Figure 7 shows cardboard boxes on a wooden pallet stored in a mechanical room. The NFPA 1, “Fire Code,” article 10.19.5.1, states combustible material shall not be stored in boiler rooms, mechanical rooms, or electrical equipment rooms. The storage of combustible materials in those spaces could increase the risk of fire and restrict access to the equipment.

Building 8320 contained an automatic sprinkler system that had been deactivated and no warning signs were posted and the main control valve supplying water for the sprinkler system was turned off. Additionally, the automatic electric switch that allows the fire alarm system to activate the fire suppression system had been removed from the automatic sprinkler water valve. The Unified Facility Criteria (UFC) 3-601-02, “Operation and Maintenance: Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance of Fire Protection Systems,” section 1-10, requires building occupants to be notified whenever any of the fire protection systems are out of service or impaired to a degree that presents an increased risk to any occupant. The lack of warning signs results in the occupants of the building not having the required Constructionnotice of the increased Deficiencies risk.

The new warehouse, building 8322, completed in May 2017, is approximately 7,500 square feet and does not have automatic sprinkler protection. The UFC 3-600-01, “Fire Protection Engineering for Facilities,” section 6-11, requires warehouses greater than 5,000 square feet to have sprinkler protection. This new

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

facility is an example of the failure to comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards. Additionally, the UFC 3-600-01, section 1-5, requires the design6 services and review of a qualified fire protection engineer for major projects.

An additional example of the failure to comply with applicable construction standards includes the incomplete sprinkler coverage in mission-critical facilities like the Combined Air and Space Operations Center (CAOC) and the Wing Operations Center. These buildings were constructed with automatic sprinkler systems but were missing sprinkler heads in the electrical and mechanical rooms. The UFC 3-600-01, section 4-2, requires facilities that are protected by automatic sprinklers to be provided with coverage throughout the facility including electrical and mechanical rooms. Additional facilities that did not have complete sprinkler coverage in electrical and mechanical rooms were buildings 10295 and 10550.

The USCENTCOM dormitory had sidewall sprinklers in the sleeping quarters that were installed 19 inches below the ceiling. The NFPA 13, article 8.7, requires sidewall sprinklers to be installed 4 to 6 inches from the ceiling. Buildings 10560 and 10725 had improperly installed pendent sprinkler heads that extend down from the ceiling. The pendent sprinkler heads in the mall food court of building 10560 were installed approximately 5 feet from the ceiling. Additionally, in building 10725, the pendent sprinklers were installed 32 inches from the ceiling. The NFPA 13, article 8.6, requires pendent sprinkler heads to be installed not more than 12 inches from the ceiling. The fire generates heat that activates the sprinkler. The heat rises and collects in a layer at the ceiling. The closer the sprinklers are to the layer of heat that collects at the ceiling the sooner they will activate. The increased distance of the sprinklers from the ceiling will delay sprinkler activation, which increases the risk of injury and the loss of property.

Initiating devices for smoke and fire detection were not properly installed in the BPC dormitory. The distance from the ceiling to the sidewall-mounted smoke detector was 21 inches. The NFPA 72, “National Fire Alarm and Signaling Code,” article 17.7.3.2, requires spot-type smoke detectors to be located on the ceiling or, if on a sidewall, not more than 12 inches below the ceiling. The fire generates smoke that activates the smoke detectors. The smoke rises and collects in a layer at the ceiling. The closer the smoke detectors are to the layer of smoke that collects at the ceiling the sooner they will initiate. Improperly installed smoke detectors delay the signal to initiate the fire suppression system and delay alarm warnings for building occupants. We did not access all sleeping rooms in this dormitory to minimize the disruption to sleeping airmen who work mid- and swing-shift schedules, however, every room we did access had improperly installed smoke detectors. 6 The UFC 3-600-01, section 1-5, defines ‘major projects’ as not only new construction but projects that involve designing or modifying fire-rated construction, fire detection, fire suppression, or life safety systems.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Five of the six permanent dormitories we visited had penetrations through the walls and ceilings. These penetrations or holes lacked fire-stopping measures. The NFPA 101, “Life Safety Code,” article 8.3.5.1, requires protection by a fire stop system for all electrical, mechanical, plumbing, and communication systems penetrations that pass through a wall, floor, or ceiling assembly constructed as a fire barrier. The lack of adequate fire stopping measures for penetrations through fire barriers could contribute to the spread of fire and smoke through the dormitory. Figure 8 shows cables running through a hole in the wall, which should be sealed using NFPA-approved fire-stopping measures. In addition, we observed fire doors that were propped open, which can allow the rapid spread of smoke and fire throughout a building. Also, we found that the latches on stairwell fire doors had been tampered with, which prevented the doors from remaining closed when activated by a fire alarm. These doors need to remain closed to prevent fire and smoke from filling the exit stairwells.

