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Audit of Screening and Quarantine Procedures for Personnel Entering Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar

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Audit of Screening and Quarantine Procedures for Personnel Entering Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar Report No. DODIG-2020-128 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY U.S. Department of Defense InspectorSEPTEMBER 24, 2020 General Audit of Screening and Quarantine Procedures for Personnel Entering Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar INTEGRITY INDEPENDENCE EXCELLENCE The document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Audit of Screening and Quarantine Procedures for ResultsPersonnel Entering in Brief Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar September 24, 2020 Background (cont’d) Objective (U//FOUO) In response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the 379th AEW took several actions. The Security Squadron The objective of this audit was to developed screening procedures for arriving personnel at determine whether the Air Force the North Gate, which includes checking COVID-19 travel implemented screening and quarantine passes, procedures for personnel entering Al Udeid The Security Squadron Air Base (AUAB), Qatar, in accordance also established screening procedures for other country with applicable guidance in response to nationals arriving at AUAB. The Support Squadron began the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19). performing screening procedures for arriving personnel at We were able to determine whether the air terminal, including screening and quarantine procedures The Medical Group initiated training for were developed; however, because no screening procedures at all U.S.-operated entry points one failed the initial screening during for AUAB. our observations, we could not verify Finding how effectively the quarantine procedures were implemented. Background (U//FOUO) The 379th AEW Security and Support Squadrons developed screening and quarantine procedures for personnel entering AUAB in accordance with applicable guidance in The 379th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) response to COVID-19. The Squadrons implemented most is located at AUAB and comprises several procedures, but improvements are needed. Specifically, groups, including the 379th Expeditionary based on our observations, Security and Support Squadron Medical Group (Medical Group) and the personnel of all personnel entering 379th Expeditionary Mission Support Group. AUAB and implemented all screening procedures for incoming The Mission Support Group includes the air terminal passengers. Additionally, Security Squadron Expeditionary Security Forces Squadron personnel except in (Security Squadron) and the Expeditionary one instance. However, when conducting screening at the Forces Support Squadron (Support Squadron). North Gate, Security Squadron personnel did not consistently check travel passes that were required for each person’s The Security and Support Squadrons re-entry, or require that operate and conduct screening of arriving personnel at the North Gate and the AUAB air terminal, respectively. The lack of consistently implemented screening procedures The Medical Group is responsible for for personnel entering AUAB occurred because screening additional medical assessment and potential procedures and a requirement to conduct training, developed quarantine determinations, if necessary, by the 379th AEW in March 2020, were still evolving and at both locations. had not been formally documented. Additionally, the initial training provided to personnel performing screenings On March 11, 2020, the Director-General did not include all of the required screening procedures. of the World Health Organization declared Furthermore, Squadron Commanders did not require COVID-19 a global pandemic, and on screening personnel to take refresher training when COVID-19 March 20, 2020, the AUAB Installation screening procedures changed or when returning to screening Commander declared a Public Health FORduties OFFICIAL after an USE extended ONLY period. Emergency on AUAB related to COVID-19. i DODIG-2020-128 (Project No. D2020-D000RJ-0123.000) │ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Audit of Screening and Quarantine Procedures for ResultsPersonnel Entering in Brief Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar Finding (cont’d) If screening procedures are not consistently applied (U//FOUO) Squadron Commander began requiring to all personnel entering AUAB, there is a risk that Security Squadron Flight Chiefs to provide refresher U.S. military, civilian, and contractor personnel training on both Medical Group-recommended may contract and spread COVID-19. If a surge in procedures and travel pass procedures. The Security COVID-19 cases develops, ongoing operations and Squadron documented the Medical Group-provided exercises in Qatar and the U.S. Central Command COVID-19 training using sign-in rosters, and provided area of responsibility could be canceled, postponed, them to demonstrate to us that all posts and patrols or impacted by staffing shortages caused by rapid were briefed on COVID-19 procedures weekly. increases in infected personnel. The training includes procedures for checking travel Recommendations passes for personnel entering AUAB through the North or East Gate, the requirement We recommend that the 379th AEW Commander formalize, through issuance of official documentation with signature, the training, screening, and The actions taken by management address the quarantine procedures. deficiencies we identified during the audit by formally documenting the screening and quarantine procedures (U//FOUO) We recommend that the 379th Security and training requirements, and by performing Squadron Commander provide refresher training refresher training on COVID-19 screening procedures to ensure that Security Squadron personnel for the gate. The actions taken address the specifics require individuals entering AUAB to display entry of Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, and 2. Therefore, documentation for verification of their ability to access Recommendations 1.a, 1.b, and 2 are closed. Please see the base and that the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations. Management Actions and Our Response (U//FOUO) On August 21, 2020, the 379th AEW Public Health Emergency Officer issued a memorandum formally documenting standardized COVID-19 screening procedures for personnel entering the installation through the North Gate and air terminal. According to the guidance, Medical Group personnel will train Security Squadron personnel, and documentation will be retained to support that training was provided. Additionally, the guidance states that the 379th AEW will submit lessons learned to U.S. Air Forces Central Command/A9. As of July 17, 2020, the Security FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ii │ DODIG-2020-128 (Project No. D2020-D000RJ-0123.000) FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Recommendations Table Recommendations Recommendations Recommendations Management Unresolved Resolved Closed 379th Air Expeditionary Wing Commander None None 1.a, 1.b 379th Expeditionary Security Forces None None 2 Squadron Commander Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations. • Unresolved – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation. • Resolved – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation. • Closed – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY iii DODIG-2020-128 (Project No. D2020-D000RJ-0123.000) │ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY INSPECTOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500 September 24, 2020 MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR PERSONNEL AND READINESS COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE SUBJECT: Audit of Screening and Quarantine Procedures for Personnel Entering Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar (Report No. DODIG-2020-128) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General’s audit. We considered management actions taken when preparing the final report. Management actions taken addressed the recommendations in this report, and we consider the recommendations closed. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact me at Richard B. Vasquez Assistant Inspector General for Audit Readiness and Global Operations FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY v DODIG-2020-128 │ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Contents Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Objective 1 ................................................................................................................................................................................................................... Background 1 ................................................ Audit Team Observations of North Gate and Air Terminal Procedures 9 .................................................................................................................................................................... Finding.Review of Internal The Controls 379th AEW Developed Screening 10 Procedures, but the Procedures Are Not Consistently Implemented for Personnel Entering AUAB .............................................................................................................................................................................
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