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The Unity of Consciousness: the Binding Problem Before 100 B.C.E

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The Unity of Consciousness: the Binding Problem Before 100 B.C.E Bridgewater Review Volume 38 Issue 2 Article 9 11-2019 The Unity of Consciousness: The Binding Problem before 100 B.C.E. Jonathan Holmes Follow this and additional works at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/br_rev Part of the Life Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Holmes, Jonathan (2019). The Unity of Consciousness: The Binding Problem before 100 B.C.E.. Bridgewater Review, 38(2), 30-33. Available at: https://vc.bridgew.edu/br_rev/vol38/iss2/9 This item is available as part of Virtual Commons, the open-access institutional repository of Bridgewater State University, Bridgewater, Massachusetts. shapes, colours, motions, sizes, and The Unity of Consciousness: The distances … how do we specify what goes with what? (from Binding Problem before 100 B.C.E. Philosophical Transactions of the Jonathan Holmes Royal Society of London, 1988) Thus, the binding problem is pretty “We must not be too sure of the ignorance of our ancestors” important. Without such binding, I – Will Durant wouldn’t be writing this, as our species would not have survived very long hen I was in graduate school in the mid- or evolved in the first place. This is 1990s, one of my main interests was because without such binding, con- sciousness from moment to moment Wconsciousness. What exactly was it? How would be a chaotic jumble of sensory did it work? How exactly did a three-pound piece and perceptual features in an incom- of meat in my head produce a person with internal, prehensible collage of overlapping and incoherent conscious experience. qualitative, subjective states with a unified perceptual Figures one and two are attempts by and overall mental experience? This part about unified the author to illustrate this, though in simplified form. Figure one repre- mental experience is referred to as neural binding, and, sents a picture of a cat correctly bound since we don’t really know exactly how it works, it is together. Figure two is a rough idea called the binding problem. of what the image might look like if perceptual binding was not working In brief, the binding problem is the perception. A major researcher in the correctly in some fashion. question of how it is that the brain puts area, Anne Treisman, makes the fol- Moreover, it is not restricted to exter- all the various simple features of objects lowing statement on the problem: nal stimuli. When we remember from the multiple senses together to The binding problem in percep- something, say the last lunch date we (a) create a perception of coherent tion deals with … how we achieve had, various features of that memory objects that are distinct from others, the experience of a coherent are stored all over the brain in various and then (b) to put all these coherent world of integrated objects, and areas. Somehow, they must all come objects into a conscious scene where avoid seeing a world of disem- together into a coherent subjective everything is unified in conscious bodied or wrongly combined experience. Some think of memory as Figure 1: (Author’s Photo) Figure 2: (Author’s Photo) 30 Bridgewater Review a filing cabinet, where memories get topic, a recent advance, something that Despite such difficulties, and the fact filed away, they get stored, and when was not much considered before. This that it is a popular place to start philo- you want them you open up the correct is inaccurate and, also, where things sophical discussions on the unity of file and there is your memory just the get interesting. conscious experience, Descartes is a way things happened. Unfortunately, path too well trodden by those who a better analogy would be that memory Some Remarkably study philosophy of mind. When one is like a jigsaw puzzle made of mil- Early History looks back further, issues surrounding lions of pieces all scattered about a large The general idea behind the binding the unity of conscious experience crop number of neural connections that problem, the unity of conscious experi- up again and again, and down though one has to put together in real time, ence, is far from a new question. One history for a long, long time. Therefore, moment to moment, with no picture famous person to consider is Descartes I’d like to share some thoughts on the on the box to go by. Even our train of in the 1600s. Descartes had ideas about binding problem from three periods thought, and whatever comes to mind how it all comes together for us, as if in history more than 1600 years before during it, must be bound together. there were some little ‘me’ inside our Descartes, to explore some hopefully Whenever I am reminded of this, I mind watching experience on a movie less familiar territory. am continually amazed that the whole system works at all. During graduate school I came across a series of papers by Francis Crick and Alcmaeon proposed that a Christof Koch on feature binding in the visual cortex. Francis Crick is the primary distinction between Crick from Crick and Watson that won the Nobel Prize in 1962 for their animals and humans was that work on the helical structure of DNA. animals have sense perception, but Crick apparently had a seriously flexible mind, allowing him to switch from only humans have understanding. expertise in genetics to expertise in neuroscience. At any rate, these papers … This has led some scholars to attracted significant attention as they proposed a measurable mechanism for propose that Alcmaeon was saying feature binding in the visual cortex – that is, how we put together various that humans can bring together simple features of visual stimuli to build up a conscious experience of something the various senses in a way that far more complex, like seeing a person animals cannot. or an object. Earlier work had certainly been done decades before, but these papers still stand as a landmark con- cerning the binding problem. In short, it was proposed that neurons across screen in an area of the brain called Two words of warning, however. First, different areas fire in synchronous pat- the pineal gland. This setup is referred when going back into time this deeply, terns or wavelengths to bind visual to as the Cartesian Theater. It is quite sometimes all we have are fragments contents together. It is an idea akin to famous for being very intuitive, as well of sayings, or comments by others on an orchestra with all the separate instru- as for arriving at the beginnings of a the original sayings. In a sense, some- ments playing a coherent song, but more modern age that was ready to times it is akin to reconstructing a with no conductor. Much work has receive Descartes’ thoughts and build whole dinosaur from a tooth and two been done since then. Binding is vital upon his ideas. However, it is also quite leg bones. Second, even experts in the to our psychological functioning and it impossible, partly due to ignoring the field continue to be perplexed by some is still a very hot topic in neuroscience mind-body problem, but partly too in early philosophical sayings. Indeed, the and a variety of other areas – so much terms of infinite regress with the little Presocratic philosopher Heraclitus was so that some may think that it is a new ‘me’ – who’s watching the movie in referred to as ‘the obscure’ even in his their head, and so on to infinity? own time – what is one to make of this November 2019 31 millennia later? So, just a quick caution, modern brain around, but the term In discussing the human soul or mind, there is some wiggle room concerning originally meant ‘breath,’ and a kind they referred to it, or sometimes a what exactly these folks were talking of vital force that allowed for life and part of it, as the hegemonikon- or the about, particularly the further back one psychological functioning. I might ‘governing part.’ The hegemonikon- digs into their writings and systems. refer to it as more of a pseudo-physical- was thought to be a centralized com- Nonetheless, though the choices I’ve immaterial breath-like fluid-like thing munication mechanism that received made may perhaps be obscure or even (I realize that’s a bit vague). At any rate, information from all parts of the organ- incommensurable in their details and pneuma was a single theoretical entity ism, made sense of it, and provided for connections within entire philosophi- which the Stoics used to explain the coherent psychological functioning cal systems, the selections I’ve made functioning of everything from rocks and understanding. Here is where the are very clear examples concerning the to the soul or mind (the current distinc- binding problem comes into play. The binding problem. tion between the soul and the mind Stoics claimed that it spoke a language had not quite fully arrived on the scene common to all the senses, and that Stoicism yet). In essence, there was a continuum it was involved in all mental events. The relevant Stoic thinkers lived during of pneuma tension corresponding to In essence, it allowed for sensory and a period in time roughly 300 to 100 a continuum of degree of unified psychological integration and organi- B.C.E. I will not go into the over- functioning. The lowest degree of zation, a requirement for reason and all system of Stoics nor the folks that tension simply referred to holding understanding. This ability is at the follow. Rather, I will try to remain things together, like rocks. A cou- heart of mental binding.
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