IWUNDU, IFEAYICHUKWU EMMANUEL.Pdf

UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA

FACULTY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

PRIVATE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2001–2010

PROJECT REPORT

PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, IN FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE AWARD OF MASTER OF SCIENCE IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEGREE, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA.

IWUNDU, IFEAYICHUKWU EMMANUEL

PG/M.Sc/09/52122

SUPERVISOR: DR. B A AMUJIRI

JULY 2012

TITLE PAGE

PRIVATE FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN NIGERIA: IMPLICATIONS TO NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 2001–2010

CERTIFICATION

IWUNDU, Ifeanyichukwu Emmanuel, a postgraduate student in the Department of

Public Administration and Local Government with Registration No.

PG/M.Sc/09/52122 has satisfactorily completed the requirements for the course and research work for the award of Master of Public Administration and Local

Government.

The work embodied in this dissertation report is original and has not been submit- ted in part or full for any diploma or degree of this or any other university.

Dr. B. A. Amujiri Professor Fab. Onah

Supervisor Head of Department

Professor C. O.T. Ugwu Professor P. E. Chigbu

Dean, Dean, SPGS.

Faculty of the Social. Sciences.

External examiner

DEDICATION

This work is dedicated to the Almighty and Merciful God, who through these years made something out of nothing in me.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT.

I hereby appreciate all those who contributed in making this academic programme a reality. They are my supervisor, Dr. B.A. Amujiri who had patient with me in spite of his busy schedules. He critically went through my work and made necessary corrections.

The head of department, Prof. Fab. Onah and lecturers in the department: Prof. N.N

Elekwe, Prof. (Mrs.) R. C. Onah, , Prof. F. C. Okoli, Prof. C. Ofuebe, Dr. Tony Onyishi,

Prof. (Mrs.) Ogonu, Dr. (Mrs.) Obi, Dr. Agalamanyi, Dr. (Mrs.) S.U. Agu etc. made the programme possible. May God bless you all, Amen.

I also appreciate my beloved wife and friend, Engr. (Mrs.) Nkiruka E. Iwundu, and

Children Ebubechukwu Mercy, Chibueze Ifeanyi Emmanuel (Jr.), Amarachukwu Aka- chukwu and Mmesoma for their patience, encouragement and endearing love.

The bibliography attests to my general indebtedness to the work of many scholars.

And to my God, who is rich in mercy and loving-kindness, be the glory forever and ever,

Amen.

IWUNDU, Ifeanyichukwu, Emmanuel

PG/M.Sc/09/52122

ABSTRACT

The study examined the implications of private funding of political parties to national development in Nigeria, 2001-2010. The specific objectives of the study were to: (i) as certain the rationale for private funding of political parties, (ii) determine the sources of funds to political parties, (iii) identify the level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs to ensure that private funders of political parties do not lose, (iv) verify the implications of private funding of political parties to national development and (v) determine the solutions to private funding of political parties in Nigeria. The study was a survey, carried out in Imo State. There were 27 Local Government Areas with a population of over 4.8 million. A simple random sampling method was applied to selecting 15 local governments and 300 respondents. Data was gathered through primary and secondary sources. The primary sources include questionnaire and interview, while secondary source were books, journal, newspapers, magazine, etc. data was analysed using the statistical package for social science to determine the percentage and mean sources. The study found that private funding of political parties was an arrangement for members of a political party to help fund her activities and reduce the dependency of parties on government. The source of funds to political parties were found to include sponsorship by influential individuals of the party, membership dues, government grants to political parties, levy from office holders/elected members of the party and fund raising dinners by members. It found that the fraud and rigging that occurred in private funding of political parties includes soliciting for the co-operation of electoral officers both at the polling booths up to the resident electoral commissioners for fraud/rigging, multiple registrations of candidates for elections, stuffing of ballot boxes before its arrival at the polling booths, inducement of voters prior to voting day, intimidation of political opponents with thugs, police, army and personal guards. The study also found that the implications of private funding includes sheepish implementation of policies that do not benefit the public but the funders, thereby making the state/national legislature less representative and less responsive, the funds allocated for development are fought for and disbursed on the basis of what was contributed by funders and self enrichment, etc. To solve the problem, the study recommended that persons wishing to run for a political office should be credible, propriety, be in good financial disposition and management, all sources of funds and the intensions of the funders should be disclosed, law should be made for equal amount to be contributed by all the members of a political party to avoid some wealthy individuals hijacking the party.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page i

Certification ii

Dedication iii

Acknowledgement iv

Abstract v

Table of Contents. vi

List of Tables vii

Chapter One: Introduction 1

1.1 Background to the Study 1

1.2 Statement of the Problem 6

1.3 Objectives of the Study 9

1.4 Significance of the Study 10

1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study 10

Chapter Two: Literature Review and Methodology 12

2.1 Literature Review 12

2.1.1Conceptual Clarification 12

vii

2.1.2 The rationale for private funding of political parties. 16

2.1.3 The Sources of funding to political parties. 18

2.1.4 The level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs private funding. 19

2.1.5 The implications of private funding to national development 25

2.1.6 The solutions to the problems of private funding of political

Parties. 32

2.1.7 Synthesis of the Review and Gap in Existing Literature 35

2.2 Hypotheses 36

2.3 Operationalisation of key concepts 36

2.4 Methodology 37

2.4.1 Research Design 37

2.4.2 Area of the Study 38

2.4.3 Sources of Data 38

2.4.4 Population of the Study 39

2.4.5 Sample Size 39

2.4.6 Sample Procedure 40

2.4.7 Validity and Reliability of Instrument 40

2.4.8 Method of Data Analysis 41

viii

2.4.9 Theoretical Framework 41

Chapter Three: Background Information of the Study Area 45

3.1 Background Information of the case study area 45

Chapter Four: Data Presentation, Findings and Discussion of

Findings 50

4.1 Data Presentation 50

4.2 Findings of the Study 60

4.3 Discussion of Findings 65

Chapter Five: Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations 71

5.1 Summary 71

5.2 Recommendations 74

5.3 Conclusion 76

Bibliography 79

Appendices 83

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1: Twenty-Seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Imo State 39

Table 2: Sample Size of the Study 40

Table 3: Twenty-Seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Imo State 45

Table 4: Respondents Sex 50

Table 5: Respondents Marital Status 50

Table 6: Respondents Occupation 51

Table 7: Respondents Highest Academic Qualification 51

Table 8: Respondents Length of Residence in Imo State 51

Table 9: Respondents Knowledge of Electoral Democracy in Imo State 53

Table 10: Rationale for the Private Funding of Political Parties 53

Table 11: The Sources of Fund to Political Parties 54

Table 12: Fraud and Rigging that Occur in Private Funding of

Political Parties 54

Table 13: The Implications of Private Funding to the Development of

Imo State and the nation at large 55

Table 14: The Solutions to the Problems of Private Funding of

Political Parties 58

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1.1 Background to the study In most countries of the world, there is reliance on private funding of political parties for their campaigns and other party activities. A political party is an organization that typically seeks to influence government policy, usually by nominating their own candidates and trying to seat them in political office, (Jones, 2009:34). Fund is crucial in the management of any political parties, if they are to achieve their objective. Fund is sourced from different areas, and the management of such resources is important for the good of that organization.

The electoral law and policies of any nations spells out the mode and sources of funding to political parties. Political parties are funded by contributions from party members, individuals and organizations which share their political ideas or who stand to benefit from their activities or governmental public funding, (Wikipedia, 2010:1). Many parties in Africa impose a compulsory levy, usually a percentage of salary, on party functionaries and occupants of certain positions of state, such as members of parliament and ambassadors, (Saffu, 2002:3). Another source of private funding for political parties, which several legislations on the continent specifically mention as permitted according to Saffu,(2002:3), “Is fund raising activities, from fund raising dinners and dances and auctions to running companies and owning properties for letting”.

Funding can also be provided by foreign aid. International donors provide funds to political parties in developing countries as a means to promote democracy and good governance. Support can be purely financial or otherwise frequently is provided as capacity development activities including the development of party manifestos, party constitutions and campaigning skills, (Wikipedia, 2010). Developing links between ideologically linked parties is another common feature of international support for a party, (ACEPROJECT.ORG, 2010:3). Sometimes this can be perceived as directly supporting the political aims of political party. Other donors

13 work on a more neutral basis, where multiple donors provide grants in countries accessible by all parties for various aims defined by the recipients. There have been calls by leading development think-tanks, such as the Overseas Development Institute, to increase support to political parties as part of developing the capacity to deal with the demands of donors to improve governance, (Foresti and Wild 2010). Money has come to play a heightened role in country's electoral process. Due to poverty level of the electorates, their support is for the candidate that gave them money. The expression is visible during run-ups to elections, (Mutesa, 2002). The heavier the purse, the bigger the vote cast in favour of the giver especially during party primaries. It is purely almost a systematic embedded rule to assume that money could determine the outcome of any general elections. In the last concluded (2011) general elections in Nigeria, money played prominent role for those who eventually emerged as winners. This was made visible from all corners of the nation. In his discourse, Anaro, (2011), states that “…before the botched National Assembly election many of the Houses of Representatives and Senatorial candidates had already distributed huge sums of money to voters to encourage them to vote for them…”. He further stated “that one of the candidate in the northern part of the country told a close confident that he spent N10 million for the election that was cancelled”. The way money was withdrawn from banks in the country affected other businesses and; the banks withdrawal limits. Anaro, (2011), observed that: Ahead of the rescheduled polls, candidates for the Saturday’s elections have continued to besiege banks to withdraw money from their accounts to prosecute the elections. This resulted in huge withdrawals from the banks, which also necessitated banks to increase their demands at the inter-bank market. This has consequently translated into increase in the Nigerian Inter- Bank Offer Rate (NIBOR).

Money is a key factor in deciding who emerges as winner in party primaries, intra-party and general elections. Private funding of such parties or candidates is like business investment which is made with the sole aim of making a profit. Regulation has not been fully substantiated to make clarifications about the level of private funding. According to Harksen (1998:23), in countries like South Africa,

There is no law regulating private funding to political parties, as a result, the private funding of political parties remains one of the last ‘legitimate' avenues by which the private sector, foreign governments or even organised criminals can extract influence over the political process and public policy. After nearly ten years of democracy, the secrecy surrounding the private funding of political parties has not been pierced because there remains a glaring lacuna in South African law: There is no law regulating private funding to political parties.

South Africa is among the few African countries that provide public funding for political parties and the expenditure of public funds by political parties is carefully regulated and closely monitored. By contrast, private funding of political parties is almost wholly unregulated and public disclosure of party incomes and expenditures is entirely discretionary, (FICK, 1997).

There are no rules on political-party funding in Zambia and the law does not compel political parties to publish their accounts or to disclose their sources of funding. Moreover, election expenditure is unregulated, (Mutesa, 2002:3). What has become clear from the available anecdotal evidence according to Mutesa, (2002:5) is that,

Money, whose source cannot be explained, has become part of the Zambian electoral process. This has raised fears of corrupting the electoral process and endangering national security. As a result, civil society activists have begun making calls for establishment of a regulatory framework to govern the use of money in the electoral process. For the time being, however, there does not appear to be political willingness on the part of politicians from both sides of the spectrum to confront this problem. This seems to suggest that the practice of using "dirty" money is so widespread that, for now, the politicians would be unwilling to change the status quo.

The unsavoury revelations about private funding of political parties in Zambia have resulted in calls for introduction of an electoral financing law. This law, if enacted, would regulate expenditures in election campaigns and compel disclosure of election funds. Such a law is, however, considered unnecessary by some commentators who feel that the Prevention and Prohibition of Money Laundering Act already in place is sufficient -to ensure that dirty money is kept out of Zambia 's electoral process, (Mutesa, 2002:3).

The secrecy that surrounds party financing makes it difficult to pass judgment on the influence that controversial funding is exerting on the electoral process. One thing for sure, however, is that money has corrupted the country's electoral process. It is now a norm in Nigeria and almost in all the developing countries of the world that a political campaign or rally that does not involve an exchange of money or some other resources costing money is doomed to fail. The use of money is therefore undermining the development of a political culture necessary to sustain an open and democratic society.

Under this scenario, there are suggestions that private financiers of political parties do so in the hope of advancing their own business interests. The fear that private financing of political parties may result in mortgaging the country to criminal elements is therefore a real one. The financers under no circumstance would allow a free flow of action in an election sponsored by them except their settlement is fully executed. Excessive use of money is a threat to the country's electoral process. In his discourse on "Funding Political Parties in Ghana: Whose responsibility? Achanso, (2010), argued that, The recent media reports that the biggest opposition political party in Ghana, the New Patriotic Party, is indebted to the extent that it may not be able to organise its impending presidential primaries slated for August 2010. As a result, the reports have added that the contestants for the primaries have been called upon to contribute towards the organisation of the primaries besides the mandatory fees they have to pay as contestants. The reports also indicated that the national chairman of the party have had to auction his personal property to settle some of the debt. This issue has reignited debates about the funding of political parties in the country, with some political analysts, suggesting that political parties in the country need to solicit for funding from their supporters, the business community, etc., as a way of funding themselves. Achanso, (2010), further argued that in Ghana, private funding could be a good approach to funding political parties, in that, it will reduce the burden of the state for having to do so. The consequences of that approach for national development, however, are still very fresh in the mind, especially the “winner-takes-all” syndrome that has characterised the country’s politics since the restoration of multi-party democracy in

1992 under the Fourth Republican Constitution of the country. This may be because, according to Achanso, (2010), While there could be a few genuine political party supporters in Ghana, it appears that most people belong to political parties in the country because of benefits they hope to derive from the parties, but not necessarily because they support the parties’ agenda towards national development. The situation where political party supporters have been rampaging to seize toilets, lorry parks, National Health Insurance Service offices, National Youth and Employment Programme offices, etc., because of claims about the contributions they have made towards the victory of their party, is still fresh in the mind. The ordinary Ghanaian who voted for a change of government may not be enthused about such developments, since they hardly contribute to the sort of development they voted for. There is no doubt that such activities are counterproductive to national development, as they lead to reprisals and the polarisation of the nation.

