DOCSLIB.ORG

Finance Curse Analysis

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Finance Curse Analysis Now a major new book! “Occupation Jersey” (2007). ǡ Ǥ May 2013 Nicholas Shaxson is author of Poisoned Wells, a book about the Resource John Christensen is the former economic adviser to the British Crown Curse based on 14 years’ research in west Africa; and also author of Treasure Dependency of Jersey, a pre-eminent British tax haven. Having originally Islands, a book about tax havens and financial centres. He has written regularly trained as a forensic fraud investigator, he is now the director of the Tax Justice for the Financial Times, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Vanity Fair, and many Network, a member of the OECD Task Force on Tax and Development, and a others. board member of Washington, D.C.-based New Rules for Global Finance. INTRODUCTION It is now well known that many countries poor peers. This paradox of poverty from which depend on earnings from natural plenty has been extensively studied and is resources like oil have failed to harness them known as the Resource Curse. for national development. In many cases it seems even worse than that: for all the This book asks whether some countries hundreds of billions of dollars sloshing into ϐ countries like oil-rich Nigeria, for instance, may be suffering from a similar, and related, ϐ ǡ phenomenon. economic growth, greater corruption, higher inequality, less political freedom and often ϐ more absolute poverty than their resource- – and not just for reasons related to the global The Finance Curse 2 ϐ ʹͲͲ͹ȀͺǤ ϐ more surprisingly, this phenomenon that we such as the Cayman Islands or Cyprus, are calling the Finance Curse is similar in these complexities are stripped away and many ways to the Resource Curse: there are big the phenomenon is laid bare in purer, more overlaps in both their causes and their effects. crystallised forms which are easier to see and understand. The Finance Curse has been evident for decades – and if untreated it may well endure for years The tax havens, which we have studied or even decades after the latest crisis has blown extensively, carry important lessons – and over. Ȃϐ Ǧ countries. ϐ ǡ and for decades academic studies suggested that bigger is generally better when it comes The book ϐ Ǥ This book starts with a brief overview of the all that research into question. New evidence is Resource Curse. The main sections that follows, starting to emerge from the IMF, the Bank for on the Finance Curse, start by looking at the International Settlements and others, revealing most important and most widely publicised ǡϐ Ǥ ϐ sectors. Our book, drawing on our many years of hands- on experience of both resource-dependent We then examine these claims in turn and ϐ Ǧǡ reveal why nearly all of them are wrong. Along far beyond the boundaries of their research the way we expose catastrophic errors in to create an unprecedented comprehensive studies that claim to demonstrate to policy body of evidence about the perils of oversized Ǯ ǯϐ Ǥ ϐ Ǥ Next, we show that not only is the ϐ Ǯ ǯϐ the City of London, for instance, Britain than advertised, but it is worse than that: a performs worse on major human development ϐ indicators – inequality, infant mortality, poverty, ϐ Ǥ and more – than Germany, Sweden, Canada plausibly say that for many countries, the net and most of its other rich-country peers. Each Ǯ ǯϐ ailment has many explanations, but oversized – in some cases strongly so. ϐ Ǥ The picture is – of course – not a simple one. Many of these effects, particularly the political Country capture ǡ ϐǤ The Finance Curse is a story about “Country damage is probably more acute in small dzȂϐ ϐ ǡ ϐ Ǧ larger countries such as Britain or the United dependent country and to dominate and States the damage is probably felt more heavily hollow out its economy. Some elements of this in economic terms. ‘capture’ are already well understood but our book introduces a wide range of new ideas and And just as some