Figure 8. Penetration without fire-stopping measures (Deficiency No. AUAB-FP-170526-010) Conclusion

Construction projects are being accepted as complete that do not meet DoD health and safety policies and standards, and fire protection systems are not being maintained according to the NFPA and the UFC. These deficiencies pose an increased risk of fire, injury, and loss of life or property.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response Recommendation B.1 We recommend that the Commander, 379 AEW:

a. Conduct a root cause analysis and implement a corrective action plan for all fire protection deficiencies identified in this report. Ensure that all current and future facility operations and maintenance comply with the Unified Facilities Criteria and the National Fire Protection Association standards. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the corrective action plan within 30 days of the issuance of this report. b. Prepare and implement a corrective action plan to ensure that all construction projects are reviewed for compliance with applicable fire protection standards before they are accepted by the Government as complete. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the corrective action plan within 30 days of the issuance of this report.

Commander, 379 AEW, Comments

The Commander, 379 AEW, agreed with the recommendations and stated that steps had been taken to identify root causes and to correct the deficiencies identified in the report. The Commander stated that he tasked the BOS contractor with providing the status of all fire suppression systems and with making required corrections. Additionally, the Commander added the services of a fire protection engineer to the BOS contract to assist with design and construction. The Commander stated that, where sprinkler and smoke detectors were not installed in compliance with fire protection standards, the 379 ECES is developing a corrective action and operations risk management plan to ensure that the existing deficiencies are mitigated while a long-term solution is designed and executed by contract. Our Response

Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, addressed all specifics of the recommendations. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved but remain open. We will close the recommendations once we verify that the corrections have been implemented. No further comments are required.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Finding C AUAB Inactive Fuel System Deficiencies

The active fuel facilities at AUAB were generally maintained in accordance with DoD health and safety standards. However, we identified deficiencies with the close air support ramp inactive fuel system that is being converted to active use. The deficiencies we found increase the risk of fire, injury, or death.

At AUAB there are fuel systems that are currently active (in use) and fuel systems that are inactive (not in use). The active fuel systems provide fuel for aircraft and ground vehicles throughout the base. During our evaluation, we found the active fuel system to be well-maintained. However, the inactive fuel system integrated into the close air support (CAS) ramp had not been maintained since it was built in 2012. The ramp is a large concrete pad for fueling aircraft. The fuel system at the CAS ramp was constructed to fuel B-52 aircraft that are loaded with munitions in a location distant from other combat support aircraft to mitigate injury or damage if there is a fuel mishap or an explosion. We evaluated the fuel system at the CAS ramp, which is currently inactive, because the Air Force was in the process of placing it into service. In August 2017, the Air Force Civil Engineering Center awarded a construction project contract for the restoration and modernization required to bring the system into operation. The 379th Expeditionary Logistics Readiness Squadron requested and were provided details on the fuel systems deficiencies we found during this evaluation to ensure Figurethey are 9. includedFuel Facility in theDeficiencies contract. by Category

Source: Deficiency log created by DoD OIG evaluation team.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

We documented 86 deficiencies related to the inactive fuel system at the CAS ramp (see Figure 9) based on the UFC standards. The deficiencies we found were related to equipment, pipelines, and fuel containment. These deficiencies increase the risk of fire, injury, or death. Examples of these deficiencies include the following:

The corrosion protection (referred to as “cathodic protection”) of the underground fuel pipeline at the CAS ramp was not installed correctly and had not been maintained since it was installed. The UFC 3-460-01, “Design: Petroleum Fuel Facilities,” section 2-13.2, requires all underground steel fuel piping to have cathodic protection. Cathodic protection is a technique used to minimize corrosion of metal surfaces by electrically connecting the metal to be protected to a more easily corroded “sacrificial metal.” The sacrificial metal then corrodes instead of the protected metal. The objective of the cathodic protection system is to reduce metal pipe rust and corrosion. The underground pipeline has not been protected from corrosion for over 4 years. Pipe corrosion weakens pipes and can lead to fuel leaks and spills.

The CAS ramp was missing pipe inspection equipment, known as pig launchers and receivers. The UFC 3-460-01, chapter 6, requires inspection equipment be installed so that pipelines are “smart piggable” and chapter 12 of the same UFC, requires pipe inspections to 7be conducted in accordance with American Petroleum Institute (API) 570. Smart pigs are pipeline inspection tools that consist of large pieces of machinery combined with powerful technology that aid in the maintenance of pipelines. Smart pigs can be inserted into the pipeline at a location, such as a valve or pump station, that has a special configuration of pipes and valves where the inspection tool can be loaded into a device known as a launcher. The launcher is closed and sealed, and the flow of fuel in the pipeline can be directed to launch the inspection tool. The inspection tool or ”pig” travels through the pipeline collecting data from the inside of the pipe, including restrictions, deformations of the pipe, as well as metal loss. The pig provides critical8 data on the condition of pipelines, which helps gauge the integrity of the pipes. The lack of inspection capability and the lack of cathodic protection on the inactive fuel system at the CAS ramp pipelines increases the risk of fire, injury, or death.

Outdoor above-ground piping and equipment throughout the inactive fuels system and the CAS ramp had rust and corrosion due to paint coating failures. The UFC 3-460-03, “Inspection and Maintenance – Pipe Penetrations,” requires the quarterly inspection of coatings for signs of deterioration, corrosion, or damage. 7 The UFC 3-460-01defines pigging as the use of internal pipe inspection tools, called pigs, to clean the inside of the pipe, determine the geometry of the pipe, and determine the location and magnitude of any internal or external corrosion occurring on the pipe. 8 See CORROSIONPEDIA at www.corrosionpedia.com for more information from corrosion subject matter experts.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

We also found six valves in the filter building that were corroded. Corrosion weakens pipes and equipment and can lead to fuel leaks and spills. This increases the risk of fire, injury, or death.