Private funding of political parties also leads to corrupt practices, since most appointments are often based on appointees’ contributions to political parties in government. Besides, public contracts are often awarded to business entities that fund the ruling political party and this does not only contribute to corruption, favouritism and nepotism, but also shoddy execution of contracts, with huge cost to the state. This unfortunate situation arises because there is a lack of process upon which political appointees are held accountable besides election periods. So the “Golden Rule” has appeared to be: do what you like within your four-year mandate, so that you do not lose out completely at the end of your mandate. Of course, diligent execution of a political party manifesto can return a ruling political to power but this is hardly the practice, except with professional and technical or thug system of rigging as applied during the 2003 and 2007 elections in Nigeria. It appears that people who do the right are often punished than rewarded, ((Ogorikpo, 2009:21), Ikegbu, (2010:15), Achanso, (2010). In jurisdictions where public opinion is very strong to compel the government to institute actions against political appointees who misconduct themselves, private funding of political parties may not be a big issue to worry about. However, in Nigeria, Zambia and Ghana, public opinion has not been compelling enough in making governments punish misbehaving (alleged corrupt) political appointees. Although, there are statutory

17 commissions, like Economic and Financial Crime Commission (EFCC), and the Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) set by the federal government of Nigeria to ensure that corrupt public officials do not get away with loots from government treasury. But our experience has been that some, if not all the public office holders in Nigeria, do get away, eat the money, digest them, sleep, wake up and are appointed another higher position. Under this circumstance, the state needs to consider the funding of the nation’s political parties.

1.2 Statement of the Problem The unfolding picture is that, money has come to be closely associated with holding of political office in the country. This state of affairs is worrisome, given the high levels of poverty in the country, the degree and gap between the rich and the poor, and the level of ownership of parties and politicization of politics itself. It simply means that, the poor, who constitute the majority in the country, cannot influence the nation's political developments. This is a serious indictment against a country whose people are made to believe to be practicing democracy, (Ogorikpo, 2009:34). Funding in a contemporary political setting, like Nigeria, can do many things from good to bad. The good aspect of it deals on making sure that democracy is funded by all the party members and for the good of all. The bad aspect is that, democracy is financed by a few power brokers and for their good only. Fund is the money employed or employable in a business to enhance its operation, or to enable the business meet its daily routine, (Iwundu and Okonkwo, 2010:3). There is the fear that private financiers of political parties do so in the hope of advancing their own business interests. The financers take it as an investment which should attract interest. Most politicians in electioneering campaigns solicit for money to enable them meet up with election demands. Some also have godfathers who are wealthy and willing to donate any amount with the hope to get them back when the chips were done. The amount expended as donated by funders would be received back when the election have been won through the monthly allocations for the governors and local government chairmen, while the other groups refund through their monthly remunerations. The conditions may have been spelt out

18 abinitio, but the unfolding scenario would be replicated as the donors starts seeking for refund of their contributions. It is also quite clear that, funding from private persons or the godfathers to an election has been the major factor contributing to the widely rate of rigging in any polity. Such rigging induced by private funding/godfathers takes various forms and phases, beginning from before the election (registration of voters in an authorized places, under aged persons, invisible persons, etc), on the election day (snatching of ballot boxes, falsification of election results, use of thugs, removal of the original of the election result sheet, etc), and after the election (bribing of members of the tribunal, INEC, false witness to the tribunal etc.), (Iwundu, 2007:21). The candidate sponsored or funded often lose grip of his or her administration to the funders or the godfather due to the saying that “He who pays the piper, dictates the tune”. It had also lead to uneasy, tension and acrimony between the funders/godfathers and the elected officer as in the case of Senator Araraume vs Achike Udenwa, Udenwa vs Ohakim in Imo state; Jim Nwobodo vs Nnamanni and Nnamnni vs Chime in Enugu state to mention but two states. The activities during these squabbles in the state or local government are better heard than witnessed. They were factions among loyalist, fighting, killing, kidnapping, arson, slow passage of bills into law, slow in development programmes, lack of people – centered – programme, division among law makers, anarchy, dictatorship, embezzlement of public funds, etc. It has been identified that some private funders are involved in shady dealings such as drug barons and gun-runners, selfish business tycoons and they fund the elections in order to make the government turn a blind eye to their heinous activities which stands against the government philosophy, encroaching on human right or promotes corruption and personal capitalistic gain, (Nwokolo, 2010). In some areas, they decide what happens, appoint those to hold governmental offices, how money should be shared and expended after taking their share, etc. In this scenario, any reaction from the elected candidate results to an unwholesome development for the entire polity in relation to financial accountability of the elected official, economic viability of the area, political thugs and porosity of security. The fear that private funding of

19 political parties may result in mortgaging the country, state and or the local government to criminal elements is therefore, a reality, (Agabisi 2010: 23). However, in most democratic nations such as Nigeria, private funding of political parties is permitted, but with a clause that there must be regulation to donations made to the funding of political parties, (IDASA, 2011). Regulation enables candidates to disclose sources of campaign contributions, campaign expenditures and the introduction of statutory limits on contributions. It attempted to restrict the influence of wealthy individuals by limiting individual donations, (Wikipedia, 2011). Private funding of political parties requires extensive disclosure of donations, which includs information such as the name, employer and address of donors. This is intended to allow for policing of undue donor influence by other campaigns or by good government groups, while preserving most benefits of private financing, including the right to make donations and to spend money for political speech, saving government the expense of funding campaigns, and keeping government from funding partisan speech that some citizens may find odious. Supporters of private financing systems believe that, in addition to avoiding government limitations on speech, private financing fosters civic involvement, ensures that a diversity of views are heard, and prevents government from tilting the scales to favor those in power or with political influence. Regulating such financial contributions may be necessary to avoid the activities of disgruntled elements. In Nigeria, we have the usual regulators, such as the electoral umpire (INEC), Board of Internal Revenue, and the political parties themselves. Regulating private funding of political parties, therefore, becomes virtually synonymous with regulating plutocratic donations. This approach will allow for public interest and scrutiny of the conduct and management of political parties, both in opposition and in government. The situation will also allow for the setting out of guidelines for the conduct and management of those governments, and their supporters to use public resources as though such resources are their private properties, as in the case of the seizure of public offices and properties by ruling political party supporters. This is an important issue that needs serious attention by all who care about how scarce national resources are utilized. It must however, be stated that in Nigeria, there is federal law on political funding /

20 campaign financing which set some legal limits on expenditures and prohibited unregulated contributions (commonly referred to as "soft money") to national political parties. ‘Soft money’ refers to funds spent by independent organizations that do not specifically advocate the election or defeat of candidates, and funds which are not contributed directly to candidate campaigns, (Wikipedia, 2011). But they matters when the dividends of good governance are to be shared by way of contract award. Today our experience has been that once individuals or corporate organization funds a political party, their contributions are seen as investments that will attract dividends in the form of political appointments, award of contracts, and seizure of public properties by political appointees, funders and supporters respectively, at the expense of the state. On this note, the study is curious to answer these questions: 1. What is the rationale for private funding of political parties? 2. What are the sources of funding to political parties? 3. What level of electoral fraud/rigging occurs to ensure that private funders of political parties do not lose? 4. What are the implications of private funding of political parties to national development? 5. What are the solutions to private funding of political parties in Nigeria? 1.3 Objectives of the Study The general objective of this study is to find out the “Implications of private funding of political parties to national development. Specifically, the study would seek to: 1. Ascertain the rationale for private funding of political parties. 2. Determine the sources of funds to political parties. 3. Identify the level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs to ensure that private funders of political parties do not lose. 4. Verify the implications of private funding of political parties to national development. 5. Determine the solutions to private funding of political parties in Nigeria.

1.4 Significance of the Study The usefulness of this study when completed has both theoretical and empirical relevance. Theoretically, the researcher shall within the limits of the academic resources available, give a fairly sufficient illustration of private funding, political party and national development. Furthermore, the study will expose the types of electoral fraud and competitive rigging being perpetuated by the private funders of political parties and the politicians unknown to the electorate so as to defend the financers’ interest/investment which was their chief aim for the funding. It will also reveal series of acts that go on in a polity where private funders sponsored the cause of campaign and electoral expenditures and their serious implications to national development. Empirically, the result will help to teach Nigerians, particularly politicians who rely on private funders/godfathers to sponsor them to any political office what they are ignorant of. It will further enhance the understanding of Nigerian law makers on the consequences of the problem; amend the electoral law to include who fund individuals or political parties for elections; punishment that would follow the imposition of ‘might’ by private funders/godfathers in an unregulated funding system. The result will reveal measures that will help build the private funding of political parties, accountability by public office holders, interest of funders and dividends arising from it for the public and the national development. 1.5 Scope and Limitations of the Study This research work on private funding of political parties in Nigeria (1999 - 2010): implications to national development, is being carried out in Imo State of Nigeria. Therefore, the study will be limited to Imo State, but references will be made to other years and states in Nigeria and elsewhere in the world to substantiate our argument. The research was limited by the nature of the study. Retrieval of information from politicians and party offices in the Imo State seemed cumbersome, yet, success were

22 made after several visits. Sometimes, we travelled from University of Nigeria to Imo State for an already scheduled appointment, only to discover that the party officials who would discuss with me travelled for another assignment. The other factor that almost inhibited the data collection was bureaucratic principle adopted by the parties in terms of information dissemination. However, we were able to meet some of the designated officers who were able to address my case. The several trips to Imo State involve money. Sometimes, we were forced to source funds for the trip and make series of phone calls when I learnt that one of the party’s secretary who had earlier arrange to discuss with me is back from his official trip. Money would have hindered me but through the contribution and the efforts of our family members, we were able to meet with all demands.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW AND METHODOLOGY

This chapter was discussed under the following headings:

2.1 Literature Review.

Related literature was reviewed in the following order:

1. The conceptual clarification: private funding, political party and national development.

2. The rationale for private funding of political parties.

3. Sources of private funding of political parties.

4. The level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs in private funding.

5. The implications of private funding to Imo State and national development.

6. The solutions to the problems of private funding of political parties.

2.1.1 Conceptual Clarification: Private Funding Private funding is the arrangement by an individual or group of people to give financial assistance to someone or group aspiring to do a thing that needs ```much money which may not be possible to finance alone, (Nwokolo, 2010:23). It also connotes an arrangement for one to fund his business alone. In political parties, the arrangement is to finance candidates who are aspiring for a political office at the local, state or national level to enable him or her foot the bills of running campaign and or other election expenses outside the state funds. Private funding of the political parties is made through contributions by individual members of that party or supporters from outside the part who shares the views as expressed by the party. In order to solicit political monetary contributions, fundraising is a major focus for many parties that engage in private funding as a source for their income generation, (Wikipedia, 2011:3). Much money can be made through private funding of a

24 party. During electioneering campaign or seeking of political office in Nigeria, political parties canvasses for fund and support by organizing dinner party, dance, and any kind of fund raising programme. At such times, party supporters, investment merchants, godfathers throw in their weights to see what money they could give to support their party. Most of those who give do so for gain. The money they give is taken as investment which is refundable, (The Economists, 2009:21). The financers uses their investment to take hold of administration in several states of Nigeria when repayments of such funds are on, the individuals or party being supported overtly or covertly make much gain from the state resources. Private funding is unregulated in some countries. Each party reserve the right to organize as much as fundraising parties as possible to raise funds for the party. It gives lee way to political corruption and a ripped fruit for the sponsors. But in a polity operating regulated private funding of political parties, sequential orders are made to the business of the state. President Jacob Zuma defends private corporate capital’s funding of political parties on the basis that corporate citizens should invest in democracy. According to him, the reality of the matter is that political parties, governments and states are always terrains of contestation among various class interests, (Bofelo, 2010). Political Party

A political party is an organization that typically seeks to influence government policy, usually by nominating their own candidates and trying to seat them in political office, (Wikipedia, 2011). It is a Group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power, (Answers.com 2011). Nnoli (2003:207), defines political party as a group of people who share a common conception of how and why state power should be organized and used. It is an organization formed to gain political power, (TheFreeDictionary, 2011).

The rationale for the existence of political parties is located in the relation between government and citizen. That is why it is the only avenue through which the ordinary citizen can break through and make impact and or effect a change in the entire

25 governmental system. Nnoli (2003:206), asserts that the fundamental purpose of parties and party system is to provide change of government from one faction of the ruling class to another.

Political party or party system make changes in the government programmes and activities by participating in electoral campaigns, educational outreach or protest actions. Parties often espouse an expressed ideology or vision bolstered by a written platform with specific goals, forming a coalition among disparate interests.

In this discourse, Trackback URL (2010) identified the following functions of political parties as:

1. Parties draw together people who have similar political philosophies and ideas. Whilst these people may not agree on all matters (hence the existence of factions and “tendencies”). 2. Parties are the chief means by which political power is exercised. Electors usually vote for parties, rather than for individual candidates. 3. Parties select candidates to contest elections for public office. Since the parties provide the candidates for election, it follows that parties also provide the nation’s political leaders. 4. In the parliamentary arena, political parties provide the government and opposition. 5. In government and opposition, political parties provide organisational support. The organisational support of political parties is vital to the stability and viability of a party’s parliamentary members. 6. Parties articulate philosophies and develop policies. All parties have methods of debating issues and formulating policies to be presented to the electorate during election campaigns. 7. Parties are an avenue for community groups to influence the decision-making process. 8. Parties are the main avenues for political debate and discussion in the community.

9. Parties are ultimately responsible for the structure of the machinery of government.

Political parties are various and operate with a peculiar pattern. According to Nnoli, (2003:212), “there are: a no-party system, one-party system, two-party system and the multi-party system”. Each type is associated with a peculiar pattern of politics arising from the characteristics and dynamics of parties operating in the system and the reactions of the people to these parties.

National Development.

Development is the upward movement of the entire social system. This social system encloses, economic factors, political stratification; institution and attitudes……(Myrdal, 1974:729).

According to Okoli, (2007:45), development as a concept belongs to the classical and neo-classical theorists. He states that:

Both of them tend to agree that development is in brief-quantitative and qualitative increase in material things. They equate development with the Gross National Product (G.N.P.), per capita income, the level and degree of urbanization, the extent of industrialization, that is, the extent to which inanimate sources of energy replace animate sources; emphasis on critical analysis as an end in itself; physical equipment such as tractors, dams, improved means of communications, ranging from Concord to Bart, Ocean lines to inter-state buses. All these are seen as indicators of development.

National development on the other hand, is the ability of a country or countries to improve the social welfare of the people e.g. providing social amenities like quality education, potable water, transportation infrastructure, housing, medical care, etc. (Google n.d:2). National development involves physical, economical, mental, political, etc. aspect of the nation. By all standards, national development encompasses all the activities planned to activate, improve, promote and actualize the well-being of the citizens. It is in fact, a shift from bad to better position, (Duru, 2009:23).

National development can be viewed from many perspectives depending on the angle one is driving from. Whatever angle, therefore, the general principle is that, it must "meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs," (World Commission on Environment and Development's, n.d.:9). In this case, the best approach in ensuring national development is creating a national development’s project team which will be a hands-on approach to working with communities and neighbors. They would be part of the local communities in which they work and to enhance those communities, (Tye, 2011:1). When this is done, the local level which belongs to the third tie level of governance would facilitate development up to the national, hence, the bottom – top approach in development aimed in the 1976 local government reform.

