G20 Contribution to the 2030 Agenda PROGRESS and WAY FORWARD Acknowledgements “In Addition to Its Core Economic

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G20 Contribution to the 2030 Agenda PROGRESS and WAY FORWARD Acknowledgements “In Addition to Its Core Economic G20 contribution to the 2030 Agenda PROGRESS AND WAY FORWARD Acknowledgements “In addition to its core economic This report was prepared by Kerri Elgar (OECD Sherpa Office) mandate, the G20’s work and Benjamin Schlier (OECD Development Centre) under the supervision of Nicolas Pinaud and Nejla Saula (OECD Sherpa encompasses action on key global Office), Federico Bonaglia (OECD Development Centre) and Thierry Soret (UNDP Co-ordinator for G20 and Multilateral Affairs). social and environmental challenges, For the OECD, Gabriela Ramos (OECD Sherpa and Chief of Staff) contributing to the provision of provided strategic guidance to the project. Simon Scott and Guillaume Cohen (OECD Statistics Directorate) provided statistical global public goods and supporting oversight and advice. Additional substantive and statistical analysis on the G20’s contribution to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable the integration of low-income Development was provided by: (from OECD) Marianne Aalto, Jesus Anton, Adele Atkinson, Andrew Auerbach, Matthias Bachmann, and developing countries into a Timothy Bishop, Sarah Box, Raffaella Centurelli, Anthony Cox, Mary Crane, Assia Elgouacem, Ana Fernandes, Sara Fyson, Justine sustainable global economy.“ Garrett, Juan Garin, Naoko Kawaguchi, Andre Laboul, Miles Larbey, Julia Nielson, Edward Perry, Nadine Piefer, Dirk Pilat, Nejla Saula, Rolf Schwarz, Isabel Seeger, Gregor Slokan, Hector Tajonar de Lara and Wiebke Bartz-Zuccala; and (from UNDP) Randi Davis, Esuna Dugarova, Radha Kulkarni, Sahba Sobhani, James Vener, Douglas Webb. Toru Oe (World Bank), Pilar Garcia Martinez (International Monetary Fund) and Candice Welsch (UNODC) also provided valuable inputs. Janine Treves (OECD Public Affairs and Communications) and Anna Ikic (OECD Sherpa Unit) provided editorial advice and support. The OECD and UNDP would like to thank the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for its support in this work, as well as G20 Development Working Group members for their comments on the report. © OECD, UNDP 2019 This document was prepared by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the United Nations Development Programme as an input for the discussions in the G20 Development Working Group (DWG) in 2019 under the G20 Japanese Presidency. The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily represent the official views of the members of the G20, nor of the member countries of the OECD; nor those of the United Nations, including UNDP, nor of the UN Member States. This document, as well as any data and any map included herein, are without prejudice to the status of or sovereignty over any territory, to the delimitation of international frontiers and boundaries and to the name of any territory, city or area, and do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the OECD, the Secretariat of the United Nations or UNDP concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area or its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. CONTENTS | 1 Table of contents Preface by the Secretary-General of the OECD 2 Preface by the UNDP Administrator 3 Foreword 5 Introduction 6 Economic dimension of Sustainable Development 8 Growth strategies 8 Domestic resource mobilisation 9 Trade and investment 11 Agriculture, food security and nutrition 13 Infrastructure 15 Financial inclusion and remittances 16 Industrialisation 18 International financial architecture 19 Social dimension of Sustainable Development 21 Human resource development, employment and education 21 Global health 22 Inclusive business 24 Environmental dimension of Sustainable Development 25 Marine environment 25 Climate and green finance 26 Energy 27 Cross-cutting issues and partnerships 29 Gender equality 29 Innovation 31 Anti-corruption 33 Multi-stakeholder dialogues and co-operation 34 2 | G20 CONTRIBUTION TO THE 2030 AGENDA Preface by the Secretary-General of the OECD The G20 has long recognised that developing countries, just improved financial stability; providing the substantive basis like advanced economies, are central to the achievement of for principles on artificial intelligence; reporting on the G20’s the G20’s overarching objective of strong, sustainable and progress on gender and women’s inclusion in the workforce; balanced growth. Framed initially by the Seoul Development and contributing to the Presidency’s policy priorities on Consensus in 2010, the G20’s work on sustainable quality infrastructure, ageing and financial inclusion. development has changed shape and expanded over time. In 2015, with the global agreement of the 2030 Agenda for We are nevertheless at a critical juncture for international fora Sustainable Development, the G20 has further stepped up its and for multilateralism in general, as highlighted by recent engagement on sustainable development. Since then, G20 developments on trade and climate. It has become clear that Leaders have consistently recognised the unique and crucial collective ambition is in danger of weakening, just