Along the pipeline, there were 16 pits that aid in the removal of water and air from the system. A pit is a hole with a removable cover that provides access to valves attached to the underground fuel pipeline. We found that 6 of the 16 pits had grounding wires that were connected to the wrong side of the isolation joint (See Figure 10). The UFC 3-460-01, requires grounding to prevent the build-up of static electricity. Static electricity build-up can cause a spark leading to a fuel system fire or explosion.

Figure 10. Pit with improper grounding and corrosion (Deficiency No. AUAB-POL-170517-007)

Conclusion

The deficiencies were related to a lack of maintenance and improper construction. The inactive fuel systems at the CAS ramp was not maintained according to DoD health and safety policies and standards, thus increasing the risk of fuel spills and leaks, which can cause fire, injury, or death. Fuel systems construction projects, such as the fuel systems project at the CAS ramp, are being accepted as complete that do not meet DoD health and safety policies and standards.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response Recommendation C.1 We recommend that the Commander, 379 AEW:

a. Conduct a root cause analysis and implement a corrective action plan for all close air support ramp fuel hydrant system deficiencies identified in this report. Ensure that all current and future facility operations and maintenance comply with the Unified Facilities Criteria and the National Fire Protection Association standards. The plan should include an assessment of the pipelines at fuel facilities in accordance with the American Petroleum Institute (API 570) piping inspection code. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the analysis and corrective action plan within 30 days of the issuance of this report. b. Prepare and implement a corrective action plan to ensure all construction projects that involve fuel systems are reviewed for compliance with applicable fuel systems standards before they are accepted by the Government as complete. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the corrective action plan within 30 days of the issuance of this report.

Commander, 379 AEW, Comments

The Commander, 379 AEW, agreed with the recommendations and stated that a complete inspection of the fuel system was performed along with a design for corrective actions. The Commander further stated that the deficiencies noted in this report would be corrected under the Air Force Civil Engineering Center contract to bring the system into operation. Our Response

Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, addressed all specifics of Recommendation C.1.a. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but remains open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the corrective actions have been implemented. No further comments are required.

Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, did not address the specifics of Recommendation C.1.b. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We request that the Commander, 379 AEW, provide additional comments, within 30 days of the issuance of this report, regarding the performance of a root cause analysis and implementation of corrective action plans to ensure that all construction projects that involve fuel systems are reviewed for compliance with applicable fuel systems standards before the Government accepts them as complete.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Finding D AUAB Indoor Air Quality Deficiencies

We identified 13 deficiencies related to indoor air quality. These deficiencies resulted in poor indoor air quality that may negatively impact the health and Figurequality 11. of Indoorlife of AUABAir Quality personnel. Deficiencies

Source: Deficiency log created by DoD OIG evaluation team.

The standards that apply to9 indoor air quality deficiencies is the Air Force 2005 Mold Policy Memorandum. This policy requires that a clean and dry environment be maintained within facilities. We documented 13 indoor air quality deficiencies (see Figure 11). The deficiencies were related to water intrusion, mold, and ventilation. These deficiencies may negatively impact the health and quality of life of the facility occupants. Examples of these deficiencies include the following.

Water damage and mold growth were observed on the ceiling in all three administrative buildings we evaluated. Administrative buildings 6671, 6874, and 10090 did not have any surface mold area greater than one square foot. However, mold should not be allowed to grow inside a building. Also, water damage is an indicator that moisture intrusion has occurred and may lead to mold growth. If the water intrusion is stopped within 24-48 hours of the initial intrusion, then mold should not be able to grow.

9 Air Force Mold Policy Memorandum from HQ U.S. Air Force, dated May 10, 2005, co-signed by the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Installations and Mission Support, U.S. Air Force and the Assistant Surgeon General, Health Care Operation titled, “Interim Policy and Guidance for the Prevention, Surveillance, and Remediation of Water Damage and Associated Mold Contamination in Air Force Facilities.”

│ DODIG-2018-049 Findings

We found mold growing in two of the seven dormitories we evaluated. Dormitory building 10570 had water damage and mold on the ceiling tiles in the common area (see Figure 12). Dormitory building 10405 had mold under the kitchen sink in two of the living quarters. Furthermore, in dormitory building 10405, we also observed water damage around a hole in a shower ceiling panel. It appeared that the hole had been made to drain water that had pooled above the ceiling panel. If this water intrusion is not addressed, mold will grow on the ceiling panel.

Figure 12. Ceiling tile mold (Deficiency No. AUAB-EN-170526-002)

Conclusion

These indoor air quality deficiencies could have been avoided with stricter adherence to the Air Force 2005 Mold Policy Memorandum. These deficiencies resulted in poor indoor air quality that may negatively impact the health and Recommendations,quality of life of AUAB personnel. Management Comments, and Our Response Recommendation D.1 We recommend that the Commander, 379 AEW, conduct a root cause analysis and implement a corrective action plan for all indoor air quality deficiencies identified in this report. Determine the causes of the moisture intrusion into occupied facilities. Ensure that all current and future facility operations and maintenance comply with the Air Force 2005 Mold Policy Memorandum. Provide the DoD Office of Inspector General a copy of the analysis and plan within 30 days of the issuance of this report.

