Peter Krause, Stephen Van Evera

MIDDLE EAST POLICY , VOL . XVI, NO.3, FALL 2009 PUBLIC DI P LOMACY : ID EAS FOR THE WAR OF ID EAS Peter Krause, Stephen Van Evera Mr. Krause is a Ph.D. candidate in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) political science department. Dr. Van Evera is Ford international professor of political science at MIT, acting director of the MIT Security Studies Program, and chair of the Tobin Project national security working group. he United States cannot defeat tions for improvement. A theme of these al-Qaeda by strength of arms suggestions is that U.S. public diplomacy alone. It must also change the should emphasize dialogue over one-way terms of debate in the Arab/Mus- monologue. Instead of simply turning Tlim world, especially in its radical wing. up the volume of its message, the United How can this best be accomplished? What States should provide mechanisms for strategy should the United States adopt Americans and the world’s Muslims to talk for what is often called the “war of ideas” to one another. against radical Islam? A second theme is that U.S. public The Barack Obama administration diplomacy should emphasize objective has vastly improved on its predecessor’s facts over propaganda. A third is that approach to the war of ideas. As a result, U.S. public diplomacy should convey the global terms of debate have improved respect to the audience. A fourth theme since the change of administrations in is that the United States should con- January 2009. But recent U.S. gains are test the al-Qaeda narrative directly; an shallow and reversible. They fall short of indirect discussion that leaves al-Qaeda’s the change in opinion needed to defeat the claims unrefuted is not enough. A fifth al-Qaeda network. Moreover, they mainly is that new nongovernmental organiza- reflect President Obama’s subtle instinct tions (NGOs) that address pernicious for public persuasion. As such, they could ideas around the world could help defeat be undone by a change in U.S. leader- the al-Qaeda narrative. Bringing these ship. These gains should be consolidated NGOs into being should be considered. by embedding them in stable policies that A sixth theme is that conflicts involving will create and sustain favorable terms of Muslims feed the al-Qaeda narrative; debate over the long term. hence, the United States should adopt a Accordingly, we survey and assess more muscular policy aimed at dampen- recent and current U.S. public diplomacy ing conflicts involving Muslims as a part toward the Muslim world and offer sugges- of its war of ideas.1 © 2009, The Authors Journal Compilation © 2009, Middle East Policy Council 106 KRAUSE & VA N EV ERA : PUBLIC DI P LO M ACY U.S. UNPOPULARITY, AL-QAEDA percent).4 In contrast, the publics of only POPULARITY four states identified al-Qaeda as the great- Foreign views of the United States were est threat to their country.5 Large majorities broadly favorable before the United States in Pakistan, Egypt, Turkey and Indonesia attacked Iraq in March 2003, but grew very did not even believe that groups of Arabs negative, especially in the Arab and Muslim carried out the September 11, 2001, attacks worlds, during the years before the Obama in the United States.6 Instead, they widely administration took office in January 2009. embraced bizarre conspiracy theories that During the administration’s first months, blamed the Israeli Mossad, the American foreign attitudes toward the United States CIA or other dark forces. improved somewhat but remained nega- Public support for the U.S.-led war tive overall. Foreign views of al-Qaeda on terror waned accordingly. Between have also declined since 2002, but al-Qaeda 2002 and 2007, public support for U.S.- still enjoys a core of popular support in the led efforts against terror fell from 69 to 38 Muslim world. As a result of its own un- percent in Britain, from 75 to 43 percent in popularity abroad and al-Qaeda’s remaining France, from 70 to 42 percent in Germany, popularity, the United States faces a stiff from 30 to 9 percent in Turkey and from headwind in its struggle against al-Qaeda. 20 to 13 percent in Pakistan.7 Its own unpopularity costs the United States Foreign attitudes toward the United support, and al-Qaeda’s remaining popular- States improved in the early months of ity is enough to sustain its efforts to find the Obama administration, but remained recruits, money and safe havens. negative overall. For example, the percent During 1999-2000, public attitudes of Egyptians who are highly confident that toward the United States were positive in the U.S. president will do the right thing much of Europe and the Muslim world, in international affairs rose sharply under averaging 74 percent among those polled Obama, from 8 percent in January 2008 to in Britain, France and Germany, and 68 39 percent in