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Mediterraneo Allargato Mediterraneo allargato Maggio 2021 16 A cura dell'Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI) AUTORI Al presente Focus, curato da Valeria Talbot, hanno contribuito: Eleonora Ardemagni (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore e ISPI) – CAPITOLO 1(YEMEN) E ARABIA SAUDITA Anna Maria Bagaini (Università di Nottingham) – CAPITOLO 1(TENSIONI TRA ISRAELE E GAZA), ISRAELE Federico Borsari (ISPI) – APPROFONDIMENTO Silvia Carenzi (Scuola Normale Superiore e Scuola Superiore Sant’Anna) – CAPITOLO 1 (SIRIA) Matteo Colombo (Clingendael e ISPI) – CAPITOLO 1 (SIRIA) Fabio Frettoli (Fondazione Agenfor International) – TUNISIA Paolo Maggiolini (Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore e ISPI) – GIORDANIA Alessia Melcangi (Università La Sapienza e ISPI) – EGITTO Annalisa Perteghella (ISPI) – IRAN Federica Saini Fasanotti (Brookings Institution e ISPI) – LIBIA Francesco Salesio Schiavi (ISPI) – IRAQ Valeria Talbot (ISPI) – TURCHIA Mappe e infografiche di Matteo Colombo (Clingendael e ISPI) Focus Mediterraneo allargato n. 16 - maggio 2021 SOMMARIO Executive summary ........................................................................................................................................ 4 Executive summary (English version) ......................................................................................................... 5 1. Arco di crisi ........................................................................................................................................... 6 La Siria a dieci anni dalle rivolte. Le elezioni presidenziali, la crisi socio-economica e le dinamiche nelle varie regioni .............................................................................................................. 6 Yemen, sincronia diplomatica cercasi ........................................................................................................ 13 Tensioni tra Israele e Gaza .......................................................................................................................... 17 2. Analisi Focus Paese .................................................................................................................................. 20 Arabia Saudita ................................................................................................................................................ 20 Egitto .............................................................................................................................................................. 25 Giordania ....................................................................................................................................................... 31 Iran .............................................................................................................................................................. 41 Iraq .............................................................................................................................................................. 49 Israele .............................................................................................................................................................. 56 Libia .............................................................................................................................................................. 63 Tunisia ............................................................................................................................................................ 68 Turchia ........................................................................................................................................................... 74 3. Approfondimento .............................................................................................................................. 82 La politica estera della presidenza Biden in Medio Oriente e Nord Africa ......................................... 82 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Negli ultimi mesi nell’area del Mediterraneo allargato si sono registrati timidi segnali incoraggianti in campo diplomatico, nonostante al proprio interno la maggior parte degli stati stia fronteggiando le conseguenze di un anno di pandemia, con difficoltà economiche sfociate spesso in crisi sociali e politiche. A livello regionale, numerosi governi sono alle prese con una rimodulazione della propria strategia come conseguenza della nuova diplomazia americana a firma Biden; in Iran le trattative in corso a Vienna, che potrebbero portare a un re-engagement americano nell’accordo sul nucleare iraniano, e i segnali di apertura che arrivano da Riyadh, fanno da sfondo alla corsa per le elezioni presidenziali di giugno, dove l’attuale leadership moderata rischia di non venire