2.1.2 The Rationale for Private Funding of Political Parties.

Money has become a medium of political participation in Nigeria. Wealthy elite with precise economic and legislative agenda on the basis of this have taken hold of elections and today hold sway over public policy. This is owing to the amount they contributed to the political party that won election. According to Ikejiani, (2007), Money and politics are inseparable and should be noted that democratic politics cannot proceed without a substantial financial resources that allow party politics and party’s official to fulfill their legitimate role in the satisfactory way. Hence, private or corporate organization’s funding of political parties is inevitable.

In developing countries like Nigeria, where poverty is still ravaging the lives of people and the interest of the ordinary citizen is on how to get the daily meal, “money becomes the outcome of elections; it establishes the credibility threshold of campaign, nomination and victory at the poll, (Esward 2010:54). If you do not have enough money, then you are judged to be not a viable candidate. Success at the polls has become a situation in which the outcome is usually determined by how much interest money the candidate can raise. Interest money is the money donated with the hope of patronage of such donor at the time the candidate wins office. The donors most often control the state affairs. They decide what the elected official will do. Those

28 donors usually have large followers because of their money. Now it is not always true that one has to raise the most money to win a race. But it is always true that if the candidate does not raise substantial amount of money, at least, half as much of the opponent, the candidate may lose.

While private party funding is used to cover campaign expenses and the cost of running a party is acknowledged to act infavour of a functioning democracy. Private party funding is also i. A potentially source of corrupt influences. ii. Subtly corrupt the legislative processes. iii. It thwarts initiative. iv. It makes compromise difficult. v. It determines bills and amendment. vi. Affect the substance of legislative bill once it has been presented for consideration. vii. It affects directly how a legislator spends his or her time in the legislative house, (Ikejiani, 2007).

The state or public funding differs from private funding, in that, while the private funders seeks for a pay back from the elected official and collaborate in instilling corruption and abuse of public office. The overall aim of state funding has been to stop corruption in election finance. Democracy involves peoples’ participation. It must encompass diverse views from all sections of the society. Political parties need a wide support base to pursue their objectives successfully. This is the rationale for private funding. However, private funding can lead to corruption as the donor expects political favour from the party of support. Hence, state funding of political parties is preferred over private funding. The down side of state funding is that political parties become state organs instead of being independent. Moreover, the voters are reluctant to support such funding. In practice, a combination of both approaches is followed to generate sufficient funds. Bhutan has a similar approach with the proviso that a political party can seek private funding only from its registered members, (Bhandari, 2010).

For democracy to succeed, greater financial support from the state to political parties seems unavoidable. The support can be in the form of cash or provision of public facilities like venues for campaign, air time for broadcasts and tax incentives, some of which are already available. Political parties should also ask their members to offer volunteer services so that their expenses are curtailed. The amount of financial help from the state will depend from one election to another based on the minimum level of expenditure to be determined by the election commission. The option for seeking funds from the private sector is risky as it could lead to misuse of power and resources by political parties. They are likely to favour their benefactors given our small and well-knit society, (Bhandari, 2010). However, private funding of political parties allows all interested citizens to be a part-owner of a political party as well as support or initiate policy for the good of the entire society.

2.1.3 Sources of Private Funding of Political Parties.

In many countries of the world, there are avenues devised to raising of funds for the management of political parties, especially, where the private funding is allowed. It is therefore, noted that, the ways parties raise funds for their programmes and activities are dependent to what the constitutions allowed. However, most countries, particularly

Nigeria have the following ways but not limited to:

i. Party-owned business interests ii. Membership dues iii. Funds raising dinners by members iv. Levies to members at various position in government v. Donations from friends, godfathers and or Sthe private sector vi. Donations from foreign governments and companies vii. Donation from civil society group and NGOs, (Lodge and Scheideggar 2005)

2.1.3 The Level of Electoral Fraud/Rigging that Occurs in Private Funding of Political Parties.

The greatest danger for African democracies is the corrupting tendency of private funding not only to the management of parties and their affairs but even to the overall governance. It was noted by EISA (2011), that the problems around private party funding are simply:

• Donations often come with strings attached; • Donations are never ever disclosed publicly; and • Donations are not regulated like public funding.

It must be emphasized that the condition of lack of funds for the operation of political parties leaves them with no option than to source funds through private persons, godfathers and or corporate organizations. During the last concluded (2011) elections in Nigeria, Abubakar (2010) states;

Several political parties expressed disappointment with INEC over non- funding of their sensitisation and enlightenment campaign saying they lack sufficient funds to mobilise the people to participate in the electoral process. In his response, Jega said INEC has no provision for political parties funding saying, “INEC has no money to give to political parties. I wish I had money to give you but there is no provision for funds in the 2010 budget for political parties.”

In these circumstances, the funds generated through donations, membership levies, loans, supports, etc, were with strings attached and expected to be refunded when the chips were done. To ensure that the contributors or the party financiers do not lose the money they invested in running the party, violence and liberal democracy accompanied by fraud/rigging becomes the order of the day. According to Ibeano (2006:7) “Elections in liberal democracy is a form of violence – choosing without making a choice. In this way, electoral violence could be both structural and objective in nature”. Electoral frauds and rigging is the presence of electoral malpractices in the process of making a choice. According to Hornby, (2001:716), Malpractice means “careless, wrong or illegal behviour while in a professional job; improper practice; it is the process of doing things outside the due process in order to achieve fraudulent goals”. Ejituwu

(1997:38-41), states that, electoral fraud and rigging has been linked with party politics which started seriously in Nigeria in 1922 when some Nigerian elites in Lagos banded themselves together to oust British colonialism. From 1954 elections to date, rigging had been noticed in Nigeria electoral process. In 1979 general elections, for instance, the popular saying was “win first and go to court later”, (Davidson, 1992). This idea has remained unchanged especially in countries where judiciary is ‘powerless’.

Rigging and fraud is a universal phenomenon. In America, the issue of race, colour and other noticeable vices led to electoral rigging, malpractice, violence, etc. For instance, Ejituwu, (1997:45), states:

For the election of March 30, 1885 to determine the status of the state and establish a government, 2000 men were registered, but 6000 ballot papers were counted after the election with the Democrats winning and voting constitution and a governor. Conscious of the fact that the election had been ‘rigged’ by the Democrats, the Republicans also voted for constitution and a governor. The Democrats feeling impotent at the polls were prepared to use all kinds of chicanery. As one Southern Democrats boasted, ‘White and Black Republicans may out-vote us but we can out-count them”.

In any democracy, the type and kind of rigging and fraud that occur, take place in three phases. According to Duru (2005:14), the phases are:

• Before the elections,

• During the elections, and

• After the elections. In his study on “Rigging in Nigeria,” Odivwri (2003), made an impressive analysis of the kinds of rigging and classifying them to be taking place in three stages, namely; Pre-Election Methods i. Registration of Voters: This is one of the earliest stages of pre-election rigging. Politicians and political parties know that, to a large extent, the volume of voters' cards possessed is directly proportional to the electoral influence that can be wielded when the chips are down. Often times, politicians mobilize their supporters heavily during voters'

32 registration exercises. Beside ensuring that their supporters have the tool of franchise through the voters' cards, politicians often explore crooked means to register "multitude of voters" sometimes with fictitious names and at other times, with names of family members leaving in the towns and cities or even abroad and of those that are even dead. It doesn't matter if such family members have registered in the towns and cities they live. It is in suspicion that this method may have been what the northerners were employing in past polls that made the Afenifere, to caution that voter’s registration should not include the enlistment of cows and sheep and goats. ii. Printing of Electoral Materials: Desperate politicians eager to win sometimes undertake the very criminal act of printing electoral materials like ballot papers or result sheets after "sighting" the specimen model copies from the electoral body. With this, and working with a syndicate of other electoral crooks, such politicians could cook up figures or engage in other forms of electoral malpractices. And with such a crooked instrument in place, aided by a network of accomplices, rigging can only be brazenly graduated in steep gradient. iii. Party Primaries: This is actually the first layer of electoral rigging. It entails manipulating existing or perceived loopholes to ensure that a particular candidate emerges as the party flag-bearer. In Nigeria, several incumbent governors employ unfair means in muscling their way through the primaries, sometimes by suddenly enlarging their cabinet as a way of securing more votes against their opponents. More often, the intrigues that follow primaries form instruments of electoral manipulations in the election proper. iv. Conscripting Electoral Officers: This is a crucial step in the entire dragnet of rigging. It involves soliciting the "co-operation" of appointed electoral officers right from the polling booths to the resident electoral commissioner. Oftentimes, "deals" are struck between the crooked politician and electoral officers in such a way that the modality of operation is mapped out neatly much ahead of the polls. This way, the elections are thus held merely to fulfill all righteousness and to give it the air of a democratic conduct when

33 in actual fact, the outcome had been pre-programmed. v. Thuggery and Intimidation: Where a candidate feels that in a free and fair contest that he or she may not be able to beat his/her opponent, he/she may resort to thuggery mainly to scare the supporters of his/her opponent, so that they will either withdraw their support from the opponent or be sufficiently intimidated that they cannot come out to vote on election day. That way, only the supporters of a particular candidate will have the "security cover" to come out to vote. Similarly, this method of rigging can also be employed during polling, where-in thugs and fanatical party supporters could snatch electoral materials at gun-point in order to achieve pre-determined aim. Several reports of this method of rigging have been noticed in Nigeria elections, where thugs were heavily mobilized and armed to harass supporters of opponents in such a way that election could not take place but results were dutifully declared in the affected centers.

Rigging Methods During the Elections’ Day i. Ballot Stuffing: As the name suggests, it involves fixing of the thumb printed ballot papers in boxes to favour a pre-determined candidate in order for him to win. Most times, the need to do this arises when the turn-out at the polls is low. Fraudulent officers may agree to utilize all the ballot papers by thumb-printing the ballot papers themselves in often quick and panicky ways. This type of rigging is done with the active connivance of both electoral officers and security officers. ii. Multiple Voting: This involves the issuance of more than one ballot papers to a voter on several rounds within the voting period. Again this is possible only with the active participation and connivance of the electoral officers. iii. Underage Voting: This is when persons who are not up to voting age are given voters' card, apparently by the "area politician" who registered a "multitude" during the registration exercise. This method is rampant in the northern part of Nigeria where large chunks of the almajaris are ready tools deployed by desperate politicians to achieve their

aims. iv. Voters' Inducement: This method of rigging takes place during or before an election. It involves influencing voters by using tangible articles or objects like cash or salt, garri, rice, sugar, yam tubers, onion bulbs, ground-nut oil, cash etc to voters as a way of currying their electoral favour and support. v. ECOWAS Voting: This is a term used in describing the method wherein politicians go to neighbouring state or country to "mobilize" voters on the day of elections. Such politicians provide transport that moves the "immigrant voters" from one polling centre to the other. Again, this works with the connivance of electoral officers who allows the "immigrants " to vote, even when their names are not in the voters' register. vi. Satellite Voting: In this method, certain pre-arranged persons are recruited into some private and hidden places around a voting centre where they are provided with "smuggled" electoral materials like ballot papers, ballot boxes, and result sheets. The ballot materials are returned to the proper voting centers before the end of polling or they (hired voters) may chose to perfect the act by completing all the requisite electoral report sheets and send to the collation centers.

Post-Election Rigging Methods The kind of electoral fraud at this stage includes:

i.Goal-Keeper's Method: Some crafty politicians would rather allow the entire process to go smoothly during elections at polling stations but lie in wait at the collation for their centers where the figures from the actual voting are neglected, and fresh ones manufactured and posted in place of the authentic ones.

ii. Deliberate Counting Errors: The presiding officers in a polling centre deliberately ignore counting some of the votes of a candidate and count all the votes of another and even inflate some. This is either possible when the presiding officer has some good knack for trickery or has also conscripted the party agents to compromise their duties and to "co-operate", usually for a fee. When this is done, a naive, careless or compromised party agent may very well endorse a manipulated result as the authentic one.

iii. Technical Rigging: This type happens between a polling centre where mini- collation had been done and a final collation centre where the results will be announced. Often times, the results from the various collation centers may indicate that a particular party or candidate has won, but between the zonal collation centers and final point of collation and announcement, like Charlie Boy show, anything could happen, that could make the winner, a few minutes ago, to become the loser.

iv. Block-Off Method: `This involves the use of all legal and illegal means to check the advancement of an opponent on the electoral chart. In the main, it entails blocking off the result of an opponent from an area he is believed to have considerable political strength. This way, the final collation is done without including the results from such places. This gives advantage to the perpetrator of the fraud since his opponent would have been disadvantaged.

Indeed, political parties in Nigerian have a wide range of techniques to rigging elections and ensuring that the popular candidate loses at the pool. Most importantly, when the party funders, including their godfathers, are holding the politicians involved on their necks, the electoral frauds and irregularities that show up during such elections include, killings, taking away result sheets from election materials by the politicians in collusion with security forces and distributing the rest, only to return and snatch the rest away at gun point later in the day, forcing people to vote for their party, beating people up, snatching ballot boxes and papers, shooting to intimidate voters, deliberate delay of delivery of materials and commencement of voting, refusal to deliver vital materials such as inks, pads, result sheets, using fake youth corpers, placing a forty-eight hour curfew in the state as against the Electoral Commission’s curfew of 7am to 5pm on the day of the election, amongst others. Voters are seriously intimidated so as to make way for the sponsored politicians to rig the election which is the only avenue they have to repay the contributions/loans.

2.1.4 The Implications of Private Funding of political parties to National Development.

Private funding of political parties remains one of the last ‘legitimate' avenues by which the private sector, foreign governments or even criminals can extract influence on public officials, (Booysen, and Masterson, 2009:3). The behaviour of the private funders/donors may seem unparralls to their intension. But their main purpose for the funding is to have a say in the government.

Although, many large donors may be well intentioned and disposed to the development of democracy and the contribution by them may well be motivated by such intentions. However, lack of control over the private funding of political parties may allow the wealthy to ‘buy' influence and access through secret donations, drowning out the citizens' voice and undermining the equal value of each person's vote. This is why many countries postulate regulation in their constitution. But the lack of regulation in favour of transparency leaves open the back door for organized criminals and rogue business people to effectively corrupt the political process through party donations. As long as the public cannot see the link between donors and political parties, a real threat exists that party funding could become a tool to undermine internal party democracy and the democratic process as a whole, (Booysen, and Masterson, 2009:3).

There are a number of instances of impropriety that have demonstrated that it is unhealthy for a democracy when private fund-raising is allowed to continue unregulated, or godfathers having field day in their decisions. Examples range from the exposition by Google (2011), “it is said that several years after leaving office, it is still Mr Tinubu who calls many of the shots in Lagos state, largely through the proxies whom he has personally selected, nominated and effectively guided into office”. He did so for Mr. Fashola. The purpose for this was for the sponsored to be rubber stamp in the office but the real manager remains outside the office where he controls the state affairs from the selection of cabinet members, budget, projects as well as other appointment in the state.