when role of this co-ordination forum in advancing and supporting it needs to be enhanced in the face of pressing challenges the implementation of the global goals, both within and faced by the global economy and the international beyond its member countries’ borders. This collective community. As the prime forum for international economic commitment is outlined in the G20’s Action Plan on the 2030 co-operation, the G20 can – and should – do more. The G20 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted in 2016, and can lead by example in several ways: fully embed sustainable taken forward through concrete actions and annual progress development in its own actions; provide critical support updates. to global public goods, including by advancing the AAAA; support developing countries’ own capacities to design and Four years on, what has this G20 commitment helped to implement sustainable development strategies. Against achieve and how can these efforts be measured? This report, this background, 2019 marks a very timely checkpoint for prepared for Japan’s G20 Presidency in 2019, examines and the global goals and for the G20 to provide much-needed assesses the G20’s collective contributions based on its own leadership. As the 2030 deadline looms ever-larger on the Action Plan. In doing so, it identifies a number of areas where horizon, world leaders will come together in New York in the G20 can demonstrate concrete progress in supporting September 2019 to take stock of progress and to reassess global prosperity, reducing the risks of instability and shocks, their respective roadmaps for the future. The clock is ticking, and reinforcing co-ordination across the global goals. Beyond much is at stake and failure is not an option. these, the report also identifies some key areas where the G20 has further to go in implementing the Sustainable As a long-standing partner of the G20, and best supporting Development Goals (SDGs) and the Addis Ababa Action actor on the UN-led global effort to achieve the SDGs, the Agenda (AAAA) on Financing for Development. OECD is committed to supporting the G20’s efforts on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, working Overall, this assessment is good news. It shows that the in partnership with the United Nations and the broader G20’s outputs and outcomes are increasingly aligned with, multilateral system. We hope the value of this assessment and are making a positive contribution to, the global goals, will lie not only in collating the robust data and evidence often working in close collaboration with international needed to inform G20 members’ decision making, but also in organisations. This year, in addition to this report, the OECD deepening the G20’s broader narrative and outreach efforts is very proud to be supporting a range of key G20 outcomes. on its global contributions. These include: inputs to the international tax agenda generating billions of dollars of new tax revenue; revision of the OECD Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements enabling countries to better manage capital flows for Angel Gurría, Secretary-General of the OECD PREFACE | 3 Preface by the UNDP Administrator Four years ago, the international community agreed Secretary-General in September 2019. The summit will take on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, the stock of the global efforts that are already being made and Addis Ababa Action Agenda, and the Paris Agreement on it will identify future actions to accelerate progress towards Climate Change as a set of key blueprints to chart a better the SDGs. future for all. The G20 made a valued contribution to these global efforts in 2016 by adopting the G20’s Action Plan In this respect, much remains to be done if we are to on the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development – a realize all 17 SDGs fully and the G20 Osaka Summit is being policy framework to align the G20 Agenda with the 2030 convened at a critical juncture and a time of uncertainty. Agenda – and ultimately aimed at contributing to global We cannot afford to delay urgent actions needed to efforts to achieve all 17 Sustainable Development Goals address the extensive and intertwined challenges such as (SDGs) by 2030. Acting upon this plan, G20 members took poverty and rising inequality; climate change; migration swift action to advance concrete sustainable development and forced displacement. The international community will outcomes in a number of key areas, in particular by also need to pivot to respond to the major transformations supporting developing countries to implement the 2030 that are currently taking place such as the “4th Industrial Agenda according to their national priorities and to assist Revolution” and the digital economy as well as co- them in the provision of global public goods. ordinating efforts to ensure that the global economy remains open and stable. These complex challenges will Reflecting on this valued support, this report examines impact upon each and every one of us in some way and how the G20 has collectively contributed to the Action it is clearly evident that no one country can tackle these Plan’s defined Sustainable Development Sectors (SDS) challenges alone.
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