riconfermata a causa della grave crisi economica che colpisce il paese. Dall’altra parte del Golfo, l’Arabia Saudita porta avanti una politica estera dai tratti più moderati rispetto al passato, nel tentativo di mantenere la tradizionale “relazione speciale” con Washington. All’insegna della moderazione e della de-escalation è stata anche la strategia della Turchia, dove il presidente Erdoğan intensifica gli sforzi per uscire dall’isolamento diplomatico cercando non solo canali di dialogo con Egitto, Arabia Saudita, Grecia, Cipro e Israele ma anche rinnovate relazioni bilaterali con Washington e Bruxelles. Questa intensa attività diplomatica turca arriva dopo mesi di forte crisi monetaria, le cui conseguenze inflazionistiche potrebbero scalfire il consenso nei confronti del partito di governo. Rimane forte la presenza turca in Libia, dove il neoeletto Governo di unità nazionale (Gnu), guidato da Abdul Hamid Mohammed Dbeibah, fatica ad imporsi nelle numerose sfide che si trova davanti. Il governo Dbeibah, che ha il compito di traghettare il paese verso le elezioni di dicembre, ha incassato importanti risultati politici anche se, sul fronte militare, sembra ancora lontano l’obiettivo di ritirare le milizie straniere presenti nel paese. Ad auspicare una stabilizzazione della situazione in Libia sono soprattutto i paesi vicini; la Tunisia da un lato, che si trova di fronte ad una crisi istituzionale che rischia di portare il paese all’ingovernabilità, e l’Egitto dall’altro, dove il presidente al-Sisi si è dimostrato un forte sostenitore di una soluzione politica per la Libia. Il governo del Cairo è alle prese con una crisi economica dettata principalmente dalla precaria sicurezza sociale della popolazione (frutto delle politiche di austerità degli ultimi mesi) e dalla fragilità delle infrastrutture egiziane, dimostrata soprattutto dall’incidente del Canale di Suez. Per quanto riguarda i teatri di guerra regionali, la situazione nello Yemen appare alquanto incerta, con gli incoraggianti sviluppi a livello di diplomazia internazionale che non trovano un riscontro sul terreno, dove gli huthi continuano la loro offensiva verso la strategica città di Marib. Il fronte siriano, invece, rimane cristallizzato dalle tre potenze esterne (Turchia, Russia e Iran) che esercitano la propria influenza sulle dinamiche del conflitto, mentre le elezioni presidenziali del 26 maggio metteranno in luce la capacità di mobilitazione della popolazione da parte del presidente Assad. Il futuro della Siria è uno dei dossier, insieme a quello iraniano, che preoccupa maggiormente Israele. A Tel Aviv le recenti elezioni parlamentari non hanno prodotto un risultato capace di garantire stabilità politica al paese, mentre il premier uscente Benjamin Netanyahu si trova ad affrontare l'escalation di tensioni a Gerusalemme culminata in un nuovo scontro con Hamas con decine di vittime da entrambe le parti. Nella vicina Giordania, invece, la famiglia reale ha dovuto far fronte al presunto tentativo di colpo di stato, sintomo di un crescente malcontento da parte dei giordani verso la leadership hashemita. 4 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (ENGLISH VERSION) Over the past few months, diplomacy in the Mediterranean has experienced a few modest, encouraging signs, despite most countries in the area are facing the consequences of the pandemic and its economic challenges, which have often spilled over onto social and political crises. At the regional level, a number of governments are adjusting their own strategy as a result of the Biden administration’s new brand of American diplomacy, exemplified by the negotiations with Iran in Vienna – which might ultimately lead to a US re-engagement as regards the Iran nuclear deal – and a newfound openness coming out of Riyadh. Both instances represent the backdrop of the upcoming presidential election in June, wherein the current moderate leadership is unlikely to be reconfirmed following the dire economic crisis that has befallen the country. On the other side of the Gulf, Saudi Arabia is advancing a more moderate kind of foreign policy in an attempt to maintain its traditional “special relationship” with Washington. Turkey’s strategy has also been in the name of cautiousness and de-escalation, with President Erdoğan intensifying his efforts to retreat from diplomatic isolation and looking for opportunities for dialogue with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel as well as renewed bilateral relations with Washington and Brussels. Such intense diplomatic activities from the Turkish front come months after an acute currency crisis, whose inflationary consequences might make a small dent on support for the central government. Turkey’s presence in Libya is still solid, where the newly elected Government of National Accord headed by Abdul Hamid Mohammed
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