There are countless other hand-picked political successors across Africa. For

Fashola, once he was installed as Governor, according to Google, (2011), he began to show the tell-tale signs of a man who actually wanted to make some of his own decisions – often without any reference to the man at whose personal sponsorship, he was occupying the governor’s mansion, and at times in direct opposition to one of Mr. Tinubu’s myriad personal business interests.

To say that this unfolding state of affairs irked Mr. Tinubu would be to understate the case to the point of material misrepresentation. Because, to Mr. Tinubu, this behaviour was much more than just the irritating impudence of an upstart lackey. Indeed, in Mr. Tinubu’s politically-charged universe, it smacked of some of the worst evils imaginable, ingratitude, disloyalty, disrespect, political dishonesty, to name but a few. And as if to add insult to injury, it had come to Mr. Tinubu’s attention that there were increasingly vocal murmurings among the public that Fashola was doing Lagos proud, that he was changing the face of Lagos, making Lagos the envy of all other states. Understandably, it was of little or no comfort to Mr. Tinubu that he was often openly congratulated for having made such a wise choice in selecting Fashola as his successor. Far more important than any advancement of Lagos state was the sacrosanct hierarchy and natural order of things that Mr. Tinubu had gone to such great lengths to establish, and which his successor now appeared to be tampering with.

The fear for this kind of trouble can never be over-emphaised. There are political war between the two men and their respective camps. In fact, it reached the point where party insiders began to fear that this rift would lead to a schism that would ultimately affect the fortunes of the party itself, not only in Lagos but in the southwest region as a whole where the party was beginning to establish its dominance, (Google, (2011). In such situations “when two elephants fight in the jungle, the grass suffers”, is usually a safe entrée.

In Nigerian politics, charisma is much less important than an arsenal of thuggish campaign tactics. Political candidates engineer kidnapping of their opponents, would-be candidates are assassinated and thugs are hired to intimidate rival campaign supporters.

Such behaviour is business-as-usual in a country run by political elites who sponsor candidates with the understanding that they will reap the financial benefits once the candidate takes office, (Hanson, (2007).

In Imo State and indeed in all the states of the federation, the funders, sponsors or the godfathers, no matter which states they are from, have often been in conflict with their godson or the politician when it comes to the issue of redemption of funds through the return on their investment and decision-making.

The first rate of episode on Governor Rochas Okorocha’s administration was the absence of the personalities in Imo State that has been ‘political institutions’ since 1999 in the inauguration of Imo State Governor. The only individuals of repute present were, Emeke Offor, Chief Victor Umeh, and Governor Peter Obi, all of Anambra origin. According to HORN, (2011),

This has led to the question in public gatherings, when did Imo State become a vassal state of Anambra State? Some have even argued that the presences of these people were expected because they successfully installed the present Imo State Governor. This particular fact has led to the revelation of some facts regarding the governorship elections in Imo State with regards to the role of the military. The rumour now flying around the state was that Emeka Offor was the one who invited the military into the Imo State governorship elections with specific instructions to do everything necessary for the emergence of Owelle Rochas Okorocha.

So in spite of the overtures by Ohakim and members of his administration, the new government of Owelle Rochas was less concerned with governance of Imo and its people but more concerned with pay back and servicing the interest of his benefactors. The interest of a business man such as Emeka Offor, who is not an indigene of Imo State, could be nothing but a substantial return on his investment. This may have been responsible for the freezing of Imo State government accounts by the new governor-elect.

The freezing of the state accounts which was unconstitutional, led to the non- payment of salaries of state workers and the non-payment of severance packages of all government appointees. The severance packages remains

unpaid till today and the two months salaries of all appointees also remains unpaid. Rochas Okorocha’s administration, in essence, controlled the state allocation starting from April 2011. From April to August 2011, about 12.5 billion Naira was allocated to the state from the federation account. With this amount of money, salaries of work done by appointees and their statutory severance packages remained unpaid. What happened to these monies? In spite of the refusal to pay salaries and severance packages, these appointees are bounded until every government vehicle in their possession was returned. It became obvious that this vendetta mission was not going to be limited just to Ohakim’s appointees, but the elected representatives of local governments, the traditional institution of the state and the suffering youths of the state through the sacking of the ten thousand graduate jobs for youths.

The implications of private funding of political parties to national development from the above exposition include: i. Controlling the state government from another state in the federation

by those that successfully installed the governor. ii. The use of military in the Imo State governorship elections with specific instructions to do everything necessary for the emergence of Owelle Rochas Okorocha. Perhaps, to be able to recover their money if he wins. iii. Personal decision of the office holder without consulting the godfathers, sponsors or the funders attracts blows. iv. The use rumours, character assassination and religious propaganda against the office holder who deviates from the refunding arrangement. v. The government of Owelle Rochas who was less concerned with governance in Imo State and her people but more concerned with pay back and servicing the interest of his benefactors may find it difficult to get out of the hands of the funders. vi. The freezing of the state accounts which was unconstitutional, led to the non-payment of salaries of state workers and the non-payment of severance packages of all government appointees. vii. Misappropriation of state funds characterizes private funding of political parties, hence

the quest to settle the funders.

The plights of the elected officers in a sponsored election are usually sore. This is so because, his personal decision without consulting the godfathers, sponsors or the funders attracts biting of officer’s anus. This exacerbates war if the office holder refuses to do business as usual with the combatants. The funders, godfathers or sponsors may throw sink at him and use rumour mongering, character assassination and religious propaganda against him. All these happened to Govenor Okorocha and his predicessors but he refused to be distracted and fought like a lion till the controversial “supplementary election” in Imo State on May 6, 2011, (Jason, 2011).

Ohakim was aware of the mission of these funders and godfathers and confident as he told the people of Imo State as early as Wednesday August 22, 2007, during the swearing-in of his commissioners: “It is not important to me how long I stay in office. What matters to me is the legacy I leave behind even if I stayed four months”. With that frame of mind, he focused on working for Imo people, (Jason, 2011). It is unfortunate that the combatants are the same. The trophy they fight for is the monthly Federal Allocation to Imo State. The victims are the same Imo citizens who have become refugees in their soporific and numbing comfort zones. No governance goes on when this kind of rancor, abuse, fighting, killing and political harlotry, etc. are on course. Attempt to initiate or carry out any development programme are resisted by those who felt they were not listened to or obeyed.

The private money donors have fractured Nigerian democracy, particularly, the Imo State polity creating a political process in which vested interest predominates and the public interest is forgotten. The individuals and the interest group with money invest in office holders and use the money to gain access to elected officials.

The ‘Ibeto Crime’ as recorded in Vanguard of February 2007, was his objection on the ruling party stopping him from the importation of cement to allow only Dangote to be the sole-importer of cement for the country. This led to the turn back of ship that have already waiting entry into the Apapa wharf loaded with cement back to the importing

41 country without considerating the cost on the individual and the country at large. This singular action by the government led to the increase in the cost of cement till today. Dangote is one of the PDP major funders in the country. His return on investment is to supply cement for the country, and perhaps add the money given to the party to be borne by the consumers of the product. The ordinary voters with ballot paper without Naira are powerless for the stipulated time. Therefore, private money or private funding undermines political democracy in three fundamental ways, according to Ikejiani-Clark, (2007):

1. It determines in every race who compete and who wins election. 2. It skews the national priorities and the outcome of legislative decisions. 3. It makes the national legislature less representative and less responsive.

In this process therefore, the elected officer finds it difficult to hold grip the government. The promise to be accountable becomes impossible as there are many investors who are around to demand interest on their investments. Accountability is the ability (of an organisation, project or institution) to provide an account of its activities both as an explicit record of them, and as an acceptance of responsibility for them, (http://www.article13.com/static/A13_M3_I2_Definitions.asp#sto).

It is vital that corruption risks are addressed, given how serious the potential fallout of corrupt exchanges between parties and funders: exposure of underhand dealings to obtain operational and campaign finance gives the impression – in some cases well-founded – that access to the democratic decision-making process can be bought, irrespective of what the public wants. As a result, people lose interest in the political process and lose trust in government. Also crucial is to tackle the abuse of state resources (such as state media, staff time or use of official telephones, vehicles and offices for campaigning) by incumbent parties, (IPU Assembly, 2011).

When the election has been won, the funders raise their machete to cut as many goodies as possible. There was far-reaching influence of fundraisers over everything from the selection of judges to the distribution of construction contracts. Most of them are

42 placed on salary even without portfolio, (Bofelo, 2010). When their decisions or orders are refused, the incumbents seat on hot fire. Very few politicians can withstand the heat that comes from the threat of the funders/sponsors/godfathers. Most governors who attempted to oppose the decisions of their funders do not find it comfortable in their administration.

What has becomes clear from the available anecdotal evidence is that, money, whose source cannot be explained, has become part of the electoral process. This has raised fears of corrupting the electoral process and endangering national security. As a result, civil society activists have made calls for establishment of a regulatory framework to govern the use of money in the electoral process. For the time being, however, there does not appear to be political willingness on the part of politicians from both sides of the spectrum to confront this problem. This seems to suggest that the practice of using "dirty" money is so widespread that, for now, the politicians would be unwilling to change the status quo, while, continuous reliance upon it breeds: i. corruption, ii. embezzlement of public funds and property,

iii. lack of local or national development, iv. the use of high business gullutonist sponsors in the running of government, v. making undue and unfavourable decisions, and vi. the control of the state affairs by some unscrupulous and unpatriotic elements whocares not about the citizens or the government but about themselves, (Mutesa,2002).

He further explained that, private funding money are also used by those involved in shady dealings that are repugnant to the security of individuals and the nation, such as drug barons and gun-runners to make the government turn a blind eye to their heinous activities. The fear that private financing of political parties result in mortgaging the country to such criminal elements is therefore a real one. When the money has been committed and the party gets to power, it might be difficult to refuse the demands of the funders or stand against their shady dealings and heinous activities. The kidnapping gangs, robbery gangs, drug gangs, private human-parts gang, etc. are bossed and sponsored by such party funders. The sole importers of essential goods to Nigeria, private refinery owners, crude oil exporters and fuel importers are also in such group.

2.1.5 Solutions to the Problems of Private Funding of Political Parties.

Controlling unfair and illegal practices is a fundamental objective of any regulatory system and in the case of political parties, the need for regulation is very compelling in the light of their role in the democratic process. Ikejiani, (2007) notes some means to regulate party funding and lower the likelihood of corruption in a democratic nation. They include:

i. Codes of Conduct for Political Parties

This is to encourage and open free and fair political competition among the politicians in any polity. Codes of conduct are not usually incorporated in laws, but are therefore, proclaimed standards that are difficult for anybody to toy with in polity. It sets out the standard of behavour expected from each political party and its members. There are usually sanctions against defaulters and law breakers.

ii. Disclosure Rules

Disclosure rules are designed to ensure that the sources of funding political parties and the implication of potential influence on the policy are made public and can be monitored. Disclosure Rules require the listing of the amount, as well as the names and addresses of the contributors, but the threshold for disclosure, differs substantially between countries and can range from zero to N1,000,000. Disclosure also applies to party expenditures. Some countries have rules requiring the declaration of assets and interest of candidates both before and after the election. These methods/steps are used to lower the inceptive for corrupt dealing by heightening the risk of dictation.

iii. Contribution Limit

This is to ensure that no private contributor exert in appropriate influence on the political system. Limits on private contribution generally regulate the maximum permissible amount of the contribution. For example, in Nigeria, Section 93, Sub-section 9 of the Electoral Act 1999, stipulate that no individual or entity should donate more than one million Naira to a political party or a candidate. Limits on private contribution also regulate the sources of funding and these include the prohibition of anonymous contribution, foreign contribution, and limits on the ability of corporations to make contribution. iv. Expenditure Limits Expenditure limits can regulate both the amount and the type of expenditure with the goal to limit perverse incentives and the need for dirty money (soft), that is, funding that exceeds the legitimate amount. The extent to which this mechanism is applied and the regulatory level they belong to depends on the respective funding limits. The type of expenditure can range from the prohibition of using funds for personal uses to restrictions of the use of paid media advertising and other campaign related expenditures. Most importantly, they may forbid the use of state resources by the ruling party for party political purposes as this is not only wrong but it also creates inequalities to the opposition parties.

v. Quality of the Regulation

The effectiveness of any regulation depends on its quality. A balance has to be gotten between the need for regulation, the closing of the potential loopholes and the practicality of its intensions. There should be an agency or body that is/are responsible for the party funding activities. Their duty is to stipulate personal responsibility and facilitate the task of monitoring by eliminating ambiguities in the rules and set bodies to oversee and enforce party funding regulations. However, the implementation, transparency provisions, including reporting and disclosure requirement involves cost and places an administrative burden on the parties without necessarily improving openness and accountability for reasons relating to the quality and timeliness the information provided.

vi. Political will and commitment

Successful regulation of party funding laws depends on the motivation that underlies their enactment and impacts on the implementation. Evidence has shown that lack of political will of the designers of the law and those subject to it has greatly undermined its effective implementation. There is therefore, the need to have a political will to make the law that applies to everybody at the same time. In the resolution adopted by consensus at the 124th Assembly of the Inter- Parliamentary Union, (IPU) held in Panama on 20 April 2011, issues bordering on transparency and accountability in the funding of political parties and election campaigns were adopted, (http://www.ipu.org/conf-e/124/res-3.htm). According to IPU, (2011), among the items adopted which could improve private funding of political parties irregularities in Nigeria, includes but not limited to: i. Recognizing that public confidence in the democratic process could be undermined by political funding mechanisms that are not accountable and transparent, ii. Noting that the reasons for regulating political party funding includes the need to promote the democratic principles of transparency and accountability, prevent

corruption, enhance competition among a broad range of political parties, accommodate a wide spectrum of political viewpoints, platforms and policies, and strengthen political parties and empower citizens to make informed decisions, iii. Recognizing that mandatory disclosure of political party funding contributes to greater transparency and gives the public an opportunity to understand what factors might inform the actions of a political party, iv. Mindful that disclosure laws, regulations and guidelines on campaign and political party funding seek to limit the negative impact of anonymous, foreign or corporate sources of funds to political parties and to ensure that all parties have an equal opportunity to compete, and that, although these measures may prove difficult, they are nevertheless important for ensuring that citizens are able to hold their political parties and elected representatives to account.

The unsavoury revelations about private financing of political parties should result in the calls for introduction of an electoral financing law. This law, if enacted, would regulate political parties’ expenditures and compel disclosure of election funds, (Mutesa, 2002). The law requiring disclose of sources of party funding including campaign contributions, campaign expenditures and the introduction of statutory limits on contributions should be fully enforced and defaulters punished by the provisions made for it, (Wikipedia, 2011).