resource-rich countries like analysis. Norway or Chile seem to have successfully avoided or managed the Resource Curse, some ϐ Ǧ ϐ Ǧ Britain or the United States, the Finance Curse’s or Luxembourg seem to have tempered or even causes and effects are masked by background avoided the Finance Curse. noise in large, raucous democracies. But in The Finance Curse 3 But some countries such as Britain and the before the crisis erupted. United States genuinely do seem cursed by ϐ Ǥ Our Finance Curse thesis cuts through this widely regarded as the Goose that Lays the Gordian knot. Taking it on board puts power Golden Eggs often turns out to be a very right back in the hands of democratically different bird: a Cuckoo in the Nest, crowding ϐ Ǥ ϐ is out, hollowing out and undermining other harmful, then it makes clear political and economic sectors. Very often, the interests of economic sense to regulate and tax this ϐ ϐ sector appropriately. If the end result is less national interest. ϐ ǡϐ Ǥ It is therefore absolutely not necessary to Our analysis has profound implications. participate in the ‘competitive’ race on lower Financiers routinely cry ‘don’t tax or regulate ϐ ǡ us too much or you will be ‘uncompetitive’ and obvious course of action is national leadership we will run away to Geneva or London or Hong on better standards, even in the absence of Kong’ – and far too often the politicians quail collective international agreements. and give them what they want. These threats and fears are perhaps the most important Finally, this is a book about how global ϐ ϐ appropriately, and why big banks are bigger countries, important though that subject is. It and potentially more dangerous today than Ǧϐ harm its host country. The Finance Curse 4 ǡϔ Quotable quotes Ǥ ǡ ǣǯ ǥ ǯ Ǥ Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo Stephen Cecchetti author of a Bank for International Settlements 1 Ǧ ǡͳͻ͹͸ ǡʹͲͳʹ ϔ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Michael Edwardes Ǥ ǡͳͻͺͲ Tony Dolphin ǡ Ǥ ϔ Ǥ David Potter Viktor Vekselberg ex-entrepreneur and Russian conglomerate owner2 ϐ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Martin Wolf ’ chief economic commentator … ϐ tougher banking rules would drive away4 Ǥ Simon Johnson ǡʹͲͲͻ ǡ ǯ Ǥ Vince Cable John Maynard Keynes UK Business Secretary3 Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ ǣ ǡǤ The Manchester Capitalism blog collectively written by academics focusing on the UK’s regional 1 Interview with Terry Lynn Karl, Caracas, 1976, cited in Karl, The Paradox of economic disparities. Plenty: oil booms and petro-states, California, 1997, p4. Karl’s books was one of the seminal books about the Resource Curse. 2 Cited in Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super- Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else, 2012 4 Banking reforms after the Libor scandal, Martin Wolf’s Exchange, FT blogs, 3 Put aside the City’s whingeing, Vince Cable, The Guardian Dec 20, 2011 July 2, 2012 The Finance Curse 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.3 The case for finance 21 INTRODUCTION 2 2.3.1 We need finance! 21 Country capture 3 2.3.2 Finance makes you rich 21 The book 3 2.3.3 The tax contribution. 21 2.3.4 The jobs contribution 22 Quotable quotes 5 2.3.5 The GDP/growth contribution 22 2.3.6 The Regional Contribution 22 1.0 THE RESOURCE CURSE 8 2.3.7 The efficiency contribution 23 Introduction 8 2.3.8 The trade surplus contribution 23 1.1 The Resource Curse: Outcomes 9 2.3.9 “It’s all we’ve got!” 23 1.1.1 Slower economic growth 9 2.3.10 “What about Switzerland?” 23 1.1.2 Crowding-out 9 2.4 The Bogus Claims 24 1.1.3 Unemployment, poor job creation 10 2.4.1 How much finance do we need? 24 1.1.4 Inequality, poverty, human indicators 10 2.4.2 Does finance really make you rich? 25 1.1.5 Authoritarianism, political freedom 10 2.4.3 What is the real tax contribution? 25 1.1.6 Conflict 11 2.4.4 What is the real jobs contribution? 29 1.1.7 Corruption 11 2.4.5 What is the real GDP contribution? 