DODIG-2018-049│ Findings

Commander, 379 AEW, Comments

The Commander, 379 AEW, agreed with the recommendation and stated that he has requested funding for a contract to complete an inventory and baseline inspection of AUAB’s roof systems for prioritizing future roof repairs and replacements. Our Response

Comments from the Commander, 379 AEW, did not fully address all specifics of the recommendation. The Commander did not indicate that a root cause analysis had been performed or that roof infiltration was the only source of water intrusion into facilities. Therefore, the recommendation is unresolved and remains open. We request that the Commander, 379 AEW, provide additional comments, within 30 days of the issuance of this report, regarding the conduct of a root cause analysis for the moisture intrusion.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Appendixes

Appendix A Scope and Methodology

We conducted this onsite evaluation from May 14, 2017, through May 25, 2017, in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

We independently selected facilities based on size, type, and age. We also interviewed the BCE and other 379 ECES personnel, including the contracting Useofficer’s of representative. Computer-Processed Data

UseWe did of not Technical use computer-processed Assistance data to perform this evaluation.

During this inspection, we used the assistance of subject matter experts (SMEs). We used a certified master electrician to evaluative electrical distribution systems and a fire protection engineer to evaluate fire protection systems. We used a team of fuel facility subject matter experts that included a mechanical engineer, a civil engineer, and an electrical engineer to evaluate the fuel facilities. We used an industrial hygienist to conduct the indoor air quality evaluation. All subject matter Priorexperts Coveragewere certified in their associated fields.

During the last 5 years, the DoD OIG issued nine reports relating to health and safety evaluations U.S. military facilities.

DODIG-2018-049│ Appendixes

DoD OIG

Report No. DODIG-2017-087, “U.S.-Controlled and -Occupied Military Facilities Inspection – Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti,” June 7, 2017

We found that new construction of U.S. military‑occupied facilities at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, were generally well‑built. However, some new construction that was accepted as complete did not fully comply with health and safety policies and standards regarding electrical and fire protection systems. We found that existing facilities were not being maintained to DoD health and safety policies and standards. The deficiencies identified during the evaluation resulted from: acceptance of new construction that did not comply with DoD health and safety policies and standards, inadequate contractor maintenance, insufficient Government inspection of work performed by the contractor, and lack of onsite Government specialized skills in electrical and fire protection inspections.

Report No. DODIG-2017-004, “Summary Report - Inspections of DoD Facilities and Military Housing and Audits of Base Operations and Support Services Contracts,” October 14, 2016

Deficiencies in electrical system safety, fire protection systems, and environmental health and safety were pervasive because of a lack of adequate preventative maintenance and inspections being performed at the installations. As a result, DoD personnel and military families were exposed to health and safety hazards at installations around the world. DoD policy and guidance requires periodic inspections of DoD facilities. However, none of these inspections comprehensively examine the effectiveness of facility sustainment processes with respect to the overall health and safety of occupants.

Report No. DODIG-2016-139, “Military Housing Inspection – Camp Buehring, Kuwait,” September 30, 2016

We found significant deficiencies in electrical and fire protection systems during the physical evaluations of the U.S. military‑occupied facilities at Camp Buehring. The majority of those deficiencies resulted from insufficient inspection, inadequate maintenance, lack of an effective maintenance and inspection plan, and ineffective project oversight. In addition, Camp Buehring did not have any permanent, Government-employed master electricians or f ire protection engineers. The maintenance contract does not require that the contractor perform electrical maintenance to any specific standard. Also, the contract inspection, testing, and maintenance requirements for fire alarm and fire protection systems do not reference the appropriate Unified Facilities Criteria.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Appendixes

Report No. DODIG-2016-106, “U.S. Military-Occupied Facilities Inspection – King Abdullah II Special Operations Training Center (KASOTC),” July 7, 2016

Report No. DODIG-2015-181, “Continental United States Military Housing Inspections – Southeast,” September 24, 2015

Report No. DODIG-2015-162, “Continental United States Military Housing Inspections – National Capital Region,” August 13, 2015

Report No. DODIG-2015-013, “Military Housing Inspections – Republic of Korea,” October 28, 2014

Report No. DODIG-2014-121, “Military Housing Inspections – Japan,” September 30, 2014

Report No. DODIG-2013-099, “Compliance with Electrical and Fire Protection Standards of U.S. Controlled and Occupied Facilities in Afghanistan,” July 18, 2013

DODIG-2018-049│ Appendixes

Appendix B Notice of Concern

INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARKCENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22:15().1500

June 7. 2017

MEMORANDUMFOR COMMANDER, 379th Am. EXPEDITIONARYWING, USAF

SUUJECT: Notic,;ofCom;crn U.S. Military Oi;cupied l'aciliticsEvaluation Al Udeid Air Base. Qatar (Project No. D2017-IX>OOPT-0103.0(Xl)

On behalf of the Lead Inspector General for Operation INHERENTRESOLVE, the DoD Ollicc of'Tnspcclor General (OIG) pcrfom1ed an electrical. lire proleetion systems, and fuels c,aluation of U.S. military occupicd facilities at Al Udcid Air Basc. Qatar (AUAB) from M11y 15 25. 2017. This memorandum is being issued from an ongoing evaluation that is being conducted in accordance with the OIG's oversight responsibilities as described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, nnd in accordance with nppropriate CIGIE C\•alualion standards. We identifieddclicicncics. which, individually or in combination pose a significont risk of fire. electrocution, loss of life and/or, property. The work conducted on this cvnltk1tion is prcliminMy. There is additional '"ork ongoing to satisfy the evaluation objective.