2.1.6 Synthesis of the Review and Gap in Existing Literature

Having gone through some relevant literature on the subject matter, one could ascertain that there are enough reasons to believe that private funding of political parties do not only betray democracy but also frustrates development both at local and national level.

Although, many scholars have written on private funding of political parties in Nigeria, but to the best of my knowledge, none have been particular with the implications of private funding to national development. It is this gap in existing literature that this

47 study seeks to fill with the view to actually revealing those implications of private funding of political parties to national development as well as finding solution to them.

2.2 Hypotheses

The assumptions to guide the quest for these explanation and solution are as follows:

1. Improper understanding of the rationale for private funding and sources of political parties’ funds has led to chaos and corruption in electoral democracy. 2. A lot of electoral fraud/rigging occurs to prevent the failure of the party and to ensure that private funders do not lose. 3. Electoral fraud and embezzlement of public resources to settle party funders hinders national development. 2.3 Operationalization of Key Concepts Private funding Private funding is an arrangement specifically made to finance the business of oneself or another. Private funding of political parties is an arrangement made to contribute money by individual members of that party or supporters from outside the part who shares the views as expressed by the part through contributions, fundraising, etc. Political Party Political party is a group of persons organized to acquire and exercise political power. It is a group of people who share a common conception of how and why state power should be organized and used. It is an organization formed to gain political power. National Development National development is the ability of a country or countries to improve the social welfare of the people e.g. providing social amenities like quality education, potable water, transportation infrastructure, housing, medical care, etc. It is an ability of a nation to move from one level to a better level. Disclosure Disclosures are rules designed to ensure that the sources of funding political parties and the implication of potential influence on the policy are made public and can

48 be monitored. Party Funds Regulation Regulation of political party funding is the promotion of the democratic principles of transparency, accountability, prevention of corruption, enhancing competition among a broad range of political parties, accommodate a wide spectrum of political viewpoints, platforms and policies, and strengthen political parties and empower citizens to make informed decisions in a polity. godfather Politicians who are strong members of a political party, with worth for deciding what happens in a party and ready to fund or make a way for their preferred candidates in spite of other views and opinion. Elections Selection or voting of candidates to an elective office by the popular majority. Rigging The inability of adopting the constitutional provisions in deciding or electing candidates to office. The abnormal cases existing or arising in an election which makes a loser to become a winner.

2.4 METHODOLOGY In this section, the following items will be discussed: research design, area of the study, sources of data, population of the study, sampling procedure, the sample size, validity and reliability of instrument and method of data analysis. ------2.4.1 The Research Design The research design was a survey. Survey according to Obasi (1999:132) and Obi (2005:62) refers to a process of eliciting data from a target population through either questionnaire or interview instruments, on phenomena that occurred during the researcher’s absence and subjecting such data to a statistical analysis for the purpose of drawing conclusions. It requires the opinion of participants, initiators and observation process. 2.4.2 Area of the Study

The study was carried out in Imo State Nigeria. Imo is an Igbo speaking state, one of the five states in the South East geo-political zone of Nigeria and with Owerri. An oil state with three senatorial districts and 27 local government areas. The state is political conscious and alive, with men of pump and pageantry, timber and caliber, colossus of Nigerian political hyper and godfathers. The study is suitable in this state because of the trends of political development and the impact of the activities of these political jug-nuts and funders during the 2001 – 2011 political periods.

2.4.3 Sources of Data The data for this study were sourced through primary and secondary sources. The primary source were questionnaire and personal observation, while the secondary source was by review of related literature in form of books, journals, magazines, newspapers, government gazettes, documented evidence in the area of the study as well as internet sources. An item structured questionnaire with a list of five alternative answers (A-E) from which respondents were to choose the correct alternative was prepared by the researcher. It was divided into two parts. Part one was the personal characteristics while part two contains questions structured to reveal the following information: 1. The rationale for private funding of political parties. 2. The level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs to ensure that private funders do not lose. 3. The implications of private funding to national development. 4. The solutions to private funding of political parties in Nigeria. Later, with the aid of a research assistant, we visited the offices, units and locations and distributed copies of the questionnaire to the selected population. The questionnaire was clearly explained to the respondents. Most of them completed copies of the questionnaire and handed them over immediately, whereas others chose to complete theirs at their convenience due to official/political engagement. Also, due to the nature of the study, interview was used to clarify some issues where there were uncertainties. The researcher made use of the observation method of data

50 collection in this study. In observation (participant) according to Obasi (1999:170) “The researcher is directly involved in what is happening that constitutes the focus of observation”. As a citizen interested in the political development of the state, information gathered from these sources would enhance generalization and conclusion. 2.4.4 Population of the Study The population for the study consists of the politicians and adult citizens in the 27 local government areas of the Imo State. The local governments are:

Table 1: Twenty-Seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Imo State.

1 Aboh Mbaise 14 Nkwerre 2 Ahiazu Mbaise 15 Nwangele 3 Ezinihitte Mbaise 16 Obowo 4 Ihitte Uboma 17 Oguta 5 Ehime Mbano 18 Ohaji/Egbema 6 Ideato North 19 Okigwe 7 Ideato South 20 Onuimo 8 Ikeduru 21 Oru East 9 Isiala Mbano 22 Oru West 10 Isu 23 Orlu 11 Mbaitoli 24 Orsu 12 Njaba 25 Owerri Municipal 13 Ngor Okpala 26 Owerri North 27 OwerriWest Source: http://www.imostate.gov.ng/info/LGA The estimated population is 4.8 million and the population density varies from 230-1,400 people per square kilometer, (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imo_State). 2.4.6 The Sample Size The sample size of the study was 300 persons from 15 LGAs. We selected this number by random, that is, picking from a tray containing 27 wrapped papers. Each paper was written the name of one local government. We unwrapped each of them and found the 15 LGAs below. The sampled population was also randomly selected from persons we felt were matured and would have insight into the politics of Imo State. They are as

51 follows: Table 2: Sample Size of the Study S/No Local Govt. Area Population/Sample 1 Aboh Mbaise 20 2 Obowo 20 3 Ihitte Uboma 20 4 Oguta 20 5 Ideato North 20 6 Onuimo 20 7 Ikeduru 20 8 Isiala Mbano 20 9 Oru West 20 10 Orlu 20 11 Mbaitoli 20 12 Owerri Municipal 20 13 Ngor Okpala 20 14 OwerriWest 20 15 Orsu 20 Total 300 Source: Field Survey 2011 The sample was a representative of the entire population. 2.4.5 Sampling Procedure Out of the 27 local government areas of Imo State, 15 local governments were selected by simple random sampling technique. This sampling technique, according to Black and Champman (1976) has high degree of selectivity that guarantees the representation of other relevant strata connected to the study. It also gives every member the opportunity to be selected among the entire population. The sample was drawn from among those who were involved in the political life as well as the citizens residing in the state. From each of the 15 Local Governments, 20 persons were randomly selected to get 300 persons as the sample. 2.4.7 Validity and Reliability of Instrument The validity and reliability of the instrument was done in response to content validity and face validity. Face validity of the questionnaire was done by presenting the draft of the measuring instrument to my project supervisor and experts in the field of Public Administration and Local Government of the University of Nigeria Nsukka. We also

52 administered the same instrument to a selected group of individuals at different times and the result received was consistent and in line with the view of Obasi (1999:126) that “reliability refers to the ability of an instrument to produce the same consistent results over time when applied to the same sample”. The views and critiques of the items were incorporated in the final questionnaire that was used for the study. The questionnaires were administered to selected group of people who possess the same characteristics with the sample to test the validity and reliability of the instrument. 2.4.8 Method of Data Analysis. The responses to each item on the questionnaire were tallied, the number of frequencies recorded. The opinion of the respondents in the case study was used to compare and evaluate the findings from other sources used. The responses were organized using a five-point Likert-scale. Each respondent was required to indicate his / her opinion by checking any of the five options, namely: strongly agree; agree; undecided; strongly disagree and disagree. Values assigned to these options were 5, 4, 3, 2, and 1 respectively. These values were added to obtain 15, which was further divided by 5 to obtain 3, which is the mean. Variables with mean scores of less than 3.0 were disagree by the respondents with the item loaded. While variables with mean scores equal and above 3.0 were strongly agree by the respondents with the items loaded. The Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) will constitute the software for the analysis of the data collected for this study. 2.4.9 Theoretical Framework

The theory used for the analysis of this study is elite theory. Elite theory is a theory of the state which describes and explains the power relationships in contemporary society, (Wikipedia, 2011). The theory posits that a small minority, consisting of members of the economic elite and policy-planning networks, holds the most power and that this power is independent of a state's democratic elections process. Elite theory stands in opposition to pluralism in suggesting that democracy is a utopian ideal. It also stands in opposition to state autonomy theory.

According to Mosca (1984), elites are an organized minority and that the masses are an unorganized majority. The ruling class is composed of the ruling elite and the sub- elites. He divides the world into two groups: ruling class and class that are ruled. Mosca asserts that elites have intellectual, moral, and material superiority that is highly esteemed

Still looking at the weight of elite preferences on the power, Mills in his book, The Power Elite, published in 1956, found new sociological perspective on systems of power in the United States, identifing a triumvirate of power groups - political, economic and military - which form a distinguishable, although not unified, power-wielding body in the United States. He proposed that this group had been generated through a process of rationalization at work in all advanced industrial societies whereby the mechanisms of power became concentrated, funneling overall control into the hands of a limited, somewhat corrupt group, (Mills,1956). This reflected a decline in politics as an arena for debate and relegation to a merely formal level of discourse. It also revealed the fact that, power generally lies outside the boundaries of elected representatives. Franz Leopold Neumann's book, Behemoth revealed the structure and practice of national socialism, (1933-1944). It provided the tools to analyze the structure of a political system and served as a warning of what could happen in a modern capitalistic democracy.

The elite theory analysis of power was also applied on the micro scale in community power studies by Hunter (1953:6). Hunter examined in detail the power relationships evident in his "Regional City" looking for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions. He posited a structural-functional approach which mapped the hierarchies and webs of interconnection operating within the city – mapping relationships of power between businessmen, politicians, clergy etc. In his controversial book “Who Rules America?”, Domhoff (1967), researched local and national decision making process networks in order to illustrate the power structure in the United States. He asserts, much like Hunter, that elite classes that owns and manages large income-producing properties (like banks and corporations) dominate the American power structure politically and economically. On this note, Burnham (1993:59) tries in his early work, The Managerial Revolution, to express the movement of all functional

54 power into the hands of managers rather than politicians or businessmen – separating ownership and control.

Due to the fact that elites have taken control of the state matters, Dye in his book “Top Down Policy Making”, argues that U.S. public policy does not result from the "demands of the people," but rather from elite consensus found in Washington, D.C. based non-profit foundations, think tanks, special-interest groups, and prominent lobbyists and law firms. (Dye, 2000). Dye's thesis is further expanded upon in his works: The Irony of Democracy, Politics in America, Understanding Public Policy, and Who's Running America? (Wikipedia, 2011). Application of the Theory Given the trend of political and administrative control of the state affairs by the political party funders, the likelihood of the political office holder losing grip of the office is envisaged. The private funding of political parties ensures that all the members of a political party can contribute to fund a party, as well as, have a say in the party’s affairs. But the practice of this arrangement differs from the principle. Hence, the state affairs were hijacked by the elites in the party who were in an organized minority. The practice of funders of political parties relates to experience of Hunter (1953:6) when he examined in detail the power relationships evident in his "regional city" looking for the "real" holders of power rather than those in obvious official positions. The occupants of political offices are not usually the real holders of power; power generally lies outside the boundaries of elected representatives. This is obvious in our system because, decisions, appointment and allocation of state funds are made by funders who are interested in the return on their investment in the party. Due to the hijack of state affairs by party funders and godfathers, public policy no longer results from the "demands of the people," but rather from elite consensus. Whatever seems good to the funders is most appropriate and needed to be implemented. Any objection from the holders of power results into controversy both for the party in power and the state in general. For instance, the misunderstanding between Senator Ararume/Udenwa and Udenwa/Ohakim in Imo State resulted from non-compliance with the terms of agreement. The holders of the office soon

55 realized that compliance to the agreement will incapacitate the administration, hence the refusal to continue to pay tribute or return on investment for party funders. The impact of this arrangement on the ruling party, the state, funders/godfathers and the holders of the office can never be overemphasized.

CHAPTER THREE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE STUDY AREA Imo State is one of the seven states created by the Federal Military Government on February 3, 1976. The state was carved out from the defunct East Central State which was one of the twelve states initially created by the Federal Military Government (General Yakubu Gowon's regime) in 1967. Imo State has twenty seven Local Governments Areas (LGAs), and three Senatorial Zones, (http://www.imostate.gov.ng/info/AboutImo). Since the creation of Imo State in 1976, there have been both military and civilian governors that piloted the affairs of the state, among the civilian governors are Chief Samuel Mbakwe of NPP, Chief Evan Enwerem - PD, Chief Achike Udenwa- PDP, Chief Ohakim – APGA and Chief Rochas Okorocha – APGA. The 27 local government areas in the state and their capitals are listed below:

Table 1: Twenty-Seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Imo State.

S/No Local Govt Areas and Capital Local Govt Areas and Capital 1 Aboh Mbaise – Aboh 14 Nkwerre – Nkwere 2 Ahiazu Mbaise - Afor Oru 15 Nwangele – Amaigbo 3 Ehime Mbano – Ehime 16 Obowo – Otoko 4 Ezinihitte Mbaise – Ezinihitte 17 Oguta – Oguta 5 Ideato North – Nkwere 18 Ohaji/Egbema – Mmahu 6 Ideato South – Nkwere 19 Okigwe – Okigwe 7 Ihitte Uboma – Isinweke 20 Onuimo – Okwe 8 Ikeduru - Iho Ikeduru 21 Orlu - Orlu 9 Isiala Mbano – Umuelemai 22 Orsu – Orsu 10 Isu – Umundugba 23 Oru East – Umuoma 11 Mbaitoli – Nwaorieubi 24 Oru West – Mgbidi 12 Njaba – Nneasa 25 Owerri Municipal - Owerri 13 Ngor Okpala - Umuneke Ngor 26 Owerri North – Orie Uratta 27 OwerriWest – Umuguma Source: http://www.imostate.gov.ng/info/LGA Location

Imo State derived her name from imo river, which takes its course from the Okigwe/Awka upland. It is located in the South/East region of Nigeria with Owerri as its capital and largest city. It is located between Anambra State in the North and Rivers State

in the South; and bounded on the East by Cross River State and Akwa Ibom State and on the West by the River Niger and Delta State, (NGEX. 2010).

