Now a major new book! “Occupation Jersey” (2007). ǡ Ǥ May 2013 Nicholas Shaxson is author of Poisoned Wells, a book about the Resource John Christensen is the former economic adviser to the British Crown Curse based on 14 years’ research in west Africa; and also author of Treasure Dependency of Jersey, a pre-eminent British tax haven. Having originally Islands, a book about tax havens and financial centres. He has written regularly trained as a forensic fraud investigator, he is now the director of the Tax Justice for the Financial Times, the Economist Intelligence Unit, Vanity Fair, and many Network, a member of the OECD Task Force on Tax and Development, and a others. board member of Washington, D.C.-based New Rules for Global Finance. INTRODUCTION It is now well known that many countries poor peers. This paradox of poverty from which depend on earnings from natural plenty has been extensively studied and is resources like oil have failed to harness them known as the Resource Curse. for national development. In many cases it seems even worse than that: for all the This book asks whether some countries hundreds of billions of dollars sloshing into ϐ countries like oil-rich Nigeria, for instance, may be suffering from a similar, and related, ϐ ǡ phenomenon. economic growth, greater corruption, higher inequality, less political freedom and often ϐ more absolute poverty than their resource- – and not just for reasons related to the global The Finance Curse 2 ϐ ʹͲͲ͹ȀͺǤ ϐ more surprisingly, this phenomenon that we such as the Cayman Islands or Cyprus, are calling the Finance Curse is similar in these complexities are stripped away and many ways to the Resource Curse: there are big the phenomenon is laid bare in purer, more overlaps in both their causes and their effects. crystallised forms which are easier to see and understand. The Finance Curse has been evident for decades – and if untreated it may well endure for years The tax havens, which we have studied or even decades after the latest crisis has blown extensively, carry important lessons – and over. Ȃϐ Ǧ countries. ϐ ǡ and for decades academic studies suggested that bigger is generally better when it comes The book ϐ Ǥ This book starts with a brief overview of the all that research into question. New evidence is Resource Curse. The main sections that follows, starting to emerge from the IMF, the Bank for on the Finance Curse, start by looking at the International Settlements and others, revealing most important and most widely publicised ǡϐ Ǥ ϐ sectors. Our book, drawing on our many years of hands- on experience of both resource-dependent We then examine these claims in turn and ϐ Ǧǡ reveal why nearly all of them are wrong. Along far beyond the boundaries of their research the way we expose catastrophic errors in to create an unprecedented comprehensive studies that claim to demonstrate to policy body of evidence about the perils of oversized Ǯ ǯϐ Ǥ ϐ Ǥ Next, we show that not only is the ϐ Ǯ ǯϐ the City of London, for instance, Britain than advertised, but it is worse than that: a performs worse on major human development ϐ indicators – inequality, infant mortality, poverty, ϐ Ǥ and more – than Germany, Sweden, Canada plausibly say that for many countries, the net and most of its other rich-country peers. Each Ǯ ǯϐ ailment has many explanations, but oversized – in some cases strongly so. ϐ Ǥ The picture is – of course – not a simple one. Many of these effects, particularly the political Country capture ǡ ϐǤ The Finance Curse is a story about “Country damage is probably more acute in small dzȂϐ ϐ ǡ ϐ Ǧ larger countries such as Britain or the United dependent country and to dominate and States the damage is probably felt more heavily hollow out its economy. Some elements of this in economic terms. ‘capture’ are already well understood but our book introduces a wide range of new ideas and And just as some resource-rich countries like analysis. Norway or Chile seem to have successfully avoided or managed the Resource Curse, some ϐ Ǧ ϐ Ǧ Britain or the United States, the Finance Curse’s or Luxembourg seem to have tempered or even causes and effects are masked by background avoided the Finance Curse. noise in large, raucous democracies. But in The Finance Curse 3 But some countries such as Britain and the before the crisis erupted. United States genuinely do seem cursed by ϐ Ǥ Our Finance Curse thesis cuts through this widely regarded as the Goose that Lays the Gordian knot. Taking it on board puts power Golden Eggs often turns out to be a very right back in the hands of democratically different bird: a Cuckoo in the Nest, crowding ϐ Ǥ ϐ is out, hollowing out and undermining other harmful, then it makes clear political and economic sectors. Very often, the interests of economic sense to regulate and tax this ϐ ϐ sector appropriately. If the end result is less national interest. ϐ ǡϐ Ǥ It is therefore absolutely not necessary to Our analysis has profound implications. participate in the ‘competitive’ race on lower Financiers