This Notice of Concern(NOC), identifies five critical deficiencies requiring immediate corrective action. DoDfnstrnction 6055.01. ·'DoDSalcty and Occupational Health (SOID Progmm," < >ctoher14, 2014, requires the I >ol )"to protect l>ol> personnel from accidental denth, injury. or occupational illness" and lo do so for "all perso1melal all operations worldwide.'' We evaluated the electrical work forcompliance with Air Force lnstmction 32-1064\\11ich incorporatesthe general safety criteria foundin the DoD Unilied Facilities Criteria. and the National Fire Protection Agency(NFPA)codes. It alsorequires supcrvison; to train employees to comply with safety st1111dnrds and follow codes. These criteria provide a baseline for the identificationofdclieiencies that impact life.health. and safety.1

• ·n.rcc 11011-wcathcrprnof clcctric.11 circuit panel cnclusurel!arc installed in exterior locations that are subject to outdoor weather conditions. Rainwater and debris entering the electrical box could contact the energized parts and energize the panel. The power panel is located in a place frequentedby \\·orkcrs; contact by personnel could result in severe shock or electrocution. See attached Evaluation Record: AUAR-EL-J 70526-001

• Outdoor swimming pool pump motor:; arc not bonded to other parts of the pool. such as the 1iool ladder. Also the ptHllJ) motors. light fo.m1res, and power outlets are not Ground fault Circuit Interrupt (GFCI) protected. Lack of properbonding creates the possibility of a diITercnee in voltage among conductors if the motor fails. This could energize the

1 We did not consider controning agreements or other authorities (including host nation) that might impact the electrical criteria at AUAB.

24 I DODIG-2018-049 Appendixes

Notice of Concern (cont'd)

pool area causing anyone contacting a non-bonded metal fixture arotmdthe pool area to receive an electric shock. Also the lack ofGFCI protection on outlets used by wet perso1melcould result in shock or electrocution. See attached Evaluation Record: AUAB-EL-170526-002

• The Manhattan Dining Facility (DFAC) has four U.K. type panelswith U.S. typecircuit breakers installed Using U.S. typebreakers in a U.K. type panel has created overheated circuit breakers which greatly ii1creases tl1Crisk of fire and explosion. Sec attached Evaluation Record: AUAB-EL-J 70526-003

• The Manhattan DFAC main serving line for hot foodhas a metal warming table with exposedwires outside of a junction box. The exposedlive wires could energize the metal, which could result in personnelbeing shockedor electrocuted. See attached Evaluation Record: AUAB-EL-170526-005

• Two 11,000 V transfonners and an associated 630 amp switch mechanismare tmprotected from vehicle trafficimpact, and are accessibleby foot traffic. Theseshould be installecl in a vault, room, or closet, or in an area surrouncled by a wall, screen, or foncc, access to which is controlled bylock(s) or other approved means, accessible to qualifiedpersons only. Transformers could be knocked offtheir platforms, breaking cable insulation and exposing 11,000 V feeder cables to passing persorn1el resultiJ1gin electrocution. See attached Evaluation Record: AUAR-El.-170526-006

Although tl1e DoD 010 lllldcrstandsthe inherentdanger in military operations, we donot view the identified safety issues as acceptable risks in tl1eAUAB operation.alenvironment. The critical deficiencies requiring immediate corrective action will be provided to all recipients of this NOC via uploads to lhe Aviation and MissiJe Development and Engineering Center (AMRIJEC) Safe AccessFile Exchange website. You will receive an automated AMRUEC delivery notice e-mail \vilh i.n:.iructions detailing the process for downloadingthe deficiencies for review and conuncn.t.

In accordance ,vithtrequirements ofDoD Instruction 7650.03, please respond to these suggested actions or proviclenction5 tnken within 14 calenclar cla%of the i5su:mce of this memorandlll11. This memorandum and management corrunenls to the suggested actionswill be included in the final report. If possible,send a portabledocument fonnat ( .pdf)file containing your comments lo PO-TAD@DOD!G.M!L.