The inhabitants of Imo State are lgbos, a culturally homogeneous group. The lgbo language is spoken throughout the state with minor differences in dialects. Imo State has a very rich cultural heritage. This is manifested in dressing, music, dance, festivals, arts and crafts, and the traditional hospitality of the people. Part of the culture of the state is the lgbo traditional hospitality to visitors, which begins with the presentation of kolanuts to the visitor. Religion There is freedom of worship in Imo State and religion occupies a central place in the lives of the people. The people are predominantly Christians of different denominations. There are also a good number of Moslems in the state. Some people in the state still cling to the local traditional religion. Population Imo State has a population of about 4.8 million persons. The population density varies from area to area, (http://www.imostate.gov.ng/info/AboutImo).

Education

Imo State is one of the states in Nigeria with a high literacy rate. There are educational development efforts of communities, including the provision of educational opportunities and physical structures for the advancement of knowledge. There are seven post secondary institutions in the state like Imo State University; Federal University of Science and Technology; Alvan Ikoku Federal College of Education, Owerri; Michael Okpara University of Agriculture, Umuagwo and Federal Polytechnic Nekede, Owerri. There are 1,205 primary schools in Imo State, about 289 secondary schools, two teachers' training colleges and over 230 private technical/vocational schools, for the training in electrical installation, radio and TV, motor mechanic, brick making and building technology. Imo State has a boarding primary school for the physically handicapped and a resource centre for the handicapped. In addition, there are two day schools for children with unique needs located at Owerri and

Okigwe, while a secondary school for the deaf and dumb is located at Orodo in Mbaitoli LGA,( http://www.imostate.gov.ng/news/). Health It was noted that, the State Health Care Delivery Scheme has adopted a grassroots approach through the establishment of rural basic healthcare centres, village primary healthcare centres; and the EPI/ORT scheme in all the LGAs. Tourism and Recreation The state has a good number of tourism centres like natural endowments at Oguta and Abadaba lakes, the Mbari Cultural Centre at Owerri, Eke Nguru in Aboh Mbaise and lgwekala shrine in Umunoha are traditional art and craft centres that depict the culture and heritage of the lgbos. Mineral Resources and Industries Imo State has a number of mineral based raw materials for industries. There are a total of 11,607 industrial and business establishments in Imo State. Out of these, 9,274 are in the services/business, 1,858 in the manufacturing sector, 416 in building and construction, 53 in agricultural activity, while 3 establishments each are in mining and quarrying as well as in water, gas and electricity. Economic Climate and Major Activities of the People

The business and industrial atmosphere in Imo State is peaceful. There is the development finance and investment company set up by the state government to develop the industrial base of the state by assisting investors. The Microfinance Bank in various communities of the state is also available to grant credit to both small and large scale business and indu- strialist. The people of Imo State are enterprising and willing to work. They are in various economic activities like trading, constrution, agriculture, transportation, consultancy, manufacturing, arts, sports etc. Notable among them are Chief Emmanuel Iwuanyanwu of Hardel and Enics Group of Coy., Chioma Ajunwa – the 1996 Olympic Gold Medalist, Nwankwo Kanu - National Footballer, Emmanuel Amunike - 1994 African Player of the Year and Olympic-winning soccer star, Colins E. Ijoma – the youngest U.S. Trial Administrator, Ge-

59 nevieve Nnaji – Nollywood Actoress, Onyeka Onwenu – Actoress and Politician and many other distinguished academia, investors, politicians, artists, etc.

Agriculture and Forestry

The chief occupation of the people is farming. Their cash crop includes palm oil/wine, raffia palm wine, rice, groundnut, melon, cotton, cocoa, rubber, maize, et cetera. Food crops such as yam, cassava, cocoyam and maize are also produced in large quantities. Forestry is yet to be fully developed in the state, (http://www.imostate.gov.ng/info/AboutImo).

Imo Politics Imo state is notably one of the states in Nigeria with high political climate. The Igbo ‘enweghi eze’ syndrome is practiced without pity because every individual tend to be individualist. Politics in the state is increasingly becoming interesting, not necessarily because of the different political parties, but because the divide and cleavages between and among politicians reveal disturbing ironies that generally characterise Nigerian politics, such as – baseless propaganda, name calling, inane campaign styles and resurrection of morbid issues that should never be tabled before the electorate in a state as homogeneous as Imo, (Esinulo, 2011). Among the major political parties in the state are the PDP, ACN, APGA, PPA and ANPP.

The chieftains in the Imo politics do not really keep seat on one political party. Funders and godfathers seem to determine the political climate and there are usually stifling relationship among them in the bid to get to the seat of power. For instance, a question may be asked on why did Chief Achike Udenwa, then the governor in Imo State insist that Chief Ifeanyi Araraume would not succeed him as governor come rain, come sun. And why did he work assiduously towards this objective? What was it between them personally or at the level of principles, which made Udenwa swear that his fellow PDP chieftain, Chief Araraume, would not succeed him at Douglas House? What offence did Araraume commit or what did Udenwa know about Araraume that he was reluctant to share with his party men or with the electorate? But for sure, Udenwa, a calculating and somewhat unpredictable

60 politician, knew more than he ever disclosed to his close associates. He simply loathed the idea of passing the baton of Imo political leadership to Araraume, the man he now wants to win power in the state in 2011. The face-off and differences between Udenwa and Araraume made the victory of Ohakim in 2007 easy, (http://thenewsafrica.com/2011/03/21/battle-for- political-power-in-imo-state/).

But the story is different today – and that confirms once again that in politics, there is no permanent enemy, only permanent interest. This is precisely what makes politics, especially its Nigerian variety, dirty and devoid of principles and morality – in every sense. However, the ‘reconciliation’ and curious political partnership between Udenwa and Araraume took only those who do not understand the nuances of politics by surprise. Whether this development would bring some measure of stability to Imo politics and fundamental changes in the political behaviour of those angling for power, is yet to be seen. What is certain is that political tension in the state has been heightened unnecessarily, and the tone and language of the campaigns sometimes veers off course. This reconciliation between the two politicians resulted in a political alliance, which has since dissolved into Action Congress of Nigeria, (ACN). Although, the seemingly buried matter resurfaced at the dying minutes when a repeat election to substantiate the winner of governorship seat in the state remained one week to hold. The two ‘reconciled’ friends soon demerged themselves into ethnic politics in order to support their brothers- Udenwa for Okorocha while Araraume for Ohakim. Investment Opportunities

There are investment opportunities in grain milling, starch production, intgrated palm produce industry, cashew product industry, fruit and vegetable juice concentrate production, integrated multi-oil seeds processing plant, cement factory, chemical plants and ceramic industry. The materials for these are available in the state,

(http://www.onlinenigeria.com/links/imoadv.asp?blurb=273).

CHAPTER FOUR DATA PRESENTATION, FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS 4.1 Data Presentation Data for this study were grouped into two sections – personal characteristics and main research question. These are presented below: Section A: Personal Characteristics

In this section, the researcher quantified the responses with percentage analysis. This involved the presentation of tables and analysis of the data to determine result as shown below:

1. What is your sex? Table 3: Respondents Sex. Items No % Male 211 70 Female 89 30 Total 300 100 Source: Field survey 2012

From table 3 above, respondents who are male was 70% while the female were 30%. This shows that both sexes were involved in the work.

2. What is your marital status? Table 4: Respondents Marital Status Items No % Married 197 66 Single 68 23 Divorced 21 7 Widow 14 4 Total 300 100 Source: Field survey 2012

Table 4 revealed that 66% of the respondents were married; 23% were single; 7% were divorced and 4% were widows. This implied that all categories of people were involved in the

62 exercise.

3. What is your occupation? Table 5: Respondents Occupation. Items No % Civil Servant 59 20 Businessman 88 29 Applicant 126 42 Student 27 9 Total 300 100 Source: Field survey 2012 Table 5 above show that 20% of the respondents were civil servants, 29% were businessmen; 42 were applicants and 9% were students. All the segment of the population was involved in the study.

4. What is your highest academic qualification? Table 6: Respondents Highest Academic Qualification. Items No % FSLC 26 9 WASC/GCE 61 20 Diploma/NCE/Professional 85 28 HND/Degree 89 30 Master/PhD 39 13 Total 300 100 Source: Field survey 2012 Table 6 above shows that 9% of the respondent’s highest academic qualification was FSLC (First School Leaving Certificate); 20% have WASC/GCE; 28% have Diploma/NCE/Professional; 30% have HND/Degree, while 13% have Master/PhD. These implied that people of all levels of education were involved.

5. How long have you lived in Imo State? Table 7: Respondents Length of Residence in Imo State. Items No % 1-10 years 15 5 11-20 years 29 10

21-30 years 55 18 31-40 years 89 30 41 + 112 37 Total 300 100 Source: Field survey 2012 From table 7 above, 5% of the respondents’ length of residence in Imo State was between 1-10 years; 10% were 11-20 years; 18% were 21-30 years; 30% were 31-40 years and 37 were between 41 and above years. This implied that the respondents have knowledge of political life in Imo.

Section B: Major Research Questions

6. Are you aware of electoral democracy in Imo state? Table 8: Respondents Knowledge of Electoral Democracy in Imo State. Items No % Aware 289 96 Not Aware 09 3 Not Certain 02 1 Total 300 100 Source: Field survey 2012

In table 8 above, 96% of the respondents are aware of electoral democracy in Imo State and Nigeria in general, 3% were not aware while 1% was not certain.

To answer questions 7-11, frequency counts were multiplied with the point scales and latter added together from which the mean (X) score were determined. The criterions mean score of 3 was adopted as cut off point to decide its acceptability or rejection. Any mean from 3 and above points represents strongly agree (SA), while 2.99 and below points is strongly disagree. The summary of the analysis of data from questions7-11 were represented below:

Question 7: What is the Rationale for the Private Funding of Political Parties?

Table 9: Rationale for the Private Funding of Political Parties ITEMS SA A UD D SD Total Mean

(5) (4) (3) (2) (1)

Government alone cannot fund 350 720 60 0 30 1160 4.28 political parties. It enhances individual ability to 1250 160 - 14 3 1427 4.91 join in the decision making, It helps to reduce fraudulent 900 280 90 60 - 1330 4.52 practices by political office holders, It will avoid an individual 1050 240 - 60 - 1350 4.16 holding claim that he single handedly sponsored a political office holder. Hence, hijacking the state economy. No one can demand for a pay- 350 360 - 280 - 990 3.75 back or a return on investment based on the amount contributed Source: Field survey 2012. Table 9 above shows the mean score of respondents on the issue of “Rationale for the Private Funding of Political Parties”. 4.28 (X) represents respondents’ opinion that government alone cannot fund political parties’ 4.91 X represents opinion on “it enhances individual ability to join in the decision making”, 4.52 X says it helps to reduce fraudulent practices by political office holders, while 4.16X represents it will avoid an individual holding claim that he single handedly sponsored a political office holder. Hence, hijacking the state economy, whereas 3.75 X believes that no one can demand for a pay-back or a return on investment based on the amount contributed.

Question 7: What are the sources of fund to political parties?

Table 10: The Sources of Fund to Political Parties ITEMS SA A UD D SD Total Mean (5) (4) (3) (2) (1)

Membership Dues 1395 60 - 12 - 1467 4.93

Donation from private 225 420 60 116 72 821 3.68 sectors/NGOs/Civil Societies Fund raising dinners by members 125 260 120 300 20 508 3.21 Donation from foreign government and 525 328 45 150 23 1068 4.10 companies Parties running businesses and 445 660 18 76 2 1201 4.22 holdings Loan from bank 625 368 63 112 6 1174 4.27

Sponsorship by influential individuals 1395 60 - 10 1 1466 4.94 of the party. Levy from office holders/elected 350 360 - 280 - 990 3.79 members of the party. Government grants to political parties 900 280 90 60 - 1330 4.52 Contribution by godfathers of the party 1395 60 - 12 - 1467 4.93 Source: Field Survey 2012.

From table 10 above, mean score (X) of respondents on the sources of fund to political parties being through membership dues was 4.93, Donation from private sectors/NGOs/Civil Societies was 3.68, Fund raising dinners by members was 3.21, Donation from foreign government and companies stood at 4.10, Parties running businesses and holdings was 4.22, Loan from bank was 4.27, Sponsorship by influential individuals of the party was 4.94, Levy from office holders/elected members of the party was 3.79, Government grants to political parties was 4.52 and Contribution by godfathers of the party stood as 4.93.

Question 8: What are the fraud and rigging that occur in private funding of political parties?

Table 10: Fraud and Rigging that Occur in Private Funding of Political Parties ITEMS SA A UD D SD Total Mean (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) Multiple registrations of 1350 100 - 10 - 1460 4.91 candidates for elections. Multiple printing of electoral 1000 200 30 60 10 1300 4.63 materials by politicians. Manipulating loopholes in the 1250 200 - - - 1450 4.86 electoral laws to ensure their candidates emerges winner at primaries and general elections Conscripting of electoral officers 900 240 60 - 40 1240 4.58 to second vent due process. Intimidation of political opponents 1050 300 15 20 - 1385 4.72 with thugs, Police, Army and personal guards. Soliciting for the ‘co-operation’ of 1350 80 - 20 - 1450 4.92 electoral officers both at the polling booths up to the resident electoral commissioners. Stuffing of ballot boxes before its 1300 120 9 14 - 1443 4.87 arrival at the polling booths. Multiple voting. - 320 - 840 60 1220 2.48 Quagmire judicial proceeding for 350 224 288 140 8 1010 3.76 election petitions Inducement of voters prior to 1250 120 9 34 - 1413 4.83 voting day. Deliberate counting errors after 20 48 15 480 39 602 2.22 the elections.

The use of under aged candidates 10 20 9 40 270 349 1.45 to vote.

Source: Field survey 2012. From the above table 10, mean (X) scores of respondents on the fraud and rigging that occur in private funding of political parties showed that 4.91 agreed that it was multiple registrations of candidates for elections, 4.63 said multiple printing of electoral materials by politicians, 4.86 was for Manipulating loopholes in the electoral laws to ensure their candidates emerges winner at primaries and general elections, 4.58 was conscripting of electoral officers to second vent due process, 4.72 was intimidation of political opponents with thugs / Police / Army / personal guards, 4.92 was for soliciting for the ‘co-operation’ of electoral officers both at the polling booths up to the resident electoral commissioners, 4.87 was stuffing of ballot boxes before its arrival at the polling booths, 2.48 was multiple voting, 3.76 was quagmire judicial proceeding for election petitions, while 4.83 was for inducement of voters prior to voting day, whereas 2.22 was deliberate counting errors after the elections and 1.45 was for the use of under aged candidates to vote.

Question 9: What are the implications of private funding to the development of Imo State and the nation at large?