30 1.2 The Roots of the Resource Curse 12 2.4.6 What is the real regional contribution? 31 1.2.1 Resource Curse roots: Dutch Disease 12 2.4.7 What is the real efficiency contribution? 33 1.2.2 Resource Curse roots: The brain drain 12 2.4.8 What is the real trade surplus 1.2.3 Resource Curse roots: Volatility 12 contribution? 33 1.2.4 Resource Curse roots: Rents 13 2.4.9 “It’s all we’ve got;” path dependency 34 1.2.5 Resource Curse roots: 2.4.10 Why is Switzerland rich? 34 “Top-down” money flow 13 2.5 Is it even worse than that: A Curse? 38 1.2.6 The ‘scramble’, or the 2.5.1 Economic losses and other outcomes 38 contemptible struggle 14 2.5.1.1 Slower, narrower growth: Peak 1.3 Norway: a counter-example? 16 Finance? 38 Summary 16 2.5.1.2 Further tax losses 41 2.5.1.3 Crowding Out, withering of 2.0 THE FINANCE CURSE 17 alternative sectors 44 2.1 Introduction to the Finance Curse: 2.5.1.4 Loss of entrepreneurialism and A Prima Facie Case. 17 productivity; hollowing-out 46 2.2 The Core Narrative: 2.5.1.5 Financialisation as economic capture 48 Country Capture 19 2.2.1 Economic Capture 19 2.5.1.6 Volatility, instability, and crises 52 2.2.1.1 Economic capture: 2.5.1.7 Inequality and poverty 53 Crowding-Out 19 2.5.2 Political outcomes 54 2.2.1.2 Economic capture: financial 2.5.2.1 Consensus, authoritarianism, and growth on steroids 19 political capture 54 2.2.2 Political capture 19 2.5.2.2 Offshore Secrecy 61 2.5.2.3 Corruption and criminalisation 64 The Finance Curse 6 2.6 Root Causes 68 Figure 13: Company versus personal taxes, Jersey, 2000-2011 (£m) 78 2.6.1 Root causes: Dutch Disease, Jersey Disease 68 2.6.2 Root causes: volatility 70 2.6.3 Root causes: Governance effects 71 Boxes 2.6.3.1 Economic rents 71 Box 1: The queue 15 2.6.3.2 The double-edged stability Box 2: Two fatal flaws in the lobbyists’ arguments 26 requirement 73 2.6.3.3 The arbitrage threat 77 Box 3: What are we measuring? 37 2.6.3.4 Top-down, concentrated source Box 4: The capture of Cyprus 56 of money 79 Box 5: Authoritarianism in Jersey 60 2.6.3.5 Inequality as a root cause 80 Box 6: The capture of the British establishment 62 2.6.3.6 The lobbying, revolving doors 80 Box 7: The British “spider’s web” 75 2.6.3.7 The small island syndrome 81 Box 8: “Too Big or Too Mobile to Fail or to Jail” 76 2.6.4 Final points.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Shana Vijayan Thesis.Pdf
    Performance Anxiety: The nature of performance management in the NHS under New Labour Shana Vijayan Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy Department of Science and Technology Studies University College London 0 Declaration I, Shana Vijayan, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 1 Abstract This thesis explores both the proliferation and prominence of ‘performance’ in the NHS, focusing on the New Labour years from 1997-2010. The research’s main objective was to understand how performance policy impacts the work-place experience: to understand the nature of work undertaken by performance managers, the tools used and the effect of these techniques. The secondary objective was to understand the goals of performance management. The introduction and rise of performance saw a change in expert authority. A new set of professionals had arrived in the NHS: regulators, auditors and performance managers. This thesis looks at the performance managers’ body of expertise, drawing upon several forms of qualitative research. The primary research tool used was institutional ethnography, which included focused interviews, a case study and experiences and notes gathered during a period based as a participant in NHS organisations. Documentary analysis carried out in the first phase of this thesis revealed that the principal rhetoric employed by politicians concerned the function of performance management in reducing risk and harm to patients. However, further research based on interviews and ethnography suggests that performance was experienced as a process of rationalisation and stigma, with risk rarely mentioned in the same way as in policy documents.