Randolph R. Stone Deputy Inspector General Policy and Oversight

Attachments: as stated

DODIG-2018-049 I 25 Appendixes

Notice of Concern (cont'd)

cc: Assistant Secretaryof the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller) Inspector G,meral oflhe Air Fore.: Commander, Air Forces Central Command Commander, 379th Expeditionary Mission SupportGroup Inspector Ocncral, 379th Air Expcditiorrnry Wing

26 I DODIG-2018-049 Appendixes

Response to the Notice of Concern

Dli:PARTMEJ\T01' ' THE AIR FORCt I& l'"Tm ..,.,.. ns AIR FOROSCL\TRAL CO\I\IASD (l"S.\FCE.'liT) V!/1 379TII \JR E:\PFDITION.\cR\" \\l'iC 21 June 2017

ME:v!ORANDUMFOR DEPARTMENTOF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM· 379 AEW/CC

SUBJ] :CT: "Jot ice of Concem-lJ.S. Military Occupied I acilities I:valuation A1 Udeid Air Hase, Qatar (l'roject No. 1)201t7-DOOOPT-OI 03.000)

1 In accordm1cc w1lh DoD lnstn1ction 7650.

2. The following uclions m-e king taken in resµnu;e to U1e fivecrili cul deficiencies identified:

a. AUAB-EL-170526-00J: Exterior electrical power pm1els e,posed to ,,eaU1er are not weatherproof

(I) 379 EC[S will pcrfonn a complete replacement of Electrical Panel behmd tl1c Fox Sky Lounge tac1lity (I 001'1) Required parts for replacement arc on hand ECD: 15 Jul 17

(2) An Hngmcering proJccli s beingde veloped to tdenflf)· and correct all other panels requiring. outdoorfocather protection This projectt" ill wcatl1crproof sc,cral exterior panels tltroughout AUAB (including buildings 2250 and 81 83). ECD: 25 Jun 18

b. AUAB-.EL-170526--002: S1,i.I.nmingPool Fm.:ilit) lac.:ks Grotut

(2) 379 FCI :smeasured and recorded an olumc \'alue of280 ohms between the pump and ,:qmpment (ladders, divmg hoards. etc.). lll1s signifies a hond betweentl1e elcctncal cqmpmcllt and the pool acces.-.ones. Additionally, all pump motors and eleclncal eqmpmenlare honded and grounded. COMPLETE

c. AUAB-EL-170526-003: fh,;:Ma nhollun Dming Fucihly (DFAC) bus four U.K. IYJX panels "ith U.S. type circuit brc.:akc.:rsu u.i11lkd.

(I) Inside Manhattan OFAC - 379 ECES will replace two electricalpane ls (PP6 and PP7), all circuit breakers and dcfccti,·c/chamxl\\ iring. Titis project will becompleted \\ith organic civil engineer mm1po\\er. The Dill of Materials (OOM) is complete mid in solicitation for vendor price quotes. Once materials are purchasedand arrive. this project is esl.iinatt.'Cl to requ1re 30

lli.,·,wn - If J.11gmun - l1artnen

DODIG-2018-049 I 27 Appendixes

Response to the Notice of Concern

days to complete. In the meantime, connections have beeu tightened to reduce heat build-up. ECD: 30 Dec 17

(2) Outside Manhatl:w OF A.C - 379 ECES will 1eplace two electrical piwds (PP 1 ;wd PP2), all circuit breakers anrlrlcfcctivclcharrcrl wiring. ·111c 8111 of M11tcnals (BOM) is complete and in solicitation for vendor price quotes. Once materials are purchased and arrive. the project is estimaterl to be completerl in conjunction with the repair of the interior electrical system. ECD: 30eDec 17

cl. AIJAH-EL-1e70526-005: The l\lanhattan DFAC main scrving line for hot foocl has a metal warming table with exposed wires outside of a j1u1ction box.

(1) 379 ECES cowpleted aud closed work order A5545 resolvw11- tins coucem. Upou further inspection no additional issues of this typewere discovered. COMPLETE

e. AUAB-EL-170526..006: Two 1 1.000V transformers and an associated 630-anip switch mccl1Rnism arc unprotcctccl from vehicle traffic impact imrl arc acccssihlc by foot traffic.

(l) Darriers were placed to protect the transformers from vehicular traffic and siiZUS are in place. CO.\ll'LETJ::

(2) 3 79 EC'ES is clcsigning II ersonnelp fenceto serve as a barrier to pcclcstrian trnffic. Tue wstallauou will add significaut set-bacl distauces (IA W NEC guidauce fo1High Voltage transformer maintenance) which will require a re-design of the Independence Dining Facility cold storn11-e facility lay-dowu a.iea as cnneut cold st011111-e twits will be too close to the uew fence. ECD: 20 l\ov 17

3. lfyou have :wy questiou:, or coucems reg.udiug these conrses ofachou or ueed additioual infonnaetiou, lease contact Lt Col Chad Gemeinhardt, 379 ECCS,CC.

ARMAGOST JASO ::.-:: N RfX- :::...7:":.•111111 JASON R. ARMAGOST Brigadier Gcncrnl, USAF Comm11ndcr

J1inion .. Jf'lngmnn .. Partfters

28 I DODIG-2018-049 Appendixes

Appendix C Evaluation Standards and Criteria

The operation, maintenance and repair of electrical systems inside facilities were performed by the 379 ECES. The criteria we used for the evaluation of the electrical systems came from the ECES Facility Manager Handbook and Air Force Instruction 32-1064, “Electrical Safe Practices,” both of which require compliance with the NFPA.