Table 11: The Implications of Private Funding to the Development of Imo State and the nation at large. SA A UD D SD Total Mean ITEMS (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) The wealthy and influential 945 260 48 38 11 1302 4.61 persons buy and control the party’s machinery. The use of army, police and 105 180 645 20 18 968 3.35 thugs to ensure that the electoral process is submerged and rigged against credible candidates. Controlling the state government - 8 15 144 221 388 1.68 from another state in the federation by those that successfully installed him / her

The sponsored office holder’s 840 180 72 100 13 1205 4.45 assignment is to ensure the pay back to funders without regard to the oath of office. Personal decisions/initiatives of 105 180 645 20 18 968 3.35 the office holders without the approval of the funders/godfathers attract their anger and can still development. The funds allocated for 1300 120 9 14 - 1443 4.88 development are fought for and disbursed on the basis of what was contributed by funders and self enrichment. Vested interest predominates in - 8 15 144 221 388 1.51 private funding instead of public interest. The resources that would have 445 660 18 76 2 1201 4.22 served useful purposes in the state are used in paying homage’s, settlement of party funders, godfathers and thugs. Political disarray, ungovernable 50 100 696 40 13 899 3.15 situation, killing, rancor, fighting, splitting of party/political harlotry, kidnapping, etc. are the continues happenings in the state. Sheepishly implementation of 1395 60 - 10 1 1466 4.94 polices that do not benefit the public but the funders, thereby making the state/national legislature less representative and less responsive. Source: Field survey 2012.

From table 11 above, analysis of the respondents opinion on the implications of private funding of political parties revealed that mean (X) 4.61 agrees that the wealthy and influential persons buy and control the party’s machinery, while 3.35 states that the use of army, police and thugs to ensure that the electoral process is submerged and rigged against credible candidates, 1.68 was the controlling the state government from another state in the federation

by those that successfully installed him / her, 4.45 was the sponsored office holder’s assignment is to ensure the pay back to funders without regard to the oath of office, 3.35 was Personal decisions/initiatives of the office holders without the approval of the funders/godfathers attract their anger and can still development, 4.88 was the funds allocated for development are fought for and disbursed on the basis of what was contributed by funders and self enrichment, 1.51 was the vested interest predominates in private funding instead of public interest, 4.22 was the resources that would have served useful purposes in the state are used in paying homage’s and settlement of party funders, godfathers and thugs, while 3.15 was political disarray, ungovernable situation, killing, rancor, fighting, splitting of party/political harlotry, kidnapping, etc. are the continues happenings in the state whereas 4.94 was sheepishly implementation of polices that do not benefit the public but the funders, thereby making the state/national legislature less representative and less responsive.

Question 10: What are the solutions to the problems of private funding of political parties?

Table 12: The Solutions to the Problems of Private Funding of Political Parties SA A UD D SD Total Mean ITEMS (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) Law should be made for equal amou350 360 - 280 - 990 3.75 to be contributed by all the members of a political party to avoid some wealthy individuals hijacking the party. Law should be made to limit the105 180 645 20 18 968 3.35 amount to be expended by any political party in any election. Sanctions should be placed against defaulters. There should be encouragement 945 of 260 48 38 11 1302 4.61 open free and fair political competition among the politicians in any polity at the same level ground. All sources of funds and the intensi 840 180 72 100 13 1205 4.45 of the funders should be disclosed to determine its acceptability. Electoral Act of 1999, section 93 (9)105 180 645 20 18 968 3.35 suggests that no individual will contribute more than one million Naira. This should be implemented to

avoid corruption. Access to electronic and print media225 420 60 116 72 821 3.68 should be made free for all political parties by the state to avoid spending huge sums of money by political party’s rallies. Parties should be made to give 105 180 645 20 18 968 3.35 account of their campaign expenses one week before general elections to quantify their qualification according to the electoral laws. Strong regulations should guide 445 660 18 76 2 1201 4.22 political parties’ funding. Such regulations should be abided by the consciousness and political will of those subject to it. Persons wishing to run for a 1395 60 - 10 1 1466 4.94 political office should be selected first by his/her community, LGA, state and nation, (as the case may be), to ascertain his credibility, propriety, and financial disposition and management. Godfathers should not be allowed 50 100 696 40 13 899 3.15 to make any financial contribution to their parties. Source: Field survey 2012. From table 12 above, mean (X) percentage score of respondent’s opinion on the solutions to the problems of private funding of political parties were analysed. 3.75 mean (X) states that law should be made for equal amount to be contributed by all the members of a political party to avoid some wealthy individuals hijacking the party, 3.35 was law should be made to limit the amount to be expended by any political party in any election. Sanctions should be placed against defaulters, 4.61 states there should be encouragement of open free and fair political competition among the politicians in any polity at the same level ground, 4.45 was all sources of funds and the intensions of the funders should be disclosed to determine its acceptability, 3.35 was for Electoral Act of 1999, section 93 (9) suggests that no

individual will contribute more than one million Naira. This should be implemented to avoid corruption, 3.68 was access to electronic and print media should be made free for all political parties by the state to avoid spending huge sums of money by political party’s rallies, 3.35 was parties should be made to give account of their campaign expenses one week before general elections to quantify their qualification according to the electoral laws, 4.22 was strong regulations should guide political parties’ funding. Such regulations should be abided by the consciousness and political will of those subject to it, while 4.94 was for persons wishing to run for a political office should be selected first by his/her community, LGA, state and nation, (as the case may be), to ascertain his credibility, propriety, and financial disposition and management, and 3.15 was for godfathers should not be allowed to make any financial contribution to their parties.

4.2 Findings of the Study

The study found in the personal characteristics that the population consisted of male 70%, while the female were 30%. It also revealed that 66% of the respondents were married; 23% were single; 7% were divorced and 4% were widows. It was further obtained that 20% of the respondents were civil servants, 29% were businessmen; 42 were applicants and 9% were students. Also, it shows that 9% of the respondent’s highest academic qualification was FSLC, 20% have WASC/GCE, 28% have Diploma/NCE/Professional and 30% have HND/Degree, while 13% have Master/PhD. Finally, 5% of the respondents’ length of residence in Imo State was between 1-10 years, 10% were 11-20 years, 18% were 21-30 years, 30% were 31-40 years and 37 were between 41 and above years.

From the major research questions, the study found that 96% of the respondents are aware of electoral democracy in Imo State and Nigeria in general. In the rationale for private funding of political parties the study found as follows: a. To enhance individual ability to join in the decision making, b. To help to reduce fraudulent practices by political office holders, c. Government alone cannot fund political parties. d. It avoids individuals holding claim that he/she single handedly sponsored a political

office holder. Hence, hijacking the state economy, e. No one can demand for a pay-back or a return on investment based on the amount contributed. The above rationale can be represented in a graph to show their relative tendencies, thus:

Source: Field survey 2012

The study found the sources of funds to political parties as follows:

F= Membership Dues G= Donation from private sectors/NGOs/Civil Societies H= Fund raising dinners by members I= Donation from foreign government and companies J= Parties running businesses and holdings K= Loan from bank

L= Sponsorship by influential individuals of the party. M= Levy from office holders/elected members of the party.. N= Government grants to political parties O=Contribution by godfathers of the party

Graphical representation of the above showed thus:

Source: Field survey 2012

It was found that the fraud and rigging that occurred in private funding of political parties includes:

P= Multiple registration, Q= Multiple printing of electoral materials by politicians R= Manipulating loopholes in the electoral laws to ensure their candidates emerges winner at primaries and general elections S= Conscripting of electoral officers to second vent due process,

T= Intimidation of political opponents with thugs / Police / Army / personal guards, U= Soliciting for the ‘co-operation’ of electoral officers both at the polling booths up to the resident electoral commissioners,. V= Stuffing of ballot boxes before its arrival at the polling booths, W= Multiple voting, X= Quagmire judicial proceeding for election petitions, Y= Inducement of voters prior to voting day, Z= Deliberate counting errors after the elections O= The use of under aged candidates to vote. The above were also represented in a graph, thus:

Source: Field survey 2012

The implications of private funding to the development of Imo State and the nation at large, the study found:

A= that the wealthy and influential persons buy and control the party’s machinery, B= the use of army, police and thugs to ensure that the electoral process is sub merged and rigged against credible candidates C= the controlling the state government from another state in the federation by those that successfully installed him / her,

D= the sponsored office holder’s assignment is to ensure the pay back to funders without regard to the oath of office, E= Personal decisions/initiatives of the office holders without the approval of the funders/godfathers attract their anger and can still development, F= the funds allocated for development are fought for and disbursed on the basis of what was contributed by funders and self enrichment G= the vested interest predominates in private funding instead of public interest, H= the resources that would have served useful purposes in the state are used in pay ing homage’s and settlement of party funders, godfathers and thugs, I= political disarray, ungovernable situation, killing, rancor, fighting, splitting of par ty/political harlotry, kidnapping, etc. are the continues happenings in the state J= sheepishly implementation of polices that do not benefit the public but the funder thereby making the state/national legislature less representative and less responsive. The graphical representation of the above showed thus:

Source: Field survey 2012

For the solutions to the problems of private funding of political parties, the following were found:

76 i. Persons wishing to run for a political office should be selected first by his/her community, LGA, state and nation, (as the case may be), to ascertain his credibility, propriety, and financial disposition and management, ii. There should be encouragement of open free and fair political competition among the politicians in any polity at the same level ground, iii. All sources of funds and the intensions of the funders should be disclosed to determine its acceptability, iv. Strong regulations should guide political parties’ funding. Such regulations should be abided by the consciousness and political will of those subject to it, v. Law should be made for equal amount to be contributed by all the members of a political party to avoid some wealthy individuals hijacking the party, vi. Access to electronic and print media should be made free for all political parties by the state to avoid spending huge sums of money by political party’s rallies, vii. Law should be made to limit the amount to be expended by any political party in any election. Sanctions should be placed against defaulters, viii. Parties should be made to give account of their campaign expenses one week before general elections to quantify their qualification according to the electoral laws, ix. Electoral Act of 1999, section 93 (9) suggests that no individual will contribute more than one million Naira. This should be implemented to avoid corruption, x. Godfathers should not be allowed to make any financial contribution to their parties. 4.3 Discussion of Findings From the data presentation in 4.1 above, the researcher found various ways perceived by the respondents as answer to the issues raised in the objectives of the study as stated below:

1. Ascertain the rationale for private funding of political parties. 2. Determine the sources of funds to political parties. 3. Identify the level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs to ensure that private funders do not lose. 4. Verify the implications of private funding to national development. 5. Determine the solutions to private funding of political parties in Nigeria. In hypothesis 1: Improper understanding of the rationale for private funding and sources of political parties’ funds has led to chaos and corruption in electoral democracy. The objectives 1 and 2 with questionnaire numbers 6, 7 and 8 addressed the hypothesis 1 and

77 found that the majority (96%) of the respondents were aware of electoral democracy in Imo State and Nigeria in general. This is an indication that electoral democracy was known and practiced by those residents in Imo State. They are in support of citizen’s participation which is one of the principles and practice in electoral democracy.

The rationale for private funding was found: to enhance individual ability to join in the decision making, to reduce fraudulent practices by political office holders, to show that government alone cannot fund political parties, to avoids individuals holding claim that he/she single handedly sponsored a political office holder, hence, hijacking the state economy, and to ensure that no one can demand for a pay-back or a return on investment based on the amount contributed. Bhandari, (2010), argued that the rationale for private funding shows that democracy involves peoples’ participation, it must encompass diverse views from all sections of the society and that political parties need a wide support base to pursue their objectives successfully. It was further noted that some political parties in the country need to solicit for funding from their supporters, the business community, etc., as a way of funding themselves. This is to avoid being indebted to the extent that it may not be able to organise its election programmes. To avert this doom, the contestants for the primaries are called upon to contribute towards the organisation of the primaries besides the mandatory fees they have to pay as contestants, (Achanso 2010). He also stated that, Private funding could be a good approach to funding political parties in the country, in that it will reduce the burden of the state for having to do so. The consequences of that approach for national development, especially the “winner-takes-all” syndrome has characterised the country’s politics since independence.

The following were found to be sources of funds to political parties - sponsorship by influential individuals of the party, membership dues, contribution by godfathers of the party, government grants to political parties, loan from bank, parties running businesses and holdings, donation from foreign government and companies, levy from office holders/elected members of the party, donation from private sectors/NGOs/Civil Societies,

78 and fund raising dinners by members. While agreeing on the sources of funds so listed, Achanso, (2010), states that the contributions from party members and the Public Election Fund are evidently inadequate. Even if the rules for mobilization of funds from the private sector were to be liberalized, the base is too narrow to generate enough money. Something has to be done to assure a level of resources to enable political parties to function and contest general elections. Foresti and Wild (2010), agreed on the above findings but adds that, in some countries/parties, such as the post-communist parties of France and Italy or the Sinn Féin party and the Socialist Party (Ireland), elected representatives take only the average industrial wage from their salary as a representative, while the rest goes into party coffers. Although these examples may be rare nowadays, "rent-seeking" continues to be a feature of many political parties around the world. Wikipedia (2011) exposes that Money and gifts-in-kind to a party, or its leading members, may be offered as incentives. Such donations are the traditional source of funding for all right-of-centre cadre parties.

From the above analysis, the study was able to prove that the residents in Imo State were aware of the electoral democracy with 96% supporting the question. It was also proved that the rationale for private funding of political parties listed were true with other views from scholars. There were also supports to the views expressed by the respondents on the sources of funds to political parties. It was our belief that improper understanding of the rationale for private funding and sources of political parties’ funds has to chaos and corruption in electoral democracy, since the majority of the respondents gave the views expressed in this study.

Hypothesis 2:

A lot of electoral fraud/rigging occurs to prevent the failure of the party and to ensure that private funders do not lose. The research objective 3 with questionnaire number 9 addressed the above hypothesis two and found that the fraud and rigging that occurred in private funding of political parties includes: soliciting for the ‘co-operation’ of electoral officers both at the polling booths up

79 to the resident electoral commissioners for aiding and abating fraud and rigging, multiple registrations of candidates for elections, manipulating loopholes in the electoral laws to ensure their candidates emerges winner at primaries and general elections, stuffing of ballot boxes before its arrival at the polling booths, inducement of voters prior to voting day, intimidation of political opponents with thugs, police, army and personal guards, multiple printing of electoral materials by politicians, conscripting of electoral officers to second vent due process, and quagmire judicial proceeding for election petitions. Supporting the above findings from the accounts of unbiased observers, domestic and international in 2007 elections states:

It was clear that the elections were not properly carried out. The "do-or-die" premise interjected into the election campaign and carried over to the elections proper vitiated the entire atmosphere. In consequence, innocent citizens with no more interest than the legitimate casting of their votes had unwarrantable violence inflicted upon them. Many of them lost their lives. There was also, INEC's inept handling of the process showed in its failure to deliver electoral materials to polling stations, leading to the disenfranchisement of millions of Nigerians who were eager to cast their votes, (Enwonwu, Obiechina, Achebe, 2007).