April/May 2009. However, percent in Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco. Egyptians’ views of U.S. foreign policy However, by 2005, U.S. favorability had remained negative. In April/May 2009, plummeted to an average of 46 percent in 67 percent of Egyptians still believed that Britain, France and Germany, and to 42 the United States plays a negative role percent in Indonesia, Turkey and Morocco.2 in the world. Large majorities continued By 2007, publics around the world to believe that the United States seeks to widely saw the United States as a threat weaken and divide the Muslim world (76 to their countries. In fact, many people percent), to control Mideast oil (80 per- considered the United States to be the cent), and to impose its culture on Muslim greatest threat. In a poll taken that year, countries (80 percent). Sixty percent said the publics of 17 states, including Pakistan, that the creation of a Palestinian state is not Bangladesh, Turkey, Indonesia, China, a U.S. goal. These numbers are virtually Russia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Brazil, unchanged from 2008.8 identified the United States as the greatest Public support for Osama bin Laden threat to their country.3 Remarkably, more in the Muslim world declined sharply after Pakistanis saw the United States as a threat 2002, but remained substantial in absolute (64 percent) than saw India as a threat (45 terms. In 2007, 41 percent of the public in 107 MIDDLE EAST POLICY , VOL . XVI, NO.3, FALL 2009 Indonesia and 38 percent in Pakistan had from which it can move at will into Af- confidence that Bin Laden would do the ghanistan, and because Pakistan’s security right thing regarding world affairs in 2007 services covertly give it direct support.13 (down from 59 percent and 46 percent, Second, al-Qaeda’s leadership has also respectively, in 2003).9 found a secure haven in Pakistan’s north- The war on al-Qaeda is not an election. west region. It has exploited this haven to It will not be decided by public opinion scale up its training activities, to support an alone. But the negative foreign attitudes invasion by its allies of Pakistan’s Swat val- reported above matter. They prevent the ley and Buner district, and to plan attacks United States from gaining important help throughout the rest of Pakistan, as well as in from individuals and governments, and they the Mideast and the West. With this haven leave space for al-Qaeda to find the recruits, in Pakistan, al-Qaeda can stay in business funds and havens it needs to stay in business. indefinitely and be free to grow in size, Since 9/11, important intelligence develop expertise and continue its search has often come from foreign citizens who for weapons of mass destruction. Al-Qaeda volunteered information. Ramzi Yousef, the burgeoned in the 1990s, eventually de- organizer of the 1993 World Trade Center veloping cells in over 60 countries, partly attack and the foiled 1994 Bojinka airliner because it enjoyed a haven in Taliban-ruled attack, was captured in Pakistan on a tip in Afghanistan, where it trained thousands of 1995.10 Khaled Sheikh Mohammed (KSM), recruits in safety. If al-Qaeda is allowed a organizer of the 9/11 attack, was captured in secure haven in Pakistan for any length of 2003 with help from phone tips.11 A 2006 time, this dangerous cycle will be repeated. al-Qaeda plot to bomb a number of planes in Al-Qaeda will expand to become larger and mid-air was foiled in Britain by a tip from a more lethal than it is today. member of the British Muslim community, These twin setbacks reflect distemper likely saving thousands of lives.12 These in Pakistani public and elite opinion. The instances reassure us that the United States Taliban and al-Qaeda find haven and recruits has friends in the Muslim world. They also in Pakistan’s northwest region because they show, however, that the United States would are popular with the people there, while the have more intelligence if it had more friends. Pakistani government and the United States The harm to U.S. security caused by are wildly unpopular. As Jane Perlez of The hostile opinion in the Muslim world is New York Times reports, “Many Pakistanis manifest today in the Pakistan/Afghanistan ... see the militants not as the enemy, but as region. Two dangerous setbacks for U.S. fellow Muslims who are deserving of greater policy are happening there, both stemming sympathy than are the American aims.”14 in large part from public attitudes in Paki- Pakistan’s security services support the stan, where the United States is very un- Taliban and give al-Qaeda wide latitude popular and al-Qaeda is somewhat popular, in the northwest partly because the United especially in the northwest region bordering States has not pressed Pakistan’s govern- Afghanistan.

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