    [Show full text]
  • Royal Statistical Scandal
    Royal Statistical Scandal False and misleading claims by the Royal Statistical Society Including on human poverty and UN global goals Documentary evidence Matt Berkley Draft 27 June 2019 1 "The Code also requires us to be competent. ... We must also know our limits and not go beyond what we know.... John Pullinger RSS President" https://www.statslife.org.uk/news/3338-rss-publishes-revised-code-of- conduct "If the Royal Statistical Society cannot provide reasonable evidence on inflation faced by poor people, changing needs, assets or debts from 2008 to 2018, I propose that it retract the honour and that the President makes a statement while he holds office." Matt Berkley 27 Dec 2018 2 "a recent World Bank study showed that nearly half of low-and middle- income countries had insufficient data to monitor poverty rates (2002- 2011)." Royal Statistical Society news item 2015 1 "Max Roser from Oxford points out that newspapers could have legitimately run the headline ' Number of people in extreme poverty fell by 137,000 since yesterday' every single day for the past 25 years... Careless statistical reporting could cost lives." President of the Royal Statistical Society Lecture to the Independent Press Standards Organisation April 2018 2 1 https://www.statslife.org.uk/news/2495-global-partnership-for- sustainable-development-data-launches-at-un-summit 2 https://www.statslife.org.uk/features/3790-risk-statistics-and-the-media 3 "Mistaken or malicious misinformation can change your world... When the government is wrong about you it will hurt you too but you may never know how.
    [Show full text]
  • Rank: 21 History of a Caribbean Tax Haven
    NARRATIVE REPORT ON BRITISH VIRGIN ISLANDS PART 1: NARRATIVE REPORT British Virgin Islands: Rank: 21 history of a Caribbean tax haven Chart 1 - How Secretive? 60Secrecy Overview and background Score The British Virgin Islands (BVI) is ranked at 24th position in the Moderately 2015 Financial Index. It has a relatively high secrecy score of 60, secretive 3-40 though it accounts for only a small share of the global market for offshore financial services. Yet its relatively low ranking in our 4-50 index seriously understates its true importance in the world of 1 offshore secrecy, as this report explains . 5-60 The BVI is an archipelago of about 60 Caribbean islands with 6-70 fewer than 23,000 inhabitants. It is a British Overseas Territory, substantially controlled and supported by Britain, but with a fair degree of political autonomy. The UK ultimately has the power 7-80 to strike down BVI secrecy legislation, though it chooses not to. The BVI has long been linked to wave after wave of scandals; 8-90 Lord Oakeshott, a former top UK politician, said in 2013 that the BVI “stains the face of Britain.” Nevertheless, it has made Exceptionally secretive 9-00 some significant improvements in transparency in recent years, improving its secrecy score, though secrecy remains a key hallmark of its offshore sector. Chart 2 - How Big? The secrecy here comes most importantly from the BVI’s lax, flexible, ask-no-questions, see-no-evil company incorporation regime, which allows owners of companies to hide behind ‘nominees’ to achieve strong secrecy2, and to set up companies quickly and at low cost.
    [Show full text]
  • The Leveson Inquiry Into the Cultures, Practices And
    For Distribution to CPs THE LEVESON INQUIRY INTO THE CULTURES, PRACTICES AND ETHICS OE THE PRESS WITNESS STATEMENT OE JAMES HANNING I, JAMES HANNING of Independent Print Limited, 2 Derry Street, London, W8 SHF, WILL SAY; My name is James Hanning. I am deputy editor of the Independent on Sunday and, with Francis Elliott of The Times, co-author of a biography of David Cameron. In the course of co-writing and updating our book we spoke to a large number of people, but equally I am very conscious that I, at least, dipped into areas in which I can claim very little specialist knowledge, so I would emphasise that in several respects there are a great many people better placed to comment and much of what follows is impressionistic. I hope that what follows is germane to some of the relationships that Lord Justice Leveson has asked witnesses to discuss. I hesitate to try to draw a broader picture, but I hope that some conclusions about the disproportionate influence of a particular sector of the media can be drawn from my experience. My interest in the area under discussion in the Third Module stems from two topics. One is in David Cameron, on whose biography we began work in late 2005, soon after Cameron became Tory leader. The second is an interest in phone hacking at the News of the World. Tory relations with Murdoch Since early 2007, the Conservative leadership has been extremely keen to ingratiate itself with the Murdoch empire. It is striking how it had become axiomatic that the support of the Murdoch papers was essential for winning a general election.