The operation, maintenance, and repair of fire protection systems and AHU’s supporting indoor air quality were performed through contracted services. The criteria we used for the evaluation of fire protection and the AHU’s were contained in contract FA8051-15-D-0008, “Engineering Support,” for civil engineering consolidated base operations support (BOS) at AUAB, Qatar. The appendices of the BOS contract we reviewed included:

• Appendix B, “Publications and Forms,” • Appendix D, “OM&R--Fire Alarm, Suppression and Mass Notification Systems, Fire Hydrants & Backflow Prevention Systems Basewide,” • Appendix F, “Facility Management of the CAOC, ISRD, AFFOR Facilities,” • Appendix G, “Industrial Chilled Water, Industrial Control Systems, and Sanitary Sewer Systems Training, and Operation, Maintenance and Repair (OM&R) of Selected Systems, “ and

• Appendix H, “Electrical Power Production and Distribution.“

The BOS contract requires the BOS contractor to comply with:

• All U.S. laws, • U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Guidelines, • Qatari Labor Laws, • The Overseas Environmental Baseline Guidance Document, • U.S. Building Codes, • Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC), • National Electric Code (NEC), • National Electric Safety Code (NESC), • Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards, and • National Fire Protection Association (NFPA).

DODIG-2018-049│ Appendixes

The CAS ramp inactive fuel hydrant system was a military construction (MILCON) project and therefore required to comply with the UFC. For facility planning, design, construction and maintenance, the DoD complies through the UFC program. Use of the UFC is directed by DoD Directive 4270.5, “Military Construction.” The NFPA is incorporated by reference in the UFC.

│ DODIG-2018-049 Management Comments

Management Comments

Commander, 379 AEW

UNCLASSIFIED

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE UN ITED STATES AI R FORCESCENTRAL COMMAND (USAFCENT) 379th AIR EXPEDITIONARY WING

8 N ovember 2017

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFE SE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: 379 AEW/CC

SUBJECT: 379 AEW Response to U.S. Military-Occupied Faci lities Evaluation · Al Udcid Air Base (AUAB), Qatar (Project No. 1)2017-DOOOPT-0103.000)

l. In accordance with DoD Instruction 7650.03. the 379 Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) provides the response below to the findings and recommendations ofthe subject draft report.

2. The following actions have beentaken, or are in the processofbeing taken in responseto the findings identified:

a. Finding A : AUAD Electrical System Deficiencies. 379 AEW concurs with all findings as written in the report. Several steps have been taken to identify the root cause and remedy the noted issues as detailed below.

(1) Circuitbreakers in B3947 have signs ofoverheating due to incompatible fuses and deficient electrical cable splices. 379 Expeditionary Civil Engineer (ECES) personnel conducted a complete inspection of B3947 and identified several other deficiencies with the electrical system. 83947 serves as one of the primary dining facilities on base. A contract has been awarded for a new panel (awarded 2 Nov 17) to replace the incorrect enclosures. All defi ciencies will be corrected during a shutdown of the fa cility. Additionally, we have purchased infrared heat guns and a camera for our electricians. 111is enables them to take temperature readings and identify hot spots while completing preventative maintenance on facilities. ECO: 15 May 2018.

(2) Exterior electrical power panels exposedto weather that are not weatherproof; missing air conditioning electrical disconnects. The inspecti on team identifi ed two facilities with interior electrical panels used in an exterior environment and fi ve air conditioning unit without electrical disconnects. 379 ECES personnel completed a 100% check of all facilities on AUAB and identified a total of 95discrc pru1c ies. Once tJ1e project design is completed. it will compete for AFCENT funding in the FY 19 Integrated Priority Listing if not through expedited AFCE 1T funding as an emergent FY18 unfunded requirement. The current estimated cost is $820.000 to correct all deficiencies. ECO: 1 December 2018, pending project funding

(3) Two 11,000-volt. transformerswere not adequately protected because they were accessible to unauthorized personnel and were not protected from damage by vehicular traffic. 379 ECES personnel completed a I 00% inspection of all transfonners on basee and

UNCLASSIFIED Mission - Wingman ~ Partners

DO DIG- 2018-049 I 3 1 Management Comments

Commander, 379 AEW (cont'd)

UNCLASSIFIED

ensured they were protected in accordance with NEC regulations. 379 ECES personnel constructed a fence around the transformers noted in the report and concrete barriers were placed to prevent vehicular damage. CLOSED

(4) Inodcqualc clearancesaround electrical equipment. A notice was sent to oil facility monagcrs directing them to ensure they have cosy occcss without impeded or blocked clearances to all electrical equipment and panels. Additionally, craftsmen completing work in the mechanical rooms have been briefed to notify facility managers ofany violations for immediate correction. Rci,,forcement of requirements around electrical equipment, electrical panels and mechanical rooms was added to the mandatory facility manager training plan. CLO ED

b. Jlindi.ng B: Fire Protection Deficiencies. 379 AEW concurs with all findings as written in the report. Several steps have been taken to identify the root cause and remedy the noted issues as detailed below.