There were other kinds of electoral fraud listed by Wikipedia (2009) such as electorate manipulation involving gerrymandering, manipulation of demography, disenfranchisement, intimidation, vote buying, misinformation, misleading or confusing ballot papers, ballot stuffing, misrecording and misreporting of votes, misuse of proxy votes, destruction or invalidation of ballots, tampering with electronic voting machines, vote fraud in legislature, prevention, mores, secret ballot, transparency, statistical indicators, prosecution voting and machine integrity. The political parties could do more to ensure victory at the poll, especially, when the funds generated were meant to be refunded to funders. Therefore, all kinds of electoral fraud and rigging occur when private funding was the means of generating funds for the political party. The inability to do so may lead to the failure of the party, which means that the source of repaying the funds would becomes hard.

Hypothesis 3 Electoral fraud and embezzlement of public resources to settle party funders do not contribute to national development. The research objective 4 with questionnaire number 10 addressed the above hypothesis three and found that there were sheepish implementation of polices by the elected officers that do not benefit the public but the funders, thereby making the state/national legislature less representative and less responsive, the funds allocated for development are fought for and disbursed on the basis of what was contributed by funders and self enrichment, the wealthy and influential persons buy and control the party’s machinery, the sponsored office holder’s assignment is to ensure the pay back to funders without regard to the oath of office, the resources that would have served useful purposes in the state are used in paying homage’s, settlement of party funders, godfathers and thugs, the use of army, police and thugs to ensure that the electoral process is submerged and rigged against credible candidates, personal decisions/initiatives of the office holders without the approval of the funders/godfathers attract their anger and can still development, and political disarray, ungovernable situation, killing, rancor, fighting, splitting of party/political harlotry, kidnapping, etc. are continues happenings in the state. Mutesa, (2002) observes that private funding undermines the development of a political culture necessary to sustain an open and democratic society. For instance, there is the assertion that private financiers of political parties do so in the hope of advancing their own business interests. Others involved in shady dealings such as drug barons and gun-runners fund political parties to make the government (if the party wins) turn a blind eye to their heinous activities, thereby results in mortgaging the country to criminal elements who are the real funders.

2010). A number of contracts abandoned in Imo State and some other states in Nigeria, resulted from this kind of political situation in award of contract. For instance, the construction of the faculty of engineering of the Imo State University at Okigwe, the Orlu/Anara/Etiti road, the privatization of some companies and economic projects, to mention but a few. We are convinced that corruption arising from private funding of political parties, according to IPU. Assembly, (2011), represents a serious threat to the rule of law, democracy, human rights, equity, social justice and the physical or infrastructural development as well as fiscal values and distribution in the economy. Where these are obtainable in a nation, development would be slow, there will be poor quality of education, poor health, poverty, youth restiveness, unemployment, child labour, late marriage for men, promiscuity among girls and ladies, thugs, kidnapping, robbery, and all kinds of vices are seen and they will enhanced poor development.

CHAPTER FIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.1 Summary In this study, we have been able to examine the implications of private funding of political parties to national development in Nigeria, 2001-2010. The scope of this study was limited to Imo State Nigeria. It maintained that private funding of political parties was the arrangements to finance a party or candidates who are aspiring for a political office at the local, state or national level to enable them foot the bills of running campaign and other election expenses. Financial support for political parties is aimed at promoting political competition, public scrutiny of policy, law-making and the exercise of executive powers. The study has the following five chapters: chapter one was the general introduction which contained the background to the study, statement of the problems, objectives of the study, significance of study, scope and limitation of study. Chapter two was literature review and the methodology. The literature was reviewed in the following order: the conceptual clarifications: private funding, political party and national development; the rationale for private funding of political parties, sources of private funding of political parties, the level of electoral fraud/rigging that occurs in private funding, the implications of private funding to Imo State and national development and the solutions to the problems of private funding of political parties. It contained also the hypothesis, operationalisation of key concepts, methodology and theoretical framework.

Chapter three was the background information of the case study, that is, the study area- Imo State - historical life and development were briefly presented. Chapter four was the data presentation, findings and discussion of findings. The study generated data from the field survey which was used in addressing the three hypothesis and the objectives of the study. The hypothesis are:

1. Improper understanding of the rationale for private funding and sources of political parties’ funds has led to chaos and corruption in electoral democracy. 2. A lot of electoral fraud/rigging occurs to prevent the failure of the party and to ensure that private funders do not lose. 3. Electoral fraud and embezzlement of public resources to settle party funders do not contribute to national development. The above were specified in the following objectives of the study: 1. What is the rationale for private funding of political parties? 2. What are the sources of funding to political parties? 3. What level of electoral fraud/rigging occurs to ensure that private funders do not lose? 4. What are the implications of private funding to national development? 5. What are the solutions to private funding of political parties in Nigeria? The objectives 1 and 2 with questionnaire numbers 6, 7 and 8 addressed the hypothesis 1 and found that the majority (96%) of the respondents were aware of electoral democracy in Imo State and Nigeria in general. The rationale for private funding were found: i. to enhance individual ability to join in the decision making, ii. to help reduce fraudulent practices by political office holders, iii. to show that government alone cannot fund political parties, iv. it avoids individuals holding claim that they single handedly sponsored a political office holder, hence, hijacking the state economy, and v. to ensure that no one can demand for a pay-back or a return on investment based on the amount contributed. The sources of funds to political parties were found as: i. sponsorship by influential individuals of the party, ii. membership dues, iii. contribution by godfathers of the party, iv. government grants to political parties, v. loan from bank, vi. parties running businesses and holdings, vii. donations from foreign government and companies, viii. levy from office holders/elected members of the party, ix. donation from private sectors/NGOs/Civil Societies, and x. fund raising dinners by members.

The research objective 3 with questionnaire number 9 addressed the hypothesis two and found that the fraud and rigging that occurred in private funding of political parties includes: i. soliciting for the ‘co-operation’ of electoral officers both at the polling booths up to the resident electoral commissioners for fraud/rigging, ii. multiple registrations of candidates for elections, iii. manipulating loopholes in the electoral laws to ensure their candidates emerges winner at primaries and general elections, iv. stuffing of ballot boxes before its arrival at the polling booths, v. inducement of voters prior to voting day, vi. intimidation of political opponents with thugs, police, army and personal guards, vii. multiple printing of electoral materials by politicians, viii. conscripting of electoral officers to second vent due process, and ix. quagmire judicial proceeding for election petitions.

The research objective 4 with questionnaire number 10 addressed the hypothesis three (3) and found that: i. there were sheepish implementation of polices that do not benefit the public but the funders, thereby making the state/national legislature less representative and less responsive, ii. the funds allocated for development are fought for and disbursed on the basis of what was contributed by funders and self enrichment, iii. the wealthy and influential persons buy and control the party’s machinery, iv. the sponsored office holder’s assignment was to ensure the pay back to funders without regard to the oath of office, v. the resources that would have served useful purposes in the state are used in paying homage’s, settlement of party funders, godfathers and thugs, vi. the use of army, police and thugs to ensure that the electoral process is submerged and rigged against credible candidates, vii. personal decisions/initiatives of the office holders without the approval of the funders/godfathers attract their anger and can still development, and viii. political disarray, ungovernable situation, killing, rancor, fighting, splitting of party/political harlotry, kidnapping, etc. are continuous happenings in the state.

To solve the problems of private funding of political parties in Imo State and Nigeria in general, the following were identified: i. Persons wishing to run for a political office should be selected first by his/her community, l.g.a, state and nation, that is, option ‘a’ four, (as the case may be), to

85 ascertain his/her credibility, propriety, and financial disposition and management, ii. There should be encouragement of open free and fair political competition among the politicians in any polity at the same level ground, iii. All sources of funds and the intensions of the funders should be disclosed to determine its acceptability, iv. Strong regulations should guide political parties’ funding. Such regulations should be abided by the consciousness and political will of those subject to it, v. Law should be made for equal amount to be contributed by all the members of a political party to avoid some wealthy individuals hijacking the party, vi. Access to electronic and print media should be made free for all political parties by the state to avoid spending huge sums of money by political party’s rallies, vii. Law should be made to limit the amount to be expended by any political party in any election. Sanctions should be placed against defaulters, viii. Parties should be made to give account of their campaign expenses one week before general elections to quantify their qualification according to the electoral laws, ix. Electoral Act of 1999, section 93 (9) suggests that no individual will contribute more than one million Naira. This should be implemented to avoid corruption, and x. Godfathers should not be allowed to make any financial contribution to their parties other than general contribution by members.

5.2 Recommendations Based on the finding of this research work, the following recommendations were made:

Mores There should an inculcation of patterns of behaviour and values in Nigeria electoral democracy. Mores is the pattern of conventional behavior in a society. It is an effective means for preventing electoral fraud and corruption in general. It work well in socities where the cultures have a strong tendency toward positive values, resulting in a low incidence of political corruption. An advantage of cultivating positive mores as a prevention strategy is that it is effective across all electoral systems and devices,

(Wikipedia, 2009 and Transparency International 2011).

Secret ballot The Nigerian government should encourage the secret ballot, in which only the voter knows how individuals have voted. What we have in Nigeria presently is open secret where the party agents are allowed to be around and most often keep watch on the voters. Transparency Most methods of preventing electoral fraud involve making the election process completely transparent to all voters. This should start from nomination of candidates through casting of the votes, tabulation and declaration of results. A key feature in insuring the integrity of any part of the electoral process is a strict chain of custody, ( Lundin, 2008). Publicity of results from polling booths To prevent fraud in central tabulation, there has to be a public list of the results from every single polling place. This is the only way for voters to prove that the results they witnessed in their election office are correctly incorporated into the totals. End-to-end auditable voting systems There should be legislation on the end-to-end auditable voting systems which provide voters with a receipt to allow them to verify whether their vote was cast correctly, and an audit mechanism to verify that the results were tabulated correctly and all votes were cast by valid voters. This will assure citizens that their votes count in the election. Use of election observers The government of Nigeria should as a matter of necessity, invite election observers to help prevent fraud and assure voters that the election is fair. There are local and international observers. Their participation in the election will guarantee an element of true and fair view in the eyes of voters.

Godfathers The electoral act in Nigeria should make provision that no godfather gets involved in the politicking of the state or prevent the godson from exercising his /her legitimate mandate through personal imposition of will.

Limit to contributions

The electoral law should provide and ensure that there is a limit to the amount of money being contributed by party members. This will help prevent the hijacking of party machinery and the control of the elected officer.

Encouragement of open free and fair political competition

There should be encouragement of open free and fair political competition among the politicians in the polity. This will ensure a smooth operation and reduce acrimony and rancor among politicians and political parties.

Disclosure

All sources of funds and the intensions of the funders should be disclosed to determine its acceptability. This will reduce the rate at which the incredible businessmen fund parties with the view to hold to ransom the affairs of the elected political officers through a financial cut on investment.

Punishment of fraudulent politicians

Law should be made to bring to book erring politicians who allowed funders or godfathers to deter their administration. Such elected officer should be banned from political context including their godfathers and funders.

These recommendations if put into practice, will go a long way solving the problems arising from private funding of political parties in Imo State and Nigeria in general.

5.3 Conclusion Funding of political parties was seen as one the major issues in all democracies around the world. The study stressed on this matter, considering the implications of the private funding to national development. However, it had been noted presently, that a candidate’s success in the poll was determined by the amount of money employed for a sustained election campaign and the prosecution of the ‘election businesses’. And due to the economic condition of many families and political parties, they do go out of their consciences in violation of the electoral law and in defiance to the rule of law. Funds are

88 sourced by the contestants and the parties through any means with prices tagged to each funder. Therefore, based on the findings of this research work, one can conveniently say that the option for seeking funds from the private sector is risky, because it often lead to misuse of power and resources by political parties. To make private funders to have interest in the funding, the funded/sponsored persons/political parties favour their benefactors given our small and well-knit society. Private funding was found to have eroded public confidence in democracy due to growing political scandals, corruption, kidnapping, killing, lack of restraint, and the use of thugs arising from the behavour of funders and godfathers who invest their resources in the party with the full purpose of gaining them back or controlling the party. To substantially ensure the funded emerged winner in the poll, there were manipulation of the loopholes in the electoral laws to ensure their candidates emerged winner at primaries and general elections, stuffing of ballot boxes before its arrival at the polling booths, inducement of voters prior to voting day, intimidation of political opponents with thugs, police, army and personal guards, multiple printing of electoral materials, conscripting of electoral officers to second vent due process, quagmire judicial proceeding for election petitions both before and after the elections. The study also noted that eventually, the money budgeted and allocated for development was used in paying back funders on the basis of what they contributed and for their self enrichment. These funders were known to be influential, wealthy and usually the strong members of the party. With these, they tended to control the party’s machinery, desired being paid homage, consulted in major decisions, placed on the payroll. Failure of the political office holder to observe and do these and more, leads to political disarray, ungovernable situation, killing, rancor, fighting, splitting of party/political harlotry, kidnapping, etc. happenings in the society. Where these problems abound, there are autocratic leadership, winner takes it all and stifled development, while more wealthy and influential persons emerging and the poverty rate increases with its attendants drop-out in schools, hunger, poor rood network, lack of portable drinking water, lack of electricity, unemployment, etc.

On this note, the study suggests that all sources of funds and the intensions of the funders should be disclosed, strong regulations should guide political parties’ funding. Such regulations should be abided by the consciousness and political will of those subject to it, law should be made for equal amount to be contributed by all the members of a political party to avoid some wealthy individuals hijacking the party, access to electronic and print media should be made free for all political parties by the state to avoid spending huge sums of money in rallies. These and many others would enhance the realization of private funding of political parties’ rationale and ensures that the democratic dividends are felt in Nigeria and Imo State in particular.

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Appendices Table 1: Twenty-Seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Imo State 39

Table 2: Sample Size of the Study 40

Table 3: Twenty-Seven Local Government Areas (LGAs) of Imo State. 45 Table 4: Respondents Sex 50

Table 5: Respondents Marital Status 50

Table 6: Respondents Occupation 51

Table 7: Respondents Highest Academic Qualification 51

Table 8: Respondents Length of Residence in Imo State 51

Table 9: Respondents Knowledge of Electoral Democracy in Imo State 53

Table 10: Rationale for the Private Funding of Political Parties 53

Table 11: The Sources of Fund to Political Parties 54

Table 12: Fraud and Rigging that Occur in Private Funding of Political Parties 54

Table 13: The Implications of Private Funding to the Development of Imo State and the nation at large 55

Table 14: The Solutions to the Problems of Private Funding of Political Parties 58