    [Show full text]
  • Value, Caution and Accountability in an Era of Large Banks and Complex Finance*
    2011-2012 BETTING BIG 765 BETTING BIG: VALUE, CAUTION AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN AN ERA OF LARGE BANKS AND COMPLEX FINANCE* LAWRENCE G. BAXTER** Abstract Big banks are controversial. Their supporters maintain that they offer products, services and infrastructure that smaller banks simply cannot match and enjoy unprecedented economies of scale and scope. Detractors worry about the risks generated by big banks, their threats to financial stability, and the way they externalize costs of operation to the public. This article explains why there is no conclusive argument one way or the other and why simple measures for restricting the danger of big banks are neither plausible nor effective. The complex ecology of modern finance and the management and regulatory challenges generated by ultra-large banking, however, cast serious doubt on the proposition that the benefits of big banking outweigh its risks. Consequently, two general principles are proposed for further consideration. First, big banks should bear a greater degree of public accountability by reforming certain principles of corporate governance to require greater representation of public interests at the board and executive levels of big banks. Second, given the unproven promises of performance by big banks, their unimpressive actual record of performance, and the many hazards they inevitably generate or encounter, financial regulators should consciously adopt a strict cautionary approach. Under this approach, big banks would bear a very heavy onus to demonstrate in concrete terms that their continued growth – and even the maintenance of their current scale – can be adequately managed and supervised. * © Lawrence G. Baxter. ** Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke Law School.
    [Show full text]
  • The Development of the City of London As a Representative Body
    The development of the City of London as a representative body Paper given by Mark Boleat at Guildhall Historical Association, 20 January 2014 The City of London Corporation has the functions of a local authority in the Square Mile, but it is heavily involved in many other areas including arts and culture, open spaces, private education, food markets, the judiciary, policing and State events. The City Corporation also has a representative role for “the City”, a shorthand expression for the UK’s financial services industry. This role involves setting out the City position and seeking to influence public policy in the UK, Europe and globally. Why the City Corporation is involved in non-local authority functions is bound up in history, and partly reflects the financial resources at its disposal. This paper seeks to explain why and how the City has come to exercise its representative role. The representative role today It is helpful briefly to set out the nature of the City Corporation’s current representative role, before beginning to analyse how that role developed. The work today includes – The Lord Mayor’s overseas programme, which is largely promotional although there is some representative work on policy issues. This also applies to the Lord Mayor’s role in receiving foreign visitors. The Policy Chairman is involved in frequent meetings with politicians, think tanks and other opinion formers in the UK, and also on the international stage – in the EU, China, India and the US. The objective of this work is to influence policy, lobbying as some would call it.
    [Show full text]
  • RGS-IBG Field Research Programmes Maracá Rainforest Project Brazil
    RGS-IBG Field Research Programmes Maracá Rainforest Project Brazil 1987-1988 An ecological survey of the riverine island of Maracá, an important tropical forest reserve in Brazilian Amazonia, and four related programmes: forest regeneration; soils and hydrology; medical entomology; land development. At the invitation of the Brazilian Secretariat of the Environment, SEMA (Secretaria Especial do Meio Ambiente) and in association with the National Amazonian Research Institute, INPA (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas da Amazônia) Patron: HRH The Prince of Wales Leader: Dr John Hemming, Director and Secretary, Royal Geographical Society; Field Leader: Steve Bowles; Administrator: Fiona Watson. Scientific Programme Directors: Ecological Survey: Dr James Ratter, Chief Principal Scientific Officer, Royal Botanic Garden, Edinburgh; Brazilian counterpart, Dr Ângelo ds Santos, INPA Ecologia Forest Regeneration: Dr John Proctor, Department of Biological Science, University of Stirling; Brazilian counterpart, Dr João Ferraz, INPA Silvicultura. Soils and Hydrology: Professor John Thornes, Department of Geography, University of Bristol; Brazilian counterpart, Flávio Luizão, INPA Ecologia. Medical Entomology: Dr Victor Py-Daniel, INPA Entomologia. Land Development: Dr Peter Furley, Department of Geography, University of Edinburgh Number of members: 202 Duration: February 1987 - March 1988 and follow-up monitoring in 1989 and 1990 At the invitation of the Brazilian Environment of Roraima. Maracá is a vast 100,000-hectare Secretariat (SEMA) and in collaboration with the uninhabited island, 60 kilometres long and 25 National Amazon Research Institute (INPA), the kilometres wide, on the Uraricoera river, a RGS mounted the largest British project ever to tributary of the Amazon. Its forests, wetlands, work in Brazilian Amazonia. It was a welcome patches of savanna, and small hills are largely invitation, since, although Brazil contains almost unexplored.