routinely cry ‘don’t tax or regulate ϐ ǡ us too much or you will be ‘uncompetitive’ and obvious course of action is national leadership we will run away to Geneva or London or Hong on better standards, even in the absence of Kong’ – and far too often the politicians quail collective international agreements. and give them what they want. These threats and fears are perhaps the most important Finally, this is a book about how global ϐ ϐ appropriately, and why big banks are bigger countries, important though that subject is. It and potentially more dangerous today than Ǧϐ harm its host country. The Finance Curse 4 ǡϔ Quotable quotes Ǥ ǡ ǣǯ ǥ ǯ Ǥ Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo Stephen Cecchetti author of a Bank for International Settlements 1 Ǧ ǡͳͻ͹͸ ǡʹͲͳʹ ϔ ǡ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Ǥ ǡ Michael Edwardes Ǥ ǡͳͻͺͲ Tony Dolphin ǡ Ǥ ϔ Ǥ David Potter Viktor Vekselberg ex-entrepreneur and Russian conglomerate owner2 ϐ ǡ ǡ Ǥ Martin Wolf ’ chief economic commentator … ϐ tougher banking rules would drive away4 Ǥ Simon Johnson ǡʹͲͲͻ ǡ ǯ Ǥ Vince Cable John Maynard Keynes UK Business Secretary3 Ǧ Ǧ Ǥ ǣ ǡǤ The Manchester Capitalism blog collectively written by academics focusing on the UK’s regional 1 Interview with Terry Lynn Karl, Caracas, 1976, cited in Karl, The Paradox of economic disparities. Plenty: oil booms and petro-states, California, 1997, p4. Karl’s books was one of the seminal books about the Resource Curse. 2 Cited in Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super- Rich and the Fall of Everyone Else, 2012 4 Banking reforms after the Libor scandal, Martin Wolf’s Exchange, FT blogs, 3 Put aside the City’s whingeing, Vince Cable, The Guardian Dec 20, 2011 July 2, 2012 The Finance Curse 5 TABLE OF CONTENTS 2.3 The case for finance 21 INTRODUCTION 2 2.3.1 We need finance! 21 Country capture 3 2.3.2 Finance makes you rich 21 The book 3 2.3.3 The tax contribution. 21 2.3.4 The jobs contribution 22 Quotable quotes 5 2.3.5 The GDP/growth contribution 22 2.3.6 The Regional Contribution 22 1.0 THE RESOURCE CURSE 8 2.3.7 The efficiency contribution 23 Introduction 8 2.3.8 The trade surplus contribution 23 1.1 The Resource Curse: Outcomes 9 2.3.9 “It’s all we’ve got!” 23 1.1.1 Slower economic growth 9 2.3.10 “What about Switzerland?” 23 1.1.2 Crowding-out 9 2.4 The Bogus Claims 24 1.1.3 Unemployment, poor job creation 10 2.4.1 How much finance do we need? 24 1.1.4 Inequality, poverty, human indicators 10 2.4.2 Does finance really make you rich? 25 1.1.5 Authoritarianism, political freedom 10 2.4.3 What is the real tax contribution? 25 1.1.6 Conflict 11 2.4.4 What is the real jobs contribution? 29 1.1.7 Corruption 11 2.4.5 What is the real GDP contribution? 30 1.2 The Roots of the Resource Curse 12 2.4.6 What is the real regional contribution? 31 1.2.1 Resource Curse roots: Dutch Disease 12 2.4.7 What is the real efficiency contribution? 33 1.2.2 Resource Curse roots: The brain drain 12 2.4.8 What is the real trade surplus 1.2.3 Resource Curse roots: Volatility 12 contribution? 33 1.2.4 Resource Curse roots: Rents 13 2.4.9 “It’s all we’ve got;” path dependency 34 1.2.5 Resource Curse roots: 2.4.10 Why is Switzerland rich? 34 “Top-down” money flow 13 2.5 Is it even worse than that: A Curse? 38 1.2.6 The ‘scramble’, or the 2.5.1 Economic losses and other outcomes 38 contemptible struggle 14 2.5.1.1 Slower, narrower growth: Peak 1.3 Norway: a counter-example? 16 Finance? 38 Summary 16 2.5.1.2 Further tax losses 41 2.5.1.3 Crowding Out, withering of 2.0 THE FINANCE CURSE 17 alternative sectors 44 2.1 Introduction to the Finance Curse: 2.5.1.4 Loss of entrepreneurialism and A Prima Facie Case. 17 productivity; hollowing-out 46 2.2 The Core Narrative: 2.5.1.5 Financialisation as economic capture 48 Country Capture 19 2.2.1 Economic Capture 19 2.5.1.6 Volatility, instability, and crises 52 2.2.1.1 Economic capture: 2.5.1.7 Inequality and poverty 53 Crowding-Out 19 2.5.2 Political outcomes 54 2.2.1.2 Economic capture: financial 2.5.2.1 Consensus, authoritarianism, and growth on steroids 19 political capture 54 2.2.2 Political capture 19 2.5.2.2 Offshore Secrecy 61 2.5.2.3 Corruption and criminalisation 64 The Finance Curse 6 2.6 Root Causes 68 Figure 13: Company versus personal taxes, Jersey, 2000-2011 (£m) 78 2.6.1 Root causes: Dutch Disease, Jersey Disease 68 2.6.2 Root causes: volatility 70 2.6.3 Root causes: Governance effects 71 Boxes 2.6.3.1 Economic rents 71 Box 1: The queue 15 2.6.3.2 The double-edged stability Box 2: Two fatal flaws in the lobbyists’ arguments 26 requirement 73 2.6.3.3 The arbitrage threat 77 Box 3: What are we measuring? 37 2.6.3.4 Top-down, concentrated source Box 4: The capture of Cyprus 56 of money 79 Box 5: Authoritarianism in Jersey 60 2.6.3.5 Inequality as a root cause 80 Box 6: The capture of the British establishment 62 2.6.3.6 The lobbying, revolving doors 80 Box 7: The British “spider’s web” 75 2.6.3.7 The small island syndrome 81 Box 8: “Too Big or Too Mobile to Fail or to Jail” 76 2.6.4 Final points.