(I) A dining facility kitchen hood fire prot.ection system discharged and had not been refilled. The fire suppression systems on AUAB are maintained by the Base Operations and Support (BOS) contractor. The BOS contractor was tasked to provide a status of all suppression systems on AUAB and identified three systems tha1 were inoperable or had discharged and not b<,,:n refil led. The contractor has corrected one facility and the chemical to refill the other two has been ordered. These systems will be operational within the next 60 days. ECO: l .January 2018

(2) Combustible materials were stored in electrical and mechanical rooms of seven buildin gs. A notice was sent to all facility managers directing them to ensure they have easy access without impeded or blocked clearances to all electrical equipment and panels. Additionally. craftsmen completing work in the mechanical rooms have been briefed to notify facility managers ofany violations for immediate correction. Reinforcement of requirements around electrical equipment. electrical panels and mechanical rooms was added to the mandatory facil ity manager training plan. CLOSED

(3) Huilding 8320 contained :111 automatic sprinkler system Ithathad been deactivated with no warningsigns posted and the main control valve turned off. This facility is connected to a pump house that was undergoing repairs and lhe suppression system was inoperahle for some time. The BOS contractor was directed to perfonn a complete review of al I fire uppression systems with signs made to post on facilities with inoperable systems. The B8320 fire suppression system repaired and returned to service. Our BOS contractor is tasked to notify fa cility managers iftheir fire suppression system status changes. CLOSED

(4) Failure to comply with applicable construction standards in various facilities throughout base and all major projects require reviewby a qualified fire protection engineer. 379 ECES util izes a contracted design cell linked to the BOS contract. This contract vehicle provides licensed Professional Engineer support to the unit for the design and execution ofthe AUAB construction program. While there is not a fire protection engineer at AUAI3. the service has been added to the contract via reach back capability. CLOSED

UNCLASSIFIED Mission ~ IVingman ~ Partners

32 DODIG -2018-049 Management Comments

Commander, 379 AEW (cont'd)

UNCLASSIFIED

(5) The USCE TCOM d ormitory has sidewa ll sprinklers in sleeping quarters that are insta lled 19 inches below the ceiling but 'FPA requires them to be installed 4 to 6 inches from ceiling. 379 EC ES is developing Corrective Action and Operations Risk Management Plans (CAP/ORM). This wiill ensure that the existing deficiencies are mitigated as much as possible while a long 1em1 solution is designed and executed via contract. ECO for the CA P/ORM is 1 December 20 17.

(6) Initiating devices for smoke and fire detection were not properly installed in the BPC d ormitory. The dista nce from the ceiling is 21 inched but FPA r equires them to be 12 inches below the ceiling. 379 ECE is developing CAP and ORM plans to ensure that the existing deficiencies are mitigated as much as possible while a long lenn fi x solution is designed and executed via contract. ECO for the CAP/O RM is I December 2017.

(7) Five or six dormitories visited had penetrations through the walls and ceilings that lacked fire stopping measures. A complete inspection was perfom1cd for all dormitori es by 379 ECES Fire Department and Structures shop 10 identify all penetrations through fire walls. All penetrations were fill ed with fire rated foam and this discrepancy was closed on 6 November 2017. C LOSED

c. Finding C: AUAB Inactive Fuel System Deficiencies. In May 2016. AFCENT utilized an Air Force Civil Engineer Center (AFCEC) contract to perform a complete inspection of the fuels system and provide a design for corrective actions. A construction contract was a 11 arded 11 ith a period ofpcrfom1ancc from eptcmbcr 2017 through May 2018 10 corrccl all defi ciencies noted in the report as well as several other critical deficiencies. This wi ll bring the system to fu ll compliance with all UFC requirements. ECD: 30 May 2018

d. Finding D: AUAB Indoor Air Quality Deficiencies. 379 AEW concurs with all fi ndings as written in the report. evcral steps have been taken to identify the root cause and remedy the noted issues as detai led below.

( I) Water damage and mold growth were observed on the ceiling in all three administrative buildings evaluated. 379 ECES personnel identified that there is no active roof inspection program al AUAB. We have requested the Air Force Installation and Mission Support Center to fund a contract to complete an inventory and baseline inspection of AUAB's roofsystems for prioritizing future roofrepairs and replacements. EC D: 30 December 2018, pending approval or baseline inspection contract approval.

3. If you have any questions or concerns regarding these courses ofaction or require additional infonnation, please contact Lt Col Chad Gcmcinhardt, 379 ECESES/CC,

JA ON R. ARMAGO T Brigadier General. USAF Commander UNCLASSIFIED Mission- Wingman- Partners

DODIG- 2018-049 I 33 Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Acronym Definition AEW Air Expeditionary Wing AFCEC Air Force Civil Engineering Center AHU Air Handling Unit API American Petroleum Institute AUAB Al Udeid Air Base BOS Base Operations Support BPC Blatchford Preston Complex CAOC Combined Air and Space Operations Center CAP/ORM Corrective Action Plan/Operations Risk Management Plans CAS Close Air Support CC Coalition Compound COCO Contractor-Owned and Contractor-Operated DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement ECES Expeditionary Civil Engineer Squadron EMSG Expeditionary Mission Support Group GFCI Ground Fault Circuit Interrupt HQ Headquarters MILCON Military Construction NEC National Electrical Code NESC National Electrical Safety Codes NFPA National Fire Protection Agency NOC Notice of Concern OIG Office of Inspector General OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Admiration SME Subject Matter Expert UFC Unified Facility Criteria USCENTCOM U.S. Central Command USAFCENT U.S. Air Force Central Command

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