    [Show full text]
  • Two-Faced Sun Shows Rupert Can Swing Both Ways If There's Somet
    Academic rigour, journalistic flair Subscribe Fourth estate follies Trawling through the dustbins of the UK media Two-faced Sun shows Rupert can swing both ways if there’s something in it for him May 1, 2015 5.06pm BST Author John Jewell Director of Undergraduate Studies, School of Journalism, Media and Cultural Studies, Cardiff University Whoever wins, Murdoch comes out in front. PA/Facundo Arrizabalaga The front pages of the Sun and the Scottish Sun on Thursday morning provided further evidence of Roy Greenslade’s recent assertion that the idea of a national press is a fallacy. In images which appear to have left the twitterati spluttering out their skinny lattes, the “English Sun”, in reference to the imminent Royal birth, had a rather hideous picture of a set of arms cradling a shawl with David Cameron’s head peeping out of the top. “Its A TORY” was the lame pronouncement. In the Scottish Sun, Nicola Sturgeon was portrayed brandishing a light sabre as an eerily misshapen Princess Leia from Star Wars. “Stur Wars” runs the headline, “May the 7th be with you: why it’s time to vote SNP.” The editorial said: Scotland voted No but there can be no doubt the referendum changed the nation. And today The Scottish Sun urges our readers to continue that change and vote for Nicola Sturgeon’s SNP on 7 May. One paper: two visions. The Sun Those expressing surprise that the UK Sun was supporting the Tories while its sister newspaper in Scotland supported the SNP should relax a little and understand that this positioning is nothing new.
    [Show full text]
  • The Jersey Way”- Moving on Iselin Jones, BA(Hons), MA, LLB
    “The Jersey Way”- moving on Iselin Jones, BA(Hons), MA, LLB. Paralegal, Corbett Le Quesne. Phil Palmer LLB, MA. Associate Professor, Institute of Law Jersey Abstract The 2017 Jersey Independent Care Inquiry report identified decades of significant child protection failures within the care system in Jersey. It also highlighted the ‘Jersey Way’ which it described as ‘a failure to establish a culture of openness and transparency, leading to a perception at least, of collusion and cover up’. The report made numerous recommendations designed to improve child protection arrangements on the Island. This article discusses the extent to which the outcome of the public inquiry will deliver justice for the victims of abuse. We argue that Inquiries are influenced by political bias, often failing to deliver what Burton and Carlen term discourse closure. We suggest adopting McAlinden and Naylor’s hybrid approach to justice, involving a combination of procedural and restorative justice, to bring the victims a true sense of closure. Key Words: Public Inquiries. Child Abuse. Procedural and Restorative Justice. The ‘Jersey Way’. Introduction The Jersey Independent Care Inquiry Report (JICIR) was hoped to draw a line once and for all over one of Jersey’s darkest periods. The report was initiated by the launch of Operation Rectangle in September 2007, originally an investigation into allegations of historical sexual abuse within the Jersey Sea Cadets before it expanded to include the former children’s home Haut de la Garenne (HDLG). It was only a few weeks later that revelations began pouring out from the HDLG investigation site. The island was in the throes of a moral panic- to the point where a coconut shell was mistaken for a child’s skull.
    [Show full text]
  • Retail Financial Services Bringing Real Benefits to Europe’S Customers 1.0 Foreword 03
    Retail Financial Services bringing real benefits to Europe’s customers 1.0 Foreword 03 1.0 Introduction 04 2.0 Executive Summary 06 3.0 Retail Financial Services Trends 11 3.1 The modern retail financial services customer 11 3.2 Disruptive technologies, new entrants and innovative business models 12 3.3 Putting Europe’s customers at the heart of the growth agenda 19 4.0 Modelling The Benefits For Europe’s Customers 21 5.0 Policy Recommendations 24 5.1 Adapting to the changing nature of the financial services ecosystem 24 5.2 Leveraging the opportunities of digitalisation 31 5.3 The Single Market in Retail Financial Services 36 5.4 Better information and products for customers 39 The International Regulatory Strategy Group The International Regulatory Strategy Group (IRSG) is a practitioner-led body comprising leading UK-based figures from the financial and related professional services industry. It is one of the leading cross-sectoral groups in Europe for the financial and related professional services industry to discuss and act upon regulatory developments. Within an overall goal of sustainable economic growth, it seeks to identify opportunities for engagement with governments, regulators and European and international institutions to promote an international framework that will facilitate open and competitive capital markets globally. Its role includes identifying strategic level issues where a cross-sectoral position can add value to existing industry views. TheCityUK and the City of London Corporation co-sponsor the IRSG. 2 | Retail financial services – bringing real benefits to Europe’s customers Foreword Foreword Globally, retail financial services continues to see significant change.
    [Show full text]
  • Nigeria's Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
    Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Just a Glorious Audit? Nicholas Shaxson November 2009 Nigeria’s Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Just a Glorious Audit? Nicholas Shaxson November 2009 © Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2009 Chatham House (the Royal Institute of International Affairs) is an independent body which promotes the rigorous study of international questions and does not express opinion of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the authors. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without the prior written permission of the copyright holder. Please direct all enquiries to the publishers. Chatham House 10 St James’s Square London, SW1Y 4LE T: +44 (0) 20 7957 5700 F: +44 (0) 20 7957 5710 www.chathamhouse.org.uk Charity Registration No. 208223 ISBN 978 1 86203 219 4 A catalogue record for this title is available from the British Library. Designed and typeset by Soapbox Communications Limited www.soapboxcommunications.co.uk Contents Preface v About the Author vii Executive Summary viii List of Abbreviations x 1. Introduction 1 1.1 Global EITI 1 1.2 Nigeria’s oil industry 3 1.3 NEITI: brief history and context 4 1.3.1 Technical and procedural context 4 1.3.2 Political history and context 6 1.4 EITI’s and NEITI’s goals 7 1.5 Rulers, oil companies, citizens – and NEITI 8 2. Reforms,
    [Show full text]
  • Whose 'Treasure Islands'? the Role of Tax Havens in the Global Economy
    (C) Tax Analysts 2012. All rights reserved. does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content. Whose ‘Treasure Islands’? The Role of Tax Havens in The Global Economy by Robert T. Kudrle Robert T. Kudrle is the Orville and Jane Freeman Professor of International Trade and Investment Policy with the Hubert Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs and the Law School at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis. A version of this article was presented at the 53rd Annual Convention of the International Studies Asso- ciation in San Diego on April 1-4, 2012. wo recent works with the same title suggest radi- In movies and novels, tax havens are often set- Tcally different views of the role of tax havens in tings for shady international deals; in practice the global economy. In late 2010, James R. Hines Jr. they are rather less flashy. Tax havens are coun- (2010) made the case for a largely beneficial role. Ac- tries or territories that offer low tax rates and fa- cording to Hines, the tax havens improve markets: they vorable regulatory environment to foreign inves- facilitate direct investment by improving the attraction tors....Taxhavensarealso known as ‘‘offshore of high-corporate-tax states for real investment, and centers’’ or ‘‘international financial centers,’’ they may shore up rather than degrade corporate tax phrases that may carry slightly differing connota- collections by high-corporate-income states such as the tions but nonetheless are used almost inter- U.S. They also seem to improve the competitiveness of changeably with ‘‘tax havens.’’ [P. 104.] national financial institutions and hence facilitate port- folio capital provision in both rich and poor